# HEATHEN IMPERIALISM



Julius Evola

THOMPKINS & CARIOU



Western civilisation needs a complete overhaul or it will fall apart one day or another,

It has realised the most complete perversion of any rational order of things.

Reign of matter, of gold, of machine, of number, it no longer possesses breath, or liberty, or light.

The West has lost the sense of command and obedience.

It has lost the sense of Action and of Contemplation.

It has lost the sense of hierarchy, of spiritual power, of mangods.

Are liberation and renewal still possible in this crepuscular world?

Is Europe capable today of the level of
awareness necessary for such a task?

Let us not be mistaken: it is only after having understood
the magnitude of the task that we will be able to act.

The threatening reality of a destructive spiritual process,
whose roots originate almost in the ground of prehistory,
whose culminating phases coincide with those which
contemporary men exalt as their essential civilisational values,

and whose influences now manifest themselves in all fields of thought and action, must be acknowledged.

This is not a matter of compromises or adaptations,

The power of a new Middle Ages is needed

— a revolt, interior as well as exterior, of a barbaric purity.

Philosophy, 'culture', everyday politics: nothing of all this.

It is not a matter of turning on the other side of this bed of agony, It is a matter of finally waking up, and getting up.



# HEATHEN IMPERIALISM



## Julius Evola

Translated by Rowan Berkeley

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## JULIUS EVOLA'S DISCUSSION OF IMPERIALISMO PAGANO

"Fascism took shape in the turmoil of the immediate post-war vears. There was the March on Rome and Mussolini came to power. Obviously, I could not but sympathise with all those who fought left-wing forces and the democratic regime. It was however necessary to discover the real purpose for which this struggle had been undertaken. When I spoke of my early vouth. I mentioned how nationalist infatuation put me off. Also, the so-called 'military nobility' – the artillery and the cavalry - had formed certain impressions during the war regarding the assault platoons, often made of rather dubious elements, which re-appeared in the 'black shirts'. In my opinion the really necessary revolution would have been a 'revolution from above', led by the Sovereign, who should have not allowed Mussolini to present himself to him as the representative of the 'Italy of Vittorio Veneto'1, but should have claimed this dignity for himself, and accordingly acted resolutely to restore the state, and to put down the subversion which was sweeping through it.

Leaving aside the socialist and proletarian origin of Mussolini, the republican and 'laicist' (i.e., secularist) tendencies of Fascism before the March are well-known. Its fusion with nationalism rectified these tendencies, but, at the same time, it reduced the revolutionary *vis* of Fascism by strikingly embourgeoisifying it, as Italian nationalism was really no more than an expression of the middle-class and of its dull, catholicising, conformist traditionalism. A strong Right, on an aristocratic, monarchical, and military basis, such as the one which had asserted itself in central Europe, was non-existent in Italy. However, Mussolini had avoided any worse outcome than this, and, when, later, he strove to assert the ideal of the Roman state,

when he thought he could oppose the forces which had come to prevail in Europe as a result of the upheaval of the war, and give shape to a new, disciplined, virile, combative type of Italian, it seemed that the critical point was overcome.

*Imperialismo pagano* originated in my relationship with Giuseppe Bottai. He and I were of the same age, he had been an artillery officer in my regiment, and he had taken part in the Futurist movement, which, as is well-known, proclaimed its allegiance to Fascism in the immediate post-war years. He was eager to be one of the 'intellectuals' of the movement, and edited the review Critica Fascista, which allowed him to demonstrate considerable freedom of opinion. My conversations with Bottai led me to propose 'stirring up the waters' by launching a revolutionary program which would express the Fascist vision of life so uncompromisingly that it would be able to tackle the problem of the compatibility between Fascism and Christianity. Bottai found this idea exciting, so I wrote articles along those lines for his review. But, as soon as the ultimate objective of the manoeuvre became apparent, and the idea was expressed that a 'heathen imperialism' was the only orientation conceivable for a consistent and courageous Fascism, a scandal broke out. Owing to the unofficial character of Bottai's review, the organ of the Vatican, the Osservatore Romano, bluntly demanded explanations concerning the extent to which such ideas were to be tolerated in Fascism. A true avalanche of attacks from the entire chain of newspapers served by the relevant agency followed, and the scandal was even echoed from abroad. There was a reason for these disproportionate reactions: the Concordat had not been signed yet, and it was feared that someone behind the scenes wanted to spoil the game. After matters took this turn, Bottai showed me the same fidelitv which later, when Fascism was in crisis, he showed Mussolini: he let me down; he did not even give me the opportunity to reply to the most absurd accusations of the Guelf press, but washed his hands of the whole matter, by stating that these articles, "while reflecting Fascist suffering"(?), were the sole responsibility of their author.

I pursued the subject under my own steam. In a book — specifically, *Imperialismo pagano*, published in 1928 — I reasserted and developed the theses of these articles, while replying to my adversaries. The book, now unavailable, was subtitled *Il fascismo dinanzi al pericolo euro-cristiano* — *con una appendice polemica sulle reazioni di parte guelfa*<sup>2</sup>. Its introduction mentioned 'anti-Europa'³ and formed a rough prelude to what I was to call later the "revolt against the modern world". It began as follows:

"Western civilisation needs a complete overhaul or it will fall apart one day or another. It has realised the most complete perversion of any rational order of things. Reign of matter, of gold, of machine, of number, it no longer possesses breath, or liberty, or light. The West has lost the sense of command and obedience. It has lost the sense of Action and of Contemplation. It has lost the sense of hierarchy, of spiritual power, of man-gods. It no longer knows nature . . . Nature has decayed to an opaque and fatal exteriority, the mystery of which profane sciences seek to ignore by means of their little laws and their little hypotheses. The West no longer knows Wisdom . . . the superb reality of those in whom the idea has become blood, life and power . . . The West no longer knows the state: the statevalue, the Imperium, as synthesis of spirituality and royalty . . . What war is, pursued as a value in its own right . . . as that sacred path to spiritual fulfilment . . . that is what these formidable European 'activists' no longer know, who no longer know warriors but only soldiers . . . Europe has lost its simplicity, has lost its centrality, has lost its life. The democratic evil corrodes it throughout, from its roots to its flowers such as law, sciences, and speculative thought. Leaders - beings who distinguish themselves, not by violence, by their gold, the ability of exploiters of slaves, but, on the contrary, by their irreducible qualities of life, there are none. Europe is a big insignificant body . . . a great body tossing and turning, driven by obscure and unpredictable forces, which crush implacably anyone who tries to oppose it or merely avoid its shackles. All this Western 'civilisation' has been able to do. This is the vaunted result of

the superstition of 'Progress' — beyond Roman imperiality, beyond bright Hellas4, beyond the ancient East, beyond the great Ocean. And the noose tightens everyday around those who are still capable of the great loathing and the great rebellion." After discussing other considerations. I asked: "Can Fascism be the principle of an anti-European restoration? Is Europe capable today of the level of awareness necessary for such a task?" I acknowledged that "Fascism arose from below, from confused demands and from raw forces unleashed by the European war", and that it "has fed on compromises, has fed on petty ambitions and on petty people. The state organism which it has built is often uncertain, clumsy, violent, not free, not devoid of misunderstandings" (Let us note that, in the supposedly loathsome atmosphere of Fascist dictatorial 'oppression', such things could be said and published). But I also stated that, looking around, I could see nothing to act "as basis and as hope". Could Fascism assume this task?

In the book that followed, I must acknowledge the impulse of radical thought, making use of a violent style, combined with a youthful lack of moderation and political sense, and with a utopian unawareness of the real situation. In the various chapters, however, I described the conditions which would be reguired in order for Fascism to be a true and necessary revolution, not merely in the socio-political field, but, first and foremost, in the field of the general vision of life, of the world and of the divine itself. Thus, I not only attacked democracy and egalitarianism — though other tendencies within Fascism which I saw as negative, such as mere nationalism, Mazzinianism, and neo-Hegelianism, were not spared — but also I mentioned the values to be opposed to economism, scientism, modern technicism, and Faustian activism. Castes were spoken of, and reference — rather inopportune and counter-productive reference, given the cultural horizons of the circles I intended to address — was even made to sapiental or Eastern ideas.

The most scathing aspect of the book was its attack on the religious problem, and the obviously convincing character of my thesis elicited many alarmed reactions. I asked to what ex-

tent the essential values of Fascist 'ethics' were compatible with Christian ones, and whether it was not mere stale rhetoric to recall Rome and its symbols without reviving also its inseparable counterpart, the spirituality of heathenism, irreducible to Christianity. I rejected in the clearest manner the identification dear to the Guelfs between the Roman tradition and the Catholic one, and denounced it, as, in this respect, a usurpation (Catholic 'Romanity'). And I returned to the theses of my scandalous articles of *Critica Fascista*: "The premise is that, in its purest form, Fascism identifies itself with the will to empire; that its recalling of the Eagle and of the Fasces must be more than mere rhetoric; that this is the condition for it to represent something new: not a pretend revolution, but an heroic resurrection." Once these premises were indicated, I stated: "If Fascism is the will to empire, then it is only by returning to the heathen tradition that it will really be true to itself and will be able to provide the fire in the soul which is lacking right now, and that no Christian belief will be able to give it."

In the face of the ultimate dilemma, I championed 'Ghibellinism': "Fascism is faced with this dilemma: either to stop at the empire as a mere material organisation — and then it can leave room for the Church, it can tolerate it, confirming its prerogative over those things of spirit which remain extraneous to this empire, which, in this respect, will thus remain subordinate to it. Alternatively, in order to realise the true idea of the empire, which, in primis et ante omnia, is an immanent spiritual reality, the Church must be removed from power and subordinated to the state, within the limits of the broad toleration which a state can concede conditionally to international associations, such as the Church is." This was the political aspect. The other aspect was the intrinsic and ineradicable antithesis with respect to values and visions of the world. Obviously, the centre of my concern, though passing through the stage of Ghibellinism and Romanity, was already shifting towards what I was to call later and generally the Traditional' state, combining at its apex both political power (the imperium) and actual spiritual authority.

Its lack of these larger points of reference, and its stress on anti-Christian controversy, represent essential limitations to that pugnacious book of mine: limitations already apparent in its title, since, in reality, there was no reason to speak of 'imperialism' — this modern term, designating a negative tendency, being almost always connected with exaggerated nationalism

— and since 'pagan' is a rather derogatory word, used specifically by Christians to designate something to be excluded and opposed. Instead, I should have introduced, via historical references, the idea of 'Roman traditionality'. Just as ambiguous was the reference to a poorly defined 'Mediterranean tradition'

— an idea which, in fact, I abandoned, or rectified, quite quickly thereafter.

The practical and political challenge represented by *Imperialismo pagano* was as ignored as if it had not been published at all. Certainly, Mussolini did not read the book: someone must have given him a short and tendentious idea of it. The Fascist leadership preferred to pass it over in silence, and thus, in a regime with a controlled press, the few reviews or reactions appeared only in second-rate papers and periodicals. Since the book sold, more or less, the immediate adherence of certain independent Fascist circles could however have been expected: but this was the case only to a rather small extent. Reghini himself remained very reserved, and viewed with disfavour my resumption and development of some of his ideas, even though, tacitly, we actually agreed on these matters.

However, abroad, especially in Germany, reactions were different. German readers assumed that the book was the product, not of some sort of captain without troops, but rather of an important current of Fascism, of which I was the leader, a current similar to some of those which, in Germany, increasingly tended to put the 'struggle over world-view' at the centre of the political fight, and which found there a more favourable soil than in Italy. Thus, I soon came to have the reputation of being a representative of 'Ghibelline Fascism'. This reputation was consolidated when, in 1933, *Imperialismo pagano* was published in German translation (by Armanen-

Verlag of Leipzig), but with a notably expanded, revised and even modified text, in which many fundamental ideas were rephrased in such a way that they also applied to Germany (the translator stated that "it brought to light theses of general value, which, therefore, can act as creative forces even within German culture"): Ghibellinism was emphasised, coupled with a more concrete reference to Swabian tradition, and the problem of the relationship between the two civilisations. Roman and Germanic was tackled. (Ghibellinism, the true Nietzsche, and the hierarchical idea were the three main points mentioned by the publisher of the German book as providing the best starting-points for constructive discussion). The symbolic meaning of the phrase, 'anti-European revolt' was broadened: I proposed as the basic myth for restoration, that of the 'Two Eagles', the Nordic and the Roman, and, more concretely, I proposed a return to what had already been expressed by the Triple Alliance. This could seem to foreshadow the idea of the Axis. But even leaving aside the fact that the German translation of my book was published before National-Socialism and Hitler came to power, to imagine that I really led or represented a 'current' would be simplistic and inaccurate, given the great diversity of planes. (...) There is no reason to discuss in detail the parts of Imperialismo pagano which were added or modified in the German edition, since, in many respects, these are foreshadowings and variant expressions of the ideas of one of my main works, which I started to write only in 1930, and which was published only in 1934, that is, Revolt against the Modern World. (...)" (Il cammino del cinabro, Vanni Scheiwiller, Milan, 1972, p.76-82).

Vittorio Veneto is the small Italian town in which the Italians won a decisive battle against the Austrians on the 28th of October, 1918, thus putting an end to the first world war on the Italo-Austrian front.

 $<sup>^2\,\,</sup>$  'Fascism faced with the Euro-Christian peril — with a controversial appendix on the Guelf reactions'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Antieuropa was a paper published by Asvero Gravelli, who was a Fascist of 'the first hour' and, later, one of the most significant figures of the sec-

#### JULIUS EVOLA'S DISCUSSION OF IMPERIALISMO PAGANO

ond Fascist wave, as a member of the national department of the PNF (Fascist National Party) and the Grand Council: during the 1930's, he embodied the ideal of Fascist internationalism, and of a dynamic, permanent revolution against the 'old' democratic Europe, which would define the outlines of a new, Fascist Europe. Antieuropa was the main forum for advocates of Fascist internationalism, and the title of this paper became the name of their movement. Gravelli claimed, in the manifesto of Antieuropa (1929, vol. 1, pp.1-13) that "Fascism was the sole unifying and saying idea for Europe", and "mentioned Italy as the only possible leader-nation of a possible process of unification as heir to the Roman imperial tradition" (S. Soave, Idea d'Europa, in Dizionario del fascismo, Einaud, Turin, 2002 vol. I p. 495). He explained the paradoxical title in a later statement (1930, no. 5): "Fascism is anti-European, because the present Europe, in the throes of a spiritual and material crisis, is still at least partially under the influence of the 'immortal principles' (of the French Revolution — ed.), while vast sections of society look to Moscow, Given this Europe, Fascism is anti-Europe. The anti-Europeanism of Fascism is not an end in itself, but a provisional historical position, which will last until Fascism has enabled Europe to regain its ideal and spiritual equilibrium, the starting point of a new European role in the world, (...) Fascism transcends democracy and liberalism; its regenerative action is based on the granite foundations of the following ideas: hierarchy; the participation of the whole population in the life of the state; social justice in the equitable distribution of rights and duties; the infusion of public life whh moral principles; the affirmation of religious values; the prestige of the family; and the ethical interpretation of the ideas of order, authority and liberty. In the light of these transcendent principles, Europe will be able to enter a new phase of History." It may be interesting to note that the October 1933- March 1934 issue of Antieuropa was entirely devoted to articles intended to undermine the principles of National-Socialist anti-Semitism. In II cammino del cinabro (p. 101), Evola called A. Gravelli a "true blackmailer"; "The attack we launched against [him and other squadrists] was specifically the result of certain distortions of our ideas, for which they were responsible, with the aggravating circumstance of the Fascist approbation irresponsibly accorded to them."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> "beyond bright Hellas" is actually not part of this list, in *Imperialismo pagano*, where Evola says: "beyond Roman imperiality, beyond the ancient East, beyond the great Ocean".

#### PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD

There are so many additions and changes in Heidnischer Imperialismus that it cannot actually be regarded as a mere revised and updated edition of *Imperialismo pagano*. The first four chapters have the same title in the Italian edition and in the German edition, but their content is noticeably different; Imperialismo pagano and Heidnischer *Imperialismus* are really two different books. To publish a critical edition of Heathen *Imperialism* — that is, a translation of *Imperialismo pagano*. footnoted with the variants contained in Heidnischer Imperialismus - was unthinkable, due to the layout issues and the related reading inconvenience this venture would cause. For the reasons put forward in *II cammino del cinabro*, even though it appears that the criticism launched by J. Evola against the content of Imperialismo pagano must be qualified by the remarks made by G. Di Turris in the foreword to its latest Italian edition, we have chosen without hesitation to make Heidnischer Imperialismus, which, as far as its form is concerned, is far more accomplished, our third publication by Evola in English translation.

Three footnotes were written by Julius Evola, and are inserted into the body of the text. Thirty-five further footnotes, written by us, refer to themes and motifs which are found only in in Heidnischer Imperialismus, but taken are again, developed, or discussed in greater depth in his later works, from Revolt against the Modern World to Ride the Tiger or explain references to political and historical events, Italian and foreign cultural personalities, or to various sations, which have been admittedly completely forgotten eighty vears after the publication of the book. So as not to distract readers from a text whose density requires at each instant their full attention, these thirty-five notes can be found on evola\_as he is.

#### PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD

Reghini's *Imperialismo pagano* has already been published on this e-group dedicated to the work of J. Evola. Other documents related to *Heathen Imperialism*, whether critical studies or essays meant to contextualis it, will follow.

# PREFACE OF THE GERMAN PUBLISHER (1933) HEATHEN IMPERIALISM IN GERMANY?

The affirmation of National-Socialism has not completed the struggle for a new vision of history, it has exacerbated it further. In particular, a task of our times will be to create a philosophy of history in which the question of race will be regarded as of significant importance. In relation to this task, this book possesses particular value, since, here, a recognised leader of Fascist Italy takes a stand on the question of race, on cultural politics and on the philosophy of history, and, for the first time, a heathen, Roman, spirit, appears in our times offering at least an attempt at historico-philosophical interpretation. It must be emphasised that, in this work, the problems which concern our own people and state life are looked at from the Roman point of view. It is therefore quite possible, and even inevitable, that the German reader, given his Nordic-volkisch tendencies, will reach in some respects different conclusions on questions of historico-cultural and spiritual facts from those of the author. This applies particularly to his views of Protestantism. Three concepts of this book are addressed specifically to the German reader, and may prompt him to take issue with the speculative structure of Evola. These are; Ghibelline thought, the philosophy of Nietzsche, and the hierarchical conception.

The concept of Ghibellinism as a political movement guides our historians in their representation of the mediaeval Swabian dynasty. Nietzsche's figure throws its shadow in the most intense manner on the philosophy of contemporary culture. The word hierarchy' has re-appeared lately many times in the speeches of such guides to mankind as the Führer himself, Adolf Hitler, in the form of the demand for a new hierarchy of leaders. These terms appear here, in the context of a philo-

#### HEATHEN IMPERIALISM IN GERMANY?

sophically and culturally militant work, and, therefore, of a representation aimed at providing a convincing account of the political and politico-cultural configuration for the future, for the new European order, and for the German-Austrian-Italian problem. One cannot avoid wondering whether such an ideal construction as that proposed in this book can ever acquire existence in reality. Its value lies however in its emphasising directives, in its offering, with the concept of 'heathen imperialism', a philosophy, not only of being, but also of the must-be.

Many will be scandalised by the concept of heathenism. However, some time ago, a well-known evangelical theologian argued that, precisely in our times, a heathenism in the true sense of the word, a positive heathenism, would reappear, and that we would have to take it seriously. This book by Evola proves that there is such a heathenism, and that it does not feed only on the negation of all values, as is often thoughtlessly said. Because of this fact, the book will be able to contribute to the clarification of various aspects of our own debates, and it will, in any case, make people more fully aware of the scale of the spiritual conflict in which Germany is now engaged, whether they then arrive at views favourable, or unfavourable, to the position presented here.

### I



# We, Anti-Europeans

#### European Decadence

rational order of things.

Reign of matter, of gold, of machine, of number, it no longer possesses breath, or liberty, or light.

The West has lost the sense of command and obedience.

It has lost the sense of Action and of Contemplation.

It has lost the sense of hierarchy, of spiritual power, of mangods.

It no longer knows nature. It is no longer, for Western man, a living body made of symbols, of gods and ritual gestures — a splendid cosmos, in which man moves freely, like a microcosm within the macrocosm: it has on the contrary decayed to an opaque and fatal exteriority, the mystery of which profane sciences seek to ignore by means of their little laws and their little hypotheses.

The West no longer knows Wisdom: it no longer knows the majestic silence of those who have mastered themselves, the bright calm of the seers, the superb solar reality of those in whom the idea has become blood, life and power. Wisdom has been supplanted by the rhetoric of 'philosophy' and 'culture', the reign of teachers, of journalists, of sportsmen; of plans, of programs and of proclamations. It has succumbed to sentimental, religious, humanitarian contamination, and the race of men of fine words who run around madly exalting 'Becoming' and 'experience', because silence and contemplation frighten them.

The West no longer knows the state: the state-value, the *Imperium*, as synthesis of spirituality and royalty, as a way to the

'supraworld', as known by the great ancient civilisations from China to Egypt, from Persia to Rome and to the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, has been overwhelmed by the bourgeois misery of a trust of slaves and traffickers.

What war is, pursued as a value in its own right, irrespective of its outcome in victory or defeat, as that sacred path to spiritual fulfilment — hence the celestial sojourn of Odin, the Valhalla, is the privilege of the heroes fallen on the battlefield; in Islam, 'sacred war', *jihad*, is synonymous with 'divine way'; in Aryan India, the warrior is side by side with ascetics and, in the classic antiquity, *mors triumphalis* is conceived of as victory over death — what such a war is, that is what these formidable European 'activists' no longer know, who no longer know warriors but only soldiers, and whom as qua-bble was enough to terrorise and force back to the rhetoric of humanism, of pacifism and sentimentalism.

Europe has lost its simplicity, has lost its centrality, has lost its life. The democratic evil and the Semitic poison corrode it throughout, from its roots to its flowers such as law, sciences, and speculative thought. Leaders — beings who distinguish themselves, not by violence, by the thirst for lucre, the ability of exploiters of slaves, but, on the contrary, by unwavering and transcendent qualities of life, there are none. Europe is a big insignificant body, possessed and shattered by an anxiety which no one dares to express, whose blood is gold, whose flesh is machines, factories and arms, whose brain is a newspaper page — a shapeless body which tosses restlessly, driven by obscure and unpredictable forces, which crushes implacably anyone who tries to oppose it or merely to avoid its shackles.

All this the praised Western 'civilisation' has been able to do. This is the vaunted result of the superstition of 'Progress' — beyond Roman imperiality, the Dorian Hellas and all the other exemplary forms of the great Aryan primordial civilisations.

And the noose tightens everyday around those who are still capable of the great loathing and the great rebellion.

#### The New Symbol

Are liberation and renewal still possible in this crepuscular world?

Is Europe capable today of the level of awareness necessary for such a task?

Let us not be mistaken: it is only after having understood the magnitude of the task that we will be able to act. The threatening reality of a destructive spiritual process, whose roots originate almost in the ground of prehistory, whose culminating phases coincide with those which contemporary men exalt as their essential civilisational values, and whose influences now manifest themselves in all fields of thought and action, must be acknowledged.

This is not a matter of compromises or adaptations. The power of a new Middle Ages is needed — a revolt, interior as well as exterior, of a barbaric purity. Philosophy, 'culture', everyday politics: nothing of all this. It is not a matter of turning on the other side of this bed of agony. It is a matter of finally waking up, and getting up.

There are still, here and there, men in whom live memories of an ancient nobility, who as individuals are ill-at-ease and feel the need to react, sometimes in this cultural domain, sometimes in that, Before it is too late, what must be recalled to the consciousness of these scattered men is the heights, beyond all the limits and private interests which currently exhaust their strength. Implacable action must ensure that their purest strength emerges, indomitable, ready to shatter the filthy encrustation of rhetoric, sentimentalism, moralism, and hypocritical religiosity with which the West has covered and humanised everything.

The one who enters the temple, however much of a barbarian he may be, has the unquestionable duty to drive out as corrupters all those who in 'civilised' Europe have succeeded in monopolising 'Spirit', Good and Evil, Science, and the Divine, and have exploited their monopoly by declaring themselves to be their propagators, while, in truth, they only know

matter and what words, fear, and superstition have layered over matter.

To all this must be said: "Enough!", so that some men at least can recover the long roads, the long danger, the long gaze, and the long silence; so that the wind of the open sea can blow again — the wind of the Nordic primordial tradition to reawaken the sleepers of the West.

Anti-philosophy, anti-humanitarianism, anti-literature, anti-'religion', this is the premise. Enough! That is what must be said to aestheticisms and idealisms; enough! To the thirst of the soul which creates for itself a Semitic God to be adored and implored; enough of the need which binds beggarly men in mutual dependence in the name of the consistency which each of them lacks.

We must pass beyond and above all this, with pure forces, which, then, will have to meet a task which transcends 'politics', which transcends the social prejudice, and which must ignore the clamorous gesture and the superficial resonancy, the materialistic force which vibrates on things and people and no longer serves a goal.

In silence, through a hard discipline, a self-possession and a self-overcoming, we must create with a tenacious and eager effort of individuals an elite, in which the 'solar' Wisdom lives again: this *virtus* which is inexpressible, which rises from the depths of the senses and of the soul and which does not express itself by arguments and books but by creative acts.

We must reawaken to a renewed, spiritualised and austere sensation of the world, not as a philosophic concept, but as something which vibrates in our blood itself: to the sensation of the world as power, to the sensation of the world as rhythm, to the sensation of the world as a sacrificial act. This sensation will create strong, hard, active, solar, beings, beings made up of force and force alone, open to this sense of freedom and greatness, to this cosmic breathing of which the 'dead' have stammered much but perceived little.

Against profane, democratic and material science, always relative and conditioned, slave to incomprehensible phenom-

ena and laws, deaf to the most profound reality of man, we must reawaken — in this élite — the sacred, inner, secret and creative science, the science of self-fulfilment and 'self-dignification', the science which leads to the occult forces which govern our organism and joins together with the invisible roots of race and things themselves, and which creates domination over these forces; so that, not as a myth, but as the most positive of realities, men are born again, as beings who no longer belong to 'life', but, now, to the 'more-than-life', and are capable of transcendent actions.

Then there will be leaders, a race of leaders. Invisible leaders who do not speak and do not show themselves, but whose action does not experience resistance and who can do everything. Then, a centre will exist in the West — in the West without centre. It is a total mistake to think that we can achieve renewal if a hierarchy is not re-established, that is to say, if we do not place a higher law, a superior order, which can find confirmation only in the living reality of the leaders, above inferior forms, linked to earth and matter, to man and human.

It is also an absolute mistake to believe that the state can be anything other than a *civitas diaboli* if it does not resurrect itself as *Imperium*, and it is also a mistake to want to build the *Imperium* on the basis of economic, military, industrial or even 'intellectual' or nationalist factors. The *Imperium*, according to the primordial conception rooted in Tradition, is something transcendent, and it can only be attained by those who have the power to transcend the lives of petty men and their appetites, their sentimentalisms, their national prides, their 'values', their 'non-values', and their Gods.

This the ancients understood, when, at the peak of their hierarchy, they venerated beings in whom the royal nature combined with the sacral, in whom temporal power was permeated with the spiritual authority of natures 'no longer human', bearers of a secret and invincible force of 'victory' and of 'fortune'; when a sort of 'sacred war' lived in any war, something universal, something overwhelming, which addressed and organised everything with the purity and inevitability of the great forces of nature.

Will those who still can or still want to put up a resistance understand this? Will they understand that there is no other alternative? That there is no other spirit which, be it in other forms and in other figures, must be re-awakened? That this is the only condition through which their 'revolution' can be anything more than a trivial contingent event in a single nation, can become a universal concept, a first ray of light in the thick fog of the 'dark age' — of the Western *kali-yuga*, and the principle of the true restoration, of the only possible recovery?

#### The Primordial Nordic-Solar Tradition

We have indicated a primordial Nordic tradition. It is not a myth, it is our truth. Already in the most remote pre-history, there where positivist superstition told us until yesterday of ape-like cave-dwellers, a primordial, unitary, and strong civilisation existed, of which an echo still resounds in all the great and eternal symbols that the past has to offer to us.

The Iranians speak of *Airyanem-Vaêjô*, located in the most extreme North, and see in it the first creation of the 'god of the light', the origin of their stock and also the seat of 'brightness' — *hvarenô* — that mystical force peculiar to the Aryan race, and above all to their divine kings; they see in it — symbolically — the 'place' where the warlike religion of Zarathustra was revealed for the first time.

Similarly, the tradition of the Indo-Aryans knows the *Shveta-dvîpa*, the 'Island of Brightness', located also in the far North, where Narâyâna, the one who 'is the light' and 'who is above the waters', that is to say above the fortuitous play of events, has his seat. It speaks also of the *Uttarakura*, a Nordic primordial race; by Nordic, what is meant is, of the solar path of the gods —  $deva-y\hat{a}na$ .

The concept of all that is sublime, high and superior re-appears in the term uttara — the concept of what, in the metaphorical sense, can be called  $\hat{a}rya$ , Aryan — according to the Nordic conception.

Again, the Achean-Dorian stocks are heirs of the legendary Nordic Hyperboreans: it is from here that the most characteristic god and hero of this race, the solar Apollo, the annihilator of the serpent Python, comes; from here that Hercules — the ally of the Olympic gods against the giants, the annihilator of the Amazons and of the elementary beings, the 'fine winner', of whom later many Greek and Roman kings considered themselves, so to speak, as the *avatâra* — carried the olive tree with whose branches, according to Pindar, the victors were crowned

In Hellas, this Nordic theme combines also with that of Thule, the mysterious Nordic land, which sometimes becomes the Island of the Heroes' and the 'Country of the Immortals', where the blond Radamante reigns, the 'Island of the Sun' — Thule ultima a sole nomens habens — whose memory remained so alive that, convinced he had recognised it in Brittany, Constantins Chlorus marched there with his legions, not so much for military glory as to reach that "which is the nearest to the sky and more sacred than every other region", with the hope of anticipating in this way his apotheosis as Caesar.

Often, in the Nordic-Germanic traditions, Asgard, the seat of the Asen and of the transformed heroes, is regarded as another divine residence of the same kind; and the Nordic kings, who were considered as semi-gods and Asen — *semideos id est ansis* — and brought their peoples victory with their mystical power of 'fortune', transferred to that 'divine' land the origin of their dynasty.

According to the Gaelic traditions, Avalon, from which originated the pure divine race of the *Tuatha dé Danann*, the heroic conquerors of prehistoric Ireland, among whom the hero Ogma corresponds precisely to the Dorian Hercules, is Nordic or Nordic-Western — Avalon, which, on the other hand, merges into *Tir na mBeo*, the 'Land of the Living', the kingdom of Boadag, the 'Victorious'.

The Aztecs too have their land of origin in the North — in Aztlan, which is indeed called 'White Land' or 'Land of the Light', which they left under the leadership of a god-warrior, Huitzilopochtli: indeed, even the Toltecs claim, as seat of ori-

gin, Tlalocan, Tollan or Tula, which, as the Greek Thule, is again the 'Land of the Sun' and melts into the 'paradise' of the kings and the heroes fallen on the battlefield.

These are only some of the unanimous references which can be found in the most varied traditions as memories of a Nordic primordial civilisation and fatherland in which, in the most intimate manner, a transcendent extra-human spirituality unites with the heroic, royal and triumphal element, reaching towards form victorious over chaos, towards super-humanity victorious over all which is human and telluric, towards 'solarity' as principal symbol of a transcendent virility, as ideal of a dignity which, in the order of spiritual forces, corresponds to the sovereign, the hero, the ruler, on the material plane.

And, while the tradition can be traced back along a road from the North to the South, from the West to the East, which the races which preserve this spirit have travelled, the larger formations of Aryan peoples, in more recent times, testify, by the purer nature of their values and cults, their most characteristic deities and institutions, to precisely this force and this civilisation, as well as to the struggle against inferior southern races, which are bound to the land and to the spirits of the land, to the 'demonic' and irrational part of their being, to the promiscuous, the collective, the totemic, the chaotic, or the 'titanic'.

These references show, in addition, how what was history became super-history: while the 'Land of the Living', the 'Fortress of the Heroes', the 'Island of the Sun', contained on one hand the secret of the origin, they revealed on the other the secret of the road towards rebirth, towards immortality, and towards super-human power: the road which leads eminently to traditional royal dignity.

The historical factors thus became spiritual factors, the real tradition became Tradition in the transcendent sense, and therefore something which stands above time yet is constantly present. Symbols, signs and sagas refer us in subterranean ways to a unique Tradition, showing us a single 'orthodoxy' whose corresponding peaks were always reached, whose 'solar' spirituality always towered over the inferior forces<sup>2</sup>.

Thus, in later times already bound to the destiny of the darkening of the 'divine' — ragnarok — the racial potential exhausted both in its populace and in its leaders, the 'Nordic' element, detaching itself from the 'spiritual' realm to which it originally belonged, became a category, a general type of civilisation and of behaviour toward the super-human, which can be found even where no memory exists of an ethnic correlation in the strict sense; a general type which can become a focus for new civilisations when these respond to its spiritual formative force, in the same manner as, within that primordial tradition, it influenced the lower elements and the multiplicity of matter.

This is why heathen Romanity must be considered as the last great creative expression of the Nordic spirit, the last universal attempt, to a considerable extent successful over the entire present cycle, to resurrect once more the forces of the world in the forms of a heroic, solar and manly civilisation; a civilisation which was immune to the urges of mystical escapism; which was true to the aristocratic-Aryan type of the patres, the masters of spear and sacrifice; which was mysteriously confirmed by the Nordic marks of the Wolf, of the Eagle and of the Axe; which was alive above all in the Olympianwarlike cult of Zeus and of Hercules, of Apollo and of Mars, in the feeling of owing to the divine its greatness and its aeternitas, in action-as-rite and rite-as-action, in the crystal-clear and yet strong experience of the supra-natural, which was acknowledged in the Empire itself and culminated in the symbol of Caesar as numen.

With heathen Rome fell the greatest traditional and solar bastion, and it is not difficult to recognise in the forces which mainly contributed to this fall, the same forces which paved the way for all the subsequent deviations and successive degenerations which have led to the current state of Europe.

In its frenetic crushing of every hierarchy, its exaltation of the weak, of the underprivileged, of those without birth and without tradition, its resentment against all strength, sufficiency, wisdom and aristocracy, and its intransigent and prose-

lytising fanaticism, the Semitic wave, dark and barbaric, enemy of itself and of the world, was indeed a venom for the greatness of Rome, a galvanising substance for all the other Asiatic-southern factors of decadence which then penetrated into the structures of Rome, and the greatest cause of the decline of the West.

In the semiticisation of the Graeco-Roman and then the Nordic world, to be attributed to a large extent to Christianity, we have in fact the revolt of the lower layers of these races, by dominating which the Nordic-Arvans had attained their splendid civilisations. The spirit of Israel, which had already created the collective sense of 'sin' and 'expiation', and which emerged most clearly in the so-called 'prophets' after the defeat and enslavement of the 'chosen people', burying the residues of the aristocratic spirit of the Pharisees, re-evoked the lower forces of Aegaeo-Pelasgian tellurism which the Achaean stocks had subdued. These can be equated to the castes of the shudras, the so-called 'dark' caste (krshña) and the demonic caste (asurya), above which the hierarchies of the three higher castes of the reborn (dvíja) culminating in the types of the brâhmana and of the king, understood as 'a great deity under human form' had stood in India, like form triumphing over chaos. They can be equated also to the forces which myth represents to us in the forms of the Nordic Rinthursi and the bands of Gog and Magog, to which Alexander had blocked the way with a symbolic wall of iron.

These forces worked spiritually, through primitive Christianity, to destroy the European spirit. At first, they concealed themselves within the lunar spirituality which took shape in the Catholic church, that is to say, a spirituality whose type is no longer the sacred king, the solar initiate, or the 'hero', but the saint or the priest who bows before God, whose ideal is no longer the warlike-sacral hierarchy and 'glory' but fraternal community and *caritas*. Later, in the Reformation and in humanism, there re-appears the original, anti-traditional, primitive, anarchist, dissolutory nature of these forces. Then, by means of political revolutions, liberalism, and the emergence

of collectivism, one cause produces another, and one fall follows another. In all the forms of modern society — and also in science, in law, in the illusory power of technology and the machine — the same spirit, paradoxical as it may seem, appears; the same levelling will, the will of the greatest number, the hatred for hierarchy, quality, and difference, goes from victory to victory; the collective and impersonal bondage born of mutual insufficiency, peculiar to the organisation of a race of slaves in revolt, becomes stronger and stronger.

There is more. Semitic-Christian mysticism combined Orphic-Dionysian pathos (which, already for Dorian-Nordic Greece, constituted a deformation of the ancient Olympian cult) with the popular mysticism of Isis, born out of the decline of the solar Egyptian tradition. In the same way, the identical element of 'passion' and excitement produced, by means of messianism and millennialism, the promiscuity of the imperial plebs — as against the calm superiority of the Caesars, the simple greatness of the Homeric heroes, the purified spirituality and the autarchic ideal of the heathen 'philosophers' and Initiates. Here is also the root of every modern deviation, in the romantic, irrational, sense which craves a bad infinitude. After its secularisation, this mysticism leads us to the myths of 'activism', the 'Faustian spirit', the contemporary superstition of progress, the Semitic mysticism of the instincts and of the élan vital, the exaltation of the 'event' and of 'life', and, in short, to the divinisation of the wild, sub-personal, collective element of man, which today seems less restrained than ever before — so as to push individuals and peoples in a direction which is far from that which they themselves wish.

Before the fall, against the Judeo-Christian tide, the other force rose once more, almost presenting a decisive alternative for the further course of the Western history of the spirit. It took the form given by the tradition of the Aryans of Iran, and appeared in the shape of the warlike cult of Mithra, the *avatâra* of the ancient Aryan god of the bright sky, the 'Ruler of the Sun', the 'Killer of the Bull', the hero with the Torch and the Axe, the symbol of the one reborn 'through power', which

a syncretic myth, no less significant for that, assimilates to the Hyporborean god of the golden age. But stronger forces hindered this 'solar' possibility.

Then came the last great reaction: the Germanic Holy Roman Empire. The so-called 'barbarians' were in reality races which were closely related to the Acheans, paleo-Iranians,

paleo-Romans, and Nordic-Aryans in general, which had maintained themselves, so to speak, in a state of pre-historic purity. And if their emergence, in contrast to the material appearance of the already Asianised and Semiticised Empire, seemed destructive, it still amounted, from a higher point of view, to a revitalising flow of heroic spirit, a galvanising contact with a force spiritually akin to that from which heathen *romanitas* had originally derived its solar greatness. This is how the ancient Roman symbol rises again in the world, directly defended by the forces of the North.

The imperial and feudal oecumenical civilisation of the Middle Ages, despite its purely nominal profession of Christian faith, must be appraised above all from this point of view. What is expressed through it is a Nordic-Roman spirituality, whose militia was the knighthood of chivalry, whose suprapolitical centre was the Imperial Ghibelline ideal, whose rite was the enterprise of the Crusades, a truer return to the heathen idea of the *mors triumphalis* than its religious outer impulse pretended. The secret soul of this spirituality, opposed to Christianity and true to a higher and more ancient tradition, was what kept it alive, hidden in legends, myths, and orders of war and chivalry, from the Templars to the Knights of the Grail and the Fidèles d'Amour.

After the fall of this medieval civilisation, the destruction of this radiant European spring in its first flowering, and the outburst of those forces which led to secularisation, particularism and a dissolving humanitarianism, the way to the final descent was open. The force of Tradition passed from the visible to the invisible realm and became an inheritance which was transmitted in a secret chain from very few to very few. Even today some have a foreboding of it and seek it by means of confused

attempts, still bound to the human and to the material. They are those who, through an obscure instinct, as a mark of reaction, evoke the symbols of the Swastika, the Eagle and the Axe. They are often unknown men, or men who blaze like tragic meteors such as Nietzsche, crushed under the weight of a truth too strong for them, which now awaits others who will know how to re-assume it and re-impose it so that it rises up hard and cold against their enemies, in the great revolt, the great struggle: that struggle which, once more, will determine whether the West is confirmed in its decline or rises again in a new dawn.

#### We, Heathen Imperialists

The circle is closing and the destiny of an ancient myth, Iranian before it was Jewish, imposes itself upon us, in the apocalyptic terms of 'universal judgment': the separation of the 'chosen' from those who, at the 'end of the world' — that is to say of our world, of our civilisation — will perish.

We invoke a determined, unconditional, complete return to the Nordic heathen tradition. We are done with all compromise, weakness, and indulgence towards everything which, being derived from the Semitic-Christian root, has infected our blood and our intelligence.

Without the return to this tradition there will be no liberation and no true restoration, and conversion to the true values of spirit, power, hierarchy, and empire will not be possible. This is a truth upon which no doubt whatsoever can be cast.

Anti-Europe, anti-Semitism, anti-Christianity — these are our watchwords. A stupid and absurd fable presents heathenism as materialism and corruption, and an exotic and anti-Aryan religion created in our decline as the purest and most exclusive synthesis of all that is spiritual, almost as if the whole story of civilisation had been a prefiguration of it. And how strongly and deeply rooted in the 'enlightened' contemporary mentality this fable still is!

No! The living and immanent spirit, the spirit in action as wisdom and extra-human power, glory of Kings and Victors, the Semitic contamination did not know! Our heathenism, our tradition, borne in the midst of the great tide of peoples which conducted it from North to South, from West to East, knew! And the one who today rises up against the European evil, and against the European religion, is not a denier, but an assertor the only one who knows what assertion is.

We, therefore, today, testify to the Nordic heathen tradition and we invoke the restoration of its values in a heathen Imperialism. The persons of the speaker and of any who join him In the same spiritual reality, isolated, impassive and uncompromisingly aristocratic in this world of merchants, of caged and of deviant souls, are insignificant compared to this reality, which, through them, calls to the unbroken and unvanquished of Europe, to those who still offer resistance, to those who will have tomorrows.

Is it still possible to feel that this is not a matter of words, utopias, or romantic abstractions, but that it is the most positive, strongest reality of all, which waits to be unearthed by beings capable of everything, by means of a work in the light of which all that the masses call 'reaction' means less than nothing? That thousands of forces are pressing in the darkness, only waiting for those who will be able to free them?

To exchange our tradition for some new pseudo-tradition or special tradition or for any of the new western forms of belief, all of which are inevitably contaminated by the Semitic spirit, would be the most absurd mistake of all

The primordial forces of our race place us today, at this decisive moment for the history of the West, for the last time in front of the dilemma: fidelity or treason. Our restoration is an empty word if it is not, above all, a 'solar' restoration, a restoration of heathen spirituality. It would be complete self-contradiction to try to invoke the defence of the Nordic and Roman tradition while failing to discern those forces which mainly contributed to the decline of this tradition; to evoke the ideal of the Empire and not to realise that the Semitic-Christian

image of the world, stripped of its masks, is in every respect the negation of the spiritual premise of our Empire.

Beyond any contingent goal, any empirical interest, any passion and any personal or partisan commitment — who, among those who are ready for the revolt on the German and Roman ground, will dare to take again the torch of the Nordic heathen tradition?

We issue the appeal, we must issue it, We will not succumb to hope or to despair. What is cannot undergo alteration from what is not.

Our values are part of what is. Circumstances and men may or may not be able to articulate the eternal in the forms of the temporal and contingent but this interests us less than it does those whose horizons cease with those forms.

## II



# **Conditions for Empire**

#### The Decadence of the Imperial Idea

Just as a living body stands insofar only as a soul is there to dom-inate it, so any social organisation having no root in a spirtual reality is precarious and extrinsic, incapable of maintaining itself solid and unyielding under the buffeting of the various forces; it is not properly an organism, but rather a compound, an aggregate.

The true cause of the decline of the political idea in the contemporary West lies in the fact that the spiritual values with which at one time the social order was suffused have gradually vanished, and no one as yet has been able to replace them. The problem has been addressed merely on the level of economic, industrial, military, administrative or, at best, sentimental factors, without realising that all this is only mere matter, necessary, of course, but insufficient in itself, and as little capable of producing a strong, rational, self-supporting order as the simple mechanical meeting of forces is able to produce a living being.

Inorganicity, exteriority — these are the dominant characteristics of contemporary social 'organisations'. That the top should be determined by the bottom; that law and order, rather than being justified by an aristocracy, a gradation of quality, and a spiritual hierarchy, have to be based on the contingent tangle of the balance of interests and the avidity of an anonymous multitude already stripped of any higher sensibility — such is the fundamental mistake that is at the root of these organisations.

The root of this degeneration goes back to distant times, to those periods in which the first elements of decline of the Nordic-solar tradition appeared. It is linked to the separation of the two powers, the split of the kingly and the sacred prin-

ciples, the dualism through which, on one hand, a material manliness emerges — the secular state and its sovereign, with purely temporal and, we would almost say, Luciferian values — and on the other hand emerges also a lunar, anti-Nordic and anti-aristocratic spirituality, a spirituality of the 'priestly' and 'religious' type, which nevertheless claims falsely the right of sovereignty.

The formation of a priestly caste, as a distinct ruling caste, necessarily led to the desecration, secularisation and materialisation of the political idea: all the rest is only the result of this. The first anti-traditional revolution was the one in which the priest replaced the 'divine King', and 'religion' took the place of the elites, which were the bearers of the solar, victorious and aristocratic spirituality<sup>1</sup>.

Phenomena of this type can already be noticed at the threshold of history, in the pre-Christian and non-Christian world: but they almost always collided with reactions, which limited their influence and reduced the likelihood of further falls. Even in India, where the caste of the *brâhmana* often became the priestly caste, in spite of all, the echo of a spirituality peculiar to a superior caste, that of the *kshatriya*, lasted, and Buddha — like Zarathustra — was a real ascetic of royal blood.

It is only in the West, with the rise of the Semitic religion and the Semitic spirit, that the disruption appears to have become decisive, and from some points of view irremediable.

Primitive Christianity, with the transcendentalism of its values depending completely on the expectation of that "kingdom which is not of this world", with the characteristic Semitic will to submission to God and humiliation of the creature, smashed the 'solar' synthesis of the spiritual and the political, of royalty and divinity, which the ancient world knew.

Taken in itself, in its deep contempt for all worldly concerns, the Galilean doctrine could only render impossible, not just the state, but society itself. But as the guiding spirit of this doctrine faded away — the expectation of the 'Kingdom', in which all values would be transvalued and the humiliated raised — the intransigence of the primitive doctrine persisted;

new forces rose, to make room in the world for what "is not of this world", a normalisation was arrived at. A compromise was reached. The Semitic element succeeded in conquering the universal symbol of Romanity. The Catholic Church rose, a hybrid formation, in which Romanisation, that is to say heathenisation, of some aspects of the original doctrine did not prevent the 'lunar', priestly, and feminine idea of spirituality from taking a central position at the same time: the atmosphere of those who 'believe' and 'love', who are mere sons and servants of 'God', and who transmit the right of sovereignty to their fraternal community (the Mother Church), conceived of, so to speak, gynaecocratically.

Let us establish this point with certainty. Christianity is one thing; Catholicism, another. Christianity as such, that is, in its primitive Semitic and revolutionary aspect, corresponds mystically to the French Revolution of yesterday, to communism and socialism today. Christianity, as the Catholic Church, however, partially takes on some aspects of the heathen Roman older, producing a highly contradictory result, in that these forms are harnessed to a content, a system of values and belief, which contradicts the 'solar' spirit of Roman heathenism; these forms are in opposition to this spirit.

This intrinsic contradiction has been the cause of the failure of the hegemonic pretence of the Church, of its inability to really take on the heritage of what had been destroyed by the Asian-Semitic revolt: Roman imperiality and universality.

The Catholic Church, in fact, is not heathen enough to be able to abolish fully this dualism: thus it distinguishes and separates the spiritual domain from the political one, the care of 'souls' from the care of the people. Then it strives, in vain, to rejoin the two parts. It finds itself in an impasse.

The attitude of the Guelfs, who refused to admit the possibility of a secular autonomous state as against the Church, and demanded the complete subordination of the Eagle to the Cross, was consistent. However, if that had occurred, what would have remained to the Church which could have allowed it to still call itself Christian — to claim the heritage of

the one who taught renunciation, the vanity of worldly concerns, and the natural equality of men as servants to a God whose kingdom is not of this earth? How could it have been possible to maintain dominion and hierarchy, if not by adopting in reality the heathen values of assertion, immanence, and difference? This is what happened to the Church in its golden age, the Middle Ages, when, for a moment, galvanised by the partial Romanisation of the Nordic-Germanic spirit, it gave the impression of really wanting again to embrace all the peoples of the West in an oecumenical unity. But this was a Fata Morgana, something which did not last — basically, only a presentation of the problem in the shape of a solution, a solution to the contradiction *de facto*, but not *de jure*.

But then the disagreement remains irremediable, in that an Empire which is really an Empire cannot tolerate a Church above it as a distinct organisation. An Empire whose dominion is purely material can, certainly, let a Church co-exist with it, and even give in to it in matters which concern the care of spiritual things, in which, hypothetically, it is not interested. However, such an Empire, as we have said above, is for us only a semblance of Empire. An Empire is really such only if an immanent spirituality permeates it; but it is obvious that a real Empire of this sort cannot recognise any organisation which claims a prerogative regarding the things of the spirit. It will dethrone and supplant any Church, putting in its place purely and simply itself as true and sole Church: in one way or the other, consciously or unconsciously, there will be a return to the heathen and Arvan conception, to the solar synthesis of royalty and sacerdotality, to the *Sacrum Imperium*.

If we examine with care the imperial idea which asserted itself in the Middle Ages against the Church, above all via the Hohenstaufens, we can distinguish precisely this: this is not a matter of temporal power in conflict with spiritual authority, but rather a struggle between two authorities of the same spiritual nature, each of them defending a supranatural origin and destiny and a universal and supra-political right. On one hand, what revives in the Empire, albeit not without attenuations and

compromises, is the heathen idea of the divine King, the sacred ruler, *lex animata in terris*, living centre for the relations of a trans-forming warlike *fides*, personification of the manly and heroic pole of the spirit. On the other hand, what subsists in the church is the principle of spiritual castration and 'priestly' truth, the lunar pole of the spirit, which seeks heedlessly, by any means, to support and bless the slaves and merchants in their revolt against the Empire and to hinder its restoration (the Communes), in order to be able to preserve its own supremacy.

In the struggle between these two great ideas we saw, as we have said, the last spiritual flashing of the West. Then follwed a slackening and of progressive secession. phase of finally, the modern state made itself autonomous from the church, this happened only because it fell from the spiritual and universal principle of the *Imperium* to the pluralistic and plebeian principle of the 'nation'; because it forgot what rovalty, in the traditional sense, means; because it was not aware that the political problem is inseparable from the religious problem, and, it lost interest in every question which transcended material interests and the claims of individual races and nations; leaving a clear field to all the usurpations of humanism and of the so-called 'freedom of thought', it was reduced to a mere temporal power. We arrive thus at the present horizons, within which we see, on one hand, an essentially secular and anti-aristocratic state, limited to economic, military and administrative problems, declining any competence with respect to the things of the spirit, and on the other hand a lunar religion, torn by schism, bereft of interest in politics, reduced, in the form of the Catholic Church, to a sort of great international association of believers, capable only of a dull paternalism as expressed in the form of flaunted but ineffective concern for the salvation of the peoples — each of which goes its own way, no longer following any religious impulse - or for the salvation of the 'souls' - which have all lost an inner, living, concrete, manly sense of spiritual reality.

This state of affairs cannot last much longer — or, at least, those who want to speak seriously of fighting back, those who

do not want to find themselves merely in the ironic situation of *plus ça change*, *plus c'est la même chose*, must not consent much longer to this renunciation, to this laceration.

An exit from the crisis of the Western world is only possible through a restoration of the absolute synthesis of the two powers, political and sacred, real and spiritual, on the basis of an Aryan-heathen vision of the world and of the manifestation of higher forms of interests, of life and of individuality — as the principle of a new universality.

Let no-one reproach us with anachronism. The same spirit can be evoked in other forms too. That the secular decline of the political idea is overcome, that the state regains a supernatural significance and represents the apex of victory over chaos — this is the central point.

We are sick to the core of abstract 'religiousness' and political realism. This paralysing antithesis should be broken, in the name of our recovery and of our tradition.

# The Protestant Deviation and Our Counter-Reformation

We have already mentioned the fact that the messianic-Galilean doctrine, in its original nature, did not aim at all to create a new form of social life or even of religion. It had a purely anarchist, antisocial, defeatist character, subversive of every rational order of things. A unique concern pervaded it, obsessively: the salvation of the soul of the individual in the face of the supposedly imminent coming of the 'Kingdom of God'.

But when the prospect of this 'Kingdom' decayed and finally disappeared, the forces focused on this hope fell back into themselves, and from its individualistic aspect, the Semitic religion passed to its socialistic aspect. The *ecclesia*, the community of the faithful, understood as an impersonal and mystic medium made out of reciprocal need — need for love, need to serve, need to communicate, need for reciprocal confirmation, reciprocal dependence of lives each insufficient to itself — replaced in each soul the vanishing reality of the 'Kingdom of God'.

It is necessary to distinguish clearly the ecclesia, of which we are now speaking, from what the Catholic religious organization subsequently became. This organisation arose gradual romanisation of the ecclesia in the primitive sense, whose spirit, to a certain extent, it betrayed, and whose Semitic part it choked off by means of a hierarchical principle of authority and a symbolic ritual *corpus*. What is important here, however, is to understand in its originary reality the ecclesia of the first Christian communities, which came to the surface when the direct influence of Jesus ceased and the sense of imminence of the 'Kingdom' faded. There we find the germ of that force which eventually led to the type of the modern Euro-American society.

In the Empire the principle was: hierarchy, investiture from above. In the Christian *ecclesia* it was: equality, fraternity. In the Empire there were personalised relations of dependence: there were masters and there were slaves. In the most complete forms, there was a regime of castes. In the *ecclesia*, these relations became depersonalised: there was a connection of equal beings, without leaders, without distinction of class or of tradition, held together only by reciprocal dependence and by the identical need of the soul. In other words, sociality was born, the form of pure associated living, being together in something collective, in egalitarian solidarity. And as we have said, this spirit confirmed itself as the annihilator of the spirit.

And so the decline continues, until the Reformation. The Reformation is the great fall of Nordic humanity: it is the degeneration, the overturning in the negative and the Semitic, of that force which had animated the struggle for the Empire against the Roman yoke. In the ideal of the Hohenstaufens we find, as a matter of fact, those principles of freedom, independence and individuality which are peculiar to the original ethos of the Germanic stocks. Except that these values, which go hand in hand with the hierarchical ideal, fought a spiritual battle during the Middle Ages; they expressed the demand for a higher hierarchy, more solar, manlier and more perfect than anything the Church could offer as compromise. In the Reformation we see

the reverse movement: these same Nordic forces freed themselves from bondage to Rome, but at the cost of burying those residues of hierarchical authority, Romanity and universality which the Church still offered; instead, a resuscitation of those forces which had formed the first Christian community and the life of the *ecclesia* occurred. In the Reformation we have the return of primitive Christianity, precisely in its lower, 'socialistic' aspect, as against the Roman aspect peculiar to the Church. Protestant intransigence put an end to the Catholic compromise, but not in the direction of the restoration of the Empire; rather in the direction of the creation of the anti-Empire.

In spite of everything, the Germanic peoples still preserved, within the heredity of their blood, too many Nordic factors for the upheaval to be fatal for them. Within the Germanic peoples, more than in any others, despite the schism, an imperial and almost feudal regime was able to maintain itself, as well as a living sensibility for the manly and Nordic values of honour, faithfulness and hierarchy — until yesterday, until the outbreak of the World War.

Things take a quite different form among the Anglo-Saxon peoples, especially after religious revolt becomes political revolt; after Humanism and Enlightenment bore their fruits; after the principle of authority falls, first in the spiritual domain, then in the social domain, and finally in the moral domain, and the ferment and decomposition of the Jacobin revolution invaded the world.

In this context we see in fact how the Reformation — originally a religious revolution — determined a deep upheaval of the political idea itself. Freeing the consciousness of men from Roman authority, it socialised and immanentised the Church; it actualised, in a more or less secularised political reality, the form of the primitive *ecclesia*.

Hierarchy from above is replaced through the Reformation with the free association of believers, emancipated from bondage to authority, each one having become anarchically judge of himself and at the same time the equal of each other. This was, in other words, the principle of the 'socialistic' Eu-

ropean decline: as against the imperial ideal, the Protestant religion has paved the way to a form of organisation dependent, not on leaders, but on the aggregate of all isolated individuals; an organisation coming from below and exhausting itself in impersonal connections, in a purely collective reality governing itself and justifying itself.

This process has rapidly absorbed the Anglo-Saxon peoples and today pretends to a 'catholicity' or universality, antithetical both to Roman or medieval Imperial catholicity and to that which, in the narrower sense, was peculiar to the Church per se: just as within each individual nation, it dissolved the difference between individuals into a pure social bond, forcing them nearer to each other, so, also, it tended to cancel the differences and the privileges of each individual nation, by placing them all at the same rank in the anonymous universalism of the ideal of a 'League of Nations'. In the meantime, religiosity was continually more and more humanised, tending more and more to identify itself with sociality2. The most recent orientation, towards a 'religion of work', and the increasing preponderance of personal interest and uncompromising moralism over all ideal and metaphysical interest in the Protestant countries, proves it.

In conclusion: the Reformation favours a consistent position, separates the Christian aspect in its moderate form of the ideal of a mere associative life from the Christian-heathen nucleus as still found in Catholic countries, and realises a distinct type of state: the democratic state, the anti-Empire, the self-government of the mass, sovereign over itself, along with the simultaneous levelling of its individuals in an anarchic, acephalous solidarism, with pseudo-rulers who are themselves mere slaves to slaves, mere 'representatives', dependent upon and responsible to the masses — rather than responsible to themselves, as superior leaders should be if they are to remain the principle of absolute authority.

Naturally, this is far from the whole story. By subterranean means, the secularised reconstitution of the *ecclesia* promotes once again the Semitic element, and in the Protestant coun-

tries, where capitalism and plutocracy have developed in the most powerful manner, what reappears behind the scenes of democratic 'freedom' is the omnipotent Jew, master of both forces and men in a world desecrated by stateless finance; and already, the signs of the approaching, final, fall, the coming birth of the pure collective, in accordance with the proletarian myth of the Third International' and the prophetic mission of the Soviet, can be seen.

We are thus faced with a decisive 'either-or'.

It is vain to fight effects without knowing the remote and concealed causes from which they are derived. It is vain to look for a political reaction of any effectiveness not rooted in a corresponding spiritual revolution.

The Church is a mere half of a thing. The Church for us is too little. We need a lot more. We need a true counter-Reformation. And this counter-Reformation will consist in the return to the original Aryan ethos, to the pure forces of Nordic-Roman tradition, to the Imperial symbol of the Eagle.

This will be the first restoration. It will need time, but our nations have to make a decision: either they will become in fact victims of the converging forces of Protestantism and of Judaism — organising themselves definitively on the republican and democratic type of Anglo-Saxon society, choosing a religion merely inherent in sociality, where the spiritual becomes only a means to temporal accomplishment, culminating in the service of the Ahrimanic mystique of the faceless 'collective man' — or they have to react, and commit themselves to recovery and restoration, that is to say, to revolution in the other sense, bringing to completion thus the ideal of the other state.

Just as the Protestant revolution went further than any possible Catholic compromise, and brought to the West the forms and values of democratic society, so also for us, who oppose the Reformation, we also should go beyond any possible Catholic compromise, but in order to affirm the other possible alternative: that which became possible through the struggle of the Empire for the sacred Roman Kingdom. On the basis of a complete Nordic-Roman restoration, we should create a state

which would be new and ancient at the same time, led by the the values of hierarchy, organisation from above, aristocracy, dominion and wisdom — that is to say, by those Imperial values which the Church in its best period to some extent possessed on loan, and which, after the failure of the bimillennial experiment of the Church, must be asserted plain, devoid of any mask or attenuation, by men who are not ashamed of their primordial nobility — men who, in their faithfulness to the original forces of the noble  $\hat{a}rya$ , their celestial-solar spirituality, and their heroic symbols, against the whole of a Europe in decline, socialised and semiticised, finally dare, as we do, to declare themselves heathen imperialists.

# Will to Hierarchy

We shall speak later of the roots of the European evil, and discuss the principles by which the necessary counter-Reformation can concretely be achieved.

Now we want to turn our attention briefly to a special point: the meaning of the principle of hierarchy, the presupposition of the new idea of the state. Proclamations and party programs are of no significance here; what matters is what is done, not what is said; what matters is the willed impetus, so strong that it overwhelms habits which have become congenital to contemporary men and by which they are still dominated, even though their mouths and minds affirm the contrary.

Today people speak a great deal about hierarchy — but at the same time they continue to make concessions to a middle-class and anti-aristocratic mentality which is in precise contradiction to this concept. Naturally, first of all, we should get rid of all residues of the democratic 'representative' system, and of all that partakes in any way in the 'socialistic', collectivist spirit. All relations must be tempered, revitalised and virilised, through a warlike attitude, a faithfulness, a rectitude and a manly zealousness of service. This *fides*, which was one of the most ancient deities of heathen Rome, and in the possession

of which Livy said that the difference between Rome and the barbarians lay; this *fides*, which is found in the Indian *bhakti*, and in the devotion which the Iranian warriors gave not only their actions, but their very thought and their very will, to their deified leaders — such *fides* is also to be found as the spiritual cement in every single political feudal unity, and in the connection of these to the *unum quod non est pars*, at the suprapolitical and sacral centre of the medieval Empire.

We need still, today, and especially today, this fides.

The pride of subordinates in service to their superiors must be reawakened. The sense of service must be reawakened, as freedom and as overcoming, almost as a transfiguring offering, which does not humiliate, but raises — everywhere, in the things of war as in those of peace, in the particular as in the general.

It is on this spiritual basis that a structure which runs perpendicularly from top to bottom should be created, in which the leaders would be so many rays of a unique centre and, in their turn, centres of unity of lower orders, gathered like soldiers around their officers.

Naturally, such a system necessitates above all the creation of elites — elites in reality and not in name only, among whom authority is not based upon office, but office upon authority —and the latter, in its turn, upon real superiority. Every hierarchy which is based on premises other than these is nothing but a semblance of hierarchy, or rather the opposite of hierarchy: a violent and artificial creation which hides in itself a principle of injustice and therefore of anarchy.

On the other hand, we must be aware that hierarchy must not in any way exhaust itself on the plane of what is called today 'politics'. Rather, politics — as that economic, industrial, and administrative part of the state which establishes a balance in the material sense — should subordinate itself to the higher values of character, to serve as a means to an end. The idea of a qualitative differentiation requires the elaboration of a number of supra-political degrees of authority, which actually correspond to various forms of life and of interest, and this is pre-

closely why they are suitable to give the leaders that true and ini disputable sovereignty which cannot be produced by anything which is conditioned by the temporal and the contingent.

Naturally, this ideal implies not only the assertion of the concept and right of nobility, but also that of monarchy. In this respect there is only an empty space in Europe, whether we speak of republican states, or of states which are nominally still monarchic, or of states built by dictators (who, from the traditional point of view, are nothing but powerful orators of the people). Where monarchy still exists, it has become a relic, a symbol rendered mute, a function which has lost its true sense and is cut off from reality. It is better than nothing — but from those who, not only in name but also in spirit, are of royal blood, should be required the courage no longer to tolerate compromises and uncertain accommodations; to scorn royal dignities if they no longer correspond to anything, or correspond to almost nothing — either that, or the courage to return resolutely, as centre and leader of the state, to crush the 'legal' usurpations of the most recent times, and to become again, in an absolute and transcendent sense, leaders of the people<sup>3</sup>.

Where monarchy, no longer able to hold sword and sceptre, has been beaten down by the intrigues of the rabble of Jews and merchants, it must be restored. Where, by force of inertia, it still exists, it must be renewed, strengthened and rendered dynamic, as an organic, central and absolute function, embodying, simultaneously, the power of force and the light of the spirit, in one single being who is genuinely the testimony of a whole stock, and also the point which transcends all that is conditioned by soil and blood. Only then one will have the right to speak of Empire. When monarchy is re-awakened, to a glorious, sacred, metaphysical reality, and yet remains simultaneously the apex of the militarily organised political hierarchy — then monarchy will recover the place and function which it once had, before its usurpation by the caste of the priests.

Naturally, the road to the true traditional ideal is long. We have made this matter sufficiently clear that no one can think that this identification of the two powers is limited to a rhetor-

ical prosopopeia, or to a superstitious divinisation of some being simply because he happens to occupy the highest position in a purely material organisation — as happened, in times already decadent, in various cases of theocracy. We insist instead on affirming a real synthesis, where spirituality is not a mere word, but the positive reality of a self-transformation, following which at least as much distance is placed, between some beings and the mass of other men, as that which this mass imagines to exist between itself and other animals. We do not want to use the term 'superman', as discredited and rhetoricised as it is today; and, on the other hand, we could hope to be understood only by few people, and we should expect to be misunderstood by the many, if we referred to the sense of the rite of initiation, which, in many ancient states — when dynasties 'of divine blood' were not present — confirmed the investiture of political power. At any rate, we must insist that this distance of the leaders is not reducible to anything 'moral', or 'ideal', or 'religious', or to any other human or non-human value, but consists, so to speak, of a different quality of being. obtained by a substantial transformation of consciousness.

We therefore affirm that this real and concrete superiority will give a meaning to the term 'spirituality', and must be recognised as the centre from which the dignity, the attribute and the real function of royalty will proceed. This royalty, in its turn, will be attested by the Imperium - according to the Aryan-heathen tradition, for which the Kings were Kings in virtue of a 'fire' attracted from the sky - hvarenő - which invested them, made them immortal, and proved that they were so by giving them victory.

In this way, the centre of transcendent stability and 'sover-eignty', the principle of every other hierarchy, the core of every faithfulness, of every honour in service, and of every heroic action, the most superb force of balance from above, will be present.

# Ш



# The Democratic Mistake

#### True liberalism

he organic idea must be the principle and sound foundation of the new state.

In the previous chapter we indicated how the concrete concept of the organism is opposed to that of the compound, which is the form of a whole of atomic free elements, linked only by an impersonal, abstract connection, not defined according to any higher principle, nor based on a real and substantial difference of the elements themselves. The opposition which exists between the imperial ideal and the liberal-democratic ideal is completely similar to the one which exists between organism and compound.

Our imperialism requires both universality and unity; not an abstract unity, derived from impersonal law or from an unreal 'collective will' and leading only to an internationalist and pacifist collapse, but rather a unity made material within a higher individual for whom the sense of the transcendent applies as principle of differentiation and of articulation,

Our imperialism definitely transcends nationalism: but, while democratic supra-nationalism is a weakening and subordination of each national assertion, promiscuously associated with miscellaneous other national assertions, the imperial and Roman supra-nationalism is that of a national assertion which, by means of a group of rulers, is reasserted beyond itself in a synthesis superior both to it and to the other nations, which it resumes under itself. Strange as it may seem, at the basis of our imperialism, here are values which also appear as presuppositions in the liberal forms of democracy. The values of freedom and independence are certainly at the centre of the best Aryan traditions. A noble

man, according to the original Germanic tradition, and subsequently within the order of the medieval civilisations, was equivalent to a free man. The first Roman constitution is based on the idea of *patres*, priests, leaders and supreme judges of their peoples, which are free as so many worlds within a world. Frederick II will say: "I am king insofar as I am free". These expressions are identical to those of liberalism, in their letter, but present a radical contrast, in their spirit.

The difference lies in the fact that, in liberalism, these values are affirmed by a race of slaves, which does not dare to think them and to want them thoroughly, as applicable at the level of the individual, but instead shifts them, in an illegitimate, egalitarian way, to 'society' and 'humanity', where they lose their primitive signification and are transformed into mistakes.

If we were to take it at its word, according to the first of its Immortal principles', this race would have established the period of freedom. In reality, it is not so at all. It does not know what the word 'freedom' means. If it did, it would also know that to want freedom, and to want the empire, are one and the same thing.

Let us consider the matter more precisely. Freedom does not tolerate compromises: either it is affirmed, or it is not affirmed. But if it is affirmed, it is necessary to affirm it thoroughly, without fear — it is necessary to affirm it, that is, as unconditional freedom.

This was perfectly understood in the affirmation that only the individual can be said to be free. Many free beings can only limit each other and negate each other — unless one presupposes, within each of them, a law which regulates their actions according to a sort of pre-established harmony.

Now, since a law does not cease to be a law merely because it is an interior law, and since this law is in any case, *ex hypothesis* something which will transcend the conscious power of each individual, here too we only have a semblance of true freedom.

We are therefore faced with these alternatives: either we may discard our original intention, and alter our fundamental

value, denying freedom per se, but allowing the many, individual, atomistic freedoms to remain, tamed, mechanised, and imitating one another (liberal democratism); or we may cling in- transigently to our aim, and create the ideal of a being whose inner superiority does not allow it to represent a force among many others in that dynamic system which is social reality, but forces it to realise itself as determinant of the law of this reality, itself free from law — whose law, then, will be law, and authority, only for the others. This means that freedom has as much reality as the empire has.

This empire must be conceived of according to the analogy of a body unified in the dominating synthesis of a soul. The unity which this body attains is not that of a soulless aggregate, but that of a higher principle, which has its cause and purpose within itself; which does not live for the needs of the body, but lor which, contrarily, the body serves as tool; which is not produced by the body, but vice versa, in the sense that the soul is the ultimate end, the deep organising principle of the body itself, without which the latter would disintegrate (Aristotle).

Analogically we will say that the Head, as bearer of the value of freedom, will not be the mere representative of the masses, the impersonal symbol of a mythical auto-organisation, of which these masses are themselves in any case capable (democratic thesis), but vice versa: the masses would receive order and form only thanks to this higher force, qualitatively distinct from those which they themselves laboriously try to express. And this force, far from living for them, would subordinate the interests of the masses to those vaster horizons which it alone can determine, without according to anyone the right of veto of its law, which is not law because it is right, but which is right because it is law, and precisely the law of this force itself (in striking contrast to the democratic principles of popular sanction and of devotion of those who govern according to 'abstract principles' or to what is supposed to be the general interest). Otherwise the apex would not be a free man, but merely the foremost of the servants, and not a spirit, but merely the voice of the body.

Unfortunately, today, it is no longer known what freedom is, one no longer dares to think it thoroughly. Unfortunately, today, almost no one knows how to command, nor how to obey. The risk of absolute responsibility and that of absolute devotion, have both totally disappeared, in the face of the mediocrity of mechanised collectivity.

And people dare to glorify our epoch as a period of freedom and liberalism, and to take pride in the abolition of slavery, without understanding that, contrarily to their view, freedom can only exist when there are masters leading the slaves, when there are proud condottieri leading masses which boldly and generously put their lives and their destinies into their hands; without understanding that only a race of slaves could demand the abolition of slavery, a race of slaves which remained such even when the chains had been smashed and the hierarchies broken down - insofar as their need for servitude and dependence created new and much more terrible tyrants: on one hand, the Semitic God, arbiter of providence and grace, and on the other, gold and 'public opinion'. These are the tools of the Jewish conspiracy, as are the fetish of socialised, impersonal law, the moralistic intolerance of the Protestant nations, and the omnipotent mass man of the Bolsheviks.

# Hierarchy according to Power. The Conquest of the State.

A fundamental concept of the heathen and 'solar' view of the world is that spirit is power and that power is spirit, according to an insoluble synthesis.

Therefore, recapitulating what we have already said, we affirm without hesitation that the measure of freedom is power.

Subordinate to the soul, according to the analogy we have given, the various parts and functions have their functions, but the soul has its own proper end in itself, and considers as imperfections the conditions and limitations which come from

the body, which it should not tolerate, but should overcome in a perfect dominion, forming an organism entirely plastic to the spirit. The Ruler should behave in the same way with respect to the various conditions peculiar to masses, as should the higher race with respect to the other races, which it has to organise into an oecumenical unity.

The freedoms of the Ruler will be manifested, therefore, to the extent that he has the power to enact his own will, the concept of 'responsibility' becoming applicable only if his actions fail, or if a higher power is present. Lacking this power, he will lose. addition. the right to exercise power. which pass to one who knows how to assert his own right to rule over and against the former. Hence, hierarchy will not be something given, but rather a task: it will not be justified by its conformity to an abstract, transcendent, law, defining good and evil, justice and, injustice, humanity, nationality, or tradition in the narrow empirical sense, but, instead, will be a precise putting-in-contact, balancing, subordinating or being subordinated of individualised forces, which are themselves the determination of who is more or less worthy at a certain degree of hierarchy. We insist therefore on the fact that, without power, the Imperium -and, with it, the apex of the attainment of freedom - has no foundation, and, even if it exists, it will do so only in a contingent and precarious manner, based not on its own force, but on the weakness and cowardice of its opponents.

However, these assertions must be followed immediately by an explanation of what exactly we mean by the word 'power', without which misunderstandings will certainly arise which in fact are quite unnecessary.

First of all, we want to underline that, to us, power does not at all mean merely material force, and that dominion and *Imperium* do not at all reduce themselves to violence and the oppression which can be exercised by its means. It is all the more necessary to make this clear, since many deliberately introduce this confusion, so as to be able subsequently to pull out the old *ad hominem* rhetoric against the 'human animal',

the *homo hominis lupus*, the 'inhuman rulers', the 'tyrants', and so on. Violence is far from sufficient to define 'power'. In fact, violence is not 'power' at all, since what it expresses is a mere 'existence in opposition' (and, therefore, on the same plane) and not an 'existence on a higher plane'. Presupposing, and deriving its sense and justification from, a resistance — presupposing, that is, that another will exists that can resist it — violence expresses merely an extrinsic, controversial, contingent, and thus, not really hierarchic or dominating, relation. The free agent is not motivated by violence, nor is the free word pronounced by it; he who really possesses power does not know violence. He does not need it, insofar as he has no antithesis and he imposes himself directly, invisibly and irresistibly in virtue of his inner, individual superiority with respect to the one he commands.

All this is so from an absolute point of view. However, we do not intend to deny to violence all utility, but only to say that it is still not really power; it may be necessary when we find in front of us lifeless rigidities which cannot be overcome except by being broken; necessary, again, at the moment of a first, direct organisational imprint on the chaos of the various material overpowering forces; nevertheless, it remains a basic and temporary phase.

We can convince ourselves of the correctness of this view, further, by considering that one can get through much, if not through everything, supported by mere unleashed forces, provided that they are sufficiently lively; however, it is necessary all the same that we know first how to unleash, and then to direct, these forces, another thing which cannot be achieved by merely material force, but only by the force of persuasion, or suggestion.

This brings us to a more subtle plane, where action and dominion exercise themselves by means of ideas. We must caution though that 'ideas' in this context must be understood, not as abstract notions, but rather as ideational keys, or 'myths' in the Sorelian sense, that is to say, as principles applied to the task of awakening energies, movements and social currents

through various moral or emotional suggestions, plus those of tradition, etc., which they are capable of exerting on the masses but here two basic points should be borne firmly in mind in the first place, the Ruler should remain master of the various ideas or myths; he should not, through believing in them, become himself the victim of suggestion, obsessed, or slave of the spirits which he himself has evoked; he should not accord to them any absolute value whatsoever, but instead should regard them coldly as means, as fascinating instruments with which — according to a precise science of mass psychology he will exert those influences which he wants, awakening and directing the blind forces of the associated collectivism. The iς connected to the first consists in the recognition of the positive nature of our attitude, which goes beyond both the ideology of pure force and ihr idealism of 'values', 'immortal principles', and so on. That purely material force is not sufficient to itself, that it will always be the tool of certain ideas — this is simply a fact. From a positive point of view, no other value than that which it gets specifically from this fact, i.e., the value of an evocative principle, as measured by its practical consequences, should be given to the idea. The idea, in other words, has value insofar as it works, and so long as it works — not because it is 'good', 'right', 'true', etcetera, all of which is only fog with respect to its reality qua ideational key. To control the 'evocative potentials' with which the various ideas are loaded, to examine them, calibrate them, combine them, apply them, depotentiate or suspend them . . . this is a higher, invisible, and terrible art of dominion which, rendered conscious, can be said to partake of 'magic' in the highest sense.

From this point of view we can dismiss as naive all those currents which maintain that only action, in the limited sense mentioned above, is worthwhile, and that any conflict of ideas, or indeed any use of ideas, is a waste of time. We cannot agree with this, not because of any 'idealism', from which we are quite far removed, but because this is an attitude which reveals itself as abstract and incomplete from the point

of view of action itself. An impassive ruler and arouser of what we have called 'ideational keys' will overwhelm at the first attack those who exalt pure action, tearing them apart and turning against them precisely the force on which they themselves are based.

Nevertheless, this degree too is merely transitional and must be transcended. It does not lead beyond the level of the powerful orator of the people. It remains within an order for which even the psychoanalytic theories of the collective unconscious or of the 'primal horde', could be true. It involves a compromise. The various 'myths' and 'ideational keys' should not be allowed to become supports or conditions of the Ruler, since he alone must be his own condition. The ideas of which we speak — above all those of 'nation' and 'fatherland', which are the culminating elements — necessarily contain something transcendent and impersonal, and hence a margin of contingency which limits their instrumental value as we have explained it.

Thus a further accomplishment is absolutely necessary, in order to ensure that what counts is not so much the idea per se, but rather the one who affirms it. It will no longer be the idea which gives value and power to the individual, but instead the individual who gives value, power, and justification to the idea. This is what Voltaire, if our memory serves us right, understood, when he said, referring to a king of France, that, if certain deeds gained value, this happened essentially because it was he who accomplished them.

There remains then one last great step: to get rid of the superstition of the 'fatherland' and the 'nation', understood in a democratic and impersonal sense. The Ruler, changing the popular focus gradually from the abstract to the concrete plane, will finally abolish the idea of the 'fatherland' itself, and will cease to depend upon it; he will render it immanent in himself, and will permit as focus only himself, as sufficient centre for every responsibility and every value, so that finally he will be able to say: "L'État, c'est moi".

Only the one in whom - according to the expression just used - superiority is not based upon power, but power upon

superiority, can remain on this level. To need 'power' is to remain impotent, and the one who understands this will perhaps understand how the path of a certain renunciation (a manly renunciation, based entirely upon an 'ability-to-do-without', a 'being-sufficient') can be a condition for the path to the supreme power, and understand also the hidden logic according to which it is from the ascetics, the saints and the initiates (according to traditions that most people consider as myths, but which we cannot by any means dismiss as such) that evocative and suprasensible powers, stronger than any power of men or things, spring unexpectedly and naturally.

As any need, any longing, any passion, expresses a deficiency of being, so, rejecting all of these integrates, increases, exalts being and pushes it to a higher, central, solar, life.

Thus any semblance of titanism which might seem to remain in the idea of the assumption of power by a single person, entirely centralised and free from any conditions, disappears. Here the individual and the supra-individual melt into a single reality, and particularistic tendencies can be retained and asserted against one another as little as can the tiny rivulets at the moment of their flowing into the sea. Here the Ruler is not so much a specific mortal being, but rather a universal element, a cosmic force. Thus the fact that kings about to be crowned abandoned their old human names, in certain Eastern traditions, becomes comprehensible. One will understand, behind the mythological symbols, the extent to which the ancient Nordic countries could consider their rulers as embodiments of the blood of Odin, of Freyr and of Tiuz; the ancient Egyptians, and the Iranians, theirs, almost as earthly images or incarnations of solar beings; the Greeks and the Romans, theirs, as revelations of constant 'heroic' influences, personified in myth by figures such as Heracles and Apollo. "To reside constantly in the great residence of the world; to sit constantly in the great seat of the world; to move forward constantly on the great road of the world, and, when this has been achieved, to make the people participants in the goods which are possessed": "By the vastness and depth of one's own

virtue, to make oneself similar to the earth; by the loftiness and the brightness of it, to make oneself similar to the sky; by its extension and duration to make oneself similar to space and eternity: to form a third power between the sky and the earth"

Tradition speaks so.

The true Ruler, the imperial nature, is exactly he who has this greater quantity of being, which immediately means a higher quality of being, or *virtus*, by which the others — without, in a certain sense, his needing to intend this to happen — are inflamed, attracted, overwhelmed. He imposes himself, so to speak, by his simple presence: as an immense and dreadful look which the others cannot resist; as that most calm grandeur which stops magically both the assault of arms and the onrush of wild unleashed beasts, and directly provokes respect and the desire to obey, to sacrifice oneself, to seek in his greater life the sense of the greater truth of one's own. In this true ruler, a whole stock, a whole tradition, a whole story burn, and in his action these cease to be abstractions or bloodless idealities and become individual reality, concreteness, life

 absolute life, because they become their own purpose — and pure freedom, spirit, light.

So, at the apex, there is the one who can really say: "I alone am the way, the truth, and the life", and who gives to a multitude of beings, to the whole system of the lower determinations of life, a unity, a sense, a justification which they did not have before. For the inferior never lives his own free life so perfectly as when he knows that it has its centre and its end in something higher; the part, as when it knows that it is a member of an organism which has its own raison d'etre not in itself, but in a soul which in its turn is a reality and at the same time an ideal or abstract law.

These are in broad outline the main stages of the conquest of the state and the path of power. The naivete of brute force, the rhetoric of ideality and of the 'immortal principles', the relativity and the ambiguity of the dynamic play of ideational keys, the myth of the fatherland and of the nation, the support of power itself — are the various limits which, as the rising sun

disperses the fog and the spectres of the night, should be smashed by the strong reality of the higher, supra-human individual, who finally becomes one with the powers of the 'supra-world'.

# The Impossibility of Democratic Self-Government

Let us get back to liberalism.

As we have indicated, its vague desire to affirm the 'immortal principle' of freedom entails a compromise, which is transformed actual contradiction when. the problem transferred from the individual level to that of the society as a whole, alongside 'freedom' another 'immortal principle' is affirmed, that of 'equality'. How can one fail to see that if there is equality there cannot be freedom, that the levelling of possibilities, the identity of duties and rights, and the despotism of a law exclusively based on quantity, make freedom impossible? We repeat: true freedom exists only within hierarchy, difference, and the irreducibility of individual qualities, only where the social problem is resolved in favour of the most complete development of human possibilities, on the basis of an ideal of articulation, and therefore of inequality, whose most perfect model is the ancient system of castes - and, in addition, only where the sense of faithfulness, heroism, and sacrifice manages to overwhelm the petty values of materialistic economic and political life.

Let us go beyond the mere superficiality and nonsensicality of the anti-imperial standpoint.

Democracy, it is said, is the self-government of the people. The sovereign will is that of the majority, as expressed freely through its vote and embodied in its representatives, who should submit to the general interest.

However, no matter how much the ideologists of democracy insist upon 'self-government', a distinction will always arise between those who govern and those who are governed, insofar as a state order is not constituted until the will of the ma-

jority is realised by individual personalities, upon whom the government must rely. These persons obviously will not be chosen at random: they will be those who, it is supposed, possess greater capacity, and therefore, for better or worse, superiority over everyone else, so that they will not be considered as mere spokesmen, but as possessing autonomy and legislative initiative

Thus an undemocratic factor appears within democratism, which it vainly seeks to suppress by means of the principle of election and popular assent. We say 'vainly', because the superiority of superior men is expressed, among other things, by the fact that they are capable of discerning what is of real value, and of arranging the various values hierarchically. that is, as subordinating or superordinating each other. Now, it is precisely this capacity which is completely overturned by the aforementioned democratic principles, insofar as they leave the judgment, which should decide which is the highest value (either with respect to the election, or to the approval) to the mass, that is to say, to all those who, ex hypothesi, are the least capable of judging, and whose judgment is restricted by necessity to the lower values of immediate life. Therefore, in the democratic regime, one can be certain that those who manage to discern the most attractive prospects, however delusory, on the basis of the principle of practical utility, will have a fatal predominance over the rest. This fatal error — similar to that of someone who, after having granted that the blind should be guided by those who see, demands that the blind decide who can see and who cannot — is the main cause of the modern degradation of political reality to the plane of purely empirical, utilitarian and material reality.

We admit that there remains one possible objection to our view: the argument that the material well-being of the people could favour a development of a higher order. But this thesis is questionable. The fact is that higher values and regenerating forces have usually arisen from moments of social crisis, whereas the 'geese of Capua', the periods of economic wealth, have usually led to stagnation and dullness in the life of the

spirit. This is a reflection of what happens in the life of individuals, in which certain values spring principally from the ground of suffering, renunciation and injustice, and in which a certain degree of tension, of living 'dangerously' from every point of view, is the stimulus to the sense of the actuality of the spirit. But, leaving this aside, we shall merely ask: by what means should the majority be expected to discern, on the basis of their material interests alone, who of their proposed leaders are capable of taking an interest also in higher values?

The truth is that democratism depends upon an optimistic hut absolutely gratuitous presupposition. It completely fails to recognise the utterly irrational character of the psychology of the masses. As we have already indicated above, in our discussion of 'ideational keys', the mass is influenced not by reason, hut by enthusiasm, emotion and suggestion. Like a young girl, it follows the one who knows best how to fascinate it, by scaring it or alluring it, using means which contain no inherent logic whatever. Like a woman, it is inconsistent, and flies from one mirage to another, in a manner that cannot be explained by any uniform rational law or progressive process. 'Progress', in the sense not just of the mere observation that things go better or worse from the material point of view, but that there occurs a passage from a materialistic criterion to a higher criterion, is a Western superstition which has arisen from the Jacobin ideology, against which we can never react with sufficient vigour. To the same degree to which it is possible to speak of self-government of the masses, in the sense that the right of election and approval can be left to the community. we might equally assert that the 'people' could be considered as one intelligence, as one great being, living a single, actual, conscious and rational life. But this is a pure optimistic myth, which no social or historical consideration confirms, and which was merely invented by a race of slaves, intolerant of true leaders, who sought a mask for their anarchic determination to subject everything to their own rebellious will.

This optimistic presupposition of democratism is also, and eminently, a presupposition of the doctrine of anarchism. And,

in a rationalised and theologised form, it reappears as the basis of the historical tendency towards, and the theory of, the 'absolute state'.

# Anti-Hegelianism

In our description of the modern world, we often use the term 'mass' in preference to more fashionable terms such as 'people' or 'humanity', which were transmitted by the French Revolution. The reason for this is that these terms already reflect the democratic and collectivist way of thinking. We cannot and will not endorse in any way that tenacious residue of the scholastic mentality by which the so-called 'universals' are reified or substantiated.

Let us explain this, as follows: we are still waiting for someone to demonstrate to us that there exists, for example, 'Man', over and above individual men. We know of men, but of 'Man' in general we know nothing, or, to put it better, we know that he is nothing, merely a concept obtained by cancelling the specificities of concrete individuals, which vanish in an empty uniformity through the abstraction peculiar to a classificatory pragmatism, 'Man', as such, is something which has existence only in our mind, but to which nothing corresponds in reality.

In the same way, we hold that 'the nation', 'the people', 'humanity', etc., are just metaphors, rather than real beings, and that their 'unity' is simply verbal, not that of an organism constituted according to an inherent rationality, but that of a system of many individual forces jostling together and counterbalancing each other, and for this reason essentially dynamic and unstable. Let us bear this well in mind when we use the term 'mass', adding to its already mentioned character of irrationality that of its multiple nature.

From this point of view, even the fundamental democratic concept of the so-called 'will of the people' turns out to be self-contradictory, and needs to be replaced by that of the momentary balance of many wills, those of the many more or less

closely associated individuals, in the same way that the jet of a waterfall, from a distance, may seem motionless and unitary, but, at close range, is seen to come from an infinity of different elements in incessant motion. Therefore any democratism, basically, is nothing but liberalism and disguised atomism.

Wr cannot over-emphasise these considerations, which have enabled us to grasp the unreality of 'the people', 'the nation', etc., and the non-logical nature of the multiple reality to which these are concretely reduced - until a force from above manifests and the power of faithfulness is awakened Here it is decisive that, not only have we exposed the pretence according to which the democratic doctrine of organisation below is justified as self-government of 'the people' or 'the nation', but we have also revealed an even older pretence, with which a lot of conceptions which claim to be, and believe themselves to be, undemocratic, are suffused. We refer to the neo-Hegelian doctrine of the 'absolute state', or superstate, which affirms that what is real is the state, not the individuals, all of whom, starting with the leaders, should vanish behind the state<sup>1</sup>, of the 'absolute state', or superstate, which affirms that what is real is the state, not the individuals, all of whom, starting with the leaders, should vanish behind the state.

Few obsessive phenomena appear to us to be of as aberrant a character as this one, whose abstractedness from reality is certainly much worse than that of democratism. We have already seen that, in democracy, 'the people' is basically a mask, which, through the more concrete notion of 'general interest', reveals to us, especially in its liberalistic forms, the reality of the individuals in accordance with whom the centre moves, albeit in an egalitarian and anti-hierarchical manner. In the doctrine of the 'absolute state', this reality disappears, devoured by a mere idea; no centre, either above or below, remains, insofar as here the leaders themselves are the obsessed of the obsessed, instruments of this impersonality to which everything gets subordinated.

We expressed ourselves quite clearly with respect to the pragmatic value which certain 'ideational keys' or 'myths' can have,

and we could even grant, with due reservations, that the 'absolute state' is one of these. It is necessary however that the thing does not become a mere cavalcade of folly. Any true imperialism has to be intensely positive, and therefore it must recognise one reality alone: that of the individual. The empire will serve an individual, a superior individual, that individual capable of saying: "L'État, c'est moi" – the individual will not serve the state. There will be a hierarchy because there are leaders, not leaders because there is a hierarchy. The profound impression, the organising dominion, left by a group of conquerors, will give sense to the so-called 'national unity' or 'nation', not the myth of this latter to the deep life of the former, who do not need it at all. The state, the nation — and 'tradition' too — are abstractions (at best, tasks), which find their reality only in certain individuals, who impose themselves, create paths where there were no paths, and confer unity upon what was merely multiplicity, chaos, commotion, the rule of sub-personal forces.

Once this reality, this higher level of force, life and light, whose handing down through elites or dynasties, through generations, beyond the limits of time, constitutes precisely that which can be said to be Tradition in an eminent and positive sense, outlives itself, by inertia, in the empty form of an imperial or national organisation without anything which could still justify it, centred on a monarchy whose throne is empty — then this obsessive survival, which has become autonomous and reacts against that of which it is only a shadow, with its demand that no individual dominate it and that it remain the supreme reality, this degeneration, becomes the genesis of the idea of 'absolute state', of 'Nation', and of the whole associated rhetoric of the most recent times.

This superstition, or political heresy, has, thanks to Hegel, culminated in a philosophical system. We should resolutely get rid of it, and of all of its reflections, to return to the Nordic-Aryan vision of free and living beings, who do not recognise the voice of the levelled multitudes, but instead beat down and mock these idols of clay, these modern ideologies, and organise themselves freely, on the only possible basis, which is the

recognition of the irreducible differences among men, which define themselves in the natural and dynamic relation of their intensity. Men, leaders of men, and men, slaves of men, as pure forces, not men turned into shadows by shadows.

As against the collectivist, centralist, homogenising concept of state and nation, we insist therefore on the pluralistic, individualistic and realistic concept, as base for a restoration, in a hierarchical, manly, and entirely non-democratic sense.

Let us not forget that 'the nation' is a modern invention - a French invention. The birth of the idea of 'the nation' coincides with the fall of our feudal, aristocratic and imperial ideal. For the primordial Germanic races. The nation' meant the entire people, commanded by free masters, allied by blood, combined for action in a common front, ready to submit themselves with pride to the discipline of a warlike Order in which every filiation became 'vassals' of a dux or heretigo, while always preserving their independence and their feeling of being themselves differentiated principles, not mere tributaries to the collective. The same thing could be said, more or less, of the ancient aristocratic constitution of Rome. The same, mutatis mutandis, of the Arvans of India: they did not know the 'nation' but only the caste, and, in them, the caste found a spiritual expression, as supreme and inviolable principle of order and hierarchy. The same, of the Arvans of Iran: the divine fire - hvarenô or farr - carried by their race, meets in the three fires, to which the articulation of the three higher castes corresponds — masters of the sacrifice, warriors, and heads of families, but without any collective and 'public' bond.

The main feature of the formations of the Nordic-Aryan peoples is this sense of individuation, of anti-collectivism, which then coincides with civilisation, with 'form' — as against the promiscuity peculiar to the Southern communities and races and the lower forms of society.

When the sovereigns in the West became hostile to feudal aristocracy, when they aimed systematically at centralisation in the sense of the 'nation' — and it is specifically France which started this process in a decisive manner — they began to dig

their own graves. The 'authorities' established by the kings eliminated the privileges and differentiated laws peculiar to each caste, by means of an absolutist levelling process, and became the basis upon which, undermining royalty, the 'people', the mass, took shape and exercised its actual tyranny. Any absolutist state is an anti-aristocratic state. Any centralisation paves the way to demagogy, and therefore to the fall from the personal to the collective.

Individuality, differentiation, articulation — an Order based solely upon individuals and upon crystal-clear, pure, manly relations between individuals — this is our ideal.

Nationalism: return to totemism.

Superstate as embodiment of the 'absolute spirit': mask of the Leviathan idea — antercom to Sovietism

# Anti-Historicism

Let us consider one particular democratic deviation, and its historicist disguises: we shall choose the ideology of the Italian, Giuseppe Mazzini, for our criticism, simply as a starting point. The same considerations could certainly be extended to other conceptions which have the same spirit, and which today are anything but rare. But Mazzini's ideology is especially interesting for its attempt to mix different motifs, not excluding the Roman idea itself.

This variant of the democratic will has invented a 'philosophy of history', which our previous arguments already suffice to undermine. It not only 'reifies' but blatantly theologises 'the people': the entity, 'the people', becomes a mystical body in which divinity itself, taken from the sky and duly socialised, lives and reveals itself as if it were its animating spirit — according to a progressive law of development which is the evolution of humanity itself through great cycles, each of which reflects an idea or 'revelation' of the divine mind.

This is a miserable modern mythology, in which no serious person can possibly have faith any longer, and whose Semitic-

Protestant character is immediately obvious. We repeat that the entity, the people', if is not a mere abstraction, is a lower, irrational and 'demonic' entity, which in itself, without the dominating action of superior beings, could not have any relation with the divine. We consider as a deviation the idea that the divine should reveal itself, in any sense, in confusion or in the element of the mass, as opposed to doing so in those who are almost, themselves, divine natures. We refer here to the Dorian-Olympian idea of the superiority of The gods' over all mere Becoming, compared to which the anti-aristocratic myths of parvenus, such as the idea of 'progress' or that of the 'evolution of humanity', can be described as superstitions of base origin, and the idea of a providential, or in any sense 'rational', plan of history, the idea that everything that happens should be regarded as 'rational' or 'justified' or an element in the fulfillment of a transcendent end, by which the private opinion of some philosopher or other would then be validated, can be described as the mere fantasies of weak souls. As free beings, we see freedom expressed in history, and we particularly dispute the legitimacy of the idea of a 'philosophy of history', because it only expresses a disguised form of determinism, and an incapacity to see and value the living, individual, unique reality of historical facts. As aristocratic spirits, we oppose to the modern myth of evolution and development the traditional ideal of stability, or indeed the traditional myth of involution, the decline which was uniformly given as the 'sense of the story', through doctrines such as that of the 'four ages', from Hesiod to the Persians, from the Chaldeans to the Indians, from the the Nordic conceptions Egyptians to on the What, in any case, does the Mazzinian philosophy of history want? One thing only: to show that what has to be, because it incorporates the 'finality' of the historical progress itself — and therefore the 'third Rome' should take prophetic mission — is anti-empire, that is, the ideal of humanity as sole reality, realised through the fraternity of equal peoples, impersonally associated in an anti-monarchical federation, opposed to any hierarchy from above, deluding itself

that it expresses, through the mythical 'will of the people', a superstitiously conceived 'will of God'. If this ideology is stripped of all its mystical aspects and the hidden and unconfessed impulses which give it life are coldly scrutinised, it will become apparent that they are, once more, the sophistic notions of democracy and anarchy, along with the old optimistic illusions about the rationality of the mass and of history. This ideal is in fact distinctly and unequivocally identical to the ideal of the *ecclesia*, which arose from the Semitic-Plebeian revolt against the ideal of Rome, and, therefore, it is essentially identical also to the spirit of the Reformation, the spirit from which all modern organisation is derived: anti-imperial, anti-aristocratic, anti-religious — in that it reduces religion to mere sociality — and anti-qualitative. Its acme is Anglo-Saxon and American society.

The Mazzinian ideal is in reality identical to this essentially democratic and Lutheran product, foreshadowed by the socalled 'League of Nations'. In fact, an international confederation, presided over, not by power and the individual, the bright reality of one single higher being — the emperor of the oecumenical, Ghibelline, Dantesque conception, which "upon considering the different conditions in the world, should have, in order to direct the different and necessary offices, the universal and indisputable office of complete command" (Convivio, IV, 4) - but by a people, or rather by 'the people', 'humanity', since, according to Mazzini, the sole mission of the 'chosen people' (and 'chosen people' is another Jewish superstition: we do not know 'chosen peoples', but only peoples which are superior, or which, by means of struggle, create themselves as superior) would be to deny itself and to impose this new gospel: that all peoples are free and fraternal. The vague Mazzinian nationalism first proclaims, to people and nation, a function and a special mission, but then dissolves this mission into the general interest of humanity. Thus a sort of universal confederation, to be constituted on the basis of a system of anti-monarchical and anti-catholic revolutions, is at the centre of Mazzini's entire politico-religious gospel, and we can

see how this gospel, basically, is a forerunner of the various aristocratic, pacifistic, and democratic modern tendencies which culminate in so-called 'Pan-Europa'.

Nor do the Mazzinians fail to insinuate that the true Rome, Rome per se, is itself surpassed by 'progress'. Their blind. evoluitonistic apriorism drives them to the deplorable superstition which reduces Roman heathenism to the level of purely legal and material reality and regards the values of the spirit as prerogatives of Christianity. The 'mission' of heathen Rome, according to them, was exhausted in the creation of a legal unity and of a material Empire, based on force; the second Rome, the Catholic one, is thought of in contrast as a spiritual Empire; and the synthesis becomes the third Rome, which is supposed to affirm social unity, in the form of the pallid associationism and federalism which we mentioned above. Roman law would have established 'freedom', laying the material basis for an equality which would then be realised on the spiritual plane by Christianity, and a new period would be prophesied in which the two terms, freedom and equality, would meet in a synthesis given by the concept of associated humanity.

Uncompromising defenders of the values of the heathen tradition, we reject all these historicist sophisms. No, whether or not anyone accepts the fact, Rome was a simultaneously material and spiritual reality, a complete and shining ideal, which rebels against any attempted confinement within the stages of some arbitrary dialectic of 'progress'. It was the Augustan power, arisen "to govern the nations — these shall be thine arts - to establish the custom of peace, to spare the vanquished, and to break in battle the proud" (Virgil, Aenead, VI, 852-854), and, once, it was something sacred: a cultural formation in which there was no gesture of life, public or private, in war or in peace, which was not accompanied by rite or symbol; a cultural formation of mysterious origin, with its own demi-gods and divine kings, and with the Aryan cult of fire and victory at the apex of a pax augusta et profunda. In the imperial function, people recognised with awe that the universal aeternitas was almost completely realised in material form.

No, the new Asian belief was not the 'continuation' of Rome, but a distortion of Rome, which did not hesitate to identify the city of Caesar with the beast of the Jewish Apocalypse and the prostitute of Babylon, Rome did not know 'equality', as conceived of by the modern rabble. The aeguitas of Roman law is an aristocratic concept, related only to the classic idea of justice, which the Christian concepts of pity, forgiveness, repentance, grace, compassion, and love, undermined. Only the levelling down of all terrestrial values to a uniform valuelessness, in the equality of all beings before 'God', on the basis of the 'original sin' of Jewish belief and the arbitrariness of grace, produced in the West an egalitarian principle which was totally unknown to the higher forms of heathen civilisation, which would have regarded it as heretical, since even on the material plane they were ruled by hierarchical organisation, military relations, relations of dominion and of enslavement and the precedence of elites.

Romanity did not need any Semitic contribution in order to be able to recognise its universal ideal, and realise it. Whatever, through successive epochs, remains great, belongs to it. As we have already said, the greatness of Rome, risen from the forces of the Nordic Aryans, created the definitive, great, oecumenical epoch of the West, the feudal-imperial civilisation of the Middle Ages. What would otherwise have remained the inheritance of an obscure Palestinian sect could perhaps, through us, as Church, participate for a moment in a universal value<sup>2</sup>.

But our universality is not Mazzini's universality, which is only an internationalism, only the display of a levelling, fraternalising, socialistic, democratic tendency, which is in no way Roman, whose freedom is not our freedom, whose last word is not organism, but aggregate, not universality, but collectivity.

And the two terms of the Mazzinian pseudo-synthesis, Romanity and sociality, represent two incompatible concepts. Between them there is a choice, but there is no possible compromise or reconciliation<sup>3</sup>.

Let the rabble, which has broken all its chains and flooded all the dykes, poisoning all the wells, dirtying all the

crossroads of science, politics, religion, and culture with its absence of spirituality, now, in a world which no longer knows either emperors or shepherds, seek its justification and its alibi in its 'sense of history'. Let it strive so that the rhytm of history, of evolution, accelerates, that change becomes pandemic, that the glorious aim of its 'progress' — the radiant future' — approaches ever nearer, so that the ultimate fall, beneath which it will be buried in wretchedness, comes all the sooner<sup>4</sup>.

We belong to a different world, which persists according to the stability of the things which retain being<sup>5</sup>. We possess a truth, not a rhetoric<sup>6</sup>.

We possess a tradition; Rome for us remains that unchanging, realised, and supra-historic symbol, which made the Galileans say: "As long as Rome exists, we need not fear the convulsions of the final age — but if Rome falls, humanity will be near its end".

### Individual and Humanity

Another means by which democratism may attempt to justify itself, only more evolutionist than historicist, can be found in the assertions of Duke G. Colonna di Cesarò<sup>7</sup>. It has the advantage of being able to be considered in its own right, not just on the basis of a hypothetical confirmation of a suitably pious nature, but as a possible conception of the world in general. It is certainly more consistent, and for this very reason it can be shown all the more easily to really tend to the support of the values of the hierarchical ideal.

According to this point of view, humanity possesses a social nature, which, far from being the culmination of an ideal development, is only its point of departure. This stage can still be found in some primitive peoples, where it seems that the individuals do not have a true consciousness of their own as autonomous beings, but live as parts of an indistinct collective being, which is their tribe or their people.

Di Cesarò sees the passage beyond this primitive 'social' stage, this primal shared 'humanity', as progressive: it is necessary that men assert themselves as individual, distinct, self-conscious centres. Then, in a third moment, he calls for the restoration of the universal connection of humanity, which will then no longer be a natural given in which the individuals are linked immediately, but instead will be something which men themselves will create, spontaneously, by means of their own free action. Democratism would correspond to this third phase, insofar as it would aim precisely at the ideal of a sociality on the basis of a whole of equal, autonomous and free beings.

The main area for criticism in this idea is the following: we need to determine the precise difference between the latter so-ciality, the point of arrival, and the former, the point of departure of such development.

Di Cesaro combines with the view we have explained, the concept of a law of progressive individuation, which puts things in a very different light. According to this law, the lower degrees of reality differ from the higher, in that in the former, the individual can be split into parts each of which preserves the quality of the previous whole (the parts of a mineral, for example — and something similar happens in certain species of plants and in the parthenogenesis of lower animals), while in the latter, this is no longer possible, since the individual is a higher organic unity, which cannot be divided without the destruction of the whole, its parts losing the specific living significance that they had within it. Nature, in this view, demonstrates progressive individuation, from the physical mineral systems to the supreme individuality and unbreakable simplicity peculiar to human self-consciousness.

According to di Cesaro, however, a fourth stage of this process, in which the progressive law of individuation would tend to surpass the human individual in a vaster form of association, which would be the social individual, the social and spiritual unity of humanity, is conceivable. This unity would therefore differentiate itself from the other, that of primitive sociality, by being the apex of a process of individuation.

In all this, there is enough to overturn the democratic position. What does individual being, in fact, mean? It means, as we have stated, that the state of the mere aggregate of separable parts (the cruder form of mineral individuation) ceases. and a higher principle arises which asserts itself over them. subordinates them to itself, and makes them obey a specific law. And the more perfect their subordination, and the domination of this higher principle, the greater the individuation. And then: just as we see that the unity of the chemical compounds have dominion over various elements and purely physical forces (lower degree), and the vegetal unity is a dominion over various sub-unities and chemical laws by virtue of a higher law which transcends them, and so on - in the same manner, admitting the development which we mentioned above, beyond the single individual, by the unity of the 'social individual' we would mean a dominion over the single individuals — not the democratic unity of the representation of the many, but rather the imperial unity of the rule of the many, the *Imperium*, which corresponds to the hegemony which shines, unquestionably, in the life of the soul, master of itself and of the body.

Therefore, precisely by admitting the law of progressive individuation, we find that, if there is to be a difference between the point of departure and the point of arrival of the process, if this process is to be something more than an enormous vicious circle, the difference can only consist in this: that, in the beginning, any T, in itself, was nothing, and identical to all the others, as a sort of medium in which the collective life of the community circulated; but, at the end, after greater and greater distances are created between T and T, differentiating higher from lower degrees of self-consciousness and human power and creating thus a hierarchy, those who could no longer be called humanity, but masters of humanity, will arise.

This is the only way to understand the law, or, better expressed, the will of progressive individuation coherently, with respect to a possible development beyond the form peculiar to normal human consciousness; and we add that the idea of 'master of humanity' is by no means one invented by us: it cor-

responds precisely to the primordial Aryan concept of the *cakravartî*, which, in the symbolic terms of saga and myth, was constantly connected with the real or legendary figures of great rulers, from Alexander the Great to King Arthur and Emperor Frederick II.

From one point of view, this may perhaps have a certain air of abnormality, almost as if a part of the body were to assume the right to subordinate to itself all the other parts. But this impression vanishes completely as soon as one ceases to refer to the one who, as ruler of men, would no longer be a man, but a being of higher level, as 'man', even if exteriorly he preserves, more or less, common human appearances. We have here an intangible hierarchy, each of whose elements is a consciousness and cannot be distinguished by any physically visible feature. Thus, the ruler cannot be compared, for instance, to a hand which attempts to gain control of the whole body, but should rather be compared to the organic unity of the body which, in a higher, incorporeal synthesis, includes the hand and all the rest.

Just as we can imagine that the unifying and organising function of nature to which a mineral compound corresponds transforms itself and passes (in the ideal, not the historical, sense) into a higher power, in which the elements and mineral laws make themselves means, subordinate to the vegetal individual, and so on — analogically, we can imagine that the power which rules that bundle of beings and elements which constitutes the personality of a common man passes to a higher power, in which the elements which must be dominated according to the same relation are the laws and the wills of the individual consciousnesses of men or of races.

Let us stress here that we do not want to abolish 'man', that is to say, that consciousness of freedom, individuality and autonomy which individual men have attained, as against primitive, indistinct, mediumistic sociality. A true king never wishes to possess shadows, puppets and automatons as subjects, but rather he desires individuals, warriors, living and strong beings; and his greatest pride would be to feel himself to be a king of kings.

Besides, as we have already stated, although we assert uncompromisingly the necessity of hierarchy, we maintain that this hierarchy should be built dynamically and freely, through natural relations of individual intensity. This is how primitive aristocracies formed — where a supernatural principle did not impose them directly - not by election and recognition from below, but by the direct self-assertion of individuals capable of a degree of resistance, of responsibility, of heroic, generous, vast and dangerous life, of which the others were not capable. It is the 'test of fire': what terrorises and breaks some, makes those who withstand it into leaders, to whom the masses naturally and lively subject themselves and give obedience — so long as others, even stronger, do not appear, whose right and dignity the former leaders will be the first to recognise, without resentment or envy, but lovally, militarily. The value of the individual maintains itself better in this conception than in any other, therefore.

It is the democratic solution that tends to destroy the worth of the individual, through the creation of an impersonal reality which levels all individuals under one law, which is not individualised in anybody, is not justified in anybody, and serves as reciprocal support, as reciprocal defence, and as reciprocal slavery, of beings each of whom is insufficient in himself.

## The Irrationality of Equality

To recapitulate what we said at the beginning of this chapter: behind the 'people' of which democrats speak, we find the 'many' — and here is what is distinctive — understood in an egalitarian way, insofar as recognition by the leaders, it is claimed, is determined not by quality, but by quantity (the greater number, the majority, of the electoral system). But quantity can be a criterion only on the presupposition of the equality of all individuals, which makes the value of each of their votes equal.

Now this 'immortal principle' of equality may be the most questionable thing in all this. The inequality of men is something too obvious for us to need to waste words upon: one only

needs to open one's eyes to see it. But our opponents, who will grant this, will make it a matter of principle, and will say: men may very well be unequal, but they are so *defacto*, not *de jure*; they are unequal, but they should not be. Inequality is unjust, and not to tolerate it, but instead to seek to remedy it, is precisely the merit and the superiority of the democratic ideal.

Nevertheless, these are mere words: the fact remains that the concepts of 'the many' and of 'equality' are mutually contradictory.

In the first place, they are contradictory according to the Leibnizian principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which is expressed as follows: a being which was absolutely identical to another would be one and the same thing as the other. Kant sought to refute this by claiming that, in different spatial locations, there can be equal vet distinct things: but, even leaving aside the inconsistency which would arise from transferring to the spiritual ground an observation peculiar to the physical world, the modern notion of space rejects the objection, since, for it, any point entails the ascription of a different value to four-dimensional Minkowski's space-time-continuum tion<sup>8</sup>. In the concept of 'many', that of fundamental diversity is therefore implicit: an absolutely equal 'many' would not be a 'many', but one. To want the equality of the many is a contradiction in terms.

In the second place, they are contradictory according to the principle of sufficient reason, which is expressed as follows: for everything there must be some reason for it to be what it is and not something else. Now a being absolutely equal to another would lack 'sufficient reason': it would be a duplicate completely deprived of any meaning.

For both these reasons, then, the idea that the 'many' not only are unequal, but have to be unequal, and that inequality is true *de facto* because it is true *de jure*, that it is real because it is necessary, turns out to be rationally founded.

But to posit inequality is to transcend quantity in favour of quality; and so, the possibility, and the necessity, of hierarchy is justified; it is in this way that the criterion of the 'majority' is

proved absurd, and that any law, or any morality, which works on egalitarian presuppositions, is proved unnatural and violent.

We repeat that it is the superior which should justify the inferior, and not vice versa. Just as the nature of error is not to recognise itself as error, whereas the nature of truth is to posit itself in consciousness as truth, while recognising at the same time error as error — the nature of what is superior is to posit itself as superior, as against the inferior, which is rendered inferior by this assertion. Superiority must not be submitted to any sanction or test of recognition, it must be based only on the direct awareness of superiority of those who are superior and posit themselves as superior to any test.

For the same reason, the so-called 'criterion of utility' cannot offer any support. In fact we would have to first decide what is useful, in relation to what, and to whom. For example, a role for violence also exists in the democratic regime - the violence peculiar to the constituted authority, which requires a tax department, civil and criminal laws, etc. This violence is not referred to as such because it is thought to contribute to the greatest good of the greatest number. But who defines and justifies what is useful, and thus determines the much discussed border between legality' and 'illegality? We have already shown that, in a rational order of things, it cannot be the mass, because of the instability and inferiority of its discriminating power. Therefore, if one fails to transcend mere quantity in favour of quality, the whole thing will turn into the worst sort of tyranny: that exercised by the majority upon the qualitatively superior minority, which is overwhelmed inexorably by the determinisms of lower life, and of organised 'society', made law, precisely as happens in the modern West.

However, the 'useful', in the context of the mass, is something far less absolute than many would like to believe. Because of the irrational character of the psychology of the masses, that which commands majority assent has very seldom been the 'useful' pure and simple, and even less often has it been the autonomous will of the many; instead, infinitely more often, it has been the power, the evocative force, of special persons, of

which overwhelming majority assent has been a mere result and echo. Powerful individuals knew how to cany the crowds where they wanted them to go, ignoring all the mediocre, middle-class rules, calculated with precision, of 'utility', of suitability, of general well-being. History shows this to us, everywhere: fired by enthusiasm for a man, a symbol, or an idea, millions of beings have overwhelmed the barriers of cautious normality, and sacrificed, immolated, or destroyed themselves.

Democratism knows this, and for this reason, slowly, subtly, winding throughout the whole of Europe, it seeks to extinguish the race of the leaders, the guiding spirits, the fascinators, and to create a levelling effect which reduces everything to the autonomy peculiar to the parts of an economic mechanism left to itself. And the game is being frighteningly successful, lately. Bolshevised. Russia and democratic and mechanised America are presented as being in opposition to one another, but in reality they are merely the two polar symbolic expressions of one and the same danger<sup>9</sup>.

But this will to degeneration, this darkness, in which Western 'civilisation' is foundering, finds us opposing it. We, like Nietzsche before us, raise the alarm and issue a call. Our nations impose a block on the Bolshevik-American tide, not by means of words, threats, or empty proclamations, but silently, by isolating ourselves and building up an aristocracy, an elite, which preserves firmly, in the living reality of superior individuals, the values of our tradition.

From this action all else will follow as natural consequence.

## From Clan to Empire. Our Doctrine of Race

We described, in the course of our discussion of the ideas of Duke di Cesaro, the 'social' form peculiar to the primitive community. We also alluded in passing to a relation — which could appear paradoxical to many — between totemism and nationalism. We now need to explain this, and to give an account of the relation between the concept of clan and the concept of

Empire, between the concept of race and the concept of civili-zation in the higher sense.

In the face of the various abstract, rationalistic forms of universalism, one is certainly justified in demanding some recognition of the right of blood, and in asking for truths and validity, which can serve as potent emotive expressions of our lives and which, therefore, are related to our blood and race, instead of being colourless generalities 'valid for all'. But, in the respect, racial theory so far presents just a general premise, which needs further determination.

We must remember that to speak of blood in regard to man is not the same tiling as to speak of it in regard to the animals. If, by blood, one means the biological heredity of a race, then we must note that, in the animals, race is everything, while, in man, It is only a part. The mistake of certain race fanatics, who think that the reintegration of a race in its ethnic unity would mean *ipso facto* the rebirth of a people, lies exactly here; they think of man as one might think of thoroughbred horses or pure-bred cats or dogs. The preservation or the reintegration of the purity of race, in the narrowest sense, may mean everything in an animal, but not in man — at least, not in the man of superior type: for him, it can be regarded as a condition which, although necessary from various points of view, is not sufficient in any way, since the factor of race is not the only one which defines man.

To arrive at a higher level and to refute the accusation of biological materialism, it is not sufficient, either, to attribute to every race a mystical soul, a 'spirit' peculiar to it, since in fact this can already be found, in the most significant manner, in the primitive totemic type of society. As is well-known, in these forms of society, the totem is the mystical soul of the group, the clan or the race: the individual members feel themselves, in their blood and in their life, to be just so many embodiments of this collective spiritual force, rather than possessing any individual personality.

If the totemic force remains at this diffuse and faceless level, so to speak, and if, consequently, there are neither leaders nor subjects, and the individuals constituting the group are nothing

but compounds — then we find ourselves at the lowest level of human society, at the level which borders on the subhuman. that is to say, on the animal kingdom. This is confirmed by the fact that the totems - the mystical souls of the clan - are often regarded at the same time as the 'spirits' of particular animal species. Besides, it is most interesting that, even when the totem is of a masculine form, the composition of these societies reflects above all the telluric-matriarchal type, peculiar to the non-Arvan, and, especially, the southern races. The communal principle plays a decisive role here. This type corresponds spiritually to the 'path of the ancestors', or pitr-vâna, of which the Indian traditions speak, also called, path of the soil or of the mother, according to which the individuals dissolve entirely after their death into the original stocks or forces of the race and blood of the ancestors, to which, as to nothing else, true existence belongs. However, while this path, the path of the totem, is also called the path of the south, there is also, opposed to it, the solar path or path of the gods, deva-vâna, also called the path of the north; a path which we can also call Olympian, travelled by those who make themselves immortal. who make themselves gods, who 'emigrate not to return'.

This contrast constitutes the key to our problem. A civilisation, in the true and superior sense — with respect to the individuals as well as to the peoples — only arises where the totemic level is overcome, and where the element of race, even understood mystically, is not the last instance; where, besides blood, a force of higher, meta-biological, spiritual, and 'solar' type manifests itself, which at the same time does not apply only to something outside of life, but determines life, transforming it, refining it, giving it a form which it did not have before, freeing it entirely from any confusion with animal life, and opening the various paths to accomplishment appropriate to the various types of personality. When this occurs, the ethnic tradition is not destroyed, but it comes to serve as the basis upon which a spiritual tradition arises as inseparable twin — and here, as between the spiritual factor and the biological factor, it is the second which should be used as support for the first, and not vice versa.

This applies, as we have said, as much to the individuals as to the peoples. As far as the first point is concerned, sociology shows us, in the primitive forms of society, already, the frequent apparition of groups characterised by initiation, which obey a law of their own and enjoy a higher authority; and the most noticeable characteristic of these groups is their purely masculine nature, the principle of the exclusion of women. The situation is no different in the great traditional peoples: from China to Greece, from Rome to the primordial Nordic peoples, and up to the Aztecs and the Incas, nobility was not distinguished by the simple circumstance of having ancestors, but by the circumstance that the ancestors of the nobility were divine, as opposed to those of the plebeians – even though these latter could remain faithful, through the integrity of blood, to their own ancestors too, since, in the regime of castes, the principle of heredity applied not only to the higher castes, but also to the lower ones. The nobles originated from 'demi-gods', that is to say, from beings who had really followed a transcendent form of life, forming the origin of a tradition in the higher sense, transmitting to their lineage a blood made divine, and, along with it, rites, that is to say, specific operations, whose secret any noble family preserved, which allowed their lineage to resume the spiritual conquest at the point which it had previously attained, and to lead it gradually from virtuality to actuality.

Thus, from the traditional point of view, the lack of ancestors is of less importance in distinguishing the plebeian from the patrician than the lack of rites. In Aryan hierarchies, a single characteristic differentiated the higher castes from the lower ones: rebirth. The ârya, as against the shudra (the one who serves), was the dvîja, the reborn. The assertion of the Mânavadharmashâstra (II, 172), that the brâhmana himself, if he omitted initiation, would no longer be differentiated from the one who serves, the shûdra, is most indicative in this respect. Analogically, what characterised the three higher castes among the Iranians was that each of them corresponded to a particular celestial 'fire'. The Nordic nobles were noble be-

cause, in their blood, they carried the blood of the Asen, the 'celestial' forces in continuous struggle with the elementary beings, The nobility of the great medieval Orders of chivalry — among whom the most significant were the Templars — was still linked to initiation. One of the weakest points in Nietzsche's conception is precisely his biological naturalism, which, in most cases, diminishes and secularises its aristocratic original, reducing it to the level of the 'blond beast'.

We have now explained the most essential issue. When we turn our attention from the castes to the races, we must therefore affirm that the true difference between race and race is not the biologically conditioned, naturalistic one, but a much deeper one, that which exists between the races which preserve in the depth of their blood the heritage and continuing presence of a principle instilled by the action of the dominating and 'solar' elites, which transcends the blood itself; and the other races, which have nothing of this, and in which something mixed and related to the forces of the earth, of animality, and of biological collective heredity, prevails. In these latter races, what dominates is totemism, and there is neither true difference, nor true personality; religion turns into an ecstatic-pantheistic nostalgia or, at the limit, into a 'religiousness' in the lunar and communistic sense.

For us, there is no other difference between the noble races of the north and those of the south: so, rather than a difference between race and race, we see a difference between race and super-race. However scandalous this may appear to the profane and plebeian mentality of today, we explain by this difference the divine character — in the literal sense of the word - which some races can have in the eyes of others, in whose blood the heritage of a supra-biological and, we can say, supra-human factor is not transmitted.

Thus, in our opinion, there is a glimmer of truth in the doctrine of the Comte de Gobineau, but no more than a glimmer $^{10}$ . The decay of the qualities and factors which constitute the greatness of a race is not — as he assumed — the effect of mixing between this race and others, nor the effect of its eth-

nic, biological and demographic decay: the truth is rather that a race decays when its spirit decays, when the inner tension to which it owed its original type and its spiritual form disappears. Then a race changes, or is corrupted, because it is damaged in its most secret root; then it loses that invisible, indomitable, transforming virtue, which had brought it about that, when it came into contact with other races, far from contaminating it, they took on little by little the form of its civilisation, and were carried by it as by a vaster current<sup>11</sup>.

This is the reason why the return to race, for us, cannot mean merely a return to blood — especially in these crepuscular times, in which almost irreparable mixings have occurred. It should mean return to the spirit of race, not in a totemic sense, but in an aristocratic sense, that is to say, in connection with the original germ of our 'form', of our civilisation.

If we therefore affirm the return to race and the return to tradition, the idea of the Leader remains nevertheless at the centre of our conception. In their solar individuality, Leaders for us represent the concrete and active manifestations of spirit as race and of race as spirit; they are resuscitations of the primordial idea, sleeping in the depth of the blood as the foundations of 'form', victorious over chaos and animality, which are borne consciously or unconsciously, in potentia or in actu, by all the members of the people who are not degenerates. Leaders restore the intimate tension of, and awaken the 'divine' components of, a transformed blood. Hence the magic of an authority about which there is nothing violent and tyrannical. but rather something royal; the magic of an action 'through presence', of an indomitable 'acting-without-acting', wei-wu-wei as the Chinese phrase has it12. Here is the path towards rebirth. The multiple forces of a race, which are fatally led to alteration and disintegration if they are deprived of this intimate support and left to the play of material, ethnic, and even political conditions, as narrowly defined, find again here a strong and living point of unity, and participate in a higher reality, in the same way that an animal body does when the soul is infused into it.

Any defence of race or blood which ignores this higher aspect, and which, whether in the name of the 'nation', the 'people', or the 'collective', refers to a merging into a single and pure law of blood and soil, signifies nothing but a return to totemism and an inclination to fall back into the social forms peculiar to a lower humanity. Basically, the nostalgia of the socialist, democratic and communist ideologies tends toward no other end than this — and the phenomenon of the Soviet Union illustrates the effect of this ideology, which, following a Jew (Marx), has revived the old, barbaric, Slavic collectivism, in a new, rationalised, form, and created a threatening seat of infection for what remains of traditional Europe.

Far from pointing in any way towards the future, all this is - from the point of view of ideal types — just a reversion to the past, to what was overcome at the time of the formation of every true traditional civilisation and every Empire. Though the 'socialist' and democratic-nationalist ideal may still be surrounded with a certain halo, the fact still remains that — mutatis mutandis — they are perfect reflections, in their social forms, of a lower, anti-Aryan and anti-Nordic type; and if the currents which aim. at these ideals demand the subordination of the individual, and of any higher spiritual possibility, in the name of blood and soil, they basically teach a 'morality' which is no more than that which an animal race arrived at consciousness could claim for itself.

The aristocratic idea of a tradition of Leaders — not the democratic or 'nationalist' idea, which depends upon the mere birth-community of blood and soil — must be the foundation and axis of any doctrine of race rightly understood — of our restoration.

<sup>1</sup> We say 'neo-Hegelian' because we are primarily referring to certain political deductions of the most recent times, whose appeal to Hegel's actual doctrine is only partially justified. Hegel has written (*Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences*, § 539, William Wallace trans.): "As a living mind, the state only is as an organized whole, differentiaded particular agencies, which, proceeding from the one notion

(though not known as notion) of the reasonable will, continually produce it as their result", and (§ 542): "the perfect form of the state, in which each and every element of the notion has reached free existence, this subjectivity is not a so-called 'moral person', or a decree issuing from a majority (forms in which the unity of the decreeing will has not an actual existence), but an actual individual - the will of a decreeing individual, - monarchy." Since this was Hegel's actual idea, our criticism cannot be directed primarily at him. We are concerned to criticise, rather, some recent Italian interpretations of Hegelian thought, along statolatrous lines, for which the idea of absolute state is associated with tendencies towards depersonalising centralisation, the absolute 'socialisation' of every activity, and intolerance towards all traditional concepts of caste and aristocracy: so much so that, within Fascism itself, some have gone so far as to think it possible to reconcile this conception of the state not only with Marxism, but also with Sovietism. [Obviously, Evola refers to Giovanni Gentile when speaking of the author of the tendency, and to Ugo Spirito when speaking of the response from within Fascism (Note of the Editor)]

## IV



# The Roots of European Evil

The have said that the modern world has now reached a point where it is useless to delude ourselves that any reaction not based on a deep spiritual change can have any effect. We can free ourselves from the evil which corrodes us only by a total negation, by a spiritual impulse which makes us into genuinely new beings, and enables us once again to perceive the possibility of grasping a new world, of breathing a new freedom: everything upon which the West currently and vainly prides itself must collapse.

Once we have recognised that our world is a world of ruins, we must strive to recover those values which allow us to understand unequivocally the cause of this ruin<sup>1</sup>.

The first root of European decline is 'socialism', anti-hierarchy.

The fundamental forms which have developed from this root, are:

The regression of the castes.

The development of sciences and positive philosophy.

Technology and the illusion of mechanical power.

'The new romantic and activist myth.

These are the main four roots of European decline, which we will now consider individually from the point of view of our hierarchical values, which are opposed to them.

In this way we shall have exhibited the fundamental features of another vision of the world and of life, which should provide us with a source of strength invisible to others, and give our battle a soul.

## The Regression of the Castes, Gold and Labour

We have already alluded to the fact that, quite generally, a law which gives us the 'sense of history' appropriate for modern times cannot talk of progress, but must talk of involution.

In this respect, there is a process which imposes itself upon the consideration of everyone in the most objective and obvious manner: the process of the regression of the castes<sup>2</sup>. Our 'sense of history' shows that, from the prehistoric period to the present, what occurs is precisely the progressive fall of power through each of the four large castes in which, in traditional civilisations, and especially in Aryan India, the qualitative differentiation of human possibilities found its reflection — from the 'solar' (royal-sacred) caste, to the warlike nobility, to the bourgeoisie (merchants), and finally, to the slaves.

First, we witness the sunset of the period of royal divinity. These leaders, these 'divine' beings, who unite completely in themselves the two powers, the royal and the pontifical authority, belong to a remote, almost mythical, past. It is through a progressive alteration of the Nordic-Aryan force, creator of civilisation, that this fall occurred. In the German ideal of the Germanic Holy Roman Empire we have already recognised the last echo of this tradition, of this 'solar' level.

Once this peak has vanished, authority goes to the immediately inferior level: the caste of the warriors. Now we find monarchs who are now simply military leaders, lords of temporal justice, political absolute sovereigns. The formula of 'divine right' persists here and there, but as a mere reminiscence without definite content. Already in late antiquity we find institutions and sovereigns of this type, which preserve the features of the ancient aristocratic-sacred constitution in form only. After the loss of the unitary medieval oecumene, this phenomenon becomes definitive and decisive.

In the second stage of regression, aristocracy decays, chivalry is extinguished, the great European monarchies are 'nationalised' and fade. By means of revolutions and 'constitutions', when they are not simply supplanted by regimes of a different

type, such as republics or federations, they are transformed into the aforementioned empty survivals, subject to the 'will' of the 'nation'. In parliamentary, republican, or national democracies, the formation of capitalist oligarchies expresses the fatal passage of authority and power from the second to the third caste, or its modern equivalent; from the warrior to the merchant. Instead of the manly principles of loyalty and honour, we find now the doctrine of the 'social contract'. The social bond is now utilitarian and economic: it is a contract conditional upon the utility and self-interest of individuals. In this way, this bond passes necessarily from the personal to the impersonal. Gold becomes the intermediary, and those who take possession of it and manage to multiply it by means of capitalism and industrialism become the real power holders. Aristocracy gives way to plutocracy, the warrior gives way to the banker, the lew, and the industrialist. The traffic in money and interest-yielding instruments, previously confined to the ghetto, becomes the glory and pinnacle of the age. The hidden force of socialism, of anti-hierarchy, begins to reveal its power visibly here.

The crisis of bourgeois society, the proletarian revolt against capitalism, the manifesto of the 'Third International', and the gradual resultant rise and organisation of groups and masses in purely collective and mechanised forms — in the context of a new 'civilisation of work' — indicate to us the third regression, in which authority passes to the last of the traditional castes, that of the slave labourers and mass men, with the resultant reduction of all horizons and values to the material and quantitative plane.

If super-human spirituality and 'glory' characterised the 'solar' period, heroism, loyalty, and honour, that of the warriors, and gold, that of the traffickers and Jews, then the exaltation of the principles of the slaves must match the coming of the slaves: labour becomes its own religion. And the hatred of the slave comes to proclaim sadistically: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat", and its idiocy, praising itself, forms sacred incense from the exhalations of human sweat: "Work

ennobles man", "Work is greatness", "Work is an ethical duty". Thus, the sepulchral stone covers the cadaver of Man, and the cycle of involution seems completed.

To the priests of 'Progress', the future holds no other ideal but this. For the moment, the struggle continues between the Jew, omnipotent master of gold, and his rebellious slaves; and this 'civilisation', of which our contemporaries are so proud, depends upon a monstrous mechanism moved by the brute and impersonal forces of gold, capital and machine.

The bonds of dependence, far from loosening, have tightened. But beside force we no longer see authority, beside obedience, no longer recognition, beside rank, no longer superiority. The master is no longer such because he is master, but because he is one who, without seeing at all beyond the small horizon common to even all human beings, dominates the material conditions of life, by means of which he is also able to subdue or to oppress those whose spirit is infinitely more powerful than his own, rendering possible the most despicable deceit and the most dreadful slavery. The power and the bond of dependence have become depersonalised and mechanised, as capital and machine. Thus, it is no paradox to say that only today can we speak of true slavery, in the form of Western economic and mechanical organisation, as it proceeds towards its own exhaustion, of which Tree America' is giving us the best example.

Perhaps, after only a few more generations, each duly and scientifically educated to the standards of 'service to society', the sense of individuality will be destroyed completely, and, with it, the last necessary remnants of consciousness which would allow them, at least, to know that they are slaves. Perhaps, what will remain will be that state of renewed innocence, which will differ from mythical Eden by the fact that 'Labour' will reign in it as universal and sole purpose of existence, of which Chigalev speaks in Dostoevsky's 'Possessed': this is the ideal of the Soviet<sup>3</sup>.

A dependence which no longer has any leaders, an organisation indifferent towards every qualitative requirement — this

'social' ideal will be realised by brute, impersonal, force, made of mere quantitativity, of money.

We have said: which no longer has any leaders. Let us not delude ourselves about this. We repeat that the race of Masters, if it has not already disappeared, is close to doing so, and the process of its destruction proceeds, in a crescendo of hasty levelling downwards towards the plane of the most material and faceless life. The so-called 'upper' or leading' classes of today are such only by ironic chance: the great leaders of the world-wide financial organisations — the technocrats. industrialists, officials, and so on - are of no more account than the freed slaves to whom the masters once delegated the control of the slaves and the administration of their goods. The same yoke subdues them, that subdues the immense, blind, automatised band of workers and other employees. above whom neither slaves, nor freed men watching over slaves, can survive - and, above: no one - this is the terrible truth of the 'civilised' ones!

And, just as, inwardly, the day of the masters of gold and of machine, without break, feverish, saturated with responsibilities, is incomparably more narrow, dependent, and poor, than the day of a humble craftsman, so too is the day of the 'upper classes', whom gold only serves morbidly, by multiplying their thirst for 'distraction', luxury, voluptuousness, and further earning.

There is no trace of Masters, in all this, and in their absence there is no sense in this pseudo-organisation. If one asks the millions of prisoners, among their machines and offices, for a reason, a justification, beyond the ephemeral intoxication with which they seek to ape the 'refinement' of the 'upper classes', no reply will be given. But if one then ascends in the hierarchy and asks this question to the leaders of the economy', the inventors, the masters of steel, coal, oil, gold, and peoples — for have we not seen that the political problem today tends to be reduced to the economic one? — again, no reply. The instrumentalities of life have prevailed over life itself, or, rather, have reduced it to the status of their own instrumentality. And thus the great darkness extinguishes the light of the illusions of

Western pride; a darkness which is expressed in an ultra-new and monstrous myth: that of work for the sake of work, of work as end-in-itself, as intrinsic value and universal duty.

An infinity of men upon an earth devoid of light, reduced to pure quantity, to quantity alone, rendered equal, according to the material identity of components subordinate to a mechanism which operates on its own, inexorably, but which can no longer accomplish anything — here is the perspective that lies at the root of the economic-industrial course which is being followed by the entire West,

Those who feel that this is the death of life, and the coming of the brute law of matter, the triumph of a fate all the more frightening because it no longer contains any persons, also feel that there is only one remedy: to break the Semitic yoke of gold, to go beyond the fetish of socialised existence and the law of interdependence, to restore aristocratic values, values of quality, of difference, and of heroism, to restore that sense of metaphysical reality which everything today opposes, and which we, therefore, affirm against everything.

This is why we could even recognise in some extremist currents a necessary function and a future, as the search for an economic balance on the basis of which different forms of life no longer reducible to the material plane are able to free themselves and to develop — but only if they are understood as a revolt against the tyranny of the economic, against the state of affairs in which, not the individual, but the quantity of gold, commands, in which concern for the material conditions of existence corrodes the whole of existence<sup>4</sup>.

The greatest single cause of the scarcity of a qualitative differentiation in modern life is the fact that it no longer leaves room for any activity not assessable in terms of practical utility and socialised existence. The economic prejudice causes levelling, since it creates the appearance of difference between those who are really equals, insofar as standing out from others according to one's gold or one's position in the mechanical-economic hierarchy is not evidence of a real difference: all belong to a single level, a single quality; for real difference to

occur, beyond that level, taken in all its possible differentiations, it would be necessary that other levels exist, which today do not exist, and that they should be independent from the sole current level, which should be subordinated to them, and not the other way around, as is irrefutably the fact in contemporary society.

This is why, if the hypertrophied, evil, monstrous bankingindustrial trusts assume without right the name 'imperialism', we, not managing to cry, can only laugh, and oppose adamantly the idea of true Imperium without radical revolution against gold, against capital, as its inescapable premise. We endorse this view, which smoulders in all revolutionary ideologies, as a symptom of the revolt against modern slavery, vet we transcend it, since we can see that it is pervaded with the same evil: it itself sees only economic and social problems. it does not seek liberation from the economic voke itself, in the name of differentiated, meta-economic and metaphysical values, so that ail human forces can work in depth, freed from economic obsession; it merely pursues an egalitarian, even more 'socialistic' (which it considers to mean, better) systematisation of the economic problem, as determined by the purely material and utilitarian needs of the masses. Hence we find. in such tendencies, a distrust, an intolerance, almost a dormant resentment, we do not say for the spiritual, but for the 'intellectual', considered as a 'luxury'5; beyond the economic balance, they do not have an accurate eve for non-economic differences — they do not see them and do not want to see them; they demonstrate the same spirit, of egalitarian and plebeian intolerance, of slaves in rebellion, which was already shown at the fall of ancient Romanity.

In conclusion, it is necessary to fight the main root of the European evil on two fronts. We need not insist upon and dwell upon the first: it consists in creating an elite, in bringing out, conscientiously and tenaciously, new differences, interests, and qualities from the undifferentiated substance of the individuals of today, so that an aristocracy, a race of masters, of rulers, can awaken. This, first of all.

In the second place, what is necessary is a movement, a revolt from the depths, which frees us from the machine, from extrinsic, inorganic, automatic, enforced dependence, which breaks the Jewish, capitalist, economic yoke, which mocks the duty of labour presented as universal law and end-in-itself, which, in short, frees us, and makes way for air and light — for hierarchy can not be restored by means of violence, the dominion of needs, the interplay of passions, interests and ambitions, but only by means of free and spontaneous recognition which springs from the sense of values and of transcendent forces, from faithfulness toward one's way of being, whatever it is, from consciousness of nature, dignity and quality. Organic, direct, real, hierarchy, in this sense, is both freer and more rigorous than any other.

How can one fail to recognise, then, that the reality of the past is also a prophetic myth for a better future? The return to the system of castes is the return to a system of truth, justice and 'form' in the higher sense.

In caste we find an ideal of community, activity, profession, blood, heredity, laws, duties, and rights, which corresponds more precisely to pre-established, typical ways of being, to organic manifestations of natures congenially refined; it presupposes the will to be what one is, the will to realise one's nature and one's destiny as quality, suppressing the vague, individualistic, and opportunistic impulses which are the causes of disorder and disorganisation; we find in it the overcoming of quantitative uniformity, of centralisation, and of standardisation, and the basis for a social hierarchy which immediately reflects a hierarchy of ways of being, of values, and of qualities, and which ascends, in an organised system of degrees, from the material to the spiritual, from the shapeless to the shaped, from the collective to the universal and the supra-universal.

Ancient India offers the most perfect example of this ideal, which, however, is found in different forms in other civilisations as well, up to that of our Nordic-Roman Middle Ages.

Our point of reference cannot be other than this.

As substratum, the sound industriousness of the lower class (shûdra), no longer rendered anarchical by demagogic ideologies; these shudras led by experts in exchange, commerce, and organisation. simplified economic-industrial for simplified needs (vaishva): beyond the vaishvas, the kshatrivas, or warlike nobility, who recognise the value and purpose of war, and in whose heroism, pride, and victory, the higher justification of a whole people can flare; beyond the kshatriyas, the brahmanas, the solar race of spirit and wisdom, of those who 'see' (rshi), who 'can', and who testify by their life that we are not of this dark earth, but that our vital roots vanish upwards into the brightness of the 'heavens'; and, at the apex of everything, as myth and limit, the ideal of the cakravartî, 'the King of the World', the invisible emperor, whose force is occult, strong and unconditioned.

#### Science against Wisdom

Power, depersonalised and socialised, has become gold or capital, and likewise wisdom, depersonalised and socialised, has become 'concept' or 'rationality'. And this is the second root of the European evil.

Both philosophy and Western positive science are, in their essence, fundamentally socialistic, democratic, and anti-hierarchical. They propose to treat as 'true' only the universally recognised, that to which anyone, whatever the life they live from day to day, provided only that they possess a certain education, can assent. And here, as in their use of the criterion of the 'majority' for their political democratism, they presuppose equality, and impose the criterion of quantity on anything that could represent quality, the irreducibility of quality, or the privilege of quality.

And it is useless to proclaim individualistic, or even relativistic, doctrines, if the very manner in which one does so, which is the conceptual manner of profane philosophy, shows that one has adhered to the democratic, impersonal, collectivist

premises which are at the root of this philosophy. The correct method is quite different — it requires us to contest those premises themselves, since we do not want to fall again into the foolishness of an imperialism which, instead of imposing itself through hierarchy from above of which we have spoken, attempts to justify itself by appealing for popular recognition. And here one will begin to realise the nature of one's enemy, and how frighteningly 'culture' itself, not only the 'society' of our contemporaries, is a democratism in actu — and one begins to see what renunciation will be necessary in order to regain soundness.

Just as gold is a reality which has become indifferent to the nature of the individuals who own it, so is the 'knowledge' of contemporary men. Let us put it better: obeying a will to equality, an intolerance for hierarchy, and, therefore, a socialistic prejudice, the knowledge of Europeans had necessarily to fall to a plane on which the effect of individual differences, and of the distinction in kinds of knowledge resulting from an active individual differentiation, is reduced to a minimum; thus, it had to refer, either to physical experience, more or less equal for all men insofar as they are animals (positive science), or to the world of abstraction and of verbal conventions (philosophy and rationalism).

This need for the socialisation of knowledge has led, fatally, to its abstraction, and therefore created an insuperable hiatus between knowledge and life, between knowledge and being, and between knowledge and the potential quality of phenomena and 'metaphysical reality'. Thus, in the West, thought, when it is not reduced to a tool for the more or less conventional transcription of the most exterior, general-quantitative, and uniform side of material things, only generates unreality, 'reified' words, and empty logical schematisms, or becomes an intellectual sport, all the more ridiculous for the good faith in which it is practiced.

Hence the whole unreality of the modern spirit: divorced from life, man today is hardly more than a shadow, which bustles about among schemes and programs and intellectual superstructures, powerless to dominate reality and life itself, while becoming more and more dependent upon a science which adds abstractions to abstractions, slave as it is to phenomenal laws noted but not understood by it, which exhaust themselves in mechanical exteriority, without any of the possibilities for the inner being of man being realised.

We certainly cannot get to the heart of this question here, owing to the limits of the present exposition. It should not be thought, however, that it is unrelated to the problem of the Empire: for us the problem of the Empire is the problem par excellence, and more specialised problems cannot be separated from it and made into domains of their own. Particularism, the reciprocal indifference of the various forms of human activity — here politics, there science, here practice, there religion, and so on — is, as we have already stated, itself an aspect of the European decline, and an unequivocal symptom of Europe's inorganic nature.

Knowledge is the key to the imperial hierarchy: "The experts should govern", Plato once said — and this is a central, absolute, definitive point in any rational order of things. But nothing would be more ridiculous than to confuse this knowledge with some technical competence, positive science, or philosophising speculation, since it coincides, rather, with what, from the outset, we have called Wisdom, a traditional expression used by both the classical West, and the East. Wisdom is as aristocratic, individual, actual, substantial, organic, and qualitative, as the knowledge of the 'civilised' is democratic, social, universalistic, abstract, levelling, and quantitative. They are two worlds, two eyes, two different visions, and the opposition between them should not be understated in even the slightest degree.

To know, according to Wisdom, does not mean 'to think', but to be, the known thing: to live it, to realise it inwardly. One does not know a thing unless one can actively transform one's consciousness into it. Thus, only what becomes apparent through direct individual experience can be considered to be knowledge. And, as against the modern mentality, which

considers what presents itself immediately to the individual to be 'phenomenon', or 'subjective' appearance, and posits some other thing behind it as 'true reality', which is simply thought or supposed (the 'thing in itself of the philosophers, the 'Absolute' of profane religion, the 'matter', the 'ether' or the 'energy' of science), Wisdom is an absolute positivism which regards only what can be grasped by direct experience as real, and everything else as unreal, abstract, and illusory.

It will be objected that, from this point of view, all knowledge would be reduced to finite and contingent things given by the physical senses — and, indeed, this is the way things are, this is how they must be, for the great majority of men, who can only tally claim to know this finiteness and contingency, which remains such even after all the pseudo-scientific explanations. However, beyond this, we support the possibility of forms of experience different from the merely sensory forms of the common man, not 'given', not 'normal', which can be reached by means of certain active processes of inner transformation. The peculiarity of such transcendent experiences (of which the 'supraworld', the 'domain of being', the seven heavens, the spheres of fire, and so on, spoken of by men still linked to Tradition, were only different representations) is that they are direct, concrete, and individual, just as is sensory experience itself, and yet they enable their possessors to grasp reality, beyond the contingent, spatio-temporal aspect of everything that is perceived by the senses. Science too tries to transcend this contingent spatio-temporal aspect, but in doing so it transcends everything which is really knowledge - vision, individual and living evidence — in favour of mere probabilities, incomprehensible 'uniformities', and abstract explanatory principles.

We mean something of this sort when we speak of 'metaphysical' reality. It must be borne in mind, though, that we speak of experience, and only of experience; that, from the traditional point of view, there is not a finite reality and an absolute reality, but a finite manner and an absolute manner of experiencing reality, a finite eye and an absolute eye; that the whole so-called 'problem of knowledge' is enclosed within the inferiority of every being, and does not depend, on 'culture', but on his capacity for freeing himself from the human, i.e., from the sensory, the rational, and the emotional, and of identifying himself with one or another form of 'metaphysical' experience, in a hierarchy which, at its limit, culminates in a state of perfect identity, spiritual vision, full supra-sensual and supra-rational actualisation of the tiling in the I and of the I in the thing, which realises a state of power and, simultaneously, a state of absolute evidence with respect to the thing itself, in which one no longer asks oneself anything, and one discovers that it is just as unnecessary to ratiocinate as it is to speak.

This, in broad outline, is the meaning of that Wisdom which constitutes the hinge of 'metaphysical' teaching and of spiritual science, whose rite of initiation originally produced the transformation of consciousness necessary for 'knowledge' and metaphysical 'vision', and whose tradition has maintained itself in the West, in subterranean form, even after the Semiticisation and decline of its ancient civilisation.

The point to be borne in mind is that sacred and sapiental science, since it is not, like profane science, a 'knowledge', but a form of being, cannot be taught by books or universities or transmitted by words: to gain it, it is necessary to be transformed, to transcend the common life for a superior life. It measures precisely the quality and reality of individual life, of which it becomes an inviolable privilege and an organic part, rather than being a concept, or a notion, which can be put into one's head like something into a bag, without one's having to be transformed or to exercise oneself in the slightest in regard to what one is.

Hence the natural aristocracy of Wisdom; hence its determined non-popularity, its non-communicability. A fetish of Europeans is, precisely, communicability: they think, more or less, that intelligible being and speakable being are the same thing. They do not realise that, although this may make sense with respect to intellectual abstractions and conventions constructed on the basis of experiences supposed to be more or less equal for all — those limited to the physical senses — never-

theless, where this uniformity ceases, where a qualitative differentiation is reasserted, discursive communicativity can no longer be a criterion.

Since it is based, precisely, on the evidence of actual experiences, beyond those of common men. Wisdom leaves open only one road: try to get to the same level as the one who sets out the teaching, by the means of a free and creative act, so as to know from experience what the other knows, or says with words which otherwise will remain only words. To socialisation, depersonalisation and conceptualisation of knowledge. to the democratic inclination to 'popularise', to weaken the superior minority for the sake of the inferior majority, so that the majority can participate in knowledge without bestirring themselves or ceasing to be inferior — we oppose uncompromisingly the opposite, aristocratic, attitude. There should exist hierarchies in knowledge itself: there should exist many truths separated from each other by deep, immense, impassable gulfs, corresponding precisely to the many qualities of life and power, to the many distinct individualities: there should exist an aristocracy of knowledge, and 'universality', understood in a communicative, democratic and uniform manner, should cease to be a criterion. We should not come down to them: they are obliged to raise themselves to us, by dignifying themselves, by ascending seriously, to the limit of their ability, in the hierarchy of beings — if they want to partake of higher and metaphysical forms, which are the points of reference to themselves and to the lower and physical forms.

In this way we rediscover also freedom, the open field, the breath which gives Wisdom. In socialised knowledge there is always a hidden 'you must', a hidden, intolerant, moralistic constraint: 'scientific' or 'philosophical' truth demands to be recognised by everyone as 'the truth'; in front of it, one is not allowed to take a different stand. The expression of a collective despotism, it wants to reign despotically over all, making all equal with respect to it — and it is precisely on the basis of this will that it has organised, built its arms, its ordeals, its method, its violence. In Wisdom, on the contrary, the individ-

ual is dissolved, restored, returned to himself: he has his truth, which expresses exactly and deeply his life, which is a special manner of experiencing and expressing reality, which does not contradict or exclude other, different, manners, which are equally possible in the differentiation on which the hierarchy of Wisdom is based.

This discussion will suffice as far as the second root of the European evil and its corrective are concerned; already, in this brief outline, the principle that "the expert should govern" is justified. In the order of Wisdom, the hierarchy of knowledge is coextensive with the hierarchy of force and superiority of individuals. Knowledge is being, and being is capacity and power, so that it attracts spontaneously to itself the dignity of *Imperium*. The true foundation of the original concept, rooted in the Tradition of 'divine royalty', was nothing other than this.

Opposed to our aim, let us repeat, there is the whole of modern Europe, with its age-old inheritance and organisation: there is, as we said, the domain of professors, 'intellectuals', optical lenses without comprehending eyes behind them, the 'cultured', academic, university world, which, in assuming without right the privilege of knowledge and spirit, testifies only to the point to which the decline and abstraction of modern man can be pushed.

#### 'Those Who Know' and 'Those Who Believe'

But there is an even greater usurpation: that which religion - in the narrowest and newest sense of the term — accomplishes by securing for itself control and expertise in matters of the 'sacred' and of the 'divine'.

The sacred and the divine are matters of faith. This is the truth which has asserted itself in Europe lately. Our truth is otherwise: it is better to know that we do not know rather than to believe.

In the contemporary mentality, there is a central point at which the attitudes of materialistic science and religion meet: In an identical renunciation of, in an identical pessimism and

agnosticism towards, the spiritual, declared and methodical in one case, concealed in the other.

The premise of materialistic science is basically that science "in the sense of real, positive and verifiable knowledge — there can only be in what is physical; and that in the non-physical there can be no certainty, so that the scientific method neglects it and abandons it, because of the lack of certainty that it appears to offer, to belief, to the dull and arbitrary abstraction of philosophy, or to the 'exigencies' of sentiment and morality.

In addition, religion, insofar as it is focused exclusively on faith and does not admit an esoteric initiatory teaching beyond the profane religion imposed on the masses, or a gnosis beyond. sanctimonious superstition, ends up with the same renunciation. In fact, one believes only where one does not know and thinks one cannot know. Hence, there is again the same agnosticism of the 'positivists' with respect to whatever is not material and gross reality.

We, on the contrary, basing ourselves on a tradition much more ancient and real than any which can be claimed by the 'faith' of Western man, on a tradition which is not proved by doctrines, but by deeds and works of power and clairvoyance; we affirm instead the possibility and the concrete reality of what we have called 'Wisdom'. We thus assert the possibility of a knowledge as positive, direct, methodical, and verifiable, in the 'metaphysical' field, as that which science strives to gain in the physical field, and our knowledge, like theirs, stands above any belief of men, whether moral or philosophical.

Therefore, we maintain, in the name of this Wisdom and of those who can attest to this Wisdom, that all those who, by means of religious superstition, mere aspirations of the 'soul', dogmas, traditions of the narrowest and most sectarian sort, hallucinations, and acts of blind faith, make themselves custodians of the sacred and the divine, must be divested of authority and ousted. Those who know, and who, insofar as they know, can be, and are — just like those god-men known and venerated by all great ancient traditions — must replace those who 'believe' — the blind leading the blind.

Therefore, these discussions of what is anti-Europe and the struggle against democracy, in the cognitive field, and on what Wisdom is, constitute within this work of ours anything but a superfluous deviation: until we have clarified this, the identification, which we claim, of the two powers — the sacred and the temporal — in a unique, intensely individualised, hierarchy, could neither be justified nor understood, and instead the most sinister misunderstandings would be possible.

However, once this question has been understood, our declaration that we uncompromising imperialists have no use for a religious hierarchy (as opposed to the Gnostic and initiatory one), is confirmed and justified. In truth, a materialistically organised society to which such a hierarchy could be added would gain nothing from it: it would offer merely a parade of empty forms, fantasies of a faith and a sentiment which has degenerated into self-contradictory dogmas and into symbols and rites which are not its own and whose sense it has lost. In sum, it would not produce the higher, solar, reality, testifying to its own potency, that we as heathens mean by spirit, but instead an absolute unreality, an anti-Aryan and anti-Roman rhetoric confined to the same ethical field, favouring everything feminine, 'romantic' and escapist which already lurks within the Western soul.

It is necessary to surpass both religious unrealism and materialistic realism, by means of a transcendent, virile, Olympian positivism.

#### Mechanical Force and Individual Power

The third of the European illusions is mechanical force, which comes from the technical applications of profane science, in which they claim one and all to see the legitimate pride, the triumph, of Western civilisation.

If the general spirit of the new Semitic doctrine is reflected in the socialistic and egalitarian requirements of the democratism inherent in the ideal of the 'universality' of Western science, we should recognise also some antecedents in the Socratic method and in some aspects of later Greek intellectualism. Nevertheless, according here with Nietzsche, we can consider these as anticipations of and preludes to the Judeo-Christian spirit, in that it is in the judeo-Christian spirit that we see the universalistic and egalitarian tendency manifest itself in the most overwhelming, concrete and unequivocal manner.

Greek culture reflects a more aristocratic concept of knowledge, and the principal motifs of its speculation were drawn from the Wisdom traditions. The doctrine according to which actual knowledge is conditioned by a real process of 'purification' and self-transformation, directed by an active individual initiative or by the traditional power of a 'rite', so that such knowledge is not a merely mental fact, and even less — passing to another aspect — a matter of faith and sentiment, remains a fundamental theme of the classical world, up to the period of neo-Platonism.

Instead, in the passive attitude of the followers of the new doctrine, in their intolerance towards all the individual methods and arts which offered paths to a 'gnosis', to an actual spiritual experience — a concealed intolerance, but one expressed nonetheless in their various doctrines regarding 'revelation', 'grace', and the sinful nature of any direct and precise initiative relying on the powers of man himself — in all this there are enough themes of renunciation, which, combined with democratic and egalitarian pathos, explain the effect of Christianity itself in producing the socialised, popularised, inorganic, impersonal, character of modern knowledge.

Over and above this pernicious universalism, another fundamental aspect of modern science comes from Christianity — we refer to its dualistic presupposition. In modern science, nature is thought of as the absolute 'other' — inanimate, external, completely separated from man; it is assumed — at least, officially — to be a reality in itself, wholly independent even of those who 'know' it, in the most unitive sense, and of the 'spiritual worlds' of these 'knowers'.

What this reveals is the typically unrealistic quality of the religious attitude, in sharp contrast to the heathen-Aryan vision

of the world. These themes, of the opposition of spirit to reality, dualism, that is, the subjectivity of spirit as against the objectivity of nature, express the loss of the sense of spiritual objectivity. At this point, natural reality was made extraneous, mute, inanimate, external, material — and it is precisely as such that it constituted the object of a new science, of Western profane science.

Not only did the heathen conception of the world far surpass mere naturalism - today only the ignorance or the tendentious falsification of some people are able to present it as limited, to the naturalistic plane - but, beyond knowing the ideals of manly overcoming and of absolute liberation, in the heathen conception the world was a living body, suffused with secret, divine and demonic forces, with meanings and with symbols, described in a saving of Olympiodoms as the "sensible expression of the invisible". Man lived in an organic and essential connection with the forces of the world and of the supra-world, so that he could be said, in the hermetic expression, to be "a whole within the whole, composed of all the powers"; the sense which is revealed by the Aryan-aristocratic doctrine of the *alma* is no different. And that conception was the basis on which, as a whole perfect in its way, the corpus of the sacred traditional sciences developed.

Christianity smashed this synthesis and created a tragic gulf. On the one hand, spirit became 'what is beyond', the unreal, the subjective — hence the primary root of European abstractionism; on the other hand, nature became matter, outward appearance closed in itself, the enigmatic phenomenon — hence the attitude which was to give rise to modern science<sup>6</sup>. And just as interior, direct, integral knowledge, given by Wisdom, was replaced with external, intellectual, discursive-scientific, profane knowledge, so the organic and essential connection of man to the deep forces of nature, which was at the basis of traditional ritual, of the power of sacrifice and of magic, was replaced by an extrinsic, indirect, violent relation; the relation peculiar to technology and the use of the machine. Thus the Semitic revolution contained the seeds of the mechanisation of life.

The machine expresses the impersonal and egalitarian qualities of the science which produces it. Just as gold is mechanised dependence reduced to the impersonal, just as modern culture has as its ideal a universal knowledge, good for all, inorganic and transmittable as a thing — so, in the world of the machine, we are faced with an equally impersonal, inorganic power, based on automatisms which produce the same effects in absolute indifference to the one who employs them. The whole immorality of such a power, which belongs to everyone and no-one, which is not value, which is not justice, which, by means of violence, can make one man more powerful than another without first making him superior, becomes clear.

It is clear that this is possible only because not a shadow of true action is to be found in that order either: no effect, in the world of technology and the machine, is directly dependent upon the 'I' as its cause, but, between the one and the other. there is, as condition of efficacy, a system of determinisms and laws which are known but not understood, and which, by a pure act of faith, are deemed to be constant and uniform. As for what the individual is, and what direct personal power is, scientific technology says nothing, and thus, surrounded by the knowledge of phenomena and by innumerable diabolical machines, the individual today is extremely wretched and powerless, more and more conditioned rather than conditioning, moving more and more on a path in which the necessity of will is reduced to a minimum' the sense of oneself, the indomitable fire of the individual entity, is gradually dving in weariness, in desolation, in degeneration.

With the 'laws' discovered by his science, which for us are mere statistical-mathematical abstractions, man will also be able to destroy or create worlds — but that does not mean that his real relation to phenomena will be changed in any way: fire will continue to burn him; organic changes to trouble his consciousness; time, passion, and death to dominate him with their law. In general, he will be absolutely the same being as before, in the same situation as before, relative to that level in the hierarchy of beings which man, with all that is human, represents.

To surpass that level — to achieve self-actualisation — to accomplish the action by freeing it, by leading it to work not below but above natural determinisms, not among phenomena but among causes of phenomena, directly, with the irresistibility and the right proper to what is superior — this, instead, is the path to true power, which is identified with the path of Wisdom itself, for where knowing entails being, certainty also entails power.

But that task demands first of all the overcoming of dualism and the restoration of the heathen vision of nature, that living, symbolic, sapiential conception which was possessed by all the great ancient civilisations.

When man becomes, instead of a phantom, once again a 'being who is', and restores his contact with and conformity to the deep forces of nature, then rite, symbol and magic itself will no longer be mere 'fantasies', as today's superstition would have it. In their ignorance they speak of these things as superstitions surpassed by their science. However, that power which is justice, which is the sanction of dignity, the natural attribute of an integrated life, in which man belongs as something living, individual, inalienable, will be known...

We repeat what we said at the beginning: Europe has created a world which in all its parts constitutes the irreparable and complete antithesis of the traditional world. There are no possible compromises or reconciliations, the two conceptions are opposed to each other, separated by an abyss over which any bridge is illusory<sup>7</sup>. Moreover, Semiticised civilisation is proceeding with dizzying velocity toward its logical consequence, its ultimate conclusion, and without intending to be prophets, we may say that this end will not be a long time coming. Those who foresee this conclusion, and manage to feel all its absurdity and tragedy, must therefore demand of themselves the courage for the Great Refusal.

It is all one world. Our discussions regarding science and machine have shown quite clearly how far renunciation must go, and how necessary and unavoidable it is. This renunciation, however, is not a leap into the void. The same consider-

ations show that a different system of values, of possibilities and of knowledge, as complete and total, is possible; a different man, and a different world, which can be recalled from the shadows and revived, as soon as the current wave of fever and madness starts to recede from the West.

# Activism and the Humanised World

The so-called activist, 'Faustian' conception of life, characterised by 'becoming', is closely connected to the rise of the machine in the West. The romantic exaltation of every kind of exertion, quest, tragic struggle, religion, or, as Guénon well describes it, the superstition of life understood as an irrepressible striving, as a restlessness which never finds satisfaction but moves restlessly, perpetually thirsty and disgusted, from form to form, from sensation to sensation, from invention to invention; the obsession with 'doing' and with 'winning', with what is new, with the 'breaking of records', with the unusual — all this constitutes the fourth aspect of European evil<sup>8</sup>: an aspect unquestionably present upon the physiognomy of Western civilisation, which, these days, has reached a sort of spasmodic climax.

We have already indicated how the root of this perversion, too, can be traced back to the Semitic stock. Messianism is its spirit, its original matter. The hallucination of another world, and of a messianic solution which flees from the present, is the product of the need for escape of the failures, the pariahs, the accursed, and those who lack the strength to assume and to will the reality which is theirs; it is the inadequacy of the souls who suffer, whose being is desire, passion and despair. Gradually, persistently hatched within the Semitic race, and emboldened by necessity as the political fortune of the 'chosen people' stumbled, this obscure reality developed from the dregs of the Empire and was the myth for the great revolt of the slaves, for the wave of frenzy which overwhelmed heathen Rome.

Subsequently, erupting through the Catholic order, pushing it aside, there was the widely contagious millennialistic madness; and when the promise and the wait proved to be deceptive, and the hoped-for millennium began to infinitely regress, since need and despair exacerbated, what remained was becoming without end, pure striving in a vacuum, and a gravitation towards emptiness.

The desire for escape from this world, in the face of the perpetual recession of the other world — this anxiety towards the world, which is the secret of modern life, which seeks desperately to escape the consciousness of oneself by persuading oneself that it is worthy — is likewise the deeper secret of Christianity after the failure of its eschatology; it is the immanent curse which it carries within itself, and which it spread to the peoples who converted to it, betraying the Olympian, classical and Aryan ideal.

If we combine the first theme which we saw rising from the messianic failure, the theme of the ecclesia which has become the vehicle of mutual social dependency, with this second theme, which has the same origin, we find the very law which dominates the whole culture and society of today: on the lower plane, industrial fever, means which become ends in themselves, mechanisation, the system of economic and material determinisms for which science beats the rhythm - linked with social climbing, the rat-race of men who do not live, but are lived - and, ultimately, as we have said, the most 'advanced' myths of 'infinite progress' on the basis of 'service to society', and of work having become an end-in-itself and universal duty; on the higher plane, all the 'Faustian', Bergsonian doctrines characterised by 'Becoming', of which we spoke above, which serve as basis for socialised truth, the 'becoming of knowledge', universalism and the impersonalism of the philosophies.

In the last analysis, all this confirms and testifies to one and the same thing: the decadence of value and individuality in the West — of that value about which it chatters with so much impudence. Only lives which are not self-sufficient, and

which wander from themselves, conduct quests in search of the 'other': they need society, a system of mutual supports, and collective law; and they strive perpetually, since they are not being, they are search, dissatisfaction, dependence upon the future — they are Becoming. They are terrified by man's natural environment: by silence, by solitude, by empty time, by the eternal — and they act, they toss restlessly, they turn here and there unceasingly, dealing with everything except themselves. They act to feel themselves, to confirm their own existence: they insist that their acts and doings supply this confirmation, but actually, they do not act, they are merely obsessed with action.

This is the meaning of the activism of the moderns. It is not action, but a fever-dream of action. It is the mad race of those who have been pushed away from the axis of the wheel, and whose race is all the more insane the greater their distance from the centre. That race, that 'velocity', just like the tyranny of socialised law in the economic, industrial, cultural and scientific fields, is entirely lethal, and its effects are visible throughout the whole order of things which these moderns have created. Once the individual wandered from himself, he lost, along with the sense of centrality, stability and inner sufficiency, also the sense of what really constitutes the value of individuality. The decline of the West comes, unquestionably, from the decline of the individual as such.

We said at the beginning that, today, people no longer know what action is. This is the truth. Those who merely skim some of the traditional Indian doctrines (to which, additionally, correspondences could be found in our classical West) will certainly be surprised at the affirmation that all movement, activity, becoming, and change are characteristic of the passive and feminine principle (shakti), whereas immobility is to be referred to the positive, masculine, solar principle (shiva). They will also find it hard to grasp the meaning of another affirmation, contained in a better-known text, the Bhagavad-Gîtâ (IV, 18), according to which the wise man distinguishes non-action from action and action from non-action.

This means neither quietism nor contemplative *nirvana* of any sort: on the contrary, it speaks of the consciousness of what activity really is. The concept is rigorously identical to the one which Aristotle expressed in speaking of 'unmoved movers'. The one who is cause of, and in control of, movement is not moved himself. He arouses, controls and directs movement: he causes the act, but does not act, that is to say that he is not led by, not involved in action; he is not action, but rather an impassible, serene superiority, from which action comes and to which it returns. This is why his command, potent and invisible, can be called by Lao-Tzu 'action-without-action' (*wei-wu-wei*)<sup>9</sup>.

Compared to this, the one who merely 'acts' is himself acted upon: the one who is seized by action, who is drunk with action, with 'will', with 'force', with elan, passion, and enthusiasm, is already an instrument; he does not act, but is subject to action; thus he appears — to these doctrines — as moved by a feminine principle and a negation with respect to the higher, transcendent, motionless, Olympian mode of the Masters of movement.

Indeed, what is exalted today in the West is precisely this negative, de-centred, lower, action: a drunken spontaneity which is unable to control itself and to create a centre for itself, whose law is outside itself, and whose secret source is a mere will to dissipate energy and to keep up a whirl of activity. This they call positive and masculine, thus exalting what is completely negative and feminine. In their blindness, contemporary men of the West see nothing more than this show, and imagine that inner action, the secret force which does not create more machines, banks, and companies, but men and gods, is not action, but renunciation, abstraction, and waste of time, 'Power', thus, is considered no more than another synonym for violence: 'Will' is identified more and more only with the type of the animal and muscle man, which presupposes an antithesis, a resistance (in or outside itself) with which one collides and tires oneself out. Tension, struggle, effort, aspiration - nisus, struggle — these are the watchwords of this activism.

But all this is not action.

Action is something elemental. It is something, simple, terrible, irresistible. There is no room in it for passion, nor for antithesis, nor for 'effort', and even less for 'humanity' and 'feeling'. It starts from absolute centres, without hatred, without craving, and without pity; from a calmness which terrifies and immobilises; from a level of 'creative indifference' superior to every opposition.

It is command. It is the terrible power of the Caesars. It is the occult and silent action of the Emperors of the Far East, fatal as that of the forces of nature, whose 'purity' it shares. It is what can still be felt breaking out of the magic immobility of some Egyptian effigies, of the fascinating slowness of some ritual gestures. It is the naked, new, Machiavellianism, in all its hardness and inhumanity. It is what bursts out when — as in the high feudal Middle Ages — man becomes once more alone, man with man or man against man, cloaked in his strength or in his weakness, without escape, without law. It is what shines when — in heroism, in sacrifice, or in great sacrilege — a force stronger than good, evil, mercy, fear or happiness arises in man, a force before which the eye no longer stares either at itself or at others, in which arises the primordial power of things and persons.

What is called in physics dissipation of energy by friction — this is what Europeans call 'heroism', in which, like children, they pride themselves. The torment of torn-up souls, the pathos of naive weaklings powerless to control themselves, to impose upon themselves silence and absolute will, all this is exalted in the West in the name of the 'tragic sense of life', since unbalance and dualism, the 'guilty conscience' and the sense of 'sin', of man as enemy of himself and violent against himself, has grown in the soul.

One complication arose upon another: 'action' disappeared behind the pleasures of emotion and torment. Resistance, that is, powerlessness, became a condition for the sense of self, hence the need for effort, the romantic exaltation of violence, the running in circles, the yearning, the superstitious belief that value lies not in arriving, but in running, not in mastery and control,

but in painful struggling conquest, not in precise, bare, fulfilled realisation, but in the 'infinite task'. Christianity, denying classical harmony, denying the sense of autarchy and absolute limit, denying the sense of Olympian superiority, of Dorian simplicity, and of active, positive, hard, immanent force, has prepared the ground for a world of the obsessed and the enchained.

All things, in the West, knows of chains, blood and darkness, nothing of freedom. The cry for freedom which is heard ringing out everywhere is only the cry of prisoners, the howling of chained wild animals, the voice which comes from below. Modern Voluntarism' is not will, but a desperate rhetoric which is substituted for will, a mental effusion to convince oneself of a will which one does not have. All modern exaltations of 'power' and of 'individuality' are identical obsessive signs, symptoms of worry, assertions which only testify to the lack of and the need for what they assert, desperate aspects of European decadence under a pitiful law of 'seriousness' and 'duty'.

For everything, in the West, is, in a sinister way, serious, tragic, not free. Everything betrays a sense of deep coercion, which, in some, manifests itself as rigorism, prohibitionism, imperativism, moralistic or rationalistic intolerance, and in others as romantic impulsiveness and human pathos. Crystalline clarity, agile simplicity, detached in a spiritual joy of free play, irony and aristocratic superiority, all this — which in fact really exists — is thought to inhabit solely the world of myth. Everywhere there reigns instead a sense of identification, of collapse, of greedy interest. The world of Michelangelo's prisons still echoes in humanity, embellished with 'heroism' and the 'cosmic', with a Beethoven and a Wagner. And how much seriousness and romantic passion is there in the Nietzschean exaltation of the 'gay science', in the very laugh of Zarathustra! The curse of the crucified god has spread everywhere, has wrapped the whole of Europe in its deep pain, a block of metal and blood.

The 'human' sense of life, so typical of the modern West, confirms its plebeian and inferior aspect. That of which some

were ashamed — 'man' — others took pride in. The ancient world elevated the individual to God, made every effort to unbind him from passion, to adapt him to transcendence, to the free air of the heights, in contemplation and also in action; it knew traditions of super-human heroes and men of divine blood. The Semiticised world not only deprived the 'creature' of this divine world, but finally reduced God to a human figure. Reviving the demonology of a Pelasgian substratum, it substituted, for the pure Olympian regions, dazzling in their radiant perfection, the terrorist world-views of its apocalypses. its Gehennas, predestination and perdition. God was no longer the aristocratic god of the Romans, the god of the patricians. to whom one prays standing, by fire-light, head held high, the emblem of which is carried at the head of the victorious legions: God was no longer Donar-Thor, the slaver of Thrym and Hymir, the 'strongest of the strong', the 'irresistible', the master of the 'refuge against terror', whose fearsome weapon, the hammer Mjolnir, corresponds to the Vajra of Shiva, and represents the same lightning force which hallowed the divine kings of the Aryans; it was no longer Odin-Wotan, the one who brings victory, the Eagle, master of the host of heroes who, by death on the battlefield, celebrated the loftiest form of cult sacrifice and were transformed into the phalanx of immortals - but became, as Rougier describes Him, the patron of the wretched and of the desperate, the One to whom they sacrificed, the comforter of the afflicted, who is implored with tears of ecstasy in the annihilation of oneself. Thus, the spirit was materialised, the soul softened. Only passion, feeling, effort, remained within experience. The supra-mundane sense, not just for Olympian spirituality, but also for virile Nordic-Roman dignity, disappeared little by little, and, in a general degeneration, a contorted world of tragedy, suffering and seriousness followed: the 'humanistic' world, instead of the epic and Dorian world.

'Humanism': of all this — a dirty fog exhaled by the earth, which has prevented the vision of the heavens — some take pride as being the 'value' of the West. It spreads equally effec-

tively in each of its forms; it is at the root of all our successive romanticisms, sentimentalisms, and modern fevers of action and will.

We shout; it is necessary to purify oneself from this! This task is just as hard as the eradication of the other already described elements by which European decadence idealises.

What is 'human' must be overcome, absolutely, without mercy. But, for this to become possible, it is necessary that individuals attain the sense of inner liberation. It must be understood that this sense cannot be the object of a craving, greedy quest by the shackled, who, as such, have no right to it. Either it is, as a simple matter which is neither solemnly proclaimed nor theorised about — a natural, elementary, and inalienable presence of elected ones, which is barely noticed — or it is not. The more it is sought and desired, the more elusive it becomes, because necessity is fatal to it.

It is necessary to regain consciousness, in the same way that one who, realising that he is running, gasping for breath in the scorching heat, would say to himself: "So? What if I walked more slowly?" - and, walking more slowly: "So? What if I stopped walking?" - and, ceasing to walk: "So? What if I lie down on the ground, here, in the shade?" - and, lying on the ground, he would feel an infinite rest and recall with amazement his race, his old haste; likewise, the soul of the Moderns, which does not know rest, silence, or pause, must be gradually appeared. It is necessary to bring men back to themselves. and to force them to find their purpose and value within themselves. They should learn again to feel alone, without help and without law, until they awaken to the fact of absolute command and absolute obedience, and then, looking coldly around, they realise that there is nowhere to go, nothing to ask for, nothing to hope for, nothing to fear. They should breathe again, released from the weight, and acknowledge the wretchedness and weakness of both love and hate. They should stand erect, as simple, pure, no longer 'human', beings.

With the superiority of aristocrats, secure in the high estate of souls in control of themselves, they mock the feverish

avidity with which slaves rush at the banquet of life. They retreat into an active indifference, capable of everything, according to a renewed innocence. The ability to throw their own lives into the game, and to stare, smiling, into the abvsses, to give without passion, to act while regarding victory and defeat, success and failure as indifferent — these spring from that superiority which compels one to dispose of one's own self as a mere thing, and in which the experience of a principle stronger than any death and every corruption truly awakens. The sense of rigidity, of effort, of the brute 'you must!' no longer exists, except as the memory of an absurd mania. Acknowledging the illusory nature of 'evolution', 'providence', and all other 'historicisms', acknowledging all 'goals' and 'justifications' as leashes necessary only for those who, being still children, do not know how to walk on their own, men will cease to be acted, but will act. If their T becomes the centre, action in its primitive, elemental, absolute sense will spring again from them, and they will be men, and no longer spectres.

If the poisonous fog of the 'human' world is dispelled, then, free from the intellectualism, the psychologising, the passion and superstition of men, nature in its free and essential state will reappear. Everything around us will become free again, will breathe again at last. The great disease of romantic man, faith, will be overcome by experience. To man, thus reintegrated, new eyes, new ears, new wings, will really and spontaneously open. The supernatural will cease to be a pallid escape for pallid souls. It will be reality, and will become inseparable from the natural. In a pure, calm, powerful, and incorporeal light of revived Dorian simplicity, spirit and form, inferiority and exteriority, reality and supra-reality, will become one and the same thing, in the balance of both members, neither higher nor lower than the other. It will thus be an epoch of transcendental realism: within those who believe that they are men, and do not know that they are sleeping gods, the forces of the elements will awaken, bringing absolute illumination and rejuvenation.

Thus, the other great human bond, that of the faceless social amalgam, will also be overcome. If the law which has made them parts of machines, stones fastened together by the impersonal cement of collective despotism and humanistic ideology, is overwhelmed, then each individual will be again his own origin and destiny: individuals shall be closed in themselves, like worlds, rocks, peaks, clad only in their strengths and weaknesses. To everyone a place - a combat post - a quality, a life, a dignity, a distinct force, matchless, irreducible. Their morality will be: you must surmount the need to 'communicate' and to 'understand the other', the ignominy of the pathos of fraternity, the sensual delight of loving and feeling loved, of feeling equal and close - you must surmount that subtle force of corruption which dissolves and weakens the sense of aristocracy. Incommunicativeness will be prized, in the name of an absolute and virile respect; valleys and peaks. stronger forces and weaker forces, one beside the other or one against the other, loyally acknowledged, in the discipline of the spirit inwardly on fire but outwardly as rigid and hard as steel, a spirit able to contain to a magnificent extent the immensity of the infinite, and to contain it in a military manner. as in a warlike enterprise, as on the battlefield. Precise relationships, order, cosmos, hierarchy. Rigorously defined groups shall bring about the organisation of this society, without intermediaries and without attenuation, through actions by which some will rise luminously, others will fall irremediably, Over this shall preside a race of solar and haughty beings. Masters of the "long, distant, fear-inspiring gaze", which does not take but gives light and power superabundantly, and, by a resolute conduct of life, aspires to an ever more extraordinary intensity, yet one always balanced in supernatural calm.

Thus the romantic myths of 'man' and the 'human' will vanish, and we will approach the threshold of the great liberation. In a world of limpidity, the words of Nietzsche, the precursor, will then be understood in their fullest and most transcendent meaning: "How beautiful, how pure, these free forces, no longer stained by spirit!"

#### IV. THE ROOTS OF EUROPEAN EVIL

 $^6$  We should not be accused of bias or prejudice when we indicate the range of the various dualisms also known by the ancient heathen and Eastern world. These dualisms have another character than the Christian one. Plato too knew of the 'other' — but he though of this 'other' as non-being, as something imperceptible and illusory, not as a reality as such — and the Greek world acquired the idea of 'matter only with late Stoicism, The Eastern concept of  $m \hat{a} y \hat{a}$  expresses better than any dualism a sense of the presence of spirit in things; it leads one to regard their sensory aspect as a veil of illusory appearance. Iranian doctrines knew of two opposed cosmic forces, which, by the very fact of their opposition, were on the same plane, whose only 'synthesis' would be the final predominance of one over the other, Complete materiality — lifeless, purely material 'nature', opposed to the 'I' — arises only when spirit is exiled to an absolute 'beyond', which occurs only in the Judaeo-Christian mentality.

# V



# Our European Symbol

### Nietzsche, the Misunderstood

nce again, we end up facing two ideal worlds, whose opposition we do not want to mitigate, but rather to exacerbate, A break and a total change are needed, if there is to be a solution.

Considering the situation we have reached, the effectiveness of grafts should no longer be hoped for. Nothing, on the basis of the values of our contemporary world, would save this corpse which plays every day at resurrecting itself, but can no longer distinguish the pangs of its agony from the pangs of waking up.

It is the substance itself which must be destroyed and renewed, radically — otherwise, everything which might otherwise offer salvation will be contaminated — it will not save, but will itself undergo the identical evil.

In all fields — as we have seen — currently prevailing conceptions are the absolute opposite of the spiritual premises on the basis of which a restoration in the traditional sense can be reached Thus, we must not hesitate to demand that everything in modern man which gives rise to the current corruption be destroyed. But, at the same time, we must bear this in mind: we demand destruction only where we know of higher, more glorious, more living forms. We do not want negation, but restoration. There is a complete, total, positive system of values, which excels anything developed by the profane 'civilisation' of today, which provides a safe base to go beyond all the negations characteristic of European decadence, without fear of ending up in the void.

The ideal of a return to caste society and qualitative hierarchy must be opposed to the demonic power of the collective,

the anonymity of omnipotent finance, and the tyranny of the socialised and Semiticised West.

The aristocratic ideal of Wisdom must be opposed to positive science, and to the debasements which have permitted work and culture to be taken over by the mob.

The supra-real, solar ideal of initiation must be opposed to the sanctimonious abstractions and formalisms of an anti-Aryan faith.

The aristocratic ideal of metaphysical action, the unconditioned power which rite and sacred traditional science can offer to the elites of a reintegrated humanity, must be opposed to the Luciferian illusion of technical-mechanical power, itself the product of a total renunciation which produces in turn new needs and new slavery.

The liberated and dominating Nordic-classical vision, and the ideal of a life informed by metaphysical experience of 'Being' as the basis of a new action and new contemplation, must be opposed to the romantic, Faustian vision of life characterised by perpetual 'Becoming'.

The rhythm accelerates, the circle of Western 'civilisation' threatens to close. There are three possible attitudes towards this.

Either withdraw, putting up barriers, leaving those who have deviated and betrayed their calling to themselves; breaking the bridges — before the 'sons of Muspell' think of  $it^1$  — to prevent their contagion from reaching all of our concealed positions.

Or wait for the solution, accelerating the rhythm of 'progress', awaiting the end or, if this is not enough, going so far as to provoke it, so that the ground is clear for the instant rise of the new tree.

The third option is to unite in the call to consciousness and revolt, during this interim period, and to oppose, patiently, tenaciously, mercilessly, with destructive force on one hand, and with creative force on the other, the tide which threatens to overwhelm the parts of Europe which still remain sane.

But the basis for this — let us repeat — the premise for any outer action is an inner renewal. Before any other type of bravery can be possible, it is necessary to have the spiritual courage

which no longer allows us to tolerate any rapprochement or compromise, which completely ignores those who accuse us of being anachronistic dreamers or Utopians cut off from reality, and which fixes us firmly, impassive, in traditional truth.

Those who are still not capable of managing this on their own can find a precursor even in these dark times, someone misunderstood, who waits in the shadows: Friedrich Nietzsche, The Nietzschean experience is still not exhausted, insofar as it has not even started. What is exhausted is the aesthetic-literary caricature of Nietzsche, which confines itself to those aspects of Nietzsche's work which were indeed conditioned by his time, and the biological-naturalistic reduction of some parts of his theories. But the value carried heroically by Nietzsche after much nameless suffering, in spite of the fact that his whole being underwent paroxysms of distress, until, without any complaint, after having given everything, it collapsed this value, which is beyond his 'philosophy', beyond his humanity, beyond his self, which is identical to a cosmic meaning, the reflection of an eonic force - the hvarenô and the terrible fire of solar initiations - this value is still waiting to be understood and taken on by our contemporaries. There is already in it the call for arms, the appeal to express contempt for the merely actual of today, for awakening - and for the great struggle: the one in which - as we have said - the destiny of the West will be settled: either to fall towards night, or to enter a new dawn.

Freeing the doctrine of Nietzsche from its naturalistic aspects, one sees that the 'superman' and the 'will-to-power' are not real except as supra-biological, and, we should say, supranatural qualities. Then this doctrine, for many, can be a path by which the great ocean can be reached — the world of the solar universality of great Nordic-Aryan traditions — from whose summit the meaning of all the misery, irrelevance and insignificance of this world of prisoners and lunatics can at last be grasped.

It is on this basis that a temporary practical policy must be understood, which should be based on the highest shared val-

ues — currently understood, however, only by a tiny elite. Others who do not understand, would find them merely a cause of confusion, and should leave to the superior ones the task of applying these ideals to matters of immediate, practical, and realisable value.

Nordic-heathen values are transcendent values which find their real meaning only within the totality of the anti-modern and anti-European conception which we have already described in essential outline. However, they can immediately provide ethical principles able to serve as the basis for a new education and a new style of life, free from hypocrisy, baseness and the hallucinations of the most recent generations.

The heathen experience is not an impossible and anachronistic experience, in any respect, or from any point of view. Are we not reminded almost every day of how 'heathenism' in the modern world is noticed and deplored by the representatives of European religions? This 'heathenism' is largely, it is true, imaginary: it is an evil whose root those who have followed us up to now will recognise without difficulty in the forces and conditions which originally altered the ancient, pre-Christian world.

In other aspects, however, this heathenism is a true heathenism. We need to discover the ways in which it can be used as a means to an end, and transformed into something positive; it must not be allowed to become a mere synonym for materialism and corruption, as is assumed unfortunately by most people when they speak of heathenism; instead, it must become the preparatory expression of a higher and truly spiritual state, which will allow us to remain faithful to the forces of the Nordic-Aryan race — insofar as these forces, however oppressed, are not already defeated.

We see the positive aspects of modern heathenism where there is a realism which permits the overcoming of romanticism; where, in the new generations, a practical rather than theoretical elimination of the various bogeymen of thought, feeling, art and morality has taken place; where something original and barbaric has arisen, which yet remains united with the simplified, limpid and controlled forces of the most extreme modernity; where a new objectivity, a new seriousness, a new isolation have really arisen, which, however, do not exclude the possibility of a union in action and for action; where objects, rather than men — works, rather than private 'personalities' and the 'tragedies' of their authors, whether individuals, races or collectives — arouse interest once again; where the impulse gains in value to emerge from one's own 'soul' into the great world, understood once more in its character of eternity and in its indifference towards the human, not as an escape, but as a return to normality, to naturalness, to centrality.

All this can provide means for a temporary catharsis. It must concentrate upon not letting these 'overcomings' flow out — as they do in most cases — to the plane of matter and of mere l'iving', the mere 'en-deçà', to end up, there, in the most horrible degeneration of human possibilities.

It is therefore necessary that the themes of a new realism, a new Nordic-heathen classicism, a new freedom for what is essential, anti-sentimentalism, the 'Dorian' and the objective — which. and there. appear in various forms among most recent generation, not seldom accompanied by the virile themes of a new Nietzscheanism – transform themselves, to reach a true level of spirituality (to find, therefore, ways which lead to something which is beyond both matter and 'spirit' as understood by modern culture) whereby these forward-looking elites will lead us towards the extra-human, with a style of limpid vision, control and supra-individual perfection.

If, on this basis, an ethics which we can still call Nordic-heathen cleanses our remaining sane races, and equips them for a new style of life, the ground will be ready for the comprehension and the gradual fulfilment of that which has an even higher value, of which we have spoken, reiterating always that there is no void ahead of us or beyond our view — the void is purely a product of our own time.

## The True Paneuropa

On this basis we can suggest some considerations of a concrete nature on the state of contemporary Europe

It is a fact that, even in the merely political and economic domain, definite negative forces, which had previously manifested themselves only sporadically and had appeared to be in a disorganised condition, are today organised and have become powers in the true, literal sense of the word. In their claim to hegemonic power, and in their destructive character with respect to European tradition of even the most fundamental sort, they appear to us as to represent a clear and present threat, to which counters must be found in all fields, including the political and social.

This state of affairs raises a fundamental question: is it possible for Europe to defend its autonomy against non-European and anti-European powers in its present state of economic and political affliction, or, to save its existence, must it organise itself in a unitary way?

This is the so-called Paneuropean problem, which Count Coudenhove-Kalergi has recently raised, adding that the problem assumes a special importance in relation to the three main powers, Russia, England, and Asia<sup>2</sup>,

Besides, it cannot be denied that, in the general atmosphere of crisis and malaise found as well on the material plane of Western society, today's best minds find themselves forced to recall the ideal of a higher ecumenical civilisation, in which the European races would be organised on the basis of a new and uniform principle, instead of remaining, as now, scattered and weakened.

The Paneuropean problem thus demonstrates its relevance to our considerations, and we can say that it truly has purpose and profound justification, insofar as, first and foremost, it expresses the need to defend Europe in a way related to Tradition, The practical advantages of a Paneuropean union can have for us only a secondary and conditional interest, since the main problem which threatens Europe is not so much a mate-

rial danger but rather a spiritual one, Let us not exaggerate the possibilities of a unity on the plane of matter and 'politics'. This is by its nature a plane of contingency, relativity, irrationalism, and compromise: it is unthinkable that a form endowed with true stability can have its life based solely upon this plane, since its higher principle — its soul — does not reside there. It is only on the plane of the spirit that true unity can take on life, and overcome the tendencies to schism and particularism.

Bearing this in mind, one still see, with Coudenhove, the main centres of forces against which a European bloc becomes necessary as being Russia, England, and Asia, providing that, at the same time, one tries to discover the spiritual aspect of the danger posed by each of them.

Russia is actually the power which most threatens our future. We have seen how the processes of spiritual regression - specifically, the fall of power from each of the ancient Arvan castes to the next — lead to the rise of a new, collectivist, proletarian, mechanised barbarism, the declared enemy of all freedom, spirit and personality, as we see clearly in the Russia of the Soviets. The Soviets actually take on the prophetic mission of bringing to future humanity a universal culture, one in accordance with their dark, demonic, consciousness — the proletarian culture, with its myth of the mass man. And Coudenhove rightly notes that, if, yesterday, Europe in the face of the Russian revolution could represent order against chaos, today it is precisely the other way about: today, we see the Soviets constituting themselves into an iron bloc — political, ideological and economic at the same time — and if such a barbaric power persists in this direction, of the absolute organisation of every energy, and the rationalisation and exploitation of every natural and human resource (their 'fiveyear plan'3 is the first manifestation of this, and it portends a policy with specific intentions of international political domination), then, for Europe, divided by various national and international disagreements regarding economics and even more, regarding its higher ideals, there is a danger which is difficult to overrate.

#### V. OUR EUROPEAN SYMBOL

The second, power, England, must be considered in the light of its ever-closer relationship with America, to grasp entirely the anti-Europeanism of its utilitarian, mercantilist, democratic-capitalist, essentially secular, Protestant culture, which has reached its ultimate conclusion in America; mammonism, overweening standardisation, tyranny of the trusts and gold, the degrading religion of 'sociality' and work, the destruction of every metaphysical interest, and glorification of the 'animal ideal'. From that point of view, England, whose world empire is now entering its decline, constitutes a lesser danger than America, which can be considered objectively to be the western equivalent of the danger which the Russia of the Soviets represents for us in the east. The difference between the two cultures consists only of this: those goals which the Soviets try to reach by means of tragic and cruel tension, dictatorship, and a system of terror, in America are attained by means of a semblance of democracy and freedom, and appear to be the natural and inevitable results of exclusive interest in material and industrial production, detachment from all traditional and aristocratic points of reference, and the chimera of a technico-material conquest of the world<sup>4</sup>.

There is no 'Asiatic danger' for us in Europeanised Japan, and even less in China or India. As R. Guénon emphasised, the truth is precisely the opposite: it is the West which has represented a danger for those peoples, or rather, the principle of their decline; the West has injected into their veins the virus of modernisation, which has brought about the rapid dissolution of everything traditional and transcendent maintained by these great peoples in their mode of social organisation<sup>5</sup>. If, some day, Asia, organised as the West is, and participating in all the contaminations of modern spirit, indeed becomes a political danger to Europe, only the latter will be responsible and to blame for it. We can, however, speak of an 'Asiatic danger' in a quite different sense: this is the danger for the European soul, especially in the present state of affairs, posed by an ambiguous, pantheistic, confused, escapist spirituality, which can be found in thousands of contemporary neo-mystical and theosophical currents and sects, almost always connected with

the themes of humanitarianism, pacifism and anti-hierarchicalism, surprisingly reminiscent of the syncretistic Asiatic culture of Alexandria in its period of decay. Naturally, all this has absolutely nothing to do with the traditional, or even more, the Aryan East: it is a pathos which, ultimately, derives from and leads back to the substratum of the inferior races, through whose rule and civilisation the great Eastern cultures were formed; a pathos which specifically reinforces and feeds the ferments of decomposition of the Semiticised West. Nevertheless, unfortunately, in many European currents the East exerts an effect of this sort, and this represents a danger: the danger of falling into an anti-Western and unmanly spiritualism in order to fight Western materialism<sup>6</sup>.

We consider that the above is the only way to integrate Coudenhove's notion of the triple threat to Europe into the framework of a larger and higher unity. That Europe should fight is fair enough, but in the name of whom, or what, should it fight? Let us suppose that Europe, in order to be able to oppose (in the political and economic sense) either Russia, as the confederation of Soviet republics, or the United States, should organise itself exactly according to the anti-hierarchical, 'socialist' and secularist ideals of these two powers. In such a case, the positive solution would coincide with the negative one; the opposition would amount to a hidden abdication, a secret undoing, a defection to the enemy through the very action which should have repelled and defeated him. Besides, it would be idle to demand from the sum of Europe's parts something which is not present in each of them individually, and to delude oneself that any form of European unity will be of any use if each people has not already headed, each on its own, in the same direction, toward spiritual integration, by which they reject everything they find in themselves that tends in the Russian or American direction, and they thus create a unitary spirit, which gives effectively to each of these peoples the possibility of finding themselves organically and, so to speak, spontaneously united in something higher than their individual existence<sup>7</sup>

The soul of those individual reactions and integrations, which could dear the ground from within for the formation of a European bloc, material and spiritual at the same time, is found in the ideals for which we stand, values fully embodied by the Nordic-Aryan tradition, which will serve us as the basis for an aristocratic restoration.

Coudenhove-Kalergi thinks he recognises as elements of the 'European soul' — and, therefore, as premises of a future Paneuropa – individualism, heroism, and socialism: values which he supposes modern Europe to have drawn from the classical, or better, Nordic and Christian tradition, But the union of these three values is itself a compromise; the introduction of 'socialism' as a European value — as shown by all our previous considerations — amounts to a sort of Trojan horse, which, sooner or later, will expose the European bloc to precisely the danger which it is necessary to oppose and which it is necessary to combat. Coudenhove has made this mistake because he sees the concept of 'individualism' solely from a pluralistic point of view; this is why he accepts 'socialism', to serve as the unifying cement and counter-balance to the division and atomism to which (he imagines) pure individualism could lead. In reality, however, there is an individualism which contains within itself — in the values of fidelity. service and honour — the seeds of the overcoming of the isolation and egoism of the individual, and renders possible a tranguil and sound hierarchical organisation. Neither the Romans nor the primordial Arvan-Roman stocks needed to wait for Christian socialism before they could reach real, higher forms of organisation. On the one hand, there is Aryan socialism, the warrior ideal of an association of free masters, and on the other there is the Semitic, ambiguous, totemic, unmanly socialism based on mutual dependency and pathos, something we would not know what to do with, and which we consider a disgrace to the European soul.

In our conception, the aristocratic idea is the primary foundation for traditional restoration, and from it we derive the principle that, even in the practical and political sense, can enable us to overcome that which today is opposed in substance to European unity.

This substantial obstacle is nationalism. We can see, as a matter of fact, how the disintegration of that ecumenical unity which Europe possessed in the Middle Ages occurred through the action of nationalism. Once the medieval hierarchic-aristocratic ideal had decayed, once the differentiation of castes and guilds had vanished, once the work of national centralisation and the creation of 'civil authorities' took over, once the rulers transferred their attention from the higher functions, which linked them to a liturgy of power, to direct and absolutist interference in a world of politics directly linked to economy and nation, understood as country and collectivity - then there was a materialisation and a regression, which gave rise to a dissolving particularism, which still endures, in an exacerbated manner, and which the various European nations support. one against the other, in the form of innumerable schisms, innumerable concepts which oppose each other, behind which a series of hegemonies of the merely political, economic, and territorial type<sup>8</sup> is hidden.

Therefore, it is only by taking the road in the opposite direction — in a natural manner, without necessarily having to recreate forms lost through the passage of time, but reassuming their spirit — that one can fulfil the ideal of European unity. When, as today, spirit is an instrument in the service of politics, aristocracy can be changed into plutocracy, society can be led like a purely economic, administrative or military organisation, and the state is simply and solely the nation, rather than being a hierarchy of castes corresponding to a differentiation and a hierarchy of values — at such times, appetites, egoisms, competition, the plans of greedy industrialists, and so on, although irrational and self-destructive in themselves, will be the strongest forces, against which any attempt at unification will fail.

To oppose all this, decentralisation and economic demobilisation are necessary; the state, as a spiritual principle, must free itself from its material aspect; or must ascribe to that aspect a limited field, beyond which the state must rise, in ac-

cordance with the fullest understanding of the hierarchic ideal, which, as such, can never be conditioned by particularism, materialism, ethnos or geography. The various states we then contain as many aristocracies, which, experiencing the same tradition of spirit and the same rituals of power, adhering inwardly to the essentially supra-national values of this tradition, will bring about an actual unity from above, a supra-national unity, which unites in spirit without confusing in body<sup>9</sup>.

Thus, we could arrive at a Paneuropa; we could determine coherently everything necessary to resolve the European crisis, and which could help us to form a bloc against the dangers, now very material, which threaten to bury what remains of our ancient civilisation. In some cases, European unity may remain in a state of experienced reality which does not need anv external order. But, in other cases, it should be ready to show its power, in its dynamic actuality, gathering in a sole and unstoppable impulse, with a single will, the various races and traditions of Europe, with a unified goal of defence and conquest, yet still following an impulse from above, which transcends the blind determinisms of political passion and pursues an ideal, something universal and transforming, roughly like the ideal of the Crusades, in which Europe, for the first and last time, achieved a universal and unifying action, transcending the limitations of country and blood.

As to the question of what political form for such a unity would be consistent with European tradition, we can only indicate once again the ethos on which the ancient Nordic-heathen constitutions were based. We think of these associations of free men who, in times of peace, were like a parliament of peers, and independent masters inside their own *mundium*; in times of war, however, or in pursuit of a common goal and for as long as this pursuit lasted, ready for the call, they transformed themselves, along with their men, into vassals, absolutely faithful to one leader.

# The Myth of the Two Eagles

This brings us to an even more specific question; from what point should the struggle for renewed European unity begin?

Our conviction is that it can begin only with the union of the two Eagles, the German Eagle and the Roman Eagle<sup>10</sup>. Lenin once said: "The Roman-Germanic world constitutes the greatest obstacle to the fulfilment of the new proletarian ideal". This confession is precious to us.

If there is a need to create a cordon sanitaire for those European countries which can say legitimately of themselves that they have a tradition, as opposed to those which either do not have one, have repudiated it, or have lost it, and therefore represent a danger to the first group, then in our opinion only the union of Italy with the Germanic countries can serve at the heart of the formation of such a bloc. The Roman-Germanic world represents the symbol and the source for the West of 'civilisation' in the true, qualitative, traditional sense, as opposed to which the socialist, mechanistic, and plebeian sense represents, as we know, the most shameful fall. Italy, Germany, and Austria together constitute the traditional core of the West, Anti-traditional peoples press westwards from their eastern homes: the Slavs have never had a tradition: nor has America: France, republican and decadent, negrified and Semiticised, the first breeding ground of the modern slave revolt. no longer has a tradition; old, aristocratic England is in the hands of democracy and, now, from every point of view, is close to its decline: the various satellites of the Mediterranean. the Balkans, and the North, to various degrees, are part of the same picture, and none demonstrates any capacity for achieving anything of universal symbolic value.

Therefore, we do not hesitate to affirm that, if a revolt and a restoration under the aegis of essentially heathen-Aryan signs — on the one hand the eagle and the swastika, on the other hand the eagle and the fasces of the lictor — should acquire power among the German and the Italian peoples, these peoples would not enclose themselves in what is called 'sacred

egoism'. To our mind the German and Italian nations are specially called to a bond which is not dictated solely by political, economic and military interests — which today's immoralism claims are the only things that can either unite or divide nations — rather, they are called to forge an organic bond, integrating the spirit and the intellect as the body. And we do not hesitate to affirm that the reconstruction in a new form of the dubious pre-War 'Triple Alliance' still offers the best starting point for our plan for a better future. It is linked to the possibility of giving Europe a principal centre, a sound foundation for its defence in every sense.

Naturally, this presupposes that, in both countries, the process of virile 'solar' reintegration of which we have already spoken takes place, compared to which all that Germany and Italy already offer on the basis of their new political idea can be considered only as exploratory preparation.

In any case, Italy has already taken a huge step forward, by eliminating the last, worn-out, yet persistent residues in this ideology of renewal which insisted on portraying Austria and the German countries in general as the 'age-old enemy' of Italy. and the other, Latin countries as brothers. And if Italy evokes an imperial ideal, the ancient Roman ideal, not only in name but also in fact, then it must see that wars waged for romantic and 'patriotic' reasons are merely ridiculous. Certainly, there will come a day on which the world war itself will reveal a meaning, beyond its superficial immediate causes, which will no longer have anything to do with the hypocritical pretexts of humanistic and anti-aristocratic ideology<sup>11</sup>. Mussolini has asserted that "the world, war was revolutionary, because in its bloodbath ended the century of democracy, of number, of majorities and of quantity". However, in fact, the world war achieved only the resurrection and coalition of plebeian nationalism, and of modern world-wide democracy, against the peoples among whom the last remnants of the ancient imperial-feudal order had been retained, who fought in the name of the feudal concept of right and honour rather than of the modern plebeian principle of land and 'nation'.

#### V. OUR EUROPEAN SYMBOL

Naturally, there is a counterpart to this for the German peoples. If Italy has to pass from the national ideal, regarding which it has little ancient tradition of its own and is dependent on the new French ideology, to the universal-imperial idea, which it possesses by virtue of Rome, then in Germany the barriers created by the fanaticism and nationalism of race, which would lead to materialistic and anti-traditional particularism. must be broken. It is necessary that Germany too recalls its higher tradition, the supranational tradition of the Germanic Holy Roman Empire — and then the path of that 'Third Reich' forecast by many in the contemporary currents of German restoration<sup>12</sup>, will necessarily lead to the point where the Roman eagle unites once again with the Nordic eagle, as in the times of medieval ecumenical Europe. If Germany is to defend the Nordic-Arvan tradition, then the lower, biologically conditioned and therefore contingent and particular sense of that concept must be distinguished from the higher, spiritual sense, which does not exclude the former, but integrates it and leads it essentially to the idea of a type, a primordial formative force, which must be awakened and must act as a force creative of the new unity and the new civilisation of Europe. If the myth of blood and race continues to serve as the intellectual horizon of the revivalists, then the claim of a universal mission, in which all of the higher races can share, will meet obstacles<sup>13</sup>. From our point of view, it is precisely this tendency among some German nationalist circles which must be overcome, not in the sense that they should simply renounce it, but that they should integrate it into a higher idea, free from the conditioning of nature and the contingent. A spiritual nationalism can never be an obstacle to a universal idea, since it takes the latter as its premise.

When Moeller van den Bruck said that Germany, having lost the war, must win the revolution, we must understand this as meaning that Germany must reject any mere reforms, which would lead it back to the political ideas held by our ancient military adversaries. It is precisely the fact which some today deplore, the fact that Germany has not achieved 'nationhood'

in the sense of a socialistic, anti-hierarchical union of all the castes, that we see as indicating the value and the positive, anti-modern side of the German people. One has to oppose all 'socialisms', facing up resolutely to the extravagant tendencies of certain among our youth. It is an indication of a profound lack of awareness to argue that the German tradition culminates in the Lutheran insurrection and the peasant wars. and on this basis to proclaim a 'message of the East'14 according to which a 'socialist' Germany should unite with Russia against Rome and against the remains of 'feudalism', instead of searching for the true foundations of Germanity in the medieval world and the Arvan-Germanic ethos. Although one can sympathise with the anti-Romanism of a Ghibelline emperor, chafing at the voke under which a Rome given over to a Semitic religion tried to put him, a voke which weighed him down too much to allow him to exercise even those remnants of imperiality, hierarchy and authority which Rome supposedly still favoured, we must maintain that, just as Christianity represented the great fall of Roman-heathen humanity, so the Reformation represented the great fall of Nordic-Germanic humanity, and that it must be repudiated, not in the name of the Church, but in the name of Nordic tradition, in the name of the heathen spirit fully re-assumed. Once that conviction is reached, many artificial antitheses which some persons, even of high spiritual and cultural attainments, foment against Rome, through incomprehension, lack of spiritual courage, or sectarian spirit, will automatically be eliminated. Luther is just as far from the true, aristocratic, German mode of being as is the 'socialism' of the Iew Karl Marx<sup>15</sup>

On a more empirical plane, in Italy, the struggle against the cancers of parliamentarianism, democracy and socialism, is already under way, in the form of 'Fascism'. A will to order, hierarchy, virility and authority pervades the new national reality. Acknowledging the positive in all this, however, must not prevent us from specifying the many remaining factors which, if they persist, will keep Italy far from a true aristocratic-traditional restoration. The Fascist tendency to state centralisation

certainly has value as an antidote against democratic liberalism and anarchically destructive individualism, but it needs to be restrained if we are to avoid that despotism of the 'authorities' which inevitably produces social levelling and decay into impersonal mechanism. Thus, the corporatist idea in Fascism. while it has the value of eliminating Marxist class struggle in favour of a higher ideal of collaboration, must not be allowed to lead to the politicisation of the economy, nor to syndicalism, nor to state control of the economy, as is wished by some Fascists who consider their movement as a fulfilment of the Muscovite revolution. Rather we must revive and defend the qualitative and pluralistic system of the guilds and medieval corporations, preserving their relative autarchy, and encouraging especially their secret spirituality, their superiority to mere money making and to activistic or productivistic agitation naturally, all this to the extent that is still possible in the world of today, devastated by the machine and chained to the elusive determinisms of an omnipotent international finance. The Fascist 'revolution' preserved the monarchy - and this is already a considerable achievement — but it has not managed to restore monarchy, from a mere symbol, to a living power. Monarchy, even in the context of Fascism, remains unfortunately a monarchy which 'rules but does not govern'. Besides. the so-called 'hierarchies' of Fascism are almost always composed entirely of mere party leaders, often people who have risen up from below, without name or true spiritual tradition, their rise more a testimony to their skill as 'tribunes of the people' or 'condottieri', in the secular sense of the Renaissance, than to truly aristocratic features.

Carried away by the struggles and concerns of concrete politics, Fascism does not seem to be interested in creating a hierarchy in the higher sense, one based on purely spiritual values, which will have only scorn for all the contaminations proceeding from 'culture' and modern intellectualism, and will refocus our attention upon things beyond both secular and religious limitations. The Fascist evocation of Roman symbols is still very far from being accompanied by an evocation of the

Roman-heathen idea — not just the military, but also the sacred idea of the Imperium — an evocation which would expose the compromising, opportunistic nature of the supposed union of integral Fascism with some interpretation of the Judeo-Christian religion. Given that the Fascist conception of the state still seems to be essentially secular, 'political', at most, 'ethical', even we heathen imperialists consider the fact that Fascism pays to the Roman Church, as bearer of a universal, otherworldly authority, if not another tribute, then at least an acknowledgement of its primacy, to be 'better than nothing', despite the contradiction involved. However, to the extent that these limits can be overcome, Italy, on the road of Fascism, could be among the first peoples which the hoped-for traditional and aristocratic restoration will call to higher destinies.

Turning to Germany, and considering the state of struggle in which it still finds itself today, we should concentrate on bringing to light the ideals and myths which can provide the best orientation for the elements agitated by the current situation. Although the swastika, the Aryan heathen sign of the sun and the flame which burns by its own power, is certainly among the symbols which could most fittingly lead to a true Germanic rebirth, nevertheless we have to acknowledge that the name of the political party which has recovered it as emblem, and which today is revolutionising Germany in a Fascist sense, is most unfortunate. As a matter of fact, despite their appeal to the 'working class', both 'nationalism' and 'socialism' are contrary to the whole German tradition, and it is clear that what is needed by Germany is a counter-revolution, against democratic socialism. The reconstituted Harzburg Front<sup>14</sup> already indicated the right way: a movement of anti-Marxist and anti-democratic revolt that submits itself to the front of conservative and traditional elements. It will be necessary to ensure that the 'socialist' moment - even if it is a 'national socialism' - does not take the upper hand, since if it does, the whole thing will devolve to the level of a mass phenomenon, which gathers around the momentary prestige of a leader. Certainly, many demands for 'social justice' are justified, and the revolt

against capitalist oligarchy is even a presupposition for the restoration of a qualitative and aristocratic order; however, it should not be forgotten that, so long as this is all one thinks of, one still remains — even if with an opposite sign — on the same plane on which Marxism acts, and no more justified from any higher point of view than Marxism is.

The imprint of a tradition of order, discipline and aristocratic rule has remained on the German people. They have to remain faithful to this tradition, and to rebuild the supra-political elements within which it can find a higher justification. The best minds in Germany are becoming more and more convinced that the democratic-republican regime is only an interregnum, a transitional phase. In certain politically tempestuous circumstances, dictatorship may be necessary, but it can never become a true and sufficient solution. It may be valid insofar as it can perhaps represent a way of rebuilding what an external power has destroyed, as for instance after defeat in war, which can happen after even the most wonderful struggles. This is naturally a matter of principle and not of persons. It is a matter of the type of regime. As we said at the beginning, monarchy — which as empire, supreme over every autonomous state, gave us a small picture of what full supra-national European rule could be - is the soundest base for the lasting preservation of a tradition, and for the formation of a strongly personalised virile hierarchy, a hierarchy which would rest upon Arvan-feudal principles of service and of faithfulness, not on any 'law' or any of the 'social truths' which have crept into our lives with the coming to power of the caste of the merchants, and subsequently of the caste of the servants. Naturally, a further requirement for Germany is to rid itself of all the matters of decomposition which have appeared in the post-war years — the defeatist-pacifist, vague, coarse, vulgar-realist literature. The contrived, false antithesis which has appeared, between a professional, battered, secular, incompetent rationalism on the one hand, and the modern lebensphilosophie, romanticism, and irrationalism on the other, must be overcome by claiming the right to a new realism of a transcendent character whereby

the ideal of culture, in a classical, supranational, Dorian-oriented sense, can be renewed; we must impress the precise law of this culture upon the spirit, the soul and the body of its future citizens, from above, in silence and dignity, filled as we are with contempt for the world of the men of letters, learned and insignificant men who dance around the complexes of eros and. the engine of the economy.

Despite the warnings we have already expressed against regarding the doctrine of race as self-sufficient, anti-Semitism is another starting-point for German recovery. Nevertheless, if one thinks the matter through, one will realise that Judaism. which Germany is already fighting, is only one aspect of a much larger enemy: anti-Semitism leads inevitably to the necessity of choice between, either, the profession of the Christian religion, or fidelity towards our true tradition and the will to create a new, fully Nordic-solar, and, therefore, heathen spirituality, this being the higher integration of our weakened and scattered forces in the dark age of the West. A radical anti-Semitism is possible only in conjunction with an anti-Christianism<sup>17</sup>. Only on the basis of an Arvan-heathen spirituality can a universal antithesis to Semitism be developed, since Semitism itself is now a universal phenomenon, whose modern economical and social forms are only its specific, particularised aspects on the material plane.

If we propose therefore the union of the two Eagles — the Roman Eagle and the German Eagle — the first problem is resolved for the future Europe. We shall see whether there will be enough courage and stubbornness in men for them to find themselves capable of remaining at the heights of this 'myth', so that they can affirm it as the 'must be!' of a future reality. And the consciousness that only our two peoples can defend ancient Europe should give us enough power to allow us to overcome all the racial or political obstacles to such an accord.

In anticipation of the political upheavals which will indicate to Europe the way to a higher destiny, it is necessary to take inner action in the interim, which is essentially this: to create a state of mind and a way of life which gradually approximates to the traditional type. The points will be found at deeper levels, from which it becomes again possible to connect oneself to the primordial forces which, behind the scenes of the political show, following the impulses of those 'invisible leaders' of whom we spoke at the beginning, will be able to slow down the fall, and counter-balance those powers — themselves extrahuman — which have contributed to the decline of the West.

#### Ghibelline Restoration

To conclude this discussion, we need to examine in greater detail the relationship between the ideal of the new European civilisation and Catholicism. From the purely doctrinal point of view, we can hardly claim to have given an unequivocal answer to this problem. But we wish to discuss the more contingent aspects, bearing in mind the principles through which movements of a political character can be strengthened today.

It must be stressed that we mean to speak specifically of Catholicism, and not of Christianity in general. Certainly, a Catholic would not be such if he did not maintain that Catholicism is Christianity, and that the Church represents the legitimate and sole heir of Christ. This 'orthodox' conviction of his, however, does not change the fact that Christianity in conjunction with Judaism directly or indirectly formed a whole very far from being reducible to pure Catholicism. We have already pointed to the powers among whom the Judeo-Christian factor can be found, which are quite distinct from the current which has been Romanised to a certain degree by the city of the Eagle and of the Fasces. We do not need to waste more words here on our attitude towards those powers. It is Catholicism in the narrow sense that we must deal with now.

The fact is that Catholicism, with its great hierarchical apparatus, its seeming stability, eternity and universality, and its defence of values which are in a way supra-terrestrial, still exerts a seductive magic on many in this dark age. This produces the result that, for some, the concept of tradition will inevitably be

based upon Catholic tradition; and someone in Italy has not hesitated to state officially, very recently, that, if Rome is still the centre of a universal idea, it is such only via the Catholic Church<sup>18</sup>. Besides, until yesterday, many of the great traditional monarchies of Europe were Catholic, and the legitimist idea was defended essentially on a Catholic basis. Many modern attempts at a return to the ecumenical Middle Ages are based on the premise that Catholicism was the central force of that period.

All this is time, and yet it only shows by how much the horizon of modern man has narrowed. This estimation of Catholicism is possible insofar as the sense of a system of values of a very different dimension and purity has become lost. As we just said: to someone who has nothing, Catholicism is at least something. Considering the usurpations of the 'secular' or 'ethical' state, a state which at least acknowledges the authority represented by the Church as a higher and universal authority is undoubtedly a value for us. In spite of this, we must have the courage to specify carefully what it is that we would hope to find in Catholicism; then, to determine in a clear-headed manner whether these elements are present in their highest conceivable forms in Catholicism.

The principal among these elements have already been mentioned: a law of order, an acknowledgement of the supernatural, and a principle of universality.

As far as the first point is concerned, whoever finds in the Church a principle of order must naturally ignore the chaotic periods of its past. But there is more. Even in the Bolshevik ideal there is a principle of order — therefore we must identify this principle, then examine to what degree a connection exists between the chosen principle and the fundamental premises of Catholic doctrine. The answer is clear enough: we are overwhelmed with texts, encyclicals, and syllabi, all stating that the Catholic ideal of order is essentially one of coordination, definitely not one of hierarchical subordination, and that it is not choosy about the specifically political form of each individual state, provided that their subordination to the Church and to Catholic doctrines endures. Catholicism, basically, re-

mains a Christianity, a 'socialism' of the peoples under a sort of paternal supervision, which favours their levelling with respect to spirit. This is the ideal of order which is more congenial to the Church than any other. Could this ideal attract the best forces of European restoration? Of those who do not forget about the heritage of their most noble Arvan past? Certainly not. If Catholicism, in spite of all, could represent the hierarchical ideal, then these forces could find support in the Church, but, from that point of view, the fact remains that everything good and great which the Church has managed to achieve over the centuries reflects, not the doctrinal affirmations of early Christianity and orthodox philosophy, but the Roman element which it partially revitalised and made its own. Given this fact, any conscious return to Catholicism could only be justified as a way of going beyond Catholicism, directly to the pre-Christian, Roman, living, and creative tradition, where compromise ends, and where those imperial forces which, when assumed by Catholicism, were enough to cause a Protestant opposition, are found in their pure state. The judgment of Maurras on the Church as principle of order belongs to a rather similar ambit of ideas19. Italian Fascists - unless motivated by the most vulgar political opportunism — could recognise the Church only according to the possibility of linking the Caesarean idea of Rome with Catholicism. And it would not be difficult to find other writers of this opinion.

Let us consider Catholicism more specifically, firstly as offering a basis for legitimist doctrine with respect to divine right. We must immediately express reservations — recognising all that in Catholicism has been in contradiction with this doctrine. Let us not forget that it was precisely the Church which first upheld in the West the doctrine of natural right, that is to say, of the popular origin and profane nature of royalty, as against the Ghibelline thesis of the 'two suns' and of the principle of supernatural nature of the Empire<sup>20</sup>. This is because the Church understood clearly that, in the context of a doctrine of divine right fully understood — as was the case since the Hohenstaufens on — little room would remain for its hegemonic

aspirations. Therefore, if Catholicism has come to support the thesis of divine right, there is a further compromise in this. This doctrine, insofar as it is creates a supernatural basis for the premise of legitimate power, is in fact only a reduced form of a much more concrete, ancient and traditional doctrine, that of royal divinity, to which we have repeatedly referred. Would Catholicism perhaps wish to retract the affirmation of Gelasius I that "after Christ no man can be at the same time king and priest", as was the case in our Aryan and heathen traditions? Would it care to know that the divine right of the Ruler is understood by our traditions as something more than a mere condition which the Church 'acknowledges' only nominally, or even by a 'consecration' which - already excluded for centuries from true and proper sacraments — could represent today nothing but an empty symbol and a mere ceremonial? Once again: Catholicism is not enough. We repeat that the principle of divine right must be understood concretely, and not in a formal and conventional manner: it must be understood to mean that an actually deified being — beyond any convention and any exterior acknowledgement from another authority — a person who manifests an extra-human nature — has the true and legitimate right to rule. Therefore, once again, what could lead us to Catholicism leads us beyond Catholicism and, directing us to the great pre-Christian traditions, shows us a more complete, definite and solid whole.

Let us now consider a second point: the value of Catholicism in as much it defends a supra-political point of view, and guides souls towards a supernatural order. Here again we must express the reservation that, to be able to recognise this value in Catholicism, we must ignore every aspect of Christianity that presents instead a romantic, passionate and sentimental reduction, and a humanisation of behaviour towards the divine. In spite of this — materialism and secularism having insinuated themselves everywhere in the modern world, like cancers — we must accord a higher justification to any system which shifts the barycentre to the truly supernatural. Of course, this is only a starting point. Beyond the problem of the relationship with the supra-world,

remains the question of the nature of this relationship. And it is here that - as is well-known - we imperialists find the greater and insurmountable obstacle to an acknowledgement of Catholicism. Towards the supernatural, as we have said, two fundamental attitudes are possible; the solar, virile, assertive one, corresponding to the ideal of traditional sacred royalty, and the lunar, feminine, religious, passive one, corresponding to the sacerdotal ideal. The priest, however powerful, thinks of himself as supplicating his God, as the Lord whom he serves, and before whom he humbles himself. All his power comes from God, and he is only a spiritual intermediary. The Semites, in particular, have carried this behaviour to an extreme degree, depicting in almost masochistic colours their creaturely subjection and the pathos of their distance from the Omnipotent. By contrast, the traditional sacred king was himself of a divine nature, and the 'gods' were his peers; he was, like them, of 'celestial' stock, he had the same blood as them; he was thus a centre, an affirmative, free and cosmic principle. Then, if our primordial tradition, that of our purest race, is a tradition of the 'solar' type, we must not delude ourselves: the will for restoration corresponding to this tradition, sooner or later, will come into conflict with Catholicism – precisely as happened in the Ghibelline Middle Ages: unless Catholicism, on the basis of our ensuing arguments. agrees to recognise the true hierarchical place proper to a religious system.

A similar problem, though independent from the one which has just been dealt with, arises in relation to the last point: the value of Catholicism as principle of universality. We have already emphasised that, if the alternative to Catholicism were merely some particularistic, strictly racialistic, nationalist-totemist idea, we would not hesitate, in spite of everything, to declare ourselves in favour of Catholicism. However, although for exceptional and provisional reasons we can take pleasure in the acknowledgement of the higher value and the higher right proper to what is universal, a further problem arises, insofar as there is universality and there is universality: there is a solar form and a lunar form with respect to the supernatural<sup>21</sup>.

After everything which has been said up to now, it is unnecessary to place further emphasis on this conclusion, clear as it should be now for everyone: as against solar, imperially and hierarchically based universality, culminating in the ideal of royal divinity, there is lunar, ecclesiastically and 'socialistically' based universality, culminating in the priest as servant of God. Which of these two universalities will we Aryans, we heirs of the sacred Caesars, and of the royal sons of Thor and Odin, seek for a new European civilisation? The most secret voice of our blood must give the answer to this question, and our spiritual courage must be able to affirm it, against the habits of thought, prejudice, superstition and false tradition which have insinuated themselves into the various European races.

What place and what function could the Church continue to have in the context of an oecumenical imperial civilisation? We are attempting to answer this question in the most unequivocal manner. To be able to do so, it is necessary to go back over what has already been said on the relationship between Wisdom and faith.

The principle of inequality on which the traditional spirit was based takes as its axiom that, according to the diversity of men and their natural possibilities, there are very different ways to come into contact with the divine. For the best - who will always be a minority — it is possible to develop a link to the divine directly, and to transform themselves into it and possess it as a living and concrete state of one's own experience: this is the solar path, the initiatory ideal For the others, for the masses, it is not possible to actualise this kind of transformation and fulfilment; the bonds of human nature are too strong. Another path is open to them: to connect themselves by a vow to something which is represented to them as a particular, real and transcendent being — such as God according to the theistic concept. Instead of knowledge of the divine, what follows is faith in the divine; instead of experience, dogma; instead of the techniques of overcoming and real participation, prayer, fear of God and religiosity; instead of the sense of sufficiency and supra-personhood, insufficiency and dependence upon the Omnipotent.

Thus, a 'religious' system could find its place and its justification even in the traditional world, insofar as it addressed the masses and offered itself as a substitute for those for whom the path of aristocratic, super-religious and initiatory fulfilment was precluded. The principle of hierarchy extended to the spiritual domain, where, beyond popular and devotional religion, bevond the cults and faiths of the masses, it allowed, without any contradiction being involved, an initiatory doctrine, an esotericism, a tradition of Knowledge and ritual, which was originally the privilege of the princes and of nobility. Under these conditions, any tradition can accept in the full sense, and regard without contempt, the one who knows and the one who does not know, provided that there is only one axis, provided that there is no way out, provided that the one who does not know, or who only assumes he knows, acknowledges, worships and praises those who are above them.

According to this full conception, the system of the Catholic Church could represent only a system which corresponded, in an approximate manner, to that of the popular religion of ancient civilisations. Conflict with Catholicism is thus inevitable only to the extent that it does not acknowledge its 'place'; insofar as it claims to be the higher value, the religion par excellence, above which nothing could ever be found, and outside of which there are only deviations and errors; in short, to the extent that it does not have, or does not want to have, any sense for a hierarchy of values, which, objectively, are higher than any 'religion'.

Needless to say, it is precisely this spirit of intolerance and narrow-mindedness which gave their forms to early Christianity and, above all, to Judaism, bringing about a true reversal of those values peculiar to traditional elites, in favour of those belonging to the lower castes: this is why heathen, aristocratic virtues come to be called 'splendid vices', the type of the sage and the initiate becomes the 'enemy of God', and the qualities of sufficiency, calm and conscious force for self-realisation, are stigmatised as Luciferian pride. All this has already been emphasised by Nietzsche and there is no need to repeat it here.

We have alluded, in general, to the phenomenon of usurpation — which already manifested itself in antiquity — by the priestly castes, which appropriated to themselves powers and sacred functions previously the sole prerogative of kings.

However, coming back to the present, we must of course admit clearly that those values with respect to which the Church would be forced to accept its subordination, in the event of a return to normality and true hierarchy, are not at all present in reality. The counterpart is completely missing in the modern world of an ideality which, though having its root, like the Church, in a supernatural origin and destiny, nevertheless does not represent the religious pole, but the solar pole of spirit, and which constitutes the soul of a universality, not of the socialist-lunar but rather of the imperial type. We are sure we have made it clear that we could not support an anti-Catholicism which represented merely the attempt of a temporal or national power to arrogate to itself a spiritual authority, even if of the merely religious type. In spite of everything, the fact remains that, both on the grounds of principle and on the grounds of the mythic elements needed for our awakening, we must unequivocally propound the concept of a complete order. in which the Church — let us repeat — could be admitted only as the expression of the spirituality of those who merely 'believe', and would remain hierarchically dependent upon the Empire, understood as incarnation of the royal spirituality of those who 'know' and 'are'. The Eagle beyond, the Cross, the solar symbol of the right of the Fathers (Empire) beyond the lunar symbol of the right of the Mothers (the Mother Church). Only under these conditions could one speak of a full traditionalism, and of a return to an order of justice and normality.

Our knowledge of our origins itself proves to us, in effect, the legitimacy of this idea. It is only when the Aryan primordial stocks of India split up and came into contact with the adulterating forces of the races originating from the South, that the Brahmins, in the sense of a dominating caste of priests, arose, and the *purohita*, the priest whose original relation to the sacred king was of dependence, though united

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with the king, according to the precise formula of the ritual, as wife to husband or earth to heaven, In China, in ancient Rome, in ancient Hellas, the rite was essentially the privilege of the king, and the sacerdotal caste, when not identical with the aristocracy, was subordinated to it. This same can be said of the primordial Nordic stocks: it seems that the Norwegian kings were the only ones able to celebrate the rite, and, among the Germans, if there ever were any priests, they did not have the supremacy and dignity of divine kings and leaders. In Egypt, it was only at the end of the twentieth dynasty that the sacerdotal caste managed to seize power, and gave birth to the dynasty of the great priests of Thebes, to the detriment of the authority of the solar kings. In the first three centuries of Christianity, the Catholic Church itself was only an organ of ritual officiants, dependent upon the Empire, and, in the Councils, the bishops accepted the authority of the prince. not only in disciplinary matters, but also in matters of dogma. Pontiffs paid the tribute of acknowledgement to the Merovingian and Carolingian kings, using the formula: Melchisedek noster, merito rex atque sacerdos, complevit laicus religionis opus — vos gens sancta estis atque regale estis sacerdotum; and, it is said that, after Charlemagne had received the Roman crown. Leo III prostrated himself before him, according to the ancient tradition: Post laudes ab apostolico more antiquorum principuum adoratus est, the Liber Pontificalis says. These references, taken from among many others of equal unambiguousness, confirm the conformity to Tradition of our Ghibelline concept: they show us what justice demands, namely, that the Cross — as sacerdotal symbol — has a function, and a positive side, in a fully understood hierarchical ideal, if it remains subordinated to the Eagle. To the extent that the Church cannot or will not do this, it immediately places itself in the context of the anti-traditional, destructive and paralysing forces; it lowers itself to the level of the problematic Judeo-Christian factor, which, as one of the main causes of the decadence of our world, can only find in us anti-moderns implacable and inexorable enemies.

#### Conclusion

We believe we have said enough in order to make the main features of our imperial myth clearly recognisable. We wish only to define a standpoint. The systematic and deepened development of our premises, which can consolidate this standpoint in a form which is not, as here, that of a military campaign, is found in other writings of ours<sup>22</sup>.

In the beginning we said that European civilisation requires a radical upheaval, without which it is destined to collapse. The plebeian superstition, according to which Western man believed in the chimera of development, and to which he devoted his material conquest of the world, has fortunately vanished. To speak of decline of the West<sup>23</sup> is no longer, as yesterday — as in the century of the Enlightenment and in the Jacobin ideas of the goddess Reason — an absurd heresy. More or less everywhere, the ultimate conclusions, to which the vaunted 'civilisation' was bound to lead, have become apparent. Confronted with this conclusion, it seems that some men return to their past, and that new forces rise for the reconquest.

And this is why the appeal which this book intends to make is not lacking in justification today. There are still men who do not belong to this modern world, and whom nothing in this world could lead astray, exalt or humiliate — men who despite all are ready to fight this world with all their strength, as soon the hour to do so strikes.

Everyone knows the legend of the Ghibelline emperor who awaits his awakening in the 'mountain', to fight the last battle alongside his faithful men. This will occur when the hordes of Gog and Magog have demolished the symbolic wall which barred their way, and flung themselves into the conquest of the world — anyone able to work out the real sense of this apocalyptic myth cannot avoid thinking that that moment is no longer distant. The hordes of Gog and Magog are the demons of the collective and of the emergence of the socialist mass man, omnipotent all over the world, in spirit as in matter. Op-

posed to this, the imperial Ghibelline symbol represents the call to muster of what forces remain still healthy.

We have not spoken much of 'politics', of social or economic reforms, since the thought of achieving a revival by such means is simply ridiculous: it would be like applying remedies to the sick parts of the body, when the blood is already infected or poisoned. The only thing that matters is the establishment of an order of values such that, by their realisation, the dark destinies which, even on the material plane, weigh upon Europe can be averted. To the one who says to us that this is not practical politics and reality, we calmly answer that he no longer knows what politics mean, what reality means.

The exaltation created by moments of danger, crisis and alarm is composed of various, often irrational and contradictory, elements. Consequently, if one examines the various contemporary socially and culturally reactionary and reformist movements, one finds many impure factors in them, conditioned from below: passions belonging in one way or another to the very evil against which they wish to defend themselves. But, in a few movements, one can find something better, a will in which the possibility of a true revival secretly awakens.

The path to this will must be pointed out.

To those not broken, those not vanquished, we propose this symbol, rooted in Tradition; and we affirm that it is only by a return to solar spirituality, to the living vision of the world, to the virile heathen ethos, and to the imperial ideal, the sacred inheritance of our Nordic-Aryan blood, that the forces of the European revolt will be able to catch fire in those souls where they do not yet burn, and only that will be able to give those souls an absolute self-consciousness, only that will be able to break the circle of the 'dark age' of the West.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> This remark by the Jew Benjamin Disraeli (in *Sybil*) holds particular significance for us in this connection: "Christianity is a sophisticated Judaism, or it is nothing; Christianity is inconceivable without Judaism, as Judaism is incomplete without Christianity".