

THE CLARENDON EDITION OF  
THE WORKS OF DAVID HUME



A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE  
VOLUME 2

EDITED BY DAVID FATE NORTON  
AND MARY J. NORTON

DAVID HUME

OXFORD

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THE CLARENDON EDITION OF THE  
WORKS OF DAVID HUME

**A Treatise of Human Nature**

An Abstract of . . . A Treatise of Human Nature

A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh

THE CLARENDON EDITION OF THE  
WORKS OF DAVID HUME



*General Editors of the Philosophical Works*

Tom L. Beauchamp   David Fate Norton   M. A. Stewart

DAVID HUME  
A Treatise of Human Nature

A CRITICAL EDITION

EDITED BY  
DAVID FATE NORTON  
MARY J. NORTON

Volume 2: Editorial Material  
including

HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF *A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE*  
FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE TIME OF HUME'S DEATH

DAVID FATE NORTON

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## Abbreviations and Conventions

Abbreviations or short titles used to refer to works by Hume:

<i>Abs.</i>	<i>An Abstract of . . . A Treatise of Human Nature</i>
<i>Adv.</i>	Advertisements to Volume 1 and Volume 3 of the <i>Treatise</i>
<i>App.</i> and <i>App.</i>	Appendix in Volume 3 of the <i>Treatise</i>
<i>Appx.</i>	Appendices in <i>EPM</i> or <i>HE</i>
<i>DNR</i>	<i>Dialogues concerning Natural Religion</i>
<i>DP</i>	<i>A Dissertation on the Passions</i>
<i>EHU</i>	<i>An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding</i> (and <i>Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding</i> , the title of this work from 1748–50)
<i>EPM</i>	<i>An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals</i>
<i>ETSS</i>	<i>Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects</i>
<i>HE</i>	<i>The History of England</i> , ed. W. B. Todd.
<i>Intro.</i>	Hume's Introduction to the <i>Treatise</i>
<i>Letters</i>	<i>The Letters of David Hume</i> , ed. J. Y. T. Greig
<i>LG</i>	<i>A Letter from a Gentleman</i>
<i>New Letters</i>	<i>The New Letters of David Hume</i> , ed. R. Klibansky and E. C. Mossner
<i>NHR</i>	<i>The Natural History of Religion</i>
<i>THN</i> and <i>Treatise</i>	<i>A Treatise of Human Nature</i>

Short titles used when citing Hume's essays:

'British Government'	'Whether the British Government inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a Republic'
'Civil Liberty'	'Of Civil Liberty'
'Coalition of Parties'	'Of the Coalition of Parties'
'Dignity or Meanness'	'Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature'
'Essay-Writing'	'Of Essay-Writing'
'First Principles of Government'	'Of the First Principles of Government'

### *Abbreviations and Conventions*

'Immortality of the Soul'	'Of the Immortality of the Soul'
'Independency of Parliament'	'Of the Independency of Parliament'
'Liberty of the Press'	'Of the Liberty of the Press'
'Moral Prejudices'	'Of Moral Prejudices'
'National Characters'	'Of National Characters'
'Origin of Government'	'Of the Origin of Government'
'Original Contract'	'Of the Original Contract'
'Parties in General'	'Of Parties in General'
'Passive Obedience'	'Of Passive Obedience'
'Parties of Great Britain'	'Of the Parties of Great Britain'
'Perfect Commonwealth'	'Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth'
'Politics to a Science'	'That Politics may be Reduced to a Science'
'Polygamy and Divorces'	'Of Polygamy and Divorces'
'Populousness'	'Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations'
'Protestant Succession'	'Of the Protestant Succession'
'Public Credit'	'Of Public Credit'
'Refinement in the Arts'	'Of Refinement in the Arts'
'Remarkable Customs'	'Of some Remarkable Customs'
'Rise and Progress'	'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences'
'Standard of Taste'	'Of the Standard of Taste'
'Study of History'	'Of the Study of History'
'Superstition and Enthusiasm'	'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm'

Additional essays cited: 'Of Commerce', 'Of Eloquence', 'Of Interest', 'Of Money', 'The Platonist', 'The Sceptic', 'Of Suicide', 'Of Tragedy'.

Short titles are often used for other authors' works. Full titles of these works are given in the Bibliography.

Other abbreviations and conventions used in vol. 2.

ann., anns.	annotation, annotations
AT	Adam–Tannery edition of the <i>Œuvres de Descartes</i>
B	Pascal's <i>Pensées</i> , ed. L. Brunschvicg
Ed. App.	'Editorial Appendix'
Editing the Texts	'Editing the Texts of the <i>Treatise</i> , the <i>Abstract</i> , and the <i>Letter from a Gentleman</i> '

### *Abbreviations and Conventions*

<i>ESTC</i>	<i>English Short-Title Catalogue</i>
Historical Account	'Historical Account of <i>A Treatise of Human Nature</i> from its Beginnings to the Time of Hume's Death'
Kr	Pascal's <i>Pensées</i> , trans. A. J. Krailsheimer
<i>OED</i>	<i>The Oxford English Dictionary</i>
vol[s].	Designates one or more volumes of this two-volume, critical edition of the <i>Treatise</i>
Volume[s]/Vol[s].	Designates one or more volumes of the three-volume, first-edition text of the <i>Treatise</i>
[xxx]	Numbers within square brackets direct the reader to specific pages of particular editions of works that are first cited by standard structural divisions (e.g., by book, part, and section). For further explanation and examples, see References and Forms of Reference, p. 687.

Abbreviations used only in Editing the Texts are explained there in notes and in Sect. 3.2.

# Historical Account of *A Treatise of Human Nature* from its Beginnings to the Time of Hume's Death

## 1. WRITING THE *TREATISE*

David Hume was born in Edinburgh, Scotland's capital, on 26 April 1711. The years of his youth were divided between that city and Ninewells, his family's small landholding at Chirnside, a village near the border with England. Little is known about Hume's childhood. His father, Joseph Home, died when David was 2; his mother, Katherine, never remarried, but, according to Hume, devoted herself to her three children.<sup>1</sup> In the absence of positive evidence about Hume's earliest education, one may speculate that he and his siblings were tutored by the Revd George Home of Broadhaugh, his uncle by marriage and the minister of Chirnside from 1704 to 1741, or that he attended school in Chirnside or Edinburgh.<sup>2</sup> On either alternative, the young Hume would have had instruction in the Calvinist doctrines of the Scottish Church and also learned Latin and possibly some Greek. It is likely that he began studies at the College of Edinburgh in 1721 (when about two years younger than most other beginning students), and probably continued there through the spring of 1725. Hume was later to report that his education consisted largely in the study of languages.<sup>3</sup> It is true that during his first year at university he would have studied Latin, and that during the second year he

<sup>1</sup> 'My Own Life', 3.

<sup>2</sup> The first two suggestions are not exclusive; the local minister might well have had a hand in the local school. Near the end of his life, Hume was interviewed by James Boswell. 'I asked him', Boswell reports, 'if he was not religious when he was young. He said he was, and used to read *The Whole Duty of Man*; that he made an abstract from the catalogue of vices at the end of it, and examined himself by this; leaving out murder and theft, and such vices as he had no chance of committing, having no inclination to commit them. This, he said, was strange work; for instance, to try if, notwithstanding his excelling his school-fellows, he had no pride or vanity' (Boswell, *Private Papers from Malahide Castle*, 12: 227–8; the interview is also recorded in N. K. Smith, Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, 76–9). This reference to 'school-fellows', while in itself interesting, gives us no clear indication of who or where these school-fellows were. They may have been boys in a local school or at the College of Edinburgh. On the anti-Calvinist, Anglican work, *The Whole Duty of Man*, see n. 126 below.

<sup>3</sup> Letter of spring 1734, to an unnamed physician, in *Letters*, 1: 13.

would have studied Greek.<sup>4</sup> But in his third year he would have followed a course in logic and metaphysics, while in his fourth and final year he would have followed a course in natural philosophy organized around the writings of Robert Boyle.<sup>5</sup> The plans originally drawn up for this course in 1708 also included provision for some instruction in ethics, but there is no firm evidence that this provision was in effect in 1724–5, the session in which Hume would have attended the course. There was also available to him an optional course in moral philosophy, the first half of which would have dealt with ethics, the second with pneumatology, including natural religion, and perhaps an account of the passions.

Hume's maternal grandfather, father, and uncle had all been lawyers. The first of these, Sir David Falconer, served as President of Scotland's highest court. His own studious disposition, Hume tells us, led his family to suppose that he, too, would find the law a suitable profession. But he found in himself an 'unsurmountable aversion to every thing but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning', and thus while his family supposed he was studying law, he was reading his favourite authors, and, from about 1727, pursuing literary and philosophical interests.<sup>6</sup>

It is difficult to say when Hume began working on the *Treatise*. His final word is that he 'composed' the work during a stay of three years (1734–7) in France.<sup>7</sup> Surviving earlier comments suggest the work then composed was begun well before 1734. In the spring of 1751, he told a friend that the 'vast

<sup>4</sup> I am drawing on the much more detailed accounts provided by M. A. Stewart, 'Hume's Intellectual Development', 11–25, and M. Barfoot, 'Hume and the Culture of Science in the Early Eighteenth Century', 151–65. For more general accounts of the arts curriculum at the University of Edinburgh, and of the views of those who taught it, see R. L. Emerson, 'Science and Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment'. Emerson argues that by 1710 the experimentalism of Bacon, Boyle, and Newton was well known, and favourably received, at Edinburgh. Additional background is provided by C. M. Shepherd, 'Newtonianism in the Scottish Universities in the Seventeenth Century'; and E. Forbes, 'Philosophy and Science Teaching in the Seventeenth Century'.

<sup>5</sup> In addition, in Dec. 1724 Hume joined a private library (the Physiological Library) that gave him access to a wide range of books on the sciences then studied; see n. 50 below. For more on the Physiological Library and Hume's knowledge of Boyle's work, see Barfoot, 'Hume and the Culture of Science in the Early Eighteenth Century'. In 1726 (i.e. after he had finished his university studies), Hume transcribed the narrative portion of a set of lectures on the theory of fluxions, lectures given by George Campbell, an 'extramural teacher of mathematics'. Little is known about the circumstances in which Hume transcribed these lectures, but the existence of the transcription suggests that his interest in scientific topics extended beyond his time as a student at Edinburgh. On this manuscript, see M. A. Stewart, 'Introduction', 8–9.

<sup>6</sup> 'My Own Life', 1. Hume mentions two natural lawyers he was supposedly reading, Johannes Voet and Arnoldus Vinnius. A 1731 edition of a work by the former was included in the Hume Library; see D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton, *The David Hume Library*, 135, item 1312, but as Stewart points out, this may well have been his nephew's copy, for Hume had probably given up the study of law before 1731 ('Hume's Intellectual Development', 26 n.).

<sup>7</sup> 'My Own Life', 2.

Undertaking' that became the *Treatise* was 'plan'd before I was one and twenty, & compos'd before [I was] twenty-five'.<sup>8</sup> In 1754 he was to say again that the work was 'compos'd before I was five & twenty'.<sup>9</sup> In 1775 he wrote and had published a brief Advertisement in which he asked his critics to disregard the *Treatise*, 'a Work, which the Author had projected before he left College, and which he wrote and published not long after'.<sup>10</sup> Given that Hume left college when 14 and published the first two volumes of the *Treatise* nearly fourteen years later, and the different suggestions made in the letters to Elliot and Stewart, there are grounds for doubt about this account of the beginnings of the *Treatise*.

The issue itself is ambiguous. What counts as *beginning* a philosophical treatise? Has the author begun it when he first puts on paper thoughts about issues found in the published work, but with perhaps no clearly formed intent of making these discussions public? Or has he begun a work only when he has a relatively clear idea of the method, structure, and scope of his undertaking, and has actually written what we would recognize as drafts of some part of the work? If we adopt this second, narrower understanding of *beginning*, then we may decide that Hume was at least 18, and perhaps even 20, when he began the *Treatise*. If we adopt the first, more relaxed understanding of *beginning*, then we may conclude that he had begun the work at a younger age. Hume's earliest extant letter, written a few weeks after his sixteenth birthday, reveals that prior to that date he had been writing about some of the issues central to the *Treatise* as published, and was known by at least one person to be doing so. In this letter, written to his friend, Michael Ramsay, he defends himself for not having sent, in a previous letter, drafts of his 'papers':

You say That I would not send in my papers because they were not polishd nor brought to any form;<sup>11</sup> w<sup>ch</sup> you say is Nicety. But was it not reasonable? Would you have me send in my loose, uncorrect thoughts? Were such worth the transcribing? All the progress that I made is but drawing the Outlines, in loose bits of Paper; here a hint of a passion, there a Phenomenon in the mind accounted for, in another the alteration of

<sup>8</sup> Letter of March–April 1751, to Gilbert Elliot of Minto, *Letters*, 1: 158. A briefer account of the writing, publication, and reception of the *Treatise* is found in T. H. Grose, 'History of the Editions', 15–40. Hume's biographers have also taken up these topics. See J. H. Burton, *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, 1: 11–135; E. C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume*, 66–132.

<sup>9</sup> Letter of Feb. 1754, to John Stewart, *Letters*, 1: 187. To both Elliot and Stewart, Hume expressed regret for publishing the *Treatise* too soon, before he had properly mastered an appropriate form for his thoughts; for further details, see Sect. 10 below.

<sup>10</sup> On this Advertisement and its first publication, see Sect. 10 below.

<sup>11</sup> Hume was later to describe the work he had done in France as 'my Papers', and in 1740 used the same term to describe his manuscript of Book 3 (see below in this section Hume's letter of Aug. 1737, and Sect. 5), but the papers mentioned here would surely have been shorter and less formal drafts.

these accounts; sometimes a remark upon an Author I have been reading,<sup>12</sup> And none of them [of] worth to any Body & I believe scarce to my self. The only design I had of mentioning any of them at all was to see what you would have said of your own.<sup>13</sup>

By the time he was 16, then, Hume had attempted explanations of phenomena of the mind. As these topics are also those of Books 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*, this letter, although it contains no explicit reference to plans to publish a systematic account of human nature, lends some credence to Hume's claim to have 'projected' the *Treatise* in his mid-teens.<sup>14</sup>

Further aspects of Hume's literary struggles are the focus of what is by far the fullest account of his early efforts to produce what became the *Treatise*: namely, his remarkable letter to an unnamed physician.<sup>15</sup> This letter, written in the spring of 1734 by a then discouraged young scholar who, finding his 'Spirits' unequal to the task he had set himself, had decided to 'lay . . . aside for some time' his 'Pretensions in Learning' in favour of a 'more active life' in the employ of a merchant. In this same letter Hume reports that he had finished college by the time he was 14 or 15, and that he was thereafter left to his own choice of reading. This he divided between books of 'Reasoning & Philosophy' and those of 'Poetry & the polite Authors'. He then immediately adds: 'Every one, who is acquainted either with the Philosophers or Critics, knows that there is nothing yet establisht in either of these two Sciences, & that they contain little more than endless Disputes, even in the most fundamental Articles.'<sup>16</sup> Far from being put off by these disputes, Hume also reports that, as a result of them, he

<sup>12</sup> M. A. Stewart has shown that the notes published as 'Hume's Early Memoranda' were almost certainly begun no earlier than 1739. See Stewart, 'The Dating of Hume's Manuscripts', 276–88, and, for further discussion and references, *idem*, 'Hume's Intellectual Development', 47, esp. nn. 95–6. For earlier suggestions about the date of the Memoranda, see E. C. Mossner, 'Hume's Early Memoranda, 1729–1740', and J.-P. Pittion, 'Hume's Reading of Bayle: An Inquiry into the Source and Role of the Memoranda'.  
<sup>13</sup> Letter of July 1727, *Letters*, 1: 9.

<sup>14</sup> We have no way of knowing, however, whether any of Hume's earliest ideas or drafts survive in the work he published in 1739–40; nor does the available evidence tell us exactly when his most characteristic or original ideas first occurred to him.

<sup>15</sup> Letter of March–April 1734, *Letters*, 1: 12–18. The physician is thought to have been either Dr George Cheyne or Dr John Arbuthnot. J. H. Burton considered both, but thought Cheyne the more likely; see *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, 1: 42–3. E. C. Mossner supposed he could show definitively that the letter was intended for Arbuthnot; see 'Hume's Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, 1734'. For a balanced consideration in support of the possibility that the letter was intended for or sent to Cheyne, but none the less maintaining 'a proper suspense of judgment' on the issue, see J. P. Wright, 'Dr. George Cheyne, Chevalier Ramsay, and Hume's Letter to a Physician'.

<sup>16</sup> *Letters*, 1: 13. Pierre-Daniel Huet has an interlocutor say: 'When first I apply'd my self to the Study of Philosophy in my younger Years, I was very much offended at the continual Disputes of Philosophers about every Trifle . . . one might see every Day some new Disputes arise' (*Philosophical Treatise concerning the Weakness of Human Understanding*, 3). Hume alludes to this work at *Letter from a Gentleman* 24. See also n. 25.

found a certain Boldness of Temper, growing in me, which was not enclin'd to submit to any Authority in these Subjects, but led me to seek out some new Medium, by which Truth might be establisht. After much Study, & Reflection on this, at last, when I was about 18 Years of Age, there seem'd to be open'd up to me a new Scene of Thought, which transported me beyond Measure, & made me, with an Ardor natural to young men, throw up every other Pleasure or Business to apply entirely to it.<sup>17</sup>

Here we find Hume reporting that, before he was 18, he had devoted 'much Study, & Reflection' to precisely those issues which were to be his central concern in subsequent years.

Hume goes on to tell his correspondent that, following this philosophical epiphany, he 'cou'd think of no other way of pushing my Fortune in the World, but that of a Scholar & Philosopher', and that he was 'infinitely happy in this Course of Life for some Months'. Suddenly, however, 'about the beginning of Sept<sup>r</sup> 1729', he lost interest in his project:

all my Ardor seem'd in a moment to be extinguisht, & I cou'd no longer raise my Mind to that pitch, which formerly gave me such excessive Pleasure. I felt no Uneasyness or Want of Spirits, when I laid aside my Book; & therefore never imagin'd there was any bodily Distemper in the Case, but that my Coldness proceeded from a Laziness of Temper, which must be overcome by redoubling my Application. In this Condition I remain'd for nine Months, very uneasy to myself, as you may well imagine, but without growing any worse, which was a Miracle.<sup>18</sup>

Hume at this point in his letter is describing a worrisome state of mind and the effects that this has had on him. The first and most noticeable effect: his 'Ardor' for the 'new Scene of Thought' suddenly left him, and he could not restore it. He then 'felt no Uneasyness or Want of Spirits, when [he] laid aside [his] Book'. But what book is this? Is it merely a generic book, his reading? A commonplace book in which he recorded his reading and thoughts thereon?<sup>19</sup> A book he was writing, even a manuscript of what would

<sup>17</sup> *Letters*, 1: 13. Hume never explains what he means by the 'new Scene of Thought' that captured all his attention and energy in 1729, thus leaving ample room for speculation about the identity of this phenomenon. Several of these speculations are summarized and criticized by R. Brandt, 'Beginnings of Hume's Philosophy'; see also D. C. Yalden-Thomson, 'Recent Work on Hume', 17.

<sup>18</sup> *Letters*, 1: 13.

<sup>19</sup> Hume was later to tell his friend Gilbert Elliot of Minto that he had recently burned just such a 'Manuscript Book, wrote before I was twenty'. This particular book 'contain'd, Page after Page, the gradual Progress of my Thoughts on that head [religion]. It begun with an anxious Search after Arguments, to confirm the common Opinion: Doubts stole in, dissipated, return'd, were again dissipated, return'd again; and it was a perpetual Struggle of a restless Imagination against Inclination, perhaps against Reason' (letter of 10 March 1751, *Letters*, 1: 154).



become, some unknown number of drafts later, the book that is the central literary concern of this long letter?<sup>20</sup> If Hume meant the last of these possibilities, then we may conclude that as early as 1729 he had begun drafting ideas that became, after much further effort, the *Treatise*, but we have no evidence that he had at this early date settled on the central focus of that work, an anatomy of human nature.

Whatever our conclusion about the date at which Hume began to think about and write the *Treatise*, it is clear from his account of these years that his early interest in the problems of moral philosophy was deeply personal as well as academic and literary. Having, he wrote, read many books of morality (those of Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch are mentioned)<sup>21</sup> and ‘being smit with their beautiful Representations of Virtue & Philosophy, I undertook the Improvement of my Temper & Will, along with my Reason & Understanding. I was continually fortifying myself with Reflections against Death, & Poverty, & Shame, & Pain, & all the other Calamities of Life.’ Such efforts, he was ruefully to conclude from experience, are useful if undertaken as part of an active life, but undertaken ‘in Solitude’, as his were, ‘they serve to little other Purpose, than to waste the Spirits’.<sup>22</sup> During the summer of 1730 Hume was also struck with some physical symptoms of illness. The physician he consulted told him he was suffering from the ‘Disease of the Learned’.<sup>23</sup> This diagnosis relieved his mind, for he could now infer that his inability to concentrate on his intellectual project arose ‘not from any Defect of Temper or Genius, but from a Disease, to which any one may be subject’. Consequently, he resumed his studies, but with moderation: ‘I now began to take some Indulgence to myself; studied moderately, & only when I found my Spirits at their highest Pitch, leaving off before I was weary, & trifling away

<sup>20</sup> Stewart argues that in saying ‘I laid aside my Book’, Hume meant ‘his reading of the moment; or, possibly, a book *in* which he was writing. He has said nothing to suggest to the physician that he was at this time “writing a book”. The context (Hume’s account of his reading) favours the first interpretation, as does his usage at *Letters*, 2: 188: “Had I been born to a small Estate . . . I shoud have remaind at home all my Life, planted and improvd my Fields, read my Book, and wrote Philosophy”’ (‘Hume’s Intellectual Development’, 30 n.). But the question is: was Hume discussing only his reading? Had he, in applying himself ‘entirely’ to the new scene of thought, gone beyond reading to writing? Given that he was already writing about phenomena of the mind two years earlier, this third possibility also seems viable.

<sup>21</sup> Hume may also have read Boethius, *De consolacione philosophiae*, for the Hume Library included a seventeenth-century copy of this work; see Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 76, item 151.

<sup>22</sup> *Letters*, 1: 14; cf. *EPM*, A Dialogue 57.

<sup>23</sup> As John Wright has pointed out (*Sceptical Realism of David Hume*, 236 n. 10), this phrase and talk of the wasting of spirits are found in Mandeville. See the latter’s *Treatise of the Hypochondriack and Hysterick Passions*, pp. xix, 94, 157–60.

the rest of my Time in the best manner I could'.<sup>24</sup> The symptoms of his illness lingered or recurred for some months, but in time he came to reflect more calmly on the task he had set for himself:

Having now Time & Leizure to cool my inflam'd Imaginations, I began to consider seriously, how I shou'd proceed in my Philosophical Enquiries. I found that the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labor'd under the same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural Philosophy, of being entirely Hypothetical, & depending more upon Invention than Experience.<sup>25</sup> Every one consulted his Fancy in erecting Schemes of Virtue & of Happiness, without regarding human Nature, upon which every moral Conclusion must depend. This therefore I resolved

<sup>24</sup> *Letters*, 1: 14–15. Hume later recommended this mixed way of life to his nephew David. Noting that 'Mr Millar [Professor John Millar of Glasgow University, where the younger David was studying] is very well pleas'd with you... He complains only of one thing, which [is not the] usual Complaint of Tutors against their Pupils, to wit, that he is afraid you [apply yourself too] close, and may hurt your Health by too assiduous Study. I shoud not men[ti]on this if I had the least Apprehension, that a hint of this Nature woud m[ake you] relax too much: But I cannot forbear saying, that every day, fair or fou[l, you] ought to use some Exercise: Relaxation for Amusement you may use [or not] as you fancy, but that for Health is absolutely necessary. When I was [of your] Age, I was inclin'd to give in to Excesses of the same kind... Bad Health, be[sides other] Inconveniences, is the greatest Interruption to Study in the World' (Letter of 8 Dec. 1775, *Letters*, 2: 305–6; the manuscript of this letter is damaged, and the words in brackets are Greig's conjectures).

<sup>25</sup> Hume's opinion regarding ancient moral philosophy may be compared with that of William Wotton, a copy of whose *Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning* was in the Hume Library (Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 137, item 1367). Like Hume, Wotton had no doubts about the superiority of modern natural history and natural philosophy: 'The whole Ancient Philosophy looks like a thing of Ostentation and Pomp', and that it seems 'very evident, That the Ancients Knowledge in all Matters relating to *Mathematicks* and *Physicks* was incomparably inferior to that of the Moderns' (302, 307). But, in contrast to Hume, Wotton supposed that 'all those Things which relate to Moral Knowledge, taken in its largest Extent, were understood by the ancient *Egyptians*, *Greeks* and *Romans*, in as great Perfection as the Things themselves were capable of'. And that in the particulars of morals: 'The minutest Differences between Vertue and Vice of all sorts, are judiciously stated by *Aristotle*, in his *Ethicks*... *Xenophon's Cyrus* shews that he had a right Notion of all those Things which will make a Prince truly great and wise. The Characters of all those Vices which are immediately taken notice of in Civil Life, are admirably drawn by *Theophrastus*.' Further praise is given to other ancients (12–14). In contrast to Wotton, the interlocutor in Huet's *Philosophical Treatise*, seeking 'nothing but the solid Foundation of Truth' and finding the philosophies of Aristotle, Descartes, and Gassendi unsatisfactory, tried at last that of Plato. There also he 'found nothing in it that could fix my Mind, no certain and determinate Principles, no System or Connexion of Doctrine, nothing coherent, nothing well prov'd. Every Thing in it is treated with Delicacy and Eloquence' (Author's Preface, 6). That by the time he was writing the *Treatise* Hume had pursued a significant interest in the ancient-modern controversy is indicated by the early versions (from 1741 to 1760) of his 'Independency of Parliament'. There he observes the 'satire and invective' of those who defended the ancients ('Boileau, Monsieur and Madame Dacier, l'Abbé de Bos'), and the 'moderation and good breeding' of those on the other side ('Fontenelle, la Motte, Charpentier, and even Perrault'). See also *Treatise* 1.4.3.1, 10–11; Editors' Annotations, anns. 146.25, 37; 148.1, 17, 20.

to make my principal Study, & the Source from which I wou'd derive every Truth in Criticism as well as Morality.<sup>26</sup>

Previous philosophers appeared to have failed, Hume went on to say, not for want of genius, but for want of control over their genius. Success in philosophy requires the ability to cast aside preconceptions in favour of a faithful, meticulous search for the facts of human nature—facts drawn as much from the reports of others as from the philosopher's own experience. From 1731 to early 1734 Hume doggedly tried to carry out this task, but found the results of his efforts discouragingly inadequate:

I believe 'tis a certain Fact that most of the Philosophers who have gone before us, have been overthrown by the Greatness of their Genius, & that little more is requir'd to make a man succeed in this Study than to throw off all Prejudices either for his own Opinions or for this of others. At least this is all I have to depend on for the Truth of my Reasonings, which I have multiply'd to such a degree, that within these three Years, I find I have scribled many a Quire of Paper, in which there is nothing contain'd but my own Inventions. This with the Reading most of the celebrated Books in Latin, French & English, & acquiring the Italian, you may think a sufficient Business for one in perfect Health; & so it wou'd, had it been done to any Purpose: But my Disease was a cruel Incumbrance on me. I found that I was not able to follow out any Train of Thought, by one continued Stretch of View, but by repeated Interruptions, & by refreshing my Eye from Time to Time upon other Objects. Yet with this Inconvenience I have collected the rude Materials for many Volumes; but in reducing these to Words, when one must bring the Idea he comprehended in gross, nearer to him so as to contemplate its minutest Parts, & keep it steddily in his Eye, so as to copy these Parts in Order, this I found impracticable for me, nor were my Spirits equal to so severe an Employment. Here lay my greatest Calamity. I had no Hopes of delivering my Opinions with such Elegance & Neatness, as to draw to me the Attention of the World, & I wou'd rather live & dye in Obscurity than produce them maim'd & imperfect.

Such a miserable Disappointment I scarce ever remember to have heard of.<sup>27</sup>

This autobiographical letter was written as Hume was travelling to Bristol to begin the more active life he had resolved to try. We know little about Hume's time in Bristol. In 'My Own Life' he describes his trial there as 'very

<sup>26</sup> *Letters*, 1: 16. Hume's earliest surviving speculations about human nature are found in 'An Historical Essay on Chivalry and modern Honour'; see Stewart, 'Hume's Intellectual Development', 34–5.

<sup>27</sup> *Letters*, 1: 16–17. Hume's attitude toward the imperfect expression of his opinions may well have been influenced by Cicero: 'Now it is possible for an author to hold right views and yet be unable to express them in a polished style; but to commit one's reflections to writing, without being able to arrange or express them clearly or attract the reader by some sort of charm, indicates a man who makes an unpardonable misuse of leisure and his pen' (*Tusculan Disputations*, 1.3.6).

feeble'. It was certainly brief, for by late summer of this same year, 1734, he was on his way to France with the 'View of prosecuting my Studies in a Country Retreat'.<sup>28</sup> Why Hume sought a country retreat in France rather than Britain is not known. John Wright conjectures that, *if* the letter to the physician was sent to Cheyne, whose practice was in Bath, only about twelve miles from Bristol, then Hume might well have consulted Cheyne in person. And *if* Hume did in fact consult Cheyne, the latter might not only have recommended a sojourn in France, but also have provided a letter of introduction to his friend Andrew Michael Ramsay (the Chevalier Ramsay), whom Hume visited on his arrival in Paris.<sup>29</sup> Consistent with this conjecture is another. We know that at some point Hume began to be self-conscious about his lack of visible success. In December 1737 he confessed to his friend Henry Home 'one of my Foibles':

I have a great Inclination to go down to Scotland this Spring to see my Friends, & have your Advice concerning my philosophical Discoveries; but cannot over-come a certain Shamefacedness I have to appear among you at my Years without having yet a Settlement, or so much as having attempted any. How happens it that we Philosophers cannot as heartily despise the World as it despises us?<sup>30</sup>

Later, in the *Treatise* itself, Hume was to observe that 'men of good families, but narrow circumstances' often leave their friends and country, and rather seek their livelihood by mean and mechanical employments among strangers ...remov'd from all our friends and acquaintance' (2.1.11.14). In Bristol Hume subjected himself (perhaps under family pressure) to what could only be, for someone who sought to find nothing less than a new way of establishing truth and who could conceive of no other way of life than that of 'a Scholar & Philosopher', a 'mean' and inconsiderable employment as a trader's clerk. In both Bristol and in France Hume was removed from family and friends, sheltered from those who may have wondered about his lack of visible progress or success.

There is little to report about Hume's three years in France or about his work on the *Treatise* while there. During the summer of 1734, he wrote three letters to Michael Ramsay, of which only one, that of 12 September, is extant. We have also his letter of the same date to James Birch, an acquaintance from

<sup>28</sup> 'My Own Life', 1–2.

<sup>29</sup> Wright, 'Dr. George Cheyne, Chevalier Ramsay, and Hume's Letter to a Physician', 131–3. Mossner conjectures that Hume left his employer in Bristol because of disagreement over the grammar and style of the latter's correspondence; see *Life of David Hume*, 90.

<sup>30</sup> *New Letters*, 2. On being appointed a Lord Ordinary of the Scottish Court of Session in 1752, Henry Home took the title Lord Kames.

his brief period in Bristol. These letters reveal that Hume had visited Paris, where he met the Chevalier Ramsay, and, armed with letters of introduction from Ramsay, had then gone to Reims, where he expected to live. A large part of the attraction of Reims may well have been the three letters of introduction Ramsay had provided, especially one to a man said to be not only among the most learned in France, but also in possession of an excellent library of which Hume hoped to take advantage.<sup>31</sup> From the letter to Birch, dated 18 May 1735, we learn, however, that after only a brief stay in Reims, Hume took up residence in La Flèche, where he remained until 1737.<sup>32</sup> Here, too, there would have been a library—that of the Jesuit College at which Descartes had been a student—to which Hume may have had access. He did at least discuss philosophical topics with some of the Jesuits,<sup>33</sup> but perhaps not regularly, for in this letter to Birch he suggests that he was devoting most of his time to his work: ‘For my part, I spend alwise more of my Time in Study, than it would be proper for you, who certainly wou’d choose to give one half of the day to Company, & the other to Reading.’

Even without this letter we can infer that Hume worked long hours in France. For, although he may have arrived there with many of the quires of paper composed before he left Scotland, his literary production during his years abroad was substantial. When he left La Flèche in the summer of 1737, he had progressed to the point that he could inform Michael Ramsay which philosophical works would help him understand a draft of the *Treatise*. He could also dread a self-imposed obligation to show this draft to Ramsay, whom he expected to see in Paris:

I shall submit all my Performances to your Examination, & to make you enter into them more easily, I desire of [y]ou, if you have Leizure, to read once over le Recherche de la Verité of Pere Malebranche, the Principles of Human Knowledge by D’ Berkeley, some of the more metaphysical Articles of Baile’s Dictionary;<sup>34</sup> such

<sup>31</sup> For conjectures regarding the individual with this library, see F. Baldensperger, ‘La première relation de David Hume en France’.

<sup>32</sup> E. C. Mossner, ‘Hume at La Flèche, 1735: An Unpublished Letter’.

<sup>33</sup> Hume later told George Campbell that an argument found in his essay on miracles occurred to him while in conversation with one of the priests at La Flèche: ‘I was walking in the cloisters of the Jesuits’ College of La Flèche, a town in which I passed two years of my youth, and engaged in a conversation with a Jesuit of some parts and learning, who was relating to me, and urging some nonsensical miracle performed in their convent, when I was tempted to dispute against him; and as my head was full of the topics of my *Treatise of Human Nature*, which I was at that time composing, this argument immediately occurred to me’ (letter of 7 June 1762, *Letters*, I: 361). See also n. 59.

<sup>34</sup> That is, Pierre Bayle, author of the *The Historical and Critical Dictionary*, the work here mentioned. In an earlier letter, Hume thanks Michael Ramsay ‘for your trouble about Baile’, thus suggesting that Ramsay had helped Hume obtain one of Bayle’s works (letter of March 1732, *Letters*, I: 12). The Hume Library included Bayle’s *Oeuvres diverses* (item 107), but not the *Dictionary*.

as those [o]f Zeno, & Spinoza. Des-Cartes Meditations wou'd also be useful, but [I] don't know if you will find it easily among your Acquaintainces. These Books will make you easily comprehend the metaphysical Parts of my Reasoning. And as to the rest, they have so little Dependence on on [*sic*] all former Systems of Philosophy, that your natural Good-Sense will afford you Light enough to judge of their Force & Solidity.

I shall be oblig'd to put all my Papers into the Chevalier Ramsay's hands when I come to Paris; which I am really sorry for. For tho' he be Free-thinker enough not to be shockt with my Liberty, yet he is so wedded to whimsical Systems, & is so little of a Philosopher, that I expect nothing but Cavilling from him. I even fortify myself against his Dis-approbation, & am resolv'd not to be in the least discourag'd by it, if I shou'd chance to meet with it. All Counsels are good to be taken, says the Cardinal de Richelieu, The good are good of themselves: The bad confirm the Good & give new Force to them. This is more especially true in works of Learning & Philosophy, where frivolous Objections & bad Reasoning give us alwise greater Assurance in the Truth.<sup>35</sup>

Hume's earliest letters, although they provide little detail about the reading he did before leaving for France in 1734, do give us useful hints about the intellectual forces that contributed to the form and substance of the *Treatise*. Both before and after psychological problems overtook him in 1729, Hume read avidly and widely. In the first of his surviving letters (that of July 1727 mentioned above), he told his friend Michael Ramsay that he could not abide 'task-reading' (the kind of reading that would have prepared him for a career in law), but that he was none the less diverted by his library and was then alternating between Cicero and Virgil. The same letter shows him to have owned a copy of Milton, and to have begun reading *On the Sublime*, the work mistakenly attributed to Longinus. By 1734, the date of his letter to the unnamed physician, he knew the moral philosophy of the ancients well enough to find it, like ancient natural philosophy, defective. He also reported that in the previous three years he had read widely among the best-known books in Latin, French, and English, and some in Italian.<sup>36</sup>

Hume's early reading left him with the impression, as he told the unnamed physician, that philosophy is characterized by 'endless Disputes'. When we turn to the published *Treatise*, the disputatious character of philosophy becomes Hume's starting-point. Anyone acquainted with the sciences, he

<sup>35</sup> Letter of 26 Aug. 1737. For earlier transcriptions of this letter, see T. Kozanecki, 'Dawida Hume' a nieznanie listy w zbiorach Muzeum Czartoryskich' (The Unknown Letters of David Hume in the Collection of the Czartoryski Museum); Mossner, *Life of David Hume*, 626–7. For Ramsay's unflattering assessment of Hume, see *ibid.* 94–5.

<sup>36</sup> Stewart has noted many of the privately owned titles that Hume may have read prior to writing the *Treatise*; see 'Hume's Intellectual Development', 26–33, 36–41.

says in the Introduction, can see the flaws in even the most widely received philosophical systems. In fact, one need not be learned 'to discover the present imperfect condition of the sciences'. Even 'the rabble' outside the halls of learning

may judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiply'd, as if every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are manag'd with the greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. (Intro. 2)

The situation is so bad, he adds, that 'even amongst those, who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature', there is a widespread prejudice 'against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds', against 'every kind of argument, that is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended', a prejudice Hume is unwilling to share:

nothing but the most determin'd scepticism, along with a great degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, 'tis certain it must lie very deep and abstruse; and to hope we shall arrive at it without pains, while the greatest geniuses have fail'd with the utmost pains, must certainly be esteem'd sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend to no such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and wou'd esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and obvious. (Intro. 3)

Hume's long letter to the physician also reports, as we have seen, that these disputes emboldened him. They made him disinclined to accept the conclusions of any previous 'Authority in these Subjects' and to seek a new means 'by which Truth might be establish'd'. It was in this letter that he first suggested that the moral philosophy of the ancients failed because it was too speculative and did not give due regard to human nature, and reported his resolve to make human nature his principal study and the source from which he would derive his philosophy. The *Treatise*, by his own description, is clearly the result of this resolve:

'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even *Mathematics*, *Natural Philosophy*, and *Natural Religion*, are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judg'd of by their powers and faculties... There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz'd in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of

human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. (Intro. 4, 6)

Many passages in Hume's reading could have contributed to this view of the centrality of the science of man. Thomas Hobbes had said that a true understanding of 'the elements of laws, natural and politic' depends upon, among other things, 'the knowledge of what is human nature'.<sup>37</sup> Nicolas Malebranche supposed that of 'all the human sciences, the science of man is the most worthy'.<sup>38</sup> Robert Hooke had undertaken, as the first step toward the improvement of natural philosophy, 'An Examination of the Constitution and Powers of the Soul... being an Endeavour of Discovering the Perfections and Imperfections of Humane Nature'.<sup>39</sup> Francis Hutcheson began his *Inquiry* saying that 'There is no Part of *Philosophy* of more importance than a *just Knowledge of Human Nature*, and its various Powers and Dispositions'.<sup>40</sup> He also hoped that his later *Essay* would serve as such an account of human nature until 'some Person of greater Abilities and Leisure apply himself to a more strict Philosophical Inquiry into the various *natural Principles* or *natural Dispositions* of Mankind'.<sup>41</sup> Isaac Watts insisted that there 'are few Studies so worthy of Man as the Knowledge of Himself'.<sup>42</sup> Alexander Pope (to whom Hume presented an autographed copy of the *Treatise*) gave the suggestion poetic expression in his *Essay on Man*, where he announced that the 'proper study of Mankind is Man', and set as the final line of the same famous work: 'And all our Knowledge is, OURSELVES TO KNOW.'<sup>43</sup>

Perhaps nothing was quite so much to the point, however, as some remarks found in Shaftesbury's *Characteristicks*, a book that Hume acquired sometime in 1726.<sup>44</sup> It is easy to suppose that Hume's attention was drawn to this work because it includes such obvious discussions of morals as *An Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit*. That supposition may be correct, but the *Characteristicks* also includes *Soliloquy: or Advice to an Author*, and one can equally well suppose that the young Hume, whenever it was that he began to try his

<sup>37</sup> *Elements of Law*, 1.1.      <sup>38</sup> *The Search after Truth*, p. xxv.

<sup>39</sup> *A General Scheme, or Idea of the Present State of Natural Philosophy*, 7.

<sup>40</sup> *An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, p. ix. The Hume Library included a copy of the 2nd edn. (1726) of this work (item 677).

<sup>41</sup> *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, p. xii.

<sup>42</sup> *Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects*, p. iv.

<sup>43</sup> *Essay on Man* 2.2, 4.398. For further background, see Editors' Annotations, ann. 4.3.

<sup>44</sup> *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*. Hume's copy of the 3rd edn. of this work (1723), now in the collection of the University of Nebraska, is signed and dated 'David Home 1726'. This volume also bears Hume's bookplate; see Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 16. The citations that follow are from the edition of 1714.



hand at becoming an author of moral philosophy, would have found this essay of great interest for its extensive advice about writing such philosophy. A 'Study of *Human Affection*', of the passions, Shaftesbury says in the *Soliloquy*, 'cannot fail of leading me towards the Knowledg of *Human Nature*, and of MY-SELF'. Furthermore, a philosophy that achieves this end 'has the Pre-eminence above all other Science, or Knowledg ... [it presides] over all other Sciences and Occupations; teaching the Measure of each, and assigning that just Value of everything in Life. By this Science *Religion* itself is judg'd, *Spirits* are search'd, *Prophecys* prov'd, *Miracles* distinguish'd.' But this endorsement comes with a qualification. The 'Study of human Nature' can reach these valuable goals only if it is pursued with the appropriate moral engagement: the true moral philosopher must be engaged in an effort to know and improve himself. Those who, like Descartes, although engaged in a study of human nature, discover only the effects of the passions on the body or only the different ways in which the different passions affect the limbs or muscles, could by their efforts become qualified 'to give Advice to an Anatomist or a Linner', but they would not become qualified to give genuinely philosophical advice to humankind or even to themselves.<sup>45</sup>

Advice of the sort Shaftesbury gives may have fitted well with Hume's mid-teen efforts to improve his own 'Temper & Will, along with [his] Reason & Understanding'. As we have seen, however, Hume at some point concluded that this form of self-concern was wasting his spirits. Rejecting all authority, Shaftesbury's included, he undertook exactly the enterprise—a descriptive moral anatomy—that Shaftesbury thought unessential and even wrong-headed.<sup>46</sup> Near the end of Book 1 of the *Treatise*, having finished his 'examination of the several systems of philosophy, both of the intellectual and natural world', and having 'fully explain'd the nature of our judgment and understanding', Hume is ready 'to proceed in the accurate anatomy of human nature' (1.4.6.23). When he had finished that undertaking, he argued

<sup>45</sup> *Soliloquy* 3.1 [297, 293]. Later in the *Characteristicks* Shaftesbury adds: 'HOW LITTLE regard soever may be shewn to that *moral Speculation* or INQUIRY, which we call the *Study of our-selves*; it must, in strictness, be yielded, That all Knowledg whatsoever depends upon this *previous-one*: "And that we can in reality be assur'd of nothing, till we are first assur'd of What *we are OUR-SELVES*." For by this alone we can know what *Certainty* and *Assurance* is' (*Miscellaneous Reflections* 4.2 [192]).

<sup>46</sup> Shaftesbury appears to return a similar verdict on the kind of philosophy found in Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, on, that is, philosophy which studies 'the *Formation of Ideas!*—their *Compositions, Comparisons, Agreement and Disagreement!*'. What, he asks, 'can have a better Appearance, or bid fairer for *genuine* and *true PHILOSOPHY?* Come on then ... Let me examine my *Ideas of Space* and *Substance*: Let me look well into *Matter* and its *Modes*; if this be looking into MY-SELF; if this be to improve my *Understanding*, and enlarge my MIND.' But if, after pursuing these studies, 'I am still the same *Mystery* to my-self as ever: to what purpose is all this Reasoning and Acuteness?' (*Soliloquy* 3.1 [299–300]). Hutcheson was also suspicious of moral philosophy that had no straightforwardly moral end in view. See Sect. 5.

that it would be of benefit to the practical moralist, the moral painter or limner. In response to Francis Hutcheson's complaint that Book 3 of the *Treatise* lacked 'a certain Warmth in the Cause of Virtue', Hume suggested that one can examine the mind either as an anatomist or as a painter, and that he had chosen the former approach, but not without supposing that in doing so he would be giving assistance to the practical moralist.<sup>47</sup> In the final paragraph of Book 3, Hume abruptly ends an already brief reflection on how his findings might contribute to 'the *happiness*, as well as of the *dignity* of virtue'. Such reflections, he says, have no place in the anatomy of human nature he has undertaken. 'The anatomist', he says, 'ought never to emulate the painter; nor in his accurate dissections and portraitures of the smaller parts of the human body, pretend to give his figures any graceful and engaging attitude or expression.' But he again insists that an anatomist 'is admirably fitted to give advice to a painter...the most abstract speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to *practical morality*; and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts, and more perswasive in its exhortations' (3.3.6.6).

Hume's search for a new means 'by which Truth might be establisht' led him also to look for a new method. Ancient philosophers had relied on genius and imagination, a lively but unsatisfactory approach. The 'tedious lingering method' of their modern successors, is equally unsatisfactory. It dawdles in the provinces when it should march directly to the capital, directly to the philosophical heart of things, 'human nature itself'. Moreover, this new and sorely needed foundational science of human nature itself requires a reliable method. As we know from the subtitle of the *Treatise*, this is the 'experimental Method of Reasoning'. Just 'as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation' (Intro. 6–7).

That Hume would be impressed by the use of the experimental method in natural philosophy is not difficult to understand. As he saw it, this method had been, for more than a century, widely and successfully employed in that domain—so successfully that by the 1730s it had virtually no opposition, while the person perceived to be its most accomplished practitioner, Sir Isaac Newton, was a British icon. Who or what may have put into Hume's mind the idea of using this method in moral philosophy is the more interesting question. In the *Treatise* he suggests that some recent British philosophers (he mentions Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler) had

<sup>47</sup> Letter of 17 Sept. 1739, *Letters*, 1: 32–3. The relevant text is quoted in Sect. 5 at nn. 120 and 121 below.

begun to ‘put the science of man on a new footing’ (Intro. 7), but it is not obvious that any of these five explicitly recommends the use of the experimental method in moral philosophy. Indeed, as we have seen, Shaftesbury questions the usefulness of disengaged observation. Some may suppose that Newton’s remark, ‘if natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by pursuing this Method [‘of Experiments and Observations’], shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral Philosophy will also be enlarged’, provided Hume with the relevant hint. But Newton says only that natural philosophy correctly pursued will improve our knowledge of the First Cause and of our duties toward that Cause.<sup>48</sup> He makes no recommendation concerning how best to do moral philosophy. Alexander Pope, in his *Essay on Man*, suggests that we ‘Account for moral as for nat’ral things’, but read in context, the remark fails to make the relevant point about method.<sup>49</sup>

Two other possibilities come to mind. One of these is Edmé Mariotte, a French experimental philosopher who in his *Logique* argues that one class of moral propositions, those having to do with ‘les moeurs & les inclinations des hommes’ (‘*Nous sommes curieux d’apprendre ce que nous ignorons*’ or ‘*Nous haïssons ceux qui nous contredisent*’, for example), derive from ‘induction & experience’, but, although this work was available to Hume, there is no direct evidence that he was aware of it.<sup>50</sup> The more likely possibility is Francis Bacon, of whom Hume clearly was aware, and who was himself ready to extend his new method to moral subjects. It may be asked, Bacon said, whether he means to improve

only Natural Philosophy by our method or also the other sciences, Logic, Ethics and Politics. We certainly mean all that we have said to apply to all of them; and just as

<sup>48</sup> *Opticks* 3.1, qu. 31 [405].

<sup>49</sup> *Essay on Man* 1.162. Both this remark and that from Newton’s *Opticks* 3.1, are quoted on the title-page of vol. 1 of George Turnbull’s *Principles of Moral Philosophy*, a work published in the same year as Vol. 3 of the *Treatise*.

<sup>50</sup> *Essai de logique*, Part 2, art. 3 [109]. Hume had access to the works of Mariotte through the Physiological Library. See Barfoot, ‘Hume and the Culture of Science’, 151–60; and *The Physiological Library. Begun by Mr. Steuart, and Some of the Students of Natural Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, April 2. 1724: And augmented By some Gentlemen; and the Students of Natural Philosophy, December 1724*. Item 147 in this catalogue is *Oeuvres de Mr. Mariotte* (Leiden, 1717), containing the *Essai de logique*. The preface to the catalogue of the Physiological Library shows this collection to have included works on a wide range of subjects, many of which are touched on in the *Treatise*. The complete list of subjects covered: ‘Of Natural History; Of Animals, Plants, Metals and Minerals: Of Anatomy, Botany and Chymic: Of Stones, Gems, Glass, &c. Of Husbandry, Planting and Gardening: Of Natural and Experimental Philosophy; Of Astronomy; Of Opticks and Perspective; Of Acousticks and Musick; Of Mechanicks and Hydrostaticks: Of Geometry, Arithmetick, and Alegbra: Of Book-keeping, Trade and Manufacture: Of Navigation, Geography, and of Voyages: Of Architecture, Fortification and Gunnery: Of the Power, Wisdom and Goodness of God manifested in the Works of Creation; Of the Truth of the Christian Religion.’

common logic, which governs things by means of the syllogism, is applicable not only to the natural sciences but to all the sciences, so also our science, which proceeds by *induction*, covers all. For we are making a history and tables of discovery about anger, fear, shame and so on; and also about instances of political affairs; and equally about the mental motions of memory, composition and division, of judgement and the rest.<sup>51</sup>

Whatever it was that led Hume to attempt to introduce the experimental method into moral philosophy, he optimistically expected substantial results from this novel approach. By the 1730s, British pride in the achievement of its natural philosophers, most notably Newton, was great indeed.<sup>52</sup> Yet Hume could suggest that the use of the experimental method in the science of man would result in no ‘less honour to our native country’ than did its use in ‘natural philosophy’. We ought, in fact, to suppose that this new science will result in even ‘greater glory’, both because of its ‘greater importance... as well as the necessity... of such a reformation’ in moral philosophy. We cannot expect an experimental moral philosophy ‘to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature’ (the ‘essence of the mind’ is as unknown to us as ‘that of external bodies’), and thus we must be content with a fundamental ignorance. None the less, ‘from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from [the mind’s] different circumstances and situations’, we can expect to form a ‘notion of its powers and qualities’. Indeed, when experiments of the appropriate kind are ‘judiciously collected and compar’d, we may hope to establish on them a science, which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension’ (Intro. 8–10).

<sup>51</sup> *New Organon* 1.127. At *Treatise* Intro. 7, Hume takes Bacon to be the father of the modern experimental method. Hume’s early familiarity with Bacon’s work is also suggested by an essay he first published in 1741: ‘The prose of BACON... is altogether stiff and pedantic’, although his ‘sense be excellent’ (‘Of Civil Liberty’ 7). Items 46, 61, and 395–402 of the Physiological Library were by Bacon. In addition, the Hume Library included a copy of Bacon’s works, *Opera, moralium et civilium* (London, 1638); see Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 73, item 83. See also Editors’ Annotations, ann. 5.3.

<sup>52</sup> The 1704 theses at the University of Edinburgh included one stating that ‘Wise Newton is an example of how indebted the human race can be to one man, and what great achievements are possible for mortals seeking the truth; with his principles of gravity alone he unravelled numerous and weighty mysteries of nature’ (quoted from Shepherd, ‘Newtonianism in Scottish Universities’, 74). Pope’s well-known ‘Epitaph’ for Newton aptly sums up this hero worship: ‘Nature and Nature’s Laws lay hid in Night / God said, “Let Newton be!” and all was light.’ That in early eighteenth-century Britain no clear distinction was made between the ‘experimental philosophy’ and the natural philosophy of Newton can be seen from some of the materials found in the annotations to the *Treatise*. See Editors’ Annotations, anns. 4.41; 4.44; 5.3; 5.15; 46.29; and esp. n. 12.18 (47).

In 1734 Hume was so discouraged that he was ready to put aside his philosophical work. Four years later, 'carry'd away by the Heat of Youth & Invention', as he was later to say,<sup>53</sup> he sent to press the first two volumes (and proposed three others) of a philosophically vast book that confidently offered solutions to long-standing philosophical disputes and to problems not hitherto noticed by philosophers. On the issue of infinite divisibility, 'philosophy and common sense', he said a few months later, have 'waged most cruel wars with each other' (*Abs.* 29). *Treatise* 1.2 (*Of the ideas of space and time*) attempts to reconcile these warring parties. The work of previous philosophers is defective in so far as they fail to give an account of the form of probability or belief on which life and action depend (*Abs.* 4), while substantially different and unsatisfactory accounts have been given of necessary connection and of the origin of our idea of it. *Treatise* 1.3 (*Of knowledge and probability*) undertakes to remedy these defects by providing an original account of belief, then links this account to our idea of necessary connection, and provides us, for good measure, a set of rules 'by which to judge of causes and effects'. *Treatise* 1.4 analyses and criticizes important forms of scepticism and both ancient and modern philosophy, argues that previous accounts of the nature of the mind and of the origin of our idea of the self are woefully inadequate, and proposes an alternative account of the latter as well as of our belief in external objects. Indeed, so confident had Hume become that he found it advisable to close Book 1 by warning his readers that certain expressions, 'tis evident' and 'tis certain', for example, were 'extorted' from him by the heat of passing philosophical moments, and should not be taken as evidence of either a 'dogmatical spirit' or a 'conceited idea' of his own judgement. Book 2 (*Of the Passions*), he tells us, contains opinions about the passions that are 'new and extraordinary', and along the way puts the issue of liberty and necessity in a 'new light', a light strong enough, he suggests, to settle this long disputed matter (*Abs.* 30, 34). Book 3 (*Of Morals*), published nearly two years later, considers two leading accounts of the foundations of morals, rejects one, supports a second, and then goes on to give a novel account of the nature and origin of the virtues. We know that the *Treatise* of 1739–40 is in some way related to a schoolboy's loose papers of 1726–7, and to the many pages, too maimed for public scrutiny, that this same individual had produced by 1733–4; but we are still left to speculate how these early efforts are related to the work making 'great pretensions to new discoveries in philosophy' (*Abs.* 35) that Hume published in 1739–40.

<sup>53</sup> *Letters*, 1: 158, letter of spring 1751; for a fuller citation, see Sect. 10 below.

## 2. PUBLICATION OF VOLUMES 1 AND 2

In his autobiography Hume says that it was during his 'Retreat in France, first at Reims, but chiefly at La Flèche in Anjou, I composed my *Treatise of Human Nature*'.<sup>54</sup> Consequently, it is sometimes supposed that when he arrived in London in the autumn of 1737, he carried with him a finished manuscript of the entire work. Perhaps he thought that he did—but there were important differences between that manuscript and the *manuscripts* (Volume 3 was not published until November 1740) that were handed over to the two booksellers who first published the *Treatise* as we know it.

At *Treatise* 1.2.2.4, for example, Hume speaks of 'the present year 1738', thus indicating that some part of the work was written or revised after his return to London. More importantly, there is his report that he had been 'castrating my Work, that is, cutting off its noble Parts, that is, endeavouring it shall give as little Offence as possible', this with the intention of giving a copy of the manuscript to Joseph Butler. Although he went on to suggest that such expurgation constituted an act of cowardice, Hume also may have seen it as an opportunity to give his work a less zealous tone: 'I was resolv'd not to be an Enthusiast, in Philosophy, while I was blaming other Enthusiasms.'<sup>55</sup> The effects of such a resolve may be seen in the Introduction to the *Treatise*, and again in the final paragraph of Book 1.<sup>56</sup> Thus it is likely that Hume was even then working on those parts of his book. In this same letter, Hume also reports that it is unlikely that his book will

appear in publick before the beginning of next Winter. For besides that it wou'd be difficult to have it printed before the rising of the Parliament;<sup>57</sup> I must confess I am not ill-pleas'd with a little Delay, that it may appear with as few Imperfections as possible. I have been here near 3 months alwise within a Week of agreeing with Printers, & you may imagine I did not forget the Work itself during that Time, where I began to feel some Passages weaker for the Style & Diction than I cou'd have wisht. The Nearness and Greatness of the Event rouz'd up my Attention, & made me more difficult to please than when I was alone in perfect Tranquillity in France.

<sup>54</sup> 'My Own Life', 2.

<sup>55</sup> Letter of 2 Dec. 1737 to H. Home, *New Letters*, 2–3. Hume did not present the manuscript to Butler, but he did later send a copy of Vols. 1 and 2 of the *Treatise* to him. It is not known if Butler responded. See Hume's letter of 13 Feb. 1739, *Letters*, 1: 27. A fragment of a Hume manuscript on evil, now in the National Library of Scotland, is said to have 'strong links with Book I of the *Treatise*', but appears not to be one of the 'noble Parts' excised from the manuscript of Book 1. For the text of this fragment and a discussion of its relation to the *Treatise*, see M. A. Stewart, 'An Early Fragment on Evil'.  
<sup>56</sup> See Intro. 3, 1.4.7.15; Editors' Annotations, anns. 178.9, 10.

<sup>57</sup> Hume's remark may reflect the fact that, while Parliament was in session, many London printers would have been occupied with printing materials associated with it.

We also know that Hume managed to make a set of important alterations to the text of the first two volumes while the work was in press.<sup>58</sup> Thus, independently of his claim that he once considered including his essay 'Of Miracles' in the *Treatise*,<sup>59</sup> it is clear that the manuscript of these two volumes underwent significant revision between September 1737 and January 1739, when they were published by John Noon.

How it was that Hume came to be published by John Noon (or Noone), a bookseller with a shop in Cheapside, not far from St Paul's churchyard, the centre of the London book trade, is not known. In December 1737, as we have seen, Hume told Home that he had been for nearly three months 'within a Week of agreeing with Printers'. This may be an example of a not uncommon conflation of *printing* and *publishing*, a possibility made more likely by the fact that some eighteenth-century printers were also publishers or booksellers. But as we know that it was only in September of 1738 that Hume signed a contract for the publication of two volumes of the *Treatise*, it is at least reasonable to ask if at one time he thought that he himself would be required to bear the cost of publishing the work, and consequently reasonable to suppose that he did bargain with, literally, *printers*. Although there is no known evidence that bears on this question, we do know that on 26 September 1738 Hume and Noon agreed to terms for the publication of a first edition of the *Treatise*. The contract signed and witnessed that day has survived:

Articles of Agreement made concluded and agreed upon the twenty sixth day of September in the year of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and thirty Eight, and in this twelfth year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord King George the second between David Hume of Lancaster Court of the one part,<sup>60</sup> and John Noone of Cheapside London Bookseller of the other part as follows.

Whereas the said John Noone hath contracted and agreed with the said David Hume for the sole Benefit and Advantage of printing and publishing the first Edition of a Book in two Volumes in Octavo Intituled a Treatise of Human Nature upon the

<sup>58</sup> See below, Editing the Texts, Sect. 1.2.2.

<sup>59</sup> Hume's letter to H. Home of 2 Dec. 1737 enclosed 'some Reasonings concerning Miracles, which I once thought of publishing with the rest'. An anticipation of a discussion of miracles in the *Treatise* may remain at 1.3.10.4. What is likely a revised version of these same reasonings was first published in 1748 as Essay 10, 'Of Miracles', in *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*. Hume gave the *Philosophical Essays* its more familiar title, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, in 1758. For information regarding this change, see Beauchamp, Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), p. xxxix.

<sup>60</sup> In March 1738 Hume reported to Home: 'I lodge at present in the Rainbow Coffeehouse, Lancaster Court' (*Letters*, 1: 26). In a note to this letter, Greig describes the Rainbow as 'the regular meeting-place of an important group of French Protestant refugees', including Pierre Des Maizeaux.

Terms and Conditions hereinafter mentioned (that is to say) First the said David Hume doth hereby covenant and agree to and with the said John Noone, that for and in Consideration of the Sum of fifty pounds, payable by the said John Noone to the said David Hume or order, at the End of six Months from the date hereof, and of twelve Copys of the said Book ready bound, to be delivered by the said John Noone to the said David Hume, when and as soon as the same shall be published. He the said David Hume shall and will permit and suffer the said John Noone to have hold and enjoy the sole property Benefit and Advantage of printing and publishing the first Edition of the said Book not exceeding one thousand Copies thereof, And that until the whole Impression of the said first Edition of the said Book shall be sold and disposed of he the said David Hume shall not reprint or publish, or cause to be reprinted or published a second Edition thereof, unless he the said David Hume shall pay to the said John Noone for all the Books remaining in his Hands unsold at the time of the publication of such second Edition according to the Price then paid for the same by Booksellers, in which Case, and no otherwise, the said David Hume shall be at Liberty to print and publish such second Edition.

And the said John Noone for the Consideration aforesaid doth hereby covenant and agree to and with the said David Hume that he the said John Noone shall and will pay or cause to be paid unto the said David Hume at y<sup>e</sup> End of six Months from the Date hereof the said Sum of fifty pounds so agreed to be by him paid to the said David Hume as aforesaid. And also shall and will deliver to the said David Hume or his Order twelve Copies of the said Book bound when and as soon as the same shall be printed and published as aforesaid.

And Lastly for the true performance of all and singular the Covenants and Agreements herein contained on the part and Behalf of the said David Hume, He the said David Hume doth bind himself his Executors Administrators and Assigns unto the said John Noone his Executors Administrators and Assigns in the penal Sum of fifty pounds of lawful Money of Great Britain firmly by these presents. In Witness whereof the said Parties to these presents interchangeably have set their Hands and Seals the Day and Year above named.

Sealed and delivered (being first duly stamp'd) in the Presence of us—  
[signed] Edward Kimber<sup>61</sup> John Free<sup>62</sup> John Noon<sup>63</sup>

Little has been written about John Noon or Noone, who published and sold books at the White Hart, near Mercer's Chapel, Cheapside. He was well

<sup>61</sup> This is likely to have been the Edward Kimber (1719–69) who worked for London booksellers as a corrector, editor, and indexer; contributed to the *London Magazine* and other periodicals; and published, among other things, accounts of his time in the American colonies. For details, see S. A. Kimber, 'The Relation of a Late Expedition to St. Augustine' (1933).

<sup>62</sup> At least two different individuals of this name could have passed through Noon's bookshop on 6 Sept. 1738: John Free, vicar of East Croker, and John Free, vicar of Runcorn. Both men published with other London booksellers and held offices that would have brought them to London.

<sup>63</sup> Hume MSS of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland, MS 23159, item 5.



enough known that both the *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *London Magazine* noted his death in January 1763. The standard reference work on eighteenth-century booksellers and printers suggests that he began publishing about 1726, and that he published philosophical and theological works, but this description is mistaken in several respects.<sup>64</sup> Although Noon's name is not to be found among the published records of the Stationers' Company, and hence it is not known when he became a bookseller, his name appears on imprints (where it is infrequently spelled 'Noone', as it is in the body of the contract for the *Treatise*) dated as early as 1708. After a sprinkling of further such appearances in the next decade, he began to publish with great regularity. For the period 1720–62 approximately 600 imprints bearing his name have been recorded in *ESTC*.<sup>65</sup>

More than four-fifths of these works are overtly concerned with religious issues. Many of them address issues of philosophical theology. Noon published Thomas Morgan's *The Absurdity of Opposing Faith to Reason: or, a Defence of Christianity against the Power of Enthusiasm* (1722), Thomas Bott's reply to William Wollaston's *Religion of Nature Delineated* (1725), John Jackson's *A Defense of Human Liberty* (1725), and, in 1729, two anonymous works, *The Materiality or Mortality of the Soul of Man*, and *The Plan of the Moral Society... To which is Added the Moral Catechism*. During a four-year period, 1725–8, he published, in partnership with others, no fewer than nine of Thomas Chubb's works, one of which, Chubb's brief *The Previous Question with regard to Religion*, was republished three times during this same period. A similar interest in philosophical aspects of religion is evinced by Noon in the following years. In 1737, for example, he published Bott's *Remarks upon Dr Butlers... Analogy of Religion, &c. concerning necessity; and also upon the Dissertation of the Nature of Virtue*; Phillips Glover, *The Argument a priori concerning the Existence and Perfections of God*; and Joseph Hallet, *The Immorality of the Moral Philosopher*, a reply to Thomas Morgan's *Moral Philosopher*. In 1740 Noon published the work of another Scottish philosopher, *The Principles of Moral Philosophy*, by George Turnbull.<sup>66</sup>

Noon was also interested in other subjects. During the early part of his career he published several short works on topical political issues, a few bits of poetry, including *Tobacco* (1718) by Raphael Thorius, an anonymous verse

<sup>64</sup> H. R. Plomer et al., *A Dictionary of the Printers and Booksellers... 1726 to 1775*, s.v. Noon, (J).

<sup>65</sup> Noon often published, as is typical for the period, in partnership with other booksellers. These include, among many others less well known, James and John Knapton, Thomas Longman, and Andrew Millar.

<sup>66</sup> Isabel Rivers has pointed out to me that Noon also published works by such well-known Dissenters as James Pierce, James Foster, Caleb Fleming, Nathaniel Lardner, and Charles Bulkley. *ESTC* shows that Noon published these authors throughout his long career.

novel, *Philander and Sacharissa* (1724), and an occasional translation from the French, Houdar de La Motte's *Romulus* (1724) and D'Allais's *The History of the Sevarambians* (1738, a work mentioned by Hume in his 'Of Polygamy and Divorces'), for example. But as Noon continued he seems to have given up his interest in polite literature for works on practical and theoretical mathematics and on natural philosophy, most notably anatomy and related medical topics. In 1735 he published the first edition of Benjamin Martin's popular work, *The Philosophical Grammar: Being a View of the Present State of Experimented Physiology, or Natural Philosophy*, and followed this two years later with Martin's *Bibliotheca Technologia: or, a Philological Library of Literary Arts and Sciences*. Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*, being, as its subtitle announced, 'an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method into Moral Subjects', may have appeared to Noon as nicely linking the works in natural and moral philosophy that made up an important part of his list.

There is no direct evidence to indicate who printed the first two volumes of the *Treatise*. No printer's name is included in the imprint, which in Volume 1 reads:

LONDON: Printed for JOHN NOON, at the *White-Hart*, near *Mercer's-Chapel*, in *Cheapside*. MDCCXXXIX.<sup>67</sup>

Nor were these two volumes printed by one of the three firms (those of Charles Ackers, William Bowyer, or William Strahan<sup>68</sup>) whose surviving records indicate the work each did for John Noon. Fortunately, however, eighteenth-century printers did sometimes include their own names in imprints, and about a dozen of those who printed for John Noon, at about the time that the *Treatise* was published, did sign their work. In consequence, it has been possible to establish that all three volumes of the *Treatise* were printed in the shop of John Wilson, at the Turk's Head, Gracechurch Street.<sup>69</sup> Of John Wilson we know that he set up for business in this location about 1736 (joining a partnership with Mary Fenner), that he lived in a house on London Bridge, that he was both printer and bookseller (the partnership he joined had begun with Henry Parsons, another bookseller), that he worked with John Noon on at least several publications, and that during the summer of 1741, while still relatively young, he died. Wilson's untimely death

<sup>67</sup> Vol. 2 omits the apostrophe, giving *Mercers-Chapel*. At this period Noon's imprint is found in four forms, including also *Mercer's Chapel* and *Mercers Chapel*, and hence it would be incorrect to conclude that there is a mistake on one of the title-pages of the *Treatise*. See Ed. App. 1.

<sup>68</sup> See *A Ledger of Charles Ackers*, ed. D. F. McKenzie and J. C. Ross; *The Bowyer Ledgers*, ed. K. Maslen and J. Lancaster; and the Strahan ledgers, British Library Add. MS 48800 (1739–68; credits and payments to 1773).

<sup>69</sup> For evidence that Wilson printed all three volumes of the *Treatise*, see below, Editing the Texts, Sect. 1.5.1, or, for a more detailed account, D. F. Norton, 'John Wilson, Hume's First Printer'.

brought an end to a promising career of interest to us here because of his role in producing Hume's work. Following the publication of the *Treatise*, John Noon was to advertise the work, with justification, as 'beautifully printed'. One need not exaggerate and suggest that the work rivalled the best printing of its age, but, as a piece of printing, the first edition of the *Treatise* is clearly better than the average of its time and a pleasure to handle and to use. No hitherto unknown author would have grounds to complain about the standard of production maintained by Wilson, nor would Hume see any of his work as handsomely produced before the *Essays and Treatises* of 1768.

By January 1739, a little over three months after the contract with Noon was signed, the *Treatise* was ready for publication. It is listed among the new books of the month in the January issues of both the *Gentleman's Magazine* in London, and the *Scots Magazine* in Edinburgh.<sup>70</sup>

Hume, his work as author completed for the moment, booked passage on a ship bound for Berwick, thinking, as he wrote to Home, that 'it wou'd contribute very much to my Tranquillity, & might spare me many Mortifications, to be in the Countrey, while the Success of the Work was doubtful'. The winds, however, proved contrary, and it was still from London, a fortnight after the first appearance of his work, that he wrote. The two weeks had not encouraged the uncertain author, for in the same letter he went on to predict that the success of his work would not be rapid:

Those, who are accustom'd to reflect on such abstract Subjects, are commonly full of Prejudices; & those, who are unprejudiz'd, are unacquainted with metaphysical Reasonings. My Principles are also so remote from all the vulgar Sentiments on this Subject, that were they to take place, they wou'd produce almost a total Alteration in Philosophy; & you know Revolutions of this kind are not easily brought about. I am young enough to see what will come of the Matter; but am apprehensive lest the chief Reward I shall have for some time will be the Pleasure of studying on such important Subjects, & the Approbation of a few Judges. Among the rest, you may believe I aspire to your Approbation; & next to that, to your free Censure & Criticism.<sup>71</sup>

This same letter shows that Hume's primary concern at this time was not with sales, but with getting the knowledgeable and unprejudiced hearing he supposes unlikely:

In looking over your Letters I find one of a twelve-month's Date, wherein you desire me to send down a great many Copys to Scotland. You propos'd no doubt to take the Pains of recommending them, & pushing the Sale. But to tell the Truth there is so little to be gain'd that way in such Works as these, that I wou'd not have you take the

<sup>70</sup> For details, see Sect. 6 below.

<sup>71</sup> Letter of 13 Feb. 1739, to Home, *New Letters*, 3–4. The *Treatise* was first advertised in the final week of January 1739. See Sect. 6 below.

Trouble. If you know any body that is a Judge, you wou'd do me a sensible Pleasure in engaging him to a serious Perusal of the Book. 'Tis so rare to meet with one, that will take Pains on a Book, that does not come recommended by some great Name or Authority, that, I must confess, I am as fond of meeting with such a one, as if I were sure of his Approbation. I am, however, so doubtful in that particular, that I have endeavour'd all I cou'd to conceal my Name; tho' I believe I have not been so cautious in this respect as I ought to have been.<sup>72</sup>

Henry Home in due course did his best to answer his younger friend's request by sending a copy of the work to Francis Hutcheson.<sup>73</sup> Unfortunately, the latter's duties as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow were demanding, and he was unable, at least in the spring of 1739, to give the work the kind of attention Hume desired. His initial response, found in a letter to Home, was generous, if non-committal:

I deferred acknowledging the most obliging Present I received of your Friends Book upon human Nature, by my Lord Kilmarnock, till I could find Leisure to peruse it: and unluckily I met with more than ordinary interruptions by unavoidable business. I perused the first volume, & a great part, indeed almost all the second. And was every where surprized with a great acuteness of thought and reasoning in a mind wholly disengaged from the prejudices of the Learned as well as those of the Vulgar. I cannot pretend to assent to his tenets as yet, these metaphysical subjects have not been much in my thoughts of late; tho' a great many of these sentiments and reasonings had employed me about 10 or 12 years ago. The teaching in a College, and a more important work of inspecting into the Conduct of several young folks committed to me, leaves very litt[le] Leisure for close attention to a long scheme of Philosophy not in my Province. This Book will furnish me matter of a good deal of thought next vacation, now coming on in less than 6 weeks. I shall have the greatest pleasure in communicating to the Ingenious Author whatever occurs probable to me on these subjects: I have for many years been more and more running into the Old Academy, despairing of Certainty in the most important subjects, but satisfied with a sort of Probable knowledge which to an honest mind will be sufficient for the Conduct of Life. I should be glad to know where the Author could be met with, if a lazy Umbratick, very averse to motion, ever makes a ramble in a vacation.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.* 4. A few months later Hume appeared somewhat less high-minded about sales. Writing from Ninewells to H. Home, he said: 'I am not much in the Humour of such Compositions [essays] at present, having receiv'd News from London of the Success of my Philosophy, which is but indifferent, if I may judge by the Sale of the Books, & if I may believe my Bookseller' (letter of 4 June 1739, *New Letters*, 5–6). For the balance of this letter and its assessment of the *Treatise*, see below, Sect. 10.

<sup>73</sup> I have no evidence to suggest that Home sent the work to others.

<sup>74</sup> Hutcheson to Home, April 1739, National Archives of Scotland, GD24/1/553, folio 158, quoted here, with minor corrections, from I. S. Ross, 'Hutcheson on Hume's *Treatise*: An Unnoticed Letter'. The dating of the letter is that suggested by Ross.

In all likelihood, Hume was shown this letter, for, although we do not know exactly when and where, he did meet Hutcheson, and the latter did make comments about issues arising in Book 1 and in a manuscript version of Book 3.<sup>75</sup>

In the meantime, Hume had approached Pierre Des Maizeaux, hoping to get comments and criticisms from him. Des Maizeaux frequented the Rainbow Coffee House in London, where Hume lived at the time he signed the contract with Noon, and thus the two men, the old scholar and the young philosopher, may have been well acquainted. Hume would certainly have sought out opportunities to talk with Des Maizeaux, for the latter had been associated with a set of writers whose works were of great interest to Hume during his formative years. These included Bayle, Shaftesbury, Saint-Evremond, and Anthony Collins.<sup>76</sup> In any event, it is clear from the following letter that Des Maizeaux knew who had written the *Treatise*, and that he had said that he would, if he had time, find out what other proper 'Judges' made of it. By April 1739, Hume could contain his concern no longer:

Whenever you see my Name, you'll readily imagine the Subject of my Letter. A young Author can scarce forbear speaking of his Performances to all the World: But when he meets with one, that is a good Judge, & whose Instruction & Advice he depends on, there ought some Indulgence to be given him. You were so good as to promise me, that, if you cou'd find Leizure from your other Occupations, you woud look over my System of Philosophy, & at the same time ask the Opinion of such of your Acquaintance as you thought proper Judges. Have you found it sufficiently intelligible? Does it appear true to you? Do the Style & Language seem tolerable?

<sup>75</sup> This correspondence is discussed in Sect. 5 below.

<sup>76</sup> Bayle is mentioned by Hume in his letters of March 1732 and 26 Aug. 1737; see n. 34 above. His *Dictionary* is cited at *Treatise* 1.4.5.22 n. 47, and his views appear to have contributed to positions taken elsewhere in the *Treatise*; see esp. 1.2.1–5, and for additional details, Editors' Annotations, anns. 23.title; 23.1; 25.1; 26.12; 31.38; 33.13; 34.14; 34.36; 39.39; n. 12.17 (47); 125.33; 129.4; 146.25; 149.13. Shaftesbury is mentioned at *Treatise*, n. 1 (5) and n. 50 (166). On Hume's interest in Shaftesbury, see Sect. 1 above and, among others, anns. 165.17; n. 50 (166); 171.38; 193.40; 296.5; 302.title. Saint-Evremond is cited at *Treatise* 3.3.2.12 (see also ann. 382.30), and a copy of his *Works*, edited and translated by Des Maizeaux (with his life of Saint-Evremond), was in the Hume Library (Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 89, item 444). The *Treatise* discussion of liberty and necessity (2.3.1–2) may owe debts to Collins; see Editors' Annotations, anns. 260.9; 262.18–19; 262.34; 263.39.

Des Maizeaux's associations with the four free-thinkers mentioned were close ones. Bayle and Shaftesbury were instrumental in his establishment in England. For his part, Des Maizeaux (1) wrote the life of Bayle which prefaces the 5-vol. edn. of the *Historical and Critical Dictionary* that he is credited with translating; (2) translated into French a part of Shaftesbury's *Characteristicks*; (3) prepared the edition of Saint-Evremond's works just mentioned; (4) was from 1715 to 1729 a protégé of Anthony Collins, with whom he also resided from time to time. Des Maizeaux also contributed to the two Franco-Dutch literary journals that were to review the *Treatise*. For additional details, see E. Labrousse, 'Bayle et l'établissement de Desmaizeaux en Angleterre', 252; B. Lagarrigue, *Un temple de la culture européenne... la Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 69; J. Almagor, *Pierre Des Maizeaux (1673–1745)*, 3–7; and I. Rivers, *Reason Grace and Sentiment*, 2: 72; and Sect. 7 below.

These three Questions comprehend every thing; & I beg of you to answer them with the utmost Freedom & Sincerity. I know 'tis a Custom to flatter Poets on their Performances; but I hope Philosophers may be exempted: And the more so, that their Cases are by no means alike. When we do not approve of any thing in a Poet, we commonly can give no Reason for our Dislike, but our particular Taste; which not being convincing we think it better to conceal our Sentiments altogether. But every Error in Philosophy can be distinctly markt, & prov'd to be such; & this is a Favour I flatter myself you'll indulge me in with regard to the Performance I put into your Hands. I am, indeed, afraid, that it wou'd be too great a Trouble for you to mark all the Errors you have observ'd. I shall only insist on being informd of the most material of them, & you may assure yourself will consider it as a singular Favour.<sup>77</sup>

If Des Maizeaux replied to this letter, his reply has been lost, and so we do not know if he brought any errors to Hume's attention. His brief notice or summary of the first two volumes of the *Treatise*, published in the spring 1739 issue of the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, says only that the author is thorough and original.<sup>78</sup>

### 3. THE ABSTRACT OF THE TREATISE

In the fall of 1737, Henry Home, understandably curious to know more about the work which provided the central topic of the letters he was receiving from Hume, requested a summary of the *Treatise*. 'I have', Hume responded, 'a greater Desire of Communicating to you the Plan of the Whole, that I believe it will not appear in publick before the beginning of next Winter', but he expressed this desire only after he had apologetically but firmly pronounced such a summary impossible:

I am very sorry I am not able to satisfy your Curiosity by giving you some general Notion of the Plan upon which I proceed. But my Opinions are so new, & even some Terms I am oblig'd to make Use of, that I cou'd not propose by any Abridgement to give my System an Air of Likelyhood, or so much as make it intelligible. Tis a thing I have in vain attempted already at a Gentleman's Request in this Place, who thought it wou'd help him to comprehend & judge of my Notions, if he saw them all at once before him.<sup>79</sup>

<sup>77</sup> Letter of 6 April 1739, *Letters*, 1: 29–30. Klibansky and Mossner (*New Letters*, 4 n.) suggest that Hume had Des Maizeaux in mind when he tells Home that he has not been sufficiently careful in keeping his authorship a secret; see above at n. 72.

<sup>78</sup> For the complete text of this notice, see Sect. 7 below.

<sup>79</sup> Letter of 2 Dec. 1737, *New Letters*, 1. The gentleman mentioned has not been identified, but if by 'in this Place' Hume means the Rainbow Coffee House, then he may have meant either his friend Alexander Cunningham (later Sir Alexander Dick) or Des Maizeaux, for both frequented that place. If he meant London, then the possibilities are greatly increased.

Less than two years later, however, Hume had changed his mind and attempted something like the 'Abridgement' he could not manage in 1737. This short work, *An Abstract of a Book lately Published; entituled, A Treatise of Human Nature, &c. wherein the CHIEF ARGUMENT of that Book is farther illustrated and explained*, was published in March 1740.<sup>80</sup>

Exactly when Hume undertook to write the *Abstract* is not known, but it was most likely during the summer or early autumn of 1739. That the brief work was well under way before the end of 1739 can be inferred from Hume's letter to Hutcheson of 4 March 1740, the letter that provides us with the first and only reference Hume is known to have made to the *Abstract*. Four sentences make up the entire comment:

My Bookseller has sent to Mr Smith a Copy of my Book, which I hope he has receiv'd, as well as your Letter. I have not heard yet what he has done with the Abstract. Perhaps you have. I have got it printed in London; but not in *the Works of the Learned*; there having been an Article with regard to my Book, somewhat abusive, printed in that Work, before I sent up the Abstract.<sup>81</sup>

Hume's remark, assuming as it does that Hutcheson knows about the *Abstract*, suggests that at least the main text of this work had been written before the two met, and that it or its publication had been among the topics of their discussion.<sup>82</sup> We know that the meeting in question took place some time before this letter, but how much earlier we can only surmise, for Hume's earliest extant letter to Hutcheson, that of 17 September 1739, does not indicate that such a meeting had taken place, while that of 4 March 1740 does do so. This brief remark about the *Abstract* also indicates that Hume and Hutcheson had discussed sending it to the review journal, *History of the Works of the Learned*. From this we can infer that their meeting took place before either of them had seen the review of the *Treatise* that began to appear in the November 1739 issue of that journal, for otherwise Hume would not have found it relevant to inform Hutcheson of that review and of its 'somewhat abusive' nature. This suggests that the main text of the *Abstract* was more or less complete by mid-autumn 1739, although we know that it was not printed until early February 1740. Its publication was announced in the *Daily Advertiser* of 11 March 1740. On the other hand, the Preface of the *Abstract*, noting as it

<sup>80</sup> N. K. Smith, satisfied that the *Abstract* is Hume's work, is also satisfied that it shows Hume to have been true to his claim that he was unable to provide an intelligible abridgement of the whole of the *Treatise*. As its subtitle indicates, the shorter work attempts only to reconstruct, illustrate, and expand the 'CHIEF ARGUMENT' of the longer one; see Smith, 'Review of the Keynes-Sraffa Edition of the *Abstract*'. I turn to the evidence that Hume is the author of the *Abstract* just below.

<sup>81</sup> *Letters*, 1: 37–8.

<sup>82</sup> Hutcheson had proposed such a meeting in April 1739; see his letter at n. 74.

does that the *Treatise* had been ‘complained of as obscure and difficult to be comprehended’, may have been written, or at least revised, only after Hume had seen the review in the *History of the Works of the Learned*, for that review does complain that the *Treatise* is difficult to comprehend.<sup>83</sup>

The more pressing question, however, has been about the authorship of the *Abstract*. John Hill Burton was apparently the first to suggest that the ‘Mr Smith’ of Hume’s brief remark was ‘notwithstanding the universality of the name’, Adam Smith, ‘then a student in the university of Glasgow’.<sup>84</sup> Eventually this conjecture was embellished by the suggestion that Hutcheson typically set his students to abstracting philosophical works, that he in this case set Adam Smith to work abstracting the *Treatise*, and that Hutcheson was subsequently so pleased with the result that he sent it to Hume. The latter, equally pleased, the conjecture runs, sent the manuscript off to London to be printed, while also asking John Noon to send Adam Smith a copy of his book.<sup>85</sup> As no copy of the *Abstract* was available to Burton, it was perhaps not entirely unreasonable for him and those who embellished his suggestion to guess that Adam Smith wrote the *Abstract*.<sup>86</sup> But when J. M. Keynes

<sup>83</sup> Along with substantive objections, the anonymous reviewer of the *Treatise* in the *Works of the Learned* complained of the ‘Inscrutability’ of the work. See *History of the Works of the Learned*, 2: 362. For further discussion of this review, see below, Sect. 7.4.

<sup>84</sup> Burton, *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, 1: 116–17.

<sup>85</sup> There is no known evidence for the claim that Hutcheson set his students to writing abstracts of philosophical works. That he did so was apparently first conjectured by W. R. Scott. Agreeing with Burton and others that Adam Smith had written the *Abstract*, Scott attempts to explain how this came about. ‘From [Alexander] Carlyle’s *Autobiography* we learn’, he writes, ‘that it was customary for Hutcheson and Leechman to require promising members of their classes to prepare abstracts either of new or standard works, and that these summaries often attracted considerable notice in the University. In this case, Hutcheson evidently sent the abstract to Hume, who thought it worthy of being printed’ (*Francis Hutcheson*, 120–1). In support of this story, Scott refers his readers to Carlyle’s report of incidents that took place in 1744. These incidents may tell us something of Hutcheson’s character, but they tell us nothing whatever about what he required of students, promising or ordinary. Briefly stated, Carlyle reports that after he had voiced the opinion (in the college literary club) that Hutcheson’s *Essay* was unintelligible, he was assigned, by a Mr (later Revd) Thom, to summarize this work so ‘that I might understand it better. I accordingly Review’d it in a few pages, and took much Pains to unravel Certain Intricacies both of thought and expression . . . tho’ not without Respect to the Author. This Essay pleas’d my Friends—and one of them, by Thom’s Instigation Carried a Copy of it to Hutcheson’. On another occasion Carlyle gave a lecture, a copy of which eventually made its way to Hutcheson. ‘When he read it, he returned it with unqualified applause, tho’ it containd some things [critical of] his Favourite Doctrine of a Moral Sense’ (*Anecdotes and Characters of the Times*, 52). Scott’s embellished account has been uncritically repeated by those ready to conclude that Adam Smith was the author of the *Abstract*; see, e.g., Greig, *Letters*, 1: 37, and J. O. Nelson, ‘Has the Authorship of *An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature* Really been Decided?’.

<sup>86</sup> A copy of the *Abstract* was probably obtained and accessioned by the British Library in Nov. 1841, as part of a purchase that included a complete set and an additional copy of Vol. 3 of the *Treatise*. The *Abstract* was bound in at the end of this additional Vol. 3, but, as the latter was not properly catalogued, this copy of the *Abstract* was effectively lost until put in Robert Connon’s hands c.1975.



and P. Sraffa found a copy of the *Abstract* and examined the text of it, they concluded on the basis of internal evidence that it was clearly the work of Hume, and that ‘Mr Smith’ was likely John Smith, Hutcheson’s Irish publisher, whom Hume hoped would bring out a second, Irish edition of the *Treatise*. With this in mind, they conjectured, Hume had arranged for Noon to send a copy of the *Treatise* to John Smith, a Dublin publisher, while for his part Hutcheson had apparently written to John Smith encouraging him to publish an Irish edition of the work.<sup>87</sup>

Keynes and Sraffa make two distinct suggestions: one about the identity of the author of the *Abstract* and the other about the identity of Mr Smith. The primary issue is that of authorship, although by now one needs to know who Smith was, and how he figured in the matter, for the mystery regarding him provides the only foundation for the hypothesis that someone other than Hume wrote the *Abstract*. Fortunately, the Mr Smith in question has now been identified as William Smith of Wetstein and Smith, publishers of the *Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de L’Europe*,<sup>88</sup> and Hume’s authorship of the *Abstract* is beyond reasonable doubt, as evidence of several kinds shows.

(1) Some of the most telling evidence that Hume wrote the *Abstract* is the fact that the work so clearly echoes views found in Hume’s private correspondence. In 1734 Hume informed the unnamed physician that ‘the moral Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labor’d under the same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural Philosophy’—the inconvenience, that is, ‘of being entirely Hypothetical, & depending

See R. W. Connon, ‘Some Hume MS Alterations on a Copy of the “Abstract”’, or below, *Editing the Texts*, Sects. 1.2.3, 1.7.6. On knowledge of the *Abstract* and its authorship in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see item (5) in the resumé of evidence that follows here.

<sup>87</sup> Keynes and Sraffa, *An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature 1740. A Pamphlet hitherto unknown by David Hume*, pp. xvii–xxiii. In opposition to this conjecture about an Irish edition, it was argued that any such scheme would involve Hume and Hutcheson in an unethical conspiracy to deprive John Noon of the benefits of the contract he had made with Hume (Nelson, ‘Has the Authorship of *An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature* Really been Decided?’, 84–7). But, as it was Hume’s bookseller who is said to have dispatched the book to Smith, it should be noted that the Keynes–Sraffa reconstruction also calls for John Noon to be involved in what would no longer be a ‘conspiracy’ against him.

<sup>88</sup> I first learned the likely identity of ‘Mr Smith’ from James Moore. His view has since been published in M. A. Stewart and J. Moore, ‘William Smith (1698–1741) and the Dissenters’ Book Trade’, and Moore and Stewart, ‘A Scots-Irish Bookseller in Holland: William Smith of Amsterdam (1698–1741)’. David Raynor, following another line of research, also concluded that ‘Mr Smith’ was Hutcheson’s ‘ancien & intime Ami’, William Smith of the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*; see ‘Hume and Berkeley’s *Three Dialogues*’, 248 n. From 1728 to 1741, William Smith was director of *Bibliothèque raisonnée*. His journal reviewed Vols. 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*, making extensive use of the *Abstract*, in the spring of 1740. For further details regarding this review, see Sect. 7 below.

more upon Invention than Experience' and of 'erecting Schemes of Virtue & of Happiness, without regarding human Nature, upon which every moral Conclusion must depend'. In contrast, as we have seen, Hume undertook to make human nature his 'principal Study'. The first paragraph of the *Abstract* lodges a similar complaint about the method, or lack thereof, of the ancient moralists:

Most of the philosophers of antiquity, who treated of human nature have shewn more of a delicacy of sentiment, a just sense of morals, or a greatness of soul, than a depth of reasoning and reflection. They content themselves with representing the common sense of mankind in the strongest lights, and with the best turn of thought and expression, without following out steadily a chain of propositions, or forming the several truths into a regular science. But 'tis at least worth while to try if the science of *man* will not admit of the same accuracy which several parts of natural philosophy are found susceptible of.

In a letter of February 1739 Hume spoke of remaining in the country while the success of the *Treatise* was doubtful, but he went on to say that this uncertainty would not soon be resolved because, most notably, those 'who are accustom'd to reflect on such abstract Subjects are commonly full of Prejudices', while his own 'Principles are also so remote from all the vulgar Sentiments on this Subject, that were they to take place, they wou'd produce almost a total Alteration in Philosophy; & you know Revolutions of this kind are not easily brought about'. He concluded by reminding himself that he could afford to be patient, and that perhaps a few qualified 'Judges' would approve of his attempt to remake philosophy: 'I am young enough to see what will come of the Matter; but am apprehensive lest the chief Reward I shall have for some time will be the Pleasure of studying on such important Subjects, & the Approbation of a few Judges'.<sup>89</sup> The Preface of the *Abstract* repeats these themes in remarkably similar language. The author of the *Treatise* suggests, it says,

*that were his philosophy received, we must alter from the foundation the greatest part of the sciences. Such bold attempts are always advantageous in the Republic of Letters, because they shake off the yoke of authority... The Author must be contented to wait with patience for some time before the learned world can agree in their sentiments of his performance... He must be judged by the FEW, whose verdict is more apt to be corrupted by partiality and prejudice, especially as no one is a proper judge in these subjects, who has not often thought of them; and such are apt to form to themselves systems of their own, which they resolve not to relinquish.*

<sup>89</sup> *New Letters*, 3–4. See above Sect. 1 for a longer excerpt from this letter. Hume's letter to Des Maizeaux, quoted in the same section, also mentions a 'good Judge'.

(2) There is further evidence of the same kind. It is clear that the author of the *Abstract* not only knew the *Treatise* extremely well, but also had the confidence to state that he had ‘farther illustrated and explained’ the ‘CHIEF ARGUMENT’ of that work. Moreover, he provides illustrations and explanations that, at the beginning of 1740, were not a part of the ‘larger work’ he hopes to make more intelligible in this way. The *Abstract* appeared more than eight months before Volume 3 of the *Treatise* was published,<sup>90</sup> and yet it ‘anticipates most of the points discussed in the first part’ of the Appendix contained in that volume, and another from the ‘second part’—points that were not made in the *Treatise* as published in 1739.<sup>91</sup> These textual anticipations are strikingly close, even to the point of repeating distinctive phraseology.

(a) The argument showing the falsity of the claim that ‘belief is some new idea... which we join to the simple conception of the object’, found in the second paragraph of the Appendix, paraphrases that published earlier at *Abstract* 17–21.<sup>92</sup>

[*Abstract* 17] What then is this *belief* [in any matter of fact]? And how does it differ from the simple conception of any thing? Here is a new question unthought of by philosophers... [19] To account for this, there are only two hypotheses. It may be said, that belief joins some new idea to those which we may conceive without assenting to them. But this hypothesis is false. *For first*, no such idea can be produced... [20] *Secondly*, The mind has a faculty of joining all ideas together, which involve not a contradiction; and therefore if belief consisted in some idea, which we add to the simple conception, it would be in a man’s power, by adding this idea to it, to believe any thing, which he can conceive.

(continued in column 1, p. 465)

[Appendix 2] what the nature is of that belief, which arises from the relation of cause and effect, few have had the curiosity to ask themselves. In my opinion, this dilemma is inevitable. Either the belief is some new idea, such as that of *reality* or *existence*, which we join to the simple conception of an object, or it is merely a peculiar *feeling* or *sentiment*. That it is not a new idea, annex’d to the simple conception, may be evinc’d from these two arguments. *First*, We have no abstract idea of existence, distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects... *Secondly*, The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases; so that

(continued in column 2, p. 465)

<sup>90</sup> On the publication of Vol. 3 of the *Treatise*, see Sect. 5 below.

<sup>91</sup> Keynes and Sraffa, ‘Introduction’, pp. xxiv–xxvii. These authors also say that, ‘Apart from considerations of style, the contents could not have been contributed by anyone but Hume himself, since they involve an anticipation of Hume’s additions to the *Treatise* which were not published until *subsequently*’ (p. xxiv). Keynes and Sraffa see the Appendix as dividing into a ‘first part’, discussing belief and including five related segments to be inserted into the text of *Treatise* 1.3, and a ‘second part’, made up of a discussion of personal identity and four additional segments, on three further topics, to be inserted in *Treatise* 1.1 and 1.2. This original disposition of the elements of the Appendix may be seen below, Ed. App. 2.

<sup>92</sup> Keynes and Sraffa, ‘Introduction’, p. xxv.

[Abstract 17](cont.)

[21] Since therefore belief implies a conception, and yet is something more; and since it adds no new idea to the conception; it follows, that it is a different MANNER of conceiving an object; *something* that is distinguishable to the feeling, and depends not upon our will, as all our ideas do... [the mind] not only conceives that motion, but *feels* something different in the conception of it from a mere reverie of the imagination... This belief joins no new idea to the conception. It only varies the manner of conceiving, and makes a difference to the feeling or sentiment.

(b) *Abstract 22*, which points out the difficulty of finding a term that aptly describes the feeling that ‘constitutes belief’, is paraphrased in that portion of the Appendix added as *Treatise 1.3.7.7*.

[Abstract 22] Our author proceeds to explain the manner or feeling, which renders belief different from a loose conception. He seems sensible, that ’tis impossible by words to describe this feeling, which every one must be conscious of in his own breast. He calls it sometimes a *stronger* conception, sometimes a more *lively*, a more *vivid*, a *firmer*, or a more *intense* conception. And indeed, whatever name we may give to this feeling, which constitutes belief, our author thinks it evident, that it has a more forcible effect on the mind than fiction and mere conception. This he proves by its influence on the passions and on the imagination; which are only moved by truth or what is taken for such.

(c) *Abstract 22* also anticipates the Appendix discussion, added at *Treatise 1.3.10.10*, of the difference between the feelings produced by poetry and those that characterize belief in reality.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>93</sup> Keynes and Sraffa might also have pointed out that *Abs. 22* anticipates, although less strikingly, the Appendix discussion, added at 1.3.5.4–5, of this same difference.

[Appendix 2](cont.)

if belief consisted merely in a new idea, annex’d to the conception, it wou’d be in a man’s power to believe what he pleas’d. We may, therefore, conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters. When we are convinc’d of any matter of fact, we do nothing but conceive it, along with a certain feeling, different from what attends the mere *reveries* of the imagination.

[*Treatise 1.3.7.7*] I must own, that I find a considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I understand the subject perfectly, I am at a loss for terms to express my meaning... An idea assented to *feels* different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior *force*, or *vivacity*, or *solidity*, or *firmness*, or *steadiness*. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination.

[*Abstract* 22] Poetry, with all its art, can never cause a passion, like one in real life. It fails in the original conception of its objects, which never *feel* in the same manner as those which command our belief and opinion.

[*Treatise* 1.3.10.10] poetry... never has the same *feeling* with that which arises in the mind, when we reason, tho' even upon the lowest species of probability... the *feelings* of the passions are very different when excited by poetical fictions, from what they are when they arise from belief and reality.

(d) *Abstract* 26, which notes that we do not derive the idea of energy (or power) from observation of the operation of our own minds, anticipates the paragraph of the Appendix that has become *Treatise* 1.3.14.12:

[*Abstract* 26] Now our own minds afford us no more notion of energy than matter does. When we consider our will or volition *a priori*, abstracting from experience, we are never able to infer any effect from it. And when we take the assistance of experience, it only shows us objects contiguous, successive, and constantly conjoined.

[*Treatise* 1.3.14.12]. Some have asserted, that we feel an energy, or power, in our own mind... In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor can we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy, more than external objects have.

(e) Finally, Keynes and Sraffa note that the *Abstract* anticipates two additions, both concerned with equality as it pertains to geometry, made near the end of the Appendix. The most striking of these parallels is that between parts of *Abstract* 29 and *Treatise* 1.2.4.31 and 1.2.4.22.<sup>94</sup>

[*Abstract* 29] Now there is an exact standard of equality, if we suppose that quantity is composed of indivisible points. Two lines are equal when the numbers of the points, that compose them, are equal, and when there is a point in one corresponding to a point in the other. But tho' this standard be exact, 'tis useless... The greatest part of philosophers, when asked what they mean by equality, say, that the word

[*Treatise* 1.2.4.31] If they judge of equality, or any other proportion, by the accurate and exact standard, *viz.* the enumeration of the minute indivisible parts, they both employ a standard, which is useless in practice...

[*Treatise* 1.2.4.22] There are many philosophers, who refuse to assign any standard of *equality*, but assert, that 'tis sufficient to present two objects, that are

(continued in column 1, p. 467)

(continued in column 2, p. 467)

<sup>94</sup> While Keynes and Sraffa correctly note that the *Abstract* is more tentative than the Appendix (leaving it to 'the learned world to judge' what Hume in the Appendix openly agrees to), the relevant passages again show remarkable similarities of content and phraseology.

[*Abstract* 29](*cont.*)

admits of no definition, and that it is sufficient to place before us two equal bodies, such as two diameters of a circle, to make us understand that term.

[*Treatise* 1.2.4.22](*cont.*)

equal, in order to give us a just notion of this proportion. All definitions, say they, are fruitless...

In addition, Keynes and Sraffa point out that the *Abstract* anticipates material found in what Hume described as a recasting of Book 1 of the *Treatise* that was published eight years later: the *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*.<sup>95</sup> They note that *Abs.* 6 anticipates the discussion of Locke on innate ideas found at *EHU* 2.9 n.1, and that the use made of the example of billiard-balls in *Abs.* 9–12 anticipates *EHU* 4.8–10. They might also have mentioned that *EHU* 4.2 includes a revised version of a sentence found in *Abs.* 18, and that the first sentence of *EHU* 4.4 is a variant version of the first clause of *Abs.* 8.

(3) The *Abstract*, although said to be ‘Printed for C. [C]orbet,<sup>96</sup> at Addison’s Head, over-against St. Dunstan’s Church, in Fleet-street’, was printed for none other than John Noon, the publisher of the *Treatise*, by William Strahan. Which is to say that in February 1740 Strahan charged to Noon’s account the cost of printing 500 copies of the *Abstract*. This we know from Strahan’s ledgers, preserved in the British Library.<sup>97</sup>

We also know that Corbett solicited opportunities to keep publishing secrets. On 19 and 20 April 1739, Corbett placed this advertisement in the *London Daily Post, and General Advertiser*:

GENTLEMEN,

*As I have very lately undertaken the Business of a Publisher, so will I as faithfully execute it, if at any Time you please to employ,*

Your most Obedient, Humble Servant,  
CHARLES CORBETT,

*Who will Inviolably keep secret all Names of Authors, Proprietors, &c. whatever.*

<sup>95</sup> On the change of this title to *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, see n. 59.

<sup>96</sup> The imprint of the work names C. Borbet as the publisher. This, despite the apparent attempt at secrecy regarding the roles of Hume and Noon, is nothing more than a simple typographical error. C. (i.e. Charles) Corbett did do business at the address found on the imprint: viz. ‘at Addison’s Head, over-against St. Dunstan’s Church, in Fleet-street’. Moreover, advertisements of the *Abstract* correctly give the name, ‘C. Corbett’; see Sect. 6 below.

<sup>97</sup> British Library, Add. MS 48800, fo. 16: dated ‘Febry 9’ and under the heading ‘D’ Account of Mr John Noon’ there is the entry: ‘To printing an Abstract of a Treatise on Human Nature 2 Sheets English Octavo @ 14<sup>s</sup> per Sheet 500 Copies 1/8/-.’ Strahan’s ledger entry is mentioned by W. B. Todd, ‘David Hume, A Preliminary Bibliography’, 191; Connon, ‘Some Hume MS Alterations on a Copy of the “Abstract”’, 353 n.; R. W. Connon and P. M. Pollard, ‘On the Authorship of Hume’s *Abstract*’, 66.

The fact that Corbett solicited opportunities to keep publishing secrets gives all the explanation one needs for his willingness to become front man for an analysis produced by Hume, and billed, as the *Abstract* was, to Hume's publisher.<sup>98</sup> The fact that it was Noon who arranged for the London printing of the *Abstract* does not establish that the work was written by Hume, but it is another bit of positive evidence in so far as it indicates that Noon was a part of the plan to use the *Abstract* to publicize the *Treatise*.

(4) Robert Cannon found, in the British Library, a copy of Volume 3 of the *Treatise* containing extensive amendments in Hume's hand. As he has also reported, a copy of the *Abstract* is bound together with this copy of Volume 3, and this copy of the *Abstract* also includes amendments. There are six such amendments, five of which are in Hume's hand and which have the character of authorial amendments.<sup>99</sup> Amendments of this sort, found in such close physical proximity to the substantial authorial amendments which Hume made to a copy of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*, substantially strengthen the grounds for attributing the *Abstract* to Hume.

(5) Some of Hume's contemporaries knew or assumed that he had written the work. An extant copy of the first edition of the *Abstract*, a copy inscribed 'Cowbridge Society 1740', bears also, in what I judge to be a second and later eighteenth-century hand, the further note, 'This tract was published by D. Hume to draw the attention of the public to his first work which fell dead born from the press'.<sup>100</sup> Mark Spencer has found that the *Abstract* was discussed and attributed to Hume in 1818 in the *New Monthly Magazine*, and again in 1821 in the fourth edition of the *Universal Biographical Dictionary*.<sup>101</sup> Most importantly, an anonymous review of the *Treatise*, published in

<sup>98</sup> It may be that Hume himself ultimately bore the cost of publishing the *Abstract*, this being one reasonable inference from his remark to Hutcheson, 'I have got it [the *Abstract*] printed in London' (*Letters*, 1: 37).

<sup>99</sup> Cannon, 'Some Hume MS Alterations on a Copy of the "Abstract"'. The sixth hand-written amendment found in this copy (substituting 'reasoning' for 'question' at 415.13) is found in all of the copies of the *Abstract* I have examined or had reports of (including Hume's own copy), and was likely made on copies before they were sold. All six amendments are recorded in *Editing the Texts*, Sect. 3.5 (Register B).

<sup>100</sup> This copy is in the collection of the library of Union Theological Seminary; I am indebted to John Cox of the UTS Library for a reproduction of the title-page of this copy. The phrase 'fell dead born from the press' is used in Hume's description of the history of the *Treatise* in his autobiography, a work first published in 1777 ('My Own Life', 2). Thus it is safe to conclude that this note was written after that date.

<sup>101</sup> M. G. Spencer, 'Another "Curious Legend" about Hume's *An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature*', 90–4. N. K. Smith pointed out that the *Universal Biographical Dictionary* of 1827 reported that Hume had 'printed a small analysis of it [the *Treatise*], in a six-penny pamphlet, to make it sell'. Smith, finding that this dictionary had been first published in 1800, mistakenly assumed that the

the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* for the spring of 1740, implicitly attributed the *Abstract* to the author of the *Treatise*: substantial portions of this review derive directly from the *Abstract*, but are presented as discussions of the *Treatise*.<sup>102</sup> Why would this reviewer have made such an assumption, or how, even, have received a copy of the *Abstract*? Perhaps because Hume himself had sent a manuscript copy of the *Abstract* to William Smith. This is one likely reading of the admittedly meagre remarks in the letter of 4 March 1739.<sup>103</sup> Hume hopes that ‘Mr Smith’ has received the copy of the *Treatise* sent by Noon, and a letter sent by Hutcheson. He then says: ‘I have not heard yet what he has done with the *Abstract*. Perhaps you have.’ This last remark suggests that Hume himself, because he sent the *Abstract* to Smith, has reason to hear about it from Smith. Because he has not so heard, he wonders if Hutcheson has. In short, Hume seems to be saying: Noon sent the *Treatise* to Smith; you (Hutcheson) sent a letter to Smith; I sent the *Abstract* to him; I haven’t heard if any of these missives have reached their destination; have you?

Alternatively, the anonymous reviewer may also have had a printed copy of the *Abstract* that had been sent to William Smith by Noon, for the latter had been sending books for review in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* since its inception in 1728. Indeed, Noon had more books reviewed in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* than any other British publisher.<sup>104</sup> It would be surprising, then, if Noon, who had sent the two volumes of the *Treatise* to Smith, had not also sent him a copy of the *Abstract*. Moreover, it is indisputably the case that a notice of the publication of the *Abstract* appeared in the spring 1740 issue of the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, the issue in which the review of the *Treatise* appeared.<sup>105</sup> Consequently, it may be that both Hume and Noon sent copies of the *Abstract* to Smith.

However the *Abstract* reached the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, one thing is clear. Assuming that ‘Mr Smith’ is William Smith accounts in a convincing way for all the otherwise puzzling elements in the situation: a Mr Smith known to

authorship of the *Abstract* had been continuously attributed to Hume from that date; see Smith, ‘Review of the Keynes–Sraffa Edition of the *Abstract*’.

<sup>102</sup> The use of the *Abstract* in this review was first noted in J. W. Yolton, ‘Hume’s *Abstract* in the *Bibliothèque Raisonnée*’. The *Bibliothèque britannique* also supposes the *Abstract* to be the work of the author of the *Treatise*, but attributes both works to the wrong philosopher; see below, Sect. 7.

<sup>103</sup> Assuming the *Abstract* was sent to the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* by Hume, the reviewer of the *Treatise* would perhaps have worked from a manuscript copy of the *Abstract*, for printed copies of that work were not available before 9 Feb 1740.

<sup>104</sup> For a complete list of books reviewed in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, see Lagarrigue, *Un temple de la culture européenne... la Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 288–354.

<sup>105</sup> A translation of this notice of the *Abstract* is reproduced in Sect. 7.8 below.



Hutcheson and to whom his letter has been sent; the dispatch of a copy of the *Treatise* to this Mr Smith; John Noon's co-operation in the affair; the strong sense of morals of both Hume and Hutcheson, which would indeed have prevented them from arranging for a pirated edition of the *Treatise*, but which would have been no barrier at all to concerted efforts (involving Noon) to arrange for a review in a well-known journal.

If this evidence confirms that Hume's authorship of the *Abstract* is now beyond reasonable doubt, then that work can be trusted to tell us something about his conception of the *Treatise*. Recognizing that many potential readers of his longer work were unaccustomed to abstract reasonings and disinclined to pursue them with the effort required, Hume took a step that he thought might 'seem somewhat extraordinary'. He attempted to make a much longer work 'more intelligible to ordinary capacities, by abridging it'; or, more accurately, he focused on what he in his title calls the chief argument of the *Treatise*, and this he 'carefully traced from the beginning to the end' (*Abs.* Pref. 4). As a consequence, once he has set the stage with necessary background (*Abs.* 1–7), the following nineteen paragraphs are given over to what is described as an 'explication of our reasonings from cause and effect', including 'probabilities, and those other measures of evidence on which life and action entirely depend, and which are our guides even in most of our philosophical speculations' (*Abs.* 4). This explication culminates with a discussion of the origin of our idea of necessary connection or power, and concludes that 'either we have no idea at all of force and energy, and these words are altogether insignificant, or they can mean nothing but that determination of the thought, acquired by habit, to pass from the cause to its usual effect' (*Abs.* 26). Another four paragraphs inform the reader 'of what our author says concerning free-will', noting that he 'has laid the foundation of his doctrine in what he said concerning cause and effect, as above-explained', and quoting the summary of the analysis of cause and effect found at *Treatise* 2.3.1.3–4 (*Abs.* 31–4). In sum, two-thirds of the *Abstract* is devoted to a discussion of the matters relating to cause and effect and causal inference, thus leaving little doubt about what Hume in late 1739 took to be at the core of the *Treatise*, or, at least, of Book 1.

Along the way, as we saw earlier, the *Abstract* makes other interesting remarks about the *Treatise* and its author. Book 1, for example, is said to be a 'logic' and is intended to remedy a defect found in other logics: their failure to deal with probabilities. More generally, the *Treatise* is said to contain 'a

great number of speculations very new and remarkable' (*Abs.* 4). The philosophy in it is said to be 'very sceptical', tending 'to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding'. And:

Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and the belief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced by habit. Nor is this all. When we believe any thing of *external* existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing but a sentiment of the same kind. Our author insists upon several other sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes, that we assent to our faculties, and employ our reason only because we cannot help it. Philosophy would render us entirely *Pyrrhonian*, were not nature too strong for it. (*Abs.* 27)

The final paragraph begins with another important interpretive comment:

Thro' this whole book, there are great pretensions to new discoveries in philosophy; but if any thing can entitle the author to so glorious a name as that of an *inventor*, 'tis the use he makes of the principle of the association of ideas, which enters into most of his philosophy. (*Abs.* 35)

#### 4. REVISING BOOK 1

Hume began revising Book 1 of the *Treatise* even as Book 2 was being printed. Sensing that his use of the term *imagination* could confuse his readers, and concluding that the note on this same term at 2.2.7.6 was both poorly placed and inadequate, he prepared a new and longer note (now n. 22 to 1.3.10.19) and had this inserted, by means of a cancel, at the end of 1.3.9.<sup>106</sup>

In the nearly two years that elapsed between the publication of the first two and the third volumes of the *Treatise*, Hume was able to assess reactions to the earlier volumes and thus added to Volume 3 an Appendix 'Wherein some Passages of the foregoing Volumes are illustrated and explain'd'. As it happens, it is only passages from Volume 1 that are illustrated or explained.

In mid-March of 1740, in a letter to Hutcheson asking for advice about the publication of the third volume of the *Treatise*, Hume gave clear signs of his dissatisfaction with the two volumes already published. 'I wait with some

<sup>106</sup> Because they have misperceived the physical evidence, previous editors have supposed that Hume arranged to add notes at the end both of 1.3.9 and of 2.2.7. While it is true that a cancel was printed to replace pp. 167–8 (M4) of the 1st edn. of Vol. 2, this cancel *removes the note*. For further information about this change, see below, Editing the Texts, Sect. 1.2.2.

Impatience for a second Edition', he said, 'principally on Account of Alterations I intend to make in my Performance', then added that he wished he 'cou'd discover more fully the particulars wherein I have fail'd', as this would give him the opportunity of 'frankly confessing [his] Errors'.<sup>107</sup>

This last sentiment is repeated in the Appendix: 'There is nothing I wou'd more willingly lay hold of, than an opportunity of confessing my errors; and shou'd esteem such a return to truth and reason to be more honourable than the most unerring judgment. A man, who is free from mistakes, can pretend to no praises, except from the justness of his understanding: But a man, who corrects his mistakes, shows at once the justness of his understanding, and the candour and ingenuity of his temper.' And, although Hume goes on to say that, with one exception, he has 'not yet been so fortunate as to discover any very considerable mistakes' in the first two volumes of the *Treatise*, he has 'found by experience, that some of my expressions have not been so well chosen, as to guard against all mistakes in the readers'. It is 'chiefly to remedy this defect', he explains, that he has 'subjoin'd the following appendix' (App. 1).

A survey of the Appendix reveals that its twelve distinguishable elements are concerned with eight substantive topics. Ed. App. 2 presents these twelve elements in the order of their original publication. To see the same elements in the same order, but as dispersed in accordance with Hume's instructions, see, in this order: App. 1–9, 1.3.5.4–5, 1.3.7.7, n. 21 at 1.3.8.5, 1.3.10.10–12 (on belief); 1.3.14.12 (on the source of the idea of power or necessary connection); App. 10–21 (on personal identity); App. 22 (on the means by which we know the distance between objects, and the differences there may be between two ideas of the same object); n. 5 at 1.1.7.7 (on simple ideas and resemblance); 1.2.4.22 and 31 (on the standard of equality in geometry); n. 12 to 1.2.5.26 (on the intrinsic limitations of our enquiries).

It has not been possible to account for Hume's concern to clarify some of these issues.<sup>108</sup> But the occasion of interest in at least one of them is clear. In his letter of 16 March 1740, Hume refers to his conversation with Hutcheson, saying that this 'has furnish'd me a hint, with which I shall

<sup>107</sup> Letter of 16 March 1739, *Letters*, 1: 38–9. This letter is quoted more fully in Sect. 10 below.

<sup>108</sup> The review of Vol. I of the *Treatise* in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* (for details, see Sect. 7.6 below) raises some of the issues dealt with in the Appendix, but as that review draws heavily on the *Abstract*, sorting out its influence on Hume, in contrast to Hume's influence on it, is a complex matter that cannot be pursued here.

augment the 2d Edition'. The hint had to do with similarity and separability as these apply to simple ideas. As Hume put it:

The Word, *simple Idea*, is an abstract Term comprehending different Individuals that are similar. Yet the point of their Similarity from the very Nature of such Ideas is not distinct nor separable from the rest. Is not this a Proof, among many others, that there may be a similarity without any possible Separation even in thought?<sup>109</sup>

The Appendix expands on this issue in the paragraph that now constitutes note 5 at 1.1.7.7.

One can also make reasonable guesses about Hume's concern with his 'expressions', or with the alleged unintelligibility of some of his discussions. The review Hume called 'somewhat abusive', that in the *History of the Works of the Learned*, had complained, sometimes scathingly, about the inscrutable style of the *Treatise*. By the autumn of 1740 (when the Appendix was printed), Hume is likely to have known about the review in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, where it is said that Hume's definition of belief, '*A lively idea, related to or associated with a present impression*', would be unintelligible had we not been prepared for it by the extensive argument that precedes it. Even with this background, the reviewer adds, perhaps one still needs to say, '*Fiat lux!*'.<sup>110</sup> Then, taking his cue from a copy of the *Abstract*, he goes on to be more specific about the additional illumination needed:

Some will doubtless ask for a clearer and more developed account of what constitutes the peculiar and distinctive character of this *lively idea* that our philosopher makes to be the essence of belief. To say that when we *believe* that a ball struck with a certain measure of force acquires a certain measure of motion, we have a *livelier idea* and one that is more sensibly *felt* by the mind than when we only *conceive* it—that is surely to speak a language in great need of explanation. What is this *feeling*? What is this *idea that is livelier than a mere conception*? The author has great difficulty defining it. He is unable to find terms that precisely represent his views. The *feeling of belief*, when compared with the mere idea of a thing, he calls sometimes a *more animated conception*, sometimes a *stronger conception*, and sometimes a *more intensive conception*. But none of this adequately explains what he wants to say. He admits this, and in order to supply what is lacking he appeals to experience... [which shows that belief] makes the mind *feel* what would otherwise only be more faintly *conceived*.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>109</sup> Letter of 16 March 1740, *Letters*, 1: 38–9.

<sup>110</sup> Review of the *Treatise* in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, April–June 1740, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 58. Another review complaining of the obscurity of these volumes appeared in the *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*, 7 Jan. 1740 (see Sect. 7.2). There is no evidence that Hume saw this review.

<sup>111</sup> Review of the *Treatise* in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 58. By spring 1740 Hume had made the admission mentioned only in *Abs.* 22, which the reviewer is here

It is also likely that Hume's views on central epistemological and metaphysical issues were challenged in discussions among his friends and acquaintances. According to James Boswell, Home (that is, 'Lord Kames'), who had encouraged Hume in his philosophical endeavours, was pressed by the latter to give his opinion of the *Treatise*, and finally did so:

[W]hen David Hume returned home from his travels, he had two volumes of his *Treatise of Human Nature* printed and published. He brought them to Lord Kames, and begged he would read them. My Lord told him he was quite out of the train of Metaphysicks, in which he never got more light, and declined reading them. About a Month after, David came back and begged he would read them to oblige him. Said My Lord: "I'll do any thing to oblige you. But you must sit by and try to beat your Book into my head." He did so. Yet My Lord had no more than a glimmering of what was his meaning. Some time after this, My Lord, who had a farm in the country and had got up at six in a May Morning when there was nothing to do in the fields, took up David's Book, and as a proof that thoughts ripen in the Mind imperceptibly, he read it, to his astonishment, with the clearest understanding. And he sat down and wrote Observations upon it. David, who used to come frequently to him, came soon after. "Well, David, I'll tell you News. I understand your book quite well." He shewed him his Objections, and David, who was not very ready to yield, acknowledged he was right in every one of them. He said he Nev<er> did think as David<do>es in that Treatise.<sup>112</sup>

The 'Observations' made that May morning have not as such survived, but in 1751 Home published his *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, and there, finding epistemological and metaphysical matters of interest, made objections to Hume's views on belief, the idea of power, and personal identity. Although Home credits Hume's 'acuteness and penetration', he cannot, he says, accept the view that 'a lively idea and belief are the same', for then 'credulity and a lively imagination would be always connected, which does not hold in fact. Poetry and painting produce lively ideas, but they seldom produce belief.'<sup>113</sup> Supposing that events something

paraphrasing. There are other such attributions of discussions or points of view, found only in the *Abstract*, to the author of the *Treatise*. Consequently, it is clear that the reviewer supposed that the *Abstract* and the *Treatise* were the work of the same person.

<sup>112</sup> Boswell, *Private Papers from Malahide Castle*, 15: 273–4. The reliability of this account must be questioned. This interview between Boswell and Home took place on 31 Jan. 1778, nearly forty years after the events reported, and Boswell waited a week to record his account. That Hume acknowledged the soundness of all Home's objections is no more likely than that, on a May morning, there was nothing to do in the fields of a Scottish farm. Home's copy (known as the Kames copy) of the *Treatise* is now located in the Hoose Library of Philosophy, University of Southern California. For further information about this copy, see below, Editing the Texts, Sects. 1.2.1, 3 and 1.7.5.

<sup>113</sup> *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, 222.

like those Boswell described took place in 1739, and that Home made this same objection on that occasion, we can then readily understand why the Appendix contains two substantial additions (1.3.5.4–5; 1.3.10.10–12) that attempt to clarify precisely how it is that belief differs from the heightened ideas characteristic of poetry and painting.

Home may also at some time have raised with Hume questions about *Treatise* 1.4.6, *Of personal identity*, for in a lengthy segment of the Appendix Hume reviews his discussion of that topic and concludes that there is something—something he cannot put his finger on—wrong with it. At the beginning of his discussion he says that

upon a more strict review of the section concerning *personal identity*, I find myself involv'd in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. If this be not a good *general* reason for scepticism, 'tis at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supply'd) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions (App. 10).

And at the end he says:

Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions. (App. 21)

If Home's objections led Hume to these self-doubts, one would very much like to know what these objections were. They seem not to be, however, included in Home's *Essays*, for, although that work includes a section entitled '*Of the Idea of Self and of Personal Identity*', the position taken by Home appears to be one that Hume had already found wanting in 1.4.6.1–2. Home writes:

It is an undoubted truth, that [a man] has an original feeling, or consciousness of himself, and of his existence; which, for the most part, accompanies every one of his impressions and ideas, and every action of his mind and body . . . It is this perception, or consciousness of self, carried through all the different stages of life, and all the variety of action, which is the foundation of *personal identity*.<sup>114</sup>

The last item in the Appendix appears as a note (now n. 12 to 1.2.5.26) near the end of Hume's discussion of the vacuum and of the possibility of an idea

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. 231–3. It must be noted, however, that Hume was later to tell Home that he 'likt exceedingly your Method of explaining personal Identity as more satisfactory than any thing that had ever occur'd to me' (Letter of 24 July 1746, *New Letters*, 20–1). The precise text on which Hume is commenting is not extant, but it may have been a draft of the material later published in *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, 231–6. See also Sect. 9.1.

thereof. This discussion of these topics may take on added significance because it is Hume's last known revision to Book 1 and because he incorporates into it remarks about the appropriate goals and expectations for natural and moral forms of the Newtonian philosophy. He begins the note by suggesting that:

As long as we confine our speculations to the *appearances* of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrass'd by any question.

He then goes on to suggest that:

If we carry our enquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty.

And he ends by remarking that, so far as 'the *Newtonian philosophy*' is concerned,

nothing is more suitable . . . than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity.

Seen as a part of the story of the writing and publication of the *Treatise*, the Appendix is in some ways more important than its brief length would suggest. For all its brevity, it reveals something about Hume, about his willingness to clarify his positions and to admit philosophical shortcomings. It also tells us something about the kinds of amendment he would have made had he been able to produce the second edition, which he awaited with impatience in March 1740. On this projected edition he may have done substantially more work than has yet been found. As late as 1840 there were in existence copies of both Volumes 1 and 2 of the *Treatise* containing extensive marginalia in Hume's hand. These two volumes were a part of the Hume Library catalogued by an Edinburgh bookseller after the death of Hume's nephew, David Hume the Younger (1757–1838). A far-reaching search (well over 2,000 libraries were approached, and advertisements were published in literary and bibliographical periodicals) located several unrecorded copies of the first edition, but we still have only the bookseller's brief and tantalizing record of these volumes and the revisions they contain, or contained:

Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. 2 vols. 8<sup>vo</sup> Halfbound uncut. Lond[on,] 1739.

\*\*\* This Copy has got a Vast of Corrections and Additions in the handwriting of the Author.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>115</sup> For further details, see Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 102–3, item 647.

## 5. REVISING AND PUBLISHING BOOK 3

Sometime during the summer of 1739, Francis Hutcheson read and commented on the manuscript of Book 3 of the *Treatise*. These comments, which Hume ‘perus’d... with Care’, are lost, but from Hume’s reply to them, the general nature of Hutcheson’s comments may sometimes be inferred.<sup>116</sup> This reply also provides us with some helpful ideas about the revisions to Book 3 made as a consequence of these comments.

From Hume’s letter of September 1739 we can infer that Hutcheson’s comments were substantial, and that they included at least an implicit demand for clarification and the expression of some important disagreements.<sup>117</sup> Hume begins by thanking Hutcheson for his useful ‘Reflections on my Papers’, and then goes on to add: ‘You have mistaken my Meaning in some Passages; which upon Examination I have found to proceed from some Ambiguity or Defect in my Expression.’

For the most part, we are left without any way of knowing which passages Hutcheson was supposed to have misunderstood, but in a substantial postscript to this same letter Hume twice suggests that his discussion of certain centrally important topics is in need of clarification. He first writes:

I cannot forbear recommending another thing to your Consideration. Actions are not virtuous nor vicious; but only so far as they are proofs of certain Qualitys or durable Principles in the Mind. This is a Point I shou’d have establish’d more expressly than I have done. Now I desire you to consider, if there be any Quality, that is virtuous, without having a Tendency either to the public Good or to the Good of the Person, who possesses it. If there be none without these Tendency, we may conclude, that their Merit is derivd from Sympathy. I desire you wou’d only consider the Tendency of Qualitys, not their actual Operation, which depends on Chance.<sup>118</sup>

<sup>116</sup> *Letters* 1: 32. For Hutcheson’s earlier response to Vols. 1 and 2, see Sect. 2 above.

<sup>117</sup> *Letters*, I: 32–5.

<sup>118</sup> It may be more difficult than some have supposed to reconstruct Hutcheson’s objections. Hutcheson also said that it is not actions, but qualities of mind, that are virtuous or vicious: ‘Every Action, which we apprehend as either *morally good or evil*, is always suppos’d to flow from some *Affection* toward sensitive Natures; and whatever we call *Virtue or Vice*, is either some such *Affection*, or some *Action* consequent upon it’ (*Inquiry* 2.2.1; cf. 2.3.1, 12, 14). He also supposed that sympathy is a feature of our psychological makeup, and a feature that has a role in our moral assessments. In an early work he said that the ‘Observation of the Happiness of others, is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, and their Misery the Occasion of Pain’, and then added that such ‘*Sympathy*’ is an ‘Effect of the Constitution of our Nature’ (*Essay* 1.1.3). And even after his exchanges with Hume he was still able to say: ‘There are other still more noble senses and more useful: such is that *sympathy* or fellow-feeling (*sympathia, sive sensus communis*), by which the state and fortunes of others affect us exceedingly, so that by the very power of nature, previous to any reasoning or meditation, we rejoice in the prosperity of others, and sorrow with them in their misfortunes’; and that ‘by our natural sense of right and wrong, and our sympathy (*sensu... communi*) with others, we



In view of what Hume has said here, we may reasonably suppose that he went on to revise or amplify what he was to publish as 3.3.1, *Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices*. In support of this hypothesis there are the explicit claims found near the beginning of that section:

If any *action* be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never consider'd in morality. (3.3.1.4)

In addition, this same section is dominated by a concern for the subjects raised in Hume's letter: character, qualities of mind, tendencies, and the principle of sympathy. In the course of the section *tendency* or *tendencies* occurs thirty-one times, *character(s)* twenty-six times, *principle(s)* twenty-two times, and *quality* or *qualities* fifteen times, and 'the nature and force of *sympathy*' is considered anew. We can reasonably conclude that 3.3.1 was either written or rewritten in response to Hutcheson's criticisms.<sup>119</sup>

Hutcheson appears to have raised at least five objections to the views set out in Hume's draft. One of these, that having to do with the relation of motive and virtue, is broached by Hume in the second and final paragraph of his postscript. Again, Hume indicates that the manuscript which Hutcheson has read is in need of revision:

You are a great Admirer of *Cicero*, as well as I am. Please to review the 4th Book, *de finibus bonorum & malorum*; where you find him prove against the *Stoics*, that if there be no other Goods but Virtue, tis impossible there can be any Virtue; because the Mind woud then want all Motives to begin its Actions upon: And tis on the Goodness or Badness of the Motives that the Virtue of the Action depends. This proves, that to every virtuous Action there must be a Motive or impelling Passion distinct from the Virtue, & that Virtue can never be the sole Motive to any Action. You do not assent to this; tho' I think there is no Proposition more certain or important. I must own my Proofs were not distinct enough, & must be alterd.

immediately approve of any persons procuring to himself or his friends any advantages which are not hurtful to others' (*Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy* 1.1.9; cf. 2.2.1). Thus it was apparently some detail of Hume's use of sympathy, not sympathy *per se*, that motivated Hutcheson's comment. For further discussion, see J. Moore, 'Hume and Hutcheson', 44–7; D. F. Norton, 'Hume and Hutcheson: The Question of Influence', esp. 250, 254–5.

<sup>119</sup> This is not to suggest that Hume had not already addressed these subjects, or that they are not taken up elsewhere in the *Treatise*; see, e.g., 2.1.11.1–9; 2.2.3.3–5; 3.3.3.2; 3.3.4.1.

In the opening paragraphs of 3.2.1, *Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?*, Book 3 as it was published explicitly addresses this point about motives on no less than three occasions. In 3.2.1.2 we are told:

'Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produc'd them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit.

And in 3.2.1.4:

It appears, therefore, that all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives, and are consider'd merely as signs of those motives. From this principle I conclude, that the first virtuous motive, which bestows a merit on any action, can never be a regard to the virtue of that action, but must be some other natural motive or principle. To suppose, that the mere regard to the virtue of the action, may be the first motive, which produc'd the action, and render'd it virtuous, is to reason in a circle. Before we can have such a regard, the action must be really virtuous; and this virtue must be deriv'd from some virtuous motive: And consequently the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action. A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous. An action must be virtuous, before we can have a regard to its virtue. Some virtuous motive, therefore, must be antecedent to that regard.

And if these remarks are not sufficiently explicit and adequate grounds for supposing that Hume has altered his text to make both his position and his proofs more distinct, there is the single sentence that constitutes 3.2.1.7:

In short, it may be establish'd as an undoubted maxim, *that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality.*

More generally, the term *action(s)* appears forty-three times in 3.2.1, and is supplemented by two occurrences of *acts; motive(s)* and *motivation* are used forty-one times; *virtue(s)* and *virtuous* a total of thirty-seven times. Roughly a third of the section is given over to the precise point of the postscript: 'that to every virtuous Action, there must be a Motive or impelling Passion distinct from the Virtue, & that Virtue can never be the sole Motive to any Action', while nearly all of the remainder (3.2.1.10–28) is concerned with finding 'some motive to acts of justice and honesty, distinct from our regard to honesty'. Thus we can also reasonably conclude that 3.2.1 was written, or rewritten, in response to Hutcheson's criticism.

Turning to the main text of Hume's letter of September 1739, we can see that Hutcheson must have addressed at least four additional issues. He must in effect have said that the account of morals offered was excessively cool and abstract, for Hume, after acknowledging Hutcheson's obliging assistance,

responds with a lengthy description of the point of view he has taken. In doing so he articulates a distinction he was to offer, in varying guises, on a number of occasions. The ‘Warmth in the Cause of Virtue’ that Hutcheson misses would be out of place in a work (such as the *Treatise* is meant to be) of abstract, metaphysical reasonings that purports to provide an anatomy of human nature.<sup>120</sup> This reply tells us still more about the conscious intentions that shaped Book 3 of the *Treatise*:

What affected me most in your Remarks is your observing, that there wants a certain Warmth in the Cause of Virtue, which, you think, all good Men wou’d relish, & cou’d not displease amidst abstract Enquirys. I must own, this has not happen’d by Chance, but is the Effect of a Reasoning either good or bad. There are different ways of examining the Mind as well as the Body. One may consider it either as an Anatomist or as a Painter; either to discover its most secret Springs & Principles or to describe the Grace & Beauty of its Actions. I imagine it impossible to conjoin these two Views. Where you pull off the Skin, & display all the minute Parts, there appears something trivial, even in the noblest Attitudes & most vigorous Actions: Nor can you ever render the object graceful or engaging but by cloathing the Parts again with Skin & Flesh, & presenting only their bare Outside. An Anatomist, however, can give very good Advice to a Painter or Statuary: And in like manner, I am perswaded, that a Metaphysician may be very helpful to a Moralist; tho’ I cannot easily conceive these two Characters united in the same Work. Any warm Sentiment of Morals, I am afraid, wou’d have the Air of Declamation amidst abstract Reasonings, & wou’d be esteem’d contrary to good Taste. And tho’ I am much more ambitious of being esteem’d a Friend to Virtue, than a Writer of Taste; yet I must always carry the latter in my Eye, otherwise I must despair of ever being servicable to Virtue. I hope these Reasons will satisfy you; tho at the same time, I intend to make a new Tryal, if it be possible to make the Moralist & Metaphysician agree a little better.<sup>121</sup>

Hume does not here or elsewhere provide details about the ‘new Tryal’ he mentions, and thus we do not know whether any of the works he published later, the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* or the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, for example, constitute, as some have conjectured, all or part of such a trial. We do know, however, that during the winter of 1739–40 Hume made at least one further highly significant change in his manuscript: he ‘alter’d’ the conclusion to Book 3. Of this we have the incontrovertible evidence of an explicit comment found in the second of his letters to Hutcheson, that of 4 March 1740, and also what is likely to have been the

<sup>120</sup> Hume first likens his efforts in the *Treatise* to that of an anatomist at I.4.6.23, where, having completed an ‘examination of the several systems of philosophy’, he says that it is ‘now time . . . to proceed in the accurate anatomy of human nature, having fully explain’d the nature of our judgment and understanding’. His earlier resolve to make human nature his ‘principal Study & the Source [of] Truth’ was noted in Sect. 1 above.

<sup>121</sup> *Letters*, 1: 32–3.

four-page manuscript of the conclusion sent to Hutcheson along with that letter. 'Since I saw you', Hume said in this letter,

I have been very busy in correcting & finishing that Discourse concerning Morals, which you perus'd; & I flatter myself, that the Alterations I have made have improv'd it very much both in point of Prudence & Philosophy...the Book is pretty much alter'd since you saw it; & tho' the Clergy be always Enemys to Innovations in Philosophy, yet I do not think they will find any great Matter of Offence in this Volume. On the contrary I shall be disappointed, if Impartial Judges be not much pleas'd with the Soundness of my Morals. I have sent you the *Conclusion*, as I have alter'd it, that you may see I desire to keep on good Terms even with the strictest & most rigid.<sup>122</sup>

The altered conclusion, that is, the conclusion as actually published, makes it clear that, however much he may have attempted to meet Hutcheson's other objections, Hume generally resisted the temptation to add declamatory warmth to Book 3. Having briefly at the outset of the conclusion restated his views about the importance of *sympathy* in morals, Hume goes on to say that, 'were it proper in such a subject to bribe the reader's assent, or employ any thing but solid argument', there would here be an abundance of materials suited to the purpose. 'All lovers of virtue (and such we all are in speculation, however we may degenerate in practice)', he continues, 'must certainly be pleas'd to see moral distinctions deriv'd from so noble a source' as sympathy, for this 'gives us a just notion both of the *generosity* and *capacity* of our nature' (3.3.6.3). But after an additional two paragraphs in this vein, Hume abruptly ends what threatens to become a declamation inconsistent with the work he had written. 'But I forbear insisting on this subject,' he says, and explains why: 'Such reflections require a work apart, very different from the genius of the present.' This said, he addresses himself directly to Hutcheson's complaint that 'Of Morals' lacked warmth in the cause of virtue. He does so by concluding Book 3 with a paraphrase of the relevant portion of his letter of September 1739:

The anatomist ought never to emulate the painter; nor in his accurate dissections and portraitures of the smaller parts of the human body, pretend to give his figures any

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. 36–7. Hume goes on to say of the text he has enclosed, 'You need not return this Copy, unless you point out any Passage, which you think it proper for me to alter.' The manuscript of the conclusion of Book 3 now found in the papers of the Royal Society of Edinburgh deposited in the National Library of Scotland (MS 23159, item 15) seems likely to be the copy sent to Hutcheson, and to have escaped the general destruction of Hume's papers (carried out by both Hume and, at his instruction, Adam Smith) only because Hutcheson did not send it back, but kept it with the letters he had received from Hume. These materials were likely given to Hume's nephew, David Hume the Younger, by Hutcheson's son. The four-page manuscript of this part of the *Treatise* is reproduced below, Ed. App. 1. On Hume's apparent failure to keep on good terms with Hutcheson (see n. 247) or the 'strictest & most rigid', see Sect. 8.

graceful and engaging attitude or expression. There is even something hideous, or at least minute in the views of things, which he presents; and 'tis necessary the objects shou'd be set more at a distance, and be more cover'd up from sight, to make them engaging to the eye and imagination. An anatomist, however, is admirably fitted to give advice to a painter; and 'tis even impracticable to excel in the latter art, without the assistance of the former. We must have an exact knowledge of the parts, their situation and connexion, before we can design with any elegance or correctness. And thus the most abstract speculations concerning human nature, however cold and unentertaining, become subservient to *practical morality*; and may render this latter science more correct in its precepts, and more perswasive in its exhortations. (3.3.6.6)

Hutcheson must also have taken exception to Hume's claim that there are virtues—justice, for example—that are, in Hume's terms, 'artificial' in so far as they are in essential ways developed or conventional, and not, like benevolence, straightforwardly natural features of human nature. In contrast, Hutcheson supposed, as Hume's letter indicates, that all the virtues could be resolved into one master virtue, benevolence.

Hume answers this objection by challenging what he saw as Hutcheson's insufficiently critical use of that important concept, *natural*. Hume began by saying:

I cannot agree to your Sense of *Natural*. Tis founded on final Causes; which is a Consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain & unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for Happiness or for Virtue? For this Life or for the next? For himself or for his Maker? Your Definition of *Natural* depends upon solving these Questions, which are endless, & quite wide of my Purpose.

Only then, however, does Hume turn directly to the objection that his account of justice suggests that this virtue is unnatural: 'I have never', he insists, 'call'd Justice unnatural, but only artificial.'<sup>123</sup>

This response also has a parallel in the *Treatise* as published. At 3.2.1.19 Hume wrote:

To avoid giving offence, I must here observe, that when I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word, *natural*, only as oppos'd to *artificial*. In another sense of the word; as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue; so no virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from original principles, without the intervention of thought or reflection. Tho' the rules of justice be *artificial*, they are not *arbitrary*. Nor is the expression improper to call them *laws of nature*; if by

<sup>123</sup> *Letters*, 1: 33.

*natural* we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species.

Moreover, at 3.1.2.7–10, Hume carefully distinguishes several senses of *natural* as the term applies to morals. There is that which is *natural* rather than *miraculous*; morals, the sentiments of right and wrong, are certainly natural in this sense. There is that which is *natural* rather than *rare* or *unusual*, a distinction, he adds, that is often difficult to make, but ‘if ever there was any thing, which cou’d be call’d natural in this sense, the sentiments of morality certainly may,’ for they are universal (3.1.2.8). There is that which is *natural* rather than *artificial*—that which is done without design or conscious intention (and thus is appropriately called *natural*), and that which is done as a result of design and conscious intention (and thus is appropriately called *artificial*). ‘Whether the sense of virtue be natural or artificial’, Hume says, ‘’tis impossible for me at present to give any precise answer . . . Perhaps it will appear afterwards, that our sense of some virtues is artificial, and that of others natural’ (3.1.2.9). There is, finally, that which is *natural* rather than *unnatural*. Hume notes that some moralists have argued that virtue is natural and vice unnatural, but this position he dismisses as untenable on the grounds that both virtue and vice are natural in the first sense of the term (that is, neither is *miraculous*), while if it should happen that vice is more common than virtue, then vice would be, in the second sense of the term, more natural than virtue.

Would Hutcheson have posed the same objection had these discussions of the various senses of *natural* been included in the manuscript he read? Perhaps not. I do not suggest that, had these remarks been in place, Hutcheson would have been satisfied by them. I suggest, rather, that had they been in place, his objection would have been different, more nuanced, and would have called for a different kind of response from Hume. It is possible, of course, that Hume’s comments on the diverse meanings of *natural* were in place, but that Hutcheson overlooked them. A later critic of the *Treatise*, William Wishart, did just that. But had Hutcheson overlooked the discussions of *natural* found in the *Treatise*, would not Hume have replied, as he did to Wishart, that his clarifications had been overlooked?<sup>124</sup> Hume’s response is limited to denying that he has said that justice is unnatural. Given that this denial follows his remark, ‘You have mistaken my Meaning in some Passages; which upon Examination I have found to proceed from some Ambiguity or Defect in my Expression’, it seems likely that discussions of the concept

<sup>124</sup> For Hume’s response to Wishart, see Sect. 8 below.

*natural*, found at 3.1.2.7–10 and 3.2.1.19, were added to the *Treatise* in response to Hutcheson's objections.

We need not be tentative about Hutcheson's part in leading Hume to make a further comment about the distinction between the artificial and the natural virtues, for a further discussion of this topic is found in the conclusion to Book 3, a part of the text we know to have been rewritten with Hutcheson in mind. Hume's discussion situates a clarification of this important distinction within a brief account of the role of sympathy in the development of the artificial virtues. Thus, after repeating a central thesis of 3.2—that justice is 'approv'd of for no other reason, than because it has a tendency to the public good'—Hume goes on to insist on two points that he supposed had not been clear to Hutcheson:

Tho' justice be artificial, the sense of its morality is natural. 'Tis the combination of men, in a system of conduct, which renders any act of justice beneficial to society. But when once it has that tendency, we *naturally* approve of it; and if we did not so, 'tis impossible any combination or convention cou'd ever produce that sentiment. (3.3.6.1, 4)

And, Hume continues, though justice is a human invention, it is not, as are most such inventions, dependent on 'humour and caprice'. Justice is on a 'footing . . . widely different' from these other inventions. Justice depends on 'interest', but the interest that gives rise to it is of a different order and ubiquitous:

The interest, on which justice is founded, is the greatest imaginable, and extends to all times and places. It cannot possibly be serv'd by any other invention. It is obvious, and discovers itself on the very first formation of society. All these causes render the rules of justice stedfast and immutable; at least, as immutable as human nature. And if they were founded on original instincts, cou'd they have any greater stability? (3.3.6.5)

In response to what is likely to have been Hutcheson's objection that he had conflated the distinctly moral virtues with such natural abilities as strength, intelligence, and wit, Hume, in his letter of September 1739, replied:

Whether natural Ability's be Virtues is a Dispute of Words. I think I follow the common Use of Language. *Virtus* signify'd chiefly Courage among the *Romans*. I was just now reading this Character of Alexander the 6th in Guicciardin. In Alessandro Sesto fu solertia & sagacita singulare: consiglio eccellente, efficacia a persuadere maravigliosa, & a tutte le facende gravi, sollicitudine & destrezza incredibile. Ma erano queste virtù avanzate di grande intervallo da vitii &c.<sup>125</sup> Were Benevolence the

<sup>125</sup> Hume quotes, with minor changes, Francesco Guicciardini, *History of Italy* 1.2: 'Alexander VI was singularly determined and sagacious, outstandingly judicious, [endowed with a] wonderful power of persuasion, and he performed every task with solicitude and an incredible skill. These

only Virtue no Characters cou'd be mixt, but wou'd depend entirely on their Degrees of Benevolence. Upon the whole, I desire to take my Catalogue of Virtues from *Cicero's Offices*, not from the *Whole Duty of Man*.<sup>126</sup> I had, indeed, the former Book in my Eye in all my Reasonings.<sup>127</sup>

In addition to underscoring the importance of classical sources, especially Cicero, in the formation of Hume's moral theory, this last comment alerts us to the likelihood of another set of revisions, to, in this case, the discussion of the natural virtues and natural abilities found in the third and final Part of Book 3. Perhaps *Treatise* 3.3.5, *Some farther reflections concerning the natural abilities*,<sup>128</sup> was added to buttress or clarify the material published as 3.3.4, *Of natural abilities*, which Hutcheson had read, but beyond the fact that these are called 'farther reflections', there is little in the text to support this particular conjecture. Indeed, it may be that section 4 was written or revised in response to Hutcheson's objections. Its opening paragraph makes reference to 'a dispute of words'; the next paragraph mentions 'the catalogue of virtues', and focuses on Caesar and Cato as described by Sallust; the third paragraph continues to speak of the ancient moralists, and of the 'qualities which form the *great man*' in terms not unlike those found in Guicciardini's description of Alexander the Sixth. Perhaps, then, section 4 was added to meet Hutcheson's objection, and an existing section was merely retitled, *Some farther reflections* . . . The evidence available leaves a number of possibilities open, but the central point remains: Hume's alterations to Book 3 of the *Treatise*, made in direct response to Hutcheson's criticisms, likely included significant revisions to his discussion of natural abilities.

virtues, however, were [always] preceded by long periods of vice, etc.' The vices in question are then listed and show Alexander's character to have indeed been mixed.

<sup>126</sup> Two works with this title were available to Hume. The older of the two, and the likely target of Hume's reference, is *The Whole Duty of Man*, an anti-Calvinist, Anglican work now widely attributed to Richard Allestree. This work was first published in 1658 with the longer title, *The Practice of Christian Graces, or, the Whole Duty of Man*. That the young Hume was familiar with this work is confirmed by his last conversation with James Boswell, when he spoke of having made an abstract of the 'catalogue of vices' found at the end of the work; see above, n. 2. Hume was later to write: 'I suppose, if CICERO were now alive, it would be found difficult to fetter his moral sentiments by narrow systems; or persuade him, that no qualities were to be admitted as *virtues*, or acknowledged to be a part of *personal merit*, but what were recommended by *The Whole Duty of Man*' (*EPM* Appx. 4 n. 72). Hume would also have been familiar with Samuel Pufendorf's *De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem*, first published in 1673, a work translated and published as *The Whole Duty of Man according to the Law of Nature* in 1691. Hume would likely have read this book in one of the many Latin editions available at the time, and thus would likely have referred to it by its Latin title.

<sup>127</sup> *Letters* 1: 33–4.

<sup>128</sup> We have emended the title of this section, which follows 3.3.4, *Of natural abilities*, from *Some farther reflections on the natural virtues*. Our reasons for making this change are set out below, Editing the Texts, Register B, entry 391.title and n. 160 there.



Finally, Hutcheson had pointed out certain passages that struck him as imprudent or irreligious. 'I shall therefore conclude with telling you', Hume wrote in response, 'that I intend to follow your Advice in altering most of those Passages you have remarkt as defective in Point of Prudence; tho' I must own, I think you a little too delicate. Except a Man be in Orders, or be immediatly concern'd in the Instruction of Youth, I do not think his Character depends upon his philosophical Speculations, as the World is now model'd; & a little Liberty seems requisite to bring into the public Notice a Book that is calculated for so few Readers.'<sup>129</sup> As Hume is here principally concerned with removing possibly offensive passages from a version of his text no longer extant, we obviously can form no precise ideas of the passages in question. If, however, it was a matter of removing passages that might offend the religious, we can remark the thoroughness with which he performed this excision, for terms referring to a supreme being (*Deity*, *God*, and cognates) occur only infrequently in Book 3, and the few discussions of matters that impinge on religion seem designed to appear uncontentious to a predominantly Protestant audience.<sup>130</sup>

Hume's first letter to Hutcheson reveals an author eager to win the approval of a highly regarded older philosopher, and to reach serious readers. To achieve this end he was prepared to alter or expand his arguments, but not to abandon the philosophical conclusions to which he had been led by his long period of study. He appears generally to have addressed Hutcheson's objections by holding his ground while offering clarification and amplification. His willingness to delete those passages that could be offensive to the religious may suggest the contrary, but such deletions cannot be assumed to

<sup>129</sup> *Letters*, 1: 34. Hume was indeed later to find that the perceived character of those 'immediatly concern'd in the Instruction of Youth' does in fact depend on their 'philosophical Speculations', for in 1745 the philosophical views set out in the *Treatise* provided a focus for the opposition to his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. For further details, see Sect. 8 below.

<sup>130</sup> The Deity is explicitly mentioned only in 3.1.1.4 and 22, where the shortcomings of a reason-based account of morals are discussed, and in a note in the Appendix (now n. 30 to 1.3.14.12). Seemingly innocuous references to religion are found at 1.4.7.13, 3.1.2.7, and 3.2.4.2. Hume may also have made small additions intended to show that he wished no quarrel with the religious. For example, to his suggestion that the mystery surrounding a promise can be compared to that of transubstantiation or holy orders (3.2.5.14), he may have added his brief n. 78: 'I mean so far, as holy orders are suppos'd to produce the *indelible character*. In other respects they are only a legal qualification.' And, having said 'that many religious declaimers decry' the heroic virtues as 'purely pagan and natural', and that these individuals 'represent to us the excellency of the *Christian* religion, which places humility in the rank of virtues, and corrects the judgment of the world, and even of philosophers, who so generally admire all the efforts of pride and ambition', he may have later added: 'Whether this virtue of humility has been rightly understood, I shall not pretend to determine. I am content with the concession, that the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride, which secretly animates our conduct' (3.3.2.13).

show that he was willing to alter his fundamental views in order to gain either Hutcheson's approval or a greater readership. In fact, in assessing this round of prudential revision, we should bear in mind that the majority of Hume's contemporaries supposed morals in some manner dependent on the Deity and religious belief, while the account of morals found in the *Treatise* is entirely secular. The removal of those passages Hutcheson thought likely to offend would in no way alter this fact, but Hume could hope that with the excision of passages overtly critical of religion or the religious his readers would better appreciate his anatomy of morals.

In another letter to Hutcheson written later in the same month, Hume asks for advice on what he called a 'Point of Prudence':

I have concluded a Reasoning with these two Sentences. *When you pronounce any Action or Character to be vicious, you mean nothing but that from the particular Constitution of your Nature you have a Feeling or Sentiment of Blame from the Contemplation of it. Vice & Virtue, therefore, maybe compar'd to Sounds, Colours, Heat & Cold, which, according to modern Philosophy, are not Qualitys in Objects but Perceptions in the Mind: And this Discovery in Morals, like that other in Physicks, is to be regarded as a mighty Advancement of the speculative Sciences; tho' like that too, it has little or no Influence on Practice.* Is not this laid a little [too stro]ng? I desire your Opinion of it, tho I cannot entirely promise to conform myself to it.<sup>131</sup>

We do not know if Hutcheson made any reply regarding the two sentences. The text of 3.1.1.26 includes two sentences very like these, but the reasoning or argument of which they are a part does not end with them. Rather, Hume ends the paragraph with a brief explanation of why it is that this '*Discovery in Morals*' has no significant effect in practice:

Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour.

In the first of his March 1740 letters to Hutcheson, Hume, after reporting that he had been busy correcting and finishing Book 3 of the *Treatise*, takes up an entirely different topic, a suitable publisher for his third volume. 'I shall set out for London in three Weeks or a Month with an Intention of publishing it', he wrote, and he then went on to say:

The Bookseller, who printed the first two Volumes, is very willing to engage for this; & he tells me that the Sale of the first Volumes, tho' not very quick, yet it improves. I have no Acquaintance among these Folks, & very little Skill in making Bargains. There are two Favours, therefore, I must ask of you, viz to tell me what Copy-Money

<sup>131</sup> *Letters*, 1: 38–40. Hume goes on in this letter to give further insight into his moral views. For his additional remarks, see Editors' Annotations, ann. 299.28.

I may reasonably expect for one Edition of a thousand of this Volume, which will make a four Shillings Book;<sup>132</sup> And, if you know any honest Man in this Trade, to send me a Letter of Recommendation to him that I may have the Choice of more than one Man to bargain with. Tis with Reluctance I ask this last Favour; tho' I know your Authority will go a great Way to make the Matter easy for me. I am sensible, that the point is a little delicate. Perhaps you may not care to recommend even to a Bookseller a Book that may give Offence to religious People: Perhaps you may not think it calculated for public Sale. I assure you, therefore, that I shall not take [it] in the least amiss, if you refuse me. I shall only say with regard to the first Article, that the Book is pretty much alter'd since you saw it; & tho' the Clergy be always Enemys to Innovations in Philosophy, yet I do not think they will find any great Matter of Offence in this Volume.<sup>133</sup>

Twelve days later Hume was to ask again for the desired letter of recommendation:

I must trouble you to write that Letter you was so kind as to offer to Longman the Bookseller.<sup>134</sup> I concluded somewhat of a hasty Bargain with my Bookseller from Indolence & an Aversion to Bargaining, as also because I was told that few or no Bookseller wou'd engage for one Edition with a new Author. I was also determin'd to keep my Name a Secret for some time tho I find I have fail'd in that Point. I sold one Edition of these two Volumes for fifty Guineas<sup>135</sup> & also engag'd myself heedlessly in a Clause, which may prove troublesome, viz, that upon printing a second Edition I shall take all the Copys remaining upon hand at the Bookseller's Price at the time. Tis in order to have some Check upon my Bookseller, that I wou'd willingly engage with another, & I doubt not but your Recommendation wou'd be very servicable to me, even tho you be not personally acquainted with him.<sup>136</sup>

Hutcheson apparently did give Hume the assistance he had requested, for in November 1740, Volume 3 of the *Treatise* was published by Thomas Longman. This volume, like the preceding two, was printed by John Wilson and published anonymously.

## 6. ANNOUNCEMENTS AND ADVERTISEMENTS

The first two volumes of the *Treatise* were published in London in January 1739.<sup>137</sup> As soon as possible thereafter, Hume decamped to Scotland and the

<sup>132</sup> There is no further evidence indicating the number of copies published.

<sup>133</sup> *Letters* 1: 36–7; see also *ibid.* 1: 32–3, quoted above.

<sup>134</sup> Hutcheson's principal early works, his *Inquiry* and his *Essay*, were both published by Longman.

<sup>135</sup> Hume's contract with Noon, quoted above, Sect. 1, calls for a payment of 'fifty pounds'.

<sup>136</sup> *Letters* 1: 38.

<sup>137</sup> Hume's remark that 'In the End of 1738, I published my *Treatise*', may only have meant that he saw the work through the press at the end of 1738 ('My Own Life', 2). More strictly speaking,

country, there to await the public's verdict on his work. For his part, John Noon, in time-honoured fashion, set about making his new property known. We can infer that information about the work was sent to the *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *Scots Magazine*, and in due course to the *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*. The British periodicals announced the work along with the other new books for January 1739; the German one announced it on 5 March of the same year.<sup>138</sup> The *Gentleman's Magazine* announcement reads:

A Treatise of humane Nature. In 2 Vols. 8vo. Printed for J. Noon. Pr. 10s.

The other announcements include only title and price:

A Treatise of humane Nature. Pr. 10s.

The earliest advertisement of the *Treatise* I have seen is that in *The London Evening-Post* for 25–7 January 1739:

*This Day is publish'd, Price 10s.*

*Beautifully printed in two Volumes, Octavo,*

A Treatise of Human Nature; Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into moral Subjects. Vol. I. Treating of the Understanding. Vol. II. Of the Passions.

*Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quæ velis, & quæ sentias dicere licet.* Tacit.

Printed for John Noon, at the White Hart near Mercer's Chapel in Cheapside.

Where may be had,

The Rev. Mr. Jackson's Defence of Human Liberty, in Answer to Cato's Letters, and other Pieces on that Subject.

On 20, 21, and 23 February 1738–9 advertisements bearing a slightly different message regarding the *Treatise* appeared in the *London Daily Post*, and *General Advertiser*. On 3, 10, and 17 March 1738–9 this modified text also appeared in the *Country Journal: or, the Craftsman*:

This Day is publish'd, Price 10s.

Beautifully printed in two Volumes, Octavo,

A Treatise of Human Nature; Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into moral Subjects; wherein the Nature of the Understanding and Passions is examin'd and explain'd.

however, the remark is accurate. According to the unreformed calendar then in use, 1739 would have begun on 25 March. As can be seen in Sect. 6 below, two of the periodicals carrying early advertisements of Vols. 1 and 2 are dated Feb. and March 1738–9.

<sup>138</sup> Information about the German announcement is taken from M. Kuehn, 'Hume in the *Göttingische Anzeigen: 1739–1800*', 48–9, 65. The *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*, after 1753 known as the *Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen*, may have received its information from one of the British journals.

Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quæ velis, & quæ sentias dicere licet. Tacit.

Printed for John Noon at the White Hart in Cheapside, near Mercer's Chapel.

Where may be had,

The History of the Sevarambians, a People in the South Continent . . .

In April, Noon ceased giving the book top billing, but included it, in both the *London Daily Post* (issues of 2, 3, and 4 April 1739) and the *London Evening-Post* (issue of 10–12 April 1739), as the second half of an advertisement principally given over to a new edition of Richard Hayes's *Negotiator's Magazine* now available at the White Hart near Mercer's Chapel in Cheapside:

Where may be had, Price 10 s. (Beautifully printed; in 2 volumes, 8vo.)

A Treatise of Human Nature; being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects; wherein the Nature of the Understanding and Passions is examin'd and explain'd.

*Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire quæ velis, & quæ sentias, dicere licet.* Tacit.

In March 1740 both the *Gentleman's Magazine* and the *Scots Magazine* listed the *Abstract* among the month's new books; the latter read simply: 'An abstract of the treatise of human nature. 6d'. The *Daily Advertiser* of 11 March 1740,<sup>139</sup> and the *London Evening-Post* for 22–5 March and 15–17 April 1740 carried advertisements of the work:

*This Day is publish'd, Price 6 d.*

An Abstract of a late Philosophical Performance, entitled, A Treatise of human Nature; being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of reasoning into moral Subjects. Wherein the chief Argument and Design of that Book, which has met with such Opposition, and been represented in so terrifyng a Light, is farther illustrated and explain'd.<sup>140</sup>

Printed for C. Corbett at Addison's Head, over-against St. Dunstan's Church in Fleet-street.

In its issues for 28–30 October 1740 and for 30 October–1 November 1740 the *London Evening Post* carried an advertisement for Volume 3:

*This Day is publish'd, the THIRD VOLUME of A Treatise of HUMAN NATURE; being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of reasoning into MORAL*

<sup>139</sup> The advertisement in the *Daily Advertiser* was brought to my attention by Jane Roscoe.

<sup>140</sup> Mossner speculated that the title of the *Abstract* found in this advertisement was Hume's original title for the work, but that he later 'cooled off' and eliminated the phrase, 'which has met with such opposition, and been represented in so terrifyng a Light'; see *Life of David Hume*, 124. In response, W. B. Todd pointed out that Strahan's printing records show 'that the *Abstract* was in print before the advertisements were distributed', and then suggests that, as 'Hume was then in Scotland, the more provocative title may have been devised by the publisher to enhance his sales', a 'not uncommon practice'; see 'David Hume: A Preliminary Bibliography', 204.

SUBJECTS: With an APPENDIX, wherein some Passages of the foregoing Volumes are illustrated and explain'd.

Printed for T. Longman at the Ship in Pater-noster-Row. Where may be had,

Discourses concerning the BEING and NATURAL PERFECTIONS OF GOD... By JOHN ABERNETHY, M. A.

On 29 October 1740, and again two days later, the *London Daily Post*, and *General Advertiser* carried the same advertisement, as did the *Daily Post* for 3 November, the *Daily Gazetteer* of 11 and 13 November; the *Country Journal: or the Craftsman* of 15 November; and *Commonsense: or the Englishman's Journal* of 22 November, of the same year. None of these advertisements indicated the price of the book.

No further advertisements of the *Treatise* or *Abstract* have been found in London-based periodicals of the period 1739–40, and none has been found in Scottish and provincial periodicals for these years. There was, however, an advertisement in the issue of Reilly's *Dublin News-letter* for 13 January 1741:

JUST PUBLISHED, and SOLD by JOHN SMITH, Bookseller on the *Blind-Quay* near *Cork-hill*,  
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: Being an Attempt to introduce the Experimental  
Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. Vol. I of the UNDERSTANDING. Vol. II. Of  
the PASSIONS. Vol. III of MORALS.

ALSO,

The MILITARY HISTORY of CHARLES XII... by *Gustavus Alderfeld* [i.e. *Adlerfeld*]<sup>141</sup>

Among the more interesting advertisements for the *Treatise* are those that appeared roughly fifteen years later, after Hume had become a well-known author. In the issue of the *London Evening-Post* for 5–7 December 1754, and of the *Daily Advertiser* for 7–9 December, John Noon advertised the *Treatise* with no concern for chronological accuracy:

*This Day was publish'd, Price 10 s.*

IN TWO VOLUMES OCTAVO,

A TREATISE on HUMAN NATURE: Being an Attempt to introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects: Wherein the Nature of the Understanding and Passions are explain'd.

By the Author of *The History of Great Britain*,

<sup>141</sup> Quoted from Connon and Pollard, 'On the Authorship of "Hume's" *Abstract*', 64–5. The John Smith mentioned in this advertisement is the same bookseller whom Keynes and Sraffa supposed to be the 'Mr Smith' of Hume's remark about the *Abstract* (see above, Sect. 3). Connon and Pollard, who discovered this advertisement, also argue that 'it should almost certainly be interpreted as announcing that John Smith had imported to Dublin copies of the London edition' of the *Treatise*, not as an indication of a pirated edition. This same John Smith had co-operated with Thomas Longman in the publication of Hutcheson's *Inquiry* and *Essay*.

Now publishing in Quarto.

Printed for J. Noon, at the White Hart in Cheapside, near Mercers Chapel.<sup>142</sup>

In early 1756, Noon and the firm of Longman,<sup>143</sup> clearly hoping to take advantage of Hume's growing fame, collaborated on advertisements in the *Whitehall Evening-Post; or London Intelligencer* (issues of 3–5 and 5–7 February 1756) and the *London Evening Post* (issues of 10–12 February 1756):

*This Day was published, Price 14 s.*

In Three Volumes, Octavo

A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE.

Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects: Wherein the Nature of the Understanding and Passions is examined and explained.

By DAVID HUME, Esq;

Printed for J. Noon, in Cheapside, near Mercers Chapel; and M. and T. Longman, at the Ship in Pater-noster-Row.

In November and December 1756, a similar advertisement appeared in three more issues (25–7 and 27–30 November; 30 November–2 December) of the *London Evening Post*.<sup>144</sup> In the meantime, in the *Edinburgh Evening Courant* for 15 April 1756 the bookselling firm of Yair and Fleming advertised four new titles, and then added:

Where may be had,

A Treatise on human nature, being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of reasoning into Moral Subjects, by David Home, Esq; 3 vols 8vo. 15 s.<sup>145</sup>

Whether by accident or design, this advertisement uses the form of Hume's name, 'Home', that he had discarded more than twenty years earlier.<sup>146</sup>

In addition to advertisements in the periodical press, John Noon also advertised his books another way. He included as back-matter in his publications lists of books printed for him and available from his shop. Eighteenth-century

<sup>142</sup> No new edition of the *Treatise* was published in the mid-1750s, or at any other time during Hume's life; nor has there been found any physical evidence (a cancel title-page bearing a later date, for example) suggesting that there had been a new 'issue' in the technical sense of that term.

<sup>143</sup> Thomas Longman, the publisher of Vol. 3, died in 1755.

<sup>144</sup> These London advertisements of 1756 are apparently the only ones drawing attention to all three volumes of the *Treatise*, even though they use a description that ignores Vol. 3. These same issues of the *Evening Post* also advertised the newly published second volume of Hume's *History of England*.

<sup>145</sup> I am indebted to Richard Sher for bringing this advertisement to my attention.

<sup>146</sup> In 1756 Home (then Lord Kames), David Hume, and John Home the playwright were all under attack by some of the Edinburgh ministers (see I. S. Ross, *Lord Kames and the Scotland of his Day*, 152–65). The advertisements of 1756 (London and Edinburgh) are the only ones known to have included the name of the author of the *Treatise*.

books were often sold in boards, or temporary covers, and only later more permanently bound. Many binders apparently discarded these advertisements if they happened to be printed as a separate gathering. Consequently, it is impossible to determine just how regularly Noon advertised in this way, but, given the number of his lists that have survived, it is likely that he regularly included them in the wide range of books he published. In any case, without attempting an exhaustive search, I have found more than twenty distinct lists or advertisements that include the *Treatise*. These include one each of lists containing twelve, twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three, forty-four, and forty-nine titles; two distinct lists of seven, eight, nine, thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen titles; and three distinct lists of seventeen titles each.<sup>147</sup> There is also evidence that Noon published a twelve-page catalogue listing the *Treatise* among 132 titles available from his shop.<sup>148</sup> The lists themselves are undated.

The typical list begins:

BOOKS printed for JOHN NOON, at the White-Hart, near Mercer's Chapel, Cheapside.

The ensuing notices of the *Treatise* may give only title and minimal information:

A Treatise of human Nature; being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of reasoning into moral Subjects, in 2 vol. Pr. 10 s.

<sup>147</sup> The works in which I have seen the lists mentioned:

(1) The single lists of twelve: M. Lowman, *Paraphrase and Notes on the Revelation of St. John* (1745); of twenty-one, G. Turnbull, *Principles of Moral Philosophy*, vols. 1 and 2 (1740); of twenty-two, M. Towgood, *Charles I and the Causes of the Civil War* (1748); of twenty-three, J. Jackson, *Defence of a Book... Belief of a Future State* (1746); of forty-four, A. Oakes, *Doctrine of Hell-Torments* (1740); P. Cardale, *Gospel-Sanctuary* (1740); T. Mole, *Sermon* (1745); of forty-nine, B. Martin, *Elements of Geometry* (1739).

(2) The two different lists of seven: (a), M. Lowman, *Rational of the Ritual of the Hebrew Worship* (1748); (b), C. Bulkley, *Discourses* (1752); of eight: (a), J. Foster, *Essay on Fundamentals* (1754); (b), [D. Booker], *Beauties of the Mass Exemplified* (1756); of nine: (a), J. Milner, *Practical Grammar of Greek* (1740); (b), S. Carkeet, *Essay on the Conversion of St. Paul* (1741); of thirteen: (a), Lockman, *Travels of the Jesuits* (1743); (b), M. Lowman, *Civil Government of the Hebrews* (1745); of fourteen: (a), R. Hayes, *Modern book-keeping* (1739); (b), J. Scott, *Sermons* (1752); of fifteen: (a), J. Tasker, *Sufficient Reasons for a Separation from the Church of England* (1751); (b), T. Moore, *First Vision of St. John* (1750).

(3) The three different lists of seventeen: (a), S. Collet, *Practical Paraphrase of Romans, Galatians, Hebrews* (1744); (b), A. Monsanto, *A Tour from England* (1752); (c), J. Heineccius, *System of Universal Law* (1763; this work was published by Noon in 1741, and reissued by Keith with a new title-page in 1763, but with the advertisement, 'Books printed for John Noon' in place at the end of the work; I have not seen a copy of the 1741 issue).

<sup>148</sup> The forty-nine items in the four-page list found in B. Martin, *Elements of Geometry*, are numbered consecutively (as items 84–132) with the eighty-three items in the eight-page list found in some copies of the *Treatise* and J. Scott, *Sermons* (1743). The *Treatise* is item 84 in this group, and thus by the narrowest of margins is not advertised in itself.



On occasion, however, there is a longer entry using the longer subtitle found in the periodical advertisements of 1739, 1754, and 1756. These entries also include the motto found on the title-pages of the volumes of the *Treatise* published by Noon:

A Treatise of human Nature; being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of reasoning into moral Subjects: Wherein the Nature of the Understanding and Passions is examin'd and explain'd. In 2 vol. Octavo. Price 10 s.

*Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire quæ velis, & quæ sentias dicere licet.* Tacit.<sup>149</sup>

It may be that Hume at one time intended to use this longer title, which also appeared in some of the advertisements mentioned above, but changed his mind late in the printing process. It is perhaps more likely that Noon expanded the title in order to give a clearer idea of the contents of the work.

As early as 1741 some lists report the *Treatise* to be in three volumes octavo, and the price to be fourteen shillings,<sup>150</sup> thus indicating that Noon and Longman co-operated in the sale of the book, and that Hume was right to think that Volume 3 would make a 'four Shillings Book'. (The earlier two-volume set sold for ten shillings.)

## 7. NOTICES, REVIEWS, AND CRITICISM, 1739–41

In addition to advertisements and the brief announcements in three literary magazines, the *Treatise* was also noticed or reviewed, sometimes at considerable length, and more than once, in six periodicals, and was also in the summer of 1740 the subject of a 2,500-word 'Letter' in *Commonsense: or The Englishman's Journal*. Although Hume may have been unhappy with much of what was said about his work, he could have had no just grounds for complaining that the *Treatise* failed to receive attention or excite responses in the journals of the period.<sup>151</sup> Indeed, the attention devoted to the *Treatise* by review journals appears to have been unusual. George Turnbull's *Principles of Moral Philosophy*, for example, a work of a similar sort published by John Noon in 1740, was not reviewed in any of the periodicals that published notices or reviews of the *Treatise*.

<sup>149</sup> For advertisements in this form, see the lists in Martin's *Elements of Geometry* (1739), the two volumes of Turnbull's *Principles of Moral Philosophy* (1740), and vol. 2 of J. Scott's *Sermons* (1743).

<sup>150</sup> See the list in S. Carkeet, *Essay on the Conversion of St. Paul*.

<sup>151</sup> I discuss Hume's famous claim that the *Treatise* 'fell dead-born from the Press' at the end of this section.

Before turning to the content and authorship of the notices and reviews of the *Treatise* and *Abstract*, I list them in approximate order of appearance.<sup>152</sup>

- A notice of Volumes 1 and 2, *Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de L'Europe*, 22 (April–June 1739), 481–2.<sup>153</sup>
- A notice of Volumes 1 and 2, *Neue Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*, [25] (May 1739), 381.<sup>154</sup>
- A notice of Volumes 1 and 2, *Nouvelle bibliothèque, ou histoire littéraire des principaux écrits qui se publient*, 3 (Oct. 1739), 302.<sup>155</sup>
- A notice of Volumes 1 and 2, *Bibliothèque britannique, ou histoire des ouvrages de sçavans de la Grande-Bretagne*, 14 (Oct.–Dec. 1739), 215.<sup>156</sup>
- A review of Volumes 1 and 2, *The History of the Works of the Learned*, 2 (Nov. 1739), 353–90; (Dec. 1739), 391–404.<sup>157</sup>
- A notice of Volumes 1 and 2, *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*, 1 (21 Dec. 1739), 904.<sup>158</sup>
- A review of Volumes 1 and 2, *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*, 2 (4 Jan. 1740), 9–12.
- A review of Volumes 1 and 2, *Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de L'Europe*, 24 (April–June 1740), 325–55.

<sup>152</sup> These notices and reviews were first listed and discussed by E. C. Mossner, in 'The Continental Reception of Hume's *Treatise*, 1739–1741', and his *Life of David Hume*, 118–32, 137–8.

<sup>153</sup> As reported in Sect. 3 (prior to n. 88), the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* was published by the Amsterdam firm of Wetstein and Smith, and was from 1728 to 1741 overseen by William Smith. The principal contributors to the journal during this period were Jean Barbeyrac, Pierre Des Maizeaux, and Armand de La Chapelle. Barbeyrac alone, according to Smith, wrote two-thirds of the reviews. See Lagarrigue, *Un temple de la culture européenne... la Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 24 n. 26, 49.

<sup>154</sup> The *Neue Zeitungen* was published by the Leipzig firm of Erben and Georgi. From its foundation in 1715 until 1746 it was edited by Johann Gottfried Krause.

<sup>155</sup> The *Nouvelle bibliothèque* was published at The Hague from 1738 to 1744, first by Pierre Paupie (1738–42), then by Pierre Gosse (from Jan. 1743). Its principal contributors were Jean-Baptiste de Boyer, marquis d'Argens; Charles Chais; Armand de la La Chapelle; and Jean Barbeyrac.

<sup>156</sup> The *Bibliothèque britannique* was published at The Hague from 1733 to 1747 by the firm of Pieter de Hondt. According to the British Library records, its contributors included L. de Beaufort, J. Bernard, P. Des Maiseaux, B. Duval, T. Lédiard, and J. Rousset de Missy. Lagarrigue has more recently said that the *Bibliothèque britannique* was written by D. C. de Beaufort, J.-P. Bernard, G. Cantier, P. Daudé, F.-P. Du Val, A. Le Moine, J. P. Stehelin, and others; see Lagarrigue, *Un temple de la culture européenne... la Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 369.

<sup>157</sup> *The History of the Works of the Learned. Giving a General View of the State of Learning Throughout Europe*, was issued monthly, in London, from Jan. 1737 through Dec. 1743. This journal was in effect the result of an amalgamation of *The Present State of the Republic of Letters* and *The Literary Magazine: or, the History of the Works of the Learned*. The first of these periodicals was published from 1728 to 1736 by William and John Innys. The second was published for two years, 1735–6, by a 'Society of Gentlemen'. Ephraim Chambers is credited with being one of the principal editors of the *Literary Magazine* (see W. T. Lowndes, *The Bibliographer's Manual*, 1369), and may also have been an editor of *The History of the Works of the Learned*.

<sup>158</sup> The *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*, a bi-weekly journal, began publication in Jan. 1739 and, although renamed, has been continuously published since; see also n. 166.

- A review of Volumes 1 and 2, *Nouvelle bibliothèque, ou histoire littéraire des principaux écrits qui se publient*, 4 (July 1740), 291–316; 5 (Sept. 1740), 45–63.
- A review of Volume 3, *Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de L'Europe*, 26 (April–June 1741), 411–27.
- A notice of the *Abstract*, *Bibliothèque britannique, ou histoire des ouvrages de sçavans de la Grande-Bretagne*, 14 (Jan.–Mar. 1740), 436.
- A notice of the *Abstract*, *Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de L'Europe*, 24 (April–June 1740), 481–2.

There was, in addition:

- An untitled letter 'To the *Author of Common Sense*' in *Commonsense: or The Englishman's Journal*, 178 (5 July 1740), [1–2].<sup>159</sup>

### 7.1 Notices of Volumes 1 and 2 in the Franco-Dutch Periodicals

The first notice of the *Treatise* was that published by the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* in the late spring of 1739. The notice appeared at the head of a column of literary news from London. This column was regularly contributed by Pierre Des Maizeaux, and we know that he was paid for writing the instalment in which the following short notice of the *Treatise* appeared.<sup>160</sup> As we also know that Hume had talked to Des Maizeaux about the *Treatise*, we can infer how it came about that, although the *Treatise* was published anonymously, this notice identified Hume as its author.<sup>161</sup> Thus we can safely conclude that Pierre Des Maizeaux was the author of the first published response to the *Treatise*, and that even he, friend and editor of several well-known free-thinkers, found the author to be 'very original':

From London

A gentleman, a Mr. *Hume*, has published *A Treatise of human Nature: being an Attempt, &c.* That is, *Traité de la Nature humaine; où l'on essaye d'introduire la Méthode expérimentale de raisonner dans les sujets de Morale*. In 8vo. 2 vol. This work is divided into two volumes, of which the first, concerning the Understanding, contains four Parts each divided into several Sections. The first Part concerns ideas, their origin, composition, abstraction, connection, &c.; the second, the ideas of space

<sup>159</sup> *Commonsense* was a London weekly published by James Purser. It began 5 Feb. 1737 and continued to 16 Nov. 1743. Its principal contributors were Charles Molloy; George Lyttelton, Baron Lyttelton; and Philip Dormer Stanhope, 4th Earl of Chesterfield.

<sup>160</sup> British Library, Add. MS 4288, fol. 158, letter of William Smith to Des Maizeaux, quoted in part by Lagarrigue, *Un temple de la culture européenne... la Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 74 n. I am indebted to Dario Perinetti for a transcript of this letter.

<sup>161</sup> See Hume's letter to Des Maizeaux, quoted at the end of Sect. 2 above.

and time; the third, knowledge and probability; and the fourth, scepticism [*Pyrrhonisme*] and the other systems of philosophy. The second volume, concerning the passions, contains three Parts. The first Part is concerned with pride and humility; the second with love and hatred; and the third with the will and the direct passions. Those who desire something new will find what they want here. The author argues on his own terms, he goes thoroughly into things, and he follows new ways of thinking. He is very original.

The other early notices were even briefer, but managed to convey an impression of the work, and especially of its originality and free-thinking character. In an age when intellectual novelty was not widely regarded as a virtue, this feature was often viewed with suspicion. Such was not the case with the short notice found in the *Nouvelle bibliothèque*:<sup>162</sup>

Although the ideas of the author are in several respects very similar to those of Dr. Hutcheson on the moral sentiments and the passions,<sup>163</sup> there are certainly many original things in this new treatise, which is only the beginning of a more extensive and complete work.<sup>164</sup>

In contrast, the *Bibliothèque britannique* was concerned about Hume's 'extraordinary paradoxes' or innovations. The *Treatise*, we are told,

is a system of logic or, rather, of metaphysics, as original as one could want, in which the author claims to correct the most capable philosophers, particularly the famous Mr. Locke, and in which the most extraordinary paradoxes, even the denial that the operations of the mind are free, are advanced.

## 7.2 Notices in the German Periodicals

The two German journals initially reached a stand-off. The *Neue Zeitungen* was clearly displeased:

A new free-thinker has published an extensive *Treatise of Human Nature*, 2 volumes octavo, in which he attempts to introduce the proper method of philosophizing into moral subjects. He first examines and explains the human understanding, and then its effects. The author's evil intentions are made sufficiently clear by the motto, taken

<sup>162</sup> Mossner argues that the early reviewers of the *Treatise* were generally and unwarrantably hostile to the work. He says, for example, that the notice just quoted from the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* is 'the only known contemporary account completely undismayed by the free-thinking implications of the *Treatise*' ('Continental Reception', 35). David Raynor says that, of the early reviews of the *Treatise*, the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* review of Vols. 1 and 2 'is the only favourable one' ('Hume and Berkeley's *Three Dialogues*', 248). I suggest that this notice in the *Nouvelle bibliothèque*, the longer *Nouvelle bibliothèque* review, and the notice in the *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen* are at least neutral, and in some respects positive.

<sup>163</sup> This is only the earliest of the notices or reviews which suggest that there are similarities between the views found in the *Treatise*, including those found in Vols. 1 and 2, and those of Hutcheson.

<sup>164</sup> Des Maizeaux also contributed to the *Nouvelle bibliothèque*, but, given that this notice does not reveal the name of the author of the *Treatise*, it was perhaps not his work.

from Tacitus, of the work: *Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quae velis, & quae sentias, dicere, licet.*<sup>165</sup>

The *Göttingische Zeitungen*, in a notice of only a few lines, joined the *Nouvelle bibliothèque* in linking Hume to Hutcheson, but, unlike the *Neue Zeitungen*, revealed no hostility toward the *Treatise*:

An unknown author has prepared *A treatise of human nature* or *Abhandlung von der Menschlichen Natur*, wherein he has sought, more than any other previous attempt, to introduce into morals the method of drawing inferences from sensations and experiences. In this work he has dealt with the understanding and the passions. It is only the beginning of a larger work. The author has indeed much in common with Mr. Hutchinson, though [he has] also not a few new thoughts of his own.<sup>166</sup>

### 7.3 Review in the *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*

Less than a month later, a substantially longer review in the *Göttingische Zeitungen* was considerably more critical, but not because of a concern about free-thinking. The criticisms, although delivered with considerable irony, are about substance and presentation. The *Treatise* must, writes the reviewer, ‘be given such a high rank among extraordinary books that we cannot resist giving you an idea of the main concerns of the work by providing information about the most remarkable thoughts of the author’.<sup>167</sup> This work informs us, he continues, ‘that all the sciences have a connection with human nature. Therefore, the best way of accomplishing anything in them would be to learn to know this nature itself, and then build on its principles a new and unchanging structure of all the sciences.’ This is to be done by the experimental method, but not by undertaking directly experiments on ourselves or others, for these would have a distorting effect on the phenomena being considered. ‘This will

<sup>165</sup> The *Neue Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*, published in Leipzig from 1715, was in 1740 edited by J. B. Mencke. This journal appeared twice weekly. It contained no long reviews, but focused on scholarly news, and especially news deriving from Mencke’s correspondence (J. Kirchner, *Die Deutsche Zeitschriftenwesen*, 41). The text of this notice is reproduced in R. Brandt and H. Klemme, *David Hume in Deutschland*, [31]. The translation is by Manfred Kuehn.

<sup>166</sup> This notice and the review of the *Treatise* that appeared in the *Göttingische Zeitungen* only two weeks later may have been the work of W. B. A. von Steinwehr, professor of philosophy and natural law at the University of Göttingen, 1738–41. Steinwehr edited *Göttingische Zeitungen* from its inception in Jan. 1739 until Oct. 1740. I am indebted to Heiner Klemme for this information about Steinwehr. If Steinwehr was not the author, these items could have been written by Albrecht von Haller, who is said to have contributed to the early numbers of *Göttingische Zeitungen* and who later (1747–53) edited it. See Lagarrigue, *Un temple de la culture européenne... la Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 93. The translation is by Dario Perinetti.

<sup>167</sup> Although the reviewer promises an additional ‘full discussion of this work’ at a future date, no further discussion of the *Treatise* appeared in *Göttingische Zeitungen*. Translation of this review is by Manfred Kuehn; see Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 41–3.

not be considered entirely novel; nevertheless, its explication is sometimes original enough, if only it were otherwise correct.’

This reviewer then, like most others, focuses entirely on Book I of the *Treatise*. He notes Hume’s view that ideas are ‘nothing more than images made by the lively impressions’, that ‘all ideas originate thus from impressions, and thus correspond precisely to them’, and that ‘impressions comprise all sensations, passions, and first motions of the soul’.<sup>168</sup> The reviewer complains, however, of Hume’s ‘abstract, or more accurately, unclear notions of the ideas of memory and the imagination, of the connection of ideas, of the concepts of substance and modes, and of abstract ideas’. He doubts that we can ‘expect that [the author] will shed more light on moral truths than previous thinkers have’, and permits himself an ironical comment: ‘If the reader can obtain as good an opinion of the author’s proofs as the author himself has, then the reader must allow himself to be persuaded without fail; otherwise, we doubt this will happen.’ Following a few sentences on Book I, Part 2, *Of the ideas of space and time*, the review concludes:

The author has peculiar thoughts about certainty and probability, and a great talent for obscuring what others might have said clearly about these subjects. As clear as is our experience that whatever begins to exist must have a cause, just so obscure is the *proof* that the author gives of this. The necessary connection between cause and effect is for him only [a connection] in thought and not in the thing itself; he supposes that all the necessity of causes and effects consists only in a determination of the soul to think two objects as always connected. Strange enough! We shall not even consider the related conclusions which the author draws from this.

The fourth part, of the sceptical and other philosophical doctrines, is as extraordinary as the ones that precede it. Everything is only probable, nothing is certain, if we listen to the author. His ideas about the proof that bodies exist resembles in thoroughness those that he has given before. The *principium individuationis* is, as he finally says after [having offered] different intricate thoughts, nothing but the immutability, and (if we may talk this way) uninterruptedness of a thing’s existence between two different representations of it. This will be sufficient for the reader to get some idea of the other volume in advance.

#### 7.4 Review in the *History of the Works of the Learned*

The one review mentioned in Hume’s correspondence is that published in what he called the ‘*Works of the Learned*’. The author of this review is unknown.<sup>169</sup> Whoever wrote it, it is more than merely ‘somewhat abusive’, as

<sup>168</sup> It should be noted that, except in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* notice mentioned above, these early materials on the *Treatise* never mention Hume by name. He is always the ‘author’ or the ‘anonymous author’.

<sup>169</sup> Mossner, who attributed this review to William Warburton, granted ‘there is no direct evidence’ to support his attribution. It ‘may be conjectured’, he said, that Warburton was the author because he

Hume characterized it in the second of his letters to Hutcheson. But, hostile as it is, the review is not philosophically empty, and cannot be fairly dismissed as containing only ‘raillery and falsification’.<sup>170</sup> Granted, the reviewer is scathing. He is outraged by Hume’s necessitarian scheme. He is shocked by the brash arrogance of an unknown author who more than once curtly dismisses the efforts of Locke and Clarke and other respected philosophers, while just as frequently suggesting that his own arguments and system show the way through the most difficult philosophical mazes. As a result, the reviewer does speak with unbridled rancour about Hume’s genius, his method, and his self-heralded originality. He says, for example: ‘See what an extraordinary Light our Author, by two or three Arguments, has cast upon a Point, which cost Mr. *Locke*, and some other eminent Philosophers, no little Pains in settling.’ And: ‘What a prodigious Stretch of Invention is here? How vastly do these Speculations exceed in Fineness the finest of the *Aristotelian* Cobwebs?’ But it is not simply Hume who is attacked in this way. The reviewer mocks Hume’s principle that all ideas are copies of impressions, but so too does he mock Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason.<sup>171</sup> Moreover, if remarks in this review struck Hume as abusive, he may have realized that he was being repaid, though excessively, in kind. The *Treatise* itself is not without its scathing passages.

There is, however, more to this review than a tone now seldom used, one that we would likely judge inappropriate or unprofessional. We can agree that the reviewer was abusive and that there are aspects of Volume 1 of the *Treatise* that he did not understand, but we must also grant that he did

was ‘the colossus of eighteenth-century controversy’ (Mossner, *Life of David Hume*, 122–4). Mossner’s assessment seconds that of J. H. Burton, who describes this review as adopting a tone of ‘clamorous jeering and vulgar raillery that forcibly reminds one of the writings of Warburton’. Burton goes on, however, to say that the review is ‘the work of one who respects the adversary he has taken arms against’ (*Life and Correspondence*, 1: 109). Mossner’s attribution is challenged by R. M. Ryley, ‘Did Warburton Review Hume’s *A Treatise of Human Nature*?’, and Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 1.

In the 2nd edn. of his *Life of David Hume* Mossner draws attention to an editorial note appended to a review of Thomas Morgan’s *Physico-theology*: ‘These Articles, on the *Physico-Theology* of Dr. Morgan, were communicated by a Correspondent, who chuses, I find, to be concealed, with Regard to his Name, Profession, and Abode; all I can say of him is, by the Similitude of the *MSS*. I believe him to be the Person who drew up the Account of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, which was printed in the Months of *November* and *December* 1739’ (*History of the Works of the Learned*, 4 (1741), 257). Mossner then suggests further circumstantial grounds for supposing that Warburton is the author of the review of the *Treatise* (*Life of David Hume*, 617–18). Mossner might also have mentioned that the many long and favourable reviews (essentially abstracts) of Warburton’s works published in this journal indicate that he did contribute regularly to it, and that Warburton did later hide his identity when attacking Hume’s *Natural History of Religion*. For details of this last, see Beauchamp, Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

<sup>170</sup> Mossner, *Life of David Hume*, 122.

<sup>171</sup> *History of the Works of the Learned*, 2: 358, 395, 376. This review is reprinted in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses* 3: 3–40.

accurately report several important claims made by the work. More than one-third of the review consists of reasonably accurate quotations, used without any obvious intention to distort. In addition, the reviewer candidly tells his readers that he has made no effort to produce a systematic summary of the work (something, as we know, that Hume himself had found impossible), but has focused on those passages that have seemed to him extraordinary.<sup>172</sup>

This reviewer also raises important substantive objections to some of the views espoused in these same passages. In response to Hume's claim that the mind may in its deliberations about minute quantities 'reach a minimum', the reviewer suggests that Hume 'might more reasonably have said, *the Mind may reach a Minimum, or be convinced of the Existence of indivisible Atoms; for it is certain the Imagination never forms an Idea of partial Extension, but under some Figure*'.<sup>173</sup> The ten-plus pages devoted to Hume's account of our ideas of space and time are not without value.<sup>174</sup> If the reviewer misunderstands the point of Hume's discussion in 1.3.3, *Why a cause is always necessary?*, he does at least understand that Hume is claiming that *experience* leads us always to *believe* that a cause is necessary, a fundamental point missed by many subsequent commentators. The reviewer also says that he cannot understand Hume's first definition of a cause; he objects to Hume's claim that all 'science' degenerates into probability; he is unconvinced by the claims that the mind is only a bundle of perceptions or that matter may be the cause of thought.<sup>175</sup> Many of these objections are recognizably *philosophical* objections, and the reviewer, though he is abusive, none the less recognizes, and quotes at length, a number of important passages from, and takes seriously important parts of, the *Treatise*,<sup>176</sup> while Hume himself came to agree that the 'manner', the philosophical style, of the *Treatise* was defective, and that the work was, as the reviewer suggests, a '*Juvenile*' one.<sup>177</sup>

<sup>172</sup> *History of the Works of the Learned*, 2: 375.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.* 364 n.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.* 364–74.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.* 377, 381–2, 385, 399.

<sup>176</sup> Mossner found the final paragraph of the review so different in tone as to indicate a different authorship. I suggest, however, that the softening of tone begins several pages earlier, at the point at which the discussion of 1.4.6 (*Of personal identity*) begins. If this suggestion is correct, it may tell against the hypothesis that the review had two authors.

<sup>177</sup> *History of the Works of the Learned*, 2: 404. Hume's assessments of the *Treatise* are discussed in Sect. 10 below. The claim, first made in the *London Review* a year after Hume's death, that Hume in a fit of anger challenged the publisher of this review to a duel, is unsubstantiated. The alleged event is, as Mossner has pointed out (*Life of David Hume*, 123), inconsistent with all that we know of Hume's character, and with the fact that it was while Hume was in Scotland that the review appeared. Mossner is mistaken, however, in supposing that Hume did not return to London until five years after the review appeared. As we saw above, he was there, arranging for the publication of Vol. 3 of the *Treatise*, in the summer of 1740.



7.5 Review of Volumes 1 and 2 in the *Nouvelle bibliothèque*

The anonymous reviewer for this journal provides his readers with an extended and reasonably accurate summary of Book 1 of the *Treatise*.<sup>178</sup> Hume's view of the unhappy state of philosophy, wherein the musicians, and not the men at arms, win the day, is repeated, as is his comment about the prejudice against abstract reasonings. Nothing could be more natural, we are told, than this new author's reliance on experience: 'the essence of the human mind being unknown to us, it is impossible to form any notion of its powers other than from the careful and repeated examination of the different effects that result from the different circumstances in which these powers are found'. England is singled out as having produced several philosophers, the very ones Hume mentions, who have 'excited the attention and the curiosity of the public'. Such 'a land of tolerance and liberty', to retranslate a quotation from Hume himself, 'is the only one able to produce learned men capable of improving reason and philosophy'.<sup>179</sup>

The long-standing dispute over the origin of ideas is mentioned, and Hume's account of perceptions, impressions, and ideas is sketched. The reviewer sees no difficulty in Hume's basic position, but asks if he is consistent when he claims that impressions and ideas resemble one another in every respect but their force and vivacity: Hume himself also says that some of our complex ideas never have corresponding impressions, and that many of our complex impressions are not copied *exactly* by their corresponding ideas.

<sup>178</sup> There is no direct evidence of the authorship of this review. If it was written by one of the four principal contributors to the *Nouvelle bibliothèque* (see n. 155 above), then it was most likely the work of J. B. Argens. The latter's *Philosophie du bon-sens, ou Réflexions philosophiques sur l'incertitude des connoissances humaines* (*Philosophical Dissertations on the Uncertainty of Human Knowledge*) shows him to have had an interest in some of the issues raised in Book 1 of the *Treatise*, and to have adopted a moderate perspective not unlike that taken in this review. Chais, a Protestant pastor in The Hague, wrote religious works, but is not known to have reviewed philosophical works for either *Nouvelle bibliothèque* or the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, to which he also contributed. From 1717 to 1728 La Chapelle reviewed extensively for the *Bibliothèque anglaise*, and from 1728 to 1742 for the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*. His attitudes and reviewing style can be well documented from his contributions to those journals. This review is not in his style, nor is it in the style of Barbeyrac. For more on Barbeyrac and La Chapelle and the reviews in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, see nn. 153, 190, 207, and 214, and Lagarrigue, *Un temple de la culture européenne... la Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 49–68, 76–7.

<sup>179</sup> *Nouvelle bibliothèque*, trans. D. F. Norton and R. Pates, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 66. Hume had written, 'So true it is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty' (Intro. 7). Quotations of the *Treatise* found in the translation of this and the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* reviews discussed below are all retranslations from the French. The content of the 'texts' of the *Treatise* presented in the French-language reviews sometimes differs significantly from the content of the English original. Thus, despite the fact that the French reviewers provided what appear to be lengthy quotations of the *Treatise*, they did not always convey to their readers a reliable version of Hume's views.

The reviewer recognizes, however, that Hume saw that he had initially overstated his case, and quotes the general proposition that resolves the apparent contradiction: viz. 'all our simple *ideas*, when they first appear to the mind, are derived from simple *impressions*, that correspond to them and that these *ideas* exactly represent.'<sup>180</sup> The discussions of Hume on the missing shade of blue, abstract ideas, and distinctions of reason seem equally careful and temperate. Hume's views on this latter issue, and his views on the infinite divisibility of space and time, are said to involve *paradoxes*, but here that term appears only to denote, as it often did at the time, a *heterodox opinion, an opinion not generally received*. Hume himself uses the term in this sense, and was fully aware of the fact that the *Treatise* included such paradoxes.<sup>181</sup> Nor would Hume have been surprised to find it said that his 'new solution' to the puzzle of the vacuum would satisfy neither Cartesians nor Newtonians.<sup>182</sup>

Much of *Treatise* 1.3 is also patiently outlined. The seven kinds of philosophical relation, and the differences among them, are noted. Hume's elimination of geometry from the class of exact sciences is reported and passed by without comment. The view of the *Treatise* that we learn about cause and effect through experience, not through the analysis of ideas, is noted. Moreover, the reviewer recognizes that only the relation of cause and effect is 'capable of persuading us of the existence or the action of an object which is followed or preceded by some other object or action . . . It informs us of the existence or of the action of objects that we do not [at present] see or feel.' In 1.3.3, we are told, the author, as is his custom, rejects the generally held opinion of philosophers; he claims that no one has ever demonstrated that *everything that begins to exist must have a cause of existence*. To show that this 'paradox' should be taken seriously, the author again relies on his principle 'that all distinct ideas are separable', and insists that the 'ideas of cause and effect are clearly distinct and different. This makes it easy for us to conceive of some object, non-existent at present, which will exist a moment later, without conjoining to this idea the distinct idea of a cause or of a productive principle.' Given that the separation is possible in imagination, it is really possible. Hume's arguments against the philosophers (Hobbes, Clarke, Locke, and others) who have tried to demonstrate the principle that *everything that begins to exist must have a cause of existence*, are summarized and followed by a paragraph which explains 'how experience has led us to believe' this principle. This paragraph is in effect a translation of Hume's

<sup>180</sup> *Nouvelle bibliothèque*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 67; cf. *Treatise* 1.1.1.6.

<sup>181</sup> See, e.g., Hume's use of the term at 1.3.14.24.

<sup>182</sup> *Nouvelle bibliothèque*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 73.

own summary (found at 1.3.6.2) of this point, the summary beginning ‘We remember to have had frequent instances of the existence of one species of object’, and including a discussion of the effect of constant conjunction. To this the reviewer added: ‘It is thus that the ideas of cause and effect are found to be united in the mind.’ The materials that remain to be examined, we are told, are too interesting to pass over lightly, and too abstract to explain in the present instalment and thus are left to another time.<sup>183</sup>

The second instalment of the *Nouvelle bibliothèque* review appeared in the issue of September 1740. The reviewer turns immediately to *Treatise* 1.3.7 and Hume’s account of opinion or belief, or the ‘lively, corresponding idea, or one that is associated with a present impression’.<sup>184</sup> Again, Hume’s text is intelligently and fairly abridged, largely by unannounced translation of key sentences. Thus, for example,

If one person sits down to read a book as a romance, and another as a true history, they plainly receive the same ideas, and in the same order; nor does the incredulity of the one, and the belief of the other hinder them from putting the very same sense upon their author. (1.3.7.8)

has become, without attribution to Hume:

Une personne qui lit un Livre comme un Roman, & une autre qui le lit comme une histoire véritable, reçoivent toutes les deux parfaitement les mêmes idées & dans le même ordre. L’incrédulité de l’un, & la foi de l’autre ne les empêchent point d’attacher le même sens aux paroles de l’Auteur.<sup>185</sup>

Hume is next reported to have explained the difference between believing and not believing as a difference in the manner of conceiving, or of force and vivacity; to have said that this liveliness is communicated to the idea believed by the impression with which it is associated; and to have attributed this effect to custom. We are then told that this conclusion is consistent with Hume’s principles, shown how he proposes and meets objections, and how he explains the probability of chance and of causes. At the end of this outline the reviewer interjects an equivocal assessment: ‘May I be permitted to remark in passing that if the principles of the author on impression, belief, and custom are not sound, we must at least agree that he makes adroit use of them to explain several intellectual phenomena that are equally surprising and difficult to explain.’<sup>186</sup>

<sup>183</sup> *Nouvelle bibliothèque*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 74–6. At more or less this same point of exposition in the *Abstract*, Hume said of himself: ‘His reasoning seems to be curious; but could scarce be rendered intelligible, or at least probable to the reader, without a long detail, which would exceed the compass I have prescribed to myself’ (*Abs.* 23).

<sup>184</sup> *Nouvelle bibliothèque*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 76.

<sup>185</sup> *Nouvelle bibliothèque* 4.1(1740): 45.

<sup>186</sup> *Nouvelle bibliothèque*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 80.

The reviewer devotes only the minimum of attention to *Treatise* 1.3.14, *Of the idea of necessary connection*. Hume's conclusion that the idea of 'necessary connection' (*nécessaire liaison*) is derived only from impressions of contiguity, succession, constant conjunction, and a determination of the mind, is reported with complete *sang-froid*. Indeed, more space is given over to the rules for judging of causes and effects. The arguments offered by Hume in his discussion of the reason of animals are said to be 'so evident and so common that it would be useless to outline them here'.<sup>187</sup>

The balance of the review is given over to the fourth and final part of Book 1. Hume's scepticism regarding reason is outlined; his response to the suggestion that he may be excessively sceptical repeated: 'Nature by an absolute necessity determines us to judge just as she obliges us to breathe and to feel'; his insistence that it is 'pointless' to ask '*if there are or are not bodies*' is noted. In a rare burst of criticism, Hume's explanation of why we believe in bodies is said to be

treated in such an abstract manner that I would need to copy Section II in its entirety in order to make myself understood, and perhaps even then readers would not understand much of it, so singular are the ideas of our anonymous author, and such the air of singularity that he gives to the most common ideas.<sup>188</sup>

On the other hand, Hume is said not only to have explained the views of the Peripatetics, but also to have shown how they came to add so many absurd elements (forms and substances, for example) to their system. And he is said to have turned 'all modern philosophers into so many sceptics'.<sup>189</sup> There are brief discussions of the sections on the immateriality of the soul and personal identity, neither of which evince a reaction. Nothing is said about the conclusion to Book 1. The review ends by mentioning the second volume of the *Treatise*, and reporting briefly the contents thereof.

To sum up, the readers of this review were given a surprisingly accurate sketch of Book 1 of the *Treatise*, more accurate, perhaps, than anything else written for many decades afterward, and were never discouraged from taking the work seriously. The reviewer shows no hostility toward Hume. He recognizes that the *Treatise* is highly original, without suggesting that it represents an undesirable penchant for free-thinking. Because he so often paraphrases the *Treatise*, he says little, in fact, that Hume himself might not have said, for Hume was happy enough to think that, although his work was original and singular, it was also abstruse and difficult to summarize.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid. 81.<sup>188</sup> Ibid. 82.<sup>189</sup> Ibid. 83.

7.6 Review of Volumes 1 and 2 in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*

This review combines an attempt at accurate exposition with criticism that treats the *Treatise* as a significant and original, but flawed and worrisome, contribution to philosophy.<sup>190</sup> The reviewer expresses a general concern about the effect of metaphysics on religion, and thus in his final paragraph worries about some unspecified negative consequences of the work. He begins by noting the great progress that the British have made in metaphysics, and praising them for their successful efforts ‘to make philosophy more useful by teaching men to know themselves better than they previously did’. The ‘science of man’ is a goal worth pursuing. The reviewer then loosely summarizes the opening paragraphs of the *Abstract* (themselves a summary of parts of the Introduction to the *Treatise*), mentioning Hume’s intention to imitate Bacon, Locke, and the usual others by replacing, in philosophy, conjectures and hypotheses with experience and observation. The goal of the *Treatise* is said to be ‘to provide us with an accurate anatomy of human nature by following the experimental method in its most rigorous form’.<sup>191</sup>

The question, the reviewer continues, ‘is how to deal with such an important subject with the clarity, precision, and comprehensiveness appropriate to it’. Leibniz’s complaint is repeated: previous philosophers have been prolix in discussing demonstration, but have given little attention to

<sup>190</sup> There is no direct evidence of the authorship of this review (as a matter of policy, virtually all reviews in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* were anonymous; see the ‘Avertissement’, *Bibliothèque raisonnée* 1: (1728), p. xii). Lagarrigue, after a review of more than 7,000 letters related to the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, reports only one letter relevant to the question of the authorship of this review: viz. the letter mentioned in n. 160. See *Un temple de la culture européenne... la Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 47. Whoever wrote this review, he had at his disposal, and made ample use of, a copy of Hume’s *Abstract*. This fact was first noticed by John Yolton, who also suggested that Des Maizeaux could easily have had a copy of the *Abstract* and used that as the basis of this review (see ‘Hume’s *Abstract* in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*’). Lagarrigue shows this attribution unlikely given that the review in question is not included in the list of contributions to the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, vol. 24, for which Des Maizeaux was paid, and that, more generally, Des Maizeaux’s contributions to the journal were nearly always limited to literary news from London. Finally, critical passages of the sort found in this review are uncharacteristic of Des Maizeaux’s work. Lagarrigue also shows, incidentally, that it was not unusual for the authors of books being reviewed to supply the reviews or ‘extraits’ published in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*. See Lagarrigue, *Un temple de la culture européenne... la Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 70–4, 293–4, items 342–3, 352–4. The review or at least the critical comments in it, as well as the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* review of Book 3, have also been attributed to Francis Hutcheson. See Moore, ‘William Smith and the Reviews of Hume’s *Treatise* in the *Bibliothèque Raisonnée*’, 8–30; Moore and Stewart, ‘A Scots-Irish Bookseller in Holland’, 10; and Stewart and Moore, ‘William Smith (1698–1741) and the Dissenters’ Book Trade’, 24–6. For doubts about this attribution, see D. F. Norton and D. Perinetti, ‘The *Bibliothèque raisonnée* Review of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*.’

<sup>191</sup> *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 48–9.

probability, on which much of life depends.<sup>192</sup> On this issue, Hume's efforts are granted modest praise:

In this respect, we cannot reproach our author. He elaborates amply on these matters, and if the principles that he posits in explaining them are not to the taste of everyone, everyone will at least find there something new, and even the most accomplished metaphysicians will find something to challenge them.<sup>193</sup>

This praise is followed, however, by remarks critical not only of Hume, but also of the British penchant for metaphysics:

In general, this work is full of original thoughts that have all the merit of singularity. Readers will find that by dint of his desire to go thoroughly into the innermost nature of things, the anonymous author uses barely intelligible language. I fear, moreover, that his paradoxes not only savour of Pyrrhonism, but also lead to consequences that the author appears to disapprove. Metaphysics, as much as the other sciences, has its pitfalls. When it goes beyond certain limits, it obscures the very objects that it seeks to reveal. Under pretext of yielding only to evidence, it finds difficulty everywhere. Even religion suffers much in encounters with metaphysics, for sometimes in trying to demonstrate and clarify it produces first principles too arcane, too difficult. For all that, among some English theologians it is now fashionable to sprinkle even their sermons with the most subtle metaphysics. At the least, unless we have Locke at our fingertips, we cannot begin to understand them. We must hope that such an unfortunate fashion will not survive in the bosom of such an enlightened and perceptive country.<sup>194</sup>

Taking his lead from the *Abstract*, the reviewer focuses on what Hume has to say about 'our *manner of reasoning on causes and their effects*'. With this as a goal, he summarizes the account of impressions and ideas found in 1.1.1, *Of the origin of our ideas*, and then quotes in full 1.1.2, *Division of the subject*. The reviewer takes this material to establish that there is 'no *idea*, whether of the understanding, or of the imagination, or of the memory, that has not been preceded by some *impression*', and to provide the foundation for the principle (clearly expressed in *Abs.* 7) that the only way to clarify an obscure idea is to discover the impression from which it is derived. The author of the *Treatise* is seen to apply this principle to our idea of cause.<sup>195</sup>

At this point the reviewer in effect paraphrases seven paragraphs of the *Abstract*, those in which Hume introduces the example of the billiard-balls and reports on the three perceptible 'circumstances' (contiguity of time and place, priority of time, constant conjunction) that characterize the causal

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.* 3: 49. Hume first mentions Leibniz's complaint in *Abs.* 4; see Editors' Annotations, ann. 408.3.

<sup>193</sup> *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 50.

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>195</sup> *Ibid.* 50, 53.

relation (*Abs.* 9); asks what happens when our present experience is only a cause or an effect, and we infer that the associated cause or effect ‘has existed or will exist’ (*Abs.* 10); introduces the story of Adam, who, with a fully formed intellect but no experience, witnesses and learns from the behaviour of billiard-balls (*Abs.* 11–12); concludes that all reasonings concerning cause and effect depend on experience and presuppose the uniformity of nature (*Abs.* 13); argues that we cannot *demonstrate* that the course of nature must continue uniformly the same, thus proving that the future will necessarily resemble the past (*Abs.* 14); and concludes that custom, not reason, ‘is the guide of life’ (*Abs.* 16).<sup>196</sup>

This is too much for the reviewer, who says:

We are thus reduced, if the philosophy of this learned Englishman is true, to believing nothing about the future until we see it. Fortunately for us, all these fine speculations are not as obvious as he thinks they are... I grant that the resemblance of the future to the past is a matter of fact, but I deny that it is a matter that we can know with some probability only from experience. Our anonymous author claims that we cannot resolve this issue without presupposing that which is in doubt, namely, that the future will resemble the past. Not so. We can decide from the nature of the things about which experience has already taught us. We can say: this cause has always produced, and always produces everywhere, this particular effect; therefore it will always produce this effect in so far as it will be this particular cause and operate in the same circumstances. To reply, *but the course of nature may change*, is to say nothing to the point. For, if the course of nature changes, the cause will not be the same cause nor will it operate in the same circumstances, and it will be clear that it will not produce the same effects.<sup>197</sup>

The reviewer next paraphrases more of the *Abstract*. This time the relevant paragraphs are those that: explain the difference between the mere conception of, as contrasted with a belief in, a given matter of fact, and between this form of belief and the conviction produced by demonstration (*Abs.* 17–20); offer the novel theory that belief is ‘a different MANNER of conceiving an object’, a distinctive, involuntary feeling (*Abs.* 21); and describe this feeling as a stronger or more lively, vivid, or intense conception, different from the ideas produced by poetry (*Abs.* 22–3). Then, after citing in full 1.3.7.8 (which discusses the difference between two readers of the same work), the reviewer mentions, but despairs of abridging, the arguments by which Hume develops his views about the transfer of

<sup>196</sup> *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses* 3: 53–6. The reviewer also quotes *Treatise* 1.3.6.5: ‘there can be no demonstrative arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had experience’.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.* 3: 56.

vivacity from impression to associated idea.<sup>198</sup> None the less, he provides a useful summary of Hume's view:

The author is as profound as he is ingenious, and so it is easy, if one's attention strays for a moment, to lose one's way in what follows. In general, if I really understand his view, he thinks that belief (that is, the conviction we have that a particular cause will produce a particular effect) is entirely founded on past experience, that we believe only to the extent that, from habit, we remember the impressions by which the mind has been affected in the past. From this it follows that, if belief communicates to the bare conceptions of the mind some degree of vivacity, it takes this from the vivacity (which itself may vary) of the original impressions on which it is founded. Perhaps the author would put this differently: it is only hesitantly that we flatter ourselves with having understood him.<sup>199</sup>

Six more paragraphs of the *Abstract* are paraphrased,<sup>200</sup> those in which Hume says that when our experience has not been uniform we believe about the future what has most commonly happened in the past (*Abs.* 24); says that his conclusions apply equally to the operations and phenomena of the mind (*Abs.* 25); notes our inability to form, directly, an *impression* of a necessary connection (*Abs.* 26); says that the philosophy of the *Treatise* is 'very sceptical' and that 'Philosophy would render us entirely *Pyrrhonian*, were not nature too strong for it' (*Abs.* 27);<sup>201</sup> says that 'the soul, as far as we can conceive it, is nothing but a system or train of different perceptions' (*Abs.* 28); and reports that the *Treatise* defends the uncommon view that matter is not infinitely divisible, and that the senses and imagination should be the 'ultimate judges' of equality, of the proportion of one object to another (*Abs.* 29). This last claim the reviewer describes as a 'travesty', and then offers a concluding comment about the author whose work he has reviewed:

There are in our author a hundred other things we could note: the spirit of Pyrrhonism that directs his manner of philosophizing; the inconsistency of many of the singular propositions that he takes pleasure in accumulating; finally, the pernicious consequences that we could draw from his principles. What is most shocking is the confidence with which he pronounces his paradoxes. Never have I seen a more dogmatic Pyrrhonism. He is not in doubt when he dares to substitute his speculations for the opinions of the greatest philosophers on the most abstract matters (on the nature of our ideas, of extension, of space, of the void, of identity, etc.). He is not in doubt when he advances the argument, for example, that it is false that everything that exists must necessarily have a cause of its existence; that we have *a priori* no proof of the existence of the Deity; that the most able mathematicians are unsure of the

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.* 56–9.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.* 59.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.* 59–62.

<sup>201</sup> The reviewer suggests that Book 1, Part 4 of the work is intended to illustrate this point; see *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 61.



truth of their discoveries until the wise public has applauded them; and a quantity of other propositions equally audacious, not to say anything stronger. On every point the author is as decisive as he can be. In comparison with himself, the Lockes and Clarkes are often in his eyes but poor and superficial reasoners. If we may be allowed to speak in his language, we clearly see that habit and custom have already so formed his beliefs that he believes only in a very lively manner. It is nevertheless appropriate for the public to know that it is to a young philosopher that we are indebted for the essays discussed.<sup>202</sup> What can we not expect from so subtle and profound a genius once age has matured his taste and given him time to think anew on the subjects he has outlined? He seems to us to have already achieved more clarity in his treatise on the *passions*, which makes up the second volume of this work. Perhaps we can later help our readers to judge this treatise.<sup>203</sup> Until then we ask this wise and ingenious author to pardon us for the mistakes we may have made in trying to summarize his arguments. We would need to be as quick-witted as he is in order not to stray from the obscure paths he obliges us to take. We are among that group who cannot yet see *the imperfection and absurdity of all the vulgar hypotheses that he rejects*. He clearly expected that those, unaccustomed as he is, *to profound reflections on the intellectual faculties of the mind, would not immediately understand his principles*.<sup>204</sup> He also saw that he may sometimes have exceeded the limits of a *prudent scepticism* and too often made use of those forms of speaking, *it is evident, it is certain, it is undeniable*, that are commonly but inappropriately employed. But he expressly says that if this has happened it was by inadvertence, the result of a lively impression that objects made on him, and not from conceit or from a taste for philosophical dogmatism, from which, he says, he is *far removed*.<sup>205</sup> Indeed, we would have to be passionately Pyrrhonian not to believe what he says about that.<sup>206</sup>

### 7.7 The Review of Volume 3 in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*

This, the only review of the third volume of the *Treatise*, appeared in spring 1741.<sup>207</sup> The reviewer begins by noting that, because in his third volume the author of the *Treatise* has turned to ‘those matters of the most concern to the happiness of man’ and that ‘are intended to be understood by everyone, he has taken care to express himself in a more intelligible manner than he has done in the preceding volumes’. Later the reviewer grants that the author ‘has really made an effort to accommodate himself to the capacity of a greater

<sup>202</sup> Des Maizeaux, Noon, or Hutcheson could have provided the reviewer with this biographical information.

<sup>203</sup> No review of Vol. 2 appeared in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*.

<sup>204</sup> The reviewer alludes to 1.3.13.20.

<sup>205</sup> The reviewer alludes to 1.4.7.15.

<sup>206</sup> *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 62–3.

<sup>207</sup> For a discussion of the authorship of this review, and of the possibility that one individual may have been responsible for both *Bibliothèque raisonnée* reviews, see Norton and Perinetti, ‘The *Bibliothèque raisonnée* Review of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*’. The translations that follow are from this essay.

number of people' by 'sometimes' taking care to clarify 'his principles by using popular examples' and also by adding 'notes to the text, and these notes, at least the majority of them, truly do shed some light on it'. On the whole, however, the reviewer is not satisfied. He fears, he says, 'that *ordinary readers* may again complain that his metaphysics is a little obscure', and goes on to point out that

when one intends to reform the ideas of almost all humankind, and to open paths new even to the eyes of philosophers, it would be only natural first of all to forge a language that is simple and clear, which anyone could easily understand. Without this it is impossible to communicate one's ideas, and even more difficult to have them appreciated [*de les faire goûter*].

He also laments the great number of 'singular associations of ideas and words that no one ever thought of putting together before'; characterizes *Treatise* 3.2.1 (*Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?*) as obscure; and closes the review with the comment, 'Were the author willing to add a glossary, he could spare his readers much work'.<sup>208</sup>

The reviewer has deeper and more philosophically significant objections. He reveals early on that he is suspicious of philosophical attempts to ground morals. The 'metaphysician who undertakes to demonstrate the principles of natural right', he says, 'wastes his time and effort'. It is not just that such abstract approaches can be, because they are understood by so few, of limited benefit. It is, more importantly, that this method may be

really harmful to religion, in spite of the intention of the philosophers that use it. We know that our hearts are constantly seeking pretexts for avoiding obedience. Is there any more plausible pretext than that drawn from the obscurity of books intended to teach the elements of virtue? Is it to make these pleasing that they are made so difficult? Is this not, on the contrary, the means for making them always disagreeable?<sup>209</sup>

As the review progresses, however, this general suspicion of philosophical morals is replaced by a more narrowly focused dissatisfaction with the moral sense theory found famously in the work of Hutcheson, and now in this new work. Noting that *Treatise* 3.1.1 (*Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason*) raises the issue of the foundation or source of moral distinctions, and that the views of both Clarke and Wollaston are rejected as unsound, the reviewer complains that the author of the *Treatise* 'approves none of what is most approved on this subject'.<sup>210</sup> Following a substantial sketch of Hume's arguments showing that moral distinctions cannot derive from reason, the reviewer turns to the positive theory of the *Treatise*. Those who wonder how

<sup>208</sup> *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 26 (1741), 412–15, 427.

<sup>209</sup> *Ibid.* 413.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.* 416.

this skilful metaphysician explains virtue and vice should know that he supposes that:

the mind, as much as the body, has a taste, and this taste helps it to distinguish that which is right from that which is wrong, in the same manner as we at first glance distinguish that which is beautiful from that which is ugly. It is a matter of sentiment: reasoning has no place in it. . . . What is right gives pleasure and is approved; what is wrong produces pain and is blamed. There is the key to the whole mystery!<sup>211</sup>

This is followed by a more complete summary of Hume's theory, and then by a lengthy paragraph criticizing him for offering nothing more than an unimproved version of the useless, demonstrably defective moral sense theory of Hutcheson:

In ordinary language, what we have just read amounts, if I am not mistaken, to this. In order to express with precision the difference between right and wrong, it is necessary to state the question in these terms. Why is it that our mind, on a simple view of certain actions, is touched by a sentiment of pleasure that makes it approve them, whereas on the view of other actions it is touched by a contrary sentiment? Many people would be satisfied to reply that it is because we are so made, but for the liking of our author, this is not philosophical enough. It is necessary to say that things happen in this way because our mind, besides its other faculties, has a mental taste that to him is partly natural to it, but also partly artificial—that is to say, which in part follows from the constitution of our nature, and in part is the product of education, example, conventions and of human laws [*des constitutions humaines*]. With the help of this taste our mind first knows, by the pleasure or pain it experiences, that which is morally good and morally bad, and thus, entirely spared from reasoning, this sentiment suffices for it to choose, without doubt, to embrace virtue and avoid vice.

That is the whole system of our author. When Mr Hutcheson proposed it in his *Recherches sur l'origine des Idées que nous avons de la Vertu & du Bien moral*, able people found in it three great flaws. Firstly, they did not approve of this supposition of a new mental faculty, intended only to enable our mind to discern right from wrong. They saw this as absolutely useless, and claimed that the mind, given its indisputable capacity to reflect and sense, is adequately furnished with all that is necessary for it to distinguish good from evil. Secondly, they observed that in this system the perception of objects is confounded with the sentiments that result from it. On this, Mr. Burnet raised objections that up until now have remained unanswered.<sup>212</sup> Thirdly, and last, they did not conceal that this *mental taste* [*Goût spirituel*], or this *moral sentiment*, whatever one wishes to call it, is clearly linked to fanaticism, and can

<sup>211</sup> *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 26 (1741), 412–15, 421–2.

<sup>212</sup> Reviewer's note: 'Letters between the late Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Hutcheson, concerning the true foundation of Virtue.' The work the reviewer cites was published in 1735, ten years after Burnet and Hutcheson exchanged letters in the *London Journal*. The publication of this edition of collected letters was reported in the 'Literary News' of the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 16 (1735), 226.

at least very easily open the door to the excesses of enthusiasm. Dr. Berkeley sharply exposed this difficulty in his *Alciphron*,<sup>213</sup> and made it clear that nothing would be more arbitrary than the ideas of right and wrong if these depended on such an inner taste. I do not understand how it is that our author did not find it appropriate to examine the objections of these scholars. They would have opened a beautiful field for his speculations, and for his profound metaphysics. Perhaps it is modesty, perhaps even prudence. How can one add anything to the ingenious efforts that Mr. Hutcheson has opposed to Mr. Burnet's reflections on this topic?<sup>214</sup>

The final paragraphs of the review focus first on Hume's claim that virtue derives from motives, not actions *per se*, then on the answer he gives to his question about "in what manner the rules of justice have been established by the artifice of men; and secondly, what are the reasons that determine us to attach to the observance of these rules the ideas of moral beauty, while we consider the breach of them as something ugly and deformed" that we could not reasonably approve'. These rules, the reviewer notes, are said to be the result of two features of the soul, self-love and limited generosity, and the fact that external objects are both scarce and easily transferred. This is too much for the reviewer:

What language! All this means, according to the principles of our author, that men, having come together in society, have established laws based on their mutual interest, and that these laws are so much the rules of justice that, prior to them, there was

<sup>213</sup> Reviewer's note: 'See *Alciphron; or, The Minute Philosopher*, Dialogue 3.'

<sup>214</sup> *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 26 (1741), 425–6. These pointed criticisms of Hutcheson's moral sense theory tell heavily against the hypothesis that Hutcheson is the author of this review (see n. 190 above). As part of a discussion critical of his moral theory, Hume is explicitly and severely castigated for offering an over-complicated theory, the theory of a moral sense, when no theory is needed, and when, furthermore, any competent philosopher would already know that this theory, a theory explicitly attributed to Hutcheson, has been shown to be: (i) useless and redundant; (ii) philosophically confused (it confounds the perception of objects with the sentiments such perception produces); and (iii) a tool of enthusiasm or even fanaticism. The reviewer goes on to criticize Hume for failing to attempt to rescue this sorry theory, but for present purposes I note that the reviewer's criticism of Hutcheson is here neither indirect nor implicit. The shortcomings of Hume's theory of moral perception are precisely the substantial shortcomings of Hutcheson's theory. It is unlikely that Hutcheson would have criticized Hume by pointing out that the moral theory of the *Treatise* has exactly the same flaws that competent critics had found in Hutcheson's own theory.

Several other considerations also count against the hypothesis that Hutcheson wrote this review: (1) the reviewer has shown himself suspicious of all philosophical attempts to ground morals, a task Hutcheson had explicitly undertaken; (2) the reviewer supposes the 'most approved' moral theories include those of Clarke and Wollaston, two moralists whose rationalist views Hutcheson openly opposed; (3) the reviewer reveals that he is unaware that Hutcheson had expanded his replies to Burnet (those first published in the *London Journal* in 1725) and other critics by additions to later editions of his *Inquiry* (that of 1729, e.g.), and also by publishing in 1728, as the second part of his *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, the *Illustrations on the Moral Sense*; and (4), to suppose that Hutcheson secretly criticized Book 3 of the *Treatise* even while he was recommending it to his own publisher (see above, Sect. 5) is to attribute to Hutcheson a duplicity that runs contrary to what has been reported about his moral character. See Leechman, Preface, pp. xxiv–xxvi.

nothing like the right of property or, in consequence, that which we call justice or injustice. This, as one can see, is Hobbes's system clothed in a new fashion.<sup>215</sup>

### 7.8 Notices of the *Abstract*

The two notices of the *Abstract* are slight. That found in the *Bibliothèque britannique* includes the title of the work, a translation of this, and an additional sentence attributing the work to George Turnbull. This notice appeared in the March 1740 issue of the *Bibliothèque britannique*, while the *Abstract* was first advertised (in the *Daily Advertiser*) on 11 March. New books rarely travelled across the channel so quickly. Moreover, the title that this notice gives to the work is found only in the advertisement of 11 March,<sup>216</sup> and Corbett's name is correctly spelled, as it is in that advertisement.<sup>217</sup> These phenomena can be explained by supposing that the editors of the *Bibliothèque britannique* took their information about the *Abstract* from the *Daily Advertiser*. This hypothesis accounts for the facts of the case without supposing that some copies of the *Abstract* were printed with an alternative title, a possibility for which there is no evidence in William Strahan's ledger.<sup>218</sup>

Still to be explained, however, is the fact that this notice attributes the *Abstract* to George Turnbull, who, we are told, 'is also the Author of the Treatise which is spoken of here [in the title of the *Abstract*], and that we announced in the *Literary News* of the preceding Issue of this Journal'. This mistaken attribution of the *Abstract* may be due, as Mossner suggests, to the fact that this notice is preceded by a notice of Turnbull's *Treatise on Ancient Painting*,<sup>219</sup> but this does not explain how it happened that Turnbull is supposed to have written the *Treatise of Human Nature*. That mistake may have been occasioned by the lists of available books that John Noon placed in his publications.<sup>220</sup> Some of these lists place the *Treatise*, for which no author is given, immediately after two or more works by, and explicitly attributed to, George Turnbull. Indeed, the lists in the two volumes of Turnbull's *Principles of Moral Philosophy* are arranged in this way. As a consequence, it may well have seemed to some that Turnbull was also the author of the *Treatise*, the very next (and sometimes the last) book on some of these lists. In a general way Turnbull wrote the kind of work that the *Treatise* is (he too wrote

<sup>215</sup> *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 26 (1741), 426–7.      <sup>216</sup> See above, Sect. 5 at n. 140.

<sup>217</sup> It will be recalled that in the *Abstract* itself the publisher is mistakenly styled 'Borbet'.

<sup>218</sup> On Strahan's ledger, see above, Sect. 3, at n. 97.

<sup>219</sup> Mossner, *Life of David Hume*, 124. Mossner says that in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée* Turnbull is identified as a 'Mr. Thurnbull'. But Turnbull is first identified there as 'George Turnbull Docteur en Droit', and only later, presumably by typographical error, referred to as 'Mr. Thurnbull'.

<sup>220</sup> See above, n. 147.

treatises on moral philosophy and was sympathetic to the experimental method), and hence such an inference, however mistaken and to us incredible, was not entirely without some foundation. Whatever may be the explanation, the mistake was to live on: Johan Anton Trinius, in his *Freydenker Lexicon* (1759), appears to have relied on the *Bibliothèque britannique*, for he lists the *Treatise of Human Nature* as the work of ‘Thurnbull’.<sup>221</sup> But the mistake also survived in England, for a catalogue of used books issued in 1762 offered for sale ‘Turnbull’s *Treatise of human Nature*, 3 vol. neat, 9 s’.<sup>222</sup>

The only other known notice of the *Abstract* appeared in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, in the spring of 1740. No author is suggested for the *Abstract*, but for the second time this journal identified Hume as the author of the *Treatise*. The notice in its entirety reads:

Some having found the *Treatise of Human Nature* of Mr. Hume a little too abstruse, a pamphlet has been published to help them understand it: *An Abstract of a Book lately published, entitled a Treatise of Human Nature &c.* That is, *Extrait d’un Livre publié depuis peu sous le titre Traité de la Nature humaine &c. où le principal sujet de ce Livre est plus amplement éclairci & expliqué.* In 8.<sup>223</sup>

### 7.9 Letter to *Commonsense*: or the *Englishman’s Journal*

In addition to these reviews and notices, one other early discussion of the *Treatise* appeared in July 1740 as a letter ‘To the Author of *Common Sense*’.<sup>224</sup> The author of this letter reported that he had recently published *An Essay towards demonstrating the Immateriality and Free Agency of the Soul*,<sup>225</sup> and now wished to give ‘a short Answer to a long Book lately published, intitled, *A Treatise of Human Nature*’. The author of the *Treatise*, he says, seems to have adopted the doctrine of necessity, and hence to be in need of correction. The

<sup>221</sup> Johann Anton Trinius, *Freydenker Lexicon*, 456–7.

<sup>222</sup> *A Catalogue of a very Choice and Curious Collection of Books in all Arts, Sciences, and Languages... Which will be Sold... on Tuesday, Feb. 16, 1762... by John Whiston and Benj. White* ([London, 1762]).

<sup>223</sup> This notice is included in the ‘News from London’, which was for the issue in question contributed by Des Maizeaux. As the notice does not provide the name of the author of the *Abstract*, it may be that Hume had learned his lesson, and kept this information from Des Maizeaux.

<sup>224</sup> ESTC suggests that *Commonsense* was ‘written almost solely by Charles Molloy, with occasional contributions by Dr. William King, Lord Chesterfield and Lord Lyttleton’. From a survey of the known writings of these four individuals, I judge it unlikely that the letter was written by any one of them. Attention was first drawn to this letter by Mossner, ‘The First Answer to Hume’s *Treatise*’, 291–3. The letter is reprinted in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 86–91.

<sup>225</sup> *Essay towards Demonstrating the Immateriality and Free Agency of the Soul. In Answer to... Samuel Strutt [and] Anthony Collins* (London: [1740]). The author of this work is unidentified. Although the work is dated 1760, a notice of it appeared in the *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 24 (1740), 480, and a review of it in *Nouvelle bibliothèque*, 8 (1741), 34–79.

unknown critic professes uncertainty on this crucial point because, he writes, the book in question is ‘so very abstruse and perplex’d, that, I am convinced, no Man can comprehend what he means’. It is to ensure that what may be a merely misleading show of learning does not ‘impose upon weak Readers’ that this critic has written in response to the *Treatise*.<sup>226</sup>

Some two-thirds of this commentary of about 2,500 words is directed toward that part of the *Treatise*, 2.3.1–3, in which Hume discusses the will, summarizes his conclusions about the source of our idea of necessary connection, and argues that there are no good reasons for supposing that the moral world differs from the physical in the matter of causal regularity. The commentator, complaining along the way about the novel vocabulary of the work, and revealing, ironically, an occasionalist bias that denies that there is in material objects any causal efficacy, undertakes to correct errors on all these points.

The main point at issue, that human actions are free, is so obvious, this critic argues, ‘that it is never opposed but by those who either lay down to themselves *false Principles*, or *mistake the Terms*’ they use.<sup>227</sup> On this issue, the author of the *Treatise* is said to have made several errors:

- He confuses the will, which he calls ‘*an internal Impression we feel and are conscious of*’ (see 2.3.1.1), with its exercise, or ‘what we call the *Act of volition*’. The will is a faculty, not, as claimed at 2.3.1.2, an impression.
- He says that the motions of material objects are ‘determined by an *absolute Fate*’ (see 2.3.1.3), when they are, on the contrary, determined by the qualities given to them, and preserved in them, ‘*by God Almighty*’.
- He says that ‘in no single Instance [is] the *ultimate Connexion* of any Objects... discoverable’ (see 2.1.3.4), when in fact Sir Isaac Newton has discovered just this connection, showing that ‘it depends upon or proceeds from Cohesion, Attraction, Repulsion, and Communication of Motion, which are Qualities *given* in different degrees to *Matter*, by the *Author of Nature*’, on whom ‘the mutual Influence of Bodies must always *originally depend*’.
- He mistakes the origin of the idea of necessity. We have the idea of necessity because we have first ‘perceived in ourselves a Motion *that is not necessary*’. Moreover, we know of the necessity holding between external objects only by observation, and ‘for this very reason, we are often liable to be deceived in our Judgments about the *Necessity or Freedom of external Motions or Effects*’.

<sup>226</sup> All citations here are from the original, *Commonsense*, 178 (1740), 1–2.

<sup>227</sup> The critic grants that Anthony Collins, in his *Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty*, had perspicaciously defended the necessitarian view of our actions, but his arguments are said to have been answered in the critic’s *Essay* (see n. 225).

—He is wrong to suppose that there is a necessary connection between our motives and our actions: ‘every man must be convinced from what he feels within himself’ that such influences are not ‘*absolute and necessary*’.

Having thus prevented the philosophy of the *Treatise* from ‘having any *mischievous* Effect upon the Opinions or Morals of Mankind’, the anonymous critic turns to Hume’s opposition, found in *Treatise* 1.2, to the commonly held view that space is infinitely divisible. The author of the *Treatise* is wrong from the outset, we are told, because he thinks that ‘it is a Contradiction to suppose, that any *finite Part of Space* contains an *infinite Number of Parts*’, while anyone who understands the nature of infinities or space realizes that ‘the *Magnitude of an Object* has nothing to do with its *speculative Divisibility*’. Indeed, the question, Is space infinitely divisible? is a ‘very *improper*’ one to ask, for every part of space, even the

*smallest* we can imagine, must be supposed to have *Parts*, that is to say, it must be supposed to have *Extension*; for this is all we can mean by the *Divisibility of Space*; because *no Part of Space*, the most *immense or largest* we can imagine, can be *actually* divided, that is to say, it is impossible to *divide Space* as we do *Matter*, by removing or destroying that *Contiguity* which is between any two of its *Parts*.

The letter writer concludes his commentary by declaring on his honour that he has not the ‘least Intimation’ who the author of the *Treatise* is, and thus that his objections ‘cannot proceed from any *Malice or Ill-will*’. On the contrary, he says, his criticism ‘proceeds entirely from the Regard I have for that Science called *Metaphysics*: A Science which is in itself of great *Dignity*, because it may do infinite Service to Religion, Virtue, and Morality, and consequently to *Religious* as well as *Civil Liberty*’ when it is ‘handled in a natural and concise Manner; but it does infinite mischief, when, *by departing from Nature*, it is rendered obscure, perplex’d, and *contemptible*’.

The existence of these thirteen items shows that in the period immediately following its publication, the *Treatise* and its author were the object of significant attention on the European continent as well as in Britain. Yet, thirty-five years later, Hume was to make what is perhaps his best-known comment about the *Treatise*:

Never literary Attempt was more unfortunate than my *Treatise of human Nature*. It fell *dead-born from the Press*; without reaching such distinction as even to excite a Murmur among the Zealots.<sup>228</sup>

<sup>228</sup> ‘My Own Life’, 2. Writing to William Strahan about John Dalrymple’s briefly popular *Memoirs of Great Britain*, Hume reported that ‘I am diverted with conjecturing what will be the Fate of this strange Book: Will it run a few Years? Or fall at once dead born from the Press? I think the



Those who cite this famous remark all too often overlook the context in which it appears. Hume is speaking about exactly the period, 1739–41, of these notices and reviews. Just prior to saying that the *Treatise* fell dead-born, he has said:

In the end of 1738, I published my *Treatise*; and immediatly went down to my Mother and my Brother, who lived at his Country house and was employing himself, very judiciously and successfully in the Improvement of his Fortune.

And just after, he goes on:

But being naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I very soon recovered the blow, and prosecuted with great ardour my studies in the country. In 1742, I printed at Edinburgh the first part of my *Essays*: the work was favourably received, and soon made me entirely forget my former Disappointment.<sup>229</sup>

The *Treatise* did not come into the world unnoticed. It was, for its time, widely reviewed. What, then, are we to make of Hume's 'dead-born from the Press'? Are we to conclude that he did not know of some of these reviews? That he did not count them as significant responses to the *Treatise*? That by 1776 he had forgotten about them? That a dead-born *Treatise* suited well the literary history of himself that he hoped to promote?<sup>230</sup> Perhaps he was alluding to the fact that the work sold so poorly that there was never any real possibility of the second edition which he eagerly anticipated in the months following publication of the first two volumes.<sup>231</sup> Perhaps, despite the significant attention the journals gave to the *Treatise*, Hume remained conscious of the massive gap between what he had envisioned as he sent the first volumes to the press, and what had transpired. He had hoped that his 'improvement in the science of man' would provide to his 'native country'—and to himself as

last Event more probable' (letter of 25 March 1771, *Letters*, 2: 242). As G. B. Hill pointed out, the phrase 'dead-born from the Press' is found in Pope: 'All, all but truth, drops dead-born from the Press, / Like the last Gazette, or the last Address' (*Satires* 2.226); see Hill, *Letters of David Hume to William Strahan*, p. xx. There is, however, little reason to think that Hume supposed the *Treatise* suffered because it lacked 'truth'; see Sect. 10 below.

<sup>229</sup> 'My Own Life', 2. There are, however, grounds for supposing that Hume's 'Disappointment' was not entirely forgotten; again, see Sect. 10.

<sup>230</sup> This possibility is one implication of Stewart's suggestion that in 'My Own Life' Hume was pushing 'the line he wished to promote for posterity' ('Two Species of Philosophy', 81). See also Schliesser, 'The Obituary of a Vain Philosopher', 347.

<sup>231</sup> Looking back, in April 1776, at this disappointing outcome, Hume may have realized just how unusual a result it was. Among his predecessors and contemporaries no other philosopher of importance had been judged so harshly by the public. Malebranche, Locke, Clarke, Berkeley, Hutcheson, Butler, Reid: all had written profound, abstract philosophical works that made their way through multiple editions. Among the philosophers we now judge of consequence, only Hume had the chagrin of seeing his most comprehensive philosophical work fail to reach a second edition, and the further humiliation, as he may have seen it, of seeing the decidedly thinner philosophical writings of such a critic as James Beattie run through edition after edition.

well, perhaps—honour and glory to match that earned by British natural philosophers.<sup>232</sup> Measured against that hope, the *Treatise* did arrive dead-born.

## 8. THE LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN

Beyond the responses of Hutcheson to Volumes 1 and 2, and to a draft of Book 3,<sup>233</sup> little is known about initial Scottish reactions to the *Treatise* or *Abstract*. During the summer of 1740, Hume was in London overseeing the publication of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*. While in the south, he stayed for a time in Richmond with his friend William Mure. To his sister Agnes, at home in Glasgow, Mure reported: ‘We have been here now these ten days, and pass our time in a very agreeable way, we have our country man Mr. Hume the author of the metaphysical books that you heard so much of last summer as a party to our retirement.’ What Agnes Mure might have heard is not recorded, but her brother’s letter does give a hint, for it continues:

he is a very sensible young fellow and extremely curious in most parts of learning and how much soever he has shown himself a Sceptick upon subjects of speculation and enquiry, he is as far from it as any man with regard to the qualities of a well natured friendly disposition, and an honest heart which are no doubt of greater consequences to the intrinsick worth of a character than any abstract opinions whatever.<sup>234</sup>

Whether the *Treatise* of the affable but sceptical young Hume did or did not create a stir in Scotland soon after its publication is the topic of a much later exchange of letters. In the *Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement* for 1771, one ‘Orthodoxus’ complained, in an open letter to James Beattie, that the latter had done a disservice by focusing attention on the *Treatise*:

a book upon human nature, which was never, or but by a few people read or understood... Should Mr Beattie bring again to light a book forgotten, and hardly to be found in any bookseller’s shop in Britain; what is the consequence? This dangerous book will be again desired, and read; and perhaps another edition required, that the glory of Mr Beattie’s triumph may appear more conspicuous.<sup>235</sup>

<sup>232</sup> *Treatise*, Intro. 8.

<sup>233</sup> See above, Sects. 2 and 4.

<sup>234</sup> William Mure of Caldwell to Agnes Caldwell, 5 June 1740, National Archives of Scotland, GD1/481/1; quoted from J. C. Hilson, ‘An Early Account of Hume’. The letter continues: ‘As he [Mr Hume] is very communicative of all his knowledge we have a great deal from him in the way of dispute and argument, and not a little too in the way of plain information we reason upon every point with the greatest freedom, even his own books, (which we are working at at present) we canvass with ease, and attack him boldly wherever we can get the least hold of him, and question or contradict his most favourite notions; all this goes on with the greatest good humour’. Hilson identified the letter writer as William Mure.

<sup>235</sup> *Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Amusement*, 13 (1771), 51. Orthodoxus was Henry Grieve, brother-in-law to Hume’s friend John Home. For more on Grieve and his correspondents, see Sect. 9.4.

'Eumenes', writing from Glenullen later in the same year says that Orthodoxus is far too optimistic if he supposes that Hume's sceptical philosophy terminates in speculation alone, or that it is 'a mere metaphysical windmill' now under the attack of Beattie's 'philosophical knight-errantry'.<sup>236</sup> So too is Orthodoxus over-optimistic when he claims that

the Dissertation on Human Nature [the *Treatise*] has never been read, or but by few; that it is now forgotten, and hardly to be met with in any bookseller's shop in Great Britain. How true the last of those facts may be, I pretend not to judge; but the first and the second (that the book has either been read by few, or is intirely forgotten) are absolutely false, and so grossly contradictory to universal knowledge and conviction, that he must be charitable indeed who can palliate them with the excuse of mistake. I was in Edinburgh soon after the original publication, and well remember how much and how frequently it was mentioned, in every literary conversation: and if it is now so irrecoverably involved in oblivion, how should it have happened that Dr Reid, and a number of other venerable names, have opposed the full strength of their genius to its malignity?<sup>237</sup>

These anecdotal comments provide only limited evidence, but it may be that Corbett's advertisement for the *Abstract*, claiming as it did that the *Treatise* had 'met with such opposition, and been represented in so terryfying a Light', contained an element of truth: during the summer of 1739, in Scotland at least, the *Treatise* may have created a philosophical stir.<sup>238</sup>

It may also be that Francis Hutcheson responded again, albeit indirectly, to the account of morals found in Book 3 of the *Treatise*. The second edition of Hutcheson's *Philosophia moralis* was published in 1745. At no point in this work does Hutcheson mention by name either Hume or the *Treatise*. But, knowing as we do that he had looked over Volumes 1 and 2 of that work, read and commented on a draft of Book 3, and doubtless had seen the published version of that part of the work, it is reasonable to look in this work for allusions to the *Treatise* or its author. Recalling Hume's remark that he took his 'Catalogue of Virtues from *Cicero's Offices*',<sup>239</sup> we can ask if it was with Hume in mind that Hutcheson said:

The design of *Cicero's books de officiis*, which are so very justly admired by all, has been mistaken inconsiderately by some very ingenious men, who speak of these

The letter of Orthodoxus and the replies it engendered are reprinted in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 200–30.

<sup>236</sup> Eumenes was Thomas Blacklock, as we know from Beattie's correspondence. See 'Thomas Blacklock and Others', in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 200–3.

<sup>237</sup> *Weekly Magazine*, 13 (1771), 99–100. Blacklock was 18 in 1739, and may well have been interested in the philosophy of the *Treatise*. On 'Dr Reid', i.e. Thomas Reid, see Sect. 9.9.

<sup>238</sup> For the description of the early reception of the *Treatise* found in the *Annual Register* for 1776, see Sect. 9.20.

<sup>239</sup> See Hume's letter to Hutcheson of Sept. 1739, quoted in Sect. 5 above; the phrase 'catalogue of virtues' is repeated in *Treatise* 3.3.4.2; see also Editors' Annotations, ann. 387.31.

books as intended for a compleat system of morals or ethicks. Whereas *Cicero* expressly declares, that the doctrine concerning *virtue*, and the *supreme good*, which is the principal part of ethicks, is to be found elsewhere . . . The design then of these books *de officiis* is this; to shew how persons in higher stations, already well instructed in the fundamentals of moral philosophy, should so conduct themselves in life, that in perfect consistence with virtue they may obtain great interest, power, popularity, high offices and glory.<sup>240</sup>

And:

Let not philosophy rest in speculation, let it be a medicine for the disorders of the soul . . . Look not upon this part of philosophy as matter of ostentation, or shew of knowledge, but as the most sacred law of life and conduct.<sup>241</sup>

We know also that Hutcheson remained unconvinced by the moral philosophy of the *Treatise*, for in a surviving letter Hume maintains, against the views he finds in Hutcheson's Latin work, views that he had set out in Books 2 and 3 of the *Treatise*: viz. that a passion may be calm but powerful; that natural abilities may cause greater esteem than do the moral virtues; that the concept of virtue has a broader scope than Hutcheson supposes; that justice and property have their origin in self-interest, not in either public or private benevolence; that some of our conceptions of virtue and vice derive from convention. 'It mortifies me much', Hume interjects, 'to see a Person, who possesses more Candour & Penetration than any almost I know, condemn Reasonings, of which I imagine I see so strongly the Evidence.'<sup>242</sup>

By 1745 the *Treatise* was well known, at least by reputation, in Scottish intellectual circles—well enough to be centrally implicated in a decision not to appoint Hume to the Chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. The events and exchanges leading to this decision began in 1742, when the holder of the chair, Dr John Pringle, took leave from his duties in order to pursue his other career, that of physician, with the British army in the Low Countries.<sup>243</sup> Pringle extended this leave through the 1743–4 session, and again for the following year. That he would resign his post in the university became increasingly a possibility during his second year abroad. It was during this period that Hume's friends in Edinburgh, notably John Coumts, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh in 1744, and Henry Home began

<sup>240</sup> *Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, p. ii. This work is a translation of the 2nd edn. of Hutcheson's *Philosophiae moralis institutio compendiaria*, 1745.

<sup>241</sup> *Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, p. iv.

<sup>242</sup> Letter of 10 Jan. 1743, *Letters*, 1: 47. Hutcheson had sent Hume a copy of the 1st edn. of his *Philosophia moralis*.

<sup>243</sup> My account of these events draws substantially on Stewart, *The Kirk and the Infidel*, and Sher, 'Professors of Virtue'.

actively to promote Hume for the projected vacancy.<sup>244</sup> Given that the decision would be made by the Edinburgh Town Council, Coutts's support was important to whatever hope Hume had for the job. As it happened, however, Pringle held on to the post until March 1745, by which time Coutts had reverted to being an ordinary councillor, and opposition to Hume's appointment, of two sorts, political and philosophical, had solidified. The political opposition was substantial, but directed primarily against Coutts and his allies, not against Hume personally. The public figures involved were mostly divided between two loosely confederated interests, the Argathelian (the party supporting the national politics of Archibald Campbell, Duke of Argyll), and the Squadrone (the party of John Hay, Marquess of Tweeddale), and during the period in question the latter group held tenuous ascendancy, while it was to the former, the Argathelians, that Coutts, Home, and most of their supporters were allied. The philosophical opposition to Hume's candidacy, focused as it was on what were seen as the religious implications of the *Treatise*, was formidable, but even without this further opposition Hume could well have lost out, as he eventually did, to William Cleghorn, the nephew of Gavin Hamilton, the council leader.<sup>245</sup>

At the request of the town council, the academic senate of the university had in the middle of the previous decade prepared a detailed description of the position for which Hume was a candidate. The 'regulations under which the Professour of Pneumaticks and moral Philosophy shall be oblig'd to teach in that profession' included:

1st He shall teach the Pneumaticks, that is, the being and perfections of the one true God, the nature of Angels and the Soul of man, with the duties of natural religion to which rational Creatures are bound towards the Supreme being.

2ly He shall teach Moral Philosophy.

3ly Every Munday he shall praelect upon the truth of the Christian religion.<sup>246</sup>

These requirements reflected the normal view of the discipline current at the time, and clearly called for a positive commitment to a number of principles of religion that even a sympathetic reader of the *Treatise* would be at a loss to find in that work. Hume himself had allowed that there was perceived to be a connection between a person's 'philosophical Speculations' and his

<sup>244</sup> Hume describes the situation and the manner of his becoming a candidate for the professorship in his letter of 4 Aug. 1744 to William Mure of Caldwell; see *Letters*, 1: 55–8.

<sup>245</sup> In the course of events, Hutcheson was approached about the position, declined consideration, was none the less appointed to the post on 3 April 1745, and turned it down, with thanks, a week later. See Stewart, *Kirk and Infidel*, 9–14.

<sup>246</sup> Edinburgh University Library, Senatus minutes, 25 Feb. 1734; quoted from Sher, 'Professors of Virtue', 99.

eligibility to be ‘concern’d in the Instruction of Youth’.<sup>247</sup> It is not entirely surprising, then, that the ministers of Edinburgh’s churches, who had the right to be consulted about the candidates for this position, would be alarmed that Hume might be chosen to teach the youth of Edinburgh, and that one of these ministers, William Wishart, should take the lead in sounding this alarm.<sup>248</sup> In doing so, Wishart, who was the Principal of the University and current Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, may have had multiple aims. He may at one point have had hopes that the Chair would come to him, but he also played a leading role in the campaign to appoint Cleghorn. His fundamental aim was to ensure that when the Council formally asked the ministers for their collective advice about the appointment, that advice would be firmly against Hume, because, as he said, he ‘feared a great danger to the Society [i.e. the College] whose welfare [he] was under [the] strongest ties to take all care of in [his] power’.<sup>249</sup> With this aim in view, Wishart scanned the *Treatise* and produced a set of six charges, buttressed by citations drawn from the work, against its author. Hume is accused of universal scepticism, of holding principles leading to atheism, of making errors concerning the being and existence of God, of committing errors concerning the first cause and prime mover of the universe, of denying the immateriality of the soul, and of sapping the foundations of morality.<sup>250</sup>

The document containing Wishart’s charges was probably circulated in manuscript, or manuscripts. Its intended readership would have been the

<sup>247</sup> Letter of 17 Sept. 1739, *Letters*, 1: 34. In August 1744 Hume was to learn that Hutcheson had apparently joined in the ‘accusation of Heresy, Deism, Scepticism, Atheism, &c &c &c.’ made against him: ‘But what surprizd me extremely was to find that this Accusation was supported by the pretended Authority of Mr Hutcheson & even Mr Leechman, who, tis said, agreed that I was a very unfit Person for such an Office. This appears to me absolutely incredible, especially with regard to the latter Gentleman. For as to Mr Hutcheson, all my Friends think, that he has been rendering me bad Offices to the utmost of his Power. And I know, that Mr Coutts, to whom I said rashly, that I thought I could depend upon Mr Hutcheson’s Friendship & Recommendation; I say, Mr Coutts now speaks of that Professor rather as my Enemy than as my Friend. What can be the Meaning of this Conduct in that celebrated & benevolent Moralist, I cannot imagine. I shall be glad to find, for the Honour of Philosophy, that I am mistaken; & indeed, I hope so too: And beg of you to enquire a little into the Matter; but very cautiously, lest I make him my open & profess’d Enemy, which I would willingly avoid’ (*Letters*, 1: 57–8).

<sup>248</sup> Wishart’s key role in the campaign is known both from Hume’s correspondence (*Letters*, 1: 62) and from Wishart’s private papers; see Stewart, *Kirk and Infidel*, 7–27; ‘William Wishart, an Early Critic of *Alciphron*’; and ‘Principal Wishart (1692–1753) and the Controversies of his Day’.

<sup>249</sup> From Wishart’s speedhand manuscript, dated 5 June 1745, which, in his words, offered a ‘fair, candid and faithful narrative, from first to last, of my conduct with regard to the proposal of my succeeding to the Moral Philosophy Chair in our University’, Edinburgh University Library, MS La. ii. 115, fol. 394. The transcription is by Stewart, and is quoted from *Kirk and Infidel*, 27.

<sup>250</sup> That the charges and the documentation supporting them derived from Wishart is known from Hume’s correspondence; see *New Letters*, 15, quoted just below. Hume would have had this information from his supporters in Edinburgh.

ministers and the council. In the course of events a copy came into the hands of Coutts, who in turn sent a copy to Hume, who was then living near St Albans. Hume quickly composed and sent a letter of reply to Coutts. Home put Wishart's document (presumably all of it) together with Hume's reply and published the result in the vain hope that it would stem the rising tide against Hume's candidacy.<sup>251</sup> The work was printed and ready for sale on or about 21 May 1745, for on that date an Edinburgh newspaper, the *Caledonian Mercury*, carried this advertisement:

*This Day will be published, and sold by the Booksellers in Town,*

A LETTER from a Gentleman to his Friend at *Edinburgh*; containing some Observations on a Specimen of the Principles Concerning RELIGION and MORALITY, said to be maintain'd in a Book lately publish'd, intituled, *A Treatise of Human Nature, &c.*

A similar advertisement appeared later that day in the *Edinburgh Evening Courant*.<sup>252</sup>

On 22 May 1745 the town council asked the ministers to provide on 28 May their assessments of the candidates. We learn from a contemporary correspondent that 'Twelve of the 15 Ministers of this City gave their avisementum against Mr Hume on Account of his Principles', and thus that his candidacy was abandoned by his supporters.<sup>253</sup> From Hume's letter to Home,

<sup>251</sup> The work entitled *A Letter from a Gentleman* comprises several distinguishable parts: (1) the opening paragraphs of a letter from Hume to Coutts (§§1–3); (2) a 'Specimen', composed by Wishart and made up largely of quotations and misquotations of the *Treatise*, and intended to reveal the 'Principles concerning Religion and Morality' found in the work (§§4–12); (3) a summation, also by Wishart, of the six charges made against the author of the *Treatise* in the preceding *Specimen* (§§13–19); (4) Hume's reply to these charges as this was made in the letter to Coutts (§§20–39); and (5) two closing paragraphs of this letter, paragraphs that include comments on the limitations of the reply being made, on the invidious way in which the *Treatise* has been attacked, and a version of what was to become a familiar authorial criticism of that work (§§40–1). As one can see by comparing §§3 and 18, the text of Hume's letter has been at least slightly modified to make it suit the use to which it was put.

<sup>252</sup> The evening paper reported that '*This Day is published*', etc. This paper also gives the title as it was published, *A LETTER from a Gentleman to his friend in Edinburgh*, and incorporates minor differences of form. These advertisements were first described in *New Letters*, 15.

<sup>253</sup> Thomas Hay to Tweeddale, 1 June 1745, National Library of Scotland, MS 7066, quoted from Stewart, *Kirk and Infidel*, 18. Soon after Hume's death in 1776, two letters in the *London Chronicle* reported on what Hume calls this 'Affair'. The author of the first letter, whom Fieser supposes to have been John Home, says that the events took place about 'the year 1746, or 1747', and that the presbytery of Edinburgh, having the right to veto any one of three candidates, 'put a negative upon Mr. Hume'. He then adds that, 'though he [Hume] had probably been before confirmed in his sceptical principles; yet it was from this period that he declared open and irreconcilable war, not only against the presbytery of Edinburgh, but against the whole body of the clergy', although he remained on friendly personal terms with several. The author of the second letter said that the story told in the first was 'not entirely destitute of foundation, but full of inaccuracies'. He then pointed out that the 'lord provost, magistrates, and council of Edinburgh possess an exclusive right of choosing most of the professors of the university, but every election must be made with the advice

written in mid-June of the same year, we see that he had asked that his name be withdrawn, but his no longer extant letter to this effect, a letter written on 1 June, could not have reached Edinburgh in time to have any effect on the matter. On 13 June Hume wrote:

I find my Affair at Edinburgh is over upon two Accounts, both because I am glad to be off with it (as I inform'd you in mine dated June. 1) & because I find it wou'd not succeed, if I had been never so much dispos'd for it. I can now laugh at the Malice of those who intended to do me an Injury, without being able to reach me.<sup>254</sup>

On 15 June he added in a postscript to the same letter:

Since I wrote the above, I receiv'd yours of June the 4th, & I am as little surpriz'd as I am vext at the Turn this Affair has taken. I have indeed a great Regard as well as Sense of Gratitude for Mr Coutts, & am heartily sorry he shou'd have been defeated by a Pack of Scoundrels, tho it was entirely by his own Fault.<sup>255</sup>

And then added still another postscript:

I wish you wou'd show Jack Stewart & Mr Coutts my Letter of June. 1. wherein I desir'd to give up my being candidate for the Professorship, that they may more fully know my Sentiments & way of thinking on that head, & may see, that I was fully resolv'd not to do any thing of that Nature without their full Consent.<sup>256</sup>

From this same letter, we may also conclude that Hume neither expected nor intended his letter to Coutts to be published. On 13 June he wrote:

I am sorry you shou'd have found yourself oblig'd to print the Letter I wrote to Mr Coutts, it being so hastily compos'd that I scarce had time to revise it.<sup>257</sup> Indeed the

(not of the presbytery, but only) of the ministers of that city'. This writer points out that the events took place in 1745, and suggests that Hume's candidacy depended mostly on the support of Coutts. It is true, he adds, that most of the clergy opposed Hume, 'grounding their objection on "A Treatise of Human Nature," published in 1739, which had been ascribed to him' (cited from Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 355, 360–1).

At about the same time S. J. Pratt observed that 'Mr. Hume, in the History of his Life, has not informed us of his having stood candidate for the Professorship of Moral Philosophy, in the University of Edinburgh; [and] of the opposition which the Scots clergy excited to his pretensions' (*Supplement to the Life of David Hume*, 14).

<sup>254</sup> Letter of 13 June 1745, *New Letters*, 14–15.

<sup>255</sup> Klibansky and Mossner suggest that Hume could blame Coutts for the defeat because he had allowed Pringle to delay his resignation an additional year, during which time those opposed to Hume could gather force. See *New Letters*, 17.

<sup>256</sup> Klibansky and Mossner suggest that Hume refers to John Stewart, the son of Archibald Stewart, Lord Provost of Edinburgh after Coutts.

<sup>257</sup> While Hume had to compose his letter in haste, he may have borrowed from his draft of what became, after undergoing a change of title (see n. 59), *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, on which he may have been working at the time. ¶32 of the *Letter from a Gentleman* resembles *EHU* 7.25 and n. 16, and ¶21 resemble *EHU* 12.23. See Beauchamp, Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lxxiii–lxxix.



Charge was so weak, that it did not require much time to answer it, if the Matter had been to be judg'd by Reason. The Principal found himself reduc'd to this Dilemma; either to draw Heresies from my Principles by Inferences & Deductions, which he knew wou'd never do with the Ministers & Town Council. Or if he made use of my Words, he must pervert them & misrepresent them in the grossest way in the World. This last Expedient he chose, with much Prudence but very little Honesty.

However badly Wishart had behaved in Hume's eyes, there were some, Couatts included, who were impressed by Wishart's performance, and perhaps even by his philosophical abilities. On 5 June the Edinburgh Council chose, from between Wishart and William Cleghorn, the new Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. Cleghorn's supporters prevailed, by a vote of nineteen to twelve. By mid-June, in the same letter, Hume could say that 'in the main I am far from being displeas'd with my present Situation', and also report that 'I never was very fond of this Office of which I have been dissappointed, on account of the Restraint, which I foresaw it wou'd have impos'd on me'. To this he added: 'I have Leizure enough for reading; but scarce for writing at present. However I intend to continue these philosophical & moral Essays, which I mention'd to you.' These 'philosophical & moral Essays' were likely to have included those recastings of the *Treatise*, as Hume later characterized them, published as *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* and *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*.<sup>258</sup>

## 9. FURTHER RESPONSES: 1751–77

In the final thirty-five years of Hume's life there were surprisingly few published responses to the *Treatise*. Some of those few are brief, and combine comment on the *Treatise* with comment on *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* or *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*.<sup>259</sup> There were also still briefer comments, mere passing mentions or denunciations of the *Treatise*. In this section, these responses to the *Treatise* are taken up in the order of their publication.

<sup>258</sup> For more on these recastings, as well as a third, *A Dissertation on the Passions*, see Sect. 10 below. Stewart suggests that in the *Philosophical Essays* (i.e. *EHU*) Hume elaborated his answers to Wishart; see 'Two Species of Philosophy', 85–6.

<sup>259</sup> For accounts of the responses focusing on the two works mentioned, see Beauchamp, Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lxxiv–civ; and *idem*, Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lxiv–lxxx.

## 9.1 Henry Home, Lord Kames

In his *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, a work first published in 1751, Home, soon to be Lord Kames, addressed several issues raised by the *Treatise*.<sup>260</sup> In his only recorded comment on this work, included in a letter to Michael Ramsay, Hume says nothing about the substance of the views found there: ‘Have you seen our Friend Harrys Essays? They are well wrote; and are an unusual instance of an obliging method of answering a Book.’<sup>261</sup> The ‘obliging method of answering’ includes respectfully raising objections to the views of ‘the author of the treatise upon human nature’. The more substantial of these objections are that this author:

- offers (along with Hutcheson) a superficial account of the moral sense. Works of art, as well as moral qualities, arouse approbation and disapprobation. The author of the *Treatise* should have observed and explained the differences between these similar responses.<sup>262</sup>
- mistakenly resolves the moral sense into sympathy, which is to say that he maintains that this sense approves or disapproves of actions only after it has determined that they are beneficial or harmful to society, and provides no convincing account of duty or obligation.<sup>263</sup>
- mistakenly claims ‘that justice, so far from being one of the primary virtues, is not even a natural virtue, but established in society by a sort of tacit convention’. But, Kames goes on, the ‘figure which this author deservedly makes in the learned world is too considerable, to admit of his being past over in silence’.<sup>264</sup>
- although the first to have given belief the attention it deserves, fails in his attempt to explain this important phenomenon. His view that belief ‘must consist in the lively manner of conceiving the idea; and that, in reality, a lively idea and belief are the same’, is unsatisfactory. ‘Poetry and painting produce lively ideas, but they seldom produce belief.’ The ‘real truth appears to be this. There is a certain peculiar manner of perceiving objects, and conceiving propositions, which, being a simple feeling, cannot be described, but is expressed by the word belief.’ The cause of this ‘modification’ is the irresistible authority of the senses, our own, or those of others who attest to their experience.<sup>265</sup>

<sup>260</sup> Home, or Kames, as he is denominated in this section, treats moral issues in part 1 of the *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, epistemological and metaphysical issues in part 2. For an account of his alternatives to Hume’s views, see Ross, *Lord Kames*, 98–110.

<sup>261</sup> Letter of 22 June 1751, *Letters*, 1: 162.

<sup>262</sup> Kames, *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, 51.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.* 57–8.      <sup>264</sup> *Ibid.* 103.      <sup>265</sup> *Ibid.* 222, 227.

- fails to note that ‘man...has an original feeling, or consciousness of himself and of his existence; which, for the most part, accompanies every one of his impressions and ideas, and every action of his mind and body’, and which serves as the foundation of our idea of personal identity.<sup>266</sup> Consequently, this author is left doubting his own existence.<sup>267</sup>
- offers an account of the origin of our idea of power that comes ‘far short of the truth’. A ‘constant connection of two objects, may, by habit or custom, produce a similar connection in the imagination’, but that connection ‘does by no means come up to our idea of power’. On the contrary, Kames says, we have a ‘feeling of power’, and this fact shows that our ‘author... attempts rather too bold an enterprize, when he undertakes to argue mankind out of their senses and feelings’.<sup>268</sup>

Notwithstanding these objections to Hume’s views, we find that Kames incorporated into his works positions characteristic of the *Treatise*. His *Essays upon Several Subjects concerning British Antiquities*, written in 1745 and published in 1747, evoked from Hume the remark, ‘You do me the Honour to borrow some Principles from a certain Book. I wish they be not esteem’d too subtile & abstruse.’<sup>269</sup> Hume does not identify the principles he supposed to have been borrowed from his *Treatise*, but he might well have had in mind the emphasis placed on the gradual development of political institutions, the role of the imagination and of feelings in the formation of political and legal rules, the role of interest in the development of law and justice, and humanity’s need of government.<sup>270</sup>

As it happens, the borrowings from the *Treatise* found in Kames’s *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion* are even more noticeable. In this work Kames maintains that sympathy is a principle implanted in our nature, and that, for the preservation of society, justice is more important

<sup>266</sup> Kames, *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, 231–2; for more on Kames’s complaint, see above, Sect. 4, at nn. 112 ff.

<sup>267</sup> Kames suggests that doubt about the authority (or reliability) of our senses increases by stages. Berkeley, ‘by denying the reality of external objects, strikes at the root of the authority of our senses, and thereby paves the way for the most inveterate scepticism’. If we can be brought to doubt of the reality of external objects, Kames goes on, ‘the next step will be, to doubt of what passes in our own minds, of the reality of our ideas and perceptions... And the last step will be, to doubt of our own existence’ (ibid. 240). This is perhaps the first published (although still incomplete) intimation that Hume’s philosophy represents the logical and sceptical end-point of a process that had begun with Locke and was continued by Berkeley. Kames returned to this historical development in his *Elements of Criticism*, discussed below. See also 9.6, 9.9 of this section.

<sup>268</sup> Kames, *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, 287–9. Kames’s criticism on this issue is directed at both the *Treatise* and the *Philosophical Essays* (i.e. *EHU*).

<sup>269</sup> Letter of late June 1747, *New Letters*, 27. A copy of the 1747 edn. of Kames’s *Essays upon Several Subjects concerning British Antiquities* was in the Hume Library, item 718.

<sup>270</sup> See Kames, *Essays upon Several Subjects concerning British Antiquities*, 23–4, 123, 128 n., 192 ff.

than generosity, while our generosity toward others is limited.<sup>271</sup> He also utilizes a variation on Hume's attempt to show that the efforts of rationalists to derive obligations from factual claims are unsatisfactory (see 3.1.1.27). How could anyone, Kames asks, infer from the proposition that 'God is our superior', the further proposition, 'it is fit we should worship him'? Where, he asks, 'is the connecting proposition by means of which the inference is drawn?'<sup>272</sup> Kames in these *Essays* also follows closely the position taken by the *Treatise* on liberty and necessity, and then embellishes Hume's view that we have a mistaken sense of liberty. The latter tells us:

Now moral evidence is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, deriv'd from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation . . . And indeed, when we consider how aptly *natural* and *moral* evidence cement together, and form only one chain of argument betwixt them, we shall make no scruple to allow, that they are of the same nature, and deriv'd from the same principles. A prisoner, who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well from the obstinacy of the goaler, as from the walls and bars with which he is surrounded; and in all attempts for his freedom chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The same prisoner, when conducted to the scaffold, foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards as from the operation of the ax or wheel.<sup>273</sup>

Kames in his *Essays* says that:

Motives being once allowed to have a determining force in any degree, it is easy to suppose the force so augmented, by accumulation of motives, as to leave little freedom to the mind, or rather none at all. In such instances, there is no denying that we are under a necessity to act. And tho' this, to be sure, is not physical necessity, as arising not from the laws of matter, but from the constitution of the mind; yet the consequence is equally certain, fixed and unavoidable, in the case of moral, as of physical necessity. This is so true, that, in some instances, these two kinds of necessity seem to coincide, so as scarcely to be distinguished. A criminal walks to the scaffold in the midst of his guards. No man will deny that he is under an absolute necessity in this case . . . I ask, Is this a physical, or a moral necessity? . . . the distinction betwixt these two seems lost. And yet, strictly speaking, it is only a moral necessity: for it is the force of a motive which determines the criminal to walk to the scaffold; to wit, that resistance is vain, because the guards are neither to be forced nor corrupted.<sup>274</sup>

<sup>271</sup> Kames, *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, 68–9, 84. Hume first mentions sympathy as a 'principle' of human nature at 2.1.11.2; humanity's limited generosity is posited at *Treatise* 3.2.2.16 and 3.3.1.23; the priority of justice over benevolence for the preservation of society is noted at 3.2.1.13 and 3.2.2.22.

<sup>272</sup> Kames, *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, 97.

<sup>273</sup> *Treatise* 2.3.1.15, 17.

<sup>274</sup> Kames, *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, 164–5.

And while the *Treatise* goes on to mention and then explain ‘a false sensation or experience even of the liberty of indifference’ (2.3.2.2), the *Essays* do the same for a ‘delusive’ or ‘deceitful’ sense of liberty.<sup>275</sup> It should be noted, however, that the two works explain this delusion differently. The *Treatise* emphasizes the ‘looseness, which we feel in passing or not passing from the idea of one to that of the other’ as we are ‘performing the actions’ (2.3.2.2). In contrast, Kames says that ‘it is principally in reflecting and passing judgment upon a past action, that the feeling of liberty is sensible and strong’.<sup>276</sup> He also agrees that human liberty is limited to ‘spontaneity, or acting according to our inclination and choice. It may be therefore distinguished from *constraint*, but must not be opposed to necessity’.<sup>277</sup> Given these similarities, it is easy to see why Hume told Michael Ramsay that, while ‘Philosophers must judge’ who has the better of the argument between himself and Kames, ‘the Clergy have already decided it, & say he is as bad as me. Nay some affirm him to be worse, as much as a treacherous friend is worse than an open Enemy.’<sup>278</sup>

Kames published his *Elements of Criticism* in 1762, and again briefly attended to the *Treatise*. Having explained that we ‘cannot perceive an external object till an impression be made upon our body’, Kames goes on to observe that the ‘singular opinion that impressions are the only objects of perception, has been espoused by some philosophers of no mean rank’, and he then in a note quotes from 1.4.2.9: ‘“Properly speaking it is not our body we perceive when we regard our limbs and members; so that the ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions or to their objects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain,” &c.’<sup>279</sup> In a subsequent note on theories of perception, Kames turns to Descartes’s view: ‘we perceive nothing external but by means of some image either in the brain or in the mind: and these images he terms *ideas*.’ He then goes on to the now familiar charge:

One would not readily suspect any harm in this ideal system, further than leading us into a labyrinth of metaphysical errors in order to account for our knowledge of external objects, which is more truly accounted for by simple perception. And yet some late philosophers have been able to extract from it death and destruction to the whole world, levelling all down to a mere chaos of ideas. Dr Berkeley... taking for granted that we cannot perceive any object but what is in the mind, discovered, that the reasoning employ’d by Des Cartes and Locke to infer the existence of external objects, is inconclusive; and upon that discovery ventured, against common sense, to annihilate totally the material world. And a later philosopher discovering, that

<sup>275</sup> Kames, *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, 183, 207–8.

<sup>276</sup> *Ibid.* 194.      <sup>277</sup> *Ibid.* 192–3; cf. *Treatise* 2.3.2.1.

<sup>278</sup> Letter of 22 June 1751, *Letters*, 1: 162.

<sup>279</sup> Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, 3: 380–1.

Berkeley's arguments might with equal success be applied against immaterial beings, ventured still more boldly to reject both by the lump; leaving nothing in nature but images or ideas floating *in vacuo*, without affording them a single mind for shelter or support.

When such wild and extravagant consequences can be drawn from the ideal system, it might have been expected, that no man who is not crazy would have ventured to erect such a superstructure, till he should first be certain beyond all doubt of a solid foundation...

Upon the chimerical consequences drawn from the ideal system, I shall make but a single reflection. Nature determines us necessarily to rely on the veracity of our senses; and upon their evidence, the existence of external objects is to us a matter of intuitive knowledge and absolute certainty. Vain therefore is the attempt of Dr Berkeley and of his followers, to deceive us, by a metaphysical subtilty, into a disbelief of what we cannot entertain even the slightest doubt.<sup>280</sup>

## 9.2 John Stewart

In February 1754, the Edinburgh Philosophical Society published the first volume of its proceedings, *Essays and Observations, Physical and Literary*. Hume, a member of this society, was one of two editors of this volume. He and his co-editor, Alexander Monroe, accepted a paper, 'Of the Laws of Motion', that Kames, had presented to the Society. They also accepted a reply to this paper, 'Some Remarks on the Laws of Motion, and the Inertia of Matter', presented by John Stewart, who from 1742 to 1759 was Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. The printed version of this paper included some sharply critical personal comments about Kames, suggestions that he lacked the skills in mathematics and natural philosophy needed to challenge, as he had, the widely held view that matter is absolutely inert, followed by the recommendation that he and others like him 'exercise their faculties on other subjects, where there may be more room for subtle evasions, and where mistakes, tho' equally remote from truth, and perhaps of more pernicious consequence to mankind, cannot, from the nature of the thing, be so easily detected'.<sup>281</sup> If this closing remark was not also aimed at Hume, an earlier part of Stewart's essay was, for he had also said:

That something may begin to exist, or start into being without a cause, hath indeed been advanced in a very ingenious and profound system of the sceptical

<sup>280</sup> Ibid. 3rd edn., 2: 506–8 n. The *Treatise* is also discussed in the 'Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic' included in Kames's *Sketches of the History of Man*. This 'Account' was written by Thomas Reid; see sect. 9.9 below. <sup>281</sup> *Essays and Observations Physical and Literary*, 139–40, 116–17.

philosophy;<sup>282</sup> but hath not yet been adopted by any of the societies for improvement of natural knowledge. Such sublime conceptions are far above the reach of an ordinary genius; and could not have entered into the head of the greatest physiologist on earth. The man who believes that a perception may subsist without a percipient mind or a perceiver, may well comprehend, that an action may be performed without any agent, or a thing produced without any cause of the production. And the author of this new and wonderful doctrine informs the world, that, when he looked into his own mind, he could discover nothing but a series of fleeting perceptions; and that from thence he concluded, that he himself was nothing but a bundle of such perceptions.

Stewart apparently added these comments to his paper after it had been presented to the Society, and without showing them to the editors of the volume, and thus Hume saw them only after they were printed. This is, at least, an inference that we can draw from Hume's one surviving letter to Stewart. This letter begins mid-controversy with Hume writing:

Sir

I am so great a Lover of Peace, that I am resolv'd to drop this Matter altogether, & not to insert a Syllable in the Preface, which can have a Reference to your Essay. The Truth is, I cou'd take no Revenge, but such a one as wou'd have been a great deal too cruel, & much exceeding the Offence. For tho' most Authors think, that a contemptuous manner of treating their Writings, is but slightly reveng'd by hurting the personal Character & the Honour of their Antagonists, I am very far from that Opinion. Besides, I am as certain as I can be of any thing (and I am not such a Sceptic, as you may, perhaps, imagine) that your inserting such remarkable Alterations in the printed Copy proceeded entirely from Precipitancy & Passion, not from any form'd Intention of deceiving the Society. I wou'd not take Advantage of such an Incident to throw a Slur on a man of Merit, whom I esteem, tho' I might have reason to complain of him.

When I am abus'd by such a Fellow as Warburton,<sup>283</sup> whom I neither know nor care for, I can laugh at him: But if Dr Stewart approaches any way towards the same Style of writing, I own it vexes me: Because I conclude, that some unguarded Circumstance of my Conduct, tho' contrary to my Intention, had given Occasion to it.<sup>284</sup>

After suggesting that Stewart had, after all, had the better of the *argument* against Kames and thus had little reason to attack him personally or to

<sup>282</sup> At this point a footnote adds: '*Treatise on Human Nature*, 3. vols. octavo. This is the system at large, a work suited only to the comprehension of Adepts. An excellent compend or summary whereof, for the benefit of vulgar capacities, we of this nation enjoy in the *Philosophical Essays*, and the *Essays Moral and Political*. And to these may be added, as a farther help, that useful commentary, the *Essays on Morality and Natural Religion*.'

<sup>283</sup> The Rt Revd William Warburton, Bishop of Gloucester after 1759. Warburton is not known to have publicly attacked Hume prior to the date of this letter, but he later did so, and in a manner that tempted Hume to reply; see letter of 20 May 1757, *Letters*, 1: 250.

<sup>284</sup> Letter of [Feb. 1754], *Letters*, 1: 185–6.

represent his essay as a threat to religion,<sup>285</sup> Hume goes on to comment on Stewart's charge against himself and, more particularly, against the *Treatise*:

I shall now speak a Word as to the Justness of your Censure with regard to myself, after these Remarks on the manner of it. I have no Scruple of confessing my Mistakes. You see I have own'd, that I think Lord Kames is mistaken in his Argument; and I wou'd sooner give up my own Cause than my Friend's, if I thought that Imputation of any Consequence to a man's Character. But allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as *that any thing might arise without a Cause*: I only maintain'd, that our Certainty of the Falshood of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source.<sup>286</sup> *That Caesar existed, that there is such an Island as Sicily*; for these Propositions, I affirm, we have no demonstrative nor intuitive Proof. Woud you infer that I deny their Truth, or even their Certainty? There are many different kinds of Certainty; and some of them as satisfactory to the Mind, tho perhaps not so regular, as the demonstrative kind.

Where a man of Sense mistakes my Meaning, I own I am angry: But it is only at myself: For having exprest my Meaning so ill as to have given Occasion to the Mistake.<sup>287</sup>

Having thus defended the *Treatise* from Stewart's charge that it claims that a thing may begin to exist without a cause, Hume goes on to grant that he has indeed erred:

That you may see I wou'd no way scruple of owning my Mistakes in Argument, I shall acknowledge (what is infinitely more material) a very great Mistake in Conduct, viz my publishing at all the *Treatise* of human Nature, a Book, which pretended to innovate in all the sublimest Parts of Philosophy, & which I compos'd before I was five & twenty. Above all, the positive Air, which prevails in that Book, & which may be imputed to the Ardor of Youth, so much displeases me, that I have not Patience to review it. But what Success the same Doctrines, better illustrated & exprest, may meet with, *Ad huc sub iudice lis est*.<sup>288</sup> The Arguments have been laid before the World, and by some philosophical Minds have been attended to.<sup>289</sup> I am willing to

<sup>285</sup> 'As to your Situation with regard to Lord Kames, I am not so good a Judge. I only think, that you had so much the better of the Argument, that you ought, upon that Account, to have been the more reserv'd in your Expressions. All Raillery ought to be avoided in philosophical Argument; both because it is unphilosophical, and because it cannot but be offensive, let it be ever so gentle. What then must we think with regard to so many Insinuations of Irreligion, to which Lord Kames's Paper gave not the least Occasion? This Spirit of the Inquisitor is in you the Effect of Passion, & what a cool Moment wou'd easily correct. But where it predominates in the Character, what Ravages has it committed on Reason, Virtue, Truth, Liberty, & every thing, that is valuable among Mankind?' (*Letters*, 1: 186). <sup>286</sup> Hume appears to be explaining the intent of *Treatise* 1.3.3.

<sup>287</sup> *Letters*, 1: 187.

<sup>288</sup> The line is from Horace, *Ars poetica* 1.78: 'et ad huc sub iudice lis est': 'and the case is still before the court'.

<sup>289</sup> Hume alludes to his *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* (later, *EHU*) and his *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*.



be instructed by the Public; tho' human Life is so short that I despair of ever seeing the Decision. I wish I had always confin'd myself to the more easy Parts of Erudition.<sup>290</sup>

### 9.3 John Bonar

Some of the clergy, Hume said, supposed that his philosophical opponent, Kames, was as bad, or even worse than Hume himself.<sup>291</sup> One such clergyman was John Bonar, who in his *Analysis of the Moral and Religious Sentiments Contained in the Writings of Sopho [Kames], and David Hume* (1755) set out the presumably dangerous doctrines found in, principally, Kames's *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion*, and Hume's shorter philosophical works and *History of England*. Having attended first to Kames's anonymous *Essays*, Bonar goes on to say: 'I shall subjoin some passages no less remarkable from the works of his brother philosopher and friend; who has at least been more honest in this respect, that, without disguise, he has pled the cause of vice and infidelity.' But, Bonar continues, 'I shall adduce none of my quotations from the *Treatise on human nature*, though this be the compleat system, since he has not thought fit to own it'.<sup>292</sup>

### 9.4 Thomas Blacklock, Henry Grieve, and Mrs Carnegie

While Keeper of the Advocates Library, Hume had a row, near the end of 1754, with the Curators of the Library, who insisted that three works which Hume had acquired for the library be withdrawn.<sup>293</sup> Rather than resign over

<sup>290</sup> *Letters*, 1: 187. Hume concluded the letter with further efforts to keep the peace, saying: 'As I am resolv'd to drop this Matter entirely from the Preface; so I hope to perswade Lord Kames to be entirely silent with regard to it in our Meeting. But in Case I shoud not prevail, or if any body else start the Subject, I think it better, that some of your Friends shou'd be there, & be prepar'd to mollify the Matter. If I durst pretend to advise, I shou'd think it better you yourself were absent, unless you bring a greater Spirit of Composition than you express in your Letter. I am perswaded, that whatever a Person of Mr [Alexander] Monro's Authority proposes will be agreed to: Tho' I must beg leave to differ from his Judgement, in proposing to alter two Pages. That chiefly removes the Offence given to me, but what regards Lord Kames is so interwoven with the whole Discourse, that there is not now any Possibility of altering it' (*Letters*, 1: 187–8). The Preface of the *Essays and Observations* makes no reference to any specific controversy, but it does say that it is 'not that the society [to whom the papers were read] expect or propose, that what they communicate will be intirely above doubt or disputation', and that in publishing these papers the society 'pretend not to warrant the justness of every reasoning, nor the accuracy of every observation. The author alone of each paper is answerable for the contents of it: And the society are as willing to insert what may be communicated in opposition to the sentiments of any of its members, as in confirmation of them' (pp. [vii]–viii). <sup>291</sup> See n. 146.

<sup>292</sup> *Analysis of the Moral and Religious Sentiments*, 26. For further descriptions of the events surrounding this publication, see Mossner, *Life of David Hume*, 341–4; Ross, *Lord Kames*, 152–8.

<sup>293</sup> For details, see Hillyard, 'The Keepership of David Hume'.

this affront to his competence, Hume kept his post, but gave ‘Blacklock, our blind Poet, a Bond of Annuity for the Sallary’.<sup>294</sup> What prompted Hume to involve Blacklock in this way is not known, but it could have been a particular stanza in one of his poems.<sup>295</sup> Addressing the ‘False wisdom’ of *Metaphysical Refinement*, Blacklock had earlier in the same year enlivened an otherwise dreary ode with this stanza:

Thy stiff grimace and awful tone  
An idiot’s wonder move alone;  
And, spite all thy rules,  
The wise in ev’ry age conclude,  
What PYRRHO taught, and HUME renew’d,  
“That *Dogmatists* are fools.”

A footnote to Pyrrho identifies him as the ‘Author of Scepticism’; another to Hume identifies him as ‘Author of a Treatise of Human Nature’.<sup>296</sup>

This well-known bit of doggerel does not, however, represent Blacklock’s final opinion of Hume. As we saw above, when Henry Grieve (as ‘Orthodoxus’) criticized James Beattie for focusing attention on, and thus raising a demand for, a largely unread and forgotten book, the *Treatise*, Blacklock (as ‘Eumenes’) responded with a defence of Beattie and implicit criticism of that book. His letter opens with an endorsement of freedom of expression, but moves quickly toward condemnation of Grieve, an odd phenomenon indeed: ‘a Christian defending the principles, or patronizing the persons, of sceptical philosophers’. No two things can be found ‘more diametrically opposite, more eternally irreconcilable, than the spirit and principles of Christianity and scepticism’. Hume’s ‘Dissertation on Human Nature’, typical of literature of this sort, disputes everything: ‘He dashes one principle against another, till both seem annihilated; or (which has the same effect) till the intellects of his readers are so irrevocably confounded, that they cannot distinguish light from darkness, or truth from falshood. Is this situation of mind more adapted to rational life, or to Bedlam?’ Fortunately,

nothing seems more plain, than that God and nature intended every active being to be moved and directed by principle. Of this, the impressions of sense, the demands of appetite, the impulses of instinct, the native and spontaneous exertions of reason . . . are proofs so strongly confirmed both by intuition and experience, that he

<sup>294</sup> Letter of 17 Dec. 1754, *Letters*, 1: 212.

<sup>295</sup> Greig conjectures that Hume’s Letter 89 was written to Blacklock, c. Dec. 1753 (*Letters*, 1: 183). But that letter appears to be to someone Hume had not met, and to discuss the ‘Preface’ of a forthcoming volume of poetry. Hume first met Blacklock c.1742 (letter of 15 Oct. 1754, *Letters*, 1: 200–3), and Blacklock’s *Poems on Several Occasions* of 1754 has no Preface.

<sup>296</sup> ‘On the Refinements in *Metaphysical Philosophy*’, in *Poems on Several Occasions*, 60.

who denies or doubts them, must of consequence resign every consequence of the rational character.<sup>297</sup>

At this point a third party, 'Democritus', identified only as Mrs Carnegie of Pitarrow, entered the debate. Beattie, she says, appears to be on the right side of the question, and to have the better of the argument, but he is over-virulent to the point of insolence, and he exaggerates the importance of the controversy. To Carnegie the affair is rightly seen, using language reminiscent of Hume's part of the *Letter from a Gentleman*, as a *jeu d'esprit*, although she does not forget to note that Beattie's position, in his *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth* is contrary to the creed that he as a clergyman has formally espoused.<sup>298</sup> By this point the discussion has drifted away from any explicit reference to the *Treatise*, but Blacklock is not content to suppose that Beattie and Hume are engaged in a 'a mere *jeu d'esprit*'. What, he asks,

are the subjects of the dispute? They are the being and character of God; the existence of the material, intellectual and moral universe; the distinction between vice and virtue; the certainty of human science; the reality of every present enjoyment or future hope which the soul of man can indulge. Heaven and earth! Is this a *jeu d'esprit*?

And then, taking Grieve and Carnegie to have said that the Hume–Beattie debate is of no consequence because 'Mr Hume refutes himself', Blacklock argues that his opponents fail to appreciate that the intent of this self-refutation is 'not only to demolish all former systems of philosophy, but even to annihilate the foundations and materials upon which others might be erected'.<sup>299</sup>

## 9.5 Thomas Melville

The Edinburgh Philosophical Society published a second volume of proceedings, *Essays and Observations, Physical and Literary*, in 1756. This volume included an essay, 'Observations on Light and Colours', by Thomas Melville, who had died three years before. Melville's essay included a two-paragraph note directed at the views regarding infinite divisibility found in *Treatise* 1.2. The full text of Melville's remarks:

Some Sceptics have disputed against the endless divisibility of quantity, because the imagination soon arrives at a *minimum*; alledging from thence, that our idea of

<sup>297</sup> *Weekly Magazine*, 13, quoted from Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 205, 209. For details of this part of the exchange between Grieve and Blacklock, see the beginning of Sect. 8.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.* 210. <sup>299</sup> *Ibid.* 212–13, 217, 219.

extension involves the notion of indivisibles, and is as it were compounded of them. Nothing corporeal can be imagined or conceived at all which is not conceived as *seen*, *handled*, or otherways sensibly perceived. Imaginative ideas are nothing else than transcripts or images of sensations, and therefore must be limited by the same bounds and in the same manner as sensation. Now the *minimum sensibile* is rather in all cases a confused, indistinct and uncertain transition from *perceivable* to *not perceivable*, than the clear perception of a point indivisible in magnitude; for its magnitude depends on the lustre of the object. That nothing can be conceived or imagined which is less than a certain bulk, is no more an argument against the endless divisibility of quantity, than that nothing can be felt or seen below that size; which, it is evident, from every magnifying glass and from every different distance of an object, depends not at all on the constitution of the thing perceived, but on that of the perceiver, or the means and circumstances of his perception.

Nor, tho' it were granted that the *minimum visibile* is distinctly seen as an indivisible point, would it follow, that the idea of extension, received by sight, is made up of the ideas of indivisibles; for we receive the idea of extension by that motion of the eye which is necessary to direct its *axis* to different objects or parts of an object: and, it is well known, that the generation of quantity by motion is preferred by the best writers, for this very reason, that it necessarily excludes the notion of indivisibles. It should be remembered likewise, that a visible object is not divided by the eye into a number of contiguous *minima visibilia*; for, to whatever mathematical point in the object the eye is directed, a *minimum visibile* may be seen there by means of a certain portion of the object immediately surrounding it.<sup>300</sup>

## 9.6 Richard Price

*A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals; Particularly those relating to the Original of our Ideas of Virtue, its Nature, Foundation, Reference to the Deity, Obligation, Subject-matter, and Sanctions*, was first published in 1758.<sup>301</sup> Its author, Richard Price, was a Dissenting minister and an accomplished mathematician. Although called a 'Review' of moral issues, Price's work is more accurately described as an extended critique of Hutcheson's theory of the moral sense combined with its author's explication and defence of a rationalist, even Platonic, theory of morals. In the course of this undertaking, Price on six occasions explicitly cites the *Treatise* and raises objections to positions taken in it.

Price is committed to showing that we have 'a power *immediately* perceiving right and wrong', and that 'this power is the *Understanding* . . . an immediate power of perception, and a source of new ideas'. Consequently, he objects

<sup>300</sup> *Essays and Observations*, 2: 71–2.

<sup>301</sup> The title as given is that of the editions of 1758 and 1769.

to accounts of the origin of ideas that deny reason has this power, and, more specifically, to Hume's claim that 'all our ideas' are '*derived from impressions, and copies of impressions*'. This position is criticized as being 'destitute of all proof', as presupposing 'the thing in question', and as resulting, 'when pursued to its consequences... in the destruction of all truth and certainty, and the subversion of all our intellectual faculties'.<sup>302</sup>

Price is anxious to rebut sceptical claims that our faculties themselves are unreliable. To this end he addresses an argument found at *Treatise* 1.4.1.5–6, where he takes Hume to have said:

In every judgment we can form, besides the uncertainty attending the original consideration of the subject itself; there is another derived from the consideration of the fallibility of our faculties, and the past instances in which we have been mistaken; to which must be added a third uncertainty, derived from the possibility of error in this estimation we make of the fidelity of our faculties; and to this a fourth of the same kind, and so on *in infinitum*; till at last the first evidence, by a constant diminution of it, must be reduced to nothing.

To this argument Price responds by saying:

As much of this very strange reasoning as is not above my comprehension, proves just the reverse of what was intended by it. For let it be acknowledged, that the consideration of the fallibility of our understandings, and the instances in which they have deceived us, necessarily diminishes our assurance of the rectitude of our sentiments; the subsequent reflexion on the uncertainty attending this judgment which we make of our faculties, diminishes not, but contributes to restore to its first strength, our original assurance; because the more precarious a judgment or probability unfavourable to another appears, the less must be its effect in weakening it.<sup>303</sup>

In addition, Price was unhappy with the view, which he traced to Protagoras, that some qualities exist only when perceived, and took special aim at those who in modern times equate *esse* with *percipi* and who argue that, because nothing can be present to our minds but our own ideas, we can have no conception of anything distinct from them, not even of ourselves. On this account, Price says, 'the only idea of what we call *ourselves*, is the contradictory and monstrous one of a series of successive and actually separable perceptions, not one of which *continues*, that is, *exists* at all; and without any thing that perceives'. He then goes on to argue that those who tell us (as Price supposes Hume has done) that there is 'no distinction between past and future time' are inconsistent, for they also suppose 'that there have been *past* impressions, of which all ideas are copies; and that certain objects have been

<sup>302</sup> *Review*, 60, 63. 'See Mr Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, and *Philosophical Essays*', Price says in a note.

<sup>303</sup> *Ibid.* 166 n.

observed to have been conjoined in *past* instances, and by this means produced that customary transition in the imagination from one of them to the other, in which reasoning is said to consist'. Price justifies his concern with these extravagant views by noting that, after Berkeley had introduced some of them, 'his principles [were] taken and pursued to a system of scepticism, that plainly includes them all, by another writer of the greatest talents, whom I have often had occasion to refer to. See *Treatise of Human Nature*, and *Philosophical Essays*, by Mr. Hume.'<sup>304</sup>

Price also raised three objections to positions taken in Book 3 of the *Treatise*. First, having argued that even the least developed degree of reason can in principle recognize moral distinctions and thereby influence our actions, Price grants that the 'dictates of mere reason . . . always slow, calm, and deliberate', would 'be frequently insufficient . . . and much too weak' to direct us. In these circumstances, we can use the help of such an '*instinctive*' feature as the moral sense is. But, although reason and instinct may work together to the same ends, it cannot be said, as Hutcheson claims, that morality derives solely from an 'implanted' or instinctive moral sense. Thus, while it is reasonable to grant 'that some degree of pleasure is inseparable from the observation of virtuous actions', it is a mistake to suppose 'that the perception of virtue is nothing distinct from the reception of this pleasure', or that the 'virtue of an action, [as] Mr. Hume says, is its *pleasing* us after a *particular manner*'.<sup>305</sup>

Second, rebutting a claim which he attributes to Hutcheson—'that the *whole* of virtue consists in benevolence, or the study of publick good'—Price lists and discusses six different forms that virtue may take: duty to God, duty to ourselves, benevolence, gratitude, veracity, and justice. In his discussion of veracity he argues that 'fidelity to promises is *properly* a branch or instance of *veracity*'. Then, with a reference to *Treatise* 3.2.5, Price observes that the 'nature and obligation of *promises* have been represented as attended with great difficulties', and proceeds to give an account of promising that differs in significant ways from that provided by Hume. For Price, 'the obligation to keep a promise is the same with the obligation to observe and regard truth; and the intention of it cannot be in the sense some have asserted, to will or create a new obligation' except in the sense that the 'performance of an external action becomes fit, in consequence of some new situation of a

<sup>304</sup> Ibid. 88–9 n. Thus does Price second Kames's suggestion that Hume had pursued the scepticism inherent in his predecessors' views, particularly those of Berkeley, to its logical end; see also n. 267 and the text preceding n. 346.

<sup>305</sup> *Review*, 99, 102–3; Price refers to *Treatise* 3.2.5.4, where Hume says: 'when any action, or quality of the mind, pleases us *after a certain manner*, we say it is virtuous'.

person, or some preceding acts of his own, which was not fit before', but there is nothing 'in the least mysterious' in this.<sup>306</sup>

Finally, after having claimed that his own account of morality 'affords us a stable and fixed rule of judging, and shews us the object concerning which we judge, to be real and determinate in itself, and unchangeably the same, whatever our apprehensions of it may be, whatever the impressions are on our minds, and in whatever point of view we contemplate it', Price goes on to argue that the view he opposes makes virtue 'no object of any rational estimate, leaves no fixed standard of it, and implies that all men's apprehensions of it at all times are equally just and true'. In support of this assessment of his opponents, Price in a note cites *Treatise* 3.2.8.8:

The distinction of moral good and evil is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any sentiment, or character; and as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as every one places in it, and that it is impossible, in this particular, we can ever be mistaken.<sup>307</sup>

Although there is no extant evidence that Hume responded to these comments on the *Treatise*, the Hume Library did contain a copy of the second edition of Price's *Review*.<sup>308</sup> We also know that Hume appreciated the manner in which Price had disputed with him about religious issues taken up in the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, for Hume in a letter to Price thanks him for his 'Civility', and then goes on to note that:

to the Reproach of Learning, it is but too rare to find a literary Controversy conducted with proper Decency and Good Manners, especially where it turns upon religious Subjects, in which men often think themselves at Liberty to give way to their utmost Rancour and Animosity. But you like a true Philosopher, while you overwhelm me with the Weight of your Arguments, give me Encouragement by the Mildness of your Expressions: and instead of *Rogue*, *Rascal* and *Blockhead*, the illiberal Language of the Bishop of Gloucester [William Warburton] and his School, you address me, as a man mistaken, but capable of Reason and conviction.<sup>309</sup>

<sup>306</sup> *Review*, 227–73, esp. 227, 270–3. Price alludes to *Treatise* 3.2.5.12–14; see also 3.2.5.5, 10.

<sup>307</sup> *Review*, 369–70. Price does not mention Hume's footnote clarification (*Treatise* 3.2.8.8 n. 80) of the quoted claim.

<sup>308</sup> It also contained (item 997) a presentation copy of Price's *Four Dissertations* (2nd edn., 1768), a work in which Price responded to the essay on miracles found in the *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding (EHU)*. Hume and Price met in 1768, at the home of Andrew Millar's successor, Thomas Cadell. See J. Stephens, 'When Did David Hume Meet Richard Price?'.  
<sup>309</sup> Letter of 18 March 1767, *New Letters*, 233–4.

## 9.7 Adam Smith

By 1759, when Adam Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments* was first published, Hume and Smith were close friends. Hume, who was in London when the book first appeared, arranged for copies to be distributed to mutual friends and notable persons there, and then wrote to Smith describing the positive reception which the work was receiving.<sup>310</sup> Three months later, as Smith prepared a new edition of his work, Hume proposed an objection to his account of sympathy, an objection to which Smith replied.

Of concern here, however, are Smith's responses to the *Treatise of Human Nature*. In the seventh and final part of his work, 'Of Systems of Moral Philosophy', Smith turns to 'those Systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation'. Under this heading he distinguishes between the moral sense theory of his former teacher, Francis Hutcheson, and a second, but more economical theory of the same type. Hutcheson's theory supposes that 'approbation is founded upon a sentiment of a peculiar nature... distinct from every other, and the effect of a particular power of perception... a moral sense'. Of the second theory, clearly that of the *Treatise*, Smith's account is concise. He says first, that:

According to others, in order to account for the principle of approbation, there is no occasion for supposing any new power of perception which had never been heard of before: Nature, they imagine, acts here, as in all other cases, with the strictest oeconomy, and produces a multitude of effects from one and the same cause; and sympathy, a power which has always been taken notice of, and with which the mind is manifestly endowed, is, they think, sufficient to account for all the effects ascribed to this peculiar faculty.<sup>311</sup>

Then, after several pages devoted to Hutcheson's theory,<sup>312</sup> he adds a second paragraph on Hume's:

There is another system which attempts to account for the origin of our moral sentiments from sympathy, distinct from that which I have been endeavouring to establish. It is that which places virtue in utility, and accounts for the pleasure with which the spectator surveys the utility of any quality from sympathy with the happiness of those who are affected by it. This sympathy is different both from that by which we

<sup>310</sup> Letter of 12 April 1759, *Letters*, 1: 303. Hume's letter begins: 'I give you thanks for the agreeable present of your *Theory*. Wedderburn and I made presents of our copies to such of our acquaintances as we thought good judges, and proper to spread the reputation of the book. I sent one to the Duke of Argyle, to Lord Lyttleton, Horace Walpole, Soame Jenyns, and [Edmund] Burke... [Andrew] Millar desired my permission to send one in your name to Dr Warburton.'

<sup>311</sup> *Theory of Moral Sentiments* 7.3.3.2–3.

<sup>312</sup> Smith may have supposed that some of his objections to Hutcheson's theory would apply also to Hume's, but he says nothing to this effect.



enter into the motives of the agent, and from that by which we go along with the gratitude of the persons who are benefited by his actions. It is the same principle with that by which we approve of a well-contrived machine. But no machine can be the object of either of those two last mentioned sympathies. I have already, in the fourth part of this discourse, given some account of this system.<sup>333</sup>

When we turn to the fourth part of Smith's work, we find two discussions of Hume's theory. Smith opens Part 4 by remarking that everyone who has thought carefully about the matter has found that 'utility is one of the principal sources of beauty'. After illustrating this point, he goes on to say:

The cause too, why utility pleases, has of late been assigned by an ingenious and agreeable philosopher, who joins the greatest depth of thought to the greatest elegance of expression, and possesses the singular and happy talent of treating the abstrusest subjects not only with the most perfect perspicuity, but with the most lively eloquence. The utility of any object, according to him, pleases the master by perpetually suggesting to him the pleasure or conveniency which it is fitted to promote. Every time he looks at it, he is put in mind of this pleasure; and the object in this manner becomes a source of perpetual satisfaction and enjoyment. The spectator enters by sympathy into the sentiments of the master, and necessarily views the object under the same agreeable aspects... A similar account is given why the appearance of inconveniency should render any object disagreeable both to the owner and to the spectator.<sup>334</sup>

Although after 1751 Hume's views about why utility pleases were also set out in Section 5 of his *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, we can see that Smith here has in mind the discussion found at *Treatise* 2.2.5.16–19, for it is only there that Hume explicitly links beauty, convenience, utility, pleasure, and sympathy.

Despite his high regard for Hume, Smith raised objections to his account of the role of utility in morality, or, more particularly, to the relationship of utility to our approbation of virtue and disapprobation of vice. The matter, Smith argues, is more complex than Hume has supposed. The 'same ingenious and agreeable author who first explained why utility pleases', he says, so taken with this account of things that he has resolved

our whole approbation of virtue into a perception of this species of beauty which results from the appearance of utility. No qualities of the mind, he observes, are approved of as virtuous, but such as are useful or agreeable either to the person himself or to others; and no qualities are disapproved of as vicious but such as have a contrary tendency. And Nature, indeed, seems to have so happily adjusted our sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, to the conveniency both of the individual

<sup>333</sup> *Theory of Moral Sentiments* 7.3.3.17.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.* 4.1.1–2.

and of the society, that after the strictest examination it will be found, I believe, that this is universally the case. But still I affirm, that it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulness which is either the first or principal source of our approbation and disapprobation. These sentiments are no doubt enhanced and enlivened by the perception of the beauty or deformity which results from this utility or hurtfulness. But still, I say, they are originally and essentially different from this perception.<sup>315</sup>

Smith then amplifies this objection. He says, first, that ‘it seems impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well-contrived building; or that we should have no other reason for praising a man than that for which we commend a chest of drawers’.<sup>316</sup> He then goes on to say that a careful look at our moral approvals and disapprovals shows that our first or most basic moral responses, our responses to the dispositions of moral agents, are not typically responses to the utility or disutility of these dispositions. They are, rather, responses to their ‘propriety’ or to, as he later says, the ‘suitableness of the affection’ from which these agents act.<sup>317</sup> In Smith’s words:

the usefulness of any disposition of mind is seldom the first ground of our approbation . . . the sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility. We may observe this with regard to all the qualities which are approved of as virtuous, both those which, according to this system, are originally valued as useful to ourselves, as well as those which are esteemed on account of their usefulness to others.<sup>318</sup>

Two paragraphs later, Smith alludes to an earlier observation that clarifies his point here. We may think, he had said, that it is the utility of certain qualities that ‘first recommends them to us’. This is a mistake. The recognition of utility may enhance the value of these qualities, but, as he says elsewhere, we initially

approve of another man’s judgment, not as something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to truth and reality: and it is evident we attribute those qualities to it for no other reason but because we find that it agrees with our own. Taste, in the same manner, is originally approved of, not as useful, but as just, as delicate, and as precisely suited to its object. The idea of the utility of all qualities of this kind, is plainly an after-thought, and not what first recommends them to our approbation.<sup>319</sup>

We do not know whether Hume and Smith discussed these objections, but on at least one occasion Hume did write to Smith about a subject which both

<sup>315</sup> Ibid. 4.2.3.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid. 4.2.4.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid. 7.2.1.48.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid. 4.2.5.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid. 1.1.4.4.

took to be of great importance, sympathy. In this letter Hume comments on his own view as well as that of Smith:

I am told that you are preparing a new Edition, & propose to make some Additions & Alterations, in order to obviate Objections. I shall use the Freedom to propose one, which, if it appears to be of any Weight, you may have in your Eye. I wish you had more particularly and fully prov'd, that all kinds of Sympathy are necessarily Agreeable. This is the Hinge of your System, & yet you only mention the Matter cursorily in p. 20 [that is, *Theory of Moral Sentiments* 1.1.2.6]. Now it woud appear that there is a disagreeable Sympathy, as well as an agreeable: And indeed, as the Sympathetic Passion is a reflex Image of the principal, it must partake of its Qualities, & be painful where that is so. Indeed, *when we converse with a man with whom we can entirely sympathize*, that is, where there is a warm & intimate Friendship, the cordial openness of such a Commerce overpowers the Pain of a disagreeable Sympathy, and renders the whole Movement agreeable. But in ordinary Cases, this cannot have place. An ill-humord Fellow; a man tir'd & disgusted with every thing, always *ennuié*; sickly, complaining, embarass'd; such a one throws an evident Damp on Company, which I suppose wou'd be accounted for by Sympathy; and yet is disagreeable.

It is always thought a difficult Problem to account for the Pleasure, receivd from the Tears & Grief & Sympathy of Tragedy; which woud not be the Case, if all Sympathy was agreeable. An Hospital woud be a more entertaining Place than a Ball.<sup>320</sup>

## 9.8 Alexander Gerard

*An Essay on Taste*, by Alexander Gerard, was published in 1759. In order to understand the sublime, Gerard says, we need to understand that objects that are not themselves sublime 'may nevertheless acquire it, by *association* with such as do'. At the close of his paragraph explaining this phenomenon, Gerard adds a note: 'The author of *A Treatise of Human Nature* has very ingeniously reduced these phenomena into the principle of association ... The sum of his reasoning, so far as it is necessary to take notice of it here, is as follows.' Gerard then goes on to appear to quote from *Treatise* 2.3.8 (the remainder of his note is in quotation marks), but he in fact provides a summary of 2.3.8.2–12:

"Because we are accustomed every moment to observe the difficulty with which things are raised in opposition to the impulse of gravity; the idea of ascending always implies the notion of force exerted in overcoming this difficulty; the conception of

<sup>320</sup> Letter of 28 July 1759, *Letters*, 1: 312–13. The gist of Hume's objection and Smith's reply are found in a note to 1.3.1.9 of the second and subsequent editions of Smith's work, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*.

which invigorates and elevates the thought, after the same manner as a vast object, and thus gives a distance above us much more an appearance of greatness, than the same space could have in any other direction. The sensation of amplitude, which by this means comes to attend the interposed distance, is transferred to, and considered as excited by the object that is eminent and above us; and that object, by this transference, acquires grandeur and sublimity. And here we may observe in passing, that this natural tendency to associate ideas of grandeur with things above us is the reason, why the term *sublime* is metaphorically applied to excellence of any kind, especially to that species of it, which elates the mind with noble pride in the conception. To our transferring, in like manner, the interposed space, and its attendant sensation, to the distant object, is owing the veneration, with which we regard, and the value we set upon things remote in place. And because we find greater difficulty, and must employ superior energy, in running over the parts of duration, than those of space; and in ascending through past duration, than in descending through what is future; therefore we value higher, and contemplate with greater veneration things distant in time than things remote in space, and the persons and objects of antiquity, than those which we figure to ourselves in the ages of futurity.<sup>321</sup>

Gerard makes no further comment on this material. In his later *Essay on Genius* he refers to ‘Some late philosophers [who] have observed that imagination does not act at random in associating ideas, and have, with considerable success, traced out the laws by which it is governed’. A note cites *Treatise* 1.1.4 and Kames’s *Elements of Criticism*, ch. 1.<sup>322</sup>

## 9.9 Thomas Reid

Thomas Reid’s first public notice of Hume’s efforts to overthrow ‘common notions’—Hume’s alleged assertion ‘that no trust should be placed in the senses, memory, in testimony or proof’ and that ‘this world had a beginning entirely without a cause’—is found in the second of the orations Reid delivered at graduation ceremonies of King’s College, Aberdeen.<sup>323</sup> In June 1758, at one of the early meetings of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, of which he was a founding member, Reid read a paper on ‘The difficulty of a just philosophy of the human mind; General prejudices against David Humes system of the mind; & some observations on the perceptions we have by sight’. Over the next four and a half years Reid read to the same Society

<sup>321</sup> *Essay on Taste*, 20, 21–2 n. Gerard’s essay had won, in 1756, the prize, offered by the Select Society of Edinburgh, for the best essay on taste. Hume was one of the judges of the contest, and as he was in London when the work was being printed, he helped see it through the press.

<sup>322</sup> *Essay on Genius* 2.1 [108].

<sup>323</sup> This oration was delivered in late April 1756; see *Philosophical Oration of Thomas Reid*, ed. D. D. Todd, 49.

additional papers analysing human sensation (smell, taste, touch, and seeing, in that order), including a final paper ‘upon Perception’.<sup>324</sup> Reid was obviously presenting to the Society drafts of the material that constitutes his *Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense*. This work, published in 1764, was the most systematic and philosophically sophisticated response to the *Treatise* to appear in Hume’s lifetime.

Hume had an opportunity to read a partial draft of Reid’s *Inquiry* sometime before July 1762. This draft was sent to Hume by his friend Hugh Blair, the moderate Edinburgh minister, and it was to Blair that Hume replied initially: ‘I have read over your Friend’s Performance & read it over with Pleasure.’<sup>325</sup> Hume went on to raise questions about Reid’s position. He noted, however, that he had not seen the entire work and had had difficulty comprehending the ‘author’s Doctrine’. He also defended one of his own views from one of Reid’s objections:

the Author affirms I had been hasty, & and not supported by any Colour of Argument when I affirm, that all our Ideas are copy’d from Impressions. I have endeavour’d to build that Principle on two Arguments. The first is desiring any one to make a particular Detail of all his Ideas, where he woud always find that every Idea had a correspondent & preceding Impression. If no Exception can ever be found, the Principle must remain incontestable. The second is, that if you exclude any particular Impression, as Colours to the blind, Sound to the Deaf, you also exclude the Ideas.<sup>326</sup>

Reid responded to Hume by sending him, via Blair, a brief summary of his work, an ‘Abstract’ intended, no doubt, to help Hume understand how the manuscript pieces he had seen formed a unified argument. Here we are

<sup>324</sup> Information about Reid’s contributions to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society is taken from Thomas Reid, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense*, ed. D. R. Brookes, 266. For additional detail about the society, see H. L. Ulman (ed.), *The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758–1773*.

<sup>325</sup> Aberdeen University Library, MS 2814/1/39. This letter is published in *The Correspondence of Thomas Reid*, 18–19. Paul Wood provided the first full outline of the exchange between Hume and Reid in his ‘David Hume on Thomas Reid’s *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*... A New Letter to Hugh Blair from July 1762’.

<sup>326</sup> The point at issue is discussed in both the *Treatise* (1.1.1.8–9) and in *EHU* (2.6–7). Although at no point in his *Inquiry* does Reid attribute the *Treatise* to Hume, neither does he mention or discuss any of Hume’s other works. He cites the *Treatise* by title twenty-four times, typically as part of the phrase, ‘the author of the *Treatise of human nature*’ or the equivalent (see, e.g., pp. 19, 20, 58, 61, 69, 70, 197, 198, 213, 214, 217). The name ‘Hume’ does appear four times in the *Inquiry* (3, 92, 94, 208), but never in conjunction with the *Treatise*.

At the end of the same letter, Hume also mentions ‘one particular Insinuation’ that he does not identify and that he chose not to answer on the grounds that he ‘could not properly reply to it without employing a Style’ which he prefers not to use when speaking of a person for whom he has high regard and who is Blair’s friend. ‘I wish’, he concludes, ‘the Parsons wou’d confine themselves to their old Occupation of worrying one another; & leave Philosophers to argue with Temper, Moderation & good manners’ (*Correspondence of Thomas Reid*, 19).

concerned with what this 'Abstract' has to say about the *Treatise* and its effect on Reid:

Ever since the treatise of human Nature was published I respected Mr Hume as the greatest Metaphysician of the Age, and have learned more from his writings in matters of that kind than from all others put together. I read that treatise over and over with great care, made an abstract of it and wrote my observations upon it. I perceived that his System is all founded upon one principle, from which his conclusions, however extraordinary, are deduced with irresistible Evidence. The principle I mean is, That all the objects of human thought are either Impressions or Ideas: which I was very much disposed to believe untill I read that Treatise; but finding that if this is true I must be an absolute Sceptic, I thought that it deserved a carefull Examination.

Reid went on to say:

For this purpose I entered into a Strict Examination of my Impressions that I might know whether all my Thoughts & Conceptions were images and copies of them or not; taking it for granted that if any object of thought was not like any impression it could not be an Idea, because Ideas in his System are faint copies of preceeding impressions.

...

This enquiry into the fundamental Article of Mr Humes System led me gradually into my present way of thinking with regard to the human Mind: And in what I have wrote concerning the five Senses, I have always had Mr Humes System and particularly this fundamental Article of it in my View.<sup>327</sup>

In February 1763 Hume wrote directly to Reid, telling him of the 'great pleasure' his 'deeply philosophical' manuscript has given him, regretting again that he had been unable to read 'the whole Performance', and ascribing to this fact his inability to understand fully Reid's position.<sup>328</sup> To this he added,

I shall only say, that if you have been able to clear up these abstruse and important subjects, instead of being mortified, I shall be so vain as to pretend to a share of the praise; and shall think that my errors, by having at least some coherence, had led you to make a more strict review of my principles, which were the common ones, and to perceive their futility.

Reid's reply, written three weeks later, emphasized again his debt to Hume and the *Treatise*:

In attempting to throw some new light upon these abstruse Subjects, I wish to preserve the due mean betwixt Confidence and Despair. But whether I have any Success in this Attempt or not, I shall always avow my self your Disciple in

<sup>327</sup> Reid's Abstract was first published in D. F. Norton, 'Reid's Abstract of the *Inquiry into the Human Mind*'. It is quoted here from *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*, 257–9.

<sup>328</sup> Letter of 25 Feb. 1763, *Letters*, 1: 375–6.

Metaphysics. I have learned more from your writings in this kind than from all others put together. Your System appears to me not onely coherent in all its parts, but likewise justly deduced from principles commonly received among Philosophers: Principles, which I never thought of calling in Question, untill the conclusions you draw from them in the treatise of humane Nature made me suspect them. If these principles are Solid your System must stand; and whether they are or not, can better be judged after you have brought to Light the whole System that grows out of them, than when the greater part of it was wrapped up in clouds and darkness. I agree with you therefore that if this System shall ever be demolished, you have a just claim to a great share of the Praise, both because you have made it a distinct and determinate mark to be aimed at, and have furnished proper artillery for the purpose.<sup>329</sup>

Some of the pronouncements regarding the *Treatise* and its author found in Reid's *Inquiry* are harsher than these conciliatory exchanges would lead one to expect. Reid still credits the *Treatise* with having had a profound influence on him, but he now argues that the broader effect of this work can only be negative. In dedicating his work he says:

I acknowledge . . . that I never thought of calling in question the principles commonly received with regard to the human understanding, until the *Treatise of human nature* was published, in the year 1739. The ingenious author of that treatise, upon the principles of Locke, who was no sceptic, hath built a system of scepticism, which leaves no ground to believe any one thing rather than its contrary. His reasoning appeared to me to be just: there was therefore a necessity to call in question the principles upon which it was founded, or to admit the conclusion.

But can any ingenuous mind admit this sceptical system without reluctance? I truly could not . . . for I am persuaded, that absolute scepticism is not more destructive of the faith of a Christian, than of the science of a philosopher, and of the prudence of a man of common understanding.<sup>330</sup>

In his Introduction, Reid likens the author of the *Treatise* to Zeno and Hobbes, earlier philosophers whose doubts are said to have had a thoroughly negative effect:

Zeno endeavoured to demonstrate the impossibility of motion; Hobbes, that there was no difference between right and wrong; and this author, that no credit is to be given to our senses, to our memory, or even to demonstration. Such philosophy is justly ridiculous, even to those who cannot detect the fallacy of it. It can have no other tendency, than to shew the acuteness of the sophist, at the expence of disgracing reason and human nature, and making mankind Yahoos.<sup>331</sup>

In the main body of the *Inquiry*, Reid at one point softens his criticism of Hume. The author of the *Treatise*, he says, despite holding a metaphysically

<sup>329</sup> *Correspondence of Thomas Reid*, 31.

<sup>330</sup> *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, 3–4.

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.* 21.

absurd position (that there could be sensation without a sentient being) deserves to be treated with respect.

I beg therefore, once for all, that no offence may be taken at charging this or other metaphysical notions with absurdity, or with being contrary to the common sense of mankind. No disparagement is meant to the understandings of the authors or maintainers of such opinions . . . the reasoning that leads to them, often gives new light to the subject, and shews real genius and deep penetration in the author; and the premises do more than atone for the conclusion.<sup>332</sup>

None the less, those who deny the existence of the material world (the ‘Bishop of Cloyne’ and the ‘author of the *Treatise of human nature*’) are said to exhibit a kind of ‘metaphysical lunacy’. A philosopher of this ilk,

sees human nature in an odd, unamiable, and mortifying light. He considers himself, and the rest of his species, as born under a necessity of believing ten thousand absurdities and contradictions, and endowed with such a pittance of reason, as is just sufficient to make this unhappy discovery; and this is all the fruit of his profound speculations. Such notions of human nature tend to slacken every nerve of the soul, to put every noble purpose and sentiment out of countenance, and spread a melancholy gloom over the whole face of things.<sup>333</sup>

Reid also raises a number of more specific objections to the *Treatise*. Its author, he says:

- claims to offer ‘a complete system of the sciences, upon a foundation entirely new, to wit, that of human nature; when the intention of the whole work is to shew, that there is neither human nature nor science in the world’.<sup>334</sup>
- attempts to explain the workings of the human mind by ‘three laws of association, joined to a few original feelings’. The result is ‘a puppet surely, contrived by too bold an apprentice of Nature’, with unfortunate results: namely, ‘some paradoxes in philosophy’, most notably a theory of belief, ‘more incredible than ever were brought forth by the most abject superstition, or the most frantic enthusiasm’.<sup>335</sup>
- calls into question the common-sense view that no sensation can exist independently of the mind, and then goes on to maintain ‘that the mind is only a succession of ideas and impressions, without any subject’. This discovery is said to be ‘big with consequences’, for as a result we would find that ‘there may be treason without a traitor, and love without a lover, laws without a legislator, and punishment without a sufferer’.<sup>336</sup>

<sup>332</sup> Ibid. 32–3. Reid also says that Hume is ‘undoubtedly one of the most acute metaphysicians that this or any age hath produced’. Earlier in the *Inquiry* he had ranked Hume among those of ‘very great penetration and genius . . . Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley’ (ibid. [3]).

<sup>333</sup> Ibid. 68–9.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid. 22, 30.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid. 32, 35.



- fails to see that his argument against the existence of the external world rests on an unproven assumption ‘that we can have no conception of any material thing which is not like some sensation in our minds; and particularly, that the sensations of touch are images of extension, hardness, figure, and motion’.<sup>337</sup>
- shows himself an inconsistent sceptic in so far as he fails to doubt of the ‘existence of his own impressions and ideas’.<sup>338</sup>
- fails to see that ‘All reasoning must be from first principles’, that such principles are part of our constitution, and that certain fundamental conceptions and beliefs (for example: that our thoughts and sensations must have a subject, the self, or that there is external, material existence) are natural principles. He also fails to see that, if we are deceived by our belief in these principles, ‘we are deceived by Him that made us, and there is no remedy’.<sup>339</sup>
- fails to see that ‘our belief of the continuance of the laws of nature’ is ‘an original principle of the mind’ or ‘an instinctive prescience of the operations of nature’ that cannot be accounted for by his curious hypothesis that belief is a matter of vivacity.<sup>340</sup>

Reid’s most fundamental objection, however, is to what he calls the *ideal system* or the *ideal hypothesis*, the widely held, two-part view ‘That nothing is perceived but what is in the mind which perceives it: That we do not really perceive things that are external, but only certain images and pictures of them imprinted upon the mind, which are called *impressions* and *ideas*’,<sup>341</sup> and the related principle that every idea is a copy of a preceding impression. If this *ideal system* is true, he argues, then we are landed in an all-embracing, unmitigated scepticism. Some ancient philosophers embraced this theory, as have virtually all modern philosophers since Descartes. But despite its pervasiveness, the theory is inherently defective, so that when Descartes introduced it into modern philosophy, he by the same act introduced scepticism: ‘the modern scepticism is the natural issue of the new system . . . although it did not bring forth this monster until the year 1739, it may be said to have carried it in its womb from the beginning’.<sup>342</sup> On Reid’s account, Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke did all that they could to resist this scepticism. Berkeley, by ‘giving up [on the existence of] the material world, which he thought might be spared without loss, and even with advantage’, hoped to form ‘an impregnable partition to secure the world of spirits. But, alas! the *Treatise of human nature* wantonly sapped the foundation of this partition,

<sup>337</sup> *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, 69.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.* 71.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.* 71–2.

<sup>340</sup> *Ibid.* 197–8.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid.* 4.

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.* 210.

and drowned all in one universal deluge.<sup>343</sup> The surprising feature of this situation, Reid notes, is that none of these philosophers has shown the least interest in questioning the truth of the assumption (that we perceive only ideas, or impressions and ideas) on which so disastrous a conclusion depends:

We shall afterwards examine this system of ideas, and endeavour to make it appear, that no solid proof has ever been advanced of the existence of ideas; that they are a mere fiction and hypothesis, contrived to solve the phaenomena of the human understanding; that they do not at all answer this end; and that this hypothesis of ideas or images of things in the mind, or in the sensorium, is the parent of those many paradoxes so shocking to common sense, and of that scepticism, which disgrace our philosophy of the mind, and have brought upon it the ridicule and contempt of sensible men.<sup>344</sup>

The defect in question is traced directly to Hume:

It is a fundamental principle of the ideal system, That every object of thought must be an impression, or an idea, that is, a faint copy of some preceding impression. This is a principle so commonly received, that the author [of the *Treatise of Human Nature*], although his whole system is built upon it, never offers the least proof of it. It is upon this principle, as a fixed point, that he erects his metaphysical engines, to overturn heaven and earth, body and spirit.<sup>345</sup>

One should also note that, in the course of this discussion of the *Treatise*, Reid was to join two of his immediate predecessors, Kames and Price, in describing Hume as the logical and sceptical end to which the *ideal system* naturally tends.<sup>346</sup> Ideas, he says, 'were first introduced into philosophy, in the humble character of images or representatives of things'. In this character they initially helped to explain the operations of the mind, but once philosophers began to think carefully about ideas, they began to supplant, literally, the very things they were to represent. First to go were the secondary qualities of bodies. It was by means of ideas that it was learned 'that fire is not hot, nor snow cold, nor honey sweet; and, in a word, that heat and cold, sound, colour, taste, and smell, are nothing but ideas or impressions'. Berkeley then went a step further, and showed that 'by just reasoning, from the same principles, that extension, solidity, space, figure, and body, are ideas, and that there is nothing in nature but ideas and spirits'. And then 'the triumph of ideas was completed by the *Treatise of human nature*, which discards spirits also, and leaves ideas and impressions as the sole existences in the

<sup>343</sup> Ibid. 23.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid. 28.

<sup>345</sup> Ibid. 33.

<sup>346</sup> See above nn. 267, 304. Reid and Kames discussed and corresponded about philosophical issues, beginning about 1762. See Ross, *Lord Kames*, 357–62, and Wood (ed.), *Correspondence of Thomas Reid*, *passim*.

universe'. Reid did not invent the view that Hume had taken his principles to their logical, sceptical conclusion, but the success of his *Inquiry* surely did much to fix that notion in the ensuing philosophical culture.<sup>347</sup>

In 1765, by which time Hume was among the most famous literary figures in Europe, J.-B. Robinet, who had translated some of Hume's post-*Treatise* work into French, wrote to Hume asking him if he was the author of the *Treatise of Human Nature*.<sup>348</sup> It is of interest to note that Robinet, whom one would expect to know as much about Hume's works as any French scholar or philosopher of the time, did not know that the *Treatise* had been written by Hume.<sup>349</sup> It is equally interesting to ask what may have led Robinet to raise this question when he did. One likely possibility is the attention that continental journals gave to Reid's *Inquiry*.<sup>350</sup>

Reid had been careful in the *Inquiry* to make no explicit attribution of the *Treatise* to Hume, and thus it is not surprising that some of the early reviews fail to connect the work with its author. In June 1764, the *Neue Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen* published a brief review of the *Inquiry*. The anonymous author of this brief summary notes that Reid's work is directed against the scepticism of the *Treatise*. Reid, he says, 'especially and extensively criticizes the book, *Treatise of human Nature*, which appeared already in 1739, and which includes the most remarkable defense of scepticism'. Reid's opposition to this scepticism is then quickly outlined, but Hume is not identified as the author of the *Treatise*. Later in the same year the *Journal Encyclopédique* gave Reid's work significant space, but mentioned neither the *Treatise* nor Hume. In March 1765 the *Journal de Trévoux* outlined Reid's account of the way in which the theory of ideas led to Berkeley's denial of material existence. Having followed this philosophical development to that point, the

<sup>347</sup> *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, 33–4. The Advertisement that Hume described as his 'compleat Answer' to Reid and James Beattie is discussed in Sect. 10 below.

<sup>348</sup> When this letter went unanswered, Robinet enclosed a copy of it with another letter sent nearly two years later. Hume's reply, if he did respond to Robinet's question, is lost. We know only, from further correspondence, that Hume promised to send Robinet a copy of a new edition of his philosophical works, of, that is, *ETSS*. See National Library of Scotland, MSS 23157, items 12A, letter of 2 Sept. 1767, and 12B, letter of 17 Dec. 1765; 23157, item 13, letter of 8 Jan. 1768.

<sup>349</sup> Michel Malherbe, drawing on his own research and on the earlier work of Lawrence Bongie, concluded that 'there is resounding silence in France about what makes Hume a true philosopher to us, i.e. his critique of causality and his project of a science of human nature' (M. Malherbe, 'Hume's Reception in France'. Malherbe cites, *inter alia*, Bongie's *Hume en France au dix-huitième siècle*; 'David Hume and the Official Censorship of the Ancien Régime'; *David Hume, Prophet of the Counter-revolution*; and 'Hume, "Philosophe" and Philosopher in Eighteenth-Century France'. I am indebted to Prof. Malherbe for providing me with an advance copy of his essay.

<sup>350</sup> I am indebted to Manfred Kuehn for his assistance with this discussion of French and German responses to the *Treatise* from c.1760. He has shared with me materials he collected for what became his *Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768–1800*, and translated the German texts quoted in my discussions of the reviews of Reid and Beattie and of the works of Lossius and Tetens.

reviewer went on to say: ‘There remains only one step to take, to deny even the existence of minds, and to reduce all existence to ideas; this a recent author has done in a book written in English, entitled, *Treatise of human Nature*, and published in 1739.’<sup>351</sup> The reviewer does not identify the author of this work. In 1767 Reid’s *Inquiry* was reviewed in the Franco-Dutch periodical *Bibliothèque des Sciences et des Beaux Arts*. The anonymous author of this review not only refers to the *Treatise*, but also attributes it to Hume. The reviewer mentions the systems of Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and then a page later expands significantly Reid’s story of how he came to write his *Inquiry* by attributing to Hume the work, the *Treatise*, that set Reid on his philosophical path: ‘When Mr. Hume’s *Treatise of human nature* appeared (1739), he [Reid] read it and was surprised to find there scepticism in a manner triumphant, resting on the principles of Locke. He understood that he must reject these principles, or accept the consequences that Mr. Hume drew.’<sup>352</sup>

The *Journal Encyclopédique* also reviewed the French translation of Reid’s *Inquiry* (*Recherches sur l’entendement humain d’après les principes du sens commun*). The author of this review listed the several philosophers whose views Reid opposed, and then repeated Reid’s thumbnail sketch of the *Treatise*: ‘The *Treatise of human nature* published in 1739, [is] a work in which one finds a complete system of scepticism, built on the principles of Locke, who was nevertheless the least sceptical of those who have occupied themselves with these matters.’ The reviewer went on to discuss the views of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and he closed by praising Reid’s critique of Locke, Berkeley, and ‘the author of the *Treatise of human nature*’, but he did not note that Hume and ‘the author of the *Treatise*’ are the same individual.<sup>353</sup> Reid’s *Inquiry* did help make the *Treatise* and Hume better known on the continent, but there is no reason to suppose that any of those who reviewed the *Inquiry* bothered to read the work, the *Treatise*, that had inspired it.

Reid discussed the *Treatise* in one further work published during Hume’s lifetime: the ‘Brief Account of Aristotle’s Logic’ included in Kames’s *Sketches of the History of Man* (1774). Considering the ‘Five Predicables’, Reid observes that Aristotle, ‘in the beginning of the topics’, demonstrates that there can be only four predicables. Locke, ‘having laid it down as a principle, That all our knowledge consists in perceiving certain agreements and disagreements between our ideas, reduces these agreements and disagreements

<sup>351</sup> *Journal de Trévoux*, Mar. 1765, 726.

<sup>352</sup> *Bibliothèque des Science et des Beaux Arts*, 28: 4–5.

<sup>353</sup> *Journal Encyclopédique*, Nov. 1768, 20.

to...1. Identity and Diversity; 2. Relation; 3. Coexistence; 4. Real Existence', thereby excluding all the ancient predicables.

The author of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, proceeding upon the same principle, That all our knowledge is only a perception of the relations of our ideas, observes, "That it may perhaps be esteemed an endless task, to enumerate all those qualities which admit of comparison, and by which the ideas of philosophical relation are produced: but if we diligently consider them, we shall find, that without difficulty they may be comprised under seven general heads: 1. Resemblance; 2. Identity; 3. Relations of Space and Time; 4. Relations of Quantity and Number; 5. Degrees of Quality; 6. Contrariety; 7. Causation." Here again are seven predicables given as a complete enumeration, wherein all the predicables of the ancients, as well as two of Locke's, are left out.<sup>354</sup>

In his discussion of '*the Ten Categories, and on Divisions in general*', Reid reports: 'The author of the *Treatise of Human Nature* has reduced all things to two categories; to wit, ideas, and impressions: a division which is very well adapted to his system.' Reid goes on to suggest that Hume, by no means alone among logicians and metaphysicians, has failed 'to exhaust the subject divided', and has then gone on to draw from his incomplete division, conclusions which suppose it to be perfect.<sup>355</sup>

### 9.10 Richard Tillard

In his *Letter to Mr. Phillips, containing some Observations on his History of the Life of Reginald Pole* (1765), Richard Tillard finds it surprising that Phillips should have undertaken to defend the 'Romish Religion' in 'an Age which seems disposed to take up no Tenets whatsoever upon Trust'. After all, says Tillard, 'Our Senses have been proved nothing but Liars, and the material World has been annihilated by one ingenious Author; and another, still more refined, has attempted to demonstrate that we have no more Reason to believe the Existence of Spirit than of Matter, and has left us nothing but a set of floating Ideas.' A footnote identifies the first of these sceptical authors as 'Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne'. A note to the term 'floating Ideas' reads '*Hume's Treatise on Human Nature*'.<sup>356</sup>

### 9.11 Anonymous

The author of the anonymous *Another Letter to Mr. Almon, in Matter of Libel* (1770) was upset by 'new-fangled legal conceits', changes to the 'ancient

<sup>354</sup> 'Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic', 2.1, in Kames, *Sketches of the History of Man*, 2: 178–9. Reid indicates that he is citing *Treatise* 1.1.5.2 and 1.3.1.1.

<sup>355</sup> 'Brief Account of Aristotle's Logic' 2.2, in Kames, *Sketches of the History of Man*, 2: 179–82.

<sup>356</sup> Tillard, *Letter to Mr. Phillips*, 1–2. I have been unable to learn more about Tillard.

constitution and law', and the 'new history' produced by Hume. He also notes that this

philosophical doubter, in a *Treatise on human nature*, asserts, that "naturally speaking there is no more harm in a son killing his father, than in a young oak's growing up and killing its parent stock"; without ever once taking into the account that which constitutes the essential difference between them, the reason and freedom of action in the one, which the other wants. But where the love of paradox prevails, it is no uncommon thing to pass by much greater considerations than these. A sound and a subtle understanding are very different things.<sup>357</sup>

### 9.12 James Beattie

The earliest of Beattie's responses to the *Treatise* was probably his 'vision', as Beattie himself called it, 'The Castle of Scepticism'.<sup>358</sup> Alone in a country garden, he began to read one of Hume's essays, and fell 'fast asleep'. In the ensuing dream he was carried along by a crowd of philosophers eager to see or hear 'a dissertation on the nature of things'.<sup>359</sup> His experience, however, was a philosophical analogue of Gulliver's time in Laputa. He was shown, for example, a

very accomplished Sceptick, who, they told me, denied, and hoped in a short time to bring himself to doubt, his own existence. He had tied a bandage over his eyes, and stopt his ears, which however could not entirely prevent his hearing; his nostrils also were stuffed; and his tongue and palate, and the points of his fingers were seared with a hot iron. He expected soon, he said, to get the better of his external senses, and did not despair of mastering consciousness itself (though he owned it was a very troublesome inmate) and then, says he, "I flatter myself I shall be in a fair way of reaching the true Sublime of Scepticism, and seriously call my own entity in question".<sup>360</sup>

This sceptic granted that belief in one's own existence is widespread and difficult to overcome, but for that very reason likely to be false.

Further on, Beattie encountered two philosophers speaking to each other 'through a speaking-trumpet, the sound of which was so exceedingly loud, and at the same time so indistinct by reason of a strong echo, that both were stunned with the noise, without understanding a single word of what was spoken'.

<sup>357</sup> *Another Letter to Mr. Almon*, 153–4, 156. The author is alluding to *Treatise* 3.1.1.24.

<sup>358</sup> This work was first published by E. C. Mossner in 1948. It is quoted here from Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*. <sup>359</sup> Beattie, 'Castle of Scepticism', in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 176.

<sup>360</sup> *Ibid.* 184.

More wonders were in store. A guide told him that the 'Governour' of the castle had performed the philosophical equivalent of opening his mouth wide and jumping down his own throat, for he has been able to show

that all inferences of reason are false or uncertain; and that the understanding acting alone does entirely subvert itself, and prove by argument that by argument nothing can be proved, he has contrived a puppet of mushrooms, cork, cobwebs, gossamer, and other fungous and flimsy materials, to which he gives the name of Reason. He performs with it several dextrous feats to the surprise of every spectator; and at last, by a wonderful apparatus in the machinery, he makes it to open its mouth, and with a sudden jerk throw its whole body, feet, head, trunk, legs, and arms, down its throat, where it totally disappears. He has published a full account of the whole affair in a very elaborate Treatise in three volumes, which has given us all the most perfect satisfaction.<sup>361</sup>

In conversation with the Governour himself, Beattie is surprised to learn that sceptics 'believe in one another with the most implicit and most obstinate assurance, especially when our belief is required to something inconceivable'. But, Beattie protests, I supposed that sceptics are only to doubt. Quite right, replied the Governour,

where matters of common sense and common opinion are concerned, we have nothing to do but to doubt, and disbelieve; but with our own systems and notions the case is otherwise. The Greek word, from which we derive our name, does not signify, to doubt; but, to deliberate, and seek for. In the opinions and notions of the rest of mankind we seek for truth without finding it; in our own we find it without seeking. We take it for granted (and Scepticks take so little for granted, that surely the world cannot grudge them this one poor axiom) that all men, ourselves only excepted, are fools and knaves.<sup>362</sup>

Wandering on in the castle, Beattie came upon no other than the 'sage of Malmsbury', Thomas Hobbes, who in short order picked Beattie's pockets clean. Accused of theft by Beattie, the sage replied that no harm had been done:

"If it is not an object of human laws, it is neither a virtue, nor a vice: for moral distinctions, as I told you already, especially in matters of property, are nothing else than the judgments of sovereigns upon those actions that are subject to their cognisance and deliberation. I taught this doctrine to our governour," continued he, "who is very fond of it, tho' he has given it a new turn in the expression. By the by, I think he owes me several acknowledgements which he has never paid".<sup>363</sup>

Beattie's dream brought him once more within earshot of the Governour, but by then the latter had gone beyond the 'elaborate Treatise in three volumes'

<sup>361</sup> *Early Responses*, 186–7.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.* 187.

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid.* 193.

to matters 'of such blasphemous import that [Beattie's] hair stood on end with horror'.<sup>364</sup>

When in 1770 Beattie did get around to publishing his response to Hume's philosophy, the result was his *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; In Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism*. This work was immediately popular, appearing in half a dozen editions before Hume's death in 1776. Of the works discussing the *Treatise* that Hume saw, this *Essay on Truth*, as it was called, is in one sense the most comprehensive: it addresses the widest range of the issues that Hume had taken up there. It was also the most personal. In the early editions of the work, Hume is referred to as 'Mr Hume' or 'Hume' far more often (about four times in five) than he is referred to by the more impersonal and polite 'our author' or the equivalent.<sup>365</sup> The *Essay on Truth* also discusses two of Hume's later philosophical works, the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* and the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. There are, however, roughly three references to the *Treatise* for every mention of these later works (about sixty of the former, and twenty of the latter), this notwithstanding Beattie's suggestion that the 'style of *The Treatise of Human Nature* is so obscure and uninteresting, that if the author had not in his *Essays* republished the capital doctrines of that work in a more elegant and sprightly manner, a confutation of them would have been altogether unnecessary'.<sup>366</sup>

Beattie sees Hume as extending certain sceptical conclusions found in Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and Berkeley. But, while these philosophers are seen as merely misguided and are forgiven because, despite their mistakes, they were trying to overturn scepticism, Hume is taken to be 'more subtle, and less reserved, than any of his predecessors', and is said to have gone, in comparison to them, to 'greater lengths in the demolition of common sense'. Moreover, in place of common sense he has 'reared a most tremendous fabric of doctrine; upon which, if it were not for the flimsiness of its materials, engines might easily be erected, sufficient to overturn all belief, virtue, and science, from the very foundation. He calls this work "A Treatise of Human Nature: being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects"'.<sup>367</sup>

It is not surprising, then, that Beattie found much in the *Treatise* to criticize. There are first a number of formal criticisms. Despite the claims of its

<sup>364</sup> Ibid. 195.

<sup>365</sup> Some version of Hume's name is used approximately eighty times in the edition of 1770; less personal phrases are used approximately twenty times. I return below to the changes made to these patterns in the quarto edition of 1776.

<sup>366</sup> *An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism*, 488. Unless otherwise indicated, citations are from the 1st edn., 1770. <sup>367</sup> Ibid. 248–9.



subtitle and Introduction, the method followed by Hume is not experimental. His system 'is founded on a false hypothesis [the theory of ideas] taken for granted; and whenever a fact contradictory to this false hypothesis occurs to his observation, he boldly denies it. This, it seems, in his judgement, is experimental reasoning.' Hume is also said to have 'revived the scholastic way of reasoning from theory, and of wrestling facts to make them coincide with it'.<sup>368</sup> In addition, the language of the *Treatise* is sometimes so ambiguous as to make the work virtually unintelligible. 'Most philosophical subjects', says Beattie, 'become obscure in the hands of this author; for he has a notable talent at puzzling his readers and himself.'<sup>369</sup> Hume is also said to be inconsistent. His view of personal identity 'when fairly stated is absurd and self-contradictory'; on the important question of whether the vulgar do or do not distinguish perceptions from objects, he is said to have contradicted himself, and then contradicted his contradiction, 'within the compass of half a page'.<sup>370</sup>

Beattie also raises substantive objections to the *Treatise*. The theory of ideas found there, he says, is false or contrary to fact, and ridiculous. If, as Hume says, ideas are faithful copies of impressions, then the idea of heat should keep us warm, and other ideas should more closely resemble the objects or events that they represent. Hume's most important mistake, however, is his failure to grasp the fundamental truth that all reasoning must terminate in intuitively known first principles or common-sense beliefs.<sup>371</sup> It is in consequence of this fundamental error that he has also embraced any number of mysterious and mistaken views, including, but not limited to, the following, some of which appear to reflect, in a weak sense of that notion (and assuming they reflect anything Hume has said), discussions found only in the *Treatise*:

That man must believe one thing by instinct, and must also believe the contrary by reason:—That the universe is nothing but a *heap* of perceptions unperceived by any substance:—That this universe, for any thing man knows to the contrary, might have made itself, that is, existed before it existed; as we have no reason to believe that it proceeded from any cause, notwithstanding it may have had a beginning:—That though a man could bring himself to believe . . . that every thing in the universe proceeds from some cause, yet it would be unreasonable for him to believe, that the

<sup>368</sup> *Essay on Truth*, 249, 415.

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.* 263; see also 257 n., 312, 314.

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.* 80–1, 260–1. Beattie appears to refer to Hume's discussions at *Treatise* 1.4.6.3 ff. and 1.4.2.14. He does not mention Hume's second thoughts about personal identity, found in the Appendix to Vol. 3.

<sup>371</sup> The title of Part 1, ch. 2, of the *Essay on Truth* sums up Beattie's view: 'All Reasoning terminates in first principles. All Evidence ultimately intuitive. Common Sense the Standard of Truth.' Hume's failure to adhere to this point of view is mentioned often in Part 2, ch. 2, 'This Doctrine rejected by Sceptical Philosophers'.

universe itself proceeds from a cause:—That the soul of man is not the same this moment it was the last; that we know not what it is; that it is not one but many things; and that it is nothing at all;—and yet, that in this soul is the agency of all the causes that operate throughout the sensible creation...—That if thieves, cheats, and cut-throats, deserve to be hanged, cripples, idiots, and diseased persons, should not be permitted to live; because the imperfections of the latter, and the faults of the former are on the very same footing, both being disapproved by those who contemplate them...—That man ought to believe nothing, and yet that man's belief ought to be influenced by certain principles...—That we are necessarily and unavoidably determined to act and think in certain cases after a certain manner, but that we ought not to submit to this unavoidable necessity; and that they are fools who do so:—That none of our actions are in our power; that we ought to exercise power over our actions; and that there is no such thing as power:—That body and motion may be regarded as the cause of thought; and that body does not exist:—That the universe exists in the mind; and that the mind does not exist:—That the human understanding acting alone, doth entirely subvert itself, and prove by argument, that by argument nothing can be proved.<sup>372</sup>

Beattie is concerned with these conclusions, with what he thinks of as Hume's metaphysics, for some of the same reasons that Reid and several other of his contemporaries were concerned. He believes that these conclusions will have, and in fact already have had, a detrimental effect on behaviour and society. Becoming more vehement in his criticisms of Hume as the *Essay on Truth* progresses, Beattie near the end of the work describes the danger presented by such sceptics as Hume, and then denounces such individuals in terms unusual in books of philosophy:

Every doctrine is dangerous that tends to discredit the evidence of our senses, external or internal, and to subvert the original instinctive principles of human belief. In this respect the most unnatural and incomprehensible absurdities, such as the doctrine of the non-existence of matter, and of perceptions without a percipient, are far from being harmless; as they seem to lead, and actually have led, to universal scepticism; and set an example of a method of reasoning sufficient to overturn all truth, and pervert every human faculty... When a sceptic attacks one principle of common sense, he doth in effect attack all; for if we are made distrustful of the veracity of instinctive conviction in one instance, we must, or at least we may, become equally distrustful in every other. A little scepticism introduced into science will soon assimilate the whole to its own nature; the fatal fermentation, once begun, spreads wider and wider every moment, till all the mass be transformed into rottenness and poison.<sup>373</sup>

<sup>372</sup> *Essay on Truth*, 455–7. For similar language, see the quotation from 'Castle of Scepticism' above.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid.* 496–7.

## And

Did it ever happen, that the influence of [the sceptics'] execrable tenets disturbed the tranquillity of virtuous retirement, deepened the gloom of human distress, or aggravated the horrors of the grave? . . . Ye traitors to human kind, ye murderers of the human soul, how can ye answer for it to your own hearts! Surely every spark of your generosity is extinguished for ever, if this consideration do not awaken in you the keenest remorse, and make you wish in bitterness of soul—But I remonstrate in vain. All this must have often occurred to you, and been as often rejected as utterly frivolous. Could I enforce the present topic by an appeal to your vanity, I might possibly make some impression: but to plead with you on the principles of benevolence or generosity, is to address you in a language ye do not, or will not, understand; and as to the shame of being convicted of absurdity, ignorance, or want of candour, ye have long ago proved yourselves superior to the sense of it.<sup>374</sup>

We do not know when it was that Hume became aware of Beattie's criticisms and denunciation. The Hume Library contained a copy of the first edition of the *Essay on Truth*, and thus it is not unlikely that Hume read at least some of the book soon after its publication in 1770. As early as May 1757 Hume reported having resolved that he would not reply to critics.<sup>375</sup> In the face of the attacks by Beattie (and Reid), he more or less kept this vow, but he was eventually motivated to prepare and have printed an 'Advertisement', to be prefixed to existing and future editions of his *Essays and Treatises*.<sup>376</sup> This short notice says that the *Treatise* was a juvenile work and constitutes one of Hume's several assessments of the *Treatise*, but it is of interest here because it evoked a further report on the reception and reputation of this work.

In the early part of 1776, as Beattie was preparing still another edition of his popular *Essay on Truth*, someone in London sent him a copy of Hume's Advertisement. Seeing that this brief notice represented the *Treatise* as a flawed, juvenile work that its author had never acknowledged to be his own, Beattie added a conciliatory response in his new edition. Having begun by saying that he did not suppose it was with any evil intent that those who 'attacked [Hume's] philosophy directed their batteries against the *Treatise*

<sup>374</sup> *Essay on Truth*, 500–1.

<sup>375</sup> Letter of 20 May 1757 to Andrew Millar, *Letters*, 1: 250. In 1759 and again in 1762, as well as in 'My Own Life', Hume reported that he took this resolution early in life (*Letters*, 1: 320, 360–1, 3; see also *Letters* 1: 252, 256, 314). Even after that May 1757 letter, however, Hume was on occasion tempted to reply, as he admitted later in the same year; see *Letters*, 1: 265. Hume's part of the *Letter from a Gentleman* was obviously a reply, whether or not Hume intended his letter to be printed; see above, Sect. 8.

<sup>376</sup> For the full text of Hume's draft of this Advertisement and details of its first publication, see Sect. 10 below. The critical text of it may be seen at the beginning of the Clarendon and Oxford Philosophical Texts editions of *EHU*.

of *Human Nature*', Beattie went on to describe his involvement with this work:

Ever since I began to attend to matters of this kind, I had heard Mr Hume's philosophy mentioned as a system very unfriendly to religion both revealed and natural, as well as to science; and its author spoken of as a teacher of sceptical and atheistical doctrines, and withal as a most acute and ingenious writer. I had reason to believe, that his arguments, and his influence as a great literary character, had done harm, by subverting or weakening the good principles of some, and countenancing the licentious opinions of others. . . . I endeavoured, among other studies that belonged to my office, to form a right estimate of Mr Hume's philosophy, so as not only to understand his peculiar tenets, but also to perceive their *connection* and *consequences*.

In forming this estimate, I thought it at once the surest and the fairest method to begin with the *Treatise of Human Nature*, which was allowed, and is well known to be, the ground-work of the whole; and in which some of the principles and reasonings are more fully prosecuted, and their connection and consequences more clearly seen by an attentive reader, (notwithstanding some inferiority in point of style), than in those more elegant republications of the system, that have appeared in the form of *Essays*. Every sound argument that may have been urged against the paradoxes of the *Treatise*, particularly against its first principles, does, in my opinion, tend to discredit the system. . . . Paradoxes there are in the *Treatise*, which are not in the *Essays*; and, in like manner, there are licentious doctrines in these, which are not in the other: and therefore I have not directed *all* my batteries against the first. . . .

For these eighteen years past, (and before that period I knew nothing of this author's writings), I have always heard the *Treatise of Human Nature* spoken of as the work of Mr Hume.<sup>377</sup> Till after publishing the *Essay on Truth*, I knew not that it had ever been said, or insinuated, or even suspected, that he either did not acknowledge that *Treatise*, or wished it to be considered as a work which he did not acknowledge. On the contrary, from his reprinting so often, in *Essays* that bore his name, most of the principles and reasonings contained in it; and never, so far as I had heard, disavowing any part of it; I could not but think, that he set a very high value upon it.<sup>378</sup> By the literary people with whom I was then acquainted it had been much read; and by many people it was much admired. And, in general, it was considered as the author's chief work in philosophy, and as one of the most curious systems of human

<sup>377</sup> The Preface is dated 30 April 1776, which suggests that Beattie learned that the *Treatise* was Hume's work at about the same time, June 1758, that Reid gave his first paper to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. See also n. 323.

<sup>378</sup> In the Introduction to the 1st edn. of the *Essay on Truth*, Beattie says: 'There is a Writer now alive, of whose philosophy I have much to say. By his philosophy, I mean the sentiments he hath published in a book called, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, in three volumes, printed in the year 1739; the principal doctrines of which he hath since republished again and again, under the title of, *Essays Moral and Political, &c.*' (9–10). By '*Essays Moral and Political*' Beattie is presumably referring to the *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*. This work mentions the '*Essays Moral and Political*' on the title-page of the first volume, and includes *EHU* and *EPM* in the second volume of the two-volume editions, or the third and fourth volumes of the four-volume editions.

nature that had ever appeared. Those who favoured his principles spoke of it as an unanswerable performance. And whatever its success might have been as an article of sale, (a circumstance which I did not think it material to inquire into), I had reason to believe, that as a system of licentious doctrine it had been but *too successful*; and that to the author's reputation as a philosopher, and to his influence as a promoter of infidelity, it had contributed not a little.

Our author certainly merits praise, for thus publicly disowning, though late, his *Treatise of Human Nature*; though I am sorry to observe, from the tenor of his declaration, that he still seems inclined to adhere to "most of the reasonings and principles contained in that Treatise". But if he has now at last renounced any one of his errors, I congratulate him upon it with all my heart. He has many good as well as great qualities; and I rejoice in the hope, that he may yet be prevailed on to relinquish totally a system, which I should think would be as uncomfortable to him, as it is unsatisfactory to others. In consequence of his Advertisement, I thought it right to mitigate in this Edition some of the censures that more especially refer to the *Treatise of Human Nature*: but as that Treatise is still extant, and will probably be read as long at least as any thing I write, I did not think it expedient to make any material change in the reasoning or in the plan of this performance.<sup>379</sup>

Beattie is surely right to say that he made no material change in his reasoning. His mitigation of some of his 'censures' appears to amount to little more than substituting for some twenty-five references to 'Mr Hume' such phrases as 'our author' or 'a certain author' (but never leaving the reader in any doubt as to whom he intends), and with, here and there, some minor modifications of his text.<sup>380</sup> There are no significant changes to the harsh sentiments expressed in the final few pages of his *Essay on Truth*.<sup>381</sup> Notwithstanding, Hume, although he may never have seen Beattie's Preface, had been given reason to think that Beattie had significantly softened his criticisms. In June 1776, less than three months before Hume's death, Strahan wrote:

Even your enemies relent, and I will venture to say, wish your recovery. Creech of Edinburgh [Beattie's publisher] writes me that he had just then [on May 29] received a letter from Dr. Beattie in which was the following paragraph:—"I am sincerely sorry to hear of Mr. Hume's bad health. There will be several things in this Edition [of the *Essay on Truth*] which I am pretty sure would not offend him, if he were to see them, which I heartily [wish] he may. The Essay is corrected in almost every

<sup>379</sup> *Essay on Truth* (London, 1776), pp. xi–xiv; these remarks are from the quarto edition of this date.

<sup>380</sup> Compare, e.g., pp. 163, 169, 318, and 445 of the edition of 1770, and the corresponding pp. 103, 108, 199, and 287, of quarto edition of 1776. S. C. Patten compared Beattie's discussion of Hume on personal identity in the 1774 and 1776 editions of the *Essay on Truth*. He found Beattie to have made nine changes, but concluded that these were 'not substantial' ('Did Beattie Defer to Hume?', 72).

<sup>381</sup> Pp. 496–7 and 500–1 of the edition of 1770, cited above.

page—superfluities retrenched—inaccuracies corrected—and many harsh expressions softened.’ Does not this look like repentance?<sup>382</sup>

Continental reviews of Beattie’s *Essay* also focused attention on Hume and the *Treatise*. In 1771, a year after the publication of Beattie’s *Essay*, J. G. H. Feder reviewed the work in the *Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen*. No one could read Beattie’s *Essay* without knowing that Hume was the author of the *Treatise*, but Feder, while discussing the opposition of Reid and Beattie to the views found in the *Treatise*, including the account of personal identity, never attributes the work to Hume.<sup>383</sup> In its first issue of 1772, the *Bibliothèque des Science et des Beaux Arts* began a three-part review of the *Essay on Truth*. In this review, philosophical views found in the *Treatise* are discussed in some detail, and Hume’s relationship to the work is made clear. The reviewer credits Beattie with a judicious account of the work of Locke and Berkeley that unintentionally prepared the way for scepticism, and then turns to Beattie’s response to Hume. This is not, we are told, a response to the Hume who wrote the *History of England* or the *Political Discourses*. It is, rather, a reply to the Hume who wrote the *Treatise of Human Nature* and the *Essays Moral and Political*, works that Beattie has found himself obliged, in the interests of truth and the well-being of society, to consider in order ‘to expose the contradictions and absurdities’ found in them.<sup>384</sup> The ‘contradictions and absurdities’ mentioned include some that may reflect a reading of either the *Treatise* or the *Philosophical Essays*. These include the view, allegedly held by both Berkeley and Hume, that the earth, far from being solid and material is merely an idea in my mind, that its essence is my perception, and that the moment I cease to perceive it, it ceases to exist; the view that our conviction that the course of nature will continue the same is misplaced; and the view that belief arises only from experience.<sup>385</sup>

<sup>382</sup> *Letters of David Hume to William Strahan*, 303. Hill, quoting this letter, apparently believed that Beattie had made significant changes: ‘Hume perhaps would never have made the idle attempt to have one of his greatest works suppressed, as it were, nearly forty years after its publication, had he foreseen that it would lead to his being partially absolved and publicly praised by Dr. Beattie.’ For his part, Beattie also believed that he had relented and, when he heard about Hume’s posthumous *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, felt he had been misled: ‘During the last years of Mr. Hume’s life his friends gave out that he regretted his having dealt so much in metaphysics, and that he never would write any more [on that topic]. He was at pains to disavow his *Treatise of Human Nature* in an Advertisement which he published about a half a year before his death. All this, with what I then heard of his bad health, made my heart relent towards him; as you would no doubt perceive by the preface to my quarto book’ (W. Forbes, *Account of the Life and Writings of James Beattie*, quoted by Hill, 303).

<sup>383</sup> *Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen*, 12: 91–6.

<sup>384</sup> *Bibliothèque des Science et des Beaux Arts*, 37: 116–17.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid.* 123, 138–9, 142. Beattie, unlike Reid in his *Inquiry*, criticizes both the *Treatise* and the *Philosophical Essays*.

But some of these ‘contradictions and absurdities’, appear to derive, however inaccurately, from the *Treatise*. These include (1), the view that we must believe nothing, ‘not even the most evident truths, such as the identity of our soul’, for if I follow Hume, I must believe that my soul changes each moment, that it becomes at each moment a thing that it was not before’, and thus that the past or future mean nothing to me;<sup>386</sup> (2), the view that our memory provides no foundation for our beliefs, for its ideas cannot be distinguished from those of the imagination, thus leaving us unable to distinguish history from fiction;<sup>387</sup> (3) the view that our belief that anything that begins to exist must have a cause is merely an effect of experience and observation.<sup>388</sup> Also noted is Beattie’s discussion of the fundamental Humean principle ‘proposed in the *Treatise of Human Nature*’, viz. that all our perceptions are either impressions or ideas, and that the latter are (weak) copies of the former, and to have pointed out that any sceptic who bases his system on this theory is, after all, ‘a credulous being’.<sup>389</sup> In the third and final instalment of the review Hume is criticized for a number of views—e.g., holding the unintelligible view that causes exist only in our minds, denying the reliability of our sense of freedom, arguing that views are not appropriately refuted by noting their dangerous consequences—that could equally well be derived from Beattie’s account of the *Treatise* or of the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*.<sup>390</sup>

In 1772, J. G. Herder reviewed the translation of Beattie’s *Essay on Truth* (*Versuch über die Natur und Unveränderlichkeit der Wahrheit*) in the *Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen*. Beattie’s anti-metaphysical rebuttal of the sophistical Hume is described and praised. The *Treatise* is not mentioned. Four years later this same translation was reviewed in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*. This reviewer says that Beattie does not really refute his philosophical opponents, but that his response to Hume is none the less effective: ‘He succeeds best against Hume, who in his book on human nature exaggerates scepticism to a high degree and [thus] entangles himself in a web to such an extent that it does not need a great deal of acuity to convict him by his own words and by arguments.’<sup>391</sup>

<sup>386</sup> *Bibliothèque des Science et des Beaux Arts*, 37: 130. Personal identity is also discussed in the second part of the review, where Hume is said to claim that the soul is ‘only a bundle of (*amas de*) perceptions or objects (for these are indistinguishable according to Mr Hume) that one falsely imagines to be something simple and identical (or permanent)’; *ibid.* 459–60.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid.* 132–3; cf. *Treatise* 1.3.7.8.

<sup>388</sup> *Bibliothèque des Science et des Beaux Arts*, 37: 134; cf. *Treatise* 1.3.3.

<sup>389</sup> *Bibliothèque des Science et des Beaux Arts*, 37: 458.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.* 38: 2–4, 8. <sup>391</sup> *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*, 1: 502.

### 9.13 Johann Georg Hamann

It was probably while still a university student that J. G. Hamann was introduced to British literature. Certainly, by 1756 he was familiar with much of Hume's work, including his distinctively philosophical writings. Moreover, Hume's *Treatise* was likely among the books that Hamann bought while in London in 1758. Hamann's first published work, his *Socratic Memorabilia* (1759), was written, he says, while he was 'full of Hume'.<sup>392</sup> This work makes no explicit reference to the *Treatise*, but having said that 'Our own existence and the existence of all things outside us must be believed, and cannot be determined in any other way . . . What one believes does not, therefore, have to be proved', Hamann goes on in the following paragraph to mention the 'reasons of a Hume'.<sup>393</sup> These are weak grounds for concluding that Hamann had *Treatise* 1.4.6, *Of personal identity*, in mind, but we do know that he had access to a copy of the *Treatise*, for in 1771 he published, under the title 'Night Thoughts of a Sceptic', the closing section of Book 1 of the *Treatise*—but he did this without indicating that he was publishing a translation or mentioning the source of his 'Night Thoughts'. Thus in July, 1771, readers of the *Königsberger Zeitung*, probably including Immanuel Kant, read some of the most sceptical passages of the *Treatise* without knowing their source.<sup>394</sup>

### 9.14 James Burnett, Lord Monboddo

In the first volume of his *Origin and Progress of Language* (1773), Monboddo reviewed the concept of ideas. He first describes Plato's view, that ideas 'are by their nature eternal and unchangeable; and [that] it is by participation of them that every thing is denominated to be what it is'. He does so because he wishes to show that philosophers of his own time hold the 'very reverse' of Plato's view. Whereas

Plato maintains, that ideas are substances, which have a separate existence by themselves out of any mind, these philosophers . . . assert, that they have no existence at all, not even in the mind; that all our conceptions are perceptions of sense, being nothing else but *impressions* made upon the mind by external objects, through the medium of the organs of sense. These impressions being preserved in the memory, are what we call *ideas*; which therefore are nothing but fainter perceptions of sense.<sup>395</sup>

<sup>392</sup> Hamann to F. H. Jacobi, quoted from J. C. O'Flaherty, 'The Concept of Form in the *Socratic Memorabilia*', 41.

<sup>393</sup> *Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia*, 167.

<sup>394</sup> See Manfred Kuehn, 'Kant's Conception of Hume's Problem', 185–6.

<sup>395</sup> Monboddo, *Origin and Progress of Language*, 1: 103, 110–11; I owe this and the following reference to Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 3: 244–5, but I quote from the edition of 1773.



According to Monboddo, this modern point of view was first advanced by Berkeley, and then

supported, and much enlarged upon, by a later philosopher, in a work intitled, *A treatise of Human Nature*; to which, as he has not put his name, nor ever publicly acknowledged it, so far as I know, I think he is intitled not to be named. That this late writer, who professes the sceptical philosophy, and whose intention appears to be, to overturn all science and evidence of every kind, should be fond of a doctrine that suits so well with his purpose, is no wonder at all . . .

The consequence of the opinion of these gentlemen concerning ideas certainly is, that there is no science, demonstration, nor general truth of any kind . . . there is an end of all belief in religion, morals, philosophy, or science of any kind . . . There is no such faculty of the human mind as *intellect*; the business of which . . . is, to abstract, and to consider separately, what is joined in nature, and in that way is presented to the senses. For if we have no perception of things in any other way, it is evident, that we have no intellect, nor any thing besides *sense*, *memory*, and *imagination*. These are all the powers of human nature, according to those philosophers; and these the brutes possess as well as we. So that this philosophy, at the same time that it destroys all science and certainty of every kind, degrades us to a level with the brute, by stripping us of that intellect which, by the ancient philosophers, was thought to be the distinguishing characteristic of human nature.<sup>396</sup>

Monboddo goes on to discuss the importance of the faculty of abstraction, and grants that the author of the *Treatise* ‘acknowledges, that the mind, in contemplating any individual object of sense, can lay aside the consideration of the qualities peculiar to that object, and consider only those which it has in common with others of the same kind: and to these common qualities so considered by the mind, we affix, says he, a name, which he admits to be a general term for all things of that kind, and to stand for them, in speaking and writing’. But is not this to say, Monboddo asks, that there is ‘precisely what other philosophers call an *abstract* idea?’ And especially when it is said that the ideas in question are said to represent other ideas. Berkeley and Hume were perhaps confused by the diagrams used by geometers. They ought to have realized that these diagrams are only the ‘*signs* of ideas’ needed by weaker intellects, not the true ideas or ‘pure intellectual forms themselves’.<sup>397</sup>

### 9.15 Johann Christian Lossius

In his *Physische Ursachen des Wahren* (1774), J. C. Lossius, undertakes, as the title of his work suggests, to provide a physical foundation for truth. He casts

<sup>396</sup> Monboddo, *Origin and Progress of Language*, 1: 110–13.

<sup>397</sup> *Ibid.* 116–19. Monboddo apparently overlooks what Hume had said regarding the diagrams of mathematicians at *THN* 1.2.4.33.

his effort as part of the continuing philosophical struggle between sceptics and dogmatists, and further suggests that the conflict between Beattie (whose *Essay on Truth* he greatly admires) and Hume (whom, along with other sceptics, he hopes to refute) is analogous to the ancient conflict between Chrysippus and Carneades.<sup>398</sup> In the course of the *Physische Ursachen* Lossius turns to the issue of the lack of conviction one may have for some metaphysical view. If this lack of belief is unavoidable, he says, this will be because ‘nature is either giving us a hint to look for better reasons or to give up hope for a better proof. This is especially the case where reasoning and sensation and explicit experience are contradictory to one another.’ He then goes on to say:

Hume claims that no one has an impression of the self and that therefore no one can make a concept of it. My dear Sir, he says, you do not realize that this claim contradicts my hypothesis of impressions and ideas: how could it then be true?<sup>399</sup>—And what then is this hypothesis? Here it is: all concepts are either impressions or ideas. Now all ideas are only copies of the impressions; therefore you cannot have any idea or concept of the thing of which you have not had an impression.<sup>400</sup>—And even if I did not know where the fallacy of this philosopher is to be found, I could not possibly agree with him. Therefore I am necessitated to reject the conclusion, and even if he were to bring forward more arguments, [I would still reject it] just because I would because of them have to deny an obvious sensation.<sup>401</sup>—Even more I am forced to reject the claim that this philosopher makes that bodies have no existence, but are merely a bundle of concepts, whose existence consists in their being thought. And that the soul is in just the same way a bundle of concepts.

Despite the two explicit references to the *Treatise* and his talk about ‘bundles of concepts’, Lossius may never have looked at a copy of the *Treatise*. The material quoted here at some points follows closely the German translation of Beattie’s *Essay on Truth*, and just at the point where Beattie also cites *Treatise* 1.4.6.2 and 1.2.6.9, although in reverse order.<sup>402</sup>

<sup>398</sup> *Physische Ursachen*, 3. For further background, see M. Kuehn, *Scottish Common Sense in Germany*, 86–102.

<sup>399</sup> A footnote directs the reader to the *Abhandlung über die Natur des Menschen*, 437, or *Treatise* 1.4.6.2, where Hume says: ‘Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them, nor have we any idea of *self*, after the manner it is here explain’d. For from what impression cou’d this idea be deriv’d? This question ’tis impossible to answer without a manifest contradiction and absurdity...’

<sup>400</sup> Another note directs the reader to *Abhandlung über die Natur des Menschen*, 123, or *Treatise* 1.2.6.9, where Hume says: ‘Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv’d from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that ’tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.’

<sup>401</sup> A note directs the reader to Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 10, where Sextus says that the sceptics do not abolish appearances or ‘overthrow the affective sense-impressions which induce our assent involuntarily’.

<sup>402</sup> See *Essay on Truth* 2.2.1 [262–3]. Lossius cites (*Physische Ursachen*, 232) the German translation of Beattie’s *Essay* (*Versuch über die Natur and Unveränderlichkeit der Wahrheit*, 1772).

## 9.16 Pseudonymous

The *Essays, Historical, Political, and Moral* (1774?) by the pseudonymous Brutus and Humphrey Search includes a lengthy letter in ‘defence of the political principles of the Protestant Dissenters’. The author of this letter argues that ‘the *Scots* professors’ (Wishart, Hutcheson, Fordyce, Leechman, Smith, Reid, Ferguson, Beattie, Robertson, and Gerard are mentioned) have ‘now so far out shone those in the *English* colleges’ that ‘the palm of victory in literary accomplishments and productions, must be given to *North Britain*’. He then goes on to explain why he has not mentioned ‘the celebrated *Hume*’. For one thing, Hume is not a professor. In addition, he is not so much a historian as ‘a *party* writer’, a line of thought that leads to this comment:

The ridicule into which he has thrown the glorious Reformation, and his abuse of it in his history of the *Tudors*, is truly offensive. His being a Deist, if upon principle, none should blame him for, as no man can think as he pleases. But in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, and in some of his essays, there are assertions and propositions, that if pursued, in their consequences, would lead to direct Atheism, and should be most carefully guarded against, as well as many most arbitrary principles, which he has endeavoured to establish in his history.<sup>403</sup>

## 9.17 Thomas Hepburn

In 1774, Thomas Hepburn, a Scottish minister, published *A Specimen of the Scots Review*, purportedly a proposal for a new review.<sup>404</sup> Hepburn reported the views of a widely travelled friend who was of the opinion that Reid, Beattie, and James Oswald,<sup>405</sup> through their attacks on Hume, ‘have done more harm to philosophy, religion, and truth’ by their vaguely formulated appeal to ‘common sense’ than ‘any sceptic has ever done; for philosophers of this cast leave men to reason, nature, experience, and probability, which are not bad guides so far as they go’. More to the present point, however, this ‘travelling gentleman’ says

that sceptics are only to be pitied for their doubts and darkness; that professed infidels are bad citizens; and that those who enter into controversy with them are not much better, because, without their answers, their antagonists books would sink into oblivion; witness Lord Bolingbroke’s *Philosophical Works*, and the *Treatise of*

<sup>403</sup> Brutus and H. Search, *Essays, Historical, Political, and Moral*, 2: 150, 155–6.

<sup>404</sup> Burton attributed this work to Hepburn on the basis of a letter from Hume to John Home. See Burton, *Life... of David Hume*, 2: 472; *Letters*, 2: 291. Excerpts from Burton’s work may be seen in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 236–41.

<sup>405</sup> Oswald was the author of *An Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion*. This work does not discuss the *Treatise*.

Human Nature. Our friend has travelled over all Scotland, and found only eight copies of the last book, and those in the custody of as many divines, who either had wrote, or were writing answers to it.<sup>406</sup>

### 9.18 George Campbell

In early July 1776 James Boswell paid his last visit to Hume. ‘I found him alone’, Boswell reports, ‘in a reclining posture in his drawing-room . . . He had before him Dr. Campbell’s *Philosophy of Rhetorick*’, a work published earlier that year. If Hume had made his way through Campbell’s work, he would have found references to the *Treatise*. In a chapter on the ‘*nature and use of the scholastic art of syllogising*’, Campbell says of syllogistic reasoning, ‘the scholastic art of disputation’, that it is a ‘contentious art . . . now almost forgotten’, and that there ‘is no reason for its revival’ as neither eloquence nor philosophy have benefited from it. In fact, it does more harm than good, for it produces ‘an itch of disputing on every subject, however incontrovertible’, as well as ‘a sort of philosophic pride, which will not permit us to think that we believe anything, even a self-evident principle, without a previous reason or argument’. By way of illustration, Campbell adds:

How ridiculous are the efforts which some very learned and judicious men have made, in order to evince that whatever begins to exist must have a cause. One argues, ‘There must have been a cause to determine the time and place,’ as though it were more evident that the accidents could not be determined without a cause, than that the existence of the thing could not be so determined. Another insists very curiously, that if a thing had no cause, it must have been the cause of itself; a third, with equal consistency, that nothing must have been the cause. Thus, by always assuming *the absolute necessity of a cause*, they demonstrate *the absolute necessity of a cause*. For a full illustration of the futility of such pretended reasonings, see the *Treatise of Human Nature*, B. I. Part. iii. Sect. 3.<sup>407</sup>

If Hume had read no further than this, he would have had the pleasure of finding that one of his most able and determined critics had found, in a section of the *Treatise* that others supposed to show an excess of scepticism, support for his view that our fundamental belief that ‘everything that begins to exist must have a cause’ is not the effect of demonstrative reason and argument.<sup>408</sup>

<sup>406</sup> *A Specimen of the Scots Review*, 8–9.

<sup>407</sup> *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 1: 163, 182–4. A copy of this work was in the Hume Library; see Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 80, item 238.

<sup>408</sup> G. Campbell had published, in 1762, *A Dissertation on Miracles: Containing an Examination of the Principles Advanced by David Hume, Esq; in an Essay on Miracles*. There was also a copy of this work, with marginal notes by Hume, in the Hume Library, item 237.

Campbell was satisfied and even pleased that Hume had shown that this fundamental belief is not such an effect.

As Campbell proceeds, however, the *Treatise* comes in for criticism. Reviewing what speakers ought to do to reach their hearers, Campbell considers humans as endowed with *understanding*, and then with *imagination*. Engaging the imagination as a means of gaining the attention of hearers is, he says, 'prerequisite to every effect of speaking'. But pleasing the imagination has another end to serve: belief. Making an explicit reference to the 'author of, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, in 3 vols.', he continues:

I will not say with a late subtle metaphysician, that "Belief consisteth in the liveliness of our ideas." That this doctrine is erroneous, it would be quite foreign to my purpose to here evince.<sup>409</sup> Thus much however is indubitable, that belief commonly enlivens our ideas; and that lively ideas have a stronger influence than faint ideas to induce belief. But so far are these from being coincident, that even this connexion between them, though common, is not necessary.<sup>410</sup>

In the following section Campbell considers humans as endowed with *memory*. Here he says:

The author of the treatise above quoted, hath divided the principles of association in ideas into resemblance, contiguity, and causation. I do not here inquire into all the defects of this enumeration, but only observe, that even on his own system, order both in space and time ought to have been included. It appears at least to have an equal title with causation, which, according to him, is but a particular modification and combination of the other two. Causation considered as an associating principle, is, in his theory, no more than the contiguous succession of two ideas, which is more deeply imprinted on the mind by its experience of a similar contiguity and succession of the impressions from which they are copied. This therefore is the result of resemblance and vicinity united. Order in place is likewise a mode of vicinity, where this last tie is strengthened by the regularity and simplicity of figure, which qualities arise solely from the resemblance of the corresponding parts of the figure, or the parts similarly situated.<sup>411</sup>

In the second volume of this same work Campbell points out that while it has often been observed that writers have a tendency to produce nonsense which readers fail to notice, this phenomenon has not been explained. He suggests that Berkeley may have unwittingly made a useful suggestion about the origin of this tendency. After quoting at length from Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*,<sup>412</sup> Campbell continues:

<sup>409</sup> For the relevant rebuttal, Campbell refers his readers to Reid's *Inquiry into the Human Mind*, ch. 2, sect. 5.

<sup>410</sup> *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 1: 190–1.

<sup>411</sup> *Ibid.* 197–8. Campbell goes on to characterize 'order in time'.

<sup>412</sup> Campbell quotes from Berkeley's Introduction, Sect. 19.

The same principles have been adopted by the author of a *Treatise of Human Nature*, who, speaking of abstract ideas, has the following words: "I believe every one, who examines the situation of his mind in reasoning, will agree with me, that we do not annex distinct and complete ideas to every term we make use of, and that in talking of *government, church, negociation, conquest*, we seldom spread out in our minds all the simple ideas, of which these complex ones are composed. 'Tis, however, observable, that notwithstanding this imperfection we may avoid talking nonsense on these subjects, and may perceive any repugnance among the ideas, as well as if we had a full comprehension of them. Thus if, instead of saying, *that in war the weaker have always recourse to negociation*, we should say, that *they have always recourse to conquest*; the custom, which we have acquired of attributing certain relations to ideas, still follows the words, and makes us immediately perceive the absurdity of that proposition."<sup>43</sup>

After a less detailed reference to Burke's *Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, Campbell goes on to say that these ingenious suggestions fail to account for the phenomenon in question; but when he has worked out his own account of the matter, he says that from

these principles we may be enabled both to understand the meaning, and to perceive the justness of what is affirmed in the end of the preceding quotation: "The custom, which we have acquired of attributing certain relations to ideas, still follows the words, and makes us *immediately* perceive the absurdity of that proposition."<sup>44</sup>

Thus in his final reference to the *Treatise*, Campbell concludes that Hume has correctly explained why we without hesitation adjudge some propositions to be nonsense. If Hume on his deathbed finished the *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, then some of the last things he would have read about the *Treatise* showed an appreciation for arguments central to that work.

### 9.19 Johann Nicolaus Tetens

It is clear that by 1775 Johann Tetens had first-hand knowledge of the *Treatise*, and that by 1777 he knew that Hume was its author. In the first of his two most important works, *Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie (On General Speculative Philosophy)* of 1775, Tetens indicates a familiarity with the *Treatise* while yet not knowing the name of its author, for he supposes Hume and the author of the *Treatise* are two distinct individuals. Reid and his followers, he says, have not been fair in their criticisms of 'Barkley, Hume, and the heroic skeptic, the author of the *Treatise of Human Nature* who pushed skepticism to its non plus ultra'. They should instead 'have let reason

<sup>43</sup> *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 2: 94–5.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* 101; see also 114.

itself judge its own aberrations’—have let these authors be judged by the standards of philosophy, not common sense.<sup>415</sup> Two years later, in his *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung* (*Philosophical Essays on Human Nature and its Development*), Tetens knows that Hume is the author of the *Treatise* and also sees him as an important philosopher whose views must be taken seriously:

Hume, the author of the infamous work about human nature...declared the idea which we have of our self, or of our soul, ‘as a collection of many particular sensations which follow each other, but are individual as well as separate and scattered, and from whose connection our fancy has created the idea of one whole which is a subject that supports particular sensations as qualities of it’. From this he concluded that we can justifiably say no more about the soul than that it is a collection of qualities and changes. The latter, since they are immediately sensed, exist; but we cannot say that the soul is an identical object, a complete unity, or a real thing.<sup>416</sup>

Hume’s enemies, Tetens goes on, have accused him of denying ‘even the existence of the soul’, and admitting ‘only the reality of his thoughts. This was indeed the outer limit of intellectual (literally: reasoning) scepticism.’ But the responses of Reid and Beattie, their appeals to common sense, are inappropriate. Hume’s analysis is incorrect, but one ‘may say this without assuming any more than what Hume has assumed, namely this, that we are immediately conscious of ourselves’. Hume has overlooked the fact that our sensations are always experienced against the background of other sensations, not as completely isolated entities, and this background, though obscure, is a constant. Thus our notion or concept of self-identity is

the result of the comparison of a present feeling of our self as a subject with the quality of a similar feeling that preceded it and which is reproduced. Another consequence of this is that the idea or representation of my self is not a collection of particular representations, which one makes into a unity [or whole] in the imagination in the same way in which one makes particular representations of soldiers into the unity of a regiment. This unification can be found in the feeling itself, that is, in nature, not in a connection which we have created ourselves.<sup>417</sup>

<sup>415</sup> *Über die allgemeine speculativische Philosophie*, 17–18.

<sup>416</sup> *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur*, 1: 392–3.

<sup>417</sup> *Ibid.* 394. Tetens also discusses Hume’s account of causality, but it is not possible to distinguish between what his discussion of this topic owes to the *Treatise* and what it owes to the 1755 translation of Hume’s *Philosophical Essays*.

## 9.20 Responses to the *Treatise* Following Hume's Death and the Publication of 'My Own Life'

Hume died on 25 August 1776. Less than a month later the *London Chronicle* published a three-part letter, probably the work of John Home, to which it gave the title, 'Remarks on the Life and Character of the late David Hume, Esq.'. In the course of this account we are told that

Very early in life [Hume] published his "Treatise on Human Nature," to which, however, he never put his name; and which, after remaining unanswered for thirty years, has of late furnished matter for much reasoning and more declamation to the Doctors Reid, Beatty, and Oswald. The substance, indeed, of this treatise he afterwards melted down into his "Philosophical Essays," or "Enquiry concerning Human Understanding," which was soon after published.<sup>418</sup>

The *Annual Register* for 1776 included 'An Account of the Life and Writings of the late *David Hume*, Esq.; as given to the World in one of the periodical Publications'. In places this sounds very much like the letter published in the *London Chronicle*, but there is a more detailed discussion of the *Treatise*.<sup>419</sup> This work, we are told, although

not inferior to any thing of the moral or metaphysical kind in any language, was entirely overlooked, or decried at the time of its publication, except by a few liberal-minded men, who had courage to throw aside their popular and literary prejudices, and to follow sound reasoning, without being afraid of any dangerous conclusion, or fatal discovery; of seeing errors unveiled, however sanctified by years, or supported by authorities.

We are next told that Hume soon enough learned, 'to the severe disappointment of his youthful hopes, that the taste for systematical writing was on the decline'. Consequently, he 'divided his treatise into separate essays, and dissertations' which he then published, 'with improvements, alterations, and additions, at different periods of his life'. Unfortunately, his 'enemies' and those hoping to add to their own reputations,

by exposing the mistakes of a great genius, have levelled all their arguments against this juvenile production, though never dignified with the author's name; and Dr. Beattie in particular, more than thirty years after the publication of that sceptical

<sup>418</sup> *London Chronicle*, 10–12 Sept. 1776, quoted from Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 355. The author of this letter appears to have seen a copy of Hume's Advertisement distancing himself from the *Treatise*, a circumstance that lends further credibility to the suggestion that the author was John Home (see n. 253). On the Advertisement, see below, Sect. 10.

<sup>419</sup> *Annual Register*, 28. Fieser, on the basis of textual similarities, also attributes this account to John Home; see *Early Responses*, 9: 362.



system, has been so successful as to obtain a pension by his *Essay on the Immutability of Truth*; in which he discovers all the violence of a sectary, and all the illiberality of a pedant, and rather abuses than confutes Mr. Hume.<sup>420</sup>

‘As the *Treatise of Human Nature* is now very scarce’, the author says, ‘some account of it may be agreeable to many readers.’ Hume’s purpose, ‘as he himself informs us, was, “to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects”’. His ability to achieve this end ‘can only be fully discovered by an examination of the treatise itself; which, as a composition, is admirable’. The subjects of the existing volumes, the understanding, the passions, and morals, are duly noted. ‘Criticism and politics’, we are informed, ‘would have been added systematically, if the success had, in any degree, been answerable to the merit of the work’. The description of these five subjects as found in the Introduction of the *Treatise* (Intro. 5) is quoted, and we are reminded that at so early an age, at a time ‘when he was thought little able to give a new direction to science’, this ‘great man [had] digested that ingenious system of philosophy, which has changed metaphysics from a frivolous to an useful study; and given a stability to morals, criticism, and politics, unknown in former ages!’ Next, ironically, we are told the one thing that Hume had likely never heard, and that he did not himself believe: ‘But, what is still more extraordinary, the stile and method of this first production are not less correct and happy, than those of his most admired performances, written after his taste and judgment were matured by years and experience.’<sup>421</sup>

A ‘single quotation’ is chosen to support this last claim and also to illustrate Hume’s ‘method of reasoning *experimentally* on moral subjects’. The text quoted, with some omissions and mild revisions, is that of *Treatise* 3.2.12.2–5 concerning the origin of the virtue of chastity. Following the quotation, the reviewer remarks: ‘So much *good sense* and *sound reasoning* was never perhaps delivered in so few words, on the subject of female virtue, by any writer ancient or modern: yet this is an extract from the treatise, whose confutation has been impudently attempted, more than once, by mere *common sense*, and *childish declamation!*’<sup>422</sup>

Hume’s ‘My Own Life’—which mentions when the *Treatise* was written, reports that it fell ‘*dead-born from the Press*’, and that it was then recast into three shorter works—was published in the *Scots Magazine* in January 1777, and as a pamphlet in March of the same year.<sup>423</sup> Several journals took the

<sup>420</sup> *Annual Register*, 27–8.

<sup>421</sup> *Ibid.* 28–9.

<sup>422</sup> *Ibid.* 29–30.

<sup>423</sup> I return to ‘My Own Life’ near the end of the following section.

occasion to comment on the *Treatise*. The *Critical Review* was not satisfied with Hume's claim that the *Treatise* fell 'dead-born from the Press':

We remember, however, that it was distinguished by the Reviewers of that time, though not in a manner suitable to the expectations or wishes of the Author. It was treated with some degree of contempt by the Writer of the *History of the Works of the Learned*, vol. ii. for the year 1739; who, nevertheless, prognosticated better things, from the maturer age of the author. There is a pleasant story of David's paying a visit to the Critic, and threatening to put him to the sword; but as we cannot duly authenticate the particulars, we do not chuse to repeat them.<sup>424</sup>

The *London Review* for the same month was less circumspect. Having recalled that the *Treatise* was 'severely handled' in the *History of the Works of the Learned*, it went on to say that this 'so highly provoked our young philosopher, that he flew in a violent rage, to demand satisfaction of Jacob Robinson, the publisher; whom he kept, during the paroxysm of his anger, at his sword's point, trembling behind the counter lest a period should be put to the life of a sober critic by a raving philosopher'.<sup>425</sup> But including this unlikely story was not a sign of the reviewer's hostility toward the *Treatise* and its author, for he went on to say:

It is remarkable that, in the history of our author's literary career, he is totally silent on the subject of that formidable attack, on his philosophical principles, by Dr. Beattie, in the latter's Essay on the Immutability of Truth. *Formidable* we call it, on account merely of its popularity, and the very favourable reception it met with in the world; a reception very different from that of our author's Essay on Human Nature. It were difficult to speak of this work [of Beattie's] with more contempt than, we are well assured, Mr. Hume entertained of it. "Truth!" says he, "there is no truth in it; it is a horrible large lie in *Octavo*."<sup>426</sup>

There were, however, less sympathetic comments on the *Treatise*. John Home's 'Account of the Life and Writings of the late David Hume' was reprinted in the *Weekly Magazine* in November 1777. The following month an anonymous 'Postilion' responded, doubting that the youthful Hume had changed the course of metaphysics or, for that matter, in his remarks on chastity, had shown much 'good sense and sound reasoning'. In 'plain English' he has said this:

A wife may be a w---e while the man is ignorant of it; that therefore she may not go astray, and he may have some security for the child she bears being his, and so be inclined to take care of it, it is right she be backward to grant favours to adulterers.

<sup>424</sup> *Critical Review*, March 1777, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 268.

<sup>425</sup> *London Review*, March 1777, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 269.

<sup>426</sup> *Ibid.* 275.

Can I exult in the profound thinking or erudition of the man who makes this speech, and say, he is an impudent childish declaimer who ventures to write against him?<sup>427</sup>

Two weeks later, the same journal published further ‘Strictures’ on John Home’s ‘Account’ of Hume. These criticisms came from a pseudonymous ‘Tobias Simple’. This author’s reservations about the *Treatise* encompass a broader range of philosophical issues. He doubts that Hume is as insightful as he has been represented, and uses the discussion of chastity in support of this doubt. He also defends the allegedly narrow-minded members of the presbytery of Edinburgh.<sup>428</sup> He then collects eight of Hume’s ‘dogmas’. Four of these are traced to the *Treatise*:<sup>429</sup>

1. “The efficacy of causes (says he) is neither placed in causes themselves, nor in the Deity, but belongs entirely to the soul.” The obvious conclusion is, that there is *no first cause*.
3. That matter and motion may be the cause of thought.
6. That justice is not a natural virtue, but artificial and arbitrary.
7. That all moral virtues are of the same nature, i.e. arbitrary, and depending on the custom and institutions of men.

The pseudonymous Simple then imagines a short lecture which Hume might have given had he obtained the Chair at Edinburgh, but makes no further claims about the *Treatise*. But enough has been said, both by Hume’s critics and by John Home, to suggest that the *Treatise* was understood by few at the time of Hume’s death.

Many additional responses to the *Treatise*, and many of the most important ones, have appeared since 1777, but those responses constitute a story too long and complex to pursue here.

## 10. HUME’S ASSESSMENTS AND RECASTINGS OF THE *TREATISE*

Twice near the end of his life Hume made now well-known public assessments of the *Treatise*. The first of these, a brief Advertisement, describes the work as a juvenile production which he had never publicly acknowledged, and requests that those interested in his mature philosophical views look for

<sup>427</sup> *Weekly Magazine*, Dec. 1777, in Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses*, 9: 371.

<sup>428</sup> *Ibid.* 375–7.

<sup>429</sup> *Ibid.* Four other dogmas are listed. Three of these are traced to *EHU*. No source is given for the fourth, ‘That neither matter nor spirit exist’.

these in the second half of his *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*.<sup>430</sup> The second assessment is made up of even briefer comments included in 'My Own Life'. Not so well known is the fact that these late authorial assessments of the *Treatise* follow a dozen others made in the preceding thirty-five years. It is to these earlier assessments that I turn first.

At summer's end 1734 Hume arrived in France, uncertain about his ability to deliver his 'Opinions with such Elegance & Neatness, as to draw to [himself] the Attention of the World', and preferring to 'rather live & dye in Obscurity than produce them maim'd & imperfect'.<sup>431</sup> Three years later, on his way back to Britain and entering what he described as a 'critical Time of Life', he had in hand a manuscript whose reasonings he took to have 'little Dependence on all former Systems of Philosophy' and requiring, he thought, nothing but 'natural Good Sense' to assess 'their Force & Solidity'.<sup>432</sup>

By the end of 1737, as we saw in Section 1 above, Hume was not yet satisfied with his great work. He regretted that he could not satisfy Henry Home's curiosity by providing him with an intelligible general sketch of the *Treatise* and gave as his reason that his opinions and the terms in which they were expressed were 'so new'. The fact that there would be further delays in the printing of the work he saw as an advantage, for it would give him time to improve at least its 'Style & Diction', which he now found less satisfactory than he had when he 'was alone in perfect Tranquillity in France', a comment which may suggest that parts of Hume's work were now being read by others.<sup>433</sup> It is in this letter that Hume says he is revising his work to make it less offensive, with the expectation of showing it to Joseph Butler.

In early 1738, Hume reported to Home that he had tried, unsuccessfully, to call on Butler. Unsure about his work, he had hoped, in vain as it happened, to gain an authoritative and disinterested opinion of the still unpublished *Treatise*:

I am a little anxious to have the Doctor's opinion. My own I dare not trust to; both because it concerns myself, and because it is so variable, that I know not how to fix it.

<sup>430</sup> Vol. 2 of 2-vol. editions, vols. 3 and 4 of 4-vol. editions of *ETSS*.

<sup>431</sup> Letter to a physician, *Letters*, 1: 17, quoted more fully above, Sect. 1.

<sup>432</sup> Letter of 26 Aug. 1737 to Michael Ramsay, quoted more fully in Sect. 2 above. Hume, in this same letter, and referring to what Ramsay considered his 'superior Progress in the Sciences', said: 'I know not how far there may be a Foundation for what you say. I must flatter myself that there is some Ground for it, in order to support my Courage in that dangerous Situation, in which I have plac'd myself. But however that may be, I have enough of Science to know, that a Man who is incapable of Gratitude & Friendship is in a very disconsolate Condition, whatever Abilities he may be endow'd with & whatever Fame he may acquire.'

<sup>433</sup> Letter of 2 Dec. 1737 to Home, *New Letters*, 1–2. Note 6, to *Treatise* 1.2.2.2, may also support this conjecture.

Sometimes it elevates me above the clouds; at other times, it depresses me with doubts and fears; so that whatever be my success, I cannot be entirely disappointed.

He also saw, in the possibility that Home was soon to be in London, an opportunity for philosophical advice about the *Treatise* from his older friend:

I should esteem this a very lucky event; and notwithstanding all the pleasures of the town, I would certainly engage you to pass some philosophical evenings with me, and either correct my judgment, where you differ from me, or confirm it where we agree. I believe I have some need of the one, as well as the other; and though the propensity to diffidence be an error on the better side, yet 'tis an error, and dangerous, as well as disagreeable.<sup>434</sup>

Hume's fears for the *Treatise* were also great enough to make him think that being at home in the Scottish countryside, while the 'Success of the Work was doubtful', would perhaps spare him mortification and contribute to his tranquillity, he wrote to Home in February 1739.<sup>435</sup> In this same letter he also said that he expected no quick resolution of this uncertainty. Those capable of reading so abstruse a work as the *Treatise* would be too biased to give it its due, while those not biased by prior metaphysical commitments would be unprepared to appreciate a work of this kind. 'My Principles', he went on, 'are also so remote from all the vulgar Sentiments on this Subject, that were they to take place, they wou'd produce almost a total Alteration in Philosophy', a *revolution*, in fact, while 'Revolutions of this kind are not easily brought about. I am young enough to see what will come of the Matter; but am apprehensive lest the chief Reward I shall have for some time will be the Pleasure of studying on such important Subjects, & the Approbation of a few Judges.'<sup>436</sup>

At the end of this letter Hume again displayed his vacillating sentiments about the *Treatise*, citing a weakness that authors and lovers have in common. They are 'both besotted with a blind Fondness of their Object', and though he had been on guard against this weakness, he had by now come to have an 'implicite Confidence' in his work.<sup>437</sup> In a letter to Michael Ramsay written only a month later he again counselled himself to be patient:

As to myself, no Alteration has happen'd in my Fortune, nor have I taken the least Step towards it. I hope things will be riper next Winter; & I wou'd not aim at any thing till I cou'd judge of my Success in my grand Undertaking, & see upon what

<sup>434</sup> Letter of 4 March 1738 to Home, *Letters*, 1: 25. Hume later sent Butler a copy of Vols. 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*: 'I have sent the Bishop of Bristol a Copy; but cou'd not wait on him with your Letter after he had arriv'd at that Dignity: At least I thought it wou'd be to no purpose after I begun the Printing.' Butler was named bishop of Bristol in 1738.

<sup>435</sup> Letter of 13 Feb. 1739, *New Letters*, 3; see Sect. 2 above for the full text of these remarks.

<sup>436</sup> *New Letters*, 3–4. A similar assessment is found in the Preface to the *Abstract*; see above, Sect. 3.

<sup>437</sup> See also Hume's letter to Des Maizeaux, quoted above, Sect. 2.

footing I shall stand in the World. I am afraid, however, that I shall not have any great Success of a sudden. Such Performances make their way very heavily at first, when they are not recommended by any great Name or Authority.<sup>438</sup>

By June 1739 even this modicum of confidence was gone. To Home he wrote that he was not much in the mood to write essays, ‘having receiv’d News from London of the Success of my Philosophy, which is but indifferent, if I may judge by the Sale of the Books, & if I may believe my Bookseller’. He then expands on the topic:

I am now out of Humour with myself; but doubt not in a little time to be only out of Humour with the World, like other unsuccessful Authors. After all, I am sensible of my Folly in entertaining any Discontent, much more Despair upon this Account; since I cou’d not expect any better from such abstract Reasoning, nor indeed did I promise myself much better. My Fondness for what I imagin’d new Discoveries made me overlook all common Rules of Prudence; & having enjoy’d the usual Satisfaction of Projectors, tis but just I shou’d meet with their Dissappointments. However, as ’tis observ’d that with such sort of People, one Project generally succeeds another, I doubt not but in a day or two I shall be as easy as ever, in Hopes that Truth will prevail at last over the Indifference & Opposition of the World.<sup>439</sup>

About the *Treatise* Hume cannot be said to have taken his own advice to be patient. Within the next few months he wrote the *Abstract*, a short work intended to make more intelligible to ordinary readers a much longer one that had been said to be obscure and hard to understand. This short work provides us with Hume’s most positive assessment of the *Treatise*. He grants that the work is long and abstract and thus difficult to take in, but he immediately goes on to defend its originality and to suggest that it offers, as he had suggested in his earlier letters, a revolutionary new foundation for ‘*the greatest part of the sciences*’ (Preface 2). He compares the *Treatise* to other works (the works of Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler) that have ‘had a great vogue of late years in *England*’, works that aim to set out a ‘*science of man*’ or an anatomy of human nature as accurate as are ‘several parts of natural philosophy’ (*Abs.* 1–2). As we saw in Section 3 above, these background remarks are followed by a brief summary of the *Treatise* account of central ‘*reasonings concerning matter of fact*’—a summary of its novel account of the derivation of our idea of causal connections, including the idea of the ‘*necessary connexion betwixt the cause and effect*’; of its equally novel account of belief; and of its application of these findings to the operation of the mind (*Abs.* 5–26). Hume then briefly mentions other

<sup>438</sup> Letter of 22 Feb. 1739 to Michael Ramsay, *Letters*, 1: 28.

<sup>439</sup> Letter of 4 June 1739, *New Letters*, 5.

unusual views found in the *Treatise*: that the soul or mind is neither thought itself nor a substance, but ‘nothing but a system or train of different perceptions . . . all united together, but without any perfect simplicity or identity’ (*Abs.* 28); that extension is not infinitely divisible; that geometry is not an exact science; that the *Treatise* presents a ‘new and extraordinary’ account of the passions; and makes the controversial claim that human actions are subject to the same necessity as that which characterizes the ‘operations of external bodies’ (*Abs.* 29–31).

In the course of his summary Hume also tells us that the philosophy contained in the *Treatise* is ‘very sceptical’, tending ‘to give us a notion of the imperfections and narrow limits of human understanding’, and that while there are throughout this book ‘great pretensions to new discoveries in philosophy’, the one thing that can justify taking the author to be ‘an *inventor*’ is the widespread ‘use he makes of the association of ideas’ (*Abs.* 27, 35). But Hume moderates this positive assessment of the *Treatise* in the Preface of the *Abstract*, where he repeats his earlier prediction that the author of this revolutionary work will need to ‘wait with patience’ for the learned world to agree with him because his work must be judged by the ‘Few’ who are capable of judging such work, and these, partial as they are to their own systems, are likely to be prejudiced against his (Preface 3; cf. *Abs.* 4).<sup>440</sup>

By March 1740, Hume was, as we saw in Section 4 above, already anxious to prepare a second edition of the *Treatise*. ‘I wait’, he wrote to Hutcheson, with some Impatience for a second Edition principally on Account of Alterations I intend to make in my Performance. This is an Advantage, that we Authors possess since the Invention of Printing & renders the *Nonum prematur in annum* not so necessary to us as to the Antients.<sup>441</sup> Without it I should have been guilty of a very great Temerity to publish at my Years so many Noveltys in so delicate a Part of Philosophy: And at any Rate I am afraid, that I must plead as my Excuse that very Circumstance of Youth, which may be urg’d against me. I assure you, that without running any of the heights of Scepticism, I am apt, in a cool hour, to suspect, in general, that most of my Reasonings will be more useful by furnishing Hints & exciting People’s Curiosity than as containing any Principles that will augment the Stock of Knowledge that must pass to future Ages. I wish I cou’d discover more fully the particulars wherein I have fail’d. I admire so much the Candour I have observd in

<sup>440</sup> On the likelihood that the Preface was written after the main text of the *Abstract*, see Sect. 3, pp. 460–1.

<sup>441</sup> Hume cites, not quite accurately, from Horace, *Ars poetica* 388: ‘Nonumque prematur in annum’, or, more fully, ‘si quid tamen olim scripseris, in Maeci descendat iudicis auris et patris et nostras, nonumque prematur in annum, membranis intus positis: delere licebit quod non edideris; nescit vox missa reverti’. (‘Yet if ever you do write anything, let it enter the ears of some critical Maecius, and your father’s, and my own; then put your parchment in the closet and keep it back till the ninth year. What you have not published you can destroy; the word once sent forth can never come back.’)

Mr Locke, Yourself, & a very few more, that I woud be extremely ambitious of imitating it, by frankly confessing my Errors: If I do not imitate it, it must proceed neither from my being free from Errors, nor from want of Inclination; but from my real unaffected Ignorance. I shall consider more carefully all the Particulars you mention to me.<sup>442</sup>

Indeed, by the date of this letter, which Hume begins by asking for advice about a publisher for the third volume of the *Treatise*, he had likely begun preparing that second edition. The copies of Volumes 1 and 2 of the *Treatise* containing the ‘Vast of Corrections and Additions in the handwriting of the Author’, still extant in 1838, have not been found.<sup>443</sup> But readers have had, since November 1740, the substantive additions provided by the Appendix, ‘Wherein some Passages of the foregoing Volumes are Illustrated and Explain’d’, found in Volume 3 of the work. We have also had, in the opening paragraph of the Appendix, an assessment of those volumes. Having begun by indicating that he is eager to admit and correct errors, Hume goes on to say, I have not yet been so fortunate as to discover any very considerable mistakes in the reasonings deliver’d in the preceding volumes, except on one article: But I have found by experience, that some of my expressions have not been so well chosen, as to guard against all mistakes in the readers; and ’tis chiefly to remedy this defect, I have subjoin’d the following appendix. (App. 1)

Then, after an attempt to explain or illustrate his novel account of belief, he turns to the one ‘article’ he supposes defective, saying,

I had entertain’d some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it wou’d be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning *personal identity*, I find myself involv’d in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. If this be not a good *general* reason for scepticism, ’tis at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supply’d) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions. (App. 10)

One should also note here that the opening paragraph of *Treatise* 3.1.1 provides at least an implicit assessment of the earlier volumes. There Hume says that, because morality is ‘a subject that interests us above all others’, the ‘present system of philosophy will acquire new force as it advances; and . . . our reasonings concerning *morals* will corroborate whatever has been said concerning the *understanding* and the *passions*’. Without this advantage,

<sup>442</sup> *Letters*, 1: 38–9; Hume goes on to mention matters he intends to revise. This letter and the revisions it mentions are also discussed in Sect. 4 above.

<sup>443</sup> For further details, see above, at the end of Sect. 4, and Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 25, 105.



he adds, 'I never shou'd have ventur'd upon a third volume of such abstruse philosophy, in an age, wherein the greatest part of men seem agreed to convert reading into an amusement, and to reject every thing that requires any considerable degree of attention to be comprehended'.

There are no extant authorial assessments of the third and final book of the *Treatise*. There are, however, many amendments to this book. That these were meant to be incorporated into a second edition of Book 3 cannot at present be established by any explicit remark by Hume. But the existence of these amendments constitutes an authorial assessment of Book 3 as published: Hume at one time, perhaps as early as the winter of 1740, believed that this text needed to be clarified, and set about revising a copy of it.<sup>444</sup>

The next authorial assessments of the *Treatise* available to us were made in mid-spring 1745, as part of the *Letter from a Gentleman*. As we saw above, Hume in his part of this work responds to six charges made against him as author of the *Treatise*.<sup>445</sup> He denies and rebuts each of these charges, and does so with a vigour which shows that in 1745 he was not ready to abandon positions or conclusions central to the *Treatise*. But he was ready to say that he had published the *Treatise* too soon: 'I am indeed of Opinion, that the Author had better delayed the publishing of that Book; not on account of any dangerous Principles contained in it, but because on more mature Consideration he might have rendered it much less imperfect by further Corrections and Revisals.'<sup>446</sup>

In 1751 Gilbert Elliot, in philosophical correspondence with Hume, must have asked if he would benefit from reading the *Treatise*. It was to some such question that Hume was replying when he judged the *Treatise* to have been defectively composed and precipitately published:

I believe the philosophical Essays<sup>447</sup> contain every thing of Consequence relating to the Understanding, which you woud meet with in the *Treatise*; & I give you my Advice against reading the latter. By shortening & simplifying the Questions, I really render them much more complete. *Addo dum minuo*.<sup>448</sup> The philosophical Principles are the same in both: But I was carry'd away by the Heat of Youth & Invention to publish too precipitately. So vast an Undertaking, plan'd before I was one and twenty, & compos'd before twenty five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, & a hundred times.<sup>449</sup>

Hume offered a similar assessment of the *Treatise* in 1754. It was then that he confessed to John Stewart his 'very great Mistake in Conduct, viz my

<sup>444</sup> On these amendments, see Sect. 5 above. The present edition of the *Treatise* incorporates these amendments, in appropriate form; for details see Editing the Texts, Sect. 3.5 (Register B).

<sup>445</sup> For further details, see the text of the *Letter from a Gentleman* and Sect. 8 above.

<sup>446</sup> *Letter from a Gentleman* 41.

<sup>447</sup> That is, the *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* (later, *EHU*).

<sup>448</sup> I add while I decrease in size. <sup>449</sup> *Letters*, 1: 158.

publishing at all the 'Treatise of human Nature', a book that attempted innovations 'in all the sublimest Parts of Philosophy', and that was written with a 'positive Air' that displeased him so much that he could no longer review it, though he could hope that 'the same Doctrines, better illustrated & exprest' would meet with success.<sup>450</sup>

These assessments remind us that at some point, perhaps even before 1745, Hume had lost confidence in the *Treatise*, and in one important sense had given up on it. He recognized that the *Treatise* was not attracting the kind of attention he had hoped for, and he could see that copies were selling so slowly that there was no reasonable prospect of a second edition. In his contract with John Noon he had, as he told Hutcheson, committed himself 'heedlessly in a Clause, which may prove troublesome, viz, that upon printing a second Edition' he would purchase all remaining copies of the first edition 'at the Bookseller's Price at the time'.<sup>451</sup> Hume, with limited financial resources, could not in the early or mid-1740s have given serious consideration to buying the large quantity of unsold copies remaining in Noon's warehouse. And a large quantity there must have been, for nearly twenty years later, on 10 February 1763, a month after John Noon's death, stock from his inventory was sold at a booksellers' trade sale. Among the lots offered was one made up of 290 copies of 'Hume on Human Nature, 2 vol'.<sup>452</sup> If 290 sets of Volumes 1 and 2 were still unsold in 1763, it is safe to assume that a much larger number were unsold in 1745, well before Hume

<sup>450</sup> Ibid. 187; for the full text of Hume's remarks, see *John Stewart*, Sect. 9.2 above.

<sup>451</sup> *Letters*, I: 38. The text of this letter is quoted more fully at the end of Sect. 5 above. Hume's contract with Noon is quoted in full in Sect. 2.

<sup>452</sup> An annotated copy of the catalogue for this sale indicates that all or some of these copies were purchased, for 7*d.* (for 7*d.* per set, that is?) by George Keith, a bookseller who had on occasion published in partnership with Noon. Keith is recorded as having purchased at this same sale and for the same price at least two other philosophical works published by Noon: viz. Turnbull's *Principles of Moral Philosophy* (some or all of 250 copies purchased), and Turnbull's translation of Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* (some or all of 500 copies purchased). These two works Keith reissued with cancel title-pages bearing his own imprint, but there is no evidence that such a change was made to any copies of the *Treatise*. In addition, on 7 Sept. 1758 six copies of 'Hume on Human Nature 2 vols.' were offered for sale, and perhaps not sold; on 27 Sept. 1759, Keith bought six copies, 'Hume on Human Nature 2 vol.' for 16. 6*d.* Information about these sales and that mentioned in the following paragraph may be found in *A Collection of the Catalogues of Trade Sales of Books... from 3 April 1718 to Dec. 1768*, British Library, Shelf Mark C.170.aa.1, catalogues 82, 96, 102, 121. See also C. Blagden, 'Booksellers' Trade Sales 1718-1768'; T. Belanger, 'Booksellers' Trade Sales, 1718-1768'.

There is similar, but less specific evidence suggesting that Longman also had difficulty selling Vol. 3 of the *Treatise*. On 5 June 1760, a booksellers' trade sale offered at auction 200 copies of 'Hume on Human Nature'. The surviving record of this sale gives no further details—no indication of the price the lot brought, of the buyer (if there was one), or even of the exact nature of the lot. It is likely, however, that 200 copies of Vol. 3 of the *Treatise* were on offer. Eighteenth-century catalogues of such sales typically indicate if a work of more than one volume is being sold; the absence of such an indication here suggests that the lot was made up of copies of a single volume. In addition, Thomas Longman, the publisher of Vol. 3, had died in 1755, and copies of works owned by the Longman firm were offered in several sales held after that date.

became famous, and Noon, through additional advertisements, had done his best to capitalize on that fame by selling more copies of the work. Consequently, Hume had no viable options so far as the *Treatise* was concerned. There could be no hoped-for second edition because he simply did not have, at the appropriate time, from £250 to £350 to purchase, at 10s. each, the 500–700 sets of *Treatise* 1 and 2 that Noon was likely to have had in the mid-1740s.<sup>453</sup> Because he had a contractual obligation to Noon that he could not meet by purchasing the remaining copies, his only viable option, if he was successfully to promulgate his philosophical principles, was to give the essentials of the *Treatise* a significantly different form.<sup>454</sup> Thus, at roughly the same time as he was responding to Wishart's criticisms, Hume began to reshape Book 1 of the *Treatise* as a set of related essays. This revised presentation of the 'philosophical Principles' relating to the understanding, *Philosophical Essays concerning the Human Understanding*, was probably written by the summer of 1747; it was printed and published in April 1748.<sup>455</sup>

Hume was disappointed with the early reception of the *Philosophical Essays* ('this piece was at first but little more successful than the *Treatise* of human Nature', he said), but he none the less persevered in his reformulation of his philosophical views. Sometime in 1749 he went to live with his brother at Ninewells, and there over the next two years he 'composed the second Part of my *Essays*, which I called *Political Discourses*; and also my *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, which is another part of my *Treatise*, that I cast anew'.<sup>456</sup> This work was printed in July 1751, and published, with the title it has always had, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, later that year.<sup>457</sup> Hume was pleased with this second reformulation, judging it 'of all my writings, historical,

<sup>453</sup> Following his appointments as tutor to the Marquis of Annendale, then as secretary and later as aide-de-camp to General St Clair, Hume summarized his assets in these terms: 'While Interest remains as at present, I have £50 a year, £100 worth of Books, great Store of Linnens and fine Cloaths, & near £100 in my Pocket' (Letter of 22 June 1751, *Letters*, 1: 161). In his autobiography he says that these three 'Appointments, with my Frugality, had made me reach a Fortune, which I called independent, though most of my Friends were inclined to smile when I said so: In short, I was now Master of near a thousand Pound' ('My Own Life', 3). From these remarks we can reasonably conclude that, until at least c.1748, Hume would not have had sufficient capital to buy up Noon's stock of first-edition copies. But by that date Hume had already decided that his philosophical future would be best served by moving on from the *Treatise*, by presenting his principles in a new form. Indeed, the first of his recastings of the *Treatise*, the *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* (later, *EHU*), was published while Hume was still employed abroad by St Clair.

<sup>454</sup> I grant that by the early 1740s Hume was so thoroughly disenchanted with the *Treatise* that he would not have revised it even if that option had been open to him—I insist only that the option was not open to him. For an alternative account of the matter, see Beauchamp, Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), pp. xii and n. 4.

<sup>455</sup> For further details, see Beauchamp, Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), pp. xix–xxii, xlv.

<sup>456</sup> 'My Own Life', 3. Hume's *Political Discourses* was first published in 1752, with a second edition that same year.

<sup>457</sup> For further details, see Beauchamp, Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), pp. xxiii–xxiv, xlv.

philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best', but not with its reception. The work, he said, 'came unnoticed and unobserved into the World'.<sup>458</sup>

The third and last recasting of the *Treatise* produced *A Dissertation on the Passions*, a piece first published in Hume's *Four Dissertations* of 1757, where it was titled, *Of the Passions*.<sup>459</sup> This work quarried the text of the *Treatise* more extensively, relatively speaking, than did either the first or second *Enquiry*. More than 70 per cent of the text of this 10,500-word work derives, in a recognizable form, and often nearly verbatim, from the *Treatise*. The Editors' Annotations indicate where such textual borrowings are made by each of Hume's three recastings. They also direct the reader to many of those places at which these works take up topics found earlier in the *Treatise*, or, in some cases, in the *Abstract* or *Letter*.

We have yet to consider Hume's final assessments of the *Treatise*, the well-known ones of 1775–6. Writing on 26 October 1775 to his printer and friend William Strahan, Hume near the end of his letter says:

But we must not part, without my also saying something as an Author. I have not yet thrown up so much all Memory of that Character. There is a short Advertisement, which I wish I had prefix'd to the second Volume of the Essays and Treatises in the last Edition. I send you a Copy of it. Please to enquire at the Warehouse, if any considerable Number of that Edition remain on hands; and if there do, I beg the favour of you, that you woud throw off an equal Number of this Advertisement, and give out no more Copies without prefixing it to the second volume.<sup>460</sup> It is a compleat Answer to Dr Reid and to that bigotted silly Fellow, Beattie.<sup>461</sup>

Strahan complied at once with Hume's request, and confirmed that he had done so: 'The *Advertisement* (a very proper one) shall be instantly printed,

<sup>458</sup> 'My Own Life', 4. The second *Enquiry* may represent the kind of philosophical work that Hume had in mind when he told Hutcheson: 'I intend to make a new Tryal, if it be possible to make the Moralist & Metaphysician agree a little better' (letter of 17 Sept. 1739, *Letters*, 1: 33). For an exploration of this topic, see Stewart, 'Two Species of Philosophy', 86–95.

<sup>459</sup> Hume changed the title a year later when he included this work in his *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*. For the genesis of this collection, see Beauchamp, Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), pp. xxv–xxix.

<sup>460</sup> About two weeks later Hume repeated this instruction about the volume to which the Advertisement was to be prefixed. 'Your Memory has fail'd you', he wrote to Strahan. 'The last Quarto Edition of my philosophical Pieces in 1768 was in two Volumes, and this Advertisement may be prefixed to the second Volume' (letter of 13 Nov. 1775, *Letters* 2: 304). It is the second volume of that edition (and of all 2-vol. editions) of *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*, a volume made up of *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, *A Dissertation on the Passions*, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, and *The Natural History of Religion*. I have not supposed that Hume intended the Advertisement to apply to the last of these four items.

<sup>461</sup> *Letters*, 2: 301. Hume's comment that this Advertisement is a 'compleat Answer' to Reid and Beattie has proved intriguing, and has led to a number of conjectures about the meaning of the comment and of its relation to the Advertisement. For a comprehensive discussion of these conjectures and of his own, see James Somerville, *The Enigmatic Parting Shot*, chs. 1–5.

and annexed to all the *Essays* that still remain.<sup>462</sup> As it happened, three editions of the *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects* remained in stock: the two-volume octavo edition of 1772, the four-volume, small octavo edition of 1770, and the two-volume quarto edition of 1768. In January 1776 Strahan printed copies of the Advertisement suited to each of these editions.<sup>463</sup> The text of the Advertisement, as it appears in a copy of the first volume of *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*, 1770, reads:

ADVERTISEMENT.

Most of the Principles and Reasonings contained in this Volume, were published in a Work in Three Volumes, intitled, *A Treatise of Human Nature: a Work*, which the Author had projected before he left College, and which he wrote and published not long after. But not finding it successful, he was sensible of his Error in going to the Press too early, and he cast the whole anew in the following Pieces; where some Negligences in his former Reasoning, and more in the Expression, are, he hopes, corrected. Yet several Writers, who have honoured the Author's Philosophy with Answers, have taken care to direct all their Batteries against that juvenile Work, which the Author never acknowledged; and have affected to triumph in any Advantages, which, they imagine, they had obtained over it:<sup>464</sup> a Practice very contrary to all Rules of Candour and Fair-dealing, and a strong Instance of those polemical Artifices, which a bigotted Zeal thinks itself authorised to employ. Henceforth, the

<sup>462</sup> *Letters*, 2: 304 n.

<sup>463</sup> Strahan's ledgers indicate that it was at this time, Jan. 1776, that he printed, for insertion in the three existing editions mentioned, 500, 500, and 250 copies, respectively, of the Advertisement (British Library, Add. MS 48801, fol. 68). Burton noticed that the Advertisement was to be used in editions already printed, and not just those to come, as a letter to him from T. H. Grose makes clear. Burton had loaned Grose a copy of Hume's *Philosophical Essays* of 1748. In arranging to return the book, Grose wrote: 'There is one passage in [your] Life of Hume, about which I entertain a doubt. It is in vol. 1 p. 273. "He now desired &c." "In subsequent editions &c."'. This evidently refers to the Advertisement which is prefixed to vol. 2. of the edition of 1777. But I do not find it prefixed to any other edition. If I am right, the text should run: "In the posthumous edition of 1777 &c."' (National Library of Scotland, MS 9399). Burton's reply is lost, but Grose was correct in supposing that Burton suggests that the Advertisement appeared, as indeed it did, before Hume's death (see *Life and Correspondence*, 1: 273–4). His suggestion is so vague, however, that the reader might think that Hume had openly distanced himself from the *Treatise* as early as 1748. Wayne Colver noted that his copy of the 1770 edition of *ETSS* included the Advertisement in a form different from that found in the 1777 edition ('A Variant of Hume's Advertisement Repudiating the *Treatise*', 67–8). So, too, does a copy of the 1770 edition in the library of the University of Liverpool. But, while these two copies of the small octavo Advertisement have been located, no copies of the Advertisement have been reported in the 1768 or 1772 editions of *ETSS*. The scarcity of volumes having the Advertisement added may be the effect of a fire which destroyed a warehouse belonging to Thomas Cadell on 2 March 1776. (Cadell, partner with Andrew Millar from 1765, became Hume's London publisher after Millar's death in 1768.) Hume mentions this fire in his letter to Strahan of 8 April 1776 (*Letters*, 2: 313–14).

<sup>464</sup> Of the post-1748 critics of Hume's views, only Reid focuses entirely on the *Treatise*. And although Hume had in 1740 publicly voiced dissatisfaction, in the Appendix to the third volume of the *Treatise*, with his account of personal identity, none of those who criticize this account (e.g., Kames, Reid, or Beattie) takes note of his second thoughts on this topic.

Author desires, that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical Sentiments and Principles.<sup>465</sup>

In April 1776, six months after sending the Advertisement to Strahan, Hume wrote his brief autobiography, and in this made his final remarks about the *Treatise*. The most famous of these, the suggestion that the *Treatise* ‘fell dead-born from the Press’, is not an assessment of the *Treatise* itself. It is, rather, as we saw in Section 8, Hume’s recollection of the lack of interest in the *Treatise* during a relatively brief period immediately following its publication. But a less often quoted remark is an assessment:

I had always entertained a Notion that my want of Success, in publishing the *Treatise* of human Nature, had proceeded more from the manner than the matter; and that I had been guilty of a very usual Indiscretion, in going to the Press too early.<sup>466</sup>

In general terms, these last judgements—those of the Advertisement and this from ‘My Own Life’—are consistent with one another, and also with those made by Hume as much as thirty-five years earlier. As early as 1740 he had judged the *Treatise* to be a youthful performance in need of revision. This early assessment is repeated, in stronger terms in 1745, 1751, and 1754. The Advertisement and ‘My Own Life’ make the same point using a different vocabulary. Each of these authorial assessments of the *Treatise* points to what Hume sees as defective or imperfect articulations of acceptable philosophical principles. In 1745 he recommends ‘Corrections and Revisals’ while maintaining that there are no ‘dangerous Principles’ in the work. In 1751 he says that the ‘philosophical Principles’ of Book 1 and *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding* are the same. In 1754 he speaks of the ‘same Doctrines, better illustrated & exprest’. In the Advertisement he says that most of the ‘Principles and Reasonings’ found in the second half of his *Essays and Treatises* were included in the three volumes of the *Treatise*. He then admits to ‘some Negligences in his former Reasoning, and more in the Expression’, which he hopes to have corrected in his later works, and may in this way intimate that some substantive views found in the *Treatise* are not found in the later works. The comment in ‘My Own Life’, that it was the ‘manner’ more than the ‘matter’ that was implicated in the failure of the *Treatise*, leaves open the same possibility. Nevertheless, his emphasis is again on ‘Expression’ and ‘manner’, on form rather than substance.

The Advertisement also finds Hume emphasizing—some might say embellishing—the juvenile origins of the *Treatise*. The work is no longer said to have been planned before its author was ‘one and twenty’. Now we are told

<sup>465</sup> Quoted from the copy of the 1770 edition of *ETSS* in the University of Liverpool Library (Fraser 832, vol. 1). For the critical text, see *EHU*, Clarendon Edition (p. [1]) or Oxford Philosophical Texts Edition (p. [83]). For additional details concerning the Advertisement, see *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), 125–6.

<sup>466</sup> ‘My Own Life’, 3.

that it was conceived before he left college (before age 18, might the typical eighteenth-century reader guess?) and published a vague ‘not long after’. Hume’s assessments of the *Treatise* may offer different suggestions about when the work was conceived and composed, but one part of his message is unchanging. For roughly half his life Hume deeply regretted that he had published the *Treatise* when he did, because he believed he had done the very thing he had most feared in 1734: he had delivered his opinions in a ‘maim’d & imperfect’ form.

We must observe, however, that the assessments of the *Treatise* found in the Advertisement and ‘My Own Life’ do differ from Hume’s earlier assessments in one important respect. Both constitute printed, public acknowledgement that the *Treatise* is his work. Before the Advertisement, no such public acknowledgement had been made, and thus the Advertisement is Hume’s first public avowal of the *Treatise*. This fact, when coupled with another—Hume’s assertion that most of the ‘Principles and Reasonings’ found in the *Treatise* correspond to the ‘philosophical Sentiments and Principles’ found in the relevant volume(s) of the final lifetime editions of his works—leaves another ambiguity. For, while Hume goes on to ask that henceforth it be understood that only the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, and the *Dissertation on the Passions* be taken as ‘containing his philosophical Sentiments and Principles’, he has left us to understand that many of those same opinions and principles are to be found in the *Treatise*. Consequently, it is an exaggeration to say without qualification that, by publishing the Advertisement, Hume disavowed, disowned, or repudiated the *Treatise*.<sup>467</sup> It is undeniable that by the four complex sentences of the Advertisement he *distanced* himself from the *Treatise*. He gave public notice that he considered it a poorly expressed juvenile work and cautioned against treating it as a reliable source of his mature philosophical views. But he did not explicitly disavow, disown, or repudiate any of the principles and reasonings found in that juvenile work. It was largely the manner, the ‘positive Air’, not the matter, not the ‘philosophical Sentiments and Principles’, that he rejected. Consequently, we may take it that wherever the content of the *Treatise* and the philosophical works found in the *Essays and Treatises* overlap, as they often do, substantive similarities or differences between the earlier work and the later ones must be established on a case-by-case basis, while an informed examination of the *Treatise* may contribute toward a better understanding of those works derived, in part, from it. We may also conclude that, despite Hume’s efforts to distance himself from the *Treatise*, the work is a philosophical classic worthy in its own right of continuing and rigorous study.

<sup>467</sup> For an analysis of the Advertisement that, despite its title, emphasizes this point, see Cummins, ‘Hume’s Disavowal of the *Treatise*’.

## Editing the Texts of the *Treatise*, the *Abstract*, and the *Letter from a Gentleman*

The material presented here is divided into three sections. The first outlines the procedures and policies we have followed in establishing critical texts of the *Treatise*, *Abstract*, and *Letter from a Gentleman*. Following an account of our comparative collations of multiple copies of the *Treatise* and *Abstract*, we provide bibliographical descriptions of all three works, and then continue with other matters relating to the editing of the texts. Register A in Section 2 and Register B in Section 3 record all differences between the copy-texts<sup>1</sup> and the critical texts<sup>2</sup> of the three works.

### 1. FROM COPY-TEXT TO CRITICAL TEXT

#### 1.1 Copy-texts

Volumes 1 and 2 of the *Treatise* were published by John Noon early in 1739; Volume 3 was published by Thomas Longman at the end of October 1740.<sup>3</sup> The work was not published again during Hume's lifetime, and only about 1 per cent of it exists in manuscript form. Consequently, there can be no question regarding the edition from which the copy-text was chosen. For reasons

<sup>1</sup> 'In critical editing, [the *copy-text* is] the text (generally of a particular document) whose readings, because of the circumstances of its production, are presumed authoritative in the absence of contrary evidence. An editor follows its readings except when they are determined to be in error or when there is evidence for the superior authority of variant readings in another text' (Williams and Abbott, *Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies*, 142–3; our explanations of standard bibliographical terms owe much to the Glossary (pp. 136–63) found in this work. See also P. Gaskell, *New Introduction to Bibliography*, 321–35.) In the present context, the term *copy-text* is reserved for those particular copies of the *Treatise*, *Abstract*, and *Letter from a Gentleman* from which our critical texts derive. These copies provide, as it were, a default text whose accidental and substantive readings we have followed except as explained in Sects. 1.5–1.7.8. We observe that those familiar with descriptive bibliography will find several of the notes to this section redundant.

<sup>2</sup> For a start, one may say that a *critical text* is a 'constructed' text. Such a text has its beginnings in a document or documents that are then emended by, among other things, the elimination of errors, the normalization of accidentals (see Sect. 1.5.2), or the incorporation of authorial revisions. The resulting critical text can be contrasted with a *diplomatic* or *documentary* edition, with, i.e., a 'scholarly edition that presents, without emendation, the text of a particular document' (Williams and Abbott, *Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies*, 143–4).

<sup>3</sup> For details, see above, Historical Account, Sects. 2, 5–6.



of convenience, the first-edition copy of the *Treatise* chosen as copy-text was the three-volume set found in the David Hume Collection, Rare Books and Special Collections Division, McGill University Libraries (shelf-mark B1485 1739). The copy-text of the *Abstract* is the British Library copy (shelf-mark C.175.c.8(2)) of the first and only known lifetime edition of that work. This copy, which contains marginalia in Hume's hand, is bound together and catalogued with a copy of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*. The copy-text of the *Letter from a Gentleman* is the one known copy of the first and only known lifetime edition of that work, the copy in the National Library of Scotland (shelf-mark RB.s.141).

## 1.2 Forms of the First-edition Texts

Textual editors preparing critical editions are expected to make all reasonable effort to examine the relevant forms of a given text, looking especially for different states or issues, and seeking out such other information or materials as may shed light on the text. In this section we first report on our collations of multiple copies of the first edition of the *Treatise*, and then describe the variants revealed by these collations. Analogous but much briefer reports regarding the *Abstract* and the *Letter from a Gentleman* follow at 1.2.3 and 1.2.4.

### 1.2.1 Collation of the *Treatise*

Scholars have previously reported on Hume's hand-written corrections and amendments in first-edition copies of the work, and on several textual variants found in this edition.<sup>4</sup> However, no comprehensive comparative collation of the text has been undertaken previously.<sup>5</sup> As a first step in the preparation of the present edition, we carried out such a collation using a McLeod Collator.<sup>6</sup> As a result, we are able to expand and correct previous accounts of textual variants in the *Treatise*, and also to report on additional variants.

<sup>4</sup> On Hume's autograph corrections, see W. Nethery, 'Hume's Manuscript Corrections in a Copy of *A Treatise of Human Nature*'; D. C. Yalden-Thomson, 'More Hume Autograph Marginalia in a First Edition of the *Treatise*'; R. W. Connon, 'Some MS Corrections by Hume in the Third Volume of his *Treatise of Human Nature*'; P. H. Nidditch, *An Apparatus of Variant Readings for Hume's Treatise of Human Nature*; *idem.*, 'Textual Notes'. On textual variants to the *Treatise*, see W. B. Todd, 'David Hume: A Preliminary Bibliography', 190; Nidditch, 'Textual Notes', 664; S. Ikeda, *David Hume and the Eighteenth Century British Thought*, 59. We return to these materials below.

<sup>5</sup> A comparative collation compares one copy of a text with another copy of the same edition of that text in order to see if there are differences between them. In the present case, the copy-text of the *Treatise* (the McGill copy) was systematically compared with other first-edition copies.

<sup>6</sup> The McLeod Collator is a device that uses mirrors to superimpose the visual image of one copy of a text onto the visual image of what is presumed to be another copy of that same text in such a way that any differences between the two texts, even minor differences of spacing, become apparent to the operator. For a description of this collator, see R. McLeod, 'Collator in a Handbag'.

As indicated above, the copy-text for this edition is the McGill University copy of the first edition of the *Treatise*. To carry out our collations, we have used a photocopy of this edition. To minimize distortion of the copied pages, copies were made of only one page per exposure on a copier that allowed single pages to be placed flat against the copier surface. These photocopies were then taken to libraries holding one or more copies of the *Treatise*, and to which, on two occasions, an additional copy of the *Treatise* was brought. As a rule, then, the collations carried out constitute a comparison of the McGill University copy with other copies, but there were partial exceptions to this practice. We also have photocopies of selected pages of one of the University of Toronto copies, and we occasionally collated these with bound copies. In addition, we made selected collations of one bound volume with another.

At the suggestion of Richard Landon, Librarian of the Fisher Library, University of Toronto, Randall McLeod set up a prototype of his device in the Fisher Library, and we were able to use this collator to compare the McGill and Toronto copies of the *Treatise*. All subsequent collations were carried out on a production model of the McLeod Collator. The collator was used in the Rare Book Room of the University of Edinburgh Library, in the National Library of Scotland, in the library of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and in the Hoose Library of Philosophy at the University of Southern California.

The University of Edinburgh Library holds two complete, and parts of three other sets of the *Treatise*. One complete set can be traced to the library of Dugald Stewart, and one incomplete set (Volumes 2 and 3 only) belonged to Adam Smith.<sup>7</sup> An additional incomplete set includes Volumes 1 and 2, and another consists of Volume 1 alone. The National Library of Scotland holds one complete set, and Volumes 1 and 2 of another set. While the collator was set up at this library, Dr Brian Hillyard arranged for the complete set of the *Treatise* belonging to the nearby Signet Library to be made available for collation. Thus, in Edinburgh we were able to collate four complete, and four incomplete, sets of the work, for a total of nineteen volumes.

The Rosenwald Collection of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton contains a previously unreported, three-volume set of the *Treatise* which we were allowed to collate. Furthermore, thanks to the kindness of Lady Eccles and the co-operation of Dr Elliot Shore, then Institute librarian, we were also able to use the Rosenwald Room to collate the copy of the *Treatise* then in the Hyde Collection. Volume 1 of this three-volume set bears the inscription, in Hume's hand, 'To Alexander Pope at Twickenham'. Volumes

<sup>7</sup> Vol. 1 of the Adam Smith copy is located in the Tokyo University Library. See H. Mizuta, *Adam Smith's Library: A Catalogue*, 127.

1 and 2 of this set include corrections in Hume's hand. Later, we were able to collate the three-volume set found in the Hoose Library of Philosophy at the University of Southern California, a set that bears in all three volumes the bookplate of Henry Home, Lord Kames. Volumes 1 and 2 of this set also include corrections in Hume's hand. Table 1 identifies the copies collated; Table 2 identifies copies we have inspected but not collated.

### 1.2.2 Treatise variants

The largest number of textual variants has been located in Volume 3 of the *Treatise*, but there are items of interest in the earlier volumes. The most significant variant in Volume 1 is the cancellans<sup>8</sup> often found at P1 (1: 209–10 / 81.9–82.5),<sup>9</sup> the existence of which has been noted by Todd and Nidditch,

TABLE 1. COPIES COLLATED

Library	Volumes Held	Shelf-mark
McGill University Libraries	1 2 3	B1485 1739
University of Toronto Library	1 2 3	B-11 1807
Edinburgh University Library	1 2 3	JA 3755–7; Stewart copy
	1 2 3	Dh.5.143–5
	1 2	E.B. 1924 [D.154815]
	2 3	JA 2994–5; A. Smith copy
National Library of Scotland	1	E.B. .1924 [AAAM.6.20]
	1 2 3	Q5.11.a–c
	1 2	NF 753.a.15
Signet Library	1 2 3	I Hume H882
Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton	1 2 3	no shelf-mark
Hyde Collection	1 2 3	no shelf-mark; Pope copy*
Hoose Library, Univ. South. Calif.	1 2 3	192.H92t; Kames copy

\*The Pope copy is now held privately in another collection.

<sup>8</sup> A *cancellans* (often shortened to *cancel*) is a leaf that replaces an original leaf (a *cancellandum*) that has been cut out, leaving a stub to which the cancel or replacement leaf is pasted.

<sup>9</sup> P1 is a *signature*. Books are made up of folded sheets known as *gatherings*. Printers of the early modern period identified these gatherings by a series of *signatures*, placed in the *direction line* (see n. 24) of the first page, or first and subsequent pages, of a sheet. Signatures in English books used the twenty-three characters of the Latin alphabet, with additional gatherings assigned multiple letters Aa, Bb... Aaa, Bbb, etc. Thus, the notation P1 denotes the first leaf of gathering P (also called, by extension, *signature P*). In the present discussion, references of the form 1: 209–10 (references that provide a volume number and page(s)), are always to the first-edition text, while references of the form 81.9–30 are always to page and line numbers of the critical text found in vol. 1 of this edition.

Table 2. COPIES INSPECTED

Library	Volumes Held	Shelf-mark
Aberdeen University Library	1 2 3	HN.11.143–5
	1 2 3	SB 1924 T 1
Bodleian Library, Oxford	1 2 3	Godwyn 542–4
British Library	1 2 3	1133.c.4–6; Chalmers copy*
		3 C.175.c.8(1); Hume copy
Cambridge University Library	1 2 3	S180.d.73.1–3
	1 2	S180.d.73.4–5
Clark Library, Univ. Calif. Los Angeles	1 2 3	B1493 .T71
Edinburgh Central Library	1 2	YB 1480
Glasgow University Library	1 2 3	Sp. Coll. 267–9
Huntington Library	1 2 3	290000
King's College Cambridge	1 2 3	F.14.1 <sup>1-3</sup>
	1 2 3	F.14.2 <sup>1-3</sup>
	1 2	F.14.3 <sup>1-2</sup>
	1 2	F.14.4 <sup>1-2</sup>
Princeton University	1 2 3	RHT
	1 2	Ex. 6100.391.15

\*On the Chalmers copy, see R. Klibansky, 'Appendix'. Klibansky correctly conjectured that the manuscript amendments to the text of Vol. 3 of the Chalmers copy derived from authorial amendments.

who record only that the cancellans adds a footnote. It is clear, however, that Hume decided to add the footnote while Volume 2 was being printed, for at least one copy of the work (Edinburgh University Library, Dh.5.143–5) is uncanceled at P1 and has the cancellans bound in Volume 2 as a conjunct final leaf (X8) of the final gathering. The majority of copies of Volume 1 that we have seen are cancelled at P1, with the stub of the cancellandum typically visible. As might be expected, the addition of a fifteen-line note at P1<sup>10</sup> has resulted in a significant reworking of the text, both to make room for the note, and to eliminate text made redundant by it.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> P1<sup>r</sup> denotes the *recto*, the right-hand side or front of leaf P1, in contrast to P1<sup>v</sup>, which denotes the *verso*, the left-hand side or back of P1.

<sup>11</sup> These and all other resulting variants are recorded in Register B. We also found a non-textual difference between the title-pages of some copies of Vol. 1. Near the bottom of these pages there is a double ruled line. In the decided majority of the copies we have examined, the space between these lines is approximately 1mm; in others, including the McGill, Institute for Advanced Study, and Signet Library copies, the lines are separated by a space of approximately 2mm. This variant becomes more interesting as the two versions of the title-page appear to be identical in all other respects (in the spacing of lines and letters, and even in the broken or idiosyncratic letters found both above and below the ruled line). Furthermore, the title-page of Vol. 2 was clearly printed from

Todd, Nidditch, and Ikeda have also reported that some copies of Volume 2 are cancelled at M4 (2: 167–8 / 239.20–240.4).<sup>12</sup> All, however, mistakenly report that the cancellans *adds* a six-line footnote. As can be seen in the copies presented to Kames and Pope, and in one of the King's College copies (F.14.3<sup>2</sup>), it is rather a leaf *without a footnote* that replaces the original leaf that included a footnote.<sup>13</sup> Given the material facts of the matter, it is not difficult to see what happened. Hume, perhaps while reading the proof sheets of Volume 2, concluded that his explanation of the senses in which he had used the word *imagination* would be of greater use if it were moved forward to his discussion of probable reasoning (to the end of 1.3.9), and even more useful if he expanded it. But, having decided to make this change, the reasonable further step was to delete what had become a redundant and inadequate note of explanation at 2.2.7.6, and this is precisely what the cancellans at M4 does. The majority of the copies of Volume 2 that we have examined are uncanceled, perhaps because the removal of a note, and particularly one that appears not to contradict its longer replacement, seemed unimportant to binders and owners of the volume. But the fact that this leaf was completely reset, perhaps at Hume's expense, reveals that he attached some importance to its deletion. So, too, does the fact that in the two surviving copies of Volume 2 that we know Hume to have handled, the copies presented to Kames and Pope, the note-free cancellans has replaced the cancellandum. The resetting of M4 also introduced two minor variants into the text found at M4<sup>r</sup>; these are reported in Register B.

Previous reports of variants in Volume 3 of the *Treatise* are correct as far as they go, but our collation has revealed the existence of previously unnoticed differences, including a variant gathering, F, that introduces approximately twenty textual variants, and a possible complication regarding the cancel to P8.

The first cancelled leaf in Volume 3 is the unpagged A4 (3: pp. [vii–viii]). The final eleven lines of the contents of Book 3 are printed on the recto (A4<sup>r</sup>)

the same setting of type (except for the fact that 'Of the Passions' replaces 'Of the Understanding', and the deletion of the apostrophe from *Mercer's-Chapel* to produce *Mercers-Chapel*). All copies of the title of Vol. 2 that we have seen have the narrower form of the double rule. These phenomena may indicate that the two title-pages were printed by *half-sheet imposition* (on this term, see Williams and Abbot, *Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies*, 149).

<sup>12</sup> For these reports, see n. 4 above.

<sup>13</sup> This finding is corroborated by the cataloguing note for a fourth copy, that in the Houghton Library, Harvard University (\*EC75 H8823T 1739). The note reads: 'In this copy, the leaf containing pp. 167–8 in v. 2 is integral, with a six-line note at the foot of p. 168.' We are indebted to Hugh Amory for confirming this description of the Houghton Library copy.

of this leaf. There are no variants on this page, but differences in spacing reveal that it too was reset. The cancellandum, found in a small proportion of the copies we have seen, contains verso an eight-line Errata, and nothing else. The cancellans replaces this Errata with a fourteen-line version, all of which appears to have been reset. The longer list, although fully consistent with the shorter one, includes an additional eight entries.<sup>14</sup>

The second cancelled leaf in Volume 3 is found at F6 (3: 75–6), where Hume has on F6<sup>v</sup> added an additional sentence that occupies four lines. To accommodate this addition, the compositor (typesetter) replaced the two twenty-nine-line pages of the cancellandum with a cancellans consisting of two thirty-one-line pages. Most of the copies we have examined are cancelled in this way. A copy that is not cancelled in this way is Hume's own copy, but, as Connon has reported, that particular volume incorporates, in the form of marginal additions in Hume's hand, not only the sentence added by the cancellans, but also another sentence.<sup>15</sup> We find, then, that Hume made at least three separate attempts to express a point that appears to be central to his account of the origin of justice and property.<sup>16</sup>

The situation here, however, is more complex than has been previously reported. Gathering F itself is found in two forms (hereafter distinguished as *A* and *B*) that derive from two distinct settings of it. Because *A* is the more common of the two versions, has fewer obvious typographical errors, and follows more closely what we believe to have been the orthographical forms of the manuscript of the *Treatise*, we have concluded that it is the earlier setting, and likely to have been the text from which version *B* was set. These alternative settings introduce a number of additional variants, and result, when combined with the cancel of F6, in four different states of F.<sup>17</sup> These, and a library holding a copy in the relevant state, are:

- State 1 (S1): Copies in this state are made up of version *A* of F, in an uncanceled form (University of Toronto Library).
- State 2 (S2): Copies in this state are made up of version *A* of F, with, at F6, the cancellans described above (National Library of Scotland).
- State 3 (S3): Copies in this state are made up of version *B* of F, in an uncanceled form (Bodleian Library).
- State 4 (S4): Copies in this state are made up of version *B* of F, with, at F6, the cancellans described above (McGill University Library).

<sup>14</sup> Register B indicates which items were added to make the longer list.

<sup>15</sup> See Connon, 'Some Manuscript Corrections', 15–18.

<sup>16</sup> See Register B, entry 320.45–321.2.

<sup>17</sup> A *state* is a part of a book (e.g., a leaf or gathering) that differs in form or substance from the same part of the book as found in other copies of the same impression or edition.

Using A and B to represent the separate leaves of the alternative settings *A* and *B*, and C to represent the cancellans, the situation may be represented schematically:

	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8
S1:	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
S2:	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A
S3:	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B
S4:	B	B	B	B	B	C	B	B

The textual variants resulting from these separate impositions are found between page 316, line 44, and page 322, line 32, of the present edition, and are recorded in Register B.<sup>18</sup>

We have said that the variant gathering of F derives from an entirely new setting of type. That it does is indicated by differences, obvious when seen with the aid of a collator, in spacing (of words, lines, running heads, margin titles, and signatures), and also from more obvious differences in line breaks, individual letters, and marginal brackets. Such evidence of resetting is to be found throughout the two versions of F, and on pages that were part of both the inner and outer formes.<sup>19</sup> As an example of these differences, compare the line breaks in the two versions of 3: 70.14–21:

*A*

nothing can be more certain, than that it is not any relation of ideas, which gives us this concern, but our impressions and sentiments, without which every thing in nature is perfectly indifferent to us, and can never in the least affect us. The sense of justice, therefore, is not founded on our ideas, but on our impressions.

*B*

nothing can be more certain, than that it is not any relation of ideas, which gives us this concern, but our impressions and sentiments, without which every thing in nature is perfectly indifferent to us, and can never in the least affect us. The sense of justice, therefore, is not founded on our ideas, but on our impressions.

Only the two versions of 3: 71.11–16 show a similar alteration in line breaks, but the marginal titles found on five of the eight rectos (3: 65, 71, 73, 77, 79) were set in different patterns, while other kinds of differences can be noted on every page. If these differences, distributed as they are, make it safe to

<sup>18</sup> See entries 318.9, 17; 319.39; 320.34, 37, 43; 321.14, 15, 16, 37, 40, 45; 322.title, 18 (2 items), 25.

<sup>19</sup> *Forme* (sometimes *form*) is the name given to the assemblage of type prepared for the printing of one side of a sheet, which, when printed on both sides and folded, constitutes a gathering. For diagrams showing the typical arrangements of pages within *inner* and *outer* formes, see Gaskell, *New Introduction to Bibliography*, figs. 46–63, and especially for octavos, figs. 50–3.

conclude that *B*, the second version of the gathering, represents an entirely new setting, the many similarities between *A* and *B* also suggest that they were printed at about the same time and in the same print shop. We know of nothing that explains why *B* was required, but it could have been something as simple as a failure to correctly count the number of sheets of *A* that had been printed, and the subsequent discovery of such a mistake.

The third cancelled leaf in Volume 3 is P8, and though the variation here is somewhat puzzling, it can be easily described. In at least some copies of the work in which P8 is conjunct with P1, the first line of P8<sup>v</sup> (3: 224) is corrupted by the substitution of the first line of Q1<sup>v</sup> (3: 225).<sup>20</sup> The cancellans P8 corrects this corruption. If the first line of the conjunct P8 is in some instances correct, then this gathering exists in three states (with P1 and P8 conjunct and both with and without the incorrect line, and with P8 as a cancel), but there are none the less only two versions of the text, for two of the three states will provide identical, correct readings, and differ only in so far as P8 is or is not a cancel.<sup>21</sup> The remaining state will be the uncanceled state with the incorrect line. How the corruption could have come about is beyond the scope of the present discussion, but we can report that, with the exception of the one incorrect line, the cancellandum and the cancellans appear to have been printed from the same setting, and no additional variants are introduced by the cancellans. Taken together, these phenomena suggest that there may have been a stop-press correction of P8<sup>v</sup>.<sup>22</sup>

### 1.2.3 Collation of the Abstract

Although we were unable to carry out optical collation of copies of the first edition of the *Abstract*, we have compared the copy-text to photocopies of other copies of the work, or photocopies of the copy-text with other copies. These comparisons revealed no variant states among the five copies of this brief work (sixteen leaves) inspected in this way. The five copies visually collated are the British Library copy (the copy-text; shelf-mark C.175.c.8(2)); the National Library of Scotland copy (shelf-mark Rb.s.209); the Trinity College Cambridge copy (shelf-mark Sraffa 100); the Trinity College Dublin copy (shelf-mark Fag.D.5.45 no. 5); and the University of Toronto copy (Walsh Collection).

<sup>20</sup> One such copy is the British Library copy (C.175.c.8(1)) in which Hume has entered corrections and amendments.

<sup>21</sup> We have been unable to establish that all uncorrupted versions of P8<sup>v</sup> are cancels.

<sup>22</sup> On stop-press corrections see Williams and Abbot, *Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies*, 56–7.



### 1.2.4 Collation of the Letter from a Gentleman

As there is only one known copy of the first edition of this work, no comparative collation of it is possible.

## 1.3 Bibliographical descriptions

The materials found in this section provide, in a standard format, bibliographical details of the five volumes under discussion.

### *A Treatise of Human Nature*

#### Volume I

*Title.* A | TREATISE | OF | Human Nature: | BEING | An ATTEMPT to introduce the ex- | perimental Method of Reasoning | INTO | MORAL SUBJECTS. | [rule] | *Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quae velis; & quae | sentias, dicere licet.* TACT. | [rule] | VOL. I. | [rule] | OF THE | UNDERSTANDING. | [double rule] | LONDON: | Printed for JOHN NOON, at the *White-Hart*, near | *Mercer's-Chapel*, in *Cheapside*. | [short rule] | M DCC XXXIX.

*Collation Formula.*<sup>23</sup> Demy 8<sup>o</sup>:  $\pi^2 a^2 B-O^8 P^8 (\pm P1) Q-2G^8 2H^6 [S4(-2H4)]$  signed;  $S1(-\pi1)$  signed VOL. I.; 242 leaves;<sup>24</sup> pp. [i–viii] [1] 2–10 [11] 12–313 [314] 315–475 [476].

*Contents.*  $\pi 1^r$  title as above, verso blank;  $\pi 2^{r-v}$  ADVERTISEMENT;  $a1^r$ – $a2^r$  THE CONTENTS;  $a2^v$  ERRATA of Vol. I (14 lines) and Vol. II (6½ lines);  $B1^r$ – $2H6^r$  text ( $X5^v$  blank);  $2H6^v$  bookseller's advertisement.

*Catchwords.*<sup>25</sup> Each page, except title; double catchwords where footnotes continue on the following page. Discrepancies: no catchword referring to errata ( $a2^v$ –to i.e. p. [viii]); that referring to  $B1^r$  is found at  $\pi 2^v$  and  $a2$ ;  $X3^v$

<sup>23</sup> This collational formula and others like it provide, by 'using signatures to represent gatherings and superscript figures to indicate the number of leaves in a gathering', an abbreviated account of 'the number, order, and arrangement of leaves and gatherings' of the three volumes and two pamphlets on which we are reporting (Williams and Abbot, *Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies*, 140). Signatures were needed by binders, who received books in flat sheets, then folded and arranged these in their proper order.

<sup>24</sup> The notation 8<sup>o</sup> indicates that the typical gatherings of this book were made up of sheets folded three times to make eight leaves (sixteen pages). The Greek letter  $\pi$  is used to indicate unsigned leaves or gatherings that are not inferable as part of the sequence of signed gatherings that follow. The notation 'S4 signed' indicates that the first four leaves of a gathering bear signatures, as A1, A2, A3, A4. Exceptions to this pattern are signified by a solid bar (–, the minus sign), so that 'S4(–2H4) signed' indicates that in Vol. I of the *Treatise* the rectos of the first four leaves of each eight-leaf gathering bear (at the foot of the page, on what is known as the *direction line*) signatures, that this pattern continues through gathering 2G (i.e. Gg), and that gathering 2H (i.e. Hh) is signed on only the first three leaves. The notation 'S1(– $\pi$ 1) signed VOL. I.' indicates that, with the exception of signature  $\pi$ , the first leaf of each gathering bears 'VOL. I.' on the direction line.

<sup>25</sup> A *catchword* is a word, or part thereof, appearing in the direction line of a page and serving as a guide to what is to follow at the top of the succeeding page.

caution,/caution (1: 310–11); 2H1<sup>r</sup> what/ought (1: 456–6)<sup>26</sup>; P8<sup>v</sup> tually/actually (1: 224–5); 2C1<sup>v</sup> ticular/icular (1: 386–7). This last discrepancy appears to be the result of the ‘t’ making up ‘ticular’ falling out of the first line of type set for 2C2<sup>r</sup>.

*Ornaments.* Headpieces: [iii] [v] [1] 11 53 125 315; factotums: [iii] [1] 11 53 125 315; tailpieces: [iv] 124.<sup>27</sup>

*Press figures.* 1: 45, 350, 377.<sup>28</sup>

*Variant states.* 1. The lines that make up the double rule on the title-page are in some copies separated by a 1mm space, in others by a 2mm space, but the page has not been reset. 2. The cancellans at P1 (209–10) introduces a fifteen-line note, abbreviates the text as found in the cancellandum, and introduces variant accidental forms.<sup>29</sup>

*Production.* See the entry for Volume 2.

*Publication.* See the entry for Volume 2.

*Other information.* See the entry for Volume 2.

## Volume 2

*Title.* A | TREATISE | OF | Human Nature: | BEING | An ATTEMPT to introduce the ex- | perimental Method of Reasoning | INTO | MORAL SUBJECTS. | [rule] | *Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quæ velis; & quæ | sentias, dicere licet.* TACIT. | [rule] | VOL. II. | [rule] | OF THE | PASSIONS. | [double rule] | LONDON: | Printed for JOHN NOON, at the *White-Hart*, near | *Mercers-Chapel*, in *Cheapside*. | [short rule] | M DCC XXXIX.

*Collation Formula.* Demy 8<sup>o</sup>: A<sup>2</sup> B–L<sup>8</sup> M<sup>8</sup>(±M4) N–U<sup>8</sup> X<sup>8</sup> (–X<sup>8</sup> = Vol. I P1) [\$4(–A1) signed; \$1(–A1 + A2) signed VOL. II.]; 161 leaves; pp. [i–iv] [1] 2–93 [94] 95–217 [218] 219–318.

*Contents.* A1<sup>r</sup> title as above, verso blank; A2<sup>r–v</sup> THE CONTENTS; B1<sup>r</sup>–X7<sup>v</sup> text (G7<sup>v</sup>, P5<sup>v</sup> blank). Some copies include, following the text, an additional four-page gathering A, listing eighty-three books printed for John Noon.

*Catchwords.* Each page, except title; double catchwords where footnotes continue on the following page.

*Ornaments.* Headpieces: [iii] [1] 95 219; factotums: [1] 95 219; tailpieces: 93 217 318.

<sup>26</sup> That is, the comma following ‘caution,’ in the direction line of X3<sup>v</sup>(1: 310) is omitted in the first line of X4<sup>r</sup>(1: 311). In addition, ‘what’ found in the direction line at 2H1<sup>r</sup>(1: 465) is omitted from the first line of the following page, 2H1<sup>v</sup>, so that 1: 466 begins ‘ought to be’, when it should begin, ‘what ought to be’. The other discrepancies result in analogous but minor textual flaws.

<sup>27</sup> A *headpiece* is a printer’s ornament used at the beginning of a text or textual division (e.g., contents page, section, or part). A *factotum* is a printer’s ornament containing a space into which a letter may be inserted. A *tailpiece* is an ornament or other decorative device used at the end of a division of a book.

<sup>28</sup> A *press figure* is a number used to identify the work of a particular press or press operator and is found in the bottom margin of a leaf. <sup>29</sup> For details, see Register B, entries 81.10–82.1.

*Press figures.* None.

*Variant states.* 1. The cancellans at M4 (167–8) deletes a six-line note with also two changes to accidentals recto and verso.<sup>30</sup> 2. At least one copy (Edinburgh University Library, Dh.5.144) includes X8, on which is found the cancellans for Volume 1, P1 (209–10). 3. Separately printed booksellers' advertisements are bound at the end of some copies.<sup>31</sup>

*Production.* Study of the display type used on the title-pages and running heads, marginal braces, and ornaments shows that Volumes 1 and 2 of *THN* were printed by John Wilson, a master printer with premises on Gracechurch St.<sup>32</sup> Noon undertook to publish these volumes in late September 1738, and they were set and printed between then and late January 1739. Hume was living in London at the time, and would have been available to read proofs. Because Noon's contract with Hume was for 1,000 copies, it is generally supposed that 1,000 copies were printed. Hume himself may also have thought that 1,000 copies were printed; see the entry for Volume 3, *Production*.

*Publication.* Late January 1739. Price 10s. (two volumes). In 'My Own Life' Hume said that 'In the end of 1738, I published my Treatise.' The earliest known advertisement appeared in the *London Post*, 25–7 January 1739. For additional details regarding the date of publication and the advertisements, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 6.

*Other information.* On 10 February 1763, a month after the death of John Noon, 290 copies of 'Hume on Human Nature, 2 vol' were offered at auction to the London book trade. For further details, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 10.

### Volume 3

*Title.* A | TREATISE | OF | Human Nature: | BEING | An ATTEMPT  
to introduce the ex- | perimental Method of Reasoning | INTO | MORAL  
SUBJECTS. | [rule] | ———*Duræ semper virtutis amator, | Quære quid est virtus,  
et posce exemplar honesti.* | LUCAN. | [rule] | WITH AN | APPENDIX. |  
Wherein some Passages of the foregoing | Volumes are illustrated and  
explain'd. | [rule] | VOL. III. | [rule] | OF | MORALS. | [double rule] |  
LONDON, | Printed for THOMAS LONGMAN, at the *Ship* in | *Pater-noster-Row*,  
M DCC XL.

<sup>30</sup> See Register B, entries 239.34, 240.1, 240.4.

<sup>31</sup> The Chalmers (British Library 1133.c.5) and Kames (Hoose Library 192.H92T) copies of Vol. 2 include an eight-page list, 'Books printed for John Noon, at the White-Hart near Mercer's-Chapel, Cheapside'. One King's College copy of this volume (F.14.4<sup>2</sup>) includes a twenty-four page 'Catalogue of books printed for and sold by Samuel Birt'.

<sup>32</sup> See 1.5.1. below; Historical Account, Sect. 5; and D. E. Norton, 'John Wilson, Hume's First Printer'.

*Collation Formula.* Demy 8<sup>o</sup>: A<sup>+</sup>(±A4)B–E<sup>8</sup>F<sup>8</sup>(±F<sup>8</sup>)(±F6)G–O<sup>8</sup>P<sup>8</sup>(±P8)Q–U<sup>8</sup>X<sup>+</sup>(–X<sup>+</sup>)[§4(–A1, A3–4, X3) signed; T3 signed ‘T2’; §1(–A1) signed VOL.III.]; 159 leaves; pp. [i–viii] [1] 2–199 [200] 201–81 [282] 283–310.

*Contents.* A1<sup>r</sup> title as above, verso blank; A2<sup>r-v</sup> ADVERTISEMENT; A3<sup>r</sup>–A4<sup>r</sup> THE CONTENTS; A4<sup>v</sup> ERRATA(14 lines); B1<sup>r</sup>–X3<sup>v</sup> text (O4<sup>v</sup>, T5<sup>v</sup> blank).

*Catchwords.* Each page, except title; double catchwords where footnotes continue on the following page. Discrepancies: ‘HERE’ vs. ‘HER’ at 68–9 of the two known copies of the B gathering;<sup>33</sup> ‘expressly’ vs. ‘expresly’ at 159–60.

*Ornaments.* Headpieces: [iii] [v] [1] 37 201 283; factotums: [iii] [1] 37 283; tailpieces: [iv] 36 281.

*Press figures.* 1: 16, 29, 44, 102, 126, 136, 153, 162, 194, 221, 224, 236, 253, 271, 299

2: 47, 50, 180, 210, 230, 242, 260, 276

*Variant states.* 1. The cancellans at A4 replaces an eight-line Errata list at A4<sup>v</sup> with one of fourteen lines. The conjugate A1<sup>r</sup>, including only the title-page, was apparently not reset. 2. The variant gathering F (3: 65–80) derives from a complete resetting, and each of the two versions of this gathering are also found in both an uncancelled and a cancelled state at F6 (3: 75–6). The resetting of the sheet introduced variant accidental and substantive forms, while the cancellans of F6 adds a twenty-nine-word sentence to 3.2.2.24.<sup>34</sup> 3. The cancellans at P8 (3: 223–4) corrects an error in line one of P8<sup>v</sup>, which in its uncancelled state has as its first line the text of the first line of Q1<sup>r</sup> (3: 225).

*Production.* Study of the display type used on the title-pages and running heads, marginal braces, and ornaments shows that Volume 3 of *THN* was also printed by John Wilson (see the entry for Volume 2, *Production*). Hume went to London during the summer of 1740 in order to arrange publication, and apparently remained there while the volume was being printed (see above, Historical Account, Sect. 5). There is no direct evidence of the number of copies printed, but Hume, in March 1740, asked Hutcheson ‘what Copy-Money I may reasonably expect for one Edition of a thousand of this Volume’, thus suggesting that he contemplated an edition of 1,000 copies.<sup>35</sup> However, as Volume 3 is somewhat scarcer than Volumes 1 and 2, it may be that Longman ordered fewer than 1,000 copies because he had learned from Noon that the previous volumes were not selling well.

*Publication.* Late October, 1740. The earliest known advertisement for Volume 3 appeared in the *London Evening Post* for 28–30 October 1740. The price is not given in this or other advertisements for the volume, but

<sup>33</sup> For information on the two gatherings of F, see above, 1.2.2.

<sup>34</sup> For further details, see above, Sect. 1.2.2 and Register B, entries 318.9–322.25.

<sup>35</sup> *Letters*, 1: 37.

Hume, in the letter to Hutcheson just cited, supposed that his manuscript would 'make a four Shillings Book'. Given that Volumes 1 and 2 sold for 10s., and that in 1740 and again in 1756 Longman and Noon co-operated in offering three-volume sets of *THN* for 14s., it would seem that Hume was right about the price. For additional details, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 6.

*Other information.* On 5 June 1760, 200 copies of 'Hume on Human Nature' were offered at auction to the London book trade. It is likely that these were copies of Volume 3 of *THN*. For further details, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 10.

*An Abstract of... A Treatise of Human Nature*

Title. AN | ABSTRACT | OF | A BOOK lately PUBLISHED; | ENTITLED,  
| A | TREATISE | OF | *Human Nature*, &c. | WHEREIN | The CHIEF  
ARGUMENT of that | BOOK is farther ILLUSTRATED and | EXPLAINED. |  
[rule] | [ornament] | [double rule] | LONDON: | Printed for C. BORBET, at  
*Addison's Head*, | over-against St. Dunstan's Church, in Fleet- | street. 1740. |  
[Price six Pence.]

*Collation Formula.* Small 8<sup>o</sup> in 4s:<sup>36</sup> [A]<sup>4</sup> B–D<sup>4</sup> [\$2 signed]; 16 leaves; pp. [1–5] 6–32.

*Contents.* [A]1<sup>r</sup> title as above, verso blank; [A]2<sup>r-v</sup> Preface; [A]3<sup>r</sup>–D4<sup>v</sup> text.

*Catchwords.* Each page except title. Discrepancies: B4<sup>v</sup>*effect, / and* (16–17).<sup>37</sup>

*Ornaments.* Ornament: title-page; headpieces and factotums: [3] [5].

*Press figures.* None.

*Variant states.* Several copies, including Hume's, have a hand-written correction, in an unknown hand, at D2<sup>r</sup> (p. 27, l. 24): 'question' is scored out, and 'reasoning' is written in the margin.

*Production.* William Strahan's ledger, British Library Add. MS 48800, fo. 4, dated 'Febry 9', under the heading 'Mr John Noon', records: 'To printing an Abstract of a Treatise on Human Nature 2 Sheets English Octavo @ 14<sup>s</sup> per Sheet 500 Copies 1/8/-'.

*Notes.* 'Borbet' on the title-page is a misprint for 'Corbet'.

*Publication.* Announced, with a longer subtitle, in the *Daily Advertiser* for 11 March 1740. For additional details, see Historical Account, Sects. 3, 6.

*A Letter from a Gentleman*

Title. A | LETTER | FROM A | GENTLEMAN | TO | His FRIEND in  
*Edinburgh*: | CONTAINING | Some OBSERVATIONS | ON | A Specimen

<sup>36</sup> Gaskell says that 'it is normally impossible to tell whether 8<sup>o</sup> in 4s was printed by whole sheets with two signatures or by half-sheet imposition' (*New Introduction to Bibliography*, 106, note C).

<sup>37</sup> That is, 'effect', found in the direction line of B4<sup>v</sup>, is omitted from the first line of C1<sup>r</sup>, so that p. 17 begins, 'and anticipates my', but should begin, 'effect, and anticipates my'.

of the Principles concerning | RELIGION and MORALITY, | *said to be*  
maintain'd in a Book lately pu- | blish'd, intituled, *A Treatise of Human* |  
*Nature*, &c. | [rule] | [ornament] | [rule] | EDINBURGH, | Pinted in the Year  
M. DCC. XLV.

*Collation Formula.* Small 8<sup>o</sup> in 4s: A–D<sup>+</sup> E<sup>2</sup> [\$2(–A1) signed]; 18 leaves;  
pp. [1–2] 3–34 [35–6].

*Contents.* A1<sup>r</sup> title as above, verso blank; A2<sup>r</sup>–E1<sup>v</sup> text; E2<sup>r–v</sup> blank.

*Catchwords.* Each page, except title.

*Ornaments.* Ornament: title-page; factotum: 3.

*Press figures.* None.

*Production.* Previous editors have suggested that the type and ornaments indicate that the work was printed by the firm of T. Lumisden and J. Robertson of Edinburgh.<sup>38</sup>

*Notes.* 'Pinted' on the title-page is an obvious misprint.

*Publication.* Announced in the *Caledonian Mercury* and the *Edinburgh Evening Courant*, 21 May 1745. For additional details, see Historical Account, Sect. 8.

#### 1.4 Producing and Analysing Digital Versions of the Copy-texts

To produce a reliable digital version of these texts, the entire copy-text of each was keyboarded twice. These distinct sets of files were then, using appropriate software, compared. Any discrepancies between them would indicate that at least one of the files was incorrect at those points. These discrepancies were checked against the copy-text and corrected. When this process was complete, the corrected files were printed, and, by means of a proof-reader and copy-holder, reviewed for further errors. (Subsequently, to compare the critical text to the copy-text, this proof-reading process has been carried out on two more occasions.)

Creating in this fashion a reliable, digital version of the copy-texts gave us an advantage that editors of previous generations did not have. It allowed those texts, at least that of the 225,000-word *Treatise*, to be studied in ways that would not have been available to editors working before, roughly, 1980. Armed with digital texts, we were able to locate with ease each use of any given formal component, italics or small capitals, say, or any given form of punctuation. For example, we were able to locate all the colons in the text and ascertain that, one Latin quotation and clauses beginning with *that* excepted, on only fourteen of over 450 occasions was a colon followed by a lower-case

<sup>38</sup> E. C. Mossner and J. V. Price, 'Introduction', in *A Letter from a Gentleman*, p. xxv.

letter. Or, to mention a second example, we were able to study those sentences that include sub-sentential questions (such as that at 1: 73.28–74.2 (30.24–5): ‘Here therefore I must ask, *What is our idea of a simple and indivisible point?*’). We found that these questions nearly always have a question mark at the end, and that those that are printed in italic nearly always capitalize the interrogative term with which they begin.

With digital versions of the copy-texts in hand, it was also a simple matter to compile a list of words used in each text, along with a count of the number of uses of each. Some of the information made available in this way is of marginal interest at best (as one would expect, *the* is the most common word in the *Treatise*, appearing about 13,800 times, while *a*, by a narrow margin over *that*—4,625 to 4,518—comes second). Other findings are of greater interest. We found, for example, that the copy-text always spells *immediately* with an *e* before the concluding *ly*. It uses *connexion* or its plural 168 times, *connection* or its plural three times; *reflection* or its plural 135 times; *reflexion* and its plural nine times.<sup>39</sup> In Volume 3, ordinal terms (*first*, *second(ly)*, etc.) denoting the successive points in an argument are all printed in italic; only some terms of this sort are italic in the preceding volumes.

In addition, our digital text of the *Treatise* allowed us to make a concordance of that work, and with that to go on to study Hume’s use of terms and to draw pertinent conclusions from this study. We could not only count the uses of *reason* (there are 430, plus twenty-nine uses of *reasons*) and of *reasoning* (there are 325 plus ninety-three uses of *reasonings*), but could also review these uses in context.

Information of this kind, recondite though some of it may seem at first glance, proved to be of editorial significance. Editors producing a critical text are expected to exercise principled and systematic editorial judgement over each *substantive* component of the text (over each word and each phrase, clause, sentence, or paragraph), and also over each *accidental* or *formal* component of the text (over orthography, capitalization, punctuation, italics, etc.). The data available from our digital text was of great help in making the countless unavoidable judgements that must be made about the formal and substantive features of the copy-texts being converted into critical texts. Should the critical text at 26.35 speak of ‘a short and decisive *reason*’, as does the copy-text at 1: 63.21–2, or of a ‘a short and decisive *reasoning*’? Which of these forms is Hume more likely to have used or intended? Should the critical text of the *Treatise* follow the copy-text in all its formal variations, or should it eliminate what appear to be (and can now be demonstrated to be)

<sup>39</sup> See also n. 85.

untypical forms—such variations in orthography, punctuation, or capitalization as those mentioned in the previous paragraph? These questions must be answered, with each answer serving as the grounds for a choice about the formal features of the critical texts of the three works found in the first volume of this edition. Information accruing from word lists, concordances, and digital searches enabled us to answer these questions and make these choices without undue reliance on intuition. We return below to findings of this kind and the use made of them.

### 1.5 Formal Emendation of the *Treatise*

Hume's works were published over a forty-year period. During this period English compositorial style (preferred forms of capitalization, hyphenation, italicization, punctuation, and spelling) underwent noticeable change. The General Editors of the Clarendon Hume, the edition of which the present texts are a part, have concluded that it would be inappropriate to produce critical texts that dress a copy-text published at one time in the conventions of another time. Understood in a general way, this conclusion may provide relatively unproblematic guidance in most cases, but the situation facing the editors of the *Treatise* is in one respect anomalous: the work was published by two different booksellers, in two distinct components, at an interval of about twenty-two months. At first glance it appears that the copy-text may represent not one, but two, compositorial styles.

#### 1.5.1 The Printer of the *Treatise*

As a first step toward addressing this issue, we asked ourselves if the temporally distinct components of the copy-text were the work of two different printers (of two different printing establishments, that is). None of the three volumes includes the name of a printer, but the volumes are sufficiently alike in appearance to suggest that they may have come from a single print shop. This conclusion was reached by Keynes and Sraffa, who say that, 'Though the publisher [of the third volume] was different, nevertheless the printer was clearly the same, as is shown by the identity of the ornaments'.<sup>40</sup> But,

<sup>40</sup> Introduction, in *An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature 1740*, p. xix. The further conjecture of Keynes and Sraffa, 'that the third volume had been partly set up before Hume had insisted on parting from Noon', is unsupported by evidence and unlikely in any event. Would a bookseller have arranged for the printing of a work not yet under contract? Moreover, we know that Hume substantially revised Book 3 during the winter of 1739–40, and thus can conclude that the third volume was set after those revisions were made. For additional details about the writing and publishing of Vol. 3, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 5.



while we are convinced that one printer was responsible for all three volumes of the copy-text, this conclusion cannot be reached simply by looking at the ornaments used in printing them.<sup>41</sup> It is now known that printers of the hand-press period loaned or borrowed ornaments, and this practice would presumably have been common in London, where there were many printers in close proximity to one another. In any event, some of the ornaments used in the *Treatise* may be found in works bearing the imprint of at least five different printing establishments: those of William Fenner and R. Beresford of Cambridge; and those of John Wilson, Samuel Idle, Mary Fenner, and James Waugh (sometimes with Joseph Fenner) of London. Some of the ornaments are also to be found in at least two entirely distinct works printed in the same year (1737) and bearing the imprints of Idle and Wilson, respectively. Consequently, the reappearance in Volume 3 of six of the ornaments used in the earlier volumes is not incontrovertible evidence that the three volumes were the work of a single printer. To establish this hypothesis, it is necessary to look for other evidence.

This evidence begins with the title-pages of the three volumes, the similarity of which is apparent, especially when compared with many of the hundreds of other title-pages of the period.<sup>42</sup> Of course the three volumes have distinctive subject titles ('Of the Understanding', 'Of the Passions', 'Of Morals'), and the title-page of Volume 3 includes more text and has both a different imprint and a different motto, but the three pages are typographically similar. Two of the types used on each of these pages are from the Caslon foundry, and were in common use in London by 1739–40.<sup>43</sup> But two other types found on all three title-pages are themselves unusual, even rare, and in combination probably unique to a single printer, and hence do suggest that the three titles were the product of only one printer. The two unusual types are that used to print the principal words of the title, 'Treatise of Human Nature', and that used to print the words 'moral subjects', 'Vol', and the associated (roman) volume numbers that appear on each title-page, as well as three words, 'Passions', 'Appendix', and 'Morals', each of which is found on only one of the three title-pages.

<sup>41</sup> There are thirteen different ornaments in the *Treatise*: four headpieces, five factotums, and four tailpieces. Six of these thirteen appear in both temporal segments of the work.

<sup>42</sup> See Ed. App. 1 for photographic reproductions of the title-pages of the *Treatise*.

<sup>43</sup> The Caslon types used on all three title-pages are the Great Primer Roman (used for 'Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning'), and the Caslon Small Pica (used for the mottoes and the imprint lines). A third Caslon type, the English Roman No. 2, is used on the title-page of Vol. 3 ('Wherein some Passages of the foregoing Volumes are illustrated and explain'd'). For this information about types we are indebted to James Mosley, St Bride Printing Library, London. A specimen of Caslon types, illustrating those mentioned here as well as many others, is included in the 5th and subsequent editions of Chambers's *Cyclopaedia*, 'Letter'.

The first of these unusual types is most likely the Two-line English Roman found in the Bowyer Specimen of 1740, while the second is Type 109 of the James Specimen of 1782, a Double Pica Roman from the Walpergen foundry.

There is additional evidence indicating that all three volumes were set in the same shop: broken or idiosyncratic sorts (individual pieces of type) that are found in at least one of the first two volumes are also found in Volume 3. Some running titles of all three volumes were printed from what appears to be the same broken upper-case, italic *H*. The alternative possibility, that in two different print shops there were two such letters damaged in exactly the same place and in an indistinguishable fashion, is decidedly less likely. Even more compelling, however, is the use in all three volumes of several idiosyncratic braces, including two that are uniquely damaged. Finally, there is the noticeable similarity of the general layout of the volumes, including the two temporally separate sets of Advertisements, Contents, and Errata. Against these similarities one must balance some differences: notes in the first two volumes are flagged by symbols (most often a \*), but are numbered in Volume 3, and the different handling of ordinal terms, discussed below.

The evidence that led to the conclusion that the three volumes of the first edition had only one printer also led to the identity of that printer. Having established that the *Treatise* was not printed by one of the three eighteenth-century printers (Charles Ackers, William Bowyers, and William Strahan) whose records survive,<sup>44</sup> we used *ESTC* records to discover the names of printers which sometimes appear, in the relevant period, in the imprints of books published by John Noon or Thomas Longman. Examples of the work of these printers were then examined. Some of the work of John Wilson, one printer thus identified and whose name appears on some Noon titles, is remarkably like that of the *Treatise*. For example, the title-pages of Daniel Williams's *Practical Discourses on Several Subjects*, a work printed by Wilson in 1738, are in their general appearance strikingly similar to those of the *Treatise*, and they make use of the rare Two-line English No. 2 and Double Pica Roman mentioned above. The printer of Williams's work also made use of the distinctive braces found throughout the first edition of the *Treatise*, and, in a running head ('*of Protestant Dissenters*') of the second volume, a broken, upper-case italic *P* that matches a *P* in the running head of Book 2, *Of the Passions*. In addition, in fourteen of eighteen works that we examined,

<sup>44</sup> See D. F. McKenzie and J. C. Ross (eds.), *A Ledger of Charles Ackers*; K. Maslen and J. Lancaster (eds.), *The Bowyer Ledgers*; and the Strahan ledgers, British Library Add. MSS 48800 (1739–68; credits and payments to 1773).

Wilson made use of the ornaments found in the *Treatise*.<sup>45</sup> In short, the case for concluding that the first edition of the *Treatise* had only one printer, and that this printer was John Wilson, is a strong one.<sup>46</sup>

### 1.5.2 The Compositorial Standard of the *Treatise*

We can now return to the matter of the compositorial standard set by the copy-text edition. Confident that the temporally distinct components of this edition are the work of one printing establishment, we could survey the two segments looking for similarities and differences. As it happens, we found that there are many more similarities than differences. The patterns of capitalization and punctuation are the same, while orthography and the use of italics each differ in only one noteworthy respect. It does not follow, however, that the first-edition text is in these respects fully consistent. In fact, readers of the *Treatise* could easily conclude that Hume was relatively unconcerned about orthography, punctuation, and such matters as italicization, and that the manuscripts of the work were casually prepared in these respects. The first edition, although printed in an aesthetically pleasing format, is marked by more than a hundred obvious and uncorrected typographical errors, and by many minor inconsistencies of form. Subsequent editions of the text, including all those in print when this edition was prepared, have silently corrected most of the more obvious of these errors, but their editors have not explicitly addressed the additional inconsistencies mentioned.<sup>47</sup> As a consequence, these editions, as much as the original one, include a substantial number of orthographical variations and a significant number of formal inconsistencies of other kinds.

It is reasonable to ask, however, if the evidence supports the conclusion that Hume's manuscripts were as inconsistent in these matters as the printed text of the *Treatise* is. For a start, it is useful to look at some of the letters in

<sup>45</sup> The braces, letters, ornaments, and title-pages mentioned here are reproduced in Norton, 'John Wilson, Hume's First Printer', 124–32.

<sup>46</sup> The fact that Wilson's name has not been found in the imprints of works published by Thomas Longman in no way weakens the case given that Noon and Longman co-operated, from 1740 on, in the sale of three-volume sets of the *Treatise* (see above, Historical Account, Sect. 6). If, as appears to be the case, this co-operation was decided upon before Vol. 3 was printed, the two booksellers would naturally enough have decided that the three volumes of the set should look like a *matched* set, and thus Longman would have had an incentive to use a printer he may not have used previously.

<sup>47</sup> The second (published 1817) and third (published 1825, reissued 1826, and reprinted in 1854 and since as the Everyman and Intalex texts) editions of the *Treatise* silently modernize Hume's orthography according to the standards of their time, and in this way eliminate many formal inconsistencies.

which Hume discusses the production of his works.<sup>48</sup> In general terms, these letters reveal Hume to have enjoyed being a fussy author. He said, for example, that the 'Pains' he was taking in the revision of his *History of England* amused him.<sup>49</sup> He continuously revised, often in seemingly trivial ways, the spelling and style of his collected works, the *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*.<sup>50</sup> He was not reluctant to give his printer directions about punctuation and spelling. To William Strahan the printer he wrote: 'Please only to tell the Compositor, that he always employ a Capital after the Colons.'<sup>51</sup> For the 1758 edition (printed in October 1757) of the *Essays and Treatises* Hume and Strahan adopted a new form of spelling, one that replaced the *-our* of such words as *colour*, *honour*, and *labour* with *-or*, to produce *color*, *honor*, and *labor*. In June of the following year, while a volume of his *History* was being published, Hume changed his mind about this spelling, and though professing to 'hate to be particular in a Trifle', went on to tell Andrew Millar, his publisher, that 'if Mr Strahan has not printed off above ten or twelve Sheets [80–96 pages of a quarto volume], I shoud not be displeas'd, if you told him to follow the usual, that is, his own, way of Spelling throughout'.<sup>52</sup> Consequently, although it proved too late for Strahan to reverse the orthography of the volume of the *History* he was printing, Hume did limit use of the new spelling to only the one edition of the *Essays and Treatises*.

It is reasonable to conclude from evidence of this sort that Hume took an active interest in the formal aspects of his works, and equally reasonable to conclude that he would have cared about the form of the *Treatise*. He remained in London while Volumes 1 and 2 of the work were being printed, making last-minute revisions to these volumes. He also took the trouble of returning to London to arrange for the publication of Volume 3, and is likely to have seen it through the press.<sup>53</sup> In addition, the manuscripts of his

<sup>48</sup> As we show in this section, one can also gain relevant information from a study of the formal characteristics of Hume's extant manuscript letters and from other of his surviving manuscripts.

<sup>49</sup> Letter of 18 Oct. 1768 to Baron Mure of Caldwell, *Letters*, 2: 188.

<sup>50</sup> This is the conclusion of Tom Beauchamp after his digital and visual collations of the works making up *ETSS*. See *EPM*, Introduction (Clarendon Edition), p. xxviii.

<sup>51</sup> Letter of 18 April 1757, *Letters*, 1: 247.

<sup>52</sup> Letter of 20 June 1758, *Letters*, 1: 282–3. Strahan was apparently too far advanced with the 2nd edn. of Hume's history of James I and Charles I to make the changes Hume desired, for the new spelling is used in that edition. On the other hand, Hume later wrote to Strahan himself about the orthography to be used in his two-volume *History of England under the House of Tudor*. 'I had once an Intention', he said, 'of changing the Orthography in some particulars: But on Reflection I find, that this new Method of Spelling (which is certainly the best and most conformable to Analogy) has been follow'd in the Quarto Volume of my philosophical Writings lately publish'd; and therefore I think it will be better for you to continue the Spelling as it is'—as it was in his manuscript, that is (Letter of [July 1758], *Letters*, 1: 283).

<sup>53</sup> See above, Historical Account, Sects. 5, 8.

*Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* and of the last-written volumes of his *History of England* have survived, and from these we can see that Hume was generally consistent in matters of orthography, punctuation, and form. There is, in short, nothing to indicate that Hume was casual about his manuscripts, and much to indicate that he was not. It seems unlikely, then, that the manuscripts of the *Treatise* were casually prepared, and equally unlikely that they were more than occasionally inconsistent in matters of form. How, then, does it happen that the copy-text of the *Treatise* is noticeably inconsistent in these matters? As will be seen, the evidence suggests that the great majority of the inconsistencies found in the first edition of the *Treatise* were introduced by the compositors, and not by Hume. If that is so, and if these compositorially introduced inconsistencies can be identified, then there are recognized grounds for eliminating them. As Gaskell, citing as authority Walter Greg, has put it, 'where the accidentals are grossly defective in one part of the text but not in another, or where different compositors appear to have followed different typographical conventions', it is entirely reasonable for an editor to 'aim at consistency in his final version'.<sup>54</sup>

Consider, for example, a matter of some interest and importance, the font (italic or roman) chosen for certain sets of ordinal terms: *first*, and *second(ly)*, with, sometimes, *third(ly)*, and, more rarely, *fourth(ly)*. In this respect, the form of the *Treatise* seems to have been determined, and adversely so, by the individual compositorial preferences of those who set the type, and not by Hume. Looking first at the general appearance of the first edition of the text, we find that, save for two kinds of exception, the second and all subsequent letters of the initial word of each paragraph of the text are set in small capitals (IN, THERE). If the initial word has only one letter, then the second word is set entirely in small capitals (I PERCEIVE, A MAN). The exceptions to this general rule are the first words of paragraphs beginning parts or sections (these are set in various combinations of two-line and large capitals), and, in *Volume 3 only*, paragraphs having as the first word the ordinal terms just mentioned. Neither the general practice of using small caps at the outset of paragraphs nor the first class of exceptions to that practice is of great interest here, although it is relevant to note that there is no reason to suppose that either of these practices owes its use to similar forms in Hume's manuscript. But the fact that it is only in Volume 3 that ordinal terms at the beginning of paragraphs are printed in italic is of interest, for it leads one to ask how this difference came about. Is it more likely to have derived principally from the manuscripts on which the first

<sup>54</sup> *A New Introduction to Bibliography*, 358; cf. W. W. Greg, 'The Rationale of Copy-Text', 385.

edition was based, or from the application of different compositorial practices or styles to a uniform manuscript practice?

We have just shown that one neither can nor need explain the difference by reference to what would now be called the *house style* of two different printing establishments. The evidence that all three volumes were set and printed by John Wilson is too strong to admit of serious doubt. But it does not follow that the work was not affected by distinct compositorial styles. Given that in the early eighteenth century the journeymen printers of London were indeed *journeymen*, it is not unlikely that the temporally distinct components of the first edition were set by different compositors. If so, that could account for the significantly different manner in which the two components present ordinals at the beginning of paragraphs, as well as other differences found between or within volumes. This first response is, however, of little practical import. It tells us nothing about Hume's practice or preferences in this matter, and consequently it gives us no direction. Might Hume have intervened, requesting that Volume 3 follow a pattern different from that followed in the two earlier volumes? More to the point, can we, from the available evidence, draw some reasonable conclusions about the likely presentation of these ordinals in Hume's manuscript? We can.

A review of the manuscript of Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* shows that Hume consistently underscored ordinal terms whenever he used such terms to enumerate two or more points within a single argument or discussion.<sup>55</sup> This information leads us to suggest that the compositors of the first two volumes of the *Treatise*, having decided to use small capitals at the outset of each paragraph, disregarded, for the affected words, the underlining by which Hume had indicated his intent to have italics.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, having decided to overrule Hume's underscoring and *begin* each paragraph with small capitals, the typesetters attempted to introduce a consistent pattern by also disregarding underlined ordinals *within* paragraphs. They failed to carry through this revisionary process consistently, for the occasional italicized ordinal appears (always *within* a paragraph) in these volumes, a fact which suggests that the preceding or following terms in that

<sup>55</sup> Compositors of the period would have taken a single line underscore as an instruction to set the underlined text in italic. As John Smith, author of an instruction book for printers, put it, that words or matter are to be set in italic 'is intimated by underscoring once what is to be in that character' (*A Printer's Grammar: Wherein are Exhibited... Requisites for Attaining a more perfect Knowledge both in the Theory and Practice of the Art of Printing*, 52; cf. 202).

<sup>56</sup> Smith, discussing an analogous situation, stated the rule covering such situations: 'the first word of a new paragraph, tho' a polysyllable, is commonly put in Small Capitals; and even if it happens to be a proper name, which some, upon such occasion, put in Italic Capitals, but thereby [they] break thro' the rule of uniformity, [namely] To set every first word after a [paragraph] Break in Small Capitals' (*Printer's Grammar*, 53).

particular series were likely also marked for italic—underscored, that is. At 1: 236.13 (92.7), for example, the first edition reads ‘FIRST’, while at 1: 236.25 (92.13) the following point is introduced, ‘BUT, *secondly*’.<sup>57</sup> Additional examples of this phenomenon may also be seen at 1: 246.1 (95.26), where ‘FIRST’ begins a paragraph, while at 1: 246.13 (95.32) ‘*secondly*’ is internal to that same paragraph; at 1: 252.7 (97.32), 1: 253.14 (98.6), and 1: 254.9 (98.19), where one finds, respectively, ‘*first*’, ‘*second*’, and ‘*third*’, all safely embedded within paragraphs, followed at 1: 258.16 (99.41) by a paragraph-beginning ‘A FOURTH’; at 1: 377.26 (143.24) and 1: 378.14 (143.33), where a paragraph-internal ‘*First*’, precedes a paragraph-beginning ‘SECONDLY’; and, perhaps most instructively of all, at 1: 349.9–17 (133.8–13), where the ‘four things requisite’ to justify Hume’s system are briefly listed within a single paragraph, *First...Secondly...Thirdly...Fourthly*, and then discussed at length at 1: 349.20 (133.15), following a paragraph-beginning ‘FIRST’, and then, at 1: 352.20 (134.21), 1: 359.7 (136.31), and 1: 363.15 (138.21), a paragraph-internal ‘*second*’, ‘*third*’, and ‘*fourth*’.<sup>58</sup> In short, not only can one infer that a particular compositorial style has affected the form in which these ordinals are presented in the copy-text, but one can also reasonably infer, given the other evidence available to us, that in the manuscript of the *Treatise* ordinal terms denoting a series of two or more items were routinely underlined in the expectation that these terms would be set in italic. We can still only conjecture that the change of the relevant compositorial practice that characterizes Volume 3 of the *Treatise* was the result of an explicit intervention on Hume’s part, but, knowing as we do of his interest in such matters of form,<sup>59</sup> and having now seen the evidence indicating that he had probably underlined all the ordinals found in Volumes 1 and 2, we can see that this conjecture is not unlikely.<sup>60</sup>

There is abundant additional evidence of other compositorially introduced inconsistencies. Throughout his early life Hume began virtually every

<sup>57</sup> For the location of additional examples, see below, Sect. 2.2.3.3.

<sup>58</sup> The compositors did occasionally manage a consistent retrofit. See, e.g., 1: 93.17, where ‘first’ is internal to the paragraph, and printed in roman, while at 1: 94.6, ‘SECONDLY’, in that form, begins the next paragraph. Note that the two terms are here relatively close together. Such proximity seems to be, for an easily inferred reason, a characteristic of those instances in which paragraph-internal ordinals are printed roman and match those related to them that begin paragraphs.

<sup>59</sup> Further evidence of this interest is presented in the balance of this section.

<sup>60</sup> In the matter of paragraph-beginning ordinals, Hume’s later works, beginning with the *Essays, Moral and Political* published in 1741, and continuing through *ETSS* of 1777, follow the style of Vol. 3 of the *Treatise*. On occasion (the *Essays* just mentioned and the quarto edition of *ETSS* published in 1758), compositors followed italic ordinals at the beginning of paragraphs with cap–small cap words (e.g., ‘*Secondly*, NEITHER’). In ‘National Characters’ (¶¶ 11–19) and the two 1752 printings of ‘Populousness’ (¶¶ 111–20) the ordinals of lengthy enumerations are followed by periods rather than commas (e.g., ‘*Secondly*. THERE’).

substantive he wrote with an upper-case letter, and perhaps had no intention of using lower case even in those infrequent instances in which he did not use a capital letter.<sup>61</sup> The few surviving manuscript pages of the *Treatise*, the manuscript of the *Dialogues*, and his surviving *manuscript* letters from the period just before and just after the publication of the *Treatise* provide clear examples of this practice.<sup>62</sup> In addition, almost all substantives are capitalized in the printed versions of the early editions of *Essays, Moral and Political*, the *Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding*, and the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. These facts support the claim that the substantives of the *Treatise* were capitalized in the manuscript of that work, and that Wilson and his journeymen undertook, as the work was typeset, a systematic alteration of the capitalization practice of the manuscript.<sup>63</sup> We know of no evidence indicating whether Hume did or did not approve of this eighteenth-century modernization of his manuscript practice, but, perhaps of necessity, he accepted the result, even to the point of accepting that the separately published third volume of the *Treatise* would in this respect conform entirely to the first two.<sup>64</sup>

It comes as no surprise to discover that so extensive a revision-in-process was carried out imperfectly, and that in the first-edition text one occasionally finds a few substantives that have been inconsistently left to begin in upper-case, while certain others have been mistakenly left entirely in lower-case. That is, there appears to be no good reason why the ‘Merchants’ of 1: 316.27

<sup>61</sup> Hume appears generally not to have capitalized certain nouns such as *main* (‘And in the main’, *New Letters*, 17), *manner* (‘And in like manner’, *Letters*, 1: 32), or *thing* (‘Tis a thing’, *New Letters*, 1) when these were used in an indeterminate way. In this respect his usage accords with that of other well-known writers of the period. See Locke, *Essay* 1.2.15; 1.2.28; *OED*, ‘main’ 6.a–c; ‘matter’ 16.a, 22.a. See also Ed. App. 1, n. 3.

<sup>62</sup> See Ed. App. 1. The manuscripts of these pages and of the *Dialogues* are, respectively, National Library of Scotland MS 23259, item 15, and MS 23163. Some of the manuscripts of Hume’s letters from this period are found in this same collection. Others are located in many different libraries. See *Letters* and *New Letters* for some of these locations.

<sup>63</sup> Smith’s instructions to compositors are of interest here. ‘But before we actually begin to compose’, he said, ‘we should be informed, either by the Author, or master, after what manner our work is to be done; whether the old way, with Capitals to Substantives, and Italic to Proper names; or after the more neat practice, all in Roman, and Capitals to Proper names, and Emphatical words... [we do not now] drown the beauty of Roman Lower-case Sorts by gracing every Substantive with a Capital, but only such as are Proper names, or are words of particular signification and emphasis’ (*Printer’s Grammar*, 201–2).

<sup>64</sup> Nidditch, observing Hume’s ‘letters and the manuscript of his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*’, concluded that ‘Hume persisted throughout his literary life in profusely using capitals at the beginning of substantives’. From this conclusion, Nidditch goes on to another: that Hume ‘did not want this practice, [which] was contrary to contemporary booktrade conventions, to be copied by the printers of his books is borne out by the fact that’ his works and reprints thereof, from 1754 to 1777, ‘all conform to the contemporary booktrade convention, and not to Hume’s manuscript practice, in respect of capitalization; this also applies to the first edition of the *Treatise*’ (*Apparatus of Variant Readings*, 16).



(121.21) should have upper-case status, while those of 2: 188.28 (246.40) are only 'merchants', or why the 'Printers' and 'Copists' of 1: 257.17 (99.26), or the 'Mathematician' of 1: 316.11 (121.13) should be uniquely elevated above the 'philosophers' found throughout the work, the 'prince' mentioned at 2: 230.15 (260.36), or even the 'deity' referred to at 1: 101.16 (40.33), 1: 280.13 (107.39), 1: 432.10 (162.36), 2: 240.6 (264.4), and 3: 18.18 (299.31).<sup>65</sup> There is an equivalent lack of good reason to suppose that the 'Being' mentioned at 1: 362.25, 28 (138.11, 13) was thought to have greater substance or importance than the 'being' of 1: 361.7, 12 (137.27, 29).<sup>66</sup> Most of these anomalies occur in Book 1. Again, it may be that Hume intervened. It could as well be that some of Wilson's compositors were more consistent than others. Such conjectures aside, it is clear that the practice of the second and third volumes of the *Treatise* is significantly more consistent in the relevant use of upper and lower case. Given this fact, and the general uniformity of Hume's manuscript practice, it seems likely that most of these case-related inconsistencies derive from the compositors, and not from Hume's manuscript.

So too, we suggest, does much of the inconsistent spelling of the first edition derive from the compositors and not from Hume. Consider, for example, the following. The 1739–40 volumes use the form *making* on twenty-six occasions; on two other occasions one finds, in effect, *makeing*.<sup>67</sup> We say 'in effect' because the text actually reads *make- | ing*, with the two parts of the word placed at the end of one line and the beginning of the next. And from this fact we can reasonably infer that the atypical *e* was added by the compositor(s) in accordance with a practice which called for such an addition whenever certain kinds of words were hyphenated between lines.<sup>68</sup> By our calculation, there are nine such additions in the copy-text. We conclude that these nine inconsistencies should not be attributed to Hume.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>65</sup> The second and third editions of the *Treatise* silently emend the capitalization of *deity* to produce *Deity*, a practice carried over to the Everyman and Intelext editions.

<sup>66</sup> Smith, in his advice to printers and authors, indicates that *occasional* capitalization of substantives such as these are would be taken as denoting relative importance. Some authors, Smith said, 'denote their emphatical expressions, by beginning them with Capitals' (*Printer's Grammar*, 51).

<sup>67</sup> The word counts found in this essay are based on a word list compiled from a digital version of the copy-text. As this list was based on a completely literal version of this text (i.e. not even obvious misprints were corrected), counts based on it will necessarily differ from those based on the critical text.

<sup>68</sup> Smith advised that 'all the Participles whose Verbs terminate in an *e* feminine, retain it at the end of lines, when they are divided: Thus... the Verbs which terminate in *ke*, as *brake*, *make*, *take*, &c. retain their *e* feminine at the end of a line; and the syllable *ing*, which makes the Participle of the Verb, begins the next line' (*Printer's Grammar*, 97).

<sup>69</sup> Of the nine instances, there are four that affect the spelling of participles (e.g., *making*, *taking*, *tracing*), and five that affect other kinds of word (e.g., *falsehood*, *judgment*, *wherever*). For locations, see below, Sect. 2.2.1.2.

There are a number of similar examples. Early eighteenth-century compositors were taught to use the apostrophe to replace a silent *e* or *l* at their discretion.<sup>70</sup> Revision in the other direction was equally available to them, either from habit or preference, or when faced with the need to justify a full line of text, for which the use of a wider piece of type, an *e*, for example, in comparison to an apostrophe, would be of assistance. In short, a compositor was free to set *advanced* or *advanc'd*, *deduced* or *deduc'd*, *modified* or *modify'd*, *could* or *cou'd*, and so on. The compositors of the first edition of the *Treatise* appear to have availed themselves, in an erratic manner, of this discretion.

Hume, as is widely known, was dissatisfied with the traditional spelling of his family name. From an early age he supposed the name should be spelled *Hume*, not *Home*. He also appears to have had, during the period in which he wrote the *Treatise*, other settled ideas about orthography. The relevant evidence for this claim is found in the extant letters and manuscripts he composed from the mid-1730s until about 1750. The latest of his manuscripts we have consulted with these issues in mind is that of the *Dialogues*; the earliest are his letters of 1737.<sup>71</sup> The least well known are papers, now found among the Newhailes manuscripts in the National Library of Scotland, that Hume wrote while serving as an aide to General James St Clair. A survey of these manuscripts reveals that Hume had several relatively well-settled orthographical preferences that are of interest in the present context. For example, during this period Hume seems to have used an apostrophe, rather than an *e*, in verb forms ending *ed* and in which the *e* is mute or unsounded. That is, from the late 1730s through the 1740s, Hume seems routinely to have written both *advanc'd*, *deduc'd*, etc. rather than *advanced*, *deduced*, etc., and *modify'd*, *signify'd*, etc. rather than *modified*, *signified*, etc. He seems also to have routinely written *cou'd*, *shou'd*, *'twou'd*, and *wou'd*, although it has to be said that the apostrophe, which he frequently formed by a downward stroke on his backward sloping *d*, is sometimes impossible to detect, and so one also finds, or seems to find, *receivd*, *modifyd*, *coud*, and the like.

<sup>70</sup> Smith said that 'the *e* may be cut off by an Apostrophe, in all such Verbs whose Preterimperfect, or other Tenses, end in *ed*', except when preceded by a *d*', and that 'a Compositor uses the Apostrophe after his own discretion, and according as he finds what way the syllable *ed* runs the smoothest'. He then went on to say, 'besides the influence which the Apostrophe has over the *e*', it retrenches the *l* in *cou'd*, *shou'd*, *wou'd*, and that while such elision should not be carried out heedlessly, 'the absence of the mute *l* can no-ways lessen the credit of an elaborate Essay; but may help a Printer to lengthen his Letter...*l* being a Sort which in most Founts runs short', i.e. of which there are too few (*Printer's Grammar*, 107). Gaskell says that compositors used spelling variants 'as an aid to justification' (*New Introduction to Bibliography*, 345). See also McKerrow, *Introduction to Bibliography*, 10–11.

<sup>71</sup> This discussion of the manuscripts of letters and the *Dialogues* is based on an analysis of a digital version of them.

Returning now to the first-edition text, we find some interesting and significant patterns. There are in the three volumes approximately 3,000 instances of verb forms ending 'd. And there are approximately 150 instances of verbs ending with a silent *ed*. In short, an *ed* form is used in less than 5 per cent of the more than 3,000 relevant instances. In addition, while the *ed* form is used in sixty-six of some 150 opportunities found in the first three gatherings of Volume 1, it is used in only eighteen of the more than 1,200 opportunities found in the remainder of the volume. In Volume 2, *ed* is used in only six of just over 750 opportunities, with the six uses found only within the first half of that volume. In Volume 3, *ed* or *ied* is used in sixty-two of just over 900 opportunities, with twenty-seven of thirty-four *ed* forms found in the first three gatherings, and all twenty-eight of the *ied* forms found after that point. Quite independently of Hume's practice in the extant manuscripts studied, it appears that large segments of the manuscript of the *Treatise* used only 'd in those verb forms in which a silent *e* is used as part of a terminal *ed*. At the outset of the two temporally distinct compositorial tasks (the first, the setting of Volumes 1 and 2; the second, the setting, nearly two years later, of Volume 3), a compositor used the *ed* form relatively often, but as the work progressed, the 'd form was used more and more often, or, we hypothesize, the compositors followed more and more often exactly the manuscript before them.

Much the same analysis can be given of the use of the variant forms of *cou'd* and *could*, *shou'd* and *should*, *'twou'd* and *'twould*, and *wou'd* and *would*. These words taken together occur just over 700 times in the text. In the copy-text *ould* forms are used fifty-one times.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, these uses are distributed in much the same way that the silent *ed* forms are: in Volume 1 there are nine *ould* forms in the first gathering, an additional eleven in the next three gatherings, and three in gathering P (1: 209–24). With the exception of a *would* added by the cancellans at M4 (2: 167.27), there are no *ould* forms whatever in Volume 2. Of the twenty-two uses found in the uncanceled version of Volume 3, only one is not found in the first seven gatherings, while the alternative gathering F found in the McGill and Bodleian copies substitutes three *ould* forms for the alternative *ou'd* forms. Given the evidence of the extant letters and manuscripts from this period of Hume's life, we hypothesize that the compositors were working with a manuscript devoid of *ould* forms, and that some of them, perhaps one in particular, took the liberty of introducing this form into the copy-text.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>72</sup> We assume here that S1 of Vol. 3, gathering F, is the earlier of the two uncanceled versions of F (see above, Sects. 1.2.1–2, and n. 151 below).

<sup>73</sup> These patterns may suggest that one compositor prepared the early forms of both the 1739 and 1740 texts, and then, having established the format of the work, left most of the remaining composition to another, or others; but we are unable to provide further support for this conjecture.

This approach can also lead us to instructive conclusions about other inconsistent spellings that mark the copy-text: *ancient*, for example, appears three times, *antient* twenty-one;<sup>74</sup> *balance* three times, *ballance* twelve; *connection* three times, *connexion* 172 times; *encrease* eighty-eight times, *increase* four times; *reflection* 135 times, *reflexion* nine times; *subtile* or *subtily* fifteen times, *subtle* or *subtilty* six times; *surprise* five times, *surprize* twenty times; *wherever* twenty times, *where-ever* four times. But a survey of the relevant sample of Hume's letters and manuscripts suggests that his own orthographical practice is considerably more consistent than the first-edition text. In that sample each of the forms more commonly found in the printed text—*antient*, *ballance*, *connexion*, *encrease*, *reflection*, *surprize*, and *wherever*—is used, while the alternative forms—*ancient*, *balance*, *connection*, *increase*, *reflexion*, *surprise*, or *where-ever*—are conspicuously absent. In the circumstances, it seems reasonable to conclude that these seldom used variants were introduced into the text by the compositors.

For two reasons, however, we cannot conclude that the general orthographical practice of the first edition always conforms to a uniform or at least predominant practice adopted by Hume. First, Hume's manuscript practice is not in every respect uniform. There are several words that can be found in variant forms in the printed text of the *Treatise* and also in the sample of manuscripts we have examined. These, with the number of first-edition uses in parentheses, include *dependance* (ten), *dependence* (eight); *enforce* (one), *inforce* (three); *entire (ly)* (225), *intirely* (one); *entitle* (one), *intitle* (two); *public* (seventy-three), *publick* (nine); *recal* (eleven), *recall* (one); *separate* (113), *seperate* (two), and the singular neuter possessive, *its* (739), *it's* (five). Thus, despite the fact that the first edition uses predominantly only some of these variant forms, one cannot safely infer that all the less common forms have been introduced by the compositors. Moreover, not only is it possible that the single occurrences of *intirely* and *entitle*, and the four occurrences of *increase* (see the preceding paragraph), came about because there was in the manuscript an ill-formed initial *e* or *i*, but it is also possible that what appear to be extant manuscript variations in the spelling of some of these words are to be accounted for in the same manner. It is sometimes impossible to determine whether Hume has written an *e* or an *i*. Certainly, there are characteristic differences in his usual forms of these letters, including, often enough, a dot above the *i*. But occasionally these characteristics are lacking or indistinct. In that event, one is left to infer, from previous practice, which of the two letters is intended. At that point, of course, one has sometimes gone nicely in

<sup>74</sup> The figures provided include plurals or other variant forms of the words mentioned.

a circle: the 'previous practice' available may be comprised in large part of the printed text of the *Treatise*. In short, a study of manuscript usage is helpful, but the results of that study are not themselves entirely unproblematic, and thus do not provide editors with unambiguous guidance.

Secondly, the available evidence suggests that, in a fair number of instances, the predominant practice of the printed text has been determined by the orthographical preferences of the compositors, rather than those of Hume. For example, *choose* is found twelve times in the printed text, while *chuse* is found twenty-five times; *immediatly* is never found, while *immediately* occurs 133 times; and *shew* ninety-four times, *show* fifteen times. On the other hand, in the letters and manuscripts making up our sample, Hume has invariably written *choose* and *show*, and has shown a decided preference for *immediatly*.<sup>75</sup> Again, there are grounds for supposing that the alternative forms of these words were introduced into the printed text by the compositors, whose collective intention may well have been to follow (as in the case of *immediately*) a uniform practice. In short, it is possible that, had the compositors had the use of more recent procedures or techniques, including a convenient way of making minor corrections, the copy-text of the *Treatise* would always have used *chuse* and *shew*, orthographical forms that did not show up in our manuscript samples.

### 1.5.3 Conclusions and Policies

Having assembled a considerable body of information of this kind, we faced the question of how best to use it. How, if at all, should it influence us in the determination of accidentals in the critical text of the *Treatise*? Without attempting to review the extensive theoretical discussion of such issues,<sup>76</sup> we must explain what we have done, and, in general terms, why we have done it.

A critical edition of the *Treatise* cannot be a form-by-form and letter-by-letter transcription of the copy-text. As we have pointed out above, editors of a critical text are expected to exercise principled and systematic editorial judgement over each of the components, accidental and substantive, of the text they are constructing. The exercise of such principled judgement, and a literal reproduction of the copy-text, typographical errors and all, are incompatible undertakings.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>75</sup> The manuscript of the *Dialogues*, e.g., invariably uses *immediatly*.

<sup>76</sup> For brief introductions to theoretical issues, see Williams and Abbott, *Introduction to Bibliographical and Textual Studies*, 68–86; Gaskell, *New Introduction to Bibliography*, 336–60. For further discussions, see Modern Language Association, 'Annotated Bibliography'.

<sup>77</sup> See above, n. 2 and Sect. 1.4.

Neither can the editor of a critical edition undertake merely to correct the obvious typographical errors of the copy-text. Having accepted the principle that the copy-text is in need of correction, one must ensure that one's judgements about individual words and forms are based on a thorough examination of their variant forms and likely origins. One can perhaps conceive of a substantial eighteenth-century text that, to be made into a critical text, requires only the correction of a few wrong or reversed letters, but the existence of such a text is improbable. Be that as it may, the first edition of Hume's *Treatise* is not such a text, as is demonstrated above. It is formally flawed or inconsistent in a number of ways, and hence it seemed necessary to adopt an explicit policy regarding such matters.

Our policy, briefly stated, has been to follow the form of the copy-text unless the grounds for making a change appear to be better than the grounds for following exactly the forms of that text. Put this way, this statement of policy is essentially uninformative, little more than a formal statement of what is expected of any textual editor. The relevant notion of *grounds* must be given substantive content. This task is neither simple nor one that, once completed, eliminates the need for the exercise of judgement. The grounds for departing from the copy-text do not derive from some intuitively obvious editorial principle, or even from a coherent set of such principles. They derive, rather, from acts of judgement themselves given direction by general principles of good editing together with a careful study of the relevant authorial and compositorial practices, and leavened by reflection on, among other things, the set of principles guiding the larger project of which the *Treatise*, *Abstract*, and *Letter from a Gentleman* are a part. Other editors, using the same information, and reflecting on the same themes and guidelines, might in some cases reach justifiable conclusions that are different from those we have reached.

Our point is more easily illustrated than abstractly described. We begin with a question: Why is this matter of establishing the critical text of the *Treatise* (and to a lesser extent, of the *Abstract*) in any way difficult? Why is it not just a matter of consistently applying the appropriate principle(s)? Because, among other things, the first edition of the *Treatise* was a joint product of author and printer, and a product that was in formal respects significantly different from the manuscript on which it was based. Until recently, such differences between manuscript and printed copy have been inescapable features of the writing-publishing process, and as such have been accepted by every published author. In the past, the author provided the substance of the work and, along with this, what we may think of as an implicit set of suggestions about certain formal features it should have

when printed.<sup>78</sup> Compositors, on the other hand, have undertaken to preserve the substance of the text while transforming the manuscript into printed form. In the process, they, sometimes guided by a corrector or an editor and an explicit house style, may have accepted many of the author's formal practices or suggestions about form, but may also have rejected a number of these.<sup>79</sup>

The text of the *Treatise* derives ultimately from a manuscript whose author, we suppose, had generally sought and attained a high level of formal consistency. The compositors, although they rejected a sizeable number of Hume's implicit suggestions about form, also sought consistency in these matters.<sup>80</sup> The later editor's problem arises because these two views about the forms to use, Hume's or those of his compositors, came into conflict in circumstances that allowed one implicit rule or another to be followed, but not with the consistency likely to have been preferred by either author or compositor. As a consequence, we have a text whose forms were determined partly by the author, and partly by the compositors, and which were determined only incompletely by either. As a consequence, we have a work marked by a few inconsistencies introduced by the author, and still other inconsistencies introduced by the compositors.

Faced with this situation, one might follow one of three principles:

- Pr1. Reproduce the inconsistencies of form found in the first-edition text.
- Pr2. Eliminate the inconsistencies of form found in the first-edition text by adhering to Hume's preferred practice as revealed in his letters and manuscripts.
- Pr3. Eliminate the inconsistencies of form found in the first-edition text by adhering to the predominant practice of that text.

In our view, none of these principles, taken alone, can provide adequate direction to editors seeking to produce a critical text of the *Treatise* or *Abstract*. Pr1 in effect instructs such editors to abandon critical judgement in

<sup>78</sup> Prior to the advent of recent forms of word processing, certain author's suggestions or intentions were routinely coded in ways that need not be used now; e.g., authors underlined (as Hume did) where they expected compositors to use an italic font.

<sup>79</sup> Wilson's printing establishment was a small one, and thus it is unlikely that a 'corrector', charged with making sure that 'ambiguous words and compounds' were always spelled the same way, mediated between Hume's manuscript and the compositors, but proofs of his text may well have been checked by a corrector who had the manuscript read aloud to him. See Smith, *Printer's Grammar*, 272–5; Gaskell, *New Introduction to Bibliography*, 110–16.

<sup>80</sup> It was the duty of the compositor, according to Gaskell, 'to correct or normalize the spelling, punctuation, and capitalization (known nowadays as the "accidentals") of the manuscript'. He also reports that 'Compositors considered some spellings to be acceptable and others not, and they regularly brought their author's spellings into line with what they thought was right' (*New Introduction to Bibliography*, 110, 345). See also Smith, *Printer's Grammar*, 199–200, 274–5.

favour of a mere literal transcription of the first-edition text. It demands the reproduction of inconsistencies. But typographical errors are a form of inconsistency, and no theory of editing would accept as a critical text a text that reproduced such obvious flaws. Pr1 also fails to provide guidance in the matter of Hume's corrections and amendments as represented by cancels and marginalia, subjects to which we return below. Finally, given that the *Treatise* is already available in photo-reproduced facsimile,<sup>81</sup> a literal transcription would meet no scholarly need.

One could, however, modify Pr1. One could adopt Pr1': Eliminate all *inadvertent* inconsistencies of form found in the copy-text. This is clearly an advance over Pr1 in so far as it would permit us to eliminate obvious typographical errors. It would also provide us with a principled basis for eliminating a number of orthographical inconsistencies: those, for example, that represent the inadvertent failure of the compositors to reform Hume's practice thoroughly. Thus the consequent critical text, instead of reading sometimes *shew* and sometimes *show*, would use only one of these forms, although, to determine which of the two forms is to be used, we would need to use Pr1' in conjunction with either Pr2 or Pr3. Unfortunately, however, not even this revised principle helps with some of the decisions that must be made. It cannot be said that the compositors *inadvertently* introduced such forms as *make- | ing*, or that they *inadvertently* set the ordinals that begin paragraphs in small capitals. These inconsistencies may have been the result of habitual practices followed unreflectively, but they are not for that reason inadvertent. Consequently, if we allow ourselves to be guided only by Pr1', we will find ourselves required to include in the critical text of the *Treatise* forms that we can be sure Hume did not use, and inconsistencies of form which in all likelihood were not to be found in his manuscript of the work, while at the same time we will be required to forgo the opportunity to restore to the text useful features (italicized ordinals in Books 1 and 2, for example) of the manuscript. Moreover, to allow some of these inconsistencies to stand would be unhelpful, and sometimes even misleading. That an unmitigated adherence to either Pr1 or Pr1' would have such consequences reveals that neither would be a satisfactory guide in the matter before us.

Given the failure of Pr1 and its variant, Pr1', we appear to have no choice but to adopt a principle that allows us to eliminate compositorially introduced inconsistencies from our critical edition. Pr2, calling as it does for the elimination of inconsistencies by adhering to Hume's preferred practice, will do just that.

<sup>81</sup> *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 3 vols., Intro. by D. Raynor.



There is much to be said for Pr2. One can often learn enough about Hume's manuscript practice to determine which of two or more inconsistent forms he preferred. It also seems generally right to suppose that the critical text of a work published in only a single edition should bear the greatest possible resemblance to the manuscript from which it derives, or, when the manuscript itself is not extant, to the known manuscript practices of the author. But, while this may seem generally right, it certainly does not appear to be universally right. As we noted above, Hume consistently capitalized substantives. The first-edition text does so only rarely. The uncritical application of Pr2 would entail restoring such an initial capital to thousands of substantives. Would it seem right, or merely capricious, to introduce these thousands of capitals now? In addition, having decided to let the evidence of Hume's preferences decide between inconsistencies, we could be pressed to explain why we have not taken that same evidence to lead us to restore certain other forms that the compositors managed to eliminate completely. If there is no principled way of deflecting this argument, and none is obvious, then we would find that the unqualified application of Pr2 would require us not only to replace *immediately* with *immediatly*, but also *and* by  $\mathcal{E}$ , for in all likelihood both would have been the standard form used in the manuscript.<sup>82</sup> On this tack, our critical text would soon cease to resemble any book published in early eighteenth-century Britain, for  $\mathcal{E}$ , as short-hand for *and*, was typically transformed into *and*. In short, the unqualified use of Pr2 would also lead to a number of unacceptable consequences.

We are left, then, with Pr3. The first-edition text itself must be the touchstone by which the forms of the critical text are to be determined. But, although we have been led to this position by the arguments appearing to eliminate the alternative principles available to us, it is clear that an unqualified reliance on Pr3 would also lead to unacceptable consequences. Consider the now familiar examples, *make-|ing* and ordinals. Shall we instruct the compositors of the critical text to insert an *e* in the event that certain words, *making* or *judgement*, for example, are divided between lines? Or, in the matter of ordinals, which shall we say is the standard practice of the first-edition text, the one used in Volumes 1 and 2, or the one used in Volume 3? Which of these two standards should be followed? Should this objection be countered by an appeal to statistical superiority, by the claim that, because

<sup>82</sup> The situation is even more complex than this suggests. Hume regularly used a variation of the ampersand (effectively, a +) to represent both the English word *and* (see Ed. App. 1 for examples), and the Latin word *et*. His compositors consistently translated this symbol, as it represented *and*, into that word. With equal consistency they converted the same symbol, when it represented the *et* of *etc.*, into a printed &, thereby producing  $\mathcal{E}c$ .

the practice of Volumes 1 and 2 is the numerically more common practice, it should determine the form of the critical text, we would find ourselves in a further quandary. The practice of Volumes 1 and 2 is itself consistent only in so far as small capitals are used for those ordinals that begin paragraphs. Paragraph-internal ordinals in the same series are sometimes also in roman, but sometimes they are italicized, and not, apparently, according to any pattern that could provide us with a sensible rule by which to introduce the same *inconsistent* pattern into the ordinals of Volume 3. Although we could obviously extrapolate a purely mathematical pattern from the apparently random usage of the earlier volumes, it would be absurd to sprinkle Volume 3 with paragraph-internal ordinals randomly determined to be roman or italic, and to do so *in the name of consistency*. Perhaps, after all, it is Pr1 that should be adopted.

It would be pointless to go round the same circle again. But having shown that no simple, mechanically applied rule can make the unavoidable editorial decisions that the editors of a critical edition of the *Treatise* face, we can now add meaning to our earlier statement of policy. We have followed the form of the copy-text unless the grounds for making a change appear to be better than the grounds for following exactly the text or forms of this text. The *prima facie* better grounds are various, and derive from several sources: any explicit corrections of accidentals found in the three Errata, Hume's manuscript corrections of accidentals in copies of all three volumes, Hume's manuscript practices and his expressed preferences, the copy-text itself, Hume's later use of texts from the *Treatise*, information about eighteenth-century compositorial practice,<sup>83</sup> information about eighteenth-century orthography and punctuation, our own judgement as informed by the preceding and improved and tempered by the advice of others qualified to give advice on such matters.

#### 1.5.4 Summary

Following a comprehensive review of the forms of the copy-text (orthography, punctuation, and the use of italics and small capitals, for example) and a survey of Hume's manuscript practice for the years surrounding the writing of the *Treatise*, we have concluded that many of the inconsistencies of form found in the first edition of this work were introduced by the compositors' efforts to substitute their preferred forms for those found in Hume's

<sup>83</sup> It should also be noted that the critical text makes no effort to preserve certain typographical conventions common to eighteenth-century book production. These include, e.g., the use of small capitals at the outset of each paragraph, catchwords, the long *s*, and various kinds of ornamentation. These matters are discussed more fully in Sect. 2.1 below.

manuscripts.<sup>84</sup> Faced with an unavoidable choice between preserving or eliminating such inconsistencies, we have chosen to eliminate those which cannot be traced to Hume's practice. This choice is justified by the fact that there appear to be no compelling reasons for preserving such inconsistencies, and good reasons for eliminating them. At the very least, the resulting critical text will prove less susceptible to the kind of misunderstanding that can arise when one finds a key term (*reflection*, for example) randomly spelled in different ways.<sup>85</sup> As a consequence of this decision in the matter of consistency of accidentals abstractly considered, the critical text more closely approximates the manuscript that Hume prepared, and the likely desires of author and printer alike, both of whom appear to have aimed for consistency of form. Our practice in eliminating these inconsistencies can be summarized in a few sentences.

First, if with respect to a particular usage the printed text is in fact perfectly consistent, we have followed this usage even when we have good evidence that Hume's standard usage was otherwise. Thus, for example, the critical text follows the first edition in using *immediately*, rather than *immediatly*, the form routinely used by Hume. Second, if with respect to a particular usage the printed text is *virtually* consistent, we have followed this usage even when we have good evidence that Hume's standard usage was otherwise.<sup>86</sup> Hence the critical text begins virtually all sentence-internal substantives with lower case (some are, as they were in the copy-text, in small capitals) even though these would have begun with capitals in Hume's manuscript. On the same grounds, the five cases of *it's* as the neuter singular possessive have been replaced by *its*, the form used on 739 other occasions. Third, if with respect to a particular usage the first-edition text is neither perfectly nor virtually consistent, and if we have good reason to suppose that Hume's relevant manuscript practice was generally consistent, we have followed his usage rather than that of the compositors. Hence, for example, the critical text invariably uses italicized ordinal terms and such forms as *advanc'd*, *antient*, *choose*, *connexion*, *modify'd*, *perswade*, *reflection*, *show*, and *wou'd*, to the exclusion of the alternatives, *advanced*, *ancient*, *chuse*, *connection*, *modified*,

<sup>84</sup> We emphasize that we are speaking only of *inconsistencies* of form. In many respects the compositors did impose their preferred forms with perfect or near-perfect consistency, and we have found no grounds for reversing these successes.

<sup>85</sup> The widely used Selby-Bigge edition silently, and following no apparent guiding principle, replaces first-edition uses of *reflection* or its plural with *reflexion* or its plural on more than fifty occasions (see above, Sect. 1.4). This edition also silently eliminates two of the three uses of *connection*; occasionally adds an *l* to *ou'd* forms; and, while it deletes the end-of-line *e* in *making* and *tracing*, uses *taking*, and increases from one to three the uses of *judgement* and from three to four the uses of *falschood*. In short, the Selby-Bigge edition cannot be held up as a model of orthographical accuracy or consistency.

<sup>86</sup> By *virtually consistent*, we mean approximately 99 per cent consistent.

*persuade*, *reflexion*, *shew*, and *would*, introduced into the text, as we believe, by the compositors. Fourth, if with respect to a particular usage the first-edition text is neither perfectly nor virtually consistent, we have also looked to and followed the standard of use in Volume 3. In so far as this volume was produced nearly two years later than the other two, for a more experienced author, and in several respects appears to conform more nearly to Hume's manuscript practice, this precedence is justified. Fifth, and last, if with respect to a particular usage neither the first-edition text as a whole nor Volume 3 is either perfectly or virtually consistent, and we either lack good evidence of Hume's preferred usage or know his usage to have been variable, we have allowed the inconsistency to stand in the case of orthographical forms, but have generally eliminated inconsistencies in the use of italics and certain forms of punctuation. Thus, for example, the critical text includes both *dependance* and *dependence* because the sampled manuscripts use both spellings, but, in keeping with what is only a general practice of the copy-text and Hume's manuscripts, all mentioned words are printed in italic, and all sub-sentential questions are followed by a question mark. The great majority of these formal emendations are recorded in Register A, but those that derive from Hume himself are recorded in Register B.

## 1.6 Formal Emendation of the *Abstract* and the *Letter from a Gentleman*

### 1.6.1 The *Abstract*

In preparing the critical text of the *Abstract*, we have followed the general policy and procedures set out in 1.5.3–4 above. But because of the different circumstances in which the *Abstract* was produced, the results are in some respects different. Hume wrote the main body of the short work now known as the *Abstract* sometime during the second half of 1739. His intention was to publish this account of the *Treatise* in *The History of the Works of the Learned*, but his plan failed because that journal already had on hand an unfavourable review of the *Treatise*, a review published in its November and December 1739 issues.<sup>87</sup> In due course Hume appears to have turned to John Noon for help, for, after Hume had prepared a brief Preface to the work, Noon arranged for the *Abstract* to be printed by William Strahan and published anonymously by Charles Corbet.

Given that in this scheme of things neither Hume nor Noon was to be implicated in the publication of the *Abstract*, it is not surprising that Noon had the pamphlet printed by Strahan rather than Wilson. If the idea was to

<sup>87</sup> For details, see Historical Account, Sects. 3 and 7.4.

present the *Abstract* as a bit of ‘intermeddling’ (Pref. 3) by a third party, it would be well to give it a different appearance. And this Strahan’s compositors did. They gave the work a different general appearance and a different set of accidental norms. Most noticeably, they eliminated all but one of the twenty-five *ou’d* forms that would likely have characterized the manuscript, and about 85 per cent of the *’d* forms. They also used *shew* and *shewn* on the two relevant occasions. The critical text adheres to these and the other predominant practices of the copy-text. All changes of form are reported in Register A below.

### 1.6.2 The *Letter from a Gentleman*

Because Hume’s contribution to the *Letter from a Gentleman* was a letter not intended for publication, we have limited changes of form to the modernization of quotation marks and the correction of typographical errors. See Sect. 2.2.2.3 below.

## 1.7 Sources of Substantive Emendations

In making substantive emendations to the copy-texts of the *Treatise* and the *Abstract*, we have consulted the limited but important materials in Hume’s hand that bear directly on these texts. With respect to the *Treatise*, these materials include three of Hume’s letters; a draft version of 3.3.6, ‘*Conclusion of this book*’; and Hume’s marginalia in copies of the *Treatise*. With respect to the text of the *Abstract*, there are only a few marginalia in the copy-text itself to consider. No manuscript remains bear directly on the text of the *Letter from a Gentleman*, but Hume’s one surviving comment about that work has influenced our decision about the appropriate form of the critical text. An additional set of substantive emendations derive from the judgements of editors, ourselves included.

### 1.7.1 Hume’s Letters

Extant letters from as early as 1727 until shortly before Hume’s death in 1776 reveal much about the origins of the *Treatise* and its author’s intentions, expectations, and opinions as these bear on the work. Parts of three of these letters were written largely in response to Francis Hutcheson’s comments on a draft of Book 3, *Of Morals*. The question of how Hume may have reshaped this draft to produce the published version of Book 3 is the topic of Section 5 of the Historical Account found above. The third of the two letters replicates,

with minor differences in accidentals and two small verbal variations, a two-sentence ‘Reasoning’ found at 3: 24.15–28 (301.40–302.2), but provides no grounds for emendation of the copy-text.<sup>88</sup>

### 1.7.2 Manuscript of *Treatise* 3.3.6

This manuscript (National Library of Scotland MS 23159, item 15) of about 1,150 words is of interest because it is the sole remaining manuscript of the *Treatise* or of any of the philosophical works that Hume published during his lifetime. This manuscript is most likely the copy of the conclusion to Book 3 that Hume sent to Hutcheson, a copy that was left among the latter’s papers along with the letters from Hume mentioned above. This manuscript does not represent a stage of thought significantly different from that of the text printed in late summer or autumn 1740, but it does give us an idea of the form in which the *Treatise* was sent to the printers, and of how Hume’s manuscript practices or conventions were transformed into printed forms. The complete four-page text is reproduced photographically in Ed. App. 1. Potentially significant verbal differences between this draft and the critical text are recorded in Register B below, but no emendations have been made as a consequence of these variant readings. Ed. App. 1 also includes a record of all the substantive differences, and many of the accidental differences, between the versions of 3.3.6 found in the copy-text and in this manuscript.

### 1.7.3 *Treatise* Errata

The first volume of the copy-text contains at a2<sup>v</sup> a fourteen-line, eighteen-entry Errata for Volume 1, and immediately below it a six-and-one-half-line, nine-entry Errata for Volume 2. Volume 3 contained, first, at A4<sup>v</sup> an eight-line, nine-entry Errata, and then by means of a cancel, a fourteen-line, eighteen-entry Errata. The shorter of these two lists is consistent, so far as it goes, with the longer list that replaces it. Excepting certain directions in conflict with Hume’s later hand-written corrections to his own copy of the first edition, the critical text incorporates the alterations called for by these Errata.<sup>89</sup>

### 1.7.4 The Appendix to Volume 3

The first-edition text of Volume 3 concludes with a 5,600-word Appendix, ‘Wherein some Passages of the foregoing Volumes are illustrated and explain’d’.

<sup>88</sup> The letters are those to Hutcheson of 17 Sept. 1739 and 4 and 16 March 1740. See *Letters*, 1: 32–40. The two sentences mentioned are printed in full, Historical Account, Sect. 5.

<sup>89</sup> For these conflicts and their resolution, see the relevant entries in Register B below.

Making up about one-half of this Appendix are nine passages, ranging in length from 100 to 650 words, accompanied by instructions for their insertion at nine distinct locations in Book 1. The critical text, following these instructions, incorporates into the text of Book 1 the nine passages mentioned. It also follows Hume's directions by correcting two additional errors mentioned in the Appendix. These amendments and corrections are recorded in Register B below. In the present edition, the remaining parts of the Appendix follow Book 3, just as the complete Appendix did in first-edition copies of the work. In addition, the complete Appendix as published in 1740 is reprinted below as Ed. App. 2, thus allowing readers to consider the order and scope of Hume's discussion as it was presented to eighteenth-century readers.

### 1.7.5 Hume's Marginalia in the *Treatise*

As we noted in 1.2.1–2 above, Hume's hand-written corrections or amendments are found in two sets, and one part set, of the *Treatise*. Twenty-five of the corrections found in Volumes 1 and 2 of the Pope copy do nothing more than make corrections called for by the Errata for these volumes. The remaining correction, to 1: 57.4–5 (24.21–2), corrects, in effect, the Errata.<sup>90</sup> The Kames copy contains, in Volumes 1 and 2, forty-seven corrections in Hume's hand, twenty-five called for by the Errata, the variant correction to 1: 57.4–5 (24.21–2), and an additional twenty-one corrections not found elsewhere. These latter are for the most part stylistic, although the correction at 2: 104.5 (217.10) of *ever* to *never*, does restore the obvious sense of the argument there.

Of the approximately ninety hand-written interventions found in the Hume copy (the British Library copy) of Volume 3, eighteen address the same items as the Errata to this volume, but only eleven of these exactly replicate an Errata entry. Three of the remaining seven differ in form (spelling or capitalization); four are substantively different. Of the seventy-plus additional interventions, the majority may be aptly described as stylistic, but this still leaves a fair number of substantial alterations or *amendments* to the text. Each of these corrections or amendments is recorded in Register B. Moreover, we have assumed that Hume would have undertaken to incorporate in any new edition of the *Treatise* not only the corrections called for by the Errata, but also the further corrections or amendments suggested by way of his marginalia, and have responded accordingly to these suggestions.

<sup>90</sup> All details may be seen in Register B below.

Where the Errata and the hand-written corrections are in conflict with respect to accidentals, we have followed the Errata, because these conform to the standards of capitalization and punctuation set by the copy-text. Where there is such a conflict in respect of substantive matter, we have generally accepted the reading of the hand-written material, because this post-dates the Errata and thus can reasonably be taken to represent Hume's later thoughts on the issue addressed. When we have not given preference to this material, we have explained our decision in a note to the relevant Register entry.

#### 1.7.6 Hume's Marginalia in the *Abstract*

As Connon has reported, the British Library copy of the *Abstract*, which is bound with the Hume copy of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*, includes four substantive amendments in Hume's hand.<sup>91</sup> These amendments have been incorporated in the critical text. In addition, several copies examined include a further correction, in an unknown hand, at D2', line 24. This amendment, which was most likely made by a corrector in the employ of William Strahan, the printer of the first edition, has also been incorporated in the critical text. Details of these amendments are found in Register B. There is no additional evidence that Hume intended or hoped for a second edition of the *Abstract*, but we have taken his corrections as an indication that he was not satisfied with the work as published, and as grounds for amending the copy-text.

#### 1.7.7 *The Letter from a Gentleman*

Hume mentions the *Letter from a Gentleman* just once in his correspondence. 'I am sorry', he wrote to Kames, that 'you shou'd have found yourself oblig'd to print the Letter I wrote to Mr Coutts, it being so hastily compos'd that I scarce had time to revise it.'<sup>92</sup> Given this indication that the *Letter from a Gentleman* was not written with publication in mind, and the further fact that Hume did not see the work through the press—did not have an opportunity to treat it as though intended for publication by, for example, providing Errata—and did not, so far as we know, make corrections to a copy of the printed text, we have treated the copy-text as a printed transcript of a letter that had been lightly edited by Kames. Consequently, with the exception of several typographical errors (see 2.2.1.5, 2.2.2.1), and a necessary

<sup>91</sup> R. W. Connon, 'Some Hume MS Alterations on a Copy of the "Abstract"'.  
<sup>92</sup> For further details, see Historical Account, Sect. 8.



adjustment of quotation marks, the critical text of the *Letter from a Gentleman* follows its copy-text.

### 1.7.8 Conclusion

Abstracting from these authorially derived emendations, we have instituted only a relatively few substantive emendations to the *Treatise*, and only a small number of these have a significant effect on the sense of the text. A few minor changes have also been made to the text of the *Abstract*. Each of these emendations is recorded in Register B, and our reasons for making them are set out in notes, but some general remarks, with illustrations, are in order here.

The *Treatise* is a work of some 225,000 words. The evidence suggests that Hume prepared his manuscript with care. In addition, a corrector may have checked proofs by having the manuscript read aloud to him. Hume, who was in London when all three volumes were published, surely availed himself of the opportunity to read proofs. Despite these efforts, the *Treatise* was far from perfectly printed. As we have noted, Errata were compiled for all three volumes, and Hume himself made further corrections.<sup>93</sup> In addition, we have judged the copy-text of the *Treatise* to be in need of further substantive emendation on approximately seventy-five occasions. We note, however, that while these emendations are all appropriately classified as *substantive*, inasmuch as they go beyond such merely formal features as spelling or punctuation, about 15 per cent of them are on the borderline of this classification (eight, for example, concern a choice between *those* or *these*). The majority of the remainder have only modest effect on the substance or meaning of the text. Roughly thirty emend by substituting a noun of a different number (i.e. singular or plural), or bringing about numerical agreement of subject and verb. Another ten are minor in other respects: an obviously missing word is supplied or an inappropriate particle replaced. In short, we have made fewer than fifteen substantive changes that affect the sense of the text, and several of these follow recommendations made, implicitly or explicitly, by earlier editors or commentators. Moreover, our decisions about such changes have benefited from opportunities to discuss proposed emendations, opportunities arising from the publication of what has been in effect a prototype of the critical text<sup>94</sup> and of an article setting out the substantive differences between that prototype

<sup>93</sup> For the significant set of obvious textual or typographical errors not noted in the Errata or corrected by Hume, see below, Sect. 2.2.1.5.

<sup>94</sup> This prototype is the text of the *Treatise* as found in the Oxford Philosophical Texts (OPT) edition of the work, first printed in 2000. The eleventh and later impressions of that text, and any subsequent OPT editions of the *Treatise* and the *Abstract*, follow the critical text found in vol. 1 of this, the Clarendon edition of these works.

and the familiar Selby-Bigge edition of the *Treatise*.<sup>95</sup> As a result of these discussions, we have elected to follow the copy-text in two controversial instances: at l: 54.23 (23.20) and at l: 351.25 (134.7).

In the first of these instances we had suggested that the text should read ‘quantity’ rather than ‘quality’. While we continue to believe that the context of this remark and the balance of Hume’s discussion in *Treatise* 1.2 provide grounds to question the reading of the copy-text, we have been reminded that Hume does speak of ‘degrees in any quality’ (1.3.1.1; see also 1.1.5.7, 1.3.1.2) and of ‘a real quality of extension’ that may be compounded (1.2.2.2; see also 1.4.5.15). Thus the grounds for accepting the copy-text reading may be stronger than those favouring emendation.<sup>96</sup>

In the second instance, we suggested that the text should read ‘identity’ rather than ‘unity’. If this emendation is called for, the case for it needs to be made at a length inappropriate to a note, and thus we have retained the reading of the copy-text. We raise the issue, and sketch reasons in favour of an emendation at ann. 134.7.

The substantive emendations we or earlier editors have made are set out in Register B below.

## 1.8 Editing the Quotations in the Texts

Quotations in the *Treatise* and *Abstract* are of two types: those drawn from other authors (external sources), and those drawn from the *Treatise* itself.

### 1.8.1 Accidentals

The norms of the copy-text, as these bear on orthography and italics, have been followed. On the other hand, the original punctuation of Hume’s self-quotations has been followed on the grounds that deviations from his original are at least as likely to derive from the compositors as from Hume’s transcription of the text quoted.<sup>97</sup>

### 1.8.2 Substantives

For doubtful substantive readings of quoted material drawn from external sources, we have emended the text by substituting readings that reliably

<sup>95</sup> D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton, ‘Substantive Differences between Two Texts of Hume’s *Treatise*’.

<sup>96</sup> We are indebted to M. A. Stewart for counsel on this matter. Our reasons for questioning the reading are summarized in ann. 23.19.

<sup>97</sup> We have reached this conclusion from a study of cancels and the leaves they replace. See Register B, entries 81.21; 240.1; 318.17; 319.39; 320.34, 37, 43; 321.37, 40, 45; 322.title.

represent the apparent sense of quoted texts and that are found in editions of these texts available to Hume. We have done so because we do not believe that Hume intentionally mistranscribed the texts in question, and because the deviations in question are small ones that may have been introduced by the compositors, just as deviations in punctuation were introduced by them.

On the occasion in the *Treatise* when Hume, quoting himself, omits, first, four sentences, and then two words of his own text, we have assumed that the first omission was intentional and the second inadvertent, and have thus supplied the two missing words. For further details, see ann. 379.12 and Register B, entry 379.16.

## 1.9 Standardized or Universal Forms of Reference

See vol. 1, A Note on the Texts, and Sect. 2.1.5–9 below.

## 2. REGISTER A: FORMAL EMENDATIONS

This Register reports two kinds of formal emendation: those systematic changes of form made without further notice, and systematic emendations of form reported by kind.

### 2.1 Systematic Changes of Form Made without Further Notice

2.1.1 Eighteenth-century practices no longer commonly in use have been eliminated. These include:

- Printing initial letters of paragraphs beginning Parts within factotums
- Printing initial letters of paragraphs beginning Sections as two-line capitals
- Printing in capital–small capital combinations the first or first and second word(s) of all other paragraphs of the *Treatise* and the *Abstract*
- The use of ornaments
- The use of the long ‘f’
- The use of catchwords
- The use of signatures
- Advertisements of other works in the *Treatise*.

2.1.2 Lists of contents printed in italic and placed at the beginning of each of the three volumes of the *Treatise* have been printed in roman, combined into a single list, and placed at the beginning of the critical text.

2.1.3 Corrections called for by the Errata in Volumes 1 and 3 of the *Treatise* have been made and recorded in Register B, and thus the Errata are not as such included in the critical edition.

2.1.4 The use of a full stop or a period following Book, Part, and Section titles of the *Treatise*, and following numerals in the *Treatise* have been eliminated. For the reason set out in 1.6.2 above, periods following numerals have been left in the text of the *Letter from a Gentleman*.

2.1.5 Section titles found in the margins of the copy-text of the *Treatise* have been used as the running heads of the critical text of that work. These running heads also provide, in arabic numerals, Book, Part, and Section numbers.

2.1.6 Each Book, Part, and Section of the *Treatise* has been numbered in arabic, the form more likely to have been used by Hume in his manuscript (see Ed. App. 1), and the form that he consistently used for sections in his notes to Volumes 1 and 2 of the copy-text.

2.1.7 Paragraph numbers, beginning anew with each distinct section of the *Treatise* and *Abstract*, have been added in the left-hand margins. The paragraphs of the *Letter from a Gentleman* have also been numbered consecutively in the left-hand margins. Line numbers (10, 20, 30), beginning anew with each page have been added in the right-hand margins of all but pp. 420–4 of the texts. The line numbers of footnotes continue overleaf as needed.

2.1.8 The right-hand margin of each page of critical text records the corresponding page(s) of the text of the *Treatise* in what has for many years served as the standard edition of this work, that edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge in 1888, and revised, with the addition of the *Abstract*, by P. H. Nidditch in 1978.

2.1.9 Symbols, asterisks or obelisks, for example, or lower-case letters used to mark footnotes in the copy-text of the *Treatise* have been replaced by arabic numbers, and the notes of the entire work have been numbered continuously. Some footnote markers have been moved from the beginning to the end of the phrase in which they are found, and those that in the copy-text precede punctuation follow that punctuation in the critical text.

2.1.10 Repeated, marginal double quotation marks distinguishing emphasized or quoted material have been replaced by italic text or by the now standard quotation marks that indicate the beginning and end of the material quoted. Exceptions to this practice are listed at 2.2.2.3 below.

## 2.2 Systematic Emendations of Form Reported by Kind

For the reasons outlined in 1.5 and 1.6 above, certain inconsistencies of form found in the copy-text of the *Treatise* and the *Abstract* have been eliminated

from the critical texts of these works. These emendations have no effect on the substantive meaning of the text. They are of interest principally for the light they shed on the manuscript conventions Hume probably used and the manner in which the compositors converted his manuscript into a printed book. Consequently, with a few exceptions, we have recorded these emendations in Register A.<sup>98</sup> We have organized these records by kind. Those emendations that do or may affect the sense of the text are recorded in Register B.

### 2.2.1 Orthography

Generally speaking, inconsistent orthography has been eliminated by adopting either Hume's preferred usage, as revealed by a review of his manuscript practice for the period *c.* 1737–50, or by following the norms of the copy-text of the *Treatise* and the *Abstract*.<sup>99</sup>

#### 2.2.1.1 Apostrophes

- Apostrophes added in the *Treatise*: 91.32 moment's] moments †203.33 enemy's] enemies 236.5 other's] others 286.41 'twou'd] 'twoud 329.8 person's] persons 345.4 other's] others 345.15 other's] others 379.31 other's] others 394.28 reader's] readers<sup>100</sup>
- Apostrophes deleted in the *Treatise*: 51.12 Its] It's 51.45 its] it's 65.8 every] ev'ry 107.41 its] it's 131.1 the other] t'other 196.34 its] it's 265.33 its] it's 352.16 freed] free'd 373.15 the other] t'other

#### 2.2.1.2 Hyphenation and Spacing

- Hyphens restored or added in the *Treatise*: 19.29 such-a-one] such a one 21.35 above-explain'd] above explain'd 24.38 sub-divisions] subdivisions 33.35 above-explain'd] above explain'd 39.19 juxta-position]

<sup>98</sup> The exceptions are those emendations of accidentals that derive from the Errata, cancelled leaves, Hume's marginalia, or, in the *Abstract*, from the quoted text of the *Treatise*. These are recorded in both Register A and Register B.

<sup>99</sup> As the emendations here recorded are arranged in groups of like kinds, reports of them can often be made with significant economy of space, but all reports enable the reader to determine the form of both copy-text and critical text. Where both critical text and copy-text readings are explicitly reported, the emended critical text always precedes a square bracket, while the copy-text reading follows this bracket, as, for example: enemy's] enemies. Those items that appear in two lists here in Register A are preceded by an asterisk (\*). Those that appear in both Register A and Register B are preceded by an obelisk (†).

<sup>100</sup> Because it appears that only the singular possessive form ('s) was in use by 1740 (see Smith, *Printer's Grammar*, 108), we have not emended the copy-text in those few instances (see, e.g., 175.19) in which a plural form (s) would now seem appropriate.

- juxta position 97.9 above-explain'd] above explain'd \*97.33–4 above-explain'd] above explain'd 97.41 to-day] to day 103.6 good-breeding] good breeding 208.42 above-explain'd] above explain'd 348.3 which-ever] which ever n. 82.3 (358), 383.38 above-explain'd] above explain'd
- Hyphens restored or added in the *Abstract*: 408.36 who-ever] whoever 411.15 billiard-ball] billiard ball 415.34 above-explained] above explained
- Hyphens deleted in the *Treatise*: 7.19 no one] no-one 9.34 12.9 12.28 31.41 wherever] where-ever \*74.37 correlative] co-relative 115.18 wherever] where-ever <eol><sup>101</sup> 157.34 anew] a-new 172.25 disapprobation] disapprobation 188.13 correlative] cor-relative 193.21–2 disapprobation] disapprobation 228.9–10 countrymen] country-men 234.44 apart] a-part 252.43 some way] some-way <eol> 312.17 apart] a-part 336.15 withhold] with-hold 338.15 apart] a-part 357.5 bloodshed] blood-shed <eol> 368.10 anew] a-new 371.39 aright] a-right 372.28 countrymen] country-men <eol> 373.37 no one] no-one 378.10 every one] every-one 395.29 apart] a-part
- End-of-line hyphenation. The following compound words appear in the *Treatise* only as hyphenated words on two lines. In the absence of further evidence from either the copy-text or extant manuscripts, hyphenated forms of these words have been used in the critical text: 9.40 pine-apple 34.7–8 quick-silver 117.34 head-pieces 260.11 wise-men 381.33 well-founded
- End-of-line additions. On nine occasions in the *Treatise*, the copy-text compositors, following eighteenth-century practice, have added an *e* when dividing a word between two lines.<sup>102</sup> These added letters have been deleted: 29.45 falshood] false-hood 31.41, 115.18 wherever] where-ever 125.10 making] make-ing 145.35 tracing] trace-ing 148.30 making] make-ing 185.31 falshoods] false-hoods 213.15 judgment] judge-ment 247.2 taking] take-ing n. 68.40 (297)<sup>103</sup> falshood] false-hood
- End-of-line spacing. On five occasions in the *Treatise*, words normally printed as a single unit are printed at the end of one line and the beginning of the following line, but without a hyphen. In conformity with the general practice of the copy-text, these words are in the critical text printed as single words: 2.2 myself] my self 92.26 myself] my self 316.22 itself] it self 343.16 nevertheless] never | the less 344.8 myself] my self

<sup>101</sup> The notation <eol> indicates that the copy-text uses a hyphen apparently because a word or part thereof has come at the end of a line.

<sup>102</sup> For an explanation of these additions, see n. 68 above.

<sup>103</sup> Numbers in parentheses following references to notes are to the page on which the note begins in vol. 1 of this edition.

2.2.1.3 Letters (In this section, emendations are recorded alphabetically.)

In the *Treatise*: amidst *replaces* amid: 147.44 antient *repl.* ancient: 98.37, 98.44, 144.37 ballance *repl.* balance in compounds: 313.11, 316.16, 365.13 betwixt *repl.* between: 51.44, 131.9, 141.2, 141.3, 189.32 Catholics *repl.* Catholicks: 79.27 choose and its forms *repl.* chuse and its forms: 40.2, 58.31, 198.29, 261.26, 265.7, 267.12, 267.14, 267.17, 267.29, 276.36, 300.30, 301.1, 343.31, 343.32, 347.11, 351.13, 353.23, 356.6, 356.20, 358.2, 358.20, 361.31, 362.8, 366.7, 393.14 concurr'd *repl.* concur'd: 359.3 connexion(s) *repl.* connection(s): 46.33–4, 49.22, n. 68.6 (297) controuling *repl.* controlling: 316.21 co-temporary *repl.* contemporary: 169.23 conveniencies *repl.* conveniences: 203.11, 204.43, 205.19–20, 233.12 corollary and its forms *repl.* corollary and its forms: 115.11, 116.9 discernible *repl.* discernable: 251.24, 344.3 enchanted *repl.* enchanted: 397.26 enclos'd *repl.* inclos'd: 160.43 encrease *repl.* increase: 42.21, 154.29, 325.5, 359.30 enforce and its forms *repl.* inforce and its forms: 75.2, 273.36, 344.34 enlarging *repl.* inlarging: 115.1 enliven and its forms *repl.* inliven and its forms: 69.24, 69.34, 69.40, 70.7, 70.15, 70.36, 71.12, 75.3, 84.37, 96.7, 97.13, 101.10, 101.18, 149.3, 207.40, 208.27, 228.42, 242.45, 270.25, 271.16, 279.3, 289.34 entirely *repl.* intirely: 11.28 entitled *repl.* intitled: 210.34, 387.26 faint *repl.* feint: 379.34 falsely *repl.* falsely: 137.40 farther *repl.* further: 86.14, 122.32 fervours *repl.* fervors: 85.17 forlorn *repl.* forelorn: 172.16 imbecility *repl.* imbecillity: 386.23 implicitly *repl.* implicately: 81.1, 173.13 inactive *repl.* unactive: 107.35 inconveniencies *repl.* inconveniences: 19.17–18, 182.1, 312.22, 315.15, 317.33, 330.4, 345.21, 348.5–6, 348.7 inferr'd *repl.* infer'd: 17.20, 127.32, 241.24 isosceles *repl.* isoceles: 19.26, 52.11 merely *repl.* meerly: 28.35, 37.26, 43.9 middling *repl.* midling: 250.17 persuade and its forms *repl.* persuade and its forms: 46.6, 76.9, 80.43, 81.18, 85.5, 85.35, 98.24, 144.35, 145.7, 152.25, 302.19, 352.14, 358.5, 365.7, 365.32–3, 365.37, 375.36, 380.14, 380.16, 390.41, 395.42 plane *repl.* plain: 38.6, 38.8, 38.12, 38.18, 38.22, 42.2 public *repl.* publick: 193.10, 309.15, 318.41, 318.42, 319.7, 319.9, †319.22, 321.23, n. 71.8 (323) pusillanimous and its forms *repl.* pusilanimous and its forms: 145.5, 285.15 recal *repl.* recall: 13.20 referr'd *repl.* refer'd: 16.21 reflection(s) *repl.* reflexion(s): 8.7, 10.36, \*11.4, 11.12, 11.14, 70.2, 198.29, 236.18, 236.23 relicts *repl.* relicks: 71.2 separates and its forms *repl.* separates and its forms: 281.1, 282.33 show and its forms *repl.* shew and its forms: 8.37, 10.38, 14.15, 23.2, 27.39, 39.30, 43.34, 44.27, 47.20, 47.29, 52.10, 56.21, 57.33, 62.10, 63.36, 64.29, 69.7, 84.1, 102.40, 107.15, 107.18, 117.30, 117.34, 120.1, 121.32, 126.15, 134.21, 140.42, 141.17, 141.44, 143.25, 148.15, 150.27, 158.16, 160.39, 166.37, 171.9, 174.20, 175.31, 192.41, 194.25, 195.22, 198.34,

199.29, 212.4, 212.45, 215.14, 215.38, 220.2, 226.22, 226.32, 227.1, 227.38, 233.32, 235.13, 239.17, 239.31, 253.5, 260.15, 265.26, 270.38, 286.24, 286.40, 295.15, 298.7, 299.35, 300.1, 300.10, 300.25, 303.5, 303.20, 305.8, 305.42, 307.36, 309.20, 315.35, 317.30, 318.36, 322.11, 325.11, n. 75.18 (327), 336.21, 343.23, 348.9, 350.4, 359.37, 361.16, 362.6, 378.4, 383.38, 383.40, 384.15, 388.21, 396.5 steady *repl.* stedly: 11.36 styl'd *repl.* stil'd: 278.20 subtile *repl.* subtle: 345.29, †351.45 subtilty and its forms *repl.* subilty and its forms: 93.7, 268.1, 307.33, n. 75.82 (328) surprizing *repl.* surprising: 196.33, 196.35, 196.45, 197.16, 208.31 suspence *repl.* suspense: 123.28, 123.35, 302.34 tacit *repl.* tacite: 324.12 Tho' *repl.* THOUGH: 345.32 till *repl.* 'till: 58.40, 66.43, 125.24, 262.4, 265.19, 273.32, 278.34, 284.2 tranquillity *repl.* tranquility: 282.43, 397.37 transferr'd *repl.* transfer'd: 95.1, 187.24, 251.30 trial *repl.* tryal: n. 75.24 (327) uncompounded *repl.* incompounded: 159.9

In the *Abstract*: connexion *replaces* connection: 416.38 entirely *repl.* intirely: 407.31, 408.7 entitle *repl.* intitle: 416.30 farther *repl.* further: 405.21

#### 2.2.1.4 Letters and Apostrophes

In the *Treatise*: 'd *replaces* ed: 3.3 advanc'd 3.9 obtain'd 3.11 deduc'd 3.20 manag'd 3.24 gain'd 3.35 determin'd 3.39 fail'd 3.39 esteem'd 4.7 judg'd 4.12 hop'd 4.29 follow'd 5.4 engag'd 5.29 arriv'd 5.32 refin'd 5.33 requir'd 5.34 discover'd 5.40 obtain'd 5.42 esteem'd 6.3 practis'd 6.18 compar'd 7.13 distinguish'd 7.26 distinguish'd n. 2.2 (7) allow'd n. 2.5 (7) produc'd 8.42 form'd 9.27 follow'd 10.8 enjoy'd 10.17 convey'd 10.19 deriv'd 10.28 suppos'd, deriv'd 10.36 deriv'd 10.38 convey'd 10.42 deriv'd 11.5 deriv'd 11.11 call'd 11.12 deriv'd 11.29 call'd 12.23 mention'd 13.25 interpos'd 13.28 allow'd 13.31 esteem'd 14.7 requir'd 14.32 us'd 14.35 above-explain'd 14.40 allow'd 15.3 esteem'd 15.5 produc'd 15.7 consider'd 15.37 suppos'd 16.18 assign'd 16.21 suppos'd 16.22 suppos'd 16.36 form'd 17.4 annex'd 17.18 esteem'd 18.3 conjoin'd 19.3 acquir'd 23.27 diminish'd 25.39 resolv'd 28.15 annex'd n. 20.2 (67) receiv'd 75.31 receiv'd 82.39 inclin'd 83.24 suppos'd 83.27 explain'd 83.39 observ'd 83.41 requir'd 83.43 receiv'd \*97.33–4 above-explain'd 114.12 consider'd 148.42 receiv'd 150.3 call'd 151.25 conceiv'd 197.19 desir'd 207.2 conceiv'd 223.13–14 disturb'd 294.21 suppos'd 295.10 pronounc'd 297.1 ascrib'd n. 68.2 (297) affirm'd n. 68.15 (297) us'd n. 68.30 (297) receiv'd n. 68.33 (297) receiv'd n. 68.39 (297) deriv'd n. 68.39–40 (297) suppos'd 298.4 caus'd 298.12 discover'd



299.13 compar'd 299.14 plac'd 299.15 suppos'd 299.22 compar'd  
299.38 well-dispos'd 300.17 acknowledg'd 303.42 consider'd 304.22  
deriv'd 304.43 oppos'd 305.12 oppos'd 305.26 oppos'd 305.38  
distinguish'd n. 70.1 (305) oppos'd 307.6 deriv'd 307.8 produc'd  
307.12 consider'd 310.11 confin'd 316.31 esteem'd 361.42 transgress'd  
389.38 valu'd 389.39 valu'd 392.9 receiv'd 394.23 valu'd 394.24 valu'd.

In the *Abstract*: ed replaces 'd: 405.15 attained, seemed 405.16 claimed  
405.18 received 405.26 judged 405.35 seemed 413.3 confined  
413.19–20 supposed 413.22 annexed 413.27 performed 413.37  
acquired 413.44 contained 415.7 asked 415.14 wished 415.16 waged

In the *Treatise*: y'd replaces ied: 3.9 carry'd 3.20 multiply'd 5.31 sat-  
isfy'd 8.15 carry'd 8.20 copy'd 10.38 convey'd 11.12 copy'd 13.26  
carry'd 15.41 imply'd 19.6 apply'd 84.24 hurry'd 100.22 carry'd  
177.8 carry'd 214.19 mortify'd 238.18 vary'd 312.15 satisfy'd 313.4  
carry'd 317.41 supply'd 318.10 marry'd 318.17 supply'd 343.21  
carry'd 344.25 satisfy'd 346.20 verify'd 347.23 carry'd 351.4 signify'd  
353.20 carry'd 360.2 dy'd 360.15 satisfy'd 362.2 dy'd 366.2  
carry'd 367.8 diversify'd 369.33 satisfy'd 375.33 diversify'd 376.21  
satisfy'd 376.25 mortify'd 379.39 apply'd 380.13 mortify'd 380.20  
accompany'd 382.38 fancy'd 388.34 apply'd 391.21 occupy'd 392.5  
fortify'd 394.29 supply'd 397.19 vary'd 397.30 modify'd 399.4 supply'd

In the *Abstract*: ied replaces y'd: 405.15 remedied 411.1 carried

In the *Treatise*: 'd replaces ld: cou'd repl. could: 26.8, 317.42, 331.32,  
331.33, 332.26, 333.1, 333.3 shou'd repl. should: 4.44, 5.42, 6.10, 8.36,  
10.21, 11.2, 12.35, 15.43, 16.22, 25.3, 82.2, 82.3, 293.20, n. 68.16 (297),  
301.7, 302.16, 304.26, 304.34, 312.28, \*321.14, 334.26, 343.23 'twou'd repl.  
'twould: 86.15, \*321.16 wou'd repl. would: 3.7, 4.1, 5.23, 5.24, 6.12, n. 2.4  
(7), 14.21, 21.15, 25.2, 26.10, 60.31, 82.5, 82.8, 294.40, 296.29, 301.1, 301.7,  
313.17, 317.43, 318.19, 318.29, \*322.18, 347.22.

In the *Abstract*: ld replaces 'd: 414.7 would] wou'd

#### 2.2.1.5 Miscellaneous Typographical Errors Corrected<sup>104</sup>

In the *Treatise*: 9.28 and] and and 11.17 philosophers] pilosophers  
12.20 second] sacond 20.9 parallelograms] paralelograms 28.39  
phænomena] phænomina 29.43 and this] an dthis 44.42–3 philosophy]  
philosphy 45.35 immoveable] imoveable 51.34 fundamental] fundamantal

<sup>104</sup> Any apparent typographical error that may constitute a substantive emendation is also reported in Register B.

53.26 endeavour] endavour 57.14 expressly] expresly 61.26 and] aud  
 \*74.37 correlative] co-relative 76.21 foresees] forsees 79.30 *Bartho-*  
*lomew]* *Bartholemew* 83.20 occur] cccur 84.22 withhold] withhold 88.3  
 actually] ac-actually 91.36 uninterrupted] uninterupted 95.5 to the]  
 tothe 97.6 probability] probabity †n. 29 (106) *Malebranche]* *Malbranche*  
 107.11 uncertain] uncertian 108.19 esteem] estem 114.26 preposterous]  
 proposterous 122.31 preceding] preceeding 122.36 quantity] quanity  
 129.14 unreasonable] unreason-sonable 144.2 conclusion] conlusion  
 148.33 irresistible] irresistable 150.28 compos'd] compo'd 152.22 latter]  
 latrer 158.8 communicating] commuicating 173.13 principle] principle  
 173.23 contradiction] contradicton 174.31 expressly] expresly 176.38  
 respect] repect 185.10 *scritoire]* *scritoure* 191.39 ostentatious]  
 ostentacious 195.2 villainy] villiany 197.5 and] and and 202.37 or] ot 232.4  
 agreeable] ageeeable 259.15 traveller] travellar 262.12 *spontaneity]* *spon-*  
*taniety* 262.28 something] somerhing 263.31 invidious] invidous 265.7  
 be] bc 265.21 there] their 273.7 which] which 276.39 proceed]  
 proceed 286.4 *praesentibus]* *presentibus* 295.5–6 agreement] argeement  
 302.36 proceeding] proceding †318.9 affection] affecton (S1) †321.15  
 distinction] dictinction (S4)<sup>105</sup> n. 75.129–30 (329) *Tribonian]* *Trebonian*  
 334.44 foresee] forsee 339.41 perform] perfom 346.24 neighbouring]  
 neigbouring 348.7 we] we we 357.34 sovereign] soverign 362.20 *Sulla]*  
*Sylla* n. 85.3 (379) *quemquam]* *quenquam*

In the *Letter from a Gentleman*: 421.35 Relations] Relatlons 421.36  
 Existences] Existence 422.2 Reasonings] Reasoning 424.8 attach'd] attatch'd  
 424.25 Mankind] Mankina (the copy-text is hand-corrected to Mankind)  
 425.24 Vol. 3] Vol. 2 425.31 *Scepticism]* *Sceptecism* 425.33 *Jeux d'esprit]*  
*Jeux a'esprit* (the copy-text is hand-corrected to *Jeux d'esprit*)

## 2.2.2 Punctuation

### 2.2.2.1 Miscellaneous Errors Corrected

In the *Treatise*: 4.43 observation.] observation 10.29 proceed,] proceed  
 15.38 heat] heat, 17.22 erroneous,] erroneous. 20.31 however,] however  
 27.21 time.] time 33.8 evident,] evident 40.11 *viz.]* *viz,* 42.31 distance,]  
 distance; 44.45 above-mention'd,] above-mention'd 60.36 think] think,  
 68.39 firm,] firm 79.36 remark,] remark; †81.21 passions] passions,  
 †81.22 objection,] objection 86.31 and, properly] and properly, 89.23  
 evident,] evident 95.42 evident,] evident n. 24.1 (99) Part] Part. 111.23

<sup>105</sup> On the differences between States 1 and 4 mentioned here, see Sect. 1.2.2.

must,] must 115.2 contiguity,] contiguity 115.43 be,] be n. 34.1 (126) Part] Part. 134.37 suppose,] suppose; 154.24 question,] question. 170.12 evident,] evident 190.27 But,] But 193.25 exalts,] exalts; 195.19 then,] then 198.22 hang,] hang 216.31 hatred,] hatred n. 60.1 (225) Experiment,] Experiment 235.38 which,] which 236.26 colours,] colours. 268.19 myself,] myself, 276.40 future,] future 277.11 evident,] evident 281.26 evident,] evident 301.11 animal that] animal, that 301.11 animal, must] animal must 301.35 volitions,] volitions 308.41 therefore,] therefore 309.22 riches,] riches) 315.36 property,] property, †318.17 objects,] objects? †319.39 actions,] actions †320.33 Nay] Nay, †320.36 *sympathy*,] *sympathy*: †320.42 instances,] instances †321.37 nothing,] nothing †321.40 one,] one †321.45 state,] state †322 title *rules*,] *rules* n. 75.16 (327) Burgundy,] Burgundy n. 75.20 (327) accession,] accession n. 75.115 (329) undetermin'd,] undetermin'd, n. 76.2 (330) great measure,] great, measure n. 77.16 (332) relation,] relation 338.36 *right*,] *right* 356.33 usurpation,] usurpation, 378.11 *third*,] *third*; †379.15 *pleasure*,] *pleasure*; †379.15 *pain*] *pain*,

In the *Letter from a Gentleman*: 426.11 *Subtilty*,] *Subilty*

### 2.2.2.2 Omitted Question Marks Supplied<sup>106</sup>

In the *Treatise*: 17.2 *them?*] *them*. 40.2 *space?*] *space*. 57.4 *not?*] *not*: 57.4 *exist?*] *exist*. 62.30 *perceptions?*] *perceptions* 64.14 *experience?*] *experience* 105.5 *together?*] *together*. 124.9 *life?*] *life*. 126.1 *perception?*] *perception*. 137.34 *annihilated?*] *annihilated*. 137.37 *perceiving?*] *perceiving*. 138.21 *belief?*] *belief*; 153.15 *be?*] *be*, 153.16 *is?*] *is*, 169.27 *imagination?*] *imagination*. 169.29 *them?*] *them*. 170.6 *person?*] *person*. 175.37 *certainty?*] *certainty*. 184.27 *mind?*] *mind*. 193.12 *education?*] *education*. 199.27 *it?*] *it*. 212.33 *same?*] *same*. 231.35 *it?*] *it*. 240.31 *littleness?*] *littleness*. 251.29 *occasion?*] *occasion*. 282.31 *them?*] *them*. 300.24 *occasions?*] *occasions*. 305.42 *uneasiness?*] *uneasiness*. 313.15 *entertainment?*] *entertainment*. 320.11 *injustice?*] *injustice*. 325.13 *subject?*] *subject*. n. 75.78 (328) *belong?*] *belong*. n. 75.122 (329) *ship?*] *ship*. 332.11 *language?*] *language*.

### 2.2.2.3 Quotation Marks Supplied<sup>107</sup>

In the *Letter from a Gentleman*: 421.27 *Impression*”; and “*is*] *Impression*; and *is* 421.29 *Idea*.” Again, “*the*] *Idea*. Again, *the* 421.31 *to form*.” And] *to form*.

<sup>106</sup> The copy-text of the *Treatise* normally terminates sub-sentential questions with question marks. The critical text supplies a question mark in those instances in which these are omitted in the copy-text.

<sup>107</sup> Added end quotation marks have been placed outside contiguous punctuation when this punctuation is the same as that found in the passage quoted from the *Treatise*, and inside contiguous punctuation when the punctuation is different from that of the quoted passage.

And 421.33 Absurdity”: And “what] Absurdity: And what 422.5 Production?” That “we] Production? That we 422.7–8 *latter*”; or, “a] *latter*; or, a 422.14 Causes”: And “that] Causes: And that 422.16 Nature”: And that “the] Nature: And that the 422.17 Foundation”: And “that] Foundation: And that 422.19 intuitive”: And in fine, That “*any*] intuitive: And in fine, That *any* 422.25 Ideas.” And “if] Ideas. And if 422.34–5 Necessity.” And in fine, “we] Necessity. And in fine, we 423.27 Perception”: And no wonder, for “any] Perception: And no wonder, for any 423.42 *unreasonable*.” That “all] *unreasonable*. That all 424.24 Rules.” And “in] Rules. And in 424.42 Creature.” In fine (says he) as “Force] Creature. In fine (says he) as Force

## 2.2.3 Italic and Roman Type

### 2.2.3.1 Italic Forms have Replaced Roman Forms of Mentioned Words without Other Change<sup>108</sup>

In the *Treatise*: n. 2.2 (7) *idea* n. 2.4 (7) *impression* 14.38 *relation* 19.23 *triangle* 19.36 *figure* 19.36 *rectilinear figure* 19.36–7 *regular figure* 19.37 *triangle* 19.37 *equilateral triangle* 20.8 *figure* n. 22.4 (81) *imagination* 86.8 *probability* 160.25–6 *modification* 160.28 *abstract mode* 160.31 *modification* 160.31 *action* 160.33 *action* 161.9 *modification* 181.18 *secondary* 181.18 *reflective* 278.39 *fall* 278.39 *cadency* 311.27 *natural* 377.23 *virtuous* 377.24 *vicious*

### 2.2.3.2 Italic has Replaced Roman along with a Change from Upper to Lower Case

In the *Treatise*: 14.32 *relation*] RELATION n. 69.5 (298) *relation*] Relation \*304.37 *nature*] Nature \*305.26 *nature*] Nature 320.38 *vice*] Vice 320.39 *virtue*] Virtue

### 2.2.3.3 Italic Ordinal Terms have Replaced Roman Ordinal Terms

In the *Treatise*: 17.30; 18.7, 23 *First...Secondly...Thirdly* 20.28, 34, 38; 21.6 *First...Secondly...Thirdly...Fourthly* 33.13, 29 *first...second* 37.36; 38.1 *first...Secondly* 40.19, 27; 41.16 *First...Secondly...third* 43.20, 27, 39 *First...Secondly...Thirdly* 55.34, 36 *First...Secondly* 71.35, 43; 72.9 *First...second...third* 88.32, 42; 89.23 *First...Secondly...third* 92.7 *First* 93.11, 17, 29 *First...Secondly...Thirdly* 95.26 *First* 99.41 *fourth* 110.39, 111.6 *first...Secondly* 115.13, 24, 38; 116.9 *First...Secondly...Thirdly...fourth* 119.19, 24 *first...Secondly* 133.15 *First*

<sup>108</sup> The typical practice of the copy-text is to print mentioned words or terms in italic. As Hume in his manuscripts also typically underlined mentioned words and terms, the critical text prints all mentioned words in italic.

143.33 *Secondly* 151.40; 152.6 *First...Secondly* 159.35; 160.5, 14  
*First...Secondly...Thirdly* 160.33; 161.11 *First...second* 168.21, 37 *first...  
Secondly* 210.1, 7, 13, 28 *First...Secondly...Thirdly...Fourthly* 216.38;  
217.10, 24; 218.14; 219.12; 219.42; 221.19; 224.21 *First Experiment...Second  
Experiment...Third Experiment...Fourth Experiment...Fifth Experiment...  
Sixth Experiment...Seventh Experiment...Eighth Experiment* 262.7, 18; 263.3  
*First...Secondly...third* 267.9, 11 *First...Secondly*

#### 2.2.3.4 Italic has Replaced Roman in Other Circumstances

In the *Treatise*: 43.41 &c. 50.28 *of any* 51.1 *of* 51.2 *or* 52.40 *of...and*  
65.31 *that 'tis* 75.29 *Rome* 76.43 *Mecca...Holy Land* 140.30–2 *The  
latter...former.* 247.43–5 *That 'tis...end.* \*259.17 *Republic*

In the *Abstract*: 408.30 *Mr.* 413.32 *a*

#### 2.2.3.5 Roman forms of Words and Abbreviations have Replaced Italic

In the *Treatise*: 4.6 and 4.24 and n. 2.1 (7) and 8.17 and \*14.27  
RELATIONS \*14.28 MODES...SUBSTANCES 18.26 in n. 12.18 (47) the 50.1  
viz.<sup>109</sup> 50.3 and 50.23 and 52.30 and 56.13 and 59.23 viz. 66.17 or  
74.7 or 74.8 or...or 75.1 viz. 77.1 and the 77.1 and...and 77.2 or  
the 86.5 and 90.4 viz. 105.4 viz. 105.34 viz. 134.24 viz. 145.8 and  
145.9 and...and 146.4 or 148.17 and 153.15 of 155.37 and 203.19  
the 214.1 LOVE 214.2 HATRED 225.31 Duke of 233.16 viz. 233.19 viz.  
257.2 and 257.3 and...and 261.42 and...and...and...and 262.18 or  
292.7 impressions 292.8 ideas 320.11 viz. n. 71<sup>a</sup> (324) Book...Part...  
Sect. 353.40 the Second 362.40 the 363.31 the

In the *Abstract*: 408.8 the

#### 2.2.3.6 Roman Forms of Punctuation have Replaced Italic

In the *Treatise*: 15.8 *resemblance:* 55.5 *production?* 156.33 *parte:* 188.20  
*pride:* 190.18 *humility:* 314.44 *promise:* 317.35 *generosity:* 376.37 *reason:*  
383.42 *others:*

In the *Abstract*: 411.18 *belief?*

#### 2.2.4 Upper Case, Small Capitals, and Lower Case

##### 2.2.4.1 An Initial Lower-case Letter has Replaced an Upper-case Letter

In the *Treatise*: 7.titles *ideas...origin...composition...connexion... abstrac-  
tion...origin...ideas* 9.5 *that* 15.23 *space...time* 26.37 *that* 56.13 *whatever*  
62.28 *whether* 66.22 *wherein* 94.37 *that* 95.15 *that* 95.17 *that* 99.26

<sup>109</sup> The copy-text of the *Treatise* typically uses italic forms of *viz.* and &c. only when these terms are not printed adjacent to another italicized word. This pattern is followed in the critical text.

printers...copists n. 30.1 (109) deity n. 30.5 (109) being 121.titles  
*sceptical* 121.13 algebraist...mathematician 121.21 merchants 125.41  
why 128.10 being 138.11 being 138.13 being 157.27 theologians  
159.14 theologians 159.34 theologians 161.12 theologians 162.36 being  
163.12 being 181.titles *pride...humility...subject* 228.35 being 253.22 the  
293.titles *virtue...vice...distinctions...reason* 294.11 deity 302.33 of  
304.34 whether \*304.37 *nature* \*305.26 *nature* 311.27 *laws...nature*  
324.9 *occupation* 389.9 *philosophers* 389.9–10 *grammarians* 389.28 'tis

In the *Abstract*: 407.36 *operations* 414.29 geometry 414.32 geometry  
414.34 geometry

#### 2.2.4.2 An Initial Small Capital Letter has Replaced a Large Capital Letter

In the *Treatise*: 4.6 MAN 7.2 IMPRESSIONS...IDEAS 7.24 SIMPLE...  
COMPLEX \*11.4 SENSATION...REFLECTION 11.30 MEMORY...IMAGINATION  
13.5 RESEMBLANCE...CONTIGUITY 13.6 CAUSE...EFFECT 14.13 ATTRAC-  
TION \*14.27 RELATIONS \*14.28 MODES...SUBSTANCES 67.14 A 78.12  
CREDULITY 97.7 ANALOGY 100.1 PREJUDICE 107.38 DEITY 117.32  
LOGIC 145.17 ONE...SAME 164.16 SELF

In the *Abstract*: 405.26 FEW 415.19 PASSIONS

#### 2.2.4.3 An Initial Upper-case Letter has Replaced a Lower-case Letter

—In words introducing clauses and italicized sub-sentential questions in the  
*Treatise*: 17.2 *Whether* 18.7 'Tis 18.23 'Tis 20.34 We 58.13 *How*  
64.12 *Why* 115.43 *An* 124.8 *How* 138.21 *From* 153.15 *What...What*  
193.11 *Whether* 354.38 *To* 364.3 *What* 396.39 *What*

—In words following colons in the *Treatise*:<sup>110</sup> 4.21 Morals 4.22 And  
11.26 Either 12.41 But 27.3 Consequently 27.4 Consequently  
27.5 And 42.12 We 69.1 Represents 77.26 And 97.24 But  
109.23 And 125.3 If 154.43 And 231.4 We

—In other circumstances in the *Treatise*: 2.1 Introduction 2.3 Understand-  
ing...Passions 2.6 Morals, Politics 2.7 Criticism...Human Nature  
17.8 Republic...Letters 99.2–3 Republic...Letters n. 49 (163) Father  
n. 50.4 (166) *Rhapsody* \*259.17 *Republic* n. 75.60 (328) *Pacific* 353.40  
Second 331.20 *Catholic* 331.21 *Catholics* 362.29 Second

—In other circumstances in the *Abstract*: 405.19 *Republic...Letters*  
408.8–9 *Essay...Human Understanding* 408.9 *Le Recherche...L'Art*  
408.10 *Treatise...Human Nature*

<sup>110</sup> The copy-text uses lower case after colons in the one Latin citation using colons, and typically does so when a clause beginning *that* follows a colon. The critical text replicates these patterns of use.

#### 2.2.4.4 Entire Words in the *Treatise*

- Small capitals have replaced their lower-case equivalents: 214.1 LOVE] *love* 214.2 HATRED] *hatred*
- Small capitals have replaced combinations of large capital and lower-case equivalents: 324.7–8 OCCUPATION, PRESCRIPTION, ACCESSION...SUCCESSION] Occupation, Prescription, Accession... Succession
- Lower-case letters have replaced small capital equivalents: 234.24 the whole] THE WHOLE

### 3. REGISTER B: SUBSTANTIVE EMENDATIONS OR AMENDMENTS AND TEXTUAL VARIANTS

#### 3.1 Introduction

The final part of this report on editing the texts records substantive emendations or amendments and textual variants. A majority of the substantive emendations derive from corrections or amendments suggested by Hume himself. Others, also substantive in nature, derive from the different states of the copy-text edition, the recommendations of commentators, or the judgments of editors, past and present. A few are of accidentals. More precisely, with a few exceptions, the list that follows records:

- Emendations made in consequence of the Errata, Hume's hand-written corrections, and the instructions for correction found in the Appendix to Volume 3.
- Amendments to the text made in consequence of Hume's hand-written additions or changes to the copy of Volume 3 found in the British Library.
- Textual variants, both formal and substantive, arising from cancels.
- Substantive emendations made either by previous editors or by the present editors.

#### 3.2 Abbreviations

The following abbreviations, used to indicate the source of or authority for the critical text, are used in recording items of the kind listed in the previous paragraph. All abbreviations and editorial commentary are printed in bold.

- A** signifies a hand-written correction or amendment made by Hume in his copy of the *Abstract*. This copy is now found in the British Library. See 1.7.6 above.
- App** signifies the Appendix to Volume 3 of the *Treatise*.

- Er signifies the Errata to Volumes 1 and 2 of the copy-text.
- Er<sup>1</sup> signifies the first state of the Errata found in Volume 3 of the copy-text.
- Er<sup>2</sup> signifies the second state of the Errata found in Volume 3 of the copy-text.
- H signifies a hand-written correction or amendment made by Hume in his copy of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*, now found in the British Library.
- K signifies the Kames copy of Volumes 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*, corrected in Hume's hand, and now found in the Hoose Library of Philosophy, University of Southern California.
- MS signifies the surviving draft manuscript of the conclusion to Book 3 of the *Treatise*. This manuscript, the property of the Royal Society of Edinburgh, is now located in the National Library of Scotland (MS 23159, item 15), and is reproduced in Ed. App. 1.
- P signifies the Pope copy of Volumes 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*, corrected in Hume's hand, and now in a private collection.
- S1 signifies State 1 of gathering F of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*; see above 1.2.2, pp. 595–6.
- S2 signifies State 2 of gathering F of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*; see above 1.2.2, pp. 595–6.
- S3 signifies State 3 of gathering F of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*; see above 1.2.2, pp. 595–6.
- S4 signifies State 4 of gathering F of Volume 3 of the *Treatise*; see above 1.2.2, pp. 595–6.
- T signifies the copy-text edition of the *Treatise*.
  
- GG signifies the edition of the *Treatise* prepared by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. (References are to the 1964 facsimile of the 1886 edition.)
- NN signifies the present editors.
- PN signifies P. H. Nidditch. (PN readings in square brackets [ ] are all found in SBN.)
- SB signifies the edition of the *Treatise* prepared by L. A. Selby-Bigge. (References are to the 1964 issue of the edition of 1888.)
- SBN signifies the edition of the *Treatise* prepared by L. A. Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch. (References are to the edition of 1978.)

### 3.3 Forms of Entry

Each entry begins with a page and line reference to the critical text. These are followed by the lemma, a segment of text found in the critical text at the specified location. The lemma terminates at a single right-hand square



bracket. An abbreviation following this bracket indicates the source of the reading adopted in the critical text. Except for several reports found between entries 318.9 and 322.25, any additional readings of the same portion of text follow in presumed reverse chronological order, with the reading of the copy-text coming last in any sequence of readings. Where necessary, a vertical line separates alternative textual readings and their associated abbreviations. Because the editors of the 1817 and 1825 editions of the *Treatise* uncritically revised Hume's orthography, no account of their texts is provided here (see also n. 47).

Thus the entry

17.29 *the degrees*] K | *degrees*

should be understood as reporting that at page 17, line 29, the critical text reads '*the degrees*'; that this emendation is the result of adopting the correction made by Hume in the Kames copy of the text; and that the copy-text at the comparable location reads '*degrees*'.

The entry

24.21–2 those minute objects] K P | those minute parts Er | these minute objects<sup>117</sup>

should be understood as reporting that at page 24, lines 21–2, the critical text reads 'those minute objects'; that this reading is a consequence of adopting the correction made by Hume in the Kames and Pope copies of the text; that the Errata to Volume 1 calls for the text to read 'those minute parts'; and that the copy-text reads 'these minute objects'. In this instance n. 117 (a note found at p. 648) provides further explanation of the emendation.

The entry

147.38–9 punishments] NN | punishment

should be understood as reporting that at page 147, lines 38–9, the critical text reads 'punishments'; that the present editors are responsible for this emendation; and the copy-text at the comparable location reads 'punishment'.

The entry

342.1 moral qualities] H | virtues and vices | H reads: moral Qualities

should be understood as reporting that at page 342, line 1, the critical text reads 'moral qualities'; that in doing so it follows the substantive reading of the amendment made by Hume in his own copy of Volume 3; that this amended reading replaces the words 'virtues and vices' found in the copy-text. A brief remark, printed bold-face, then reports that the exact form of Hume's manuscript amendment is 'moral Qualities'. Brief bold-face

remarks are provided whenever a hand-written correction or amendment uses forms (sentence-internal capitalized nouns or ‘&’ for ‘and’, for example) that are untypical of the copy-text and not used in the critical text or when there are other complexities to describe.

A small proportion of entries consists of or includes commentary, also in bold-face, by the present editors, which we take to need no separate explanation. Each of any important substantive changes made by the present or earlier editors is explained in a note. We assume that emendations made for obvious reasons (most of those involving a change from plural to singular, or vice versa, of ‘these’ to ‘those’, or vice versa, or the insertion of a particle, for example) need no further explanation.

### 3.4 Substantive Emendations in the *Treatise*

#### Page.line

xiv.4	ideas,] NN   ideas; <sup>111</sup>
xiv.18	existence,] NN   <i>existence</i>
xiv.22	necessary] NN   <i>necessary?</i>
xiv.26	idea or] NN   <i>idea, or</i>
xiv.28	relations] NN   <i>relations,</i>
xv.10	deriv’d] NN   <i>deriv’d?</i>
xvi.7	virtue?] NN   <i>virtue.</i>
[1]	Book] NN   Vol. <sup>112</sup>
n. 1.1 (5)	<i>Shaftesbury</i> ] NN   <i>Shaftesbury</i> <sup>113</sup>
n. 1.1 (5)	<i>Hutcheson</i> ] NN   <i>Hutchinson</i> <sup>114</sup>
7.title	<i>Of ideas...connexion, abstraction</i> ] NN   <i>Of Ideas... Abstraction, Connexion</i>
7.17	our] Er K P   the
9.27	impression] NN following PN query   impressions <sup>115</sup>
15.29	than] Er K P   than with

<sup>111</sup> Discrepancies between titles found in the Contents and those individual titles found at the beginning of the corresponding portion of text have in this and the following six instances from pp. xiv–xvi been resolved in favour of the latter. We have done so on the grounds that it is highly likely that Hume prepared manuscript copy for individual titles before he (or someone in the print shop) transcribed the list of titles making up the Contents.

<sup>112</sup> The publication of the *Treatise* in a single volume (e.g., vol. 1 of the present edition) makes ‘Vol.’ inappropriate.

<sup>113</sup> In his letters (see *Letters*, 1: 235, 460), and later works (see, e.g., *EPM* 1.4) Hume consistently used ‘Shaftesbury’.

<sup>114</sup> In his letters (see *Letters*, 1: 35, 38, 40, 48, 58), Hume consistently used ‘Hutcheson’. The compositor has used an English spelling of the name.

<sup>115</sup> That ‘impression’ should be singular is indicated by the fact that the perception in question is said to give rise to a singular ‘idea’ and is referred to by a singular pronoun, ‘it’. Nidditch suggested (SBN 668) that the plural form might be in error, but did not alter the text of SBN.

- 16.6 or] K P | of  
 16.9 a sound] K | sound  
 17.29 *the degrees*] K | *degrees*  
 n. 5 (18) **This note was added in the Appendix; for details see Ed. App. 2.**  
 19.9 only] K | but only  
 24.17 these] NN | there<sup>116</sup>  
 24.21–2 those minute objects] K P | those minute parts Er | these minute objects<sup>117</sup>  
 24.37 parts] Er K P | part  
 26.35 reasoning] NN | reason<sup>118</sup>  
 29.15 whether] NN following PN query | whither  
 32.29 will] K | shall  
 35.40–36.3 **These lines were added in the Appendix; for details see Ed. App. 2.**  
 36.4 For 'tis evident, that] NN | For 'tis evident that App | 'Tis evident, that  
 39.13–23 **These lines were added in the Appendix; for details see Ed. App. 2.**  
 39.38 may] K | might  
 43.34 objects] K | object  
 44.27 dissection] Er K P | defection  
 n. 12 (46) **This note was added in the Appendix; for details see Ed. App. 2.**  
 n. 12.3 (46) ask'd, whether] H | ask'd, if  
 50.10 place] Er K P | place it  
 50.15 ideas] NN | idea<sup>119</sup>

<sup>116</sup> The sense requires 'these'. It is not simply that some ideas are perfectly simple and indivisible. It is, rather, that the very ideas under discussion, the smallest ideas of the imagination and the smallest images of the senses, are perfectly simple and indivisible.

<sup>117</sup> Early printings of the Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the *Treatise* follow the Errata direction, but we now conclude it to be more likely that Hume wished only to change 'these' to 'those', as he does in his two hand-written corrections, thus leaving his comparison of the impressions of objects to objects themselves. We are indebted to Déborah Danowski for guidance in this matter; see *Tratado de natureza humana*, 54 n.

<sup>118</sup> Hume on several occasions speaks of 'decisive' arguments (see, e.g., 1.2.3.12; n. 12.2 (46); 1.4.6.16), once of a 'reasoning' that is the 'shortest and most decisive imaginable' (1.3.14.24; cf. *DNR* 10.34), and often of 'reasonings', but he does not elsewhere, in approximately 425 uses of 'reason', use the word as the copy-text uses it here. In addition, Hume goes on in 1.2.2.8–10 to provide an argument, a series of related claims, not merely a single reason, in support of his position. Thus we conclude that Hume or the compositor has mistakenly omitted an intended 'ing'.

<sup>119</sup> There will be, on Hume's account of things, a distinct idea of each of the distinct objects (a cause and an effect) mentioned, and hence a plural form is needed here.

- 60.9–27      These lines were added in the Appendix; for details see Ed. App. 2.
- 60.37        worn it] Er K P | worn
- 68.5–36      These lines were added in the Appendix; for details see Ed. App. 2.
- n. 21 (70)    This note was added in the Appendix; for details see Ed. App. 2
- n. 21.4 (70)  accepimus] NN | accipimus<sup>120</sup>
- n. 21.6 (70)  videmus] NN | videamus<sup>121</sup>
- 75.41        objects] NN | object<sup>122</sup>
- 78.1         a high] K | the high
- 81.10        our experience or reasonings] **cancellandum** | our reasonings **cancellans**<sup>123</sup>
- 81.14        systems, upon whatever convincing arguments they may be founded, are] **cancellandum** | systems are **cancellans**
- 81.16        *belief*, and our reasonings from causes to effects; and tho'] **cancellandum** | *belief*, and tho' **cancellans**
- 81.21        passions] **cancellandum** | passions, **cancellans**
- 81.22        objection,] **cancellans** | objection **cancellandum**<sup>124</sup>
- 81.23–4      passions and the sense of beauty.] **cancellans** | passions and the imagination. By the imagination I would be understood to mean in this place the sense of beauty and deformity. **cancellandum**; the added footnote (n. 22) makes the original sentence redundant, perhaps even inaccurate
- 81.25–6      Nature has implanted in the human mind a perception of good or evil, or in other words, of] **cancellandum** | There is implanted in the human mind a perception of **cancellans**

<sup>120</sup> The critical text follows *EHU* n. 9 (43), which in turn follows standard texts of Cicero, including those available to Hume. We are indebted to M. A. Stewart for guidance on this and the following item.

<sup>121</sup> The emendation eliminates a solecism, the use of a subjunctive, *videamus*, where the context and sense call for the indicative, *videmus*.

<sup>122</sup> We judge that the relevant noun here refers to the objects related to the idea of Rome, and not to the idea of Rome itself, and thus conclude that this noun should be plural. In support of this conclusion we note that when Hume 'presently' (in the following paragraph) returns to the topic of this sentence, he speaks of the role played by 'any resembling and contiguous objects'.

<sup>123</sup> We assume that Hume abridged the main body of the text printed in the first state of P1 (1: 209–210 of the copy-text) only to make room to insert a cancel (see Sect. 1.2.2 above) that included a footnote amplifying his use of the term 'imagination'. Consequently, with the exceptions noted at entries 81.22 and 81.24, we have for the relevant portion of the critical text (from 81.10, beginning with the words 'as our experience', to 82.5, ending with the words 'our actions') followed the earlier state of the text.

<sup>124</sup> In this instance we have followed the punctuation of the *cancellans* because it conforms to the punctuation of similar introductory phrases found in the copy-text; see, e.g., 120.4–5, 183.7.

- 81.29 feeling and experience, or] **cancellandum** | feeling, or **cancellans**
- 82.1 inconveniencies] **cancellandum** | inconveniences **cancellans**
- 84.41–85.44 **These lines were added in the Appendix (for details see Ed. App. 2), making redundant the following text: We may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser degree; only with this difference, that the least reflection dissipates the illusions of poetry, and places the objects in their proper light. 'Tis however certain, that in the warmth of a poetical enthusiasm, a poet has a counterfeit belief, and even a kind of vision of his objects: And if there be any shadow of argument to support this belief, nothing contributes more to his full conviction than a blaze of poetical figures and images, which have their effect upon the poet himself, as well as upon his readers.**
- 85.1 rises] **Er<sup>2</sup> (Vol. 3) H** | rise
- 85.35 external] **NN** | eternal<sup>125</sup>
- 93.23 when] **Er K P** | as
- n. 23.1 (96) **Sects. 9, 10.] NN** | Page 9, 10.<sup>126</sup>

<sup>125</sup> We judge 'eternal' to have been a typographical error. Although it may seem unlikely that Hume meant to speak of those beliefs that derive from memory and custom, in contrast to the fictions of poetry, as 'external' persuasions, we judge it is even less likely that he meant to speak of 'eternal' persuasions. He makes the remark in question in the midst of a discussion that contrasts what he calls loose fictions, chimeras of the brain, and the ideas of poetry with those beliefs that arise from experience. In this context, a contrast between internal and external beliefs is consistent with the general tenor of the discussion, while a contrast between internal and eternal beliefs is not so consistent. Moreover, although it is clear that Hume supposes that all perceptions are in a fundamental sense internal, at 1.4.2.7 he distinguishes between 'external and internal' impressions. For a dissenting opinion, see L. Loeb, *Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise*, 67 n.

<sup>126</sup> This note has evoked a variety of responses. The editor of the 1825 edition (reissued 1826; repr. Boston, 1854, and used as the basis of the Everyman and Intalex editions), apparently found the reference to 'Page 9, 10' (to, in effect, the final *paragraph* of the Introduction) so puzzling, or so unlikely, that he deleted the note altogether. Other editors have supposed the original note to be correct and have sent readers to the final two *pages* of the Introduction to the *Treatise*. SBN sends readers to two non-existent pages, xxii and xxiii.

The solution to the difficulty lies in noting two things. First, with the exception of a single note printed in the Appendix to Vol. 3, a note that refers to a precise page in Vol. 1, a work printed nearly two years earlier, no other note in the copy-text cites a page number. All other notes refer to some segment of the work: a section; a part and section; or a book, part, and section. When the intended section is within the part where the note occurs, a section and its number typically constitute a complete note (see, e.g., the notes to 1.4.7.4–5). Second, it is on grounds of sense implausible to suppose that Hume intended to send the reader to the final paragraph of the Introduction to the *Treatise*. Neither in that paragraph nor elsewhere in the Introduction does he discuss the voluntary repetition of ideas or the other topics of the paragraph in which the reference is found. This means that we must look elsewhere for the targeted discussions. We find these in 1.3.9 and 1.3.10 (Sects. 9 and 10 of Part 3, the Part in which the note occurs). At 1.3.9.17 Hume speaks of the 'frequent repetition' of ideas; at 1.3.10.6 he speaks of their 'constant repetition'. Consequently we conclude that 'Sects. 9, 10' is the correct reading.

99.13	testimony] Er K P   evidence
101.15	unphilosophical] NN   [unphilosophical] PN   [unphilosophical?] SB   philosophical <sup>127</sup>
102.1	reasoning] NN   reasonings <sup>128</sup>
103.37	passions] NN   passion <sup>129</sup>
105.16	instances] Er K P   instance
n. 29 (106)	<i>Malebranche</i> ] NN   <i>Malbranche</i> <sup>130</sup>
107.41	it its] NN   it it's Er K P   it's
108.35–109.10	<b>These lines and n. 30 were added in the Appendix; for details see Ed. App. 2.</b>
110.32	upon the] Er K P   upon
110.43	case] Er K P   cause
111.10	result] Er K P   results
113.2	exist] Er K P   exists
119.6	those] NN   these <sup>131</sup>
119.14	precaution,] GG   precaution <sup>132</sup>
124.38	to render] GG SB   [to] render SBN   render
127.17	a] K App   as the
130.4	These] K   Those
131.1	of the chamber] NN   the chamber
131.5	upon opening] upon opening it Er K P   upon opening <sup>133</sup>
141.39	interrupted] NN   uninterrupted <sup>134</sup>

<sup>127</sup> The subject of 1.3.13 is unphilosophical probability. Hume also calls this the 'present subject' of the paragraph in which the emendation is made. Selby-Bigge suggested '[unphilosophical?]' in a footnote to p. 149 of his edition. Nidditch inserted '[unphilosophical]' in the text. We believe this emendation to be correct and have removed the question mark and brackets.

<sup>128</sup> Although Hume often uses the plural form, 'reasonings', we judge him here to be speaking of reasoning in general, and thus to have intended to use a singular form, as he has when using the locution 'principles of' elsewhere in the *Treatise*. See, e.g., 74.33–4; 117.34; 124.11–12; 142.28; 148.40.

<sup>129</sup> The context indicates that Hume is making a comment about the passions in general, about the 'sentiments' of which he has just spoken, a comment parallel to that made about the imagination, and thus the plural form is needed to convey good sense. The plural, 'passions', also conforms to Hume's standard usage throughout the *Treatise*.

<sup>130</sup> We follow the spelling found at n. 49 (163) and *Abstract* 408.37.

<sup>131</sup> The brief discussion of Scotticisms attributed to Hume says that '*These* is the plural of *this*; *those* of *that*. The former, therefore, expresses what is near: the latter what is more remote' (*Philosophical Works*, 4: 461–2).

<sup>132</sup> We follow, as did Green and Grose, the reading of the catchword, 'caution,' at the bottom of 1: 310.

<sup>133</sup> On the grounds that the resulting change would be stylistically atypical and fail to add clarity, we have chosen to follow the reading of the copy-text: '. . . which upon opening I perceive . . .'

<sup>134</sup> This passage occurs near the beginning of Hume's explanation of how it is that the imagination leads us to believe that certain of our 'sensible perceptions have . . . a continu'd and uninterrupted existence'. More precisely, he hopes to explain why we take sets of 'resembling perceptions' to be identical even though our experience of these perceptions is always of discreet or discontinuous units. The only reading supported by this context is 'broken and interrupted'. That Hume in the following sentence twice refers to the 'interruption' that affects our perceptions supports this conclusion.

143.31	<i>perceptions</i> ] NN   <i>perception</i>
147.10	those] NN   these
147.38–9	punishments] NN punishment
149.41	no way] NN   no ways
152.10	press] Er K P   presses
n. 46.1 (158)	from] GG, SB   form
163.24	ought] NN   ought
n. 50.2 (166)	<i>Shaftesbury</i> ] <i>Shaftesbury</i>
166.27	plants and animals] NN   plants and vegetables <sup>135</sup>
170.14	what is the memory] Er K P   what the memory
171.34	natural] K App   moral
175.28	these] K   those
[179.8]	Book] NN   Vol.
183.30	passions] K   passion
185.7	passions] NN   passion
185.23	passions] NN   passion
185.34	<i>excites</i> ] K   <i>excite</i>
186.38	is it] NN following Spectator 412   it is <sup>136</sup>
186.40	water] NN following Spectator 412   waters
186.41	place] NN following Spectator 412   place, <sup>137</sup>
186.43	pleasures] NN following Spectator 412   pleasure
187.2	their] NN following Spectator 412   the
191.18	no] Er K   on
196.3	makes] NN   make
198.14	of] NN   or <sup>138</sup>
200.33	the] GG   their
203.33	enemy's] K   enemies
n. 58.1 (207)	Sect. 4] Er K   Sect. 3
214.title	<i>objects</i> ] SB   <i>object</i> <sup>139</sup>

<sup>135</sup> The emendation to this line was first suggested by R. Hall, 'Hume's Use of Locke on Identity'. The emendation removes a redundancy, and is supported by the context and by the discussion in Shaftesbury to which Hume refers.

<sup>136</sup> Emendations of the text of the quotation from *Spectator* 412 are based on a review of six editions of this work published between 1713 and 1733. Only one of these, the 'Eleventh Edition' of 1733, reads 'it is'.

<sup>137</sup> None of the editions of the *Spectator* mentioned in the previous note has a comma after 'place'. Moreover, consideration of the copy-text at 2.18.1 suggests that the comma may have been added by the compositor to help fill up an exceptionally loose line.

<sup>138</sup> Hume is contrasting, as causes of pride and humility, the qualities of the self with 'external advantages'. Given this context, and the singular 'to that' in the following line, 'of' is the correct reading.

<sup>139</sup> In this case the critical text follows, as did Selby-Bigge, the form of the title of 2.2.1 found in the Contents (2: [4]) of the copy-text, and in the three section titles found in the margins of 2: 97, 2: 99, and 2: 101.

215.16	<i>produces</i> ] <b>GG</b>   <i>produce</i>
216.1	those they] <b>NN</b>   they
216.16	those] <b>NN</b>   these
217.10	never] <b>K</b>   ever
218.31	affections to] <b>Er K P</b>   affections
222.39	causes] <b>Er K P</b>   cause
223.22	considerable a] <b>K</b>   considerable
226.42	passions] <b>NN</b>   [passions] <b>PN</b>   passion <sup>140</sup>
227.30	much as] <b>GG</b>   much
235.42	centers] <b>K</b>   center
239.34	wou'd] <b>cancellandum</b>   would <b>cancellans</b> <sup>141</sup>
239.41	is the] <b>K</b>   is
240.1	violent by] <b>cancellandum</b>   violent, by <b>cancellans</b>
240.4	The note following this line was deleted by the substitution of a new leaf (M4, 2: 167–8) for the leaf printed conjointly with M5. At the same time, the text of the six-line note first printed here was expanded and added to Vol. 1, p. 209, again by the substitution of a new leaf (P1, 1: 209–10) for the original one. The deleted note read: To prevent all ambiguity, I must observe, that where I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean in general the faculty that presents our fainter ideas. In all other places, and particularly when it is oppos'd to the understanding, I understand the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings.
241.3	excites] <b>NN</b>   excite
243.18	pursuits] <b>K</b>   pursuit
246.23	motive] <b>NN</b>   motives
247.16	have] <b>K</b>   has
252.6	pride] <b>NN</b>   [pride] <b>PN</b>   hatred <sup>142</sup>
257.27	is] <b>NN</b>   are
260.11	Our] <b>K P</b>   our <b>Er</b>   One
260.24	and practice] <b>Er K P</b>   and
265.21	there] <b>GG</b>   their
269.33	caprices] <b>K</b>   caprice

<sup>140</sup> We follow Nidditch, who recognized that two distinct passions are being considered, but placed his emendation in brackets.

<sup>141</sup> For additional details regarding the two states of M4, see above, 1.2.2.

<sup>142</sup> The need for this correction was first suggested by D. Owen ('An Unnoticed Error in Hume's *Treatise*'), who pointed out that it is love and pride, not love and hatred, that are alike in the agreeableness of their sensations.



270.37	object]Er K   objects
274.27	sensibly]Er K P   considerably
277.13	gives]NN   [gives]PN   give <sup>143</sup>
282.11	extremely]NN   extreme <sup>144</sup>
284.1	side, you'll]NN   side, and you'll
284.13	probability]NN   probabilities <sup>145</sup>
286.1	pullis]GG   pullus <sup>146</sup>
288.32	familiar]NN   similar <sup>147</sup>
[291.9]	Book]NN   Vol.
295.16–17	of the distinction betwixt]H   of H reads: the Distinction betwixt <sup>148</sup>
298.5	actions]NN   [actions]PN   judgments <sup>149</sup>
300.9	requisite]NN   required <sup>150</sup>
307.3	necessities]H   necessity H adds an s to necessity
308.10	principle]Er <sup>1, 2</sup> H   principles H deletes the s from principles
308.17	principle]H   motive H reads: Principle
310.20	for]NN   to
310.37	benevolence towards the proprietor]H   benevolence
310.41	have naturally]H   have

<sup>143</sup> As Hume here and elsewhere appears to treat 'view and contemplation' as a singular item (see 2.1.7.5, 3.1.2.11, and esp. 1.3.8.4), we follow Nidditch in bringing about subject–verb agreement, although he placed his emendation in brackets.

<sup>144</sup> The critical text follows *DP* 1.10, where this sentence is repeated.

<sup>145</sup> The critical text follows Hume's usage at *THN* 1.3.13.1, and that of *DP* 1.13, where this sentence is repeated.

<sup>146</sup> The emendation is needed to remove a semantic solecism: *pullus* means a chick, one of the 'featherless young', not an adult bird, but it is the adult bird that is panicking over the fate of the young. We are indebted to M. A. Stewart for guidance on this item.

<sup>147</sup> Three considerations support this emendation. (1) No 'similar instance' precedes the one Hume goes on to mention. The comparison of hunting and philosophy is the first illustration of the point he wishes to make. (2) If Hume did not mistakenly write 'similar' when he meant 'familiar', a compositor could easily enough have confused these two words. (3) The comparison of hunting and philosophy had been made familiar by Erasmus and Berkeley; see ann. 288.30.

<sup>148</sup> The accidentals of the amendments have been modified to conform to the style of the copy-text. All such differences between the amendments and the critical text are reported. Hume's amendments may also include, as this one does, a caret to show where in the text an insertion or deletion is to be made. He also scores through printed text that is to be replaced by the alternative he supplies. When clarity demands, these directions are reported, but no commentary is supplied when amendments are a simple matter of substitution or deletion. Descriptions of these materials are also provided by Connon and Nidditch; see n. 4 above.

<sup>149</sup> We follow Nidditch who saw (but left his emendation in brackets) that it is clear from the remainder of the sentence that Hume meant 'actions'.

<sup>150</sup> By this emendation the critical text eliminates what we judge to have been an authorial or compositorial slip. The unidiomatic phrase, 'requir'd to the' is not used elsewhere in the *Treatise*, while the idiomatic phrase, 'requisite to', is used more than forty times, including the first line of the preceding paragraph (3.1.1.22).

312.27	its] H   these
313.31	mind] H   minds
315.29–30	words... them] Er <sup>1,2</sup>   word... it H   words... it
316.24	by preserving] H   in preserving
316.25–6	by running into] H   in
318.9	affection] S3 S4   affecton S1 S2 <sup>151</sup>   affection
318.17	objects;] S1 S2   objects? S3 S4   objects?
318.22	man] NN   men
319.22	public] S1 S2   publick S3 S4   publick
319.39	actions,] S1 S2   actions S3 S4   actions
320.24	mov'd] H   induc'd S1 S2 S3 S4   induc'd
320.33	Nay] S1 S2 S4   Nay, S3   Nay
320.36	sympathy;] S1 S2 S4   sympathy: S3   sympathy;
320.42	instances,] S1 S2 S4   instances S3   instances,
320.44–321.2	Thus <i>self-interest</i> is the original motive to the <i>establishment</i> of justice: But a <i>sympathy</i> with <i>public</i> interest is the source of the <i>moral</i> approbation, which attends that virtue.] H   <i>Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue. Added in the Cancellans found at F6 of the copy-text. H reads: Thus Self-interest is the original Motive to the Establishment of Justice: But a</i>

<sup>151</sup> In the critical text, gathering *F* of the first-edition text of Vol. 3 begins at 316.44 with 'extend their reasoning', and ends with 'useless to him.' at 322.32. The cancellans found at F6 of some copies of this gathering begins at 320.24 with 'lar instance, they', and ends with 'vice and virtue.' at 321.15. The abbreviations used in this note, S1-S4, are defined, p. 645; see also pp. 595-6.

There are fifteen textual differences (variants) between the two forms of gathering *F* of Vol. 3, between, that is, the less common variant of *F* (that gathering which when uncanceled at F6 distinguishes S3), when compared with the more common variant of *F* (that gathering which when uncanceled at F6 distinguishes S1). In the relevant entries of Register B, all of which are cited in the remainder of this note: (1) Twelve of these fifteen variants are flagged by a pair of abbreviations S3 S4 appearing together as a distinct unit (see, e.g., entry 318.9). This is because these twelve differences occur only when a particular form of the text is found in both S3 and in the cancelled state of S3, in, i.e., S4. This pair, S3 S4, standing alone as they do in 318.9, is also found in entries 318.17, 319.22, 319.39, 321.16, 321.37, 321.40, 321.45, 322.title, 322.18 (twice), and 322.25. (2) The three remaining differences between S1 and S3 are flagged by the abbreviation S3 standing alone, a circumstance found only in entries 320.33, 320.36, and 320.42. (3) Three of the fourteen textual variants introduced by S3 are eliminated by the cancellans of F6 found in S2 and S4. These restorations of S1 readings are flagged by the abbreviations S1 S2 S4 standing as a distinct unit, a circumstance also found only in entries 320.33, 320.36, and 320.42. (4) At the same time, the cancellans of F6 introduces, in addition to the substantive amendment reported by entry 320.44, two new minor variants. These new variants are flagged by the abbreviations S2 S4 appearing together as a distinct unit, a circumstance found only in entries, 321.14 and 321.15.

	<u>Sympathy</u> with <u>public</u> Interest is the Source of the <u>moral</u> Approbation, which attends that <u>Virtue</u> . <sup>152</sup>
321.2–4	virtue. This latter principle of sympathy is too weak to controul our passions; but has sufficient force to influence our taste, and give us the sentiments of approbation or blame.] H   <i>virtue</i> . H reads: Virtue. This latter Principle of Sympathy is too weak to controul our Passions; but has sufficient Force to influence our Taste, & give us the Sentiments of Approbation or Blame.
321.14	shou'd] S1 S3   should S2 S4   should
321.15	distinction] S1 S3   dictinction S2 S4   dictinction
321.16	'twou'd] S1 S3   t'would S3 S4   t'would
321.37	nothing,] S1 S2   nothing S3 S4   nothing
321.40	one,] S1 S2   one S3 S4   one
321.45	state,] S1 S2   state S3 S4   state
322.title	<i>rules,</i> ] S1 S2   <i>rules</i> S3 S4   <i>rules</i>
322.18	wou'd] S1 S2   would S3 S4   would
322.18	by] S1 S2   from S3 S4   from
322.25	cut off] S1 S2   cut of S3 S4   cut of
323.13	occur] H   occur to them H deletes to them
n. 71.11 (323)	an] NN   any <sup>153</sup>
n. 71.30 (324)	contributes] H   contribute
n. 71.31 (324)	As] NN   as H   And as H deletes the And but does not indicate that as should begin with an upper case A.
324.15	affords] H   affords us
n. 73.27–8 (325)	nature. ¶ Two] H   nature. Two H inserts a vertical line between nature. and Two thereby suggesting that a paragraph break should be introduced at this point.
n. 73.37–8 (325–6)	sentence.¶ To] H   sentence. To H inserts a vertical line between sentence. and To thereby suggesting that a paragraph break should be introduced at this point.
n. 75.1 (327)	imagination] NN   imaginations <sup>154</sup>

<sup>152</sup> The critical text italicizes only the words underlined by Hume in his holograph amendment to his copy of the *Treatise*.

<sup>153</sup> The context shows that it is some particular idea, not just *any* idea, that completes the process of thought discussed.

<sup>154</sup> That Hume is discussing the imagination as a faculty, not its diverse productions, may be seen from n. 71.6–7 (323), where he argues that the rules determining property 'are principally fix'd by the

n. 75.43 (328)	<i>effect</i> ] GG   <i>affect</i> <sup>155</sup>
n. 75.65 (328)	accession to] NN   accession <sup>156</sup>
n. 75.70 (328)	provided they] H   provided it
n. 75.93 (328)	videtur] NN   videtur id <sup>157</sup>
n. 75.97 (329)	judicis continetur] NN   judicis
n. 75.129–30 (329)	<i>Tribonian</i> ] NN   <i>Trebonian</i>
330.17	agrees] H   consents
332.10	by] H   with
n. 77.14 (332)	for its] NN   for
334.8	laws] H   laws of nature
337.6	requires] NN   require
337.32	these] NN   those
338.3	these] NN   those
339.10	and a] H   and
339.16	property, right, and obligation] H   properties, rights, and obligations H deletes ies from properties and inserts a y; H also deletes an s from rights and obligations
339.20	of] H   of civil
340.32	obligation] NN   obligations
340.34	propensities] Er <sup>2</sup>   propensitys H   propensity
340.37	leaves] NN   leave
340.44	tribunals] NN   tribunal
341.35	these] NN   those
342.1	moral qualities] H   virtues and vices H reads: moral Qualities
342.11	<i>self-interest</i> ] H   <i>interest</i>   H inserts Self-
342.13–14	observ'd to be common to all mankind] H   observ'd H reads: to be common to all Mankind
342.22	giving us] Er <sup>1,2</sup> H   giving
343.36	that the provision we make] H   that we provide
343.37	objects, proceeds merely from our natural inclination] H   objects, merely because we are naturally inclin'd

imagination, or the more frivolous properties of our thought and conception'. The text of *EPM* Appx. 3, n. 65.23–4, 29–30 (100), supports this conclusion and the consequent emendation.

<sup>155</sup> The discussion preceding and following this sentence indicates that Hume is here concerned with an *effect*, not an *affect* or mental state or feeling.

<sup>156</sup> The critical text follows *EPM* n. 65.30 (100), where this phrase is repeated.

<sup>157</sup> Here and at n. 75.97 (328) the text of the quotation is emended to conform to editions of the *Institutes* likely to have been available to Hume. The emended text is also that found in subsequent editions of the *Institutes*.

- H substitutes:** proceeds merely from our natural Inclination for the copy-text reading
- 344.28 allegiance]H | society
- 344.39 As violent passion hinders]Er<sup>1,2</sup>H | As the violent passions hinder
- 345.30 that]H | which
- 346.17 posts]H | ports **H**superimposes an s over the r of ports
- 346.18 rules of society]H | laws **H** reads: rules of Society
- 346.39 may]H | must
- 346.43 cou'd]H | can
- 347.16 value]H | pride
- 347.26–7 as soon as the advantages of government are fully known and acknowledg'd, it immediately] H | it quickly **The amended amendment of H reads:** as soon as the advantages of Government are fully known & acknowledg'd, it immediatly (**Hume first wrote:** as soon as its advantages are fully known & acknowledg'd, it immediatly then deleted its and added the and of Government interlinearly).
- 348.7 we]H | we we
- 348.27 the performance]NN | performance
- 349.33–4 to our own interest, or at least to that of the public, which we partake of by *sympathy*]H | to public interest, and to our own in particular **H reads:** our own Interest, or at least [t]o that of the public, which we [p]artake of by *Sympathy*. **The words at least and we were added interlineally.**
- 350.5 in bestowing]H | to bestow **H** replaces to with in and adds ing to bestow
- 350.6 branding]H | to brand
- 350.16 For]Er<sup>1,2</sup>H | But
- 351.31 they]H | them Er<sup>2</sup> | it
- 351.45 subtile]Er<sup>1,2</sup>H | subtle **H** inserts an i in subtile
- 352.37 As]Er<sup>2</sup>H | As the
- 353.29 subjects, not in disputes betwixt themselves and their subjects;] H NN | subjects; **H** reads: not in Disputes betwixt themselves & Subjects;
- 354.16 interest] H | common interest Er<sup>2</sup> | public interest **H** deletes public
- 354.21 interest] H | common interest Er<sup>2</sup> | public interest **H** deletes public
- 354.42 society] society Er<sup>2</sup>H | interest **H** reads: Society

- 355.3 rules of justice]H | laws of society H reads: rules of Justice  
355.19 reap]H | we reap H deletes we and adds a t to reap  
356.9 to almost all the]H | to all the most H inserts almost  
before all and deletes most  
356.10 world]H | world without exception H deletes without  
exception  
358.6–7 that some principles of the imagination concur with those  
views of justice and interest]H | that there concur some  
principles of the imagination, along with those views of  
interest H deletes there concur and, along and  
inserts concur before with and justice & before interest  
358.37–8 answer, that perhaps this motive may contribute somewhat  
to the effect; but, that]H | answer, that I readily allow, that  
this motive may contribute something to the effect; but at  
the same time I assert, that H deletes 1) that I readily  
allow, 2) thing from something and 3) at the same time  
I assert and inserts perhaps before this and adds what  
to some to produce somewhat  
360.33 a particular]H | an  
361.27 legal authority]NN | legal<sup>158</sup>  
362.1 none]H | no one  
365.13 infidelity]Er<sup>1, 2</sup>H | fidelity  
366.3–4 stream, and are also apt to be affected with sympathy for  
the general interests of society]H | stream. H inserts  
& are also apt to be affected with Sympathy for the general  
Interests of Society after stream. —without changing  
the period to a comma. Hume first wrote apted then  
scored through the ed  
366.11 these]NN | those  
369.10–12 society. The inventors of them had chiefly in view their  
own interest. But we carry our approbation of them into  
the most distant countries and ages, and much beyond our  
own interest.]H | society. H reads: The Inventors of  
them had chiefly in view their own Interest. But we carry  
our Approbation of them into the most distant Countreys  
& Ages, & much beyond our own Interest.

<sup>158</sup> The clause found in the copy-text, 'shou'd the king...justly forfeit his legal, it then . . .', fails to make sense. The context indicates that 'authority' is the appropriate term to fill the obvious syntactical gap. Much of 3.2.10 is given over to the question of who, legitimately, has political authority, while Hume goes on in this same paragraph to consider what follows when 'a king forfeits his authority' (see 361.32).

369.13	has always] H   in all nations, and all ages, has H deletes in all nations, and all ages, has and then adds has always
370.15	interest] H   interests
370.19	in characters which are useful or pernicious to society] H   in the characters of others H deletes the and of others, then inserts which are useful or pernicious to Society after characters
370.30–1	conformable to] GG   conformable
370.34	society and to every individual] H   society H reads: & to every individual
371.32	these] NN   those
371.39	case] H   matter
374.24	style] H   discourse
375.4	distinguishes betwixt] H   distinguishes
375.4–5	produce, and] H   produce, from
375.35	that phaenomenon] H   it H reads that Phaenomenon
376.28	makes us] H   we
376.31	renders] H   makes
377.29	touch] Er <sup>1,2</sup> H   touches
377.34	or] Er <sup>1,2</sup> H   and
378.30	sentiment] H   thing H reads Sentiment
379.15	<i>pleasure,</i> ] NN   <i>pleasure;</i> <sup>159</sup>
379.15	<i>pain when</i> ] NN   <i>pain, when</i>
379.16	<i>painful to us, but</i> ] NN   <i>painful; but</i>
380.10	places] NN   pleases <sup>160</sup>
381.41	we meet] GG   me meet
383.16	his] Er <sup>2</sup> H   our
388.33	reward and punishment] H   rewards and punishments
391.title	<i>abilities</i> ] NN   <i>virtues</i> <sup>161</sup>

<sup>159</sup> At 379.15–16 the critical text uses the punctuation found in the passage of the copy-text that Hume is quoting; see Sect. 1.8.1 above.

<sup>160</sup> We judge it more likely that Hume wrote, or meant to write, ‘places’ than ‘pleases’. In the previous sentence he says that sympathy, giving pride the same effect as merit, makes ‘us *enter into* those elevated sentiments, which the proud man entertains of himself’ (italics added). He then qualifies this claim by saying that we do not go quite so far as the proud man goes—we do not fully *enter into* the flattering scene in which he has placed himself—thus using another metaphor of place. Moreover, had he meant to write ‘pleases’, we judge that he would more likely have written ‘with which’ rather than ‘in which’.

<sup>161</sup> On the grounds that Hume’s section titles reflect the contents they head, we submit that the only appropriate title of 3.3.5 is *Some farther reflections concerning the natural abilities*. The first paragraph of this section, in so far as it restates Hume’s account of the origin of approbation

- 393.41 I am hopeful,] it appears MS | I am hopeful,  
 394.7 have, for the most part, a] have for the greatest Part a MS |  
 have, for the most part, a  
 394.9 the chief source] the Source MS | the chief source  
 394.33 our] H | human MS | human  
 394.41 the latter] H | their MS | their  
 395.11 and extends] & common MS | and extends  
 395.21 advantages] NN | advantage  
 395.34 set more at] set at MS | set more at  
 396.13 effect, direct or collateral,] H NN | effect, H adds  
 direct or collateral NN add the comma after  
 collateral  
 398.11 has been] H | is  
 400.6 *perceptions*] NN | *perceptions* H | *perceptions* Er<sup>2</sup> |  
*perception* H adds an s to *perception* but does not  
 underline the letter  
 400.14 or a] H | or  
 400.34 reflection] H | reflections  
 400.38 Book 1, pages 42–3] NN | Vol. I. page 107  
 400.42 Book 1, page 67] NN | Vol. I. page 171  
 n. 89 (400) Book 1, pp. 169–70] NN | Vol. I. page 452 See also  
 ann 401.4; Ed. App. 2, p. 682

### 3.5 Substantive Emendations in the *Abstract*

- 407.29 *Shaftesbury*] NN | *Shaftsbury*<sup>162</sup>  
 407.29 *Hutcheson*] NN | *Hutchison*  
 408.43 instinct] NN | instincts  
 408.45 that “no] NN following T | “that no  
 409.1 ideas,] NN following T | ideas  
 409.2 idea,] NN following T | idea  
 409.10 *that pretended idea*] A | *that idea*  
 409.28 time is] NN | time, is  
 410.8 makes] NN | make

and disapprobation, does make passing reference to the origin of natural *virtues*. But, having finished this brief summary, Hume, ‘in order to justify more fully’ his theories about this origin, goes on to devote the balance of the section to the natural abilities. This makes the section, as the word ‘farther’ in the title indicates, an extension of the previous section, ‘Of natural abilities’.

<sup>162</sup> On Hume’s spelling of *Shaftesbury* and *Hutcheson*, see nn. 113, 114 above.



*Editing the Texts*

410.25	effect are] NN   effect, are
411.16	<i>anticipates</i> ] PN   <i>anticipate</i>
412.38	one. Our] A   one; our
413.33	are never] A   shou'd never be
414.3	all. When] NN   all, when
414.35–6	those relations] A   that relation
415.13	reasoning] A, but not in Hume's hand   question <sup>163</sup>
415.36	attraction,] NN following T   attraction
415.41	is founded] NN following T   are founded
415.44	objects] NN following T   object
415.44	discoverable,] NN following T   discoverable
416.2	principle,] NN following T   principle
416.7	mind; and] NN following T   mind, and

<sup>163</sup> On this amended reading, see Sect. 1.7.6 above.

## Editorial Appendix 1: Reproductions

### THE MANUSCRIPT OF *TREATISE* 3.3.6

The manuscript printed in facsimile here is one of the large number of Hume manuscripts bequeathed to the Royal Society of Edinburgh by David Hume the Younger, Hume's nephew.<sup>1</sup> These manuscripts are now housed in the National Library of Scotland (MSS 23151–64). This manuscript, MS 23159, item 15, mistakenly said by Greig and Beynon to be of the 'Conclusion of *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*',<sup>2</sup> is the only known manuscript of the *Treatise*. It is reproduced here, reduced from its approximate size, 18.5 × 22 cm, by permission of the Royal Society of Edinburgh from the Royal Society of Edinburgh's *David Hume Bequest*, held on deposit at the National Library of Scotland.

<sup>1</sup> See D. F. Norton, 'Baron Hume's Bequest: The Hume Manuscripts and their First Use'

<sup>2</sup> J. Y. T. Greig and H. Beynon, *Calendar of Hume MSS. in the Possession of the Royal Society of Edinburgh*, 135.

## Sect. 6.

## Conclusion of this Book.

Thus upon the whole it appears, that nothing is wanting to an accurate Proof of this System of Ethics. We are certain, that Sympathy is a very powerful Principle in human Nature. We are also certain, that it has a great Influence on our Sense of Beauty, when we regard external Objects, as well as when we judge of Morals. We find, that it has Force sufficient to give us the strongest Sentiments of Approbation, when ~~it operates~~ it operates alone; without the concurrence of any other Principle; as in the Cases of Justice, Allegiance, Charity, & Good-manners. We may observe, that all the Circumstances requisite for its Operation are found in most of the Virtues; which have for the greatest Part a Tendency <sup>to</sup> the Good of Society or to that of the Person, profest of them. If we compare all these Circumstances, we shall not doubt, that Sympathy is the Source of moral Distinctions; especially when we reflect, that no Objection can be raised against this Hypothesis in one Case, which will not extend to all Cases. Justice is certainly approved of for no other Reason, than because it has a Tendency to the public Good: And the public Good is indifferent to us, except so far as Sympathy interests us in it. We may presume the like regard to all the other Virtues, which have <sup>a like</sup> ~~the same~~ Tendency to the public Good. They must derive all their Merit from our Sympathy with those, who reap any Advantage from them: As the Virtues, which have a Tendency to the Good of the Person, profest of them; derive their Merit from our Sympathy with him.

Most People will readily allow, that the useful Qualities of the Mind are virtuous, because of their Utility. This way of thinking is so natural, & occurs on so many Occasions, that

we will make any scruple of admitting it. Now this being once admitted, the Force of Sympathy must necessarily be acknowledged. Virtue is considered as Means to an End. Means to an End are only valued so far as the End is valued. But the Happiness of Strangers affects us by Sympathy alone. So that Principle, therefore, we are to ascribe the Sentiment of Approbation, which arises from the Survey of all those Virtues, that are useful to Society or to the Person, possessor of them. These form the most considerable Part of Morality.

Were it proper in such a Subject to bribe the Reader's Affection, or employ any thing but solid Argument, we are here abundantly supplied with Topics to engage the Affections. All classes of Virtues (& such we all are in Speculation, however we may degenerate in Practice) must certainly be pleas'd to see moral Distinctions deriv'd from so noble a Source, which gives us a just Opinion both of the Generosity & Capacity of human Nature. It requires but very little Knowledge of human Affairs to perceive that a Sense of Morals is a Principle inherent in the Soul; & one of the most powerful that enters into the Composition. But this Sense must certainly acquire new Force, when reflecting on itself, it approves of those Principles, from whence it is deriv'd, & finds nothing, beside what is great & good in its Rise & Origin. Those who resolve the Sense of Morals into original Instincts of the human Mind may defend the Cause of Virtue with sufficient Authority; but want the Advantage, which those possess, who account for that Sense by an extensive Sympathy with Mankind. According to their System, not only Virtue must be approv'd of, but also the Sense of Virtue: And not only that Sense, but also the Principles, from which it is deriv'd. So that nothing is presented us any where but what is laudable & good.

This Observation <sup>may be</sup> extend'd to Justice & the other Virtues of that kind. The Subject be ~~is~~ not found

artificial, the Sense of its Morality is natural? Is the Combination of Men in a System of Laws, which renders any Act of Justice beneficial to Society? But when once it has that Tendency, we naturally approve of it; & if we did not so, it is impossible any Combination or Convention could ever produce that Sentiment.

Most of the Inventions of Men are subject to Change: They depend upon Humour & Caprice. They have a Vogue for a Time; & then sink into Oblivion. It may, perhaps, be apprehended, that if Justice were allowed to be a human Invention, it must be plac'd on the same footing. But the Cases are widely different. The Interest, on which Justice is founded, is the greatest imaginable, & common to all Times & Places. It cannot possibly be deriv'd by any such Invention. It is obvious, Discover itself on the very first Formation of Society. All these Laws render the Rules of Justice Steadfast & immovable; at least as immovable as human Nature. And if they were found on original Instincts, could they have any greater Stability?

The same System may help us to form a just Notion of the Happiness as well as of the Dignity of Virtue; & may interest every Principle of our Nature, ~~both our Affections & Reason~~, in embracing & cherishing that noble Quality. Who indeed does not feel an Reception of Alacrity in his Pursuits of Knowledge & Ability of every Kind, when he considers, that hence the Advantages, which immediately result from these Acquisitions, they also give him a new Lustre in the Eyes of Mankind, & are universally attended with Esteem & Approbation? And who can think any Advantages of Fortune a sufficient Compensation for the least Breach of the social Virtues, when he considers, that not only his Character with regard to others, but also his Peace & inward Satisfaction entirely depend upon his strict Observance of them; & that a Mind will never be able to bear its own Survey, that has been wanting in its Part to Mankind & Society? But I forbear insisting on this Subject.

Such Reflection requires a Work apart, very different from the Genius of the present. The Anatomist ought never to emulate the Painter; nor in his accurate Dissections & Portraiture of the smaller Parts of the human Body, pretend to give his Figures any graceful or engaging Attitude or Expression. There is even something tedious, or at least minute in the Views of things, which he presents; & too necessary the Objects should be set at a Distance, & be more cover'd up from Sight to make them engaging to the Eye & Imagination. An Anatomist, however, is admirably fitted to give Advice to a Painter; & too even impracticable to excel in the latter Art without the Assistance of the former. We must have an exact Knowledge of the Parts, their Situation & Connection, before we can design with any Elegance or Correctness. And thus the most abstract Speculations concerning human Nature, however cold & unentertaining, become subservient to practical Morality, & may render this latter Science more correct in its Precepts, & more persuasive in its Exhortations.

TEXTUAL VARIANTS: COPY-TEXT AND MANUSCRIPT  
OF *TREATISE* 3.3.6

The apparatus that follows here reports, with one general exception,<sup>3</sup> the differences between the manuscript of *Treatise* 3.3.6, *Conclusion of this book*, and the copy-text version of the same material. Although it is reasonably certain that the existing manuscript is not the one from which the copy-text edition was set, it is likely that the basic form of that no longer extant manuscript was similar to that which has survived. On this assumption, comparing the manuscript with the copy-text gives us a general idea of the way in which the compositors transformed Hume's manuscripts into printed text.

The apparatus provides first a page and line reference to the critical text, then, to the left of a square bracket, the reading of the copy-text, and to the right of that bracket, the variant reading of the manuscript. Legible words that have been crossed out by Hume are printed in that fashion. Editorial commentary is printed boldface.

critical text	copy-text] manuscript
page.line	
393.title.1	SECT. VI.] Sect. 6.
393.title.2	<i>Conclusion of this book.</i> ] Conclusion of this Book.
393.41	I am hopeful,] it appears
393.42	ethics] Ethicks
394.4	when it] when <del>we are certain that</del> it
394.5	and] &
394.7	have, for the most part,] have for the greatest Part
394.7	tendency to] Tendency <del>for</del> to
394.8	person possess'd] Person, possess
394.9	the chief source] the Source
394.14	a like] <del>the same</del> a like
394.17	person possess'd] Person, possess
394.19	qualities] Qualitys
394.20	and] &
394.26	society,] Society
394.27	person possess'd] Person, possess
394.28 <sup>4</sup>	readers] Reader's
394.30	and] &

<sup>3</sup> Sentence-internal nouns are with one exception capitalized in the manuscript, but are lower case in the copy-text. We have not recorded this consistent difference as such. But any entry that includes sentence-internal nouns records these as they are found in each of the two documents. For the one exception mentioned, see line 9 of the manuscript, where Hume appears to have deleted a capital G before writing 'the good of Society'. In addition, Hume appears to have treated *nothing* and *whole*, as he typically did *main*, *manner*, and *thing* (see *Editing the Texts*, n. 62), as indeterminate nouns not calling for an initial capital.

<sup>4</sup> The copy-text introduces double spacing between lines 21 and 22, p. 277 of the copy-text.

*Editorial Appendix 1*

394.32–3	<i>generosity and capacity</i> of human nature] Generosity & Capacity of human Nature <b>H substitutes</b> our for human
394.34	to perceive,] to perceive
394.34	soul, and] Soul; &
394.37	and finds nothing but what is great and] & finds nothing, beside what is great &
394.38	and] &
394.39	mind,] Mind
394.41	the latter] their <b>H substitutes</b> the latter for their
394.43	whence] which
394.44	side,] Side
394.44	and] &
395.1	justice, and] Justice &
395.2	Tho'] Tho
395.2	artificial,] <i>artificial</i>
395.2	'Tis] Tis
395.3	men,] Men
395.5	and] &
395.5	'tis] tis
395.8	and . . . and] & . . . &
395.11	and extends] & common
395.12	and] &
395.13	and] & [?]
395.14	and] &
395.14	at least, as] at least as
395.17	<i>happiness,</i> ] <i>Happiness</i>
395.18	and] &
395.18	nature in] Nature, both our Selfishness & Pride, in
395.19	and] &
395.20	and] &
395.21	besides] beside
395.21	immediately] immediatly
395.22	and] &
395.23	and] &
395.26	and] &
395.27	and] &
395.28	and] &
395.29	a-part] apart
395.31	and] &
395.32	and] or
395.34	and 'tis] & tis
395.34	set more at] set at
395.34	and] &



*Editorial Appendix 1*

395.35	sight,] sight
395.35	and] &
395.36	and] &
395.37	excel] excell
395.37	art,] Art
395.38	and] &
395.40	and] &
395.41	<i>practical morality</i> ; and] practical Morality, &
395.42	and] &
395.42	persuasive] perswasive

TITLE-PAGES OF THE *TREATISE*

The title-pages of the three volumes of the *Treatise* are reproductions of those of the copy-text, and are included here with the permission of the Rare Books and Special Collections Division of the McGill University Libraries.

A  
T R E A T I S E  
O F  
Human Nature :  
B E I N G  
AN ATTEMPT to introduce the ex-  
perimental Method of Reasoning  
I N T O  
M O R A L S U B J E C T S.

---

*Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quæ velis ; & quæ  
sentias, dicere licet.* TACIT.

---

V O L. I.

---

O F T H E  
U N D E R S T A N D I N G.

---

---

L O N D O N :

Printed for JOHN NOON, at the *White-Hart*, near  
*Mercer's-Chapel*, in *Cheapside*.

M D C C X X X I X.

A  
T R E A T I S E  
O F  
Human Nature :  
B E I N G  
AN ATTEMPT to introduce the ex-  
perimental Method of Reasoning  
I N T O  
M O R A L S U B J E C T S.

---

*Rara temporum felicitas, ubi sentire, quæ velis ; & quæ  
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---

V O L. II.

---

O F T H E  
P A S S I O N S.

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L O N D O N :  
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M D C C X X X I X.

A  
T R E A T I S E  
O F  
Human Nature:

B E I N G

AN ATTEMPT to introduce the ex-  
perimental Method of Reasoning

I N T O

MORAL SUBJECTS.

---

— *Duræ semper virtutis amator,  
Quære quid est virtus, et posce exemplar honesti.*  
LUCAN.

---

W I T H A N

A P P E N D I X.

Wherein some Passages of the foregoing  
Volumes are illustrated and explain'd.

---

V O L. III.

---

O F

M O R A L S.

---

L O N D O N,

Printed for THOMAS LONGMAN, at the *Ship* in  
*Pater-noster-Row*, M D C C X L.

## Editorial Appendix 2: The Appendix to Volume 3

Hume's Appendix to Volume 3, 'Wherein some Passages of the foregoing Volumes are Illustrated and Explain'd', is made up of two self-standing sections, nine passages accompanied by instructions for their insertion at nine separate places in *Treatise* 1.1–3, a paragraph that revises two arguments found in Book 1, and another paragraph providing directions for correcting two errors of the press. To facilitate study of this Appendix itself, we here reprint it in its entirety and its original order. To avoid confusion, all paragraph and line numbers have been deleted, but critical text note numbers have been retained for the four footnotes introduced by the Appendix. In addition, Hume's instructions have been adjusted to conform to the format and paging of the critical text.

### APPENDIX

There is nothing I wou'd more willingly lay hold of, than an opportunity of confessing my errors; and shou'd esteem such a return to truth and reason to be more honourable than the most unerring judgment. A man, who is free from mistakes, can pretend to no praises, except from the justness of his understanding: But a man, who corrects his mistakes, shows at once the justness of his understanding, and the candour and ingenuity of his temper. I have not yet been so fortunate as to discover any very considerable mistakes in the reasonings deliver'd in the preceding volumes, except on one article: But I have found by experience, that some of my expressions have not been so well chosen, as to guard against all mistakes in the readers; and 'tis chiefly to remedy this defect, I have subjoin'd the following appendix.

We can never be induc'd to believe any matter of fact, except where its cause, or its effect, direct or collateral, is present to us; but what the nature is of that belief, which arises from the relation of cause and effect, few have had the curiosity to ask themselves. In my opinion, this dilemma is inevitable. Either the belief is some new idea, such as that of *reality* or *existence*, which we join to the simple conception of an object, or it is merely a peculiar *feeling* or *sentiment*. That it is not a new idea, annex'd to the simple conception, may be evinc'd from these two arguments. *First*, We have no abstract idea of existence, distinguishable and separable from the idea of particular objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this idea of existence can be annex'd to the idea of any object, or form the difference betwixt a simple conception and belief. *Secondly*, The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases; so that if belief consisted merely in a new idea, annex'd to the conception, it wou'd be in a man's power to believe what he pleas'd. We may, therefore, conclude,

that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters. When we are convinc'd of any matter of fact, we do nothing but conceive it, along with a certain feeling, different from what attends the mere *reveries* of the imagination. And when we express our incredulity concerning any fact, we mean, that the arguments for the fact produce not that feeling. Did not the belief consist in a sentiment different from our mere conception, whatever objects were presented by the wildest imagination, wou'd be on an equal footing with the most establish'd truths founded on history and experience. There is nothing but the feeling, or sentiment, to distinguish the one from the other.

This, therefore, being regarded as an undoubted truth, *that belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple conception*, the next question, that naturally occurs, is, *What is the nature of this feeling, or sentiment, and whether it be analogous to any other sentiment of the human mind?* This question is important. For if it be not analogous to any other sentiment, we must despair of explaining its causes, and must consider it as an original principle of the human mind. If it be analogous, we may hope to explain its causes from analogy, and trace it up to more general principles. Now that there is a greater firmness and solidity in the conceptions, which are the objects of conviction and assurance, than in the loose and indolent reveries of a castle-builder, every one will readily own. They strike upon us with more force; they are more present to us; the mind has a firmer hold of them, and is more actuated and mov'd by them. It acquiesces in them; and, in a manner, fixes and reposes itself on them. In short, they approach nearer to the impressions, which are immediately present to us; and are therefore analogous to many other operations of the mind.

There is not, in my opinion, any possibility of evading this conclusion, but by asserting, that belief, beside the simple conception, consists in some impression or feeling, distinguishable from the conception. It does not modify the conception, and render it more present and intense: It is only annex'd to it, after the same manner that *will* and *desire* are annex'd to particular conceptions of good and pleasure. But the following considerations will, I hope, be sufficient to remove this hypothesis. *First*, It is directly contrary to experience, and our immediate consciousness. All men have ever allow'd reasoning to be merely an operation of our thoughts or ideas; and however those ideas may be vary'd to the feeling, there is nothing ever enters into our *conclusions* but ideas, or our fainter conceptions. For instance; I hear at present a person's voice, whom I am acquainted with; and this sound comes from the next room. This impression of my senses immediately conveys my thoughts to the person, along with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as existent at present, with the same qualities and relations, that I formerly knew them possess'd of. These ideas take faster hold of my mind, than the ideas of an enchanted castle. They are different to the feeling; but there is no distinct or separate impression attending them. 'Tis the same case when I recollect the several incidents of a journey, or the events of any history. Every particular fact is there the object of belief. Its idea is modify'd differently from the loose reveries of a castle-builder: But no distinct

impression attends every distinct idea, or conception of matter of fact. This is the subject of plain experience. If ever this experience can be disputed on any occasion, 'tis when the mind has been agitated with doubts and difficulties; and afterwards, upon taking the object in a new point of view, or being presented with a new argument, fixes and reposes itself in one settl'd conclusion and belief. In this case there is a feeling distinct and separate from the conception. The passage from doubt and agitation to tranquillity and repose, conveys a satisfaction and pleasure to the mind. But take any other case. Suppose I see the legs and thighs of a person in motion, while some interpos'd object conceals the rest of his body. Here 'tis certain, the imagination spreads out the whole figure. I give him a head and shoulders, and breast and neck. These members I conceive and believe him to be possess'd of. Nothing can be more evident, than that this whole operation is perform'd by the thought or imagination alone. The transition is immediate. The ideas presently strike us. Their customary connexion with the present impression, varies them and modifies them in a certain manner, but produces no act of the mind, distinct from this peculiarity of conception. Let any one examine his own mind, and he will evidently find this to be the truth.

*Secondly*, Whatever may be the case, with regard to this distinct impression, it must be allow'd, that the mind has a firmer hold, or more steady conception of what it takes to be matter of fact, than of fictions. Why then look any farther, or multiply suppositions without necessity?

*Thirdly*, We can explain the *causes* of the firm conception, but not those of any separate impression. And not only so, but the causes of the firm conception exhaust the whole subject, and nothing is left to produce any other effect. An inference concerning a matter of fact is nothing but the idea of an object, that has been frequently conjoin'd, or is associated with a present impression. This is the whole of it. Every part is requisite to explain, from analogy, the more steady conception; and nothing remains capable of producing any distinct impression.

*Fourthly*, The *effects* of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination, can all be explain'd from the firm conception; and there is no occasion to have recourse to any other principle. These arguments, with many others, enumerated in the foregoing volumes, sufficiently prove, that belief only modifies the idea or conception; and renders it different to the feeling, without producing any distinct impression.

Thus upon a general view of the subject, there appear to be two questions of importance, which we may venture to recommend to the consideration of philosophers, *Whether there be any thing to distinguish belief from the simple conception beside the feeling or sentiment? And, Whether this feeling be any thing but a firmer conception, or a faster hold, that we take of the object?*

If, upon impartial enquiry, the same conclusion, that I have form'd, be assented to by philosophers, the next business is to examine the analogy, which there is betwixt belief, and other acts of the mind, and find the cause of the firmness and strength of conception: And this I do not esteem a difficult task. The transition from a present impression, always enlivens and strengthens any idea. When any object is presented,

the idea of its usual attendant immediately strikes us, as something real and solid. 'Tis *felt*, rather than conceiv'd, and approaches the impression, from which it is deriv'd, in its force and influence. This I have prov'd at large. I cannot add any new arguments; tho' perhaps my reasoning on this whole question, concerning cause and effect, wou'd have been more convincing, had the following passages been inserted in the places, which I have mark'd for them. I have added a few illustrations on other points, where I thought it necessary.

*To be inserted in Book 1, page 60, line 9 after these words (fainter and more obscure.) beginning a new paragraph.*

It frequently happens, that when two men have been engag'd in any scene of action, the one shall remember it much better than the other, and shall have all the difficulty in the world to make his companion recollect it. He runs over several circumstances in vain; mentions the time, the place, the company, what was said, what was done on all sides; till at last he hits on some lucky circumstance, that revives the whole, and gives his friend a perfect memory of every thing. Here the person that forgets receives at first all the ideas from the discourse of the other, with the same circumstances of time and place; tho' he considers them as mere fictions of the imagination. But as soon as the circumstance is mention'd, that touches the memory, the very same ideas now appear in a new light, and have, in a manner, a different feeling from what they had before. Without any other alteration, beside that of the feeling, they become immediately ideas of the memory, and are assented to.

Since, therefore, the imagination can represent all the same objects that the memory can offer to us, and since those faculties are only distinguish'd by the different *feeling* of the ideas they present, it may be proper to consider what is the nature of that feeling. And here I believe every one will readily agree with me, that the ideas of the memory are more *strong* and *lively* than those of the fancy. A painter, who intended, &c.

*To be inserted in Book 1, page 68, line 5 after these words (according to the foregoing definition.) beginning a new paragraph.*

This operation of the mind, which forms the belief of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy; tho' no one has so much as suspected, that there was any difficulty in explaining it. For my part I must own, that I find a considerable difficulty in the case; and that even when I think I understand the subject perfectly, I am at a loss for terms to express my meaning. I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the *manner* of its being conceiv'd. But when I wou'd explain this *manner*, I scarce find any word that fully answers the case, but am oblig'd to have recourse to every one's feeling, in order to give him a perfect notion of this operation of the mind. An idea assented to *feels* different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior *force*, or *vivacity*, or *solidity*, or *firmness*, or *steadiness*. This variety of terms,



which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, 'tis needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join, and mix, and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive objects with all the circumstances of place and time. It may set them, in a manner, before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed. But as it is impossible, that that faculty can ever, of itself, reach belief, 'tis evident, that belief consists not in the nature and order of our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind. I confess, that 'tis impossible to explain perfectly this feeling or manner of conception. We may make use of words, that express something near it. But its true and proper name is *belief*, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy we can go no farther, than assert, that it is something *felt* by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions.

*A note to Book 1, page 70, line 32 after these words (immediate impression.)*

<sup>21</sup> *Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam siquando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Platonis in mentem, quem accepimus primum hic disputare solitum: Cujus etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic ejus auditor Polemo; cujus ipsa illa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram, Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quæ mihi minor esse videtur postquam est major, solebam intuens Scipionem, Catonem, Lælium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis inest in locis; ut non sine causa ex his memoriæ ducta sit disciplina. Cicero de Finibus, lib.*

*To be inserted in Book 1, page 84, line 24 after these words (impressions of the senses.) beginning a new paragraph.*

We may observe the same effect of poetry in a lesser degree; and this is common both to poetry and madness, that the vivacity they bestow on the ideas is not deriv'd from the particular situations or connexions of the objects of these ideas, but from the present temper and disposition of the person. But how great soever the pitch may be, to which this vivacity rises, 'tis evident, that in poetry it never has the same *feeling* with that which arises in the mind, when we reason, tho' even upon the lowest species of probability. The mind can easily distinguish betwixt the one and the other; and whatever emotion the poetical enthusiasm may give to the spirits, 'tis still the mere phantom of belief or perswasion. The case is the same with the idea, as with the passion it occasions. There is no passion of the human mind but what may arise from

poetry; tho' at the same time the *feelings* of the passions are very different when excited by poetical fictions, from what they are when they arise from belief and reality. A passion, which is disagreeable in real life, may afford the highest entertainment in a tragedy, or epic poem. In the latter case it lies not with that weight upon us: It feels less firm and solid: And has no other than the agreeable effect of exciting the spirits, and rousing the attention. The difference in the passions is a clear proof of a like difference in those ideas, from which the passions are deriv'd. Where the vivacity arises from a customary conjunction with a present impression; tho' the imagination may not, in appearance, be so much mov'd; yet there is always something more forcible and real in its actions, than in the fervours of poetry and eloquence. The force of our mental actions in this case, no more than in any other, is not to be measur'd by the apparent agitation of the mind. A poetical description may have a more sensible effect on the fancy, than an historical narration. It may collect more of those circumstances, that form a compleat image or picture. It may seem to set the object before us in more lively colours. But still the ideas it presents are different to the *feeling* from those, which arise from the memory and the judgment. There is something weak and imperfect amidst all that seeming vehemence of thought and sentiment, which attends the fictions of poetry.

We shall afterwards have occasion to remark both the resemblances and differences betwixt a poetical enthusiasm, and a serious conviction. In the mean time I cannot forbear observing, that the great difference in their feeling proceeds in some measure from reflection and *general rules*. We observe, that the vigour of conception, which fictions receive from poetry and eloquence, is a circumstance merely accidental, of which every idea is equally susceptible; and that such fictions are connected with nothing that is real. This observation makes us only lend ourselves, so to speak, to the fiction: But causes the idea to feel very different from the external establish'd persuasions founded on memory and custom. They are somewhat of the same kind: But the one is much inferior to the other, both in its causes and effects.

A like reflection on *general rules* keeps us from augmenting our belief upon every increase of the force and vivacity of our ideas. Where an opinion admits of no doubt, or opposite probability, we attribute to it a full conviction; tho' the want of resemblance, or contiguity, may render its force inferior to that of other opinions. 'Tis thus the understanding corrects the appearances of the senses, and makes us imagine, that an object at twenty foot distance seems even to the eye as large as one of the same dimensions at ten.

*To be inserted in Book 1, page 108, line 35 after these words (any idea of power.) beginning a new paragraph.*

Some have asserted, that we feel an energy, or power, in our own mind; and that having in this manner acquir'd the idea of power, we transfer that quality to matter, where we are not able immediately to discover it. The motions of our body, and the thoughts and sentiments of our mind, (say they) obey the will; nor do we seek any farther to acquire a just notion of force or power. But to convince us how fallacious this reasoning is, we need only consider, that the will being here consider'd as a cause,

has no more a discoverable connexion with its effects, than any material cause has with its proper effect. So far from perceiving the connexion betwixt an act of volition, and a motion of the body; 'tis allow'd that no effect is more inexplicable from the powers and essence of thought and matter. Nor is the empire of the will over our mind more intelligible. The effect is there distinguishable and separable from the cause, and cou'd not be foreseen without the experience of their constant conjunction. We have command over our mind to a certain degree, but beyond *that* lose all empire over it: And 'tis evidently impossible to fix any precise bounds to our authority, where we consult not experience. In short, the actions of the mind are, in this respect, the same with those of matter. We perceive only their constant conjunction; nor can we ever reason beyond it. No internal impression has an apparent energy, more than external objects have. Since, therefore, matter is confess'd by philosophers to operate by an unknown force, we shou'd in vain hope to attain an idea of force by consulting our own minds.<sup>50</sup>

I had entertain'd some hopes, that however deficient our theory of the intellectual world might be, it wou'd be free from those contradictions, and absurdities, which seem to attend every explication, that human reason can give of the material world. But upon a more strict review of the section concerning *personal identity*, I find myself involv'd in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent. If this be not a good *general* reason for scepticism, 'tis at least a sufficient one (if I were not already abundantly supply'd) for me to entertain a diffidence and modesty in all my decisions. I shall propose the arguments on both sides, beginning with those that induc'd me to deny the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being.

When we talk of *self* or *substance*, we must have an idea annex'd to these terms, otherwise they are altogether unintelligible. Every idea is deriv'd from preceding impressions; and we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual. We have, therefore, no idea of them in that sense.

Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination. All perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and separable, and may be conceiv'd as separately existent, and may exist separately, without any contradiction or absurdity.

When I view this table and that chimney, nothing is present to me but particular perceptions, which are of a like nature with all the other perceptions. This is the doctrine of philosophers. But this table, which is present to me, and that chimney, may and do exist separately. This is the doctrine of the vulgar, and implies no contradiction. There is no contradiction, therefore, in extending the same doctrine to all the perceptions.

<sup>50</sup> The same imperfection attends our ideas of the deity; but this can have no effect either on religion or morals. The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind; that is, a mind whose will is *constantly attended* with the obedience of every creature and being. Nothing more is requisite to give a foundation to all the articles of religion, nor is it necessary we shou'd form a distinct idea of the force and energy of the supreme being.

In general, the following reasoning seems satisfactory. All ideas are borrow'd from preceding perceptions. Our ideas of objects, therefore, are deriv'd from that source. Consequently no proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to perceptions. But 'tis intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct and independent, without any common *simple* substance or subject of inhesion. This proposition, therefore, can never be absurd with regard to perceptions.

When I turn my reflection on *myself*, I never can perceive this *self* without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, which forms the self.

We can conceive a thinking being to have either many or few perceptions. Suppose the mind to be reduc'd even below the life of an oyster. Suppose it to have only one perception, as of thirst or hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do you conceive any thing but merely that perception? Have you any notion of *self* or *substance*? If not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion.

The annihilation, which some people suppose to follow upon death, and which entirely destroys this self, is nothing but an extinction of all particular perceptions; love and hatred, pain and pleasure, thought and sensation. These therefore must be the same with self; since the one cannot survive the other.

Is *self* the same with *substance*? If it be, how can that question have place, concerning the subsistence of self, under a change of substance? If they be distinct, what is the difference betwixt them? For my part, I have a notion of neither, when conceiv'd distinct from particular perceptions.

Philosophers begin to be reconcil'd to the principle, *that we have no idea of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities*. This must pave the way for a like principle with regard to the mind, *that we have no notion of it, distinct from the particular perceptions*.

So far I seem to be attended with sufficient evidence. But having thus loosen'd all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion,<sup>99</sup> which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have induc'd me to receive it. If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only *feel* a connexion or a determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another. It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprize us. Most philosophers seem inclin'd to think, that personal identity *arises* from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception. The

<sup>99</sup> Book 1, p. 171.

present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect. But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences*, and *that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences*. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there wou'd be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable. Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflection, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions.

I shall also take this opportunity of confessing two other errors of less importance, which more mature reflection has discover'd to me in my reasoning. The first may be found in Book 1, pages 42–3, where I say, that the distance betwixt two bodies is known, among other things, by the angles, which the rays of light flowing from the bodies make with each other. 'Tis certain, that these angles are not known to the mind, and consequently can never discover the distance. The second error may be found in Book 1, page 67, where I say, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different degrees of force and vivacity. I believe there are other differences among ideas, which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms. Had I said, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different *feeling*, I shou'd have been nearer the truth.

There are two errors of the press, which affect the sense, and therefore the reader is desir'd to correct them. At Book 1, page 127, line 17 for *as the perception* read *a perception*. At Book 1, page 177, line 34 for *moral* read *natural*.

*A note to Book 1, page 18, line 40 to the word (resemblance.)*

<sup>5</sup> 'Tis evident, that even different simple ideas may have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary, that the point or circumstance of resemblance shou'd be distinct or separable from that in which they differ. *Blue* and *green* are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than *blue* and *scarlet*; tho' their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction. 'Tis the same case with particular sounds, and tastes and smells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance the same. And of this we may be certain, even from the very abstract terms *simple idea*. They comprehend all simple ideas under them. These resemble each other in their simplicity. And yet from their very nature, which excludes all composition, this circumstance, in which they resemble, is not distinguishable nor separable from the rest. 'Tis the same case with all the degrees in any quality. They are all resembling, and yet the quality, in any individual, is not distinct from the degree.

## Editorial Appendix 2

*To be inserted in Book 1, page 35, line 40 after these words (of the present difficulty.) beginning a new paragraph.*

There are many philosophers, who refuse to assign any standard of *equality*, but assert, that 'tis sufficient to present two objects, that are equal, in order to give us a just notion of this proportion. All definitions, say they, are fruitless, without the perception of such objects; and where we perceive such objects, we no longer stand in need of any definition. To this reasoning I entirely agree; and assert, that the only useful notion of equality, or inequality, is deriv'd from the whole united appearance and the comparison of particular objects. For 'tis evident that the eye, &c.

*To be inserted in Book 1, page 39, line 13 after these words (practicable or imaginable) beginning a new paragraph.*

To whatever side mathematicians turn, this dilemma still meets them. If they judge of equality, or any other proportion, by the accurate and exact standard, *viz.* the enumeration of the minute indivisible parts, they both employ a standard, which is useless in practice, and actually establish the indivisibility of extension, which they endeavour to explode. Or if they employ, as is usual, the inaccurate standard, deriv'd from a comparison of objects, upon their general appearance, corrected by measuring and juxta-position; their first principles, tho' certain and infallible, are too coarse to afford any such subtle inferences as they commonly draw from them. The first principles are founded on the imagination and senses: The conclusion, therefore, can never go beyond, much less contradict these faculties.

*A note to Book 1, page 46, line 37 to these words (impressions and ideas.)*

<sup>12</sup> As long as we confine our speculations to the *appearances* of objects to our senses, without entering into disquisitions concerning their real nature and operations, we are safe from all difficulties, and can never be embarrass'd by any question. Thus, if it be ask'd, whether the invisible and intangible distance, interpos'd betwixt two objects, be something or nothing: 'Tis easy to answer, that it is *something*, *viz.* a property of the objects, which affect the *senses* after such a particular manner. If it be ask'd, whether two objects, having such a distance betwixt them, touch or not: It may be answer'd, that this depends upon the definition of the word, *touch*. If objects be said to touch, when there is nothing *sensible* interpos'd betwixt them, these objects touch: If objects be said to touch, when their *images* strike contiguous parts of the eye, and when the hand *feels* both objects successively, without any interpos'd motion, these objects do not touch. The appearances of objects to our senses are all consistent; and no difficulties can ever arise, but from the obscurity of the terms we make use of.

If we carry our enquiry beyond the appearances of objects to the senses, I am afraid, that most of our conclusions will be full of scepticism and uncertainty. Thus, if it be ask'd, whether or not the invisible and intangible distance be always full of *body*, or of something that by an improvement of our organs might become visible or tangible: I must acknowledge, that I find no very decisive arguments on either side; tho' I am inclin'd to the contrary opinion, as being more suitable to vulgar and

## *Editorial Appendix 2*

popular notions. If the *Newtonian* philosophy be rightly understood, it will be found to mean no more. A vacuum is asserted: That is, bodies are said to be plac'd after such a manner, as to receive bodies betwixt them, without impulsion or penetration. The real nature of this position of bodies is unknown. We are only acquainted with its effects on the senses, and its power of receiving body. Nothing is more suitable to that philosophy, than a modest scepticism to a certain degree, and a fair confession of ignorance in subjects, that exceed all human capacity.

## Editors' Annotations

In reading the works of an author who lived in a remote age, it is necessary that we should look back upon the customs and manners which prevailed in his age; that we should place ourselves in his situation, and circumstances; that so we may be the better enabled to judge and discern how his turn of thinking, and manner of composing were biass'd, influenc'd, and, as it were, tinctur'd, by very familiar and reigning appearances, which are utterly different from those with which we are at present surrounded.

Thomas Warton, *Observations on the Faerie Queene*, 217

### FOREWORD

These annotations provide materials intended to illuminate, but not interpret, Hume's texts, a distinction which, however difficult to maintain in practice, provides a useful ideal. The annotations have been prepared for readers with diverse scholarly interests and competence. We are aware that we cannot, even some of the time, write for all those who make up such a disparate audience. The greater the scholarly accomplishment of any given reader, the more likely it will be that he or she will find many of these annotations expendable. Those looking for expositions of Hume's texts or interpretative suggestions are referred to the Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the *Treatise* and *Abstract*.

Each annotation is intended to serve one or more of several, sometimes overlapping, purposes:

1. *Explanation of terms or phrases.* Archaic, obsolete, or puzzling terms and phrases whose meaning is essential to the understanding of the text are explained in the annotations.

2. *Translation.* Translations of Hume's Latin quotations are provided. We are indebted to Michael Silverthorne for these translations.

3. *Amplification of cross-references.* Hume occasionally provided notes to direct readers to relevant discussions found elsewhere in the *Treatise*. Far more often he simply says that something has been discussed above, or will be discussed below, without indicating where this discussion is to be found. We have supplied the likely targets of such references whenever these are more than a few paragraphs distant from Hume's incomplete directions or if his directions are unclear. Some annotations also supply the location of earlier or later textual materials or of other annotations related to a topic of importance. Readers will be able to find additional discussions of most topics by means of the Index.

4. *Amplification of Hume's references to other authors.* We amplify Hume's usually sketchy notes by adding authors' names, titles of books, or other relevant bibliographical information.



5. *Identification of authors or works to which Hume alludes.* Hume often mentions the views of others without identifying the sources to which he alludes. We attempt to identify the authors whose works espouse or discuss the views that Hume mentions, focusing, as much as possible, on authors or works Hume is known or thought to have read, or at least would likely have had access to, before the *Treatise* was published. We assume that he had no difficulty finding the works of such philosophers as Cicero, Seneca, Bacon, Locke, and Hutcheson, but for guidance about the availability to him of works by figures now considerably less well known, we have sometimes relied on the lists of books found in the Physiological Library and the David Hume Library.<sup>1</sup>

6. *Provision of information about aspects of the intellectual background of views expressed in the Treatise, the Abstract, or the Letter from a Gentleman.* We believe that any defensible interpretation of Hume's texts requires attention to, and thus appreciation of, the intellectual and philosophical context that gave rise to the issues dealt with in these texts. In some annotations we have, in order to suggest the state of the argument or issue at the time the *Treatise* was written, mentioned or cited reference works of the period (e.g., Chambers's *Cyclopædia*) or a textbook (e.g., Watts's *Logic*). In other annotations, especially certain relatively lengthy ones, we describe controversies or positions to which Hume appears to respond. In the largest group of annotations, including many of those described in the previous paragraph, we cite or describe texts that in some sense prefigure positions that appear in the *Treatise*, either as positions Hume accepts, although perhaps in a modified form, or as positions he opposes. Hume presents this material, whether an opinion, a set of distinctions, the formulation of an issue, or the structure of an explanation, in a manner that sometimes follows, though in varying degrees, the form of his predecessors. In annotations of this sort we have often quoted, if only briefly and incompletely, rather than paraphrased, the relevant materials.<sup>2</sup> We have done so for two reasons.

First, we have come to think that Hume, as he wrote the *Treatise*, was relatively close to some of the philosophical materials that helped to inform or motivate his work. This conjecture is not to be taken as a suggestion that the views of the *Treatise* are fundamentally unoriginal. The work may in fact be at its most original in the use it makes of shared materials, in the manner in which it builds on or recycles existing views, or the new explanations it gives of previously observed phenomena. Given that Hume destroyed or arranged to have destroyed his commonplace books and nearly all his loose notes, the evidence in support of this conjecture is constituted by whatever marked similarities one finds between earlier materials that Hume may have known—the books that provided so much of his 'cautious observation of human life'—and the text of the *Treatise*.<sup>3</sup> Second, even if adequate support for the foregoing conjecture should in any given case prove elusive, we prefer to quote,

<sup>1</sup> For further discussion of Hume's early reading, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Quotations replicate period punctuation and spelling without use of [*sic*].

<sup>3</sup> Intro. 10. M. A. Stewart has shown that the notes published as 'Hume's Early Memoranda' were almost certainly *begun* no earlier than 1739 (see above, Historical Account, n. 11). Consequently, these notes are unlikely to provide direct clues to the reading that informed the *Treatise*.

rather than summarize, on the grounds that the original articulations of the classical and early modern literature available to Hume, preserve, even in translation, their semantic and conceptual character to a degree that no paraphrase can.

7. *Guidance to texts or discussions that reappear, typically in modified form, in Hume's later works.* Hume described three of his later works, *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, and *A Dissertation on the Passions*, as recastings of the *Treatise*. Consequently, some portions of the text of the *Treatise*, *Abstract*, and *Letter from a Gentleman*, usually modified but still recognizable, reappear in these later works. Relying often on the work of Tom Beauchamp, we have indicated those passages that so recur, and where they are to be found. In addition, many issues or points of view found in the *Treatise* are taken up again in the three recastings, many of Hume's essays, his *History of England*, and his *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*. We point out any obviously significant connections of this sort that we have noticed. We have also noted such connections between the *Abstract* and the *Letter from a Gentleman* and the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. And we have quoted, either in these annotations, or in the Historical Account, relevant comments from Hume's letters.

We recognize—indeed, we emphasize—that our annotations are neither complete nor definitive, and thus we welcome suggestions for their improvement.

## References and Forms of Reference

References to works by authors other than Hume are by author and title or short title (for details see the Bibliography). If a work has been translated into English, the translated title is ordinarily given, the exceptions being those classical works (e.g., Cicero's *De officiis*) whose original titles are still widely used. Titles of French works not available in English are left untranslated, but Latin titles are translated when doing so seems likely to be helpful. With rare exceptions, all quoted material is in English. Otherwise unattributed translations of French materials are by Dario Perinetti and David Norton.

Whenever possible, references are to clear, intrinsic divisions, the books, parts, sections, or chapters of cited works (as, e.g., 'Locke, *Essay* 2.8.8'), on the grounds that these remain relatively uniform from edition to edition. Page numbers are provided in two circumstances: (1) when they are the only viable option (they then follow the title, as, e.g., '*Mathematical Lectures*, 75–7' or *Works*, 1: 231); or (2) when they provide helpful specificity within a lengthy division of a cited work. In cases of the latter sort the relevant page numbers are placed within square brackets, thus, 'Malebranche, *Search* 5.7 [383]' or 'Descartes, *Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 75–6]'. References within a paragraph of an annotation are ordinarily given in order of publication, with an exception being made for Hume's *History of England*, a work that was in one sense written and published backwards; see ann. 275.44.

Numbers or words at the left of each entry refer to specific pages and lines of the critical text being annotated. Boldfaced words following these references (the lemma) and ending at a right-hand square bracket replicate all or part of the text

so specified. Although an effort has been made to produce lemmas that give the reader a sense of the passage annotated, this has often not been possible, and we mean in any event for these annotations to be read in conjunction with the full text being annotated, and urge that they be so read. To facilitate use of the annotations, book, part, section, and paragraph numbers have been placed in the left margin.

Within annotations themselves, references to the main body of the *Treatise* are typically to book, part, and section, taking the form 1.1.1 or 3.2.6, or to book, part, section, and paragraph, taking the form 1.1.1.1 or 3.2.6.3. References using such unattributed strings of this sort are always to the *Treatise*, while references to the Introduction and Appendix of the *Treatise*, to the *Abstract*, and to the *Letter from a Gentleman* use an abbreviation (Intro., App., Abs., and LG respectively) and the appropriate paragraph number(s), e.g., Intro. 8. References to Hume's other major works, the *History of England* excepted, follow this same pattern, e.g., EHU 7.2 or EPM Appx. 1.4; references to his essays are typically by short title and paragraph, e.g., 'Rise and Progress' 4. For details see Abbreviations and Conventions. References to the *History of England* provide only chapter or appendix number and the relevant volume and page numbers of the Liberty Classics edition listed in the Bibliography. Cross-references to annotations ordinarily provide only the first of any multiple line numbers (as 'see ann. 4.42', rather than 4.42–3), but with exceptions made to avoid what would otherwise be ambiguous directions.

## A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

Title-page

**TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE]** In some versions of the *Elements of Law* Hobbes referred to his previously published, *Human Nature; or the Fundamental Elements of Policy*, as a 'treatise of human Nature'; see *Elements of Law*, 191, 193. Cumberland also used the phrase to refer to Hobbes's work; see his *Treatise of the Laws of Nature*, 2.20 [130].

**EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF REASONING]** According to Chambers, writing in 1728, 'Experiments, within these 50 or 60 Years, are come into such Vogue, that nothing will pass in Philosophy, but what is founded on *Experiment*, or confirm'd by *Experiment*, &c. So that the new Philosophy is almost altogether *Experimental*' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Experimental Philosophy').

*Rara... licet]* 'The rare good fortune of a time when you may think what you like and say what you think' (Tacitus, *Histories* 1.1). Addison had used this epigraph in the first issue (23 Dec. 1715) of *The Free-holder*. Spinoza adapted Tacitus' words to a chapter title ('It is shown that in a free state every man may think what he likes, and say what he thinks'); see *Tractatus Theologico-politicus*, ch. 20, and translator's note. An edition of this work published in London in 1737 was subtitled, in part: 'To prove that the Liberty of Philosophizing (that is Making Use of Natural Reason) may be allowed without any Prejudice to Piety, or to the Peace of any Commonwealth'. Hume

refers to the 'Liberty . . . of Philosophy' at LG 41; cf. ann. 431.20. Berkeley also spoke, but ironically, of 'this most wise and happy age of free-thinking, free-speaking, free-writing, and free-acting' (*Alciphron* 2.6). See also 'Liberty of the Press' 1; HE Appx. 4 [5: 130–1], 71 [6: 540].

**Book 1. Of the Understanding]** The original Volume 1 of the *Treatise*, which was entitled *Of the Understanding*, included an Advertisement, Contents, Errata, and an Introduction, as well as Book 1 of the *Treatise*, which was also entitled *Of the Understanding*. Thus, although the first four elements mentioned were part of Volume 1, they were not part of Book 1, *Of the Understanding*.

## Advertisement

**2.5 in order to try the taste of the public]** Boileau asked: 'For in short, what is publishing a Book? Is it not as it were saying to the Public, *Try me?*' (*Works I*: p. xi). Earlier, Castiglione, speaking of the 'tribunal of public opinion', went on to say: 'if the book meets with general approval, I shall take it that it is good and believe that it will survive; and if, on the other hand, it fails to please, I shall take it that it is bad and shall at once accept that it must sink into obscurity. Then if my accusers are not satisfied with the verdict of public opinion, let them at least be content with the verdict of time' (*Courtier*, Dedication [36]).

**2.6–7 proceed to the examination of Morals, Politics, and Criticism]** The first two volumes of the *Treatise*, on the understanding and the passions, were published in January 1739. The third volume, on morals, followed in late October 1740 (for details see Historical Account, Sects. 2, 5; cf. *Abs.* 3). The projected volumes on politics and criticism were never published, but, beginning in 1741, Hume published many essays on politics and criticism in his *Essays Moral and Political* and, in 1752, his *Political Discourses*. From 1753 most of these essays were included in the several editions of *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*. There is no evidence to show which of these essays, if any, were drafted as parts of the volumes projected here.

## Introduction

- Intro. 1 **3.1–4 those, who pretend to discover any thing . . . decrying all those . . . before them]** Among others, two famous authors we know Hume to have read, Bacon and Descartes, clearly fit his description. From the latter, see especially *Principles of Philosophy* 1.1; *Passions of the Soul* 1.1. In the Preface to his *Instauratio magna* or *Great Renewal*, Bacon began by saying that the 'state of the sciences . . . is neither prosperous nor far advanced', and soon thereafter said that 'the wisdom which we have drawn in particular from the Greeks seems to be a kind of childish stage of science . . . ready to talk, but too weak and immature to produce anything', and then denounced the person (Aristotle) who, while appearing to give philosophy a form, had in fact corrupted it

(*New Organon*, Preface, 6–8; cf. *Advancement of Learning*, 193). Of the many sets of introductory remarks found in the works of early modern philosophers, including natural philosophers, none seems to have provided Hume with more ammunition for the Introduction to the *Treatise* than Bacon's Preface. See also Malebranche, *Search* 6.2.5; Hooke, 'A General Scheme, or Idea of the Present State of Natural Philosophy, and How its Defects may be Remedied by a Methodical Proceeding in the making Experiments and Collecting Observations... as the Solid Basis for the Superstructure of True Philosophy', 3, 5; Desaguliers, *Course of Experimental Philosophy*, Preface.

Hume's point was expressed humourously by Matthew Prior, who described the author of a 'new HYPOTHESIS' as showing 'That all his Predecessor's Rules | Were empty Cant, all JARGON of the Schools', and then that this author, on the ruin thus created 'rears his Throne' ('On Exodus iii.14... An Ode', the first work in *Poems on Several Occasions*, a volume Hume mentions at 2.2.8.18).

Intro. 2 3.15–16 **rabble without doors... all goes not well within]** Plutarch asked those listening to his philosophical lectures to avoid 'clamour and shouting' because, if they did not, those outside would be 'unable to make out whether the applause is for some flute-player, or harper, or dancer' ('On Listening to Lectures' 46BC [*Moralia*, 1: 246–7]). See also Huet, *Philosophical Treatise*, Author's Preface [3–7]; *DNR* 1.2–3.

3.24–5 **victory is not gain'd by the men at arms... but by the trumpeters, drummers]** Bacon spoke of the time before the Greeks, when the 'sciences of nature' may have flourished 'without the benefit of Greek pipes and trumpets' (*New Organon* 1.122). As Laird noted, Bolingbroke spoke of 'the Drummers and Trumpeters of Faction' who drown the voices of reason and truth (see Bolingbroke, *Dissertation upon Parties*, 12; Laird, 21).

Intro. 3 3.27–8 **that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings]** This prejudice was mentioned by others. Norris spoke of the 'general Prejudice that most Men are under against very Abstract and Metaphysical Arguments' (*Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World* 1.1.4). Watts noted that attacks on scholastic metaphysics have 'tempted our Youth to run to another Extreme: many of them will sneer at the name of *Metaphysicks*... and... renounce all Pretence to it with Pride and Pleasure'. Watts himself argued that metaphysics, although better called 'ontology', is a useful and even necessary science (*Brief Scheme of Ontology*, Preface; cf. *Improvement of the Mind* 20.15; *Logick* 1.6.9). See also *EHU* 1.7–13.

3.36–4.2 **metaphysics... deep and abstruse... philosophy... easy and obvious]** That the truths of nature are difficult to access was a recurring theme in early modern philosophy. Bacon remarked: 'The fabric of the universe, its structure, to the mind observing it, is like a labyrinth, where on all sides the path is so often uncertain, the resemblance of a thing or sign is deceptive, and the twists and turns of natures are so oblique and intricate' (*New Organon*, Preface, 10). Chambers said: 'The real and scientific Causes of natural Things generally lie very deep: Observation and Experiment, the proper Means of arriving at them, are in most Cases extremely

slow; and the human Mind impatient' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Hypothesis'). See also Malebranche, *Search* 3.1.3.1–2. Hume's reference to metaphysical truth that is 'deep and abstruse' and to an 'easy and obvious' philosophy resembles a distinction drawn in an early issue of the review *Memoirs of Literature*. There are, said an anonymous reviewer, 'two sorts of Philosophy. The one is sublime and abstruse, and properly cultivated by those that are call'd *Philosophers*: The other is sensible and natural; it is the Philosophy of ingenious Men of all Conditions. The Poets apply themselves to this second sort of Philosophy, as being the most useful' (*Memoirs of Literature* 2: 66–7). See also Berkeley, *Principles*, Intro. 5; Butler, *Three Sermons*, Preface §§2–4. Hume returns to the differences between philosophy that is 'easy and obvious' and that which is 'accurate and abstruse' in *EHU* 1, esp. ¶¶3, 16. See also 1.3.12.20; 'Of Commerce' 1–3.

Intro. 4 4.3–6 **all the sciences...are in some measure dependent on the science of MAN]** Many of Hume's predecessors recommended the careful study of human nature, and some also spoke of the 'science' of man or human nature. Malebranche, although pursuing a significantly different agenda, said that 'of all the human sciences, the science of man is the most worthy', and that 'the science of man, or of oneself, is a science that cannot reasonably be depreciated' (*Search*, Preface [p. xxv]; 4.6.2). Pufendorf saw the study of human nature as central to the discovery of moral law: 'there seems no Way so directly leading to the Discovery of the Law of Nature, as is the accurate Contemplation of our natural Condition and Propensions' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.14). Locke, having met with some friends to discuss a subject 'very remote' from the human understanding, saw that it was first 'necessary to examine our own Abilities, and see, what Objects our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with' (*Essay*, Epistle to the Reader, 7).

Fiering reports that, in 1739, a student at Yale College defended a thesis entitled, *Philosophiae studium homine dignissimum, est humanae naturae scientia* '(The philosophical study most worthy of man is the science of human nature)' (*Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard*, 195). For similar comments by Hobbes, Hooke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Pope, and Watts, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1. See also Charron, *Of Wisdom*, Intro.; Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, 206; Hale, *Primitive Origination of Mankind* 1.4; Bellegarde, *Letters*, Preface; Barbeyrac, *Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 1; Crousaz, *New Treatise of the Art of Thinking*, 1: 8; Gordon, *Cato's Letters* 31. See also *Abs.* 1–3; *EHU* 1.1–2.

4.6 **Natural Religion]** Wilkins described natural religion as that 'which men might know, and should be obliged unto, by the meer principles of *Reason*, improv'd by consideration and experience, without the help of *Revelation*' (*Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* 1.4).

Intro. 5 4.20–3 **The sole end...on each other]** This sentence is quoted, with minor changes, at *Abs.* 3.

Intro. 6 4.28–30 **leave the tedious lingring method...march up directly to the...center of these sciences]** Bacon complained in similar terms: 'For as yet we are but

lingering in the outer courts of nature, nor are we preparing ourselves a way into her inner chambers' (*New Organon* 2.7, edn. of Spedding *et al.*).

Intro. 7

**4.41–3 only solid foundation ... to this science itself must be ... experience and observation]** That 'experience and observation' were the keys to a sound natural philosophy was widely proclaimed well before 1739. Experiments were, in Bacon's hands, typically recorded observations of common experiences, as his *Sylva Sylvarum, or Natural History* illustrates. Harvey said that 'Silly and inexperienced persons wrongly attempt, by means of dialectics and far-fetched proofs, either to upset or to establish which things should be confirmed by anatomical dissection and credited through actual inspection. Whoever wishes to know what is in question ... must either see for himself or be credited with belief in the experts' ('Essay to Riolan', in *Circulation of the Blood*, 166). Boyle, who in 1661 said that he found it most useful 'to make experiments and collect observations', also said that he began his work with the intent of continuing the work begun by Bacon (*Certain Physiological Essays*, 302–5; cf. *Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring of the Weight of the Air*, Preface, 121–2). Hume probably owned *Certain Physiological Essays*, and would also likely have read this work while a student in Robert Steuart's natural philosophy course at Edinburgh College. (See Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 77; Barfoot, 'Hume and the Culture of Science'. On Hume's early education and reading, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1.) Hooke in 1665 said that the 'Science of Nature has been already too long made only a work of the *Brain* and the *Fancy*: It is now high time that it should return to the plainness and soundness of *Observations on material and obvious things*' (*Micrographia*, Preface [p. xiii]; for Hooke's extended discussion of the experimental method and its advantages, see his clearly Baconian 'General Scheme, or Idea of the Present State of Natural Philosophy'. See also Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 1.3 [40–1]; Newton, *Opticks* 3.1, qu. 31 [2: 404]; Desaguliers, *Course of Experimental Philosophy*, Preface; and the ann. above to the subtitle of the *Treatise*, p.688.

**4.44–5.1 application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects ... after that to natural ... about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences]** If we assume that classical natural philosophy began with Thales, then Hume's timetable may derive from Cicero. The latter, presenting the views of Antiochus of Ascalon, said: 'it is universally agreed, that Socrates was the first person who summoned philosophy away from the mysteries ... [of] nature herself ... and led it to the subject of ordinary life, in order to investigate the virtues and vices, and good and evil generally, and to realize that heavenly matters ... however fully known, have nothing to do with the good life' (*Academica* 1.4.15). This account is repeated by Bacon; see *New Organon* 1.79. See also Seneca, *Moral Epistles* 71.7; Stanley, *History of Philosophy* 3.5, 'Socrates'; Rapin, *Whole Critical Works* 1: 335–6. For a different story, traced to Aristotle, see Barbeyrac, *Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 20. Dryden had already in 1668 asked, 'Is it not evident, in these last hundred years (when the Study of Philosophy has been the business of all the *Virtuosi* in

*Christendome*) that almost a new Nature has been reveal'd to us? ...more useful Experiments in Philosophy have been made, more Noble Secrets in Optics, Medicine, Anatomy, Astronomy, discover'd, than in all those credulous and doting Ages from *Aristotle* to us?' (*Essay of Dramatick Poesy*, 15).

Bacon himself recommended the application of his new method to the moral subjects: It may be asked, he said, 'whether we are speaking of perfecting only Natural Philosophy by our method or also the other sciences, Logic, Ethics and Politics. We certainly mean all that we have said to apply to all of them; and just as common logic... is applicable not only to the natural sciences but to all the sciences, so also our science, which proceeds by *induction* covers all. For we are making a history and tables of discovery about anger, fear, shame and so on; and also about instances of political affairs; and equally about the mental motions of memory, composition and division, of judgement and the rest' (*New Organon* 1.127). See also Pope, *Essay on Man* 1.162. Newton in his *Opticks* suggested that if natural philosophy, by following the experimental method 'shall at length be perfected, [then] the Bounds of Moral Philosophy will be also enlarged', for we will then, 'so far as we can know by natural Philosophy what is the first Cause', its power over us, and its benefits to us, but he does not there suggest using the experimental method in moral philosophy itself (3.1, qu. 31 [405]). See also above, Historical Account, Sect. 1.

5.3 and n. 1 **LORD BACON and some late philosophers in England**] For the dates and relevant works of these philosophers, see the Bibliography. English-speaking writers were in nearly unanimous agreement that Bacon had initiated the changes that put the sciences on a new and productive course. Sprat, for example, discussing the new experimental philosophy, said: 'I shall onely mention one great Man... the *Lord Bacon*. In whose Books there are every where scattered the best arguments, that can be produc'd for the defence of Experimental Philosophy; and the best directions, that are needful to promote it' (*History of the Royal-Society*, 35). Barbeyrac suggested that it was from reading the works of Bacon that Grotius was inspired 'to compose a System of the Law of Nature' that became the foundation of the first genuine science of morality (*Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 29). See also Voltaire, *Letters concerning the English Nation* 12; Hume, *Abs.* 1–2, and, for Hume's later assessment of Bacon, *HE* Appx. 4 [5: 153–4].

5.7–8 **improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to... toleration... liberty**] In an essay first published in 1741, Hume attributed to Longinus the view that 'the arts and sciences could never flourish, but in a free government' ('Civil Liberty' 4; cf. 'Longinus', *On the Sublime* 44). As Hume points out in this essay, Shaftesbury and Addison are among 'the eminent writers in our own country' who accept this view, but he himself is critical of it and offers counter-examples. For Shaftesbury's view, see *Soliloquy* 2.1–2; for Addison's, see *Tatler* 161; *Spectator* 287.

Intro. 8 5.9–10 **Nor...will do less honour to our native country than...natural philosophy**] The view that 'our native country', Britain, ruled the world of natural



philosophy was not limited to the British. Voltaire suggested that Newton, obviously the foremost representative of British science, had 'obtain'd a kind of universal Monarchy over the Sciences' (*Letters concerning the English Nation*, Index s.v. 'Newton', [265]). Bacon supposed that 'the introduction of remarkable discoveries holds by far the first place among human actions' (*New Organon* 1.88).

5.15 **from careful and exact experiments**] As was intimated in ann. 4.41, no sharp distinction was drawn between 'experience' and 'experiment' in the early modern period. A recent translator of Bacon has observed: '*Experientia* and *experimentum* are used indifferently by Bacon both for the unforced observation which we might call experience and for the contrived experience which we might call an experiment' (M. Silverthorne, *New Organon* 1.70n.). Hobbes said that the 'remembrance of the succession of one thing to another, that is, of what was antecedent, and what consequent, and what concomitant, is called an experiment; whether the same be made by us voluntarily...or not made by us, as when we remember a fair morning after a red evening. To have had many experiments, is that we call EXPERIENCE, which is nothing else but remembrance of what antecedents have been followed with what consequents' (*Elements of Law* 1.4.6). Boyle did 'not scruple to confess...that I disdain not to take notice even of ludicrous experiments, and think, that the plays of boys may sometimes deserve to be the study of philosophers' (*Certain Physiological Essays*, 307). Rohault distinguished three kinds of experiment: the first makes use only of the senses; the second makes use of deliberate trials; the third involves reasoning (*System*, Preface [A8]). Locke aptly demonstrates the interchangeability of the two terms when he says first that the stages of difference 'between earnest Study, and very near minding nothing at all, Every one, I think, has experimented in himself', and then that 'almost every one has Experience of [a certain effect] in himself' (*Essay* 2.19.4; see also anns. 153.2, 44; 162.36). In *EPM* 1.10 Hume again recommended the 'experimental method', and contrasted it with the 'other scientific method, where a general abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions'.

Intro. 9

5.29–31 **at the utmost extent of human reason, we sit down contented...of our ignorance**] Hume's recommendation is reminiscent of Locke's, that the 'Mind of Man...be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its Comprehension; to stop, when it is at the utmost Extent of its Tether; and to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things, which, upon Examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our Capacities' (*Essay* 1.1.4; cf. 4.3.22). Before Locke, Arnauld and Nicole had claimed: 'The best way to limit the scope of the sciences is never to try to inquire about anything beyond us', and then '*Nescire quaedam magna pars sapientiae* [Some ignorance is a great part of wisdom]' (*Logic* 4.1 [230]). Chambers provided a digest of the central Lockean grounds for supposing that our ignorance is insurmountable. Because we lack adequate ideas, our reason, he says, 'carries us...very little beyond particular Matter of Fact; and therefore...how far

soever human Industry may advance useful and experimental Philosophy in Physical Things, yet scientific [“certain Knowledge”] will still be out of our reach’. In addition, there is a ‘want of discoverable Connection between those Ideas we [do] have’. Thus, of ‘the Causes, Manner, and Certainty’ of effects we must ‘be content to be ignorant’ (*Cyclopædia*, ‘Ignorance’). See also Rapin, *Reflexions upon Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, 82; Huet, *Philosophical Treatise* 1.4; ‘sGravesande, *Mathematical Elements*, 1: p. xi; and Hume, *Abs.* 27; *EHU* 1.6, 12.25; *EPM* 5 n. 19; *DNR* 4.11, 14.

Intro. 10 5.42–6.1 **impossibility of explaining ultimate principles...defect common to...all the sciences]**

The inherent limitations of the new science were widely noted. Bayle supposed that the typical modern natural philosopher was ready to grant the impenetrability of nature, and for that reason was a sceptic: ‘there are very few good natural Philosophers in our age, but are convinced, that nature is an impenetrable abyss, and that it’s springs are known to none, but to the maker and director of them. So that all those Philosophers are, in that respect, Academics and Pyrrhonists’ (*Dictionary*, ‘Pyrrho’ [B] [4: 653b]). Argens generalized the point: ‘The greatest Men, and those who distinguish themselves the most in the Sciences they study, ingeniously confess, that there is a vast Number of Things above their Knowledge, and which the Mind of Man is not capable of comprehending’ (‘Preliminary Discourse’ 2, *Philosophical Dissertations*). Trublet embraced a similar scepticism about learning the ultimate principles of behaviour, saying: ‘There is always something we cannot reach, at the bottom of the heart we think we have seen furthest into; and the greatest perfection we can arrive at in this art, will afford us but some uncertain conjectures upon the principles of mens actions’ (‘Uncertainty of any Judgment...upon Human Actions’, *Essays* 27 [385]). See also Bacon, *New Organon* 1.10, 66; Glanvill, *Vanity of Dogmatizing* 3; Newton, *Principia*, 2: 543–7; Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education* 190; Ayloffe, *Government of the Passions*, 1–3; Keill, *Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 1 [8]; Huet, *Philosophical Treatise* 3.10; ann. 90.42; and Hume, *Abs.* 1; *EHU* 4.12, 16; *EPM* 9.13.

6.14–15 **glean up our experiments...from a cautious observation of human life]**

Hume’s recommendation is reminiscent of Locke’s remark that in ‘the Knowledge of Bodies, we must be content to glean, what we can, from particular Experiments... Where our Enquiry is concerning... [that] which by Contemplation of our *Ideas*, we cannot discover; there Experience, Observation, and natural History, must give us by our Senses, and retail, an insight into corporeal Substances’ (*Essay* 4.12.12). Dryden suggested that ‘All History is only the precepts of Moral Philosophy reduc’d into Examples’ (*Plutarch’s Lives*, 274). Chambers said that without the ‘Observations of others’, made available through language, not even the ‘most sagacious Observer’ could produce an art or a science (*Cyclopædia*, Preface [p. vi]). See also Hume, ‘Study of History’ 6.

Book 1. *Of the Understanding*

- 1.1 *Of ideas, their origin, composition, connexion, abstraction, &c.*
- 1.1.1 *Of the origin of our ideas*  
7.title *origin of our ideas*] *EHU* 2 has the same title as this section, and takes up several of the matters discussed here. See also *Abs.* 5–7.
- 1.1.1.1 7.1 **perceptions**] Hume's use of the term *perception* was not entirely novel. Locke said that 'Whatever *Idea* is in the mind, is either an actual perception, or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again' (*Essay* 1.4.20). See also Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 1.19–28; E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 41; ann. 160.25.
- 7.2–3 **IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS...difference betwixt...force and liveliness**] Malebranche distinguished between 'strong and lively sensations' (e.g., pains) that are accompanied by the 'movement of spirits conducive to changing the body's position and to exciting the passions', and those 'weak and languid sensations' that have 'little affect on the soul', but he also supposed that some sensations were intermediate between these two types (*Search* 1.12.4).
- 7.7 **By ideas I mean the faint images**] Berkeley suggested that 'The ideas... excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed *ideas*, or *images of things*, which they copy and represent' (*Principles* 1.33).
- 7.12–13 **Every one...will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking**] Recognition of the difference between 'feeling and thinking', in terms similar to those used by Hume, was not uncommon. Malebranche said that 'sensible perception...is much more vivid...than the perception I have when I think' (*Search* 4.11.3 [322]), while Locke suggested that everyone is 'invincibly conscious to himself of a different Perception, when he looks on the Sun by day, and thinks on it by night' (*Essay* 4.2.14). See also Descartes, *Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 75–6]; and Hume, *EHU* 2.1–3.
- n. 2.1 (7) **use...impression and idea...in a sense different from what is usual**] The 'usual' senses are not specified, but in so far as Descartes supposed that the 'ideas...formed of the objects which strike the senses' in the act of perception are the result first of rays 'that press on the back of the eye', and then of a mark or trace in the brain, he may be said to have used 'idea' to 'express the manner' of perception (see, e.g., *Treatise on Man* [AT 11: 175–7]). See also Glanvill, *Vanity of Dogmatizing* 1[8–9]; Rohault, *System* 1.32; Malebranche, *Search* 3.2.2 [220–1] (on the 'impressed' species of the Aristotelians); Locke, *Essay* 2.1.15, 2.9.2–4; Huet, *Philosophical Treatise* 1.1; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 4.2. Le Grand specified a widely used sense of *idea* when he said that 'by the Word *Idea* we are not to understand any Representations imprest upon our Senses; but those Images of Things, which the *Mind* frames by Thinking' (*Entire Body of Philosophy*, 1). Chambers provided contemporary accounts

of these terms; see *Cyclopædia*, 'Idea', 'Impression', 'Perception', 'Sensation'. See also Cummins, 'Locke's Anticipation of Hume's Use of "Impression" '.

n. 2.2–3 (7) **restore ... idea, to its original sense ... Locke had perverted it, in making it stand for all our perceptions**] Locke said that the term *idea* is 'to stand for whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks ... or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking' (*Essay* 1.1.8). Stillingfleet complained that Locke had not given his readers '*the original use of [Idea], and how it was first applied*', that we might better judge the true meaning of it when so much Weight is laid upon it', but the etymology offered by Stillingfleet provides no clue to Hume's use of the term (*Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter*, 31). Law said of William King that, in contrast to Locke, he used the 'Word *Idea* ... in the old *Pla[to]nic* meaning for a *Species, Phantasm, or Corporeal Image*, as it were painted on the Brain' (King, *Essay on the Origin of Evil* n. 3 [6]). See also Berkeley, *Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 250].

1.1.1.2 7.24 **SIMPLE and COMPLEX**] On simple and complex ideas, see Locke, *Essay*, esp. 2.11.6–7, 2.12; Watts, *Logick* 1.3.2. Locke's view is repeated as authoritative by Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Idea', but disputed by Lee, *Anti-Scepticism* 2.2.3; Greene, *Principles* 5.3.3.

1.1.1.4 8.21 **New Jerusalem**] The writer of Revelation, in the New Testament, recorded his vision: 'And I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven ... And the twelve gates were twelve pearls ... and the street of the city was pure gold' (Rev. 21: 2, 21).

8.22 **Paris**] Hume twice passed through Paris before completing the *Treatise*; see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1.

1.1.1.5 8.39 **answer this challenge**] For other challenges of this sort, see, e.g., 1.2.3.4; 1.2.5.3; 1.2.6.5; 1.3.14.7, 13, 31; 1.3.16.8; 1.4.2.48; 1.4.5.4; 1.4.6.3. Locke, after describing this form of argument, which he called '*Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*', went on to express his disapproval of its use (*Essay* 4.17.20, 22). See also *EHU* 2.6.

1.1.1.9 9.35–6 **when one is born blind or deaf ... also their correspondent ideas**] That ideas of the sort Hume is here discussing depend on previous sensory experience was widely asserted, and explained and illustrated in ways similar to those used by Hume. Gassendi, for example, having established as an axiom that '*Every idea which is held in the mind takes its origin from the senses*', went on to say that 'it is for this reason that a man who is blind has no idea of colour, because he lacks the sense of vision which alone could give him one; and the man who is born deaf has no idea of sound, because he is without the sense of hearing' (*Institutio logica* 1.2). See also Malebranche, *Search* 3.1.1.2 [199], *Elucidations* 11 [634]; Locke, *Essay* 2.1.6, 2.2.2, 4.11.4; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 1.7.2–3; Watts, *Logick* 1.3.1; and Hume, *EHU* 2.7; *HE* 20 [2: 421].

9.40 **taste of a pine-apple]** Locke also maintained that only those who had actually eaten a pineapple, could have a 'true *Idea*' of the taste of this fruit (*Essay* 3.4.11). Pineapples were rare in eighteenth-century Britain. In 1746 Horace Walpole reported paying a guinea (£1.05), then a substantial sum of money, for two of them (*OED*, 'pineapple'). In a letter of July 1762, Hume commented on the argument in 1.1.8–9. The relevant portion of this letter is quoted above, Historical Account, Sect. 9.9.

- 1.1.1.10 9.42–10.21 **There is however one contradictory phenomenon...general maxim]** This paragraph is repeated, nearly verbatim, at *EHU* 2.8; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), p. lxii.

10.15–17 **whether 'tis possible...from his own imagination, to...raise up...that particular shade]** Descartes considered the same issue, and reached the same conclusion that Hume reaches. We would not, he said, expect someone blind from birth to be led 'by force of argument...to have true ideas of colours'. On the other hand, 'if someone at some time has seen the primary colours, though not the secondary or mixed colours, then by means of a deduction of sorts it is possible for him to form images even of those he has not seen, in virtue of their similarity to those he has seen' (*Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, rule 14; this passage was first brought to our attention by B. L. Mijuscovic). For an apparently contrasting opinion, see Locke, *Essay* 2.2.2. For Newton's suggestion that between the 'original or primary Colours' there are 'intermediate Colours in a continued Series' or 'an indefinite Variety of intermediate Gradations', see his 'New Theory about Light and Colours' (originally 'Letter to Henry Oldenberg'), 131–2; we owe this reference to Eric Schliesser, 'Hume's Missing Shade of Blue Reconsidered', 165.

10.20–1 **instance is so particular...does not merit...we shou'd alter our general maxim]** The relevant principle, that a single counter-instance does not overturn a well-formed 'general maxim', is found in Rohault: 'To prevent any Scruples that may afterwards arise, we must consider, that, if our Conjecture be otherwise well grounded, it does not lose its Probability, because we cannot upon the Spot explain by it a Property, which appears from some new Experiment, or which we did not before think of: For it is one Thing to know certainly, that a Conjecture is contrary to Experience; and another Thing, not to see how it agrees to it' (*System* 1.3.6). See also Berkeley, *New Theory of Vision* 29, citing Barrow's optical lectures, and, for a different perspective, Boyle, *Experimental History of Colours* 3 [675]). For Newton's later but better-known version of a principle regarding competing hypotheses, see the last of his four 'Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy' (*Principia*, 2: 398, 400).

- 1.1.1.12 10.34–5 **so much noise...when it has been disputed whether there be any innate ideas]** Locke's well-known attack on innate ideas or principles (see his *Essay* 1.2–4) produced 'noise' of the sort Hume mentions. For a historical sketch, see Yolton, *John Locke and the Way of Ideas*, 26–71. Prior to Locke, Malebranche argued

that the hypothesis of innate ideas is redundant, that a simpler explanation can be given of the relevant phenomena (*Search* 3.2.4 [326–7]). Watts discussed the sense in which ideas, truths, and rules are innate, and noted that Locke at *Essay* 1.3.3 grants that there are such '*innate practical Principles*' as the desire of happiness (*Philosophical Essays* 4.5 [112–13]; cf. 4.1–4). See also *Abs.* 6; *EHU* 2.9 n. 1.

1.1.2 *Division of the subject*

- 1.1.2.1 11.16–18 **examination of our sensations... shall not at present be enter'd upon]** Locke placed a similar restriction on his work: 'I shall not at present meddle with the Physical Considerations of the Mind... or by what Motions of our Spirits, or Alterations of our Bodies, we come to have any Sensation by our Organs, or any *Ideas* in our Understandings; and whether those *Ideas* do in their Formation, any, or all of them, depend on Matter, or no' (*Essay* 1.1.2; cf. 2.8.4, 22; 2.21.73). For attempts to provide physical or physiological accounts of sensations, see Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 1.12, 35–6; Hobbes, *Leviathan* 1.1; Malebranche, *Search* 1.10 [48–53]. See also 1.2.5.26, 2.1.1.2.

1.1.3 *Of the ideas of the memory and imagination*

- 1.1.3.1 11.35 **faint and languid]** Collier had used these terms in a similar way, saying that when a man supposes he sees a centaur, we do not typically call this '*seeing*, but *imagining*, because of the *Faint* and *Languid* Manner after which he seeth it' (*Clavis universalis* 1.1.1 [17]). See also Berkeley, *Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 235]); and above, ann. 7.2. n. 3 **Part 3. Sect. 5]** See 1.3.5.3–6.
- 1.1.3.2 12.5–6 **imagination is not restrain'd... original impressions]** The liberty of the imagination was widely acclaimed. Bacon said that 'the Imagination... being not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined, and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things' (*Advancement of Learning*, 186); Watts, that 'if the Ideas are varied, enlarged, diminished, multiplied, or joined and mingled in Forms and Qualities different from what we had in our first Perceptions of them, this is called *Imagination*, or the Power of *Fancy*' (*Philosophical Essays* 3.13; cf. *Logic* 1.3.1). See also Addison, *Spectator* 416. Locke attributed the ability to reorder ideas to the understanding (*Essay* 2.2.2); Berkeley to the will (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 235]). See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, Preface [pp. xii–xiii]; ¶4 of this section, 1.3.7.7 (a paragraph first published in the Appendix to Vol. 3), App. 2; *Abs.* 35; *EHU* 2.4–6; 5.10, 12.

*Of the connexion or association of ideas*

- 1.1.4 12.title **association of ideas]** By 1739 suggestions that ideas either associate or come to be associated were commonplace. Hobbes, considering the 'Train of thoughts', said that when 'a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, his next thought after, is not altogether so casual as it seems to be. Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently' (*Leviathan* 1.3 ¶¶1–2). Locke gave currency to the phrase when he

added a chapter, 'Of the Association of Ideas', to the 4th edn. of his *Essay*. He there said: 'Some of our *Ideas* have a natural Correspondence and Connexion one with another' (*Essay* 2.33.5). Berkeley, without using the phrase 'association of ideas', said that 'the mind has by constant experience found the different sensations corresponding to the different dispositions of the eyes, to be attended each with a different degree of distance in the object; there has grown an habitual or customary connexion between those two sorts of ideas, so that the mind no sooner perceives the sensation arising from the different turn it gives the eyes, in order to bring the pupils nearer or farther asunder, but it withal perceives the different idea of distance which was wont to be connected with that sensation' (*New Theory of Vision* 17). Brightland, in a wide-ranging textbook first published c.1710, claimed that 'Every *Idea*, consider'd in a certain manner, may be the Foundation of a *Relation*, that is, may lead us by some Property of its own to the Consideration of some other *Idea*' (*Grammar of the English Tongue*, 198).

Malebranche described and explained aspects of the association of ideas. The nonsense (e.g., 'frightening tales') told to children was a common source of such associations. These tales, focusing as they do on 'sense-perceptible things' are 'the seeds of all [children's] weaknesses, such as their extravagant fears, their ridiculous superstitions, and similar defects' (*Search* 2.1.8.1 [127]; cf. 2.3.6.1 [192]). Locke also noted that certain sets of ideas have come to be inseparably connected or related 'wholly owing to Chance or Custom', so that no sooner does one of them come 'into the Understanding but its Associate appears with it; and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole gang always inseparable shew themselves together' (*Essay* 2.33.5). Associations of this second sort, because they are seen as a pregnant source of error and conflict, receive the bulk of Locke's attention in the *Essay* and also in his *Conduct of the Understanding* (sect. 39, 'Association'). Some later writers repeated this concern; see, e.g., Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Association'; E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 45–6.

Hutcheson suggested that '*Associations of Ideas*' may produce new emotional effects: they cause to be pleasant or disagreeable objects that 'are not naturally apt' to be so (*Inquiry* 1.6.3). See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Beauty', 'Deformity'. Hutcheson also said that we have a '*Disposition* in our Nature to associate any *Ideas* together for the future, which once presented themselves jointly', and that, among other things, 'all our *Language* and much of our *Memory* depends on' this disposition (*Essay* 1.1.2). Gay, criticizing Hutcheson, suggested that some of our less attractive passions may be traced to the association of ideas (*Dissertation*, pp. xxxii–xxxiii). See also ann. 262.12, ¶2.

At *Abs.* 35 Hume says that any claim he has to originality rests on the *use* he has made of the principle of the association of ideas. *EHU* 3, which has the same title as this section, repeats and (in editions published from 1748 to 1772) elaborates some of what is said in 1.1.4.

1.1.4.1 12.39 **already excluded**] See 1.1.3.2, 4.

1.1.4.2 13.13–14 **as they lie contiguous to each other**] Malebranche argued that certain ideas come to be associated with certain brain traces because the two kinds of

phenomenon were once experienced at the same *time*; see *Search* 2.1.5.1 [103]. Locke illustrated the similar effects of contiguity of place; see *Essay* 2.33.12.

13.17 **occasion afterwards**] See 1.3.2–8, 14–15.

13.18–20 **no relation...produces a stronger connexion...than...cause and effect**] Locke suggested that cause and effect 'so cements...two *Ideas* together' as to make 'them almost one' (*Essay* 2.33.11).

1.1.4.6 14.13 **ATTRACTION**] Although his physics caused the term *attraction* to be closely associated with gravitation, Newton himself used this term in a broader sense: 'What I call Attraction may be perform'd by impulse, or by some other means unknown to me. I use that Word here to signify only in general any Force by which Bodies tend towards one another, whatsoever be the Cause' (Newton, *Opticks* 3.1, qu. 31 [376]). See also Keill, *Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 1 [4]; Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, 'Attraction'.

14.16–17 **causes...which I pretend not to explain**] See Intro. 9; ann. 5.42; compare *EHU* 3.2.

#### 1.1.5 *Of relations*

1.1.5.1 14.32–3 **word relation is commonly us'd in two senses...different from each other**] Some of Hume's predecessors distinguished *natural relations* from those of a second kind, which they styled *arbitrary* or *voluntary relations*, but with a different result. Whereas Hume counts as natural those *relations of ideas* that result from the involuntary operation of the principles of association, and as *philosophical* those resulting from an arbitrary or voluntary decision to compare ideas, his predecessors typically focused on the *relations of things* themselves, and then distinguished between what they saw to be the natural or real relations of particular things (e.g., of father and son) and a contrasting voluntary relation (e.g., of husband and wife). See Locke, *Essay* 2.12.7, 2.25.2, 2.28.2; Lee, *Anti-Scepticism* 2.28; Watts, *Brief Scheme of Ontology* 1, 7; Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, 'Relation', 'Association', 'Comparison'. Le Grand suggested a distinction between natural and artificial logics which vaguely resembles Hume's distinction between natural and philosophical relations; see *Entire Body of Philosophy*, 3.

14.35 **above-explain'd**] See 1.1.4. Relations are also the topic of 1.3.1–2; see also *EHU* 4.1–2.

14.35–6 **upon the arbitrary union of two ideas...we may think proper to compare them**] The mind's ability to compare and contrast ideas at will had been noted by, for example, Hutcheson, who said: 'The Mind has a Power of *compounding* Ideas, which were receiv'd separately; of *comparing* their Objects by means of the Ideas, and of observing their *Relations* and *Proportions*' (*Inquiry* 1.1.3). See also Locke, *Essay* 2.25.1; Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, 'Relation'.

14.38–9 **relation...only in philosophy...any particular subject of comparison**] 'Comparison of *Ideas*', Chambers said, is 'an Act of the Mind, whereby it *compares* its



Ideas one with another, in respect of Extent, Degree, Time, Place, or any other Circumstances. This Operation of the Mind is the Ground of *Relations*' (*Cyclopaedia*, 'Comparison'; cf. 'Relation').

14.39–40 **distance will be allow'd by philosophers to be a true relation]** Locke said that 'Space considered barely in length between any two Beings, without considering any thing else between them, is called *Distance*', and went on to speak of the 'relation of Distance' (*Essay* 2.13.3, 7). Colliber described distance as 'a Relative Idea of Space and Extension consider'd as a Line between Two Separate Points' (*Two Discourses concerning Space and Duration* 1 [212]).

1.1.5.2 15.6 **seven general heads]** Hume's list of philosophical relations differs from any we have found elsewhere, but Locke had suggested some of the seven types. He examined closely the relations of 'Cause and Effect', 'Time and Place', and 'Identity and Diversity'. Elsewhere Locke listed the four forms that the agreement or disagreement of ideas may take: 'Identity, or Diversity...Relation...Co-existence, or necessary connexion...Real Existence' (*Essay* 2.26–7; 4.1.3). For Malebranche on relations, see ann. 15.27.

1.1.5.4 15.19 **shall find...afterwards]** See 1.4.6.

1.1.5.7 15.27–8 **quality in common, the degrees...form a fifth species of relation]** Both Malebranche and Locke were interested in relations of this 'fifth species'. The former, speaking of 'the relation between green and red...or even between violet and violet', said that we 'sense that one is darker or more brilliant than the other, but...[are] unable to discover clearly their relations' (*Elucidations* 11 [636]). The latter gave such relations a name: 'Relations ["Whiter, Sweeter, Bigger, Equal, More, etc."] depending on the Equality and Excess of the same simple *Idea*, in several Subjects, may be called...*Proportional*', then later said that such differences are 'counted by degrees, and not quantity', and that 'we cannot demonstrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of *Whiteness*' (*Essay* 2.28.1; 4.2.11, 13). See also *DNR* 12.6–7.

1.1.5.9 15.41–2 **explain'd afterwards]** See 1.3.6.3–4, 7; 1.3.9.2–3, 10–18.

1.1.5.10 16.1–2 **first is call'd a difference of number; the other of kind]** See also 1.4.2.26–9, 1.4.6.6–13.

### 1.1.6 *Of modes and substances*

1.1.6.1 16.3–4 **philosophers, who found so much...on the distinction of substance and accident]** Many philosophers had made much of the distinction between substance and accident. Consequently, Hume may refer here to the Aristotelians and the Scholastics, to Descartes and the Cartesians, to Spinoza, and even to de Vries, *Ontologia*, the textbook used by Colin Drummond with whom Hume first studied metaphysics (see Stewart, 'Hume's Intellectual Development', 16). Criticism of this vocabulary was also widespread. Locke spoke dismissively of 'those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two Syllables, *Substance*', and said that '*Substance and Accidents* [are] of little use in Philosophy' (*Essay* 2.13.18, 20 title; cf. 2.23.1–6, 37). See also Hobbes, *Objections and Replies* 3 [AT 7: 185]; Gassendi, *Objections and Replies* 5

[AT 7: 285–6]; Malebranche, *Elucidations* 15 [658]. Watts was unconvinced by this criticism and argued that 'in the main' there is 'no sufficient Reason why we may not content ourselves with the Notion and Description of *Substance*... which the Schools give us' (*Philosophical Essays* 2.1). See also 1.4.3.5–7; ann. 146.25; *Abs.* 7.

- 1.1.6.2 16.16–18 **idea of a substance... collection of simple ideas... united... name assign'd]** Hume here appears to follow Locke, who said: 'For having no other Knowledge of any Substance, but of the simple *Ideas*, that are united in it; and observing several particular Things to agree with others, in several of those simple *Ideas*, we make that collection our specifick *Idea*, and give it a general name; that in recording our Thoughts and in our Discourse with others, we may in one short word, design all the Individuals that agree in that complex *Idea*, without enumerating the simple *Ideas*, that make it up' (*Essay* 3.6.30). Hume later wrote to Kames: 'As to the Idea of Substance, I must own, that as it has no Access to the Mind by any of our Senses or Feelings, it has always appear'd to me to be nothing but an imaginary Center of Union amongst the different & variable Qualitys that are to be found in every Piece of Matter' (letter of 24 July 1746, *New Letters*, 21). See also Hobbes, *Leviathan* 3.34 ¶2; Berkeley, *Principles* 1.1; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 1.1.4; and Hume, *Abs.* 28.

- 1.1.6.2 16.20–1 **qualities, which form a substance... refer'd to an unknown something]** Locke had famously said that we 'signify nothing by the word *Substance*, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what; (*i.e.* of some thing whereof we have no particular distinct positive) *Idea*, which we take to be the *substratum*, or support, of those *Ideas* we do know' (*Essay* 1.4.18; cf. 2.23.2). See also *EHU* 12.16. For criticism of this account, see Berkeley, *Principles* 1.16–17; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 2.1.

16.22 **fiction]** Several of Hume's philosophical predecessors used the term *fiction*, and also *fiction of the mind* (for the latter, see 1.2.4.24) to designate mental constructions lacking any known, objective reference or archetype. Hobbes, for example, said that the 'composition' of a golden mountain is an example of 'that which we commonly call FICTION of the mind' (*Elements of Law* 1.3.4; cf. *Leviathan* 1.2 ¶4, 1.3 ¶7). E. Law described a 'Fiction of the Mind' as a perception or idea for which there is no 'proper Archetype or objective Reality' (*Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 11). Others discussing the term include Malebranche, *Search* 5.7 [383], *Elucidations* 15 [659]; Locke, *Essay* 4.4.4, 9; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues*, Preface. See also, e.g., 1.2.3.9; 1.2.5.23; 1.3.7.7; 1.3.9.3, 6; 1.3.10.9; 1.4.3.1; 3.2.2.14; anns. 33.13, n. 29 (106), 169.11; *EHU* 2.5, 5.10–13. On poetic fictions, see 1.3.10.5–6, 10–11.

16.27–9 **idea of gold... dissolubility in aqua regia... suppose it to belong to the substance]** This discussion of the idea of gold, the discovery of its solubility in *aqua regia*, and the reference of its several qualities to some substance, follows closely Locke, *Essay* 3.10.19. See also Boyle, 'Origin of Forms and Qualities', 24.

1.1.7 *Of abstract ideas*

- 1.1.7.1 17.1 and n. 4 **material question... concerning abstract or general ideas]** Berkeley's arguments to show that our abstract or general ideas are (as Hume says)

'nothing but particular ones, annex'd to a certain term' were set out most fully in his *Principles*, Intro. 6–21; cf. *New Theory of Vision* 122–5, 130. See also *LG* 29; *EHU* 12.20 n. 34. Berkeley presented his view as a challenge to that of Locke. The latter had said that 'general *Ideas* are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind' formed only after much effort: 'For example, Does it not require some pains and skill to form the *general Idea* of a *Triangle*... for it must be neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalennon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist; an *Idea* wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent *Ideas* are put together (*Essay* 4.7.9). Chambers directed attention to this disagreement by suggesting that Berkeley had 'gone a good way towards overturning' what Hume calls the 'receiv'd opinion', and, as a result, 'towards setting our Philosophy on a new footing' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Abstraction'). For other relevant discussions of abstract ideas, see Gassendi, *Institutio logica* 1.4, 8; Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 1.1.5; Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 2.11 [110]; Lee, *Anti-Scepticism*, Preface, 2.11.6–7; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 3.16.

**17.8 Republic of Letters]** A phrase, given added currency by Bayle's *Nouvelles de la république des lettres* (first issue, March 1684), denoting that informal collection of individuals and their conversations and writings, constituting, as Hume writes, 'the learned world' (1.3.14.6). For additional background, see Daston, 'The Ideal and Reality of the Republic of Letters'.

- 1.1.7.2 **17.18–20 esteem'd absurd to defend...an infinite capacity in the mind]** Those arguing that the limited capacity of the human mind makes it incapable of (as Hume puts it) 'representing at once all possible sizes and all possible qualities' included Arnauld and Nicole, who said: 'Because of its small scope, the mind cannot perfectly understand things that are even slightly composite unless it considers them a part at a time... This is generally called knowing by abstraction' (*Logic* 1.5); and Locke, who said that 'it is beyond the Power of humane Capacity to frame and retain distinct *Ideas* of all the particular Things we meet with' (*Essay* 3.3.2). On the limits of the mind, see also ann. 23.13.
- 1.1.7.3 **17.30 have observ'd]** See 1.1.3.4.
- 1.1.7.4 **18.7–9 confest, that no object can appear...without being determin'd in its degrees both of quantity and quality]** That *ideas* are, at least initially, singular was granted by both Gassendi and Locke. The former said that, because 'all the things...in the world...able to strike the senses are singulars...the ideas which come from them into the mind...can only be singular' (*Institutio logica* 1.4). Locke said that 'the *Ideas first* in the Mind, 'tis evident, are those of particular Things' (*Essay* 4.7.9). See also *EHU* 12.15.
- 1.1.7.6 **18.23–4 principle generally receiv'd...every thing in nature is individual]** Those who affirmed that every existing *thing* is individual include Malebranche: 'every creature is a particular being' (*Search* 3.2.6 [232]); Locke: 'all things that exist

are only particulars' (*Essay* 3.3.6); and Berkeley: 'it is an universally received maxim, that *every thing which exists, is particular*' (*Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 192]).

1.1.7.7 18.39–40 **propos'd to explain**] See ¶1 of this section.

n. 5.1–3 (18) **different simple ideas ... in which they differ**] Prior to adding this note in the Appendix, Hume wrote to Hutcheson on the topic; for his comment, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 4.

19.1 **we apply the same name to all of them**] Locke said that 'Words become general, by being made the signs of general *Ideas*' (*Essay* 3.3.6; cf. 3.5.10); Berkeley that, because 'there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general name', such names can signify 'a great number of particular ideas' (*Principles*, Intro. 18).

1.1.7.12 20.30 **decimals**] tenth parts.

1.1.7.16 21.23 **have propos'd**] See ¶2 of this section.

21.25 **already prov'd**] See ¶¶2–6 of this section.

1.1.7.17 21.32–3 **distinction of reason ... so much talk'd of ... so little understood, in the schools**] Bayle said that the 'school-men' resorted to 'the distinction between a mental and a real separation' in order to distinguish colour from the coloured subject. He dismissed this scholastic distinction as 'meer illusion' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [1] [5: 617ab]). Earlier, Arnauld and Nicole supposed distinctions of reason to be a 'third way of conceiving things by abstraction', a way that 'takes place when, in the case of a single thing having different attributes, we think of one attribute without the other even though they differ only by a distinction of reason' (*Logic* 1.5). On distinctions of reason, see also Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* 1.60–3, 2.8; Spinoza, 'Appendix containing Metaphysical Thoughts' 2.5, in *Descartes' Principles*; Berkeley, *Principles*, Intro. 10; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Distinction'; *THN* 1.2.6.6, 1.4.5.27.

21.35 **above-explain'd**] See 1.1.3.4, 1.1.4.1, and ¶3 of this section.

1.1.7.18 22.1 **globe of white marble**] Martin used a similar example, saying that we may, by '*Precisive* abstraction', distinguish two things that cannot be separated (e.g., a mode from a substance), as when we 'abstractedly consider as a *Quality*' the '*round Shape* of a *Globe*' and then find this quality in other objects (*Bibliotheca Technologica*, 'Metaphysics' [228–9]).

## 1.2 *Of the ideas of space and time*

23.title *ideas of space and time*] Philosophical accounts of space and time date from antiquity. For detailed historical background, see Sorabji, *Time, Creation and the Continuum* and *Matter, Space and Motion*; and Grant, *Much Ado About Nothing*, as well as the studies listed in the extensive bibliographies of these works. For an account

of the early modern debate over the structure of matter, whether infinitely divisible or not, see Holden, *The Architecture of Matter*. Helpful but less synoptic historical background is found in Furley, 'Epicurus and David Hume', in *Two Studies in the Greek Atomists*; and R. Wood, Introduction to Wodeham, *Tractatus de Indivisibilibus*.

For nearly contemporary accounts of the issues Hume encountered, Bayle is essential reading. First, Bayle was himself a participant in the extensive seventeenth-century debate about the nature of space, time, and the vacuum or void, and, while presenting the views of ancient philosophers on these topics, he also engagingly outlined the contemporary debate in lengthy, discursive notes in his *Dictionary* (see esp. 'Leucippus', 'Zeno of Elea', and 'Zeno the Epicurean') and in his *Système abrégé de philosophie* (3.2.2–5). In addition, the marginal references in the *Dictionary* provided Bayle's readers with a useful guide to then recent literature on the topic. Along with references to works by such well-known authors as Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Pascal, and Newton, there are others to works by those now of lesser renown—Arnauld, Huet, Gassendi, Malebranche, Nicole, Rohault, and Suárez, for example—as well as those now seldom discussed—Arriaga, Clavius, de Volder, and Hartsoeker, for example. As Laird, Kemp Smith, and others have noted, Hume in *Treatise* 1.2 makes substantial use of Bayle's discussions, to the point of sometimes seeming merely to paraphrase them.

Berkeley's views on these issues began to appear only in 1709, and consequently he is not included in Bayle's lists. But Berkeley's works, especially his *New Theory of Vision* and *Principles*, are essential background to the *Treatise* account of space and time; for further discussion, see Raynor, "'Minima sensibilia" in Berkeley and Hume'; Ayers, 'Berkeley and Hume: a Question of Influence'. Chambers' *Cyclopædia*, first published in 1728, is also a valuable aid to an appreciation of Hume's positions on space and time or the ideas thereof (see, e.g., 'Divisibility', 'Number', 'Space', 'Time', and 'Vacuum'), while E. Law's *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity* reprises debates about space and time among early eighteenth-century British philosophers.

1.2.1 *Of the infinite divisibility of our ideas of space and time*

- 1.2.1.1 23.1–11 **paradox...embrac'd by philosophers...doctrine of infinite divisibility**] The view Hume finds paradoxical had been described by Bayle: the 'divisibility *in infinitum* [of matter] is an opinion embraced by Aristotle, and almost all the professors of Philosophy, in all universities for several ages. Not that they understand it, or can answer the objection it is liable to; but because having clearly apprehended the impossibility of either Mathematical or Physical points, they found no other course but this to take' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea', [G] [5: 610b]). Berkeley agreed that the opinion was widely and justly held: 'the infinite divisibility of matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who on the received principles demonstrate it beyond all exception' (*Principles* 1.47). Other philosophers holding the view include Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 4.1 [231]; Malebranche, *Search* 1.6.1 [26]; Rohault, *System* 1.9. Some of those holding the contrary view are cited in ann. 25.1. See also *Abs.* 29; *EHU* 12.17–20; *DNR* 1.3.

1.2.1.2 23.13–14 **universally allow'd...mind is limited...can never attain...adequate conception of infinity**] The mind's finitude and the consequences thereof were a recurring theme of the period. Arnauld and Nicole said, 'Because the mind is finite, it gets lost in and is dazzled by infinity' (*Logic* 4.1 [230]); Hooke, that 'We know not the Limits of Quantity, Matter, and Body as to its Divisibility or Extension, no Imagination can comprehend the *Maximum* or the *Minimum Nature*, our Faculties are finite and limited' ('Present State of Natural Philosophy', 66). See also Descartes, *Meditations* 3 [AT 7: 47–50], *Principles of Philosophy* 3.2; Boyle, 'Discourse of Things above Reason', 215–16; Rohault, *System* 1.21.3; Malebranche, *Search* 2.3.1.4 [163], 3.1.2.1 [203], 3.2.10 [253]; Locke, *Essay* 2.17.15, 21 and *Examination of Malebranche* 45; Keill, *Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 4 [33]; Addison, *Spectator* 420; Berkeley, *Principles*, Intro. 4, 1.47; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 12.3; and Hume, *Abs.* 27; *EHU* 1.6, 7.24, 12.25; *DNR* 1.3.

23.19–20 **the idea, which we form of any finite quality**] We have previously suggested that 'quality' should be emended to 'quantity' on the grounds that the context indicates that the topic here is finite 'quantity' (see D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton, 'Substantive Differences between Two Texts of Hume's *Treatise*', 250). Hume goes on in the next paragraph to focus on our ideas of fractional parts or quantities (thousandths and ten thousandths) of grains of sand, and to insist that these ideas, although nominally different, are indistinguishable. The remaining paragraphs of this section (1.2.1) discuss the parts of entities (ink spots, mites), but not the qualities of these entities. The phrase 'finite quantity' is repeated at 34.9 (1.2.4.14). At 39.32 (1.2.4.32) we are told that 'no idea of quantity is infinitely divisible'. There are no relevantly similar discussions of finite qualities. On the other hand, as Hume does speak of '*degrees in any quality*' (1.3.1.1–2; see also 1.1.5.7) and of 'a real quality of extension' that may be compounded (1.2.2.2; see also 1.4.5.15), the grounds for accepting the copy-text reading may be stronger than those in favour of emendation, and thus we have restored the original reading.

1.2.1.3 23.25 **imagination reaches a minimum**] The view that perception has limits, reaching an indivisible minimum, has roots in ancient atomism. Epicurus said: 'We must conceive that the minimum perceptible . . . does not permit the distinguishing of parts [within itself]' ('Letter to Herodotus' 58). Berkeley came to the same conclusion, saying that 'sensible extension is not infinitely divisible. There is a *Minimum Tangible*, and a *Minimum Visible*, beyond which sense cannot perceive', and that 'for any object to contain several distinct visible parts, and at the same time to be a *minimum visibile*, is a manifest contradiction' (*New Theory of Vision* 54, 81; cf. *Principles* 1.127–32). Hooke not only agreed, but explained the phenomenon: 'the Sensation of a Man's Sight is limited to a certain bigness, less than which none can distinguish; which, as I have elsewhere shewed [see ann. 24.2], is not less than what is comprised within about half a Minute of a Degree, at most, of the Orbicular Part of the bottom of the Eye; which in all probability is from the bigness of the smallest sensible Part receiving the Image, or of the Optick Nerve that is capable

of conveying a distinct Motion or Sensation to the Brain, as *Des Cartes* has very ingeniously explained' ('Lectures of Light', 135; for more on Descartes's explanation, see ann. 77.37). See also Malebranche, *Search* 1.6.1 [27–8]; Locke, *Essay* 2.15.9, 2.29.16, 4.17.10; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Point, *Punctum*, in Physicks'.

23.28–31 **ten thousandth part of a grain of sand...the images...nothing different from each other]** Hume appears to follow Locke, who said 'In Matter, we have no clear *Ideas* of the smallness of Parts, much beyond the smallest, that occur to any of our Senses... For I ask any one, Whether taking the smallest Atom of Dust he ever saw, he has any distinct *Idea* (bating still the Number, which concerns not Extension) betwixt the 100 000, and the 1000 000 part of it' (*Essay* 2.29.16). On grains of sand or wheat or minute seeds and infinite divisibility, see also, e.g., Rohault, *System* 1.21.2; Keill, *Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 5 [59–62].

23.33 **what is distinguishable is separable]** See 1.1.3.4, 1.1.4.1, 1.1.7.3.

- 1.2.1.4 24.2–3 **Put a spot of ink upon paper...at last you lose sight of it]** Hume proposes an experiment resembling that by which Hooke measured the angle subtended by a minimum visible. Arguing against a method of mapping the stars by means of the naked eye, Hooke carried out an experiment using a paper on which were drawn alternating black and white strips one inch wide and four to five inches long. Then, he said, let a person 'expose this Paper against a Wall open to the light, and if it may be so that the Sun may shine on it, and removing himself backwards for the space of 287  $\frac{1}{3}$  feet, let him try whether he can distinguish it, and number the dark and light spaces, and if his eyes be so good that he can, then let him still go further backwards and backwards from the same, till he finds his eyes unable any longer to distinguish those Divisions, there let him make a stand, and measure the distance from his eye to the aforesaid Paper, and try by calculation under what Angle each of those black and white spaces appears to his eye, for by that means it will be manifest how small an Angle his eye is capable of distinguishing, and beyond which it cannot reach.' Hooke concluded that the angle in question would be 30" or one-half minute (*Animadversions* 8). We owe this reference to Rolf George, 'James Jurin Awakens Hume', 3. Two works by Jurin, *Geometry No Friend to Infidelity* and *Minute Mathematician*, as well as Berkeley's *Analyst* and his *Defence of Free-Thinking in Mathematics*, may have been in one of the bound volumes of pamphlets in the Hume library. See Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 60–1. Hume's experiment is also reminiscent of the one that Mariotte used to demonstrate the existence of the blind spot in each eye; *Nouvelle Découverte*, 496–7. An account of this experiment and discovery is also found in Hooke's 'Lectures of Light', 123.

24.8–12 **microscope or telescope...advances to a minimum, what was formerly imperceptible]** Berkeley, satisfied that the minimum visible is always of a uniform size, then argued that the microscope (or 'microscopical eyes') would in this respect produce nothing different—would in effect only enlarge to a minimum that which was before imperceptible. See his *New Theory of Vision* 80–6.

1.2.1.5 24.25–7 **we can form ideas... the smallest atom... of an insect a thousand times less than a mite]** By the mid-seventeenth century, microscopic study of the mite revealed that, small as it may be, it has even smaller parts. Rohault concluded that the smallness of these parts presented a challenge which the human imagination could not meet: 'our Imagination is unable to comprehend or represent the extreme Smallness of the least Parts of which a Mite is composed' (*System* 1.21.3). Pascal's well-known discussion of the mite, and of how the last, least part of nature affords an entry point to new and infinitely small universes complete in every detail, including mites in all their parts, was also available to Hume, and likely read by him (*Port-Royal Pensées*, 171–2 [B72; Kr199]). The mite reappeared often in the philosophical literature of the period; see, e.g., Malebranche, *Search* 1.6.1 [25–6]; Berkeley, *New Theory of Vision* 80–1, 86; Addison, *Spectator* 420. For a contemporary illustration, see Hooke, *Micrographia*, Obs. 55.

24.26 **atom]** An atom was said to be 'a Corpuscle, or Part, or Particle of Matter so minute or small as to be indivisible' (Bailey, *Dictionarium Britannicum*). See also ann. 26.7 on indivisible moments.

24.26 **animal spirits]** On this topic, see ann. 44.28.

24.31–2 **system of infinite divisibility... of indivisible parts or atoms]** See ann. 25.1.

1.2.2 *Of the infinite divisibility of space and time*

1.2.2.1 24.34–41 **Wherever ideas are adequate... whatever appears impossible... must be really impossible]** The relevant conception of *adequate idea* appears to be that found in Locke, who said that those ideas he called 'Adequate... perfectly represent those Archetypes, which the Mind supposes them taken from' (*Essay* 2.31.1). See also Gassendi, *Institutio logica* 1.1. Locke's view of adequate ideas is treated as standard by Chambers, who says: 'Adequate Ideas, or Notions, are such Images or Conceptions of an Object, as perfectly represent it, or answer to all the Parts and Properties of it' (*Cyclopaedia*, 'Adequate'). Hume's confidence in adequate ideas has parallels in that of two contemporaries also concerned with the nature of space and time. Colliber argued that what is impossible in idea (e.g., an 'Absolute Infinity') is also impossible in nature: 'Not that Our Ideas are the Adequate Measures of Reality; but because what is Inconsistent in it's Self can't but be Impossible both in Idea and Reality' (*Impartial Enquiry*, 156). E. Law, although he granted that the 'clear intuitive Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of two or more Ideas' ('Knowledge') does not 'inform us that there really are or may be external things correspondent to such our Ideas', was none the less satisfied that such perception 'does indeed assure us, that if there are such things as our Ideas represent, they must be likewise so related, and the same Consequences will follow in Fact, that do in Theory' (*Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 6). See also ann. 31.15.

1.2.2.2 25.1–2 **Every thing capable of being infinitely divided contains an infinite number of parts]** Hume's language is reminiscent of that of Bayle, who, along with



many others, argued that the view, attributed to Aristotle, that any given length of the continuum may be divided without end into smaller and smaller parts, is mistaken. Any given segment of extension or matter Bayle took to be made up of actual parts, of distinct, logically independent ontological units (*partes extra partes*, as some put it), as far forth as it is divisible, even if the Deity divided it to the last possible degree. That being the case, then, should any segment of matter be capable of infinite division, that segment must contain an infinite number of such parts. Or, as Bayle put it, 'if matter is divisible *in infinitum*, it actually contains an infinite number of parts, and is not therefore an infinite in power, but an infinite which really and actually exists' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [F][5: 609b]). The claim in question was an essential component of both ancient and early modern atomism. Charleton, a member of the Epicurean, Gassendist camp, took the 'Grand Base' of atomism to be the view that '*the Parts of no Physical Continuum or Magnitude, are subdivisible to Infinity*', and went on to say: '*If in a Finite Body, the number of Parts, into which it may be divided, be not Finite also; then must the Parts comprehended therein be really Infinite: and, upon Consequence, the whole Composition resulting from their Commixture, be really Infinite; which is repugnant to the supposition*' (that the body in question is finite) (*Physiologia* 2.2.1.1, 4). Hobbes, criticizing Zeno's arguments against motion, had also occasion to criticize the conclusion reached by Charleton. To be 'divided into infinite parts' said Hobbes, 'is nothing else but to be divided into as many parts as any man will. But it is not necessary that a line should have parts infinite in number, or be infinite, because I can divide and subdivide it as often as I please; for how many parts soever I make, yet their number is finite' (*Elements of Philosophy* 1.5.13). See also Aristotle, *Physics* 3.4–8; Digby, *Two Treatises* 1.2.3–8.

Chambers, summarizing the long-standing dispute about the divisibility of bodies, notes that the Epicureans, in contrast to the Peripatetics and Cartesians, suppose that the alleged infinite divisibility of matter is an absurdity, and deny that all bodies are divisible. The 'primary Corpuscles, or Atoms they hold perfectly insecable, and indivisible . . . a Body can only be divided into such Parts as it actually contains. But to suppose infinite Parts in the smallest Corpuscle, say they, is to suppose it infinitely extended: For infinite Parts placed externally to each other, as the Parts of Bodies doubtless are, must make an infinite Extension. They add, that there is a World of Difference between the *Divisibility* of Physical, and Mathematical Quantities. For every Mathematical Quantity, or Dimension, they grant, may be increas'd and diminish'd infinitely: But Physical Quantity' cannot be so increased or diminished (*Cyclopaedia*, 'Divisibility'). Those maintaining that there are ultimate, indivisible (insecable, indiscerptible, uncompounded) particles of matter include Epicurus (see Gassendi, 'Doctrine of Epicurus'); Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 1.547–55; H. More, *Immortality of the Soul*, Preface; Cudworth, *True Intellectual System* 1.5 [829]; Newton, *Principia* 3, rule 3 [2: 398–9]. Berkeley also argued 'no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible' (*Principles* 1.23; we owe this reference to Ayers, 'Berkeley and Hume: a Question of Influence', 307). Although Boyle appears to suppose that corpuscles have magnitude and are impenetrable and thus indivisible, his expressed intent was to avoid the use of

'arguments that are either grounded on, or suppose, indivisible corpuscles called *atoms*' ('Origin of Forms and Qualities', 7; cf. 41, 50). For further references and discussion, see Holden, *Architecture of Matter*.

25.11–17 **I then repeat this idea...the idea of extension must also become infinite]** Hume's account of the origin of his idea of infinite extension has substantial parallels in that of Locke: 'Every one, that has any *Idea* of any stated lengths of Space, as a Foot, finds, that he can repeat that *Idea*; and joining it to the former, make the *Idea* of two Foot; and by the addition of a third, three Foot; and so on, without ever coming to an end of his additions...he finds, that after he has...enlarged his *Idea*, as much as he pleases, he has no more reason to stop, nor is one jot nearer the end of such Addition, than he was at first setting out... This, I think, is the way, whereby the Mind gets the *Idea of infinite Space*' (*Essay* 2.17.3–4). Similar accounts are found in Gassendi, *Institutio logica* 1.3; *Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 295–6]; Mersenne, *Objections and Replies* 2 [AT 7: 123–4].

n. 6.1–2 (25) **objected to me...infinite divisibility...an infinite number of proportional not of aliquot parts]** Charleton explained that 'when a Physical Continuum is divided into two parts, and each of those parts is subdivided again into two more', and so on, or 'into 10 equal parts, and each of those into 10 more', and so on, then 'PROPORTIONAL' parts are produced. In contrast, if the same 'Continuum is divided into such parts, as being divers times repeated, are æquated to the whole', or into so many equal parts ('Miles, Furlongs, Fathoms, Feet, Digits, &c.') as seems useful to the person dividing, then 'ALIQUOTAL' parts are produced. In other words, each of the aliquotal parts constituting any determinate magnitude has itself a determinate magnitude. Each would be of the same determinate size, equal to some real segment of the whole. Consequently, no matter how small these parts might be, an infinite number of them would constitute an infinite magnitude. Charleton traced the objection Hume mentions to the Stoics, who claimed (he said) that a finite continuum with an infinite number of parts would not have infinite length because the parts in question are not aliquotal (determinately sized), but only proportional (relatively sized), quantities (*Physiologia* 2.2.1.2, 8). See also Bayle, *Système abrégé de philosophie* 3.2.2; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Aliquot Part'.

Who brought this well-known objection to Hume's attention is not known. One possibility is Benjamin Worster, who in the late 1730s gave public demonstrations of natural phenomena in rooms near the Rainbow Coffee House, where Hume was then living. Worster had put the case for proportional parts by saying, (a) 'All Matter is capable of being divided into Parts, that is, into Halves, Quarters, Tenths, Hundredth Parts, &c.'; (b) 'All Matter is capable of being divided for ever; otherwise we shall necessarily come at last to such Matter as cannot be divided at all, which is contrary' to (a); (c) 'By the infinite Divisibility of Matter, is not meant that there are contained an infinite Number of Particles of a determinative Bigness in any finite Quantity of Matter, how great soever. This is absolutely impossible. But the only Meaning is, that no Part of Matter can be conceived so small, but we may conceive a

smaller; to which purpose nothing else is necessary, but to double or treble, &c. the Denominator of the Fraction by which the Part is expressed. It is not therefore at all difficult to conceive how a very small Particle of Matter has as many Parts as a very large Body. On the contrary, it would be strange if it should be otherwise; for how can a Mountain have more Halves, Quarters, or Tenths, than a Mole-hill?' (*Principles of Natural Philosophy*, 3–4). E. Law anticipated an objection like that mentioned by Hume, saying that his arguments showing the absurdity of 'an *Infinite* made up of *Parts*' were not 'to be evaded by denying these finite Quantities are *aliquot or constituent Parts of these several Infinities*' (*Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 98, 100). The objection in question is posed by S. Clarke (see *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, props. 1, 3 [10–11, 60–1]).

- 1.2.2.3 n. 7 (25) **Mons. Malezieu**] Nicholas de Malezieu, author of *Elémens de géométrie*. The argument to which Hume refers is found in Book 9, in a section entitled 'Réflexions sur les incommensurables'. The text of this section is reproduced in part by Laird (*Hume's Philosophy*, 69–70), and in its entirety by N. K. Smith (*Philosophy of David Hume*, 340–2).

25.22–3 **existence in itself belongs only to unity, and is never applicable to number**] Hume follows closely Malezieu's formulation of this point: 'when I carefully consider the existence of things, I understand very clearly that existence pertains to units, and not to numbers' (*Elémens de géométrie* 9 [149]). See also ann. 25.34.

25.24–7 **Twenty men...absurd to suppose any number to exist, and yet deny the existence of unites**] Hume again follows Malezieu, who said: 'there could never be numbers if there were no units; there could not be twenty men if there were not one man' (*Elémens de géométrie* 9 [149]). See also Aristotle, *Physics* 3.7 (207<sup>b</sup>6–8); Leibniz, 'Monadology' 1–2; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Number'; and Hume, *DNR* 9.9.

25.28–9 **extension is always a number, according to the common sentiment of metaphysicians**] This may be an allusion to Locke, who said that 'our *Idea of Infinity*, even when applied to those [i.e. "*Expansion and Duration*"], seems to be nothing, but the *Infinity of Number*' (*Essay* 2.16.8).

25.34–5 **That term of unity is merely a fictitious denomination**] This claim was anticipated by Berkeley, who, having claimed it to be obvious that 'number is entirely a creature of the mind', then looked at certain items taken to be units ('one book, one page, one line'), and concluded that 'in each instance it is plain, the unit relates to some combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind' (*Principles* 1.12; cf. 1.120; *New Theory of Vision* 109).

- 1.2.2.4 26.3–5 **time...each of its parts succeeds another...none...can ever be co-existent**] That the parts of time cannot coexist was often asserted. Descartes said that 'the nature of time is such that its parts are not mutually dependent, and never coexist' (*Principles of Philosophy* 1.21). Bayle agreed, and explained the consequences of the position, saying that there is 'no part of time whatsoever, which can co-exist

with another; each must exist alone; each must begin to be, when the precedent ceaseth to be; and each must cease to be before the following can begin to exist. From whence it follows, that time is not divisible *in infinitum*, and that the successive duration of things is composed of moments, properly so called, each of which is simple and indivisible, perfectly distinct from time past and future, and contains no more than the present time' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [F] [5: 609a]). See also Locke, *Essay* 2.15.12; E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 78.

**26.5–6 1737 cannot concur with the present year 1738]** In 'My Own Life', Hume says that he 'came over to London in 1737' after having spent three years in France during which he composed the *Treatise* (*Letters*, 1: 2). In 1738 he was living in London and revising the text he had prepared in France; see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1.

**26.7–8 indivisible moments]** A variety of philosophers took 'moments' to be indivisible units of time. Fairfax described a moment as 'a now of time' and said that moments are indivisible or 'cleaveless' (*Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge*, 26). Locke said that the least portion of duration 'may be called a *Moment*, and is the time of one *Idea* in our Minds, in the train of their ordinary Succession there' (*Essay* 2.15.9; cf. 2.14.10). See also Bayle as quoted in ann. 26.3. Those who took the contrary view include Malebranche, who said that 'ultimately duration has no instants as bodies have no atoms' (*Search* 1.8.2 [38–9]), and Watts, who, although familiar with the atomist positions on moments and atoms, remained unconvinced. 'A Moment', he said, 'is called the least Part of Time: So an Atom is the least Part of Matter: But modern Philosophers suppose all Sort of Quantity to be infinitely divisible... and then there is properly no Atom, no Moment' (*Brief Scheme of Ontology* 12). See also Gassendi, *Syntagma* 2.1.2.7 [392].

1.2.2.5 **26.12–13 infinite divisibility of space implies that of time, as is evident from the nature of motion]** Bayle, summarizing Zeno's paradoxes of motion, linked the infinite divisibility of space and time. Zeno, he reported, claimed that for a moving body 'to run through one foot of matter... an infinite time would be necessary; for the spaces, which it is successively obliged to run through... being infinite in number, it is plain that they cannot be run through in less than an infinity of moments; unless it were pretended that the body which moves is in several places at the same time, which is false and impossible' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [F] [5: 609a]).

1.2.2.6 **26.19 calling a difficulty what pretends to be a demonstration]** Barrow granted that the infinite divisibility of the continuum is 'difficult to be understood', but went on to argue that, although 'we are not able to comprehend how this indefinite Division can be performed, yet we ought not therefore to doubt, but it may be performed; because we clearly perceive it to follow from the Nature of Matter, a Thing most manifestly known to us' (*Mathematical Lectures*, 162). S. Clarke also attempted to avoid criticism by granting that there are some 'difficulties' with his

view of infinite divisibility, and Collins objected to this move in much the same way that Hume does. For this exchange, see S. Clarke, *Works*, 2: 525; 3: 794, 814, 849–50, 855. See also Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 4.1 [231]; Malebranche, *Search* 3.1.2.2 [204]; E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 107–8.

- 1.2.2.7 26.31–3 **mathematicians ... say ... indivisible points ... liable to unanswerable objections**] One standard and allegedly unanswerable objection to the ‘doctrine of indivisible points’, i.e. to the hypothesis that space is constituted of indivisible mathematical points, was that made by Arnauld and Nicole: ‘Now taking two of these parts that are assumed to be indivisible, I ask whether they do or do not have any extension. If they have some extension, then they are divisible, and they have several parts. If they do not, they therefore have zero extension, and hence it is impossible for them to form an extension.’ Arguments to show that there cannot be such points are also offered (*Logic* 4.1 [231–2]). Bayle thought ‘a man of the meanest capacity may apprehend with the utmost evidence ... that several nothingnesses of extension joined together will never make an extension ... let us take it to be impossible ... that matter should be composed of them’ (*Dictionary*, ‘Zeno of Elea’, [G][5: 610b; cf. 611a]). See also Barrow, *Mathematical Lectures*, 149–50; Keill, *Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 3; Cartaud de la Villate, *Pensées critiques sur les mathématiques* 2.

- 1.2.2.8 26.37–9 **an establish'd maxim ... that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible**] Descartes said that ‘possible existence is contained in the concept or idea of everything that we clearly and distinctly understand’ (*Objections and Replies* 1 [AT 7: 116]; cf. *Objections and Replies* 2, axiom 10 [AT 7: 166]). Arnauld and Nicole repeated this view (*Logic* 4.7 [250]). See also ‘sGravesande, *Explanation of the Newtonian Philosophy*, quoted in ann. 40.24. E. Law, however, challenged the claim that ‘*Whatsoever is possible in Idea, is possible in itself*’ (*Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 5–6).

26.39–40 **We can form the idea of a golden mountain ... such a mountain may actually exist**] The ability to form an idea of a golden mountain, as the idea of something that could, but does not in fact exist, was often noted. See among others, Hobbes, *Elements of Law* 1.3.4, *Elements of Philosophy* 4.25.9; Gassendi, *Institutio logica* 1.3; Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 1.1–2 [28, 32]; Malebranche, *Search* 3.2.1.1 [217]; Crousaz, *New Treatise of the Art of Thinking*, 1: 13; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues* 2 [*Works*, 2: 224].

26.40–1 **We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley ... regard it as impossible**] Descartes said that he could not ‘think of a mountain without a valley’, and that ‘a mountain and a valley, whether they exist or not, are mutually inseparable’ (*Meditations* 5 [AT 7: 66–7]).

- 1.2.2.9 26.42–3 **we have an idea of extension; for otherwise why do we talk and reason concerning it**] E. Law also claimed that talking of a subject indicates that there is an idea of that subject: ‘In the first Place, with regard to the Idea of Space, ’tis confess’d that Men have some kind of Notions of it, otherwise there

would never have been so many tedious Disputes about it' (*Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 3). Hume has further thoughts on this claim at 1.2.5.2, 21–2; see also ann. 40.23.

**27.5–6 arguments . . . against the possibility of mathematical points are mere . . . quibbles]** Hume may have in mind the 'arguments' of such writers as H. More, who said a mathematical point is '*nothing else but pure Negation or Non-entity*' (*Immortality of the Soul*, Preface [3]); Cudworth, who said that such a point is merely a '*Mode of Conceiving*' (*True Intellectual System* 1.5 [825]); and Chambers, who said that a mathematical point is that 'which has no Parts, or is indivisible', and that such points are 'only conceived by the Imagination' despite being that with which 'all Quantity begins and ends' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Point'). For arguments purporting to show that space or extension cannot be constituted of such indivisible and unextended points, see anns. 26.31; 33.13; 34.14, 36.

1.2.3 *Of the other qualities of our ideas of space and time*

1.2.3.1 27.13–19 **No discovery . . . nature and composition]** These lines are repeated, with minor variation, in *Abs.* 7.

27.14 **above-mention'd]** See 1.1.1.7.

1.2.3.4 27.39–41 **idea of extension is . . . a copy of these colour'd points . . . the manner of their appearance]** Leibniz, after claiming to have 'demonstrated' that space itself 'is nothing else but an *Order* of the Existence of Things, observed as existing together', went on to suggest that our '*Notion of Space*' has an origin of the sort that Hume describes. We form this notion, Leibniz said, because men 'consider that many things exist at once, and they observe in them a certain *Order of Co-Existence*, according to which the Relation of one thing to another is more or less simple. This Order is their *Situation* or Distance' (*Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence* 5.29, 47). For alternative accounts of the origin of the idea of space, see Locke, *Essay* 2.4.3, 2.13.2, 2.17.3–4; Berkeley, *Principles* 116; *Of Motion* 53–7; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 1.7; E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 11–12.

1.2.3.6 28.18 **The idea of time, being deriv'd from the succession of our perceptions]** That the idea of time derives from the perceived succession of ideas or perceptions was widely asserted. See, e.g., Malebranche, *Search* 1.8.2 [38–9], 1.9.3 [44–5]; Locke, *Essay* 2.14.2–4; Bailey, *Dictionarium Britannicum*, 'Time'; Berkeley, *Principles* 1.98; *Three Dialogues* 2 [*Works*, 2: 190]; Addison, *Spectator* 94; Leibniz, *Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence* 3.6; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Time'; E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 82 ff.; Collier, *Two Discourses concerning Space and Duration* 2 [228]. For a variant on this view, see Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 1.459–63; for an alternative view, see ann. 29.42.

1.2.3.7 28.27–8 **A man in a sound sleep, or . . . occupy'd with one thought, is insensible of time]** Hume's claim resembles that made by Locke, *Essay* 2.14.4.

28.30–1 and n. 8 **remark'd by a great philosopher...our perceptions have certain bounds]** The 'great philosopher' is Locke, who said: 'There seem to be *certain Bounds to the quickness and slowness of the Succession of those Ideas one to another in our Minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten*' (*Essay* 2.14.9).

28.33–5 **wheel about a burning coal...an image of a circle of fire]** Newton described this experiment and suggested a cause of the visual effect: 'when a Coal of Fire moved nimbly in the circumference of a Circle, makes the whole circumference appear like a Circle of Fire; is it not because the Motions excited in the bottom of the Eye by the Rays of Light are of a lasting nature, and continue till the Coal of Fire in going round returns to its former place?' (*Opticks* 3.1, qu. 16). For variations on the experiment and explanations of the phenomenon, see Bacon, *New Organon* 2.46; Rohault, *System* 1.35.2; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Leucippus' [E] [3: 791b]; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Visible'. Locke (*Essay* 2.14.8) discusses the phenomenon more generally. For a brief discussion of these variations (Bacon's excepted), see Larivière and Lennon, 'The History and Significance of the Burning Coal Example'.

1.2.3.10 29.19 **maxims above-explain'd]** See 1.1.3.4, 1.1.7.3.

1.2.3.11 29.42–4 **idea of duration is applicable...to objects...unchangeable...the common opinion]** Gassendi argued that it is time itself that flows, that there is time independently of any change in objects or perceptions. He described time as 'an incorporeal fluid extension in which it is possible to designate the past, present, and future so that every object may have its time'. He also said that time 'flows by... whether we think about it or not... it elapses and has its before and after whether it is being measured or not', and that it is 'not something dependent upon motion or posterior to it, but is merely indicated by motion' (*Syntagma* 2.1.2.7 [391, 393, 396]). Newton said: 'It may be, that there is no such thing as an equable motion, whereby time may be accurately measured. All motions may be accelerated and retarded, but the flowing of absolute time is not liable to any change. The duration or perseverance of the existence of things remains the same, whether the motions are swift or slow, or none at all: and therefore this duration ought to be distinguished from what are only sensible measures thereof' (*Principia* 1, def. 8, schol. [1: 8]). For a brief survey of opinions about the nature of time, see Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Time'.

30.1–2 **idea of duration... can never be convey'd... by any thing steadfast and unchangeable]** This obvious implication of the view that the idea of time can only be derived from a succession of perceptions was succinctly stated by Colliber: 'had we but One Invariate Perception without any such Succession of Ideas in our Minds, we could have no such Notion as this of Duration, but That of Pure Existence only... We can have no Idea of an Unsuccessive Duration' (*Two Discourses concerning Space and Duration* 2 [228–9]). See also ann. 28.18.

n. 9 (30) **Sect. 5]** See 1.2.5.29.

1.2.3.15 30.29–30 **idea of space is convey'd to the mind by two senses, the sight and touch]** Locke claimed that 'we get the *Idea* of Space, both by our Sight, and Touch'

(*Essay* 2.13.2). For Berkeley's rejoinder, that 'there is no one self same numerical extension, perceived both by sight and touch', and that there is no idea of space or extension 'common to two senses', see his *New Theory of Vision* 121–2, 127; cf. *Theory of Vision Vindicated* 41.

30.37–8 **nothing but the idea of their colour or tangibility...can render them conceivable]** Berkeley claimed that we cannot 'frame an idea of a body extended and moved' unless we 'give it some colour or other sensible quality' (*Principles* 1.10). See also 1.4.4.8; ann. 150.14.

1.2.4 *Objections answer'd*

1.2.4.1 31.15–16 **infinite divisibility is utterly impossible and contradictory]** The atomists had long held that the infinite divisibility of bodies is inconceivable, and thus impossible. As Lucretius put it, 'since true reasoning protests...and denies that the mind can believe it [i.e infinite divisibility], you must yield and confess that there are things which no longer consist of any parts and are of the smallest possible nature'. Lucretius also claimed that from the fact that there are minimum visibles, 'you may deduce...that [even] in those things which you cannot perceive a least exists which they have as their extreme', as, that is, their indivisible, atomic constituent (*Nature of Things* 1.623–6, 1.750–2).

1.2.4.3 31.30–1 **often been maintain'd in the schools, that extension must be divisible, in infinitum]** See ann. 23.1. For objections to the idea that mathematical points could form the basis of extension, see anns. 26.31, 33.13, 34.36.

31.38–9 **The system of physical points...is too absurd to need a refutation]** Bayle treated the hypothesis that space or extension is constituted of 'Epicurean atoms, that is, of extended and indivisible corpuscles' with the same disdain he had shown for the suggestion that it is made up of mathematical points (see ann. 26.31). Every extension, no matter how small, he argued, has, for example, a left and a right side, which is to say it has parts. Consequently, it is clear that the alleged indivisibility of atoms is 'meerly chimerical' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [c] [5: 610b]). The objection as posed by Arnauld and Nicole is quoted in ann. 26.31; on the minimum visible, see anns. 23.25, 24.8.

1.2.4.4 32.1–2 **necessity...of penetration, if extension consisted of mathematical points]** According to Chambers, penetration is 'the Action whereby one Thing enters another, or takes up the same Place' (so that both objects occupy one and the same place), while what 'we popularly call *Penetration*, only amounts to the Matter of one Body's being admitted into the Vacuity of [the empty spaces within] another' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Penetration'). The Cartesians maintained that extension is impenetrable, that one space does not penetrate another; see Spinoza, *Descartes'* *Principles* 2 A13; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Solidity'.

32.6 *secundum se, tota, & totaliter]* According to itself, totally and completely.

1.2.4.5 32.10 **no void within their circumference]** The dispute about the existence of vacua concerned both internal and external voids, both empty or void microcosmic



spaces or vacua within the circumference of objects, and empty or void macrocosmic and extraterrestrial space. See Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 1.329–98, 655–65; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Vacuum'; Grant, *Much Ado About Nothing*, 14–23.

- 1.2.4.7 32.34–5 **a spot of ink... becomes altogether invisible]** See also 1.2.1.4; ann. 24.2.
- 1.2.4.8 33.1–2 **many objections... against the indivisibility of the parts of extension]** See ann. 26.31.
- 1.2.4.9 33.6–8 **A surface is *defin'd*... A line... A point... depth]** See Euclid, *Elements* 1, defs. 5, 3, 1, respectively.
- 1.2.4.10 33.13–15 **objects of geometry... never can exist in nature]** Hume's claim would have been seen as sceptical by some of his predecessors. Arnauld and Nicole, for example, said that the ability of geometers to abstract from reality 'shows how ridiculous is the argument of some skeptics who try to call into question the certainty of geometry, on the grounds that it presupposes lines and surfaces which are not found in nature' (*Logic* 1.5 [38]). Keill also undertook to refute those who claimed that 'neither Points, nor Lines, nor Surfaces, as the Geometers conceive them, do truly exist in the Nature of Things' (*Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 3 [22]). On the other hand, Bayle argued that the 'object' of mathematics has 'a very great and irreparable defect': that 'it is a meer chimera which cannot possibly exist. Mathematical points, and consequently the lines and surfaces, globes and axes, of the Geometricians are fictions which never can have a being' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno the Epicurean' [D][5: 620b]).
- 1.2.4.11 33.20–1 **Whatever can be conceiv'd... implies the possibility of existence]** See ann. 26.37.
- 1.2.4.12 33.29–31 and n. 10 **It has been pretended... by an abstraction without a separation]** The full title of the work cited in n. 10 is *Logique, ou L'Art de Penser* (*Logic; or The Art of Thinking*), by Arnauld and Nicole. The argument is essentially as Hume represents it; see *Logic* 1.5 [37–8].
- 33.35 **above-explain'd]** See 1.1.7.17–18; ann. 21.32.
- 1.2.4.13 33.37 **sufficiently explain'd]** See 1.2.1.
- 1.2.4.14 33.41–2 **A surface terminates a solid; a line terminates a surface; a point terminates a line]** See Euclid, *Elements* 1, defs. 3, 6, 13.
- 33.42–34.1 **if the *ideas*... not indivisible, 'tis impossible... conceive these terminations]** Bayle made the point in another way: 'It is certain that an infinite number of parts doth not contain any which is first... The same reason demonstrates that a body in motion, rolling on a sloping table, could never fall off the said table; for before it falls, it must of necessity touch the last part of the table. And how will it touch that, since all those parts which you will pretend to be the last, contain an infinity of parts, and an infinite number hath no part which can be last?' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [G][5: 613b]).

- 1.2.4.15 34.14–16 **schoolmen...maintain'd...mix'd among...particles of matter...mathematical points]** Hume again follows Bayle, who said: 'This objection obliged some scholastic Philosophers to suppose, that nature hath intermixed Mathematical points with the parts divisible *in infinitum*, to the end that they may serve to connect them, and compose the extremities of bodies...this evasion is so absurd that it doth not deserve to be refuted' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [G] [5: 613b]). According to Charleton, it was Suárez, in his *Metaphysicarum Disputationum*, who supposed that the continuum can be conceived only as a combination of physical parts and mathematical points (*Physiologia* 2.3.2.3). See also Fairfax, *Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge*, 106; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Punctum'.
- 1.2.4.18 34.36–40 **ask mathematicians...This question will embarrass both of them]** Although such mathematical paradoxes were widely discussed, Hume again appears to have drawn on Bayle, who recounted objections showing that both those who suppose extension composed of indivisible points and those who suppose it infinitely divisible appear to be committed to the conclusion that the sides of any given square are equal in length to the diagonal of that square (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [G] [5: 612ab]). On such paradoxes, see also Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 1.615–22; Fairfax, *Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge*, 115 ff.; Rohault, *System* 1.9.6–8; Malezieu, *Elémens de géométrie* 9; Cartaud de la Villate, *Pensées critiques sur les mathématiques* 6.
- 1.2.4.21 35.25 and n. 11 **some, who pretend, that equality is best defin'd by congruity]** The reference in n. 11 is to Isaac Barrow, *The Usefulness of Mathematical Learning Explained and Demonstrated, being Mathematical Lectures*, lect. 11. Barrow had noted that Euclid demonstrates the equality of certain triangles by showing the congruity of their sides and angles, and mentioned others (Archimedes, Apollonius, Pappus, Snellius, Hobbes, and Cavalieri, inventor of the '*Method of Indivisibles*') favourably disposed to this method. Proclus and, indirectly, John Wallis, are mentioned as opposed to the method. Barrow also said that, while some describe congruity as 'the Occupation, Possession, or Repletion of the same Place or Space' either by '*Application, Succession, or Mental Penetration*', it is, strictly speaking, 'only attributed to equal Magnitudes, which...do precisely occupy the same Place, *i.e.* do justly fill it, and are contained by it' (*Mathematical Lectures*, 185–9, 197; cf. 200–4; for excerpts from these lectures, see N. K. Smith, *Philosophy of David Hume*, 343–6). See also Hobbes, *Elements of Philosophy* 3.18.2; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Congruity'.
- 1.2.4.22 35.40–2 **refuse to assign any standard of equality...two objects...give us a just notion]** Barrow, citing *Posterior Analytics* 1.10, said that Aristotle found it unnecessary to define equality because 'the Notion of Equality is perspicuous of itself, and its Signification abundantly plain to every one'. Barrow disagreed, saying that a definition of equality is essential, not least because of disputes about its nature and because it is not perceived by the senses (*Mathematical Lectures*, 198–9). Butler said that any attempt to define 'similitude or equality' would be confusing, and yet 'there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea. For as, upon two triangles being compared or viewed together, there arises to the mind the idea of similitude; or upon

twice two and four, the idea of equality' ('Of Personal Identity' §2). See also Malebranche, *Search* 1.6.3 [32], 3.2.6 [234], 6.1.5 [434]; Locke, *Essay* 2.14.18, 2.16.4; Cudworth, *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* 4.2.1; Mayne, *Essay concerning Rational Notions*, 51–2; Quincy, *Introduction, Medicina Statica*, pp. xiv–xvii; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Judgment'; and Hume, *Abs.* 29.

- 1.2.4.24 37.1–2 **mind to proceed...after the reason has ceas'd]** Locke observed that 'Custom settles habits of Thinking in the Understanding, as well as of Determining in the Will, and of Motions in the Body; all which seems to be but Trains of Motion in the Animal Spirits, which once set a going continue on in the same steps they have been used to' (*Essay* 2.33.6). See also 1.3.13.9–10, 1.4.2.22; anns. 44.28, 100.43.

37.3–4 **with regard to time...no exact method of determining the proportions of parts]** Locke concluded that our measurements of time are inexact 'because no two different parts of Succession can be put together to measure one another' (*Essay* 2.14.18).

37.7–11 **A musician...correcting himself...without being able to tell whence he derives his standard]** In contrast to Hume's claim that the standard at issue is 'plainly imaginary' (36.41), Malebranche had said that the 'ear alone is unable to judge sounds with the precision necessary for a science. The most practiced and discerning ear still is not sensitive enough to recognize the difference between certain sounds.' But reason, he argued, is able to give us 'a science [of music] based on indisputable demonstrations' (*Search* 6.1.4 [427]). Although Chambers said that the science of sound is based on an imaginary standard, he also said that there is a significant gap between what we can hear and the mathematical precision of that science. The reason, he said, that we 'know so distinctly, and mark so precisely, the Concords call'd Octave, Fifth, Fourth, &c. is, that we have learnt to express Sounds by Lines... The Ear it self cannot judge of Sounds with such Precision; its Judgments are too faint, vague, and variable to form a Science. The finest, best tuned Ear, cannot distinguish many of the Differences of Sounds; whence many Musicians deny any such Differences; as making their Sense their Judge' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Geometry').

- 1.2.4.25 37.16–19 **distinction betwixt a curve and a right line...impossible to...fix]** Barrow argued that 'the Periphery of a Circle, or any other Curve, may be so stretched or extended as to pass into a Right Line, and consequently be congruent with a Right Line; and on the contrary a Right Line may be so incurvated, as to degenerate into the Periphery of a Circle, or any other Curve Line' (*Mathematical Lectures*, 194).

- 1.2.4.26 37.35–6 **mathematicians...exact definition of a right line...the shortest way betwixt two points]** Hume provides a standard version of Euclid's definition of a right or straight line; see *Elements* 1, def. 4.

- 1.2.4.27 38.1 **already establish'd]** This section, ¶¶ 18 ff.

1.2.4.28 38.9 **the flowing of a right line]** That the flowing of a straight line produced a plane surface was part of a standard trilogy of motions producing magnitudes. As Chambers put it, 'The Origin of all *Magnitude* is a Point, which though void of Parts itself, yet its Flux [motion] forms a Line, the Flux of that a Surface, and [the motion] of that a Body' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Magnitude').

38.12–13 **right line may flow irregularly ... form a figure quite different from a plane]** Euclid's definition of a plane surface excludes figures formed by an irregularly flowing line: 'A plane superficies is that in which any two points being taken, the straight line between them lies wholly in that superficies' (*Elements* 1, def. 7). Harris said that it is only 'by the Motion of a *Right Line* always keeping in the same Plane' that a plane surface is made (*Lexicon Technicum*, 'Surface').

1.2.4.30 38.42 **twenty leagues]** The length of a league was never standardized, but twenty leagues would amount to some fifty to sixty miles.

1.2.4.33 39.39–40.2 **point of contact ... concur for some space]** Hume restates a well-known conundrum. Barrow noticed that there are some who suppose 'Mathematical Figures to have no other Existence in the Nature of Things than in the Mind alone', and to illustrate this view (with which he disagreed), cited Vossius: 'There is not any Sphere ... in the Nature of Things that only touches in a Point; for it always with some Part of its Superfice touches the subjected Plane in a Line, as Aristotle shews Protagoras to have objected against the Geometricians' (*Mathematical Lectures*, 76). Bayle argued that 'a globe placed on a plane, would only touch it in one indivisible point, and that rolling on the plane, it would touch it always in a single point. From whence it will result, that it must be wholly composed of unextended parts; but that is impossible, and manifestly includes this contradiction, that an extension would exist and not be extended' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno the Epicurean' [D] [5: 622a]). See also Euclid, *Elements* 3, defs. 2, 3; Malezieu, *Elémens de géométrie* 9; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Point').

39.39–40 **no mathematician, who will not refuse to be judg'd by the diagrams he describes]** Theodore, spokesman for Malebranche, insisted that his proof of the Pythagorean theorem derived from the ideas of extension and lines, 'and by no means from the white and the black which make all these things sensible and particular' (*Dialogues* 5.7; cf. *Search* 1.7.1–3 [33–4], 6.1.4 [428]). See also Gassendi, *Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 329], and *Physics* 1.3.5, cited in Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Zeno the Epicurean' [D] [5: 620b]; Barrow, *Mathematical Lectures*, 75–7; Mariotte, *Essai de logique* 2.2.1; Locke, *Essay* 4.4.6; ann. 33.13.

1.2.5 *The same subject continu'd*

1.2.5.2 40.19–20 **men have disputed for many ages concerning a vacuum and a plenum]** Hume's historical claim replicates that of Chambers: 'Whether there be any such Thing in Nature as an absolute *Vacuum*; or whether the Universe be completely full, and there be an absolute *Plenum*; is a thing has been controverted by the Philosophers of all Ages' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Vacuum'; cf. 'Matter'). On the

history of this dispute from ancient times to c.1720, see Grant, *Much Ado About Nothing*, *passim*.

40.21–2 **philosophers...take party on either side, as their fancy leads them]** To Boyle, the supposition of the 'Plenists' that there cannot be a vacuum or void seemed not to follow 'from any experiments, or phaenomena of nature, that clearly and particularly prove their hypothesis, but from their notion of a body...[and] seems to make the controversy about a vacuum rather a metaphysical, than a physiological question' (*New Experiments*, exp. 17 [37–8]). Locke argued that a philosopher's view about the existence or non-existence of a vacuum depends on an essentially arbitrary choice of the 'Idea to which he annexes the name *Body*', with the consequence that Cartesians deny the existence of vacua, while their opponents say that these do exist (*Essay* 4.7.12–13). For Descartes's view, see *Principles of Philosophy* 2.16. See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Leucippus'[G] [3: 792]; E. Law, in King, *Essay on the Origin of Evil*, n. 5 [9 ff.], n. 11 [25 ff.]; Argens, *Philosophical Dissertations* 3.10.

40.23–4 **it may be pretended, that the very dispute is decisive concerning the idea]** Locke claimed that 'those who dispute for or against a *Vacuum*, do thereby confess, they have distinct *Ideas* of *Vacuum* and *Plenum*, i.e. that they have an *Idea* of Extension void of Solidity, though they deny its existence' (*Essay* 2.13.21; cf. 2.4.3). 'Gravesande argued that we can know that a vacuum is possible because we can conceive of one, and 'whatever we conceive to be possible may exist' (*Explanation of the Newtonian Philosophy*, 4–5). On the other hand, Bayle, well aware of the long-standing dispute about the existence of the vacuum, argued that a thorough search of the mind fails to find an idea of a vacuum, i.e. the idea of an 'unmovable, indivisible, and penetrable extension'. He also noted Hartsoecker's opinion that there can be no vacuum in nature because 'it is utterly contradictory to conceive a meer nothingness' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno the Epicurean' [1] [5: 616a]). Hume returns to this issue in ¶¶22 and 28 of this section. See also 1.2.2.9; ann. 26.42.

- 1.2.5.3 40.32–3 **conceive the annihilation...of matter by...the deity...other parts remain at rest]** Variations on this thought experiment had been widely discussed. Descartes argued that 'if God were to take away every single body contained in a vessel, without allowing any other body to take the place of what had been removed...the sides of the vessel would...have to be in contact. For when there is nothing between two bodies they must necessarily touch each other. And it is a manifest contradiction for them to be apart, or to have a distance between them, when the distance in question is nothing; for every distance is a mode of extension, and therefore cannot exist without an extended substance' (*Principles of Philosophy* 2.18). Gassendi took the contrary view, asking that we conceive 'a container far more extensive than any vase...[viz.] the lunar sphere...and let us also imagine that the entire mass of elements included within it...has been destroyed by God...so that absolutely nothing remains in its place'. After 'this reduction to nothing', do we not, he asked, 'still conceive the same region between the surfaces

of the lunar sphere that had been there, but now empty of the elements and devoid of every body. That God can preserve this lunar sphere intact and reduce the bodies contained in it to nothing and prevent any other body from taking their place no one would deny, except a man who denies God's power' (*Syntagma* 2.1.2.1 [385–6]). Among early modern writers, the example or variants of it, and support for Descartes's conclusion, are found in Rohault, *System* 1.8.2–3 and Fairfax, *Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge*, 91–2. Support for Gassendi's conclusion is found in Charleton, *Physiologia* 1.6.1.11; Locke, *Essay* 2.13.21–3; Keill, *Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 2 [16–18]; and Argens, *Philosophical Dissertations* 3.9–15. By the 1720s the view that such void spaces are possible prevailed, at least in Britain. Colliher said that Newton, Locke, and Bentley had demonstrated the 'Possibility and Reality of a Space Specifically distinct from Matter' (*Two Discourses concerning Space and Duration* 1 [214]); Watts, that 'Whether there be a Vacuum or void Space is now no longer doubted among Philosophers, it having been proved by Sir Isaac Newton, and others, beyond all Contradiction; and every one agrees to it' (*Philosophical Essays* 1.1). See also ann. 41.18.

40.40 **subtile matter**] Descartes posited 'subtile matter' as that which fills all apparent microcosmic vacua: 'since there is no vacuum in nature (as nearly all philosophers acknowledge), and yet there are many pores in all the bodies we perceive around us (as experience can show quite clearly), it is necessary that these pores be filled with some very subtile and very fluid matter, which extends without interruption from the heavenly bodies to us' (*Optics* 1 [AT 6: 86–7]; cf. *Description of the Human Body* 3, 4 [AT 11: 250, 255]; *Principles of Philosophy* 3.52). Harris supposed that the Cartesian notion of subtile matter is useless as a means of explaining natural phenomena (*Lexicon Technicum*, 'Vacuum'); Cotes ridiculed it as a way of denying a vacuum in theory and granting it in fact (Preface to 2nd edn. of Newton's *Principia*, 1: p. xxxi). See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Materia subtilis', 'Medium'; Argens, *Philosophical Dissertations* 3.16.

40.42–41.1 **some metaphysicians, who answer...matter and extension are the same**] The Cartesians, of course, agreed with Descartes's 'answer': viz. that 'extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature of corporeal substance' (*Principles of Philosophy* 1.53). Hume's language here is reminiscent of that of Locke, who said: 'There are some that would persuade us, that *Body and Extension are the same thing*' (*Essay* 2.13.11).

- 1.2.5.4 41.18–19 **the motion we observe in bodies...impossible...without a vacuum**] The argument that motion requires a vacuum or void macrocosmic space is of ancient origin. See Epicurus, 'Letter to Herodotus' 40, 67, and Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 1.329–45, 370–83, 418–29. Early modern versions are found in, for example, Newton, *Principia* 3, prop. 6, cor. 3 [2: 414]; Locke, *Essay* 2.13.22–3; S. Clarke, in Rohault, *System* 1.8.1 n.; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Vacuum'; Argens, *Philosophical Dissertations* 3.15. For arguments to the contrary, see Aristotle, *Physics* 4.6–9; Hobbes, *Elements of Philosophy* 4.26.3. Bayle supposed that Zeno could have

argued that because a vacuum is impossible, motion is impossible (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [1]).

- 1.2.5.5 41.25–6 **idea of darkness is no positive idea]** Locke maintained the contrary view, saying that the ideas of heat, cold, light, and darkness 'are equally clear and *positive Ideas* in the Mind; though, perhaps, some of *the causes* which produce them, are barely *privations* in those Subjects, from whence our Senses derive those *Ideas*' (*Essay* 2.8.2). See also Arnauld and Descartes, *Objections and Replies* 4 [AT 7: 206, 232]; E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 39–43.

41.31–3 **not from...removal of visible objects...idea of utter darkness...that of vacuum]** Hume in effect takes issue with two of his contemporaries. E. Law said: 'As Space is conceiv'd to be pure *Vacuum*... the Idea of it can only be excited in us by the absence or removal of Solidity, or by the difference which we find between the presence and absence of solid Matter, and our comparing them together' (*Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 22). Watts compared space to '*Shadow or Darkness*', and said that the latter has '*seeming Properties and Powers*, which make Mankind ready to fancy it a real Being' (*Philosophical Essays* 1.8). See also Descartes, *The World or Treatise on Light*, ch. 4.

- 1.2.5.6 41.34–6 **man...supported in the air...sensible of nothing...never receives the idea of extension]** Hume's conclusion contrasts with that of Berkeley, who, following a similar thought experiment, concluded that the mere motion of his limbs (i.e. an instance of this motion without any accompanying sensations or while, as Hume puts it, 'sensible of nothing') would be sufficient to produce the idea of '*pure space*' or extension. If, Berkeley said, I suppose 'all the world to be annihilated besides my own body... there still remains *pure space*', by which 'nothing else is meant, but only that I conceive it [would then be] possible, for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance: but if that [possibility] too were annihilated, then there could be no motion, and consequently no space' (*Principles* 1.116). See also E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 22–4.

- 1.2.5.8 42.1–3 **commonly allow'd...all bodies...appear as if painted on a plane surface...degrees of remoteness...discover'd more by reason]** That vision reveals only 'a plane surface' and that one learns to see (to discover 'by reason') distance were conclusions several philosophers reached in response to a question posed by William Molyneux. The question, given a wide audience by its inclusion in Locke's *Essay*, supposed that a man born blind had learned to distinguish solid figures by touch, and then who as an adult was enabled to see. Would this man, by sight alone, be able to distinguish between such figures? Those who answered in the negative include Molyneux himself and Locke (*Essay* 2.9.8); Berkeley (*New Theory of Vision* 41, 156–8; *Principles* 1.43; *Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 201]; *Alciphron* 4.11; cf. ann. 127.43); Cheselden, 'Account of some Observations'; E. Law, (*Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 47–8). Chambers, concerned with a different issue, reports that, with respect to bodies, the surface or '*Superficies* is all that presents itself to the

Eye' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Superficies, or Surface'; cf. 'Visible'). See also the following annotation, and for a variant form of the issue of what a man born blind would be able to distinguish, Hume, *HE* 20 [2: 421]. For further history, see Degenaar, *Molyneux's Problem*.

1.2.5.12 42.41–3.1 **angles, which the rays of light... form... produce... perceptions, from which we can judge of the distance]** At App. 22 Hume says that he was in error when he made this claim for the reason that the angles in question, those 'which the rays of light flowing from the bodies make with each other', are not known to us, 'and consequently can never discover the distance'. Efforts to explain the perception of distance by means of rays of light and angles are found in Descartes, *Optics* 6 [AT 6: 137–46]; Malebranche, *Search* 1.9.3 [43–7]; Rohault, *System* 1.32.14–15; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Visible'. Berkeley, arguing against the view that Hume sets out here (but then repudiates at App. 22), said that a certain disposition of the eyes, viz. a 'lessening or widening [of] the interval between the pupils', accompanied by noticeable sensation, appears to be that which, after relevant experience, 'brings the idea of greater or lesser distance into the mind' (*New Theory of Vision* 3–17, esp. 12, 16–17).

1.2.5.17 43.41–2 **all qualities... heat, cold, light, attraction... diminish in proportion to the distance]** Newton's law of universal gravitation holds that attraction is inversely proportional to distance. Harris credited Keill with demonstrating 'that all Qualities are *Remitted*, or have their Power or Efficacy abated, in a *Duplicate Ratio* of the distance from the Centre of the *Radiation*, or Exertion of the Quality' (*Lexicon Technicum*, 'Quality'; cf. Keill, *Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 1 [5–7]).

1.2.5.20 44.22–3 **When I receiv'd... principles of union]** See 1.1.4.

44.24–5 **first maxim, that we must... rest contented with experience]** See Intro. 8–9, 1.1.4.6; ann. 4.41.

44.26–7 **an imaginary dissection of the brain]** Prior, in a poem Hume mentions at 2.2.8.18, poked fun at such imaginary dissections: 'Here, RICHARD, how could I explain, | The various Lab'rinth of the Brain? | ... I could demonstrate every Pore, | Where Mem'ry lays up all her Store; | And to an Inch compute the Station, | 'Twixt Judgment, and Imagination. | O Friend! I could display much Learning, | At least to Men of small Discerning. | ... Could I but see thy Head dissected!' (*Alma; or, The Progress of the Mind* 3.151–81).

44.28 **animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces]** Malebranche described the animal spirits as 'merely the most refined and agitated parts of the blood', and said that they '*ordinarily flow in the traces of the ideas most familiar to us, which is why we do not judge things soundly*' (*Search* 2.1.2.1 [91], 2.2.2 title [134]; cf. 2.1.5.3 [106–7]). Locke suggested that, were his purpose 'to enquire into the natural Causes and manner of Perception', he would rely on the 'different degrees and modes of Motion in our animal Spirits' (*Essay* 2.8.4). Chambers described



animal spirits as 'an exceedingly thin, subtile, moveable Fluid, Juice or Humour separated from the Blood in the Cortex of the Brain, hence received into the minute Fibres of the Medulla, and by them discharged into the Nerves, by which it is convey'd through every Part of the Body, to be the Instruments of Sensation, muscular Motion, &c.' And, though he grants that the theory of animal spirits is controversial, he contends that it provides the best available explanation of bodily motion and function. Chambers attributed to the Cartesians the view that 'the animal Spirits exciting a Motion in the most delicate Fibres of the Brain, leave a kind of Traces or Footsteps, which occasion our *Remembrance*. Hence it happens, that by passing several times over the same things, the Spirits becoming accusom'd to the same Passages, leave them open, and so make their way without any Effort or Labour; and in this consists the Ease wherewith we recollect such Ideas' (*Cyclopaedia*, 'Spirits', 'Memory'; cf. 'Imagination'). For other sympathetic discussions or uses of the theory, see, e.g., Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 1.7–16, 42; Glanvill, *Vanity of Dogmatizing* 3.5; Locke, *Essay* 2.8.12, 21; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 3.15 and *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 1.3.

Harvey said: 'spirits . . . serve as a common subterfuge of ignorance. For smatterers, not knowing what causes to assign to a happening, promptly say that the spirits are responsible . . . like bad poets, they call this *deus ex machina* on to their stage to explain their plot and catastrophe' ('Essay to Riolan', in *Circulation of the Blood*, 149). Although Cheyne in his *Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion* was ready to explain voluntary motion by the mind's activation of animal spirits (see ch. 3), he later pronounced the theory of animal spirits to be unfounded nonsense, on a par 'with the *substantial Forms* of Aristotle, and the *celestial System* of Ptolemy' (*English Malady* 1.9.6). For further references, see Gilson, *Index Scolastico-Cartésien*, 'esprits animaux'; Sutton, *Philosophy and Memory Traces*, 23–128; Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 153–89. See also ann. 37.1; *EHU* 7.14.

- 1.2.5.21 45.7–8 see many instances in . . . this treatise] See, e.g., 1.4.2.32, 35, 42–4, 56; 1.4.3.3; 1.4.6.6–7; 3.1.2.1.

45.15 usual for men to use words for ideas] A variation on a common refrain. See, e.g., Bacon, *New Organon* 1.60; Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy* 1.74; Spinoza, *Ethics* 2 P49 S2; Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 1.11; Malebranche, *Search* 1.19.2 [82–4], *Elucidations* 12 [639–40]; Rohault, *System* 1.4; Locke, *Essay* 3.2.1, 7; 3.10.2, 4; 4.5.4; Berkeley, *Alciphron* 7.3; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 1.11. See also 1.1.7.14, 1.3.14.14; App. 11; *Abs.* 7; *EHU* 2.9. For Swift's parody of the use of words for ideas, see *Gulliver's Travels* 3.5.

- 1.2.5.22 45.27–8 frequent disputes concerning a vacuum . . . prove not the reality of the idea] See also ann. 40.23.

- 1.2.5.23 45.33 the second objection] See ¶3 of this section.

45.43 already been remark'd] See 1.1.1.3–7.

1.2.5.24 46.3 **motion of a body has much the same effect as its creation**] See ¶4 of this section. Malebranche argued that 'bodies cannot move themselves...their motor force is but the will of God that conserves them successively in different places' (*Elucidations* 15 [660]; cf. ann. 107.35). See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [G] [5: 613a]).

1.2.5.25 46.11 **objections above-mention'd**] See ¶¶2–4 of this section.

1.2.5.26 46.25–6 **my intention never was to...explain the secret causes**] See Intro. 8–9 (cf. 1.1.2.1, 2.1.1.1–2); ann. 5.29; *EHU* 1.4, 12, 16.

46.29–30 **can never pretend to know body...than by...external properties...the senses**] The experimentalist character of Hume's principle and subsequent comment here is apparent even without the explicit reference to 'the *Newtonian* philosophy' added at n. 12.18 (47). Newton, in explication of his third rule, insisted that 'the qualities of bodies are only known to us by experiments' or the experience provided by our senses, and forbade forsaking such experience for 'dreams and vain fictions of our own devising' (*Principia* 3 [2: 398]). Locke, warning us that we '*must beware of Hypotheses and wrong Principles*', also said that the 'Knowledge of Bodies we must get by our Senses', and emphasized the practical value of such knowledge in what Hume a few lines later calls the 'conduct of life' (*Essay* 4.12.12.title, 12.). See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Body'; ann. 6.14.

n. 12.6–7 (46) **whether two objects, having...distance betwixt them, touch...depends upon the definition of...touch**] Hume's conclusion is well illustrated by two of his contemporaries. Watts registered the 'great *Objection*' that could be made against the view that space is nothing. 'Space', he said, 'cannot be meer Nothing, for two Bodies may have twenty Miles of Space between them, and yet if all this Space be Nothing, then there is Nothing between these two Bodies, and therefore they are close together or touch one another' (*Philosophical Essays* 1.11). E. Law criticized Jackson, saying: 'The Annihilation of every thing between [any two bodies] is surely not the same Idea as their touching one another', and the proposition, 'That if there be nothing between two things, they must therefore touch; is...groundless' (*Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 51; see Jackson, *Existence and Unity of God*, 78–9). See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [G] [5: 611b]; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Touching'.

n. 12.17–18 (47) **the contrary opinion... more suitable to vulgar... notions**] Bayle claimed that 'to the vulgar it is almost as strange a paradox to deny a vacuum, as to deny motion' (*Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [I] [5: 615]). Watts thought the idea of a void space so 'plain and easy' that 'there is no Difference between the Philosopher and the Ploughman in this their general and common Conception or Idea of it' (*Philosophical Essays* 1.1). Argens said: '*The Opinion that admits a Vacuum seems to be most natural. It is probable there is one*' (*Philosophical Dissertations* 3.13 title).

n. 12.18 (47) **Newtonian philosophy ... rightly understood**] Chambers observed the confusion resulting from the fact that the 'Term *Newtonian Philosophy*', was, as he put it, 'apply'd very differently', and then provided five different senses in which the term was being used c.1725. These were to denominate (1) the modern 'Corpuscular' or '*New Philosophy*' (in contrast to the Peripatetic, Cartesian, or ancient Corpuscularian philosophies) as it had been corrected and improved by Newton; (2) the method followed by Newton, i.e. 'the Reasoning, and drawing of Conclusions directly from Phænomena... deducing the first Powers and Laws of Nature from a few select Phænomena, and then applying those Laws, &c. to account for other things... in this sense, the *Newtonian Philosophy* is the same with the *Experimental Philosophy*'; (3) the '*Mechanical and Mathematical Philosophy*', or that 'wherein Physical Bodies are consider'd Mathematically; and where Geometry and Mechanics are apply'd to the Solution of Phænomena'; (4) 'that part of Physical Knowledge' dealt with in Newton's *Principia*; and (5) the 'new Principles' which Newton introduced, along with 'the new System founded thereon; and the new Solution of Phænomena thence deduced'. Chambers goes on to argue that the Newtonian philosophy 'is laid down chiefly in the third Book [*System of the World*] of the *Principia*'. Many of the principles underlying this part of Newton's work, Chambers says, are such that 'even the first-rate Mathematicians would find a Difficulty' comprehending, but no matter: 'Tis enough to have read the Definitions, Laws of Motion, and the three first Sections of the first Book', and then to move on, as Newton himself suggested, to the third book (*Cyclopædia*, 'Newtonian Philosophy').

n. 12.23 (47) **confession of ignorance**] For confessions of ignorance by some of the post-Newtonian philosophers, see anns. 5.29, 5.42.

1.2.5.28 47.12–13 **proof... have the idea of a vacuum, because we dispute... concerning it**] See ¶2 of this section; ann. 40.23.

1.2.6 *Of the idea of existence, and of external existence*

1.2.6.2 48.10–12 **no impression nor idea... is not conceiv'd as existent... idea... of being is deriv'd**] The origin of the idea of being or existence also briefly interested Locke. He supposed that this idea is one of two (the other being the idea of unity) that are 'suggested to the Understanding, by every Object without, and every *Idea* within' (*Essay* 2.7.7; cf. 2.30.2). Berkeley objected to the view that we have 'a notion of entity or existence, *abstracted* [i.e. separate] from *spirit* and *idea*, from perceiving and being perceived' (*Principles* 1.81). See also Watts, *Brief Scheme of Ontology* 1; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Existence'; *THN* 1.2.2.8; ann. 26.37.

1.2.6.4 48.27–30 **idea of existence... conjoin'd with the idea of any object, makes no addition**] At LG 31 the 'Author' of the *Treatise* is taken to have said that 'we have no general Idea of Existence, distinct from every particular Existence'.

- 1.2.6.6 n. 13 (48) **Part 1. sect. 7]** See 1.1.7.17–18.
- 1.2.6.7 49.4–6 **universally allow'd...nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions]** Compare Locke and Berkeley. The former said: '*the Mind*, in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, hath no other immediate Object but its own *Ideas*' (*Essay* 4.1.1). The latter: 'that the objects immediately perceived are ideas, is on all hands agreed' (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 237]; cf. *Principles* 1.1). Others making similar claims include Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 1.11 (where the view is also attributed to Plato and Cicero); Malebranche, *Search* 1.1.1 [1–2], 1.14.2–3 [68–70], 3.2.1.1; Cudworth, citing Plotinus, *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* 4.1 [129]; S. Clarke, *Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence* 2.5; 'sGravesande, *Mathematical Elements*, 1: p. xiv; Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, 'Idea'. See also 1.4.2.21, 47; 2.2.2.22; 3.1.1.2; ann. n. 2.2 (7); *Abs.* 5; *EHU* 12.9.
- 49.6–7 **objects become known...only by those perceptions they occasion]** Compare Arnauld and Nicole: 'we can have no knowledge of what is outside us except by means of the ideas in us' (*Logic* 1 [25]). See also Locke, *Essay* 4.11.2; and for variations on the theme, Malebranche, *Search* 1.14.1–2 [67–9].
- 1.2.6.8 49.11–12 **impossible...to conceive...an idea of any thing specifically different]** On this issue, see also 1.4.2.2, 56; 1.4.5.19–20; 1.4.6.13; ann. 149.38.
- 1.2.6.9 49.19 **relative idea]** Locke explains how we come to have an 'obscure and relative *Idea* of Substance in general' (*Essay* 2.23.2–3; cf. *Letter to the Bishop of Worcester*, *Works*, 4: 7, 22, 42). Berkeley examines the 'relative idea of matter' at *Principles* 1.16.
- n. 14 (49) **Part 4. Sect. 2.]** See 1.4.2, especially ¶¶18–24.

### 1.3 *Of knowledge and probability*

50.title *knowledge and probability]* The distinction between knowledge and probability can be traced to classical times. Aristotle said that when speaking on politics and ethics one must be content with premisses and conclusions 'which are only for the most part true', and that 'it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs' (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.3, 1094<sup>b</sup>12–27). As James Franklin has shown, medieval and renaissance figures elaborated on this advice in a wide variety of ways. Canon lawyers and medieval philosophers addressed such issues as reasonable proofs and the choice of the safer or more probable course of action. By c.1400 the term *moral certainty* (*certitudo moralis*) was used to refer to the less than perfect conviction spoken of by Aristotle. By the beginning of the sixteenth century there existed a well-developed vocabulary of related concepts, *doubt*, *opinion*, *scruple*, and the *probable*, with the latter characterized as 'the opposite of hidden, that is, what is proved by witnesses' or as that which 'pertains to

opinion', taking the latter to be that which is the object of a widely believed opinion, or that which is morally certain (*Science of Conjecture*, 69–76, esp. 71).

Elaborations of this familiar distinction also appear regularly in the moral philosophy produced from the late sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth. Hooker argued that our greatest assurance of truth derives from 'intuitive beholding'; when we cannot attain that level of knowing we can turn to 'strong and invincible demonstration'; and, 'in case these both do fail', then we find ourselves inclined to that which has the 'greatest probability' (*Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 2.7.5). In his widely read defence of Christianity, Grotius argued that there are 'divers *ways* of proving or manifesting the *truth*. Thus is there one way in *Mathematicks*; another in *Physicks*, a third in *Ethicks*, and lastly another kinde when a *mater* of fact is in question' (*True Religion Explained* 2.23). During the middle decades of the seventeenth-century, influential Anglican theologians produced epistemic taxonomies similar to these earlier ones. Wilkins, for example, one of the founders of the Royal Society, distinguished between 'Knowledge or Certainty', a 'kind of Assent which doth arise from such plain and clear Evidence as doth not admit of any reasonable cause of doubting', and 'Opinion and Probability', that 'kind of Assent which doth arise from such evidence as is less plain and clear' (*Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* 1.1). Variations on the theme that there are distinctive epistemic states, each providing a different level or kind of certainty or conviction (often denominated 'evidence') are found in a number of other British writers of the period, but the view is most fully presented by Locke in his *Essay* (see, e.g., 4.2.1–2, 14–15 or 4.17.14–17). These writers in one way or another distinguished between some presumably certain or infallible epistemic state, i.e. some form of *knowledge*, and a lesser, fallible, and imperfect state, *probability*, which may also be said to manifest itself in different degrees or levels. Thus Locke said that there are 'degrees' of probability ranging 'from the very neighbourhood of Certainty and Demonstration, quite down to Improbability and Unlikelihood, even to the Confines of Impossibility; and also degrees of Assent from full Assurance and Confidence, quite down to Conjecture, Doubt, and Distrust' (*Essay* 4.15.2; cf. *Letter concerning Toleration*, *Works*, 6: 558). Sergeant challenged the coherence of assenting to a probability (*Method to Science* 3.9 [344–56]; *Solid Philosophy* 22.5 [416–17]). For additional background, see Van Leeuwen, *The Problem of Certainty in English Thought, 1630–1690*; Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England*, 15–118.

Among seventeenth-century French philosophers, Gassendi and Malebranche distinguished between knowledge and probability (see, respectively, *Institutio logica* 2.13–14; *Search* 3.1.3.2 [209]), while Arnauld and Nicole distinguished between metaphysical certainty, moral certainty, and the merely probable (*Logic* 4.15). For post-Lockean versions of such distinctions, see, e.g., Huet, *Philosophical Treatise* 1.1 [13–17]; A. M. Ramsay, *Travels of Cyrus* 6 (quoted in ann. 86.17); Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Evidence'; and Watts, *Logick* 2.2.8. In the *Treatise*, Hume distinguishes between knowledge and probability (1.3.1–2); knowledge, proofs, and probability

(1.3.11.2); and degrees of evidence or probability (1.3.13.19). See also 1.3.6.4; 1.3.12.2, 20–5; 1.3.13.1; 1.4.1.1–6; 2.3.1.12; anns. 50.25, 62.36, 66.27, 90.9; *LG* 26.

Before 1740, the *probable* was widely taken to be that which is credible or believable (that which is 'worthy of acceptance or belief', or is 'likely' and has 'an appearance of truth' and 'may in view of present evidence be reasonably expected to happen, or to prove true': *OED*, 'probable' 2.a, 3.a), while a *probability* was simply that which was probable, a likelihood, or, among the more reflective, a measure of believability as a *subjective* effect of 'Inducements to receive' facts or propositions as true (*OED*, 'probability' 1.a, 2.a; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Probability'). For further indications of conventional British thought or terminology c.1725–40, see also Chambers's articles on 'Certitude', 'Evidence', 'Faith', and 'Opinion'. In still another relevant article, Chambers points out that some writers of the early modern period would have used *probable* and some of its cognates in a substantially different way. Some scholastic writers, he says, understood the *probable* to be that which could be supported by some argument or authority, and that the *Probabilists* are those Roman Catholic theologians (Jesuits and Molinists) 'who adhere to the Doctrine of *probable Opinions*; holding, that a Man is not always obliged to take the more probable side'. Opposing this *Probabilist* position, Chambers observed, were the *Probabiliorists*, who maintained, as Butler put it, that we lie 'under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act upon' the most probable opinion, even if this view is only marginally more probable than some alternative (*Analogy of Religion*, Intro. §5). Chambers identified the Jansenists generally, and especially those of Port-Royal (e.g., Arnauld and Nicole) as *probabiliorists* (*Cyclopædia*, 'Probabilists'). See also Pascal, *Provincial Letters*, letter 5; and for a historical survey, Franklin, *Science of Conjecture*, 83–101.

It is clear, then, that in the early decades of the eighteenth century the notion of probability was by many understood in ways that had little to do with the mathematical doctrine of chance, that aspect of the topic on which twentieth- and twenty-first-century scholars interested in the history of probability have frequently focused. From this latter perspective, the 'Letters between Fermat and Pascal' represent a likely starting-point, while works by, for example, Huygens (*Of the Laws of Chance* and *Treatise on Light*), Montmort (*Essai d'analyse sur les jeux de hazard*), J. Bernoulli (*Ars conjectandi*), and De Moivre (*Doctrine of Chances*), are often mentioned. Hume may have encountered some of this (then) sophisticated mathematical literature, but we have found no clear allusions to it in the text of the *Treatise*. For discussion of this material, see Hald, *History of Probability and Statistics and their Applications before 1750*, and Daston, *Classical Probability in the Enlightenment*.

1.3.1 *Of knowledge*

- 1.3.1.1 50.3–4 **These relations may be divided into two classes]** Hume's effort to classify relations by kinds of thing related and the kinds of epistemic state produced has precedents in Malebranche. There are, the latter said, 'three kinds of relations or

truths', those between ideas, those between things and their ideas, and those between things alone. Those between ideas, found typically in the mathematical sciences, are 'eternal and immutable' and are 'the only ones the mind can know infallibly'. Relations of the remaining two kinds 'are subject to the change to which every creature is liable' (*Search* 6.1.5 [433–4]). See also Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 4.13; Locke, *Essay* 2.25.5; and *THN* 3.1.1.9; ann. 295.3; *EHU* 4.1, 18.

- 1.3.1.2 50.25–6 **more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration]** The distinction Hume makes here resembles that made by both Malebranche and Locke. The former distinguished between the 'immediate comparison' of ideas and comparisons dependent upon 'one or several intermediary ideas' (*Search* 6.2.1 [438]), while Locke described 'intuitive Knowledge' as the mind's perception of 'the Agreement or Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other', and 'Demonstration' as the perception of 'the Agreement or Disagreement of any Ideas...not immediately', but by means of 'intervening Ideas' (*Essay* 4.2.1–3). See also Descartes, *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, rules 3, 11; and on demonstration, Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 4.1; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Demonstration'.

- 1.3.1.4 51.9 **already observ'd]** See esp. 1.2.4.17–18, 29–33.

51.9–11 **geometry, or the art...never attains a perfect precision]** Geometry was more typically supposed to be a science. Arnauld and Nicole, for example, claimed that 'Geometry is virtually the only science that can furnish clear ideas and indisputable propositions' (*Logic*, Discourse 2 [17]). Chambers, however, said that the lack 'of Clearness and Precision in our Perceptions, and want of Perverserance and Attention to 'em...render Geometry it-self, little other than an Art' (*Cyclopædia*, Preface [p. vii]). At *EHU* 4.1 Hume includes geometry among the sciences. For discussions of the terms 'art' and 'science', see Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, Preface [pp. vii ff.], 'Art', 'Geometry', 'Science'; Watts, *Logick* 2.2.9.4.

- 1.3.1.6 51.42 **angles of a chiliagon]** The chiliagon or some other many-sided figure was routinely used to make the point Hume is making. See, e.g., Descartes, *Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 72–3]; Locke, *Essay* 2.29.13–14; Crousaz, *New Treatise of the Art of Thinking*, 1: 15; Watts, *Logick* 1.3.4; and the following annotation.

- 1.3.1.7 52.5–6 **mathematicians...pretend, that those ideas...spiritual a nature]** Hume's reference to ideas of a spiritual nature may derive from his reading of Arnauld and Nicole, who had said that 'Nothing is more important in metaphysics than the origin of our ideas, the separation of mental ideas [*idées spirituelles*] from corporeal images...we wanted to show at one point that there are corporeal things that can be conceived in a mental form [*manière spirituelle*] without being imagined. For this we used the example of a figure of a thousand angles' (*Logic*, Discourse 2 [17–18]). See also Malebranche, *Search* 1.4.1 [16–18].

52.16 **principle so oft insisted on]** See, e.g., 1.1.1.7–9, 1.2.3.1, 1.2.5.23.

- 1.3.2 *Of probability; and of the idea of cause and effect*
- 1.3.2.2 52.36–8 **perception...a mere passive admission of the impressions]** The view that the mind passively receives many of its ideas or perceptions was not unusual. Malebranche said that the understanding or 'the faculty of receiving different ideas and modifications in the mind is entirely passive and contains no action' (*Search* 1.1.1 [3]; cf. 6.2.3 [449]). Locke said that experience shows that 'the Mind, in respect of its simple *Ideas*, is wholly passive' (*Essay* 2.22.2; cf. 2.9.1). See also Descartes, *Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 79].
- 53.14–15 **this conclusion...can be founded only on the connexion of cause and effect]** Compare 1.4.2.21, 47, 54; 1.4.4.15; 1.4.7.4.
- 1.3.2.3 53.24–5 **informs us of existences...do not see or feel, is causation]** Compare *EHU* 5.21.
- 1.3.2.4 53.28 **To begin regularly...idea of causation]** Compare *Abs.* 8. Hume's Index to *ETSS*, under the heading, 'Cause and Effect, its Idea, whence', directs readers to '4.4–6, &c. Its Definition, 7.29, n. 17' of *EHU* (Clarendon Edition, 308).
- 1.3.2.6 54.3–4 **nothing can operate in a time or place...remov'd from those of its existence]** Whether or not a thing could be a cause while yet remote from its effect was a contentious issue, at least with respect to motion. Hobbes said that there 'can be no cause of motion, except in a body contiguous and moved. For let there be any two bodies which are not contiguous, and betwixt which the intermediate space is empty...and let one of the propounded bodies be supposed to be at rest; I say it shall always be at rest' (*Elements of Philosophy* 2.9.7). In the first three editions of his *Essay*, Locke claimed that bodies operate 'by impulse' and that it is 'impossible to conceive, that Body should operate on what it does not touch, (which is all one as to imagine it can operate where it is not) or when it does touch, operate any...way than by Motion' (*Essay* 2.8.11 n.). Under the influence of Newton, Locke deleted the second of these claims; see *Mr. Locke's Reply to the...Bishop of Worcester's Answer, Works*, 4: 467). See also Malebranche, *Search* 6.2.8 [500]; Cotes, Preface to the 2nd edn. of Newton's *Principia* and Cajori's note thereon [1: p. xxxi, 2: 636–7]; Cudworth, *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* 3.1 [76–7]; Lee, *Anti-Scepticism* 2.8.4; S. Clarke, notes to Rohault, *System* 1.11.15; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Attraction'. In the 2nd edn. of *EHU* (1750) Hume expanded his analysis of the causal relation by saying that 'A Cause is different from a Sign; as it implies a Precedency and Contiguity in Time and Place, as well as constant Conjunction. A Sign is nothing but a correlative Effect from the Same Cause.' These sentences, and with them any reference to contiguity of place as a component of the causal relation, were dropped from all later editions of *EHU*. See Editorial Appendix, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), 250.
- n. 16 (54) **Part 4. Sect. 5]** See 1.4.5.9–14.
- 1.3.2.7 54.15–16 **Some pretend that 'tis not absolutely necessary a cause shou'd precede its effect]** Hume may have had Hobbes in mind, for the latter said that 'a



CAUSE simply, or an entire cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents both of the agents how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant', and also that 'in whatsoever instant the cause is entire, in the same instant the effect is produced' (*Elements of Philosophy* 2.9.3, 5). Watts argued that 'A Cause is in Order of Nature before its Effect, but not always in Time. For a Fire gives Heat, and a Star gives Light as soon as they exist' (*Brief Scheme of Ontology* 10.3.4). See also Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 3.25–8, a part of the systematic discussion of cause that occupies 3.13–29.

54.20–2 **establish'd maxim . . . object, which exists for any time . . . not its sole cause]** Hobbes may be Hume's source of this maxim. 'An entire cause', he said, 'is always sufficient for the production of its effect, if the effect be at all possible. For let any effect whatsoever be propounded to be produced; if the same be produced, it is manifest that the cause which produced it was a sufficient cause; but if it be not produced, and yet be possible, it is evident that something was wanting . . . without which it could not be produced . . . and therefore, that cause was not entire, which is contrary to what was supposed' (*Elements of Philosophy* 2.9.5; cf. *Of Liberty and Necessity*, 274–5).

1.3.2.8 54.35 **preceding case]** See 54.8–12.

1.3.2.9 54.39–40 **Motion in one body is regarded upon impulse as the cause of motion in another]** 'Impulse', or the impact of one object on a second, was widely taken to be the cause of motion in the second object. Malebranche, for example, said: 'The impenetrability of bodies makes it clearly conceivable that motion can be communicated by impulsion, and experience proves, without the slightest obscurity, that in actual fact it is communicated in this way' (*Search* 6.2.8 [500]; but cf. 3.2.3 [224]). Locke also said that it is 'by impulse' that a billiard-ball 'communicates the motion it had received', thereby setting 'another Ball in motion' (*Essay* 2.21.4; cf. 2.23.22, 4.10.19). See also Bacon, *New Organon* 2.45; Boyle, *Examen of the Origin and Doctrine of Substantial Forms*, 42; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Impulsive'; ann. 54.3; *Abs.* 9, 11; *EHU* 7.6.

54.41–3 **the one body approaches the other . . . without any sensible interval]** For variations on this theme, see 1.3.14.1, 10–12, 15–16, 22, 28; 2.3.1.4, 16; *Abs.* 9; *EHU* 7.6–9, 26, 28, 30; 8.4, 21.

1.3.2.10 55.3–4 **pretend to define a cause . . . something productive of another]** Locke said that 'a Cause is that which makes any other thing . . . begin to be' (*Essay* 2.26.2). Chambers defined causality 'in Metaphysics' as 'the Power, or Action of a Cause in producing its Effect' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Causality'). See also ann. 106.10; *EHU* 7.29 n. 17, 8.25 n. 19.

1.3.2.11 55.11–12 **There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION]** Malebranche had argued that a necessary connection is a component of the notion of cause: 'A true cause . . . is one

such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effect' (*Search* 6.2.3 [450]). See also the two following paragraphs of this section, 1.3.6.3, 2.3.2.6; *Abs.* 26; *EHU* 8.25.

- 1.3.2.12 55.18–19 **consider their relations...find none but those of contiguity and succession]** That no causal *connection* or relation is ever sensed had been pointed out by several of Hume's predecessors. Glanvill said that '*causality* it self is *insensible*', and that our experience of it reduces to concomitancy (*Vanity of Dogmatizing* 20.1; cf. ann. 92.7). Malebranche observed that 'the true cause that moves bodies does not appear to my eyes' (*Elucidations* 15 [660]; cf. *Search* 6.2.3 [446–52], *Dialogues* 7.11–12); Mayne, that the 'Action of Striking, which here means a violent Shock or Impulse, and implies such a force or strength of Motion as will Push or bear forwards what stands in its way, and is capable of being Moved by it, is not perceived by *Sense*' (*Two Dissertations*, 12). See also Locke, *Essay* 2.21.4, 2.23.28; Berkeley, *Principles* 1.30–2; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, Preface [p. xvi]; below ann. 61.14.

55.22–3 **already...establish'd]** See 1.1.1.7, 1.2.3.1, 1.3.1.7.

- 1.3.2.13 55.28–9 **necessary...to leave the direct survey of this question]** At 1.3.14.1 Hume returns to the question he puts aside here.

55.31–3 **some other questions...I shall proceed to examine]** For further discussion of the first of the two questions Hume goes on to pose, see 1.3.3, 2.3.1.4; *Abs.* 8–16. For further discussion of the second, see esp. 1.3.6–7.

- 1.3.2.15 55.37 **nature of that inference]** Compare *Abs.* 10.

- 1.3.2.16 55.43–4 **Passions are connected...no less than external bodies are connected]** On this topic, see 2.3.1.5 ff.

### 1.3.3 *Why a cause is always necessary*

56.title *Why a cause is always necessary]* There is comment on the intent and implication of this section at *LG* 26–30; see also 'Immortality of the Soul' 5; and the next annotation.

- 1.3.3.1 56.2–3 **maxim...whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence...commonly taken for granted]** Hobbes, for example, said: 'For whatsoever is produced, in as much as it is produced, had an entire cause, that is, had all those things, which being supposed, it cannot be understood but that the effect follows; that is, it had a necessary cause' (*Elements of Philosophy* 2.9.5; cf. *Leviathan* 1.12 ¶6); Rohault, that '*Every Effect presupposes some Cause*' (*System* 1.5.6, axiom 4). See also Gassendi, *Syntagma* 2.1.4.8, [409–24], a survey of ancient opinions on the topic; Ward, *Philosophical Essay* 1.3; Locke, *Essay* 4.10.3, *Letter to the Bishop of Worcester*, *Works*, 4: 61–2, cited in ann. 58.1; S. Clarke, *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 1; Collins, *Philosophical Inquiry*, 49, 57. Hume also mentions this maxim at *EHU* 8.25; *DNR* 2.3, 9.3, and later wrote, in reply to a critic (John Stewart), 'But allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that any

thing might arise without a Cause: I only maintain'd, that our Certainty of the Falseness of that Proposition proceeded neither from Intuition nor Demonstration; but from another Source' (letter [of Feb. 1754], *Letters*, 1: 187). On Hume's exchange with Stewart, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 9.2.

56.7 **above-explain'd]** See 1.3.1.1–2.

- 1.3.3.4 56.37–41 and n. 17 **All the points of time...equal...object can never begin to be...something to fix its beginning]** Hume appears to paraphrase Hobbes, who said that 'a man cannot imagine anything to begin *without a cause*... but if he try [so to imagine], he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was *eternal*' (*Of Liberty and Necessity*, 276; cf. *Decameron physiologicum*, 85; *Elements of Philosophy* 2.8.19).

- 1.3.3.5 57.10–12 and n. 18 **second argument...if any thing wanted a cause, it wou'd produce itself]** Laird found a clear objection to this argument in the early editions of S. Clarke's work: 'the Sum of what all Atheists... have ever said upon this Head, amounts to no more but this One foolish Argument: That Matter could not begin to exist, when *it was not*; because this is supposing it to Be, before it was: and that it could not begin to Exist, when *it was*; because this is supposing it not to Be, after it was' (*Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 10 [125–6]; cf. Laird, *Hume's Philosophy*, 97). In later editions Clarke wrote: 'Now to be *Self-existent*, is not, to be *Produced by itself*; for that is an express Contradiction' (*Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 3 [15]). E. Law said: 'If *something* exists *now*, then something has existed *always*, otherwise, that something which now exists, must *once* either have been made by *nothing*, i.e. been *caused* by no *Cause*, which is absurd; or else have *made* itself, i.e. have *acted* before it *existed*, or been at once both *Effect* and *Cause*; which is also absurd' (in King, *Essay on the Origin of Evil* n. 18 [45]). See also Ward, *Philosophical Essay* 1.3.

57.19–20 **object, that exists absolutely without any cause...not its own cause]** According to many theologians and philosophers, it is only the Deity who can 'exist absolutely without any cause' and yet is not its own cause. As Watts put it, 'Every Being, besides the first Being, wants a Cause: God... is self-existent or independent, and has no Cause' (*Brief Scheme of Ontology* 10.3.2). See also E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 148–9; Butler, *Analogy of Religion* 1.6.4; Hume, *DNR* 9.3.

- 1.3.3.6 n. 19 (57) **Mr. Locke]** See the two following annotations.

57.25–7 and n. 19 **third argument...Whatever is produc'd without any cause...has nothing for its cause]** See Locke, *Essay* 4.10.3. S. Clarke puts this argument clearly: 'For since Something now Is, 'tis evident that Something always

Was: Otherwise the Things that Now Are, must have been produced out of Nothing, absolutely and without Cause: Which is a plain Contradiction in Terms. For, to say a Thing is *produced*, and yet that there is no *Cause* at all of that Production, is to say that Something is *Effected*, when it is *Effected by Nothing*; that is, at the same time when it is *not Effected at all* (*Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 1). Collins offered a variation on the theme, saying, 'If any thing can have a beginning which has no cause, then nothing can produce something. And if nothing can produce something, then the world might have had a beginning without a cause... a real absurdity' (*Philosophical Inquiry*, 57). See ann. 57.10 for E. Law's version of this argument.

57.28–9 **nothing can never be a cause... or equal to two right angles**] Locke, in the course of offering a variation on the 'third argument', said: 'Man knows by an intuitive Certainty, that bare *nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two right Angles*' (*Essay* 4.10.3, 8).

1.3.3.8 58.1–2 **frivolous... every effect must have a cause, because 'tis imply'd in the very idea of effect**] Hume may here refer to Locke's argument that we come to know that the proposition, 'every thing that has a beginning must have a cause' is true 'by contemplating our ideas, and perceiving that the idea of beginning to be [an effect] is necessarily connected with the idea of some operation; and the idea of operation, with the idea of something operating, which we call a cause; and so the [idea of] beginning to be, is perceived to agree with the idea of a cause, as is expressed in the proposition: [that "every thing that has a beginning must have a cause"] and thus it comes to be a certain proposition; and so may be called a principle of reason, as every true proposition is to him that perceives the certainty of it' (*Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, Works*, 4: 61–2).

1.3.3.9 58.16–17 **future enquiry**] The sections that follow, esp. 1.3.4–7.

1.3.4 *Of the component parts of our reasonings concerning cause and effect*

1.3.4.2 58.31–2 **any point of history... for what reason... believe or reject it**] See also 1.3.13.6; ann. 99.29; *EHU* 10.5.

1.3.5 *Of the impressions of sense and memory*

1.3.5.2 59.26–30 **impressions... impossible to decide... whether they arise... from the object... mind... author of our being**] Malebranche compiled a list of the five possible '*ways external objects can be seen*'. The three possibilities that Hume considers correspond to the first three of these ways. There is an 'absolute necessity', Malebranche said, that '(a) the ideas we have of bodies and of all other objects... come from these bodies or objects; or (b) our soul has the power of producing these ideas; or (c) God has produced them in us while creating the soul or produces them every time we think about a given object'. The two Malebranchean possibilities omitted from Hume's list, (d) that 'the soul has in itself all the perfections it sees in bodies', and (e) that 'the soul is joined to a completely perfect being that contains... all the ideas of created beings', appear to be variant forms of (b) and (c) (*Search*

3.2.1.2 [219]; cf. *Elucidation* 6 [571–2]). See also Descartes, *Meditations* 3, 6 [AT 7: 38–9, 79–80]; Locke, *Essay* 2.8.7–15, 2.30.2; Berkeley, *Principles* 1.33.

59.30–1 **Nor is such a question any way material to our present purpose]** Malebranche had made a similar disclaimer, saying that because 'we do not reason on the basis of these [external] beings but on their ideas', it is 'not absolutely necessary to examine whether there are actually beings external to us corresponding to these ideas' (*Search* 6.2.6 [484]; see also *Elucidation* 17 [747]).

1.3.5.3 59.34–5 **the characteristic, which distinguishes the memory from the imagination]** See also 1.1.3; anns. 11.35, 12.5.

1.3.5.5 60.27–8 **painter...to represent a passion...get a sight of a person actuated by a like emotion]** Painters could have seen many of the passions or emotions illustrated in Le Brun, *Conference...upon Expression, General and Particular*. Le Brun appears to have assumed a uniformity in the expression of each passion.

60.32 **he always finds its idea to be much decay'd]** Hobbes, not distinguishing between imagination and memory, said that imagination 'is nothing but *decaying sense*' (*Leviathan* 1.2 ¶2; cf. *Elements of Law* 1.3.7; *Elements of Philosophy* 4.25.7). Locke associates memory and the 'constant decay' of ideas (*Essay* 2.10.4–5). See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Memory'.

1.3.5.7 61.8–9 **perception...constitutes the first act of the judgment]** Descartes articulated the more typical view that there is, or ought to be, a clear separation between perception and the first *act* of judgement, saying that he 'saw that over and above perception, which is a prerequisite of judgement, we need affirmation and negation to determine the form of the judgement, and also that we are often free to withhold our assent, even if we perceive the matter in question. Hence I assigned the act of judging itself, which consists simply in assenting (i.e. in affirmation or denial) to the determination of the will rather than to the perception of the intellect' (*Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, Works*, 1: 307 [AT 8B: 363]). Arnauld and Nicole also say that judging is an action by which the mind brings together ideas that were previously conceived 'without forming any explicit judgment about them' (*Logic* 1 [23]). See also Locke, *Essay* 4.1.4; below, n. 20 (67); ann. n. 20.3 (67).

1.3.6 *Of the inference from the impression to the idea*

1.3.6.1 61.14–19 **no object...implies the existence of any other...no impossibility of that kind]** Glanvill and Wilkins reached similar conclusions about the logical openness of causal inferences. The former said: 'We cannot know any thing to be the cause of another, but from its attending it; and this way is not infallible... There's no demonstration but where the contrary is impossible' (*Vanity of Dogmatizing* 20 [188]). Wilkins insisted that there may be '*indubitable certainty*' without '*infallible certainty*', which is to say there are many things (e.g., that the sun will rise tomorrow) that we cannot but believe, even though we can see that their 'contrary is not impossible, and doth not imply any Contradiction' (*Of the Principles and Duties of*

*Natural Religion* 1.3.4). For additional discussion of the issues raised here, see also 1.3.6.5, 1.3.7.3, 1.3.11.2, 3.1.1.18; anns. 56.2; 62.40; 66.27, 29; 86.12; 92.7; 298.22; *Abs.* 11, 14–16, 18; *EHU* 4.2, 18, 12.27–8; *DNR* 9.5–7.

1.3.6.3 61.36 **we have insensibly discover'd a new relation]** See 1.3.2.6–11.

61.38 **CONSTANT CONJUNCTION]** Malebranche had also given constant conjunction a role in the causal judgements of ordinary individuals. Because 'the true cause' of an effect is unknown to us, 'men never fail to judge that a thing is the cause of a given effect when the two are conjoined... This is why everyone concludes that a moving ball which strikes another is the true and principal cause of the motion it communicates to the other... and such other prejudices—because it always happens that a ball moves when struck by another... and that we do not sensibly perceive what else could be the cause of these movements' (*Search* 3.2.3 [224]; cf. 4.10.2 [310–11]; *Elucidations* 15 [671]; cf. anns. 55.11, 18). Keill took constant conjunction to be a sure indication of a causal connection: 'If two things are so connected together, that they perpetually accompany each other, that is, if one of them is changed or removed, the other likewise will be in the same manner changed or removed; either one of these is the Cause of the other, or they both proceed from the same common Cause' (*Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 8, axiom 7). See also Berkeley, *New Theory of Vision* 17. Compare *THN* 1.3.14.12, 1.3.15.5, 2.3.1.4–18; *Abs.* 9–15. Hume's index to *ETSS* includes the heading 'Conjunction, frequent, constant, the only circumstance from which we know Cause and Effect, 7.21, 7.26, 8.5, 8.7, &c.' (*EHU*, Clarendon Edition, 308). See also *EHU* 5.5, 7.28.

61.41 **now see the advantage of quitting the direct survey]** Hume quit the 'direct survey' at 1.3.2.13; see also 1.3.14.1.

62.22 **Perhaps 'twill appear]** See ¶¶13–15 of this section and 1.3.14.20, 26–9.

1.3.6.4 62.36 **knowledge or probability... degrees of evidence]** On knowledge, probability, and degrees of evidence, see ann. 50.title. In early modern use *evidence* often denoted a quality or a condition which, when present, gives rise to conviction or certainty, with different degrees of evidence presumably representing (rather than producing) different levels of conviction. Thus Malebranche said that 'evidence [*l'évidence*] consists only in the clear and distinct perception of all the constituents and relations of the object necessary to support a well-founded judgment' (*Search* 1.2.3 [10]). According to the *Dictionnaire de L'Académie française* (1694), 'Evidence' is the 'Qualité de ce qui est évident'. Chambers, after defining evidence as 'a Quality in Things whereby they become visible and apparent', went on to say that '*Evidence*, is the essential and infallible Character, or Criterion of Truth; and is that, in Effect, which with us constitutes Truth... If *Evidence* should be found in Propositions that are false, we shou'd be compell'd into Error; since the Assent we give to *Evidence* is necessary' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Evidence'). For Locke's use of the term in this sense, see *Essay* 4.2.1, 4, 14; 4.17.14). See also 'Gravesande, *Introduction* 2.12 ('De l'Evidence'); *OED*, 'evidence' 1. Huet expressed a sceptical view, arguing that 'Evidence' is simply

a 'Modification' of 'images', and that it 'may be on the wrong as well as the right Side, and that the Evidence on the right Side carries no Marks whereby it may be known from that on the wrong Side' (*Philosophical Treatise* 1.9 [62]). Frede argues that Theophrastus was the first philosopher to suggest that the quality of evidentness is a guarantee of truth, and that the Stoics and Epicureans adopted this view ('Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions').

1.3.6.5 62.38 **foregoing . . . reasoning**] See 1.3.3.3.

62.40–1 **We can at least conceive a change in the course of nature**] Hobbes and Leibniz made this point in different ways. Hobbes insisted that uniform past experience proves nothing about the future, thus leaving us free to imagine even that day will not follow night. The 'signs' derived from experience, he said, 'are but conjectural; and according as they have often or seldom failed, so their assurance is more or less; but never full and evident; for though a man hath always seen the day and night to follow one another hitherto; yet can he not thence conclude they shall do so, or that they have done so eternally. Experience concludeth nothing universally' (*Elements of Law* 1.4.10). Leibniz used much the same example, but concluded that there will come a time at which day does not follow night because there will be no sunrise. We 'expect the day to dawn tomorrow', he said, 'because we have always experienced it thus; only an astronomer foresees it by reason, and even this prediction will finally fail, when the cause of day dawning, which is not eternal, shall cease' ('Principles of Nature and Grace' 5). For further references to the related set of issues raised here, see ann. 61.14.

1.3.6.7 63.17–18 **probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance**] Butler also emphasized the connection between probability and resemblance. When 'we determine a thing to be probably true, [or] suppose that an event has or will come to pass', he said, 'it is from the mind's remarking in it a likeness to some other event, which we have observed has come to pass'. To this he added that 'this observation forms, in numberless daily instances, a presumption, opinion, or full conviction, that such event has or will come to pass', depending on our past experience (*Analogy of Religion*, Intro. §3).

1.3.6.9 63.37 **already made**] See 1.3.2.10.

63.40 **remark afterwards**] See, e.g., 1.3.14.

1.3.6.10 64.2 **already prov'd**] See 1.3.2.5.

64.5–6 **appeal to past experience decides nothing in the present case**] The limitations of past experience as a guide to the future were discussed in classical times. Sextus Empiricus, taking 'induction' to be the attempt to establish a general proposition by means of a review of relevant particulars, argued that inductions will fail to establish general propositions because, either by design or by necessity, only some portion of the relevant particulars will have been reviewed. Assuming this analysis valid, it will follow that no review of relevant past particulars will establish a

reliable general proposition covering, or guaranteeing, a future outcome (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 2.204). Arnauld and Nicole reached the same conclusion. No axiom, they argued, can be established by induction—by experience or observation. Induction can provide only ‘probability’, because it is ‘a certain means for knowing something only when we are sure that the induction is complete’. We find, though, that nothing is ‘more common than discovering the falsity of something we thought was true based on inductions that appeared so general that we could not imagine finding any exception to them’. These same authors also argued that, just as ‘we ought to believe it probable that an event has happened whenever certain circumstances’ we know to be ‘ordinarily connected with that event’ have taken place, so ‘we also ought to believe that it is likely that [a given event] is likely to happen whenever present circumstances are such that they are usually followed by such an effect’ (*Logic* 4.6 [247], 16 [273]). See also ann. 92.7. For additional historical background, see Brown, ‘History Versus Hacking on Probability’; Milton, ‘Induction before Hume’; Franklin, *Science of Conjecture*, 109–13, 119–20, 200–3, 206–10.

1.3.6.12 64.25 **already taken notice**] See ¶¶2–3 of this section.

1.3.6.14 65.14–16 **not...necessary...we shou’d reflect on...experience**] Arnauld and Nicole also argued that there is such a close connection between words and ideas that the former give rise to the latter without the need for reflection. Having said that ‘it is useful to the aim of logic...to understand the different functions of sounds intended to signify ideas’, they went on to say that the mind typically links sound and idea ‘so closely that we can scarcely conceive one without the other’ (*Logic* 2.1 [73]). See also Locke, *Essay* 3.2.8.

1.3.7 *Of the nature of the idea or belief*

1.3.7.1 65.37–9 **to discover more fully the nature of belief...following considerations**] On the nature of belief, see, in addition to the discussion which follows in this section, 1.3.13.19; 1.4.2.24, 41–52; ann. 68.15; *Abs.* 17–25, 27 (published March 1740), App. 2–9 (published, as was ¶7 of this section, Oct. 1740); ann. 396.26; *EHU* 5.8, 10–22. Hume’s index to *ETSS*, under the heading, ‘Belief, what’, directs readers to 5.10–11, *Et c.* (*EHU*, Clarendon Edition, 307).

1.3.7.3 66.27–8 **nor is it possible...to conceive any thing contrary to a demonstration**] Hume repeats a commonly held view. Barrow attempted to explain why demonstrations, especially those of mathematics, ‘do necessarily compel the Assent of the Hearer’, thus leaving him with no freedom to imagine their contrary (*Mathematical Lectures*, 56). Locke said that in ‘some of our *Ideas*’, there are ‘certain Relations, Habitues, and Connexions, so visibly included in the Nature of the *Ideas* themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them, by any Power whatsoever’. Consequently, finding that the angles of a right triangle are equal to two right angles (the familiar example used by Hume at 1.3.1.1 and 1.3.14.23), we are unable to conceive this relationship to be, or to be made, other than it is, or ‘to depend on any arbitrary Power’ (*Essay* 4.3.29). For further references to the related set of issues raised here, see ann. 61.14.



66.29–31 **in reasonings from causation...imagination is free to conceive both sides]** Hume again repeats a common view. Maxwell, for example, said that we 'plainly perceive, that it is no Contradiction or Absurdity, to suppose, that the World were in some respects otherwise than it is... we can easily conceive it existing otherwise [than it does], which we could not do, were it impossible for it to exist otherwise, for we cannot conceive Impossibilities' (App. 2 [100–1], in Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature*). Again, for further references to the related set of issues raised here, see ann. 61.14.

1.3.7.4 67.1–2 **manner of our conceiving]** See also 1.3.8.7; *Abs.* 21–2; *EHU* 5.12–13.

1.3.7.5 67.3–5 **impressions and ideas...differ...only in their...force and vivacity]** Hume revises this claim at App. 22; see also ¶7 of this section.

67.13–15 **belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA...PRESENT IMPRESSION]** See also 1.3.7.7 (published Oct. 1740), ann. 68.15.

n. 20.3–4 (67) **vulgar division of the acts of the understanding...and in the definitions...of them]** Drummond, with whom Hume studied logic at Edinburgh, supposed there were three 'operations of the mind', apprehension, judgement, and discourse or sequential thinking. See Stewart, 'Hume's Intellectual Development', 13. Early modern logicians commonly identified four operations of the mind, of which the first three were those, conception, judgement, and reasoning, mentioned by Hume. Arnauld and Nicole said that 'Logic...consists in reflections... on the four principal operations of the mind: *conceiving, judging, reasoning, and ordering*' (*Logic*, [23]), and then gave definitions of conceiving, judging, and reasoning not unlike those reported by Hume. For further examples, see Le Grand, *Entire Body of Philosophy*, 1–2; Brightland, *Grammar of the English Tongue*, 193–4; Crousaz, *New Treatise of the Art of Thinking* 2: 2; Watts, *Logick*, Intro.; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Logic'; Martin, *Bibliotheca Technologica*, 'Of Logic'. Laird mentions four other logicians who maintain this position: Keckermann, Burgersdijk, Aldrich, and Heineccius (*Hume's Philosophy*, 110 n.). Hume's position in some ways resembles that of Malebranche, who said that 'there is no difference on the part of the understanding between a simple perception, a judgment, and an inference'. Malebranche still supposed, however, that in judgements we perceive 'the relations between two or more things', and that in inferences or reasoning we perceive 'the relations among the relations of things' (*Search* 1.2.1 [7]; cf. 6.1.2, quoted by Laird, *Hume's Philosophy*, 110).

1.3.7.7 68.15–18 **idea assented to feels different...superior force...steadiness]** Similar descriptions of belief are found at 1.3.10.10 (first published as part of the Appendix); 1.4.1.8; App. 2–3, 5, 8; *Abs.* 22; *EHU* 5.12–13.

68.18–36 **This variety of terms...all our actions]** These lines are repeated, virtually unchanged, at *EHU* 5.12; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), p. lxx; see also ann. 397.21. A similar variety of terms recurs at App. 3 and *Abs.* 21–2.

68.22–3 **imagination has the command over all its ideas]** See also 1.1.3.2–4; ann. 12.5; *EHU* 5.10.

1.3.7.8 68.37 **This definition]** The definition found at the end of ¶5 of this section.

68.40–1 **book as a romance...as a true history]** Compare 'Study of History' 1.

1.3.8 *Of the causes of belief*

1.3.8.3 69.32–71.7 **may, therefore, observe...reality of his existence]** These lines and n. 21 are repeated, virtually unchanged, at *EHU* 5.15–18; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lxx–lxxvii.

1.3.8.4 70.4–6 **devotees of that strange superstition...good effect of those external motions]** Hume associated 'superstition' with the Roman Catholic religion (and enthusiasm with the Protestant); see his essay, 'Superstition and Enthusiasm'. See also *HE*, Foreword, 1: pp. xiv–xviii; 62 [6: 142–5], or *HE*, 2nd edn., 5: 7–9, 25–7. Aquinas explained that true religion does not worship images 'considered as mere things themselves, but as images drawing us to God incarnate. Motion to an image does not stop there at the image, but goes on to the thing it represents.' Images found in churches 'are signs, with the purpose of impressing on our minds and confirming the belief in the sublimity of angels and saints' (*Summa theologiae* 2a2ae.81, 3; 2a2ae.94, 2; cf. 3a.25, 4). The Council of Trent said that 'when the nature of Men was such that it could not be supported without external props, to the meditation of Divine things...the Church, appointed certain Rites, to the end that some might be pronounced with a low, and others with a more audible voice in the Mass. Ceremonies...as mystical Benediction, Lights, Incense, Vestments, and many more of that kind...whereby...the minds of the Faithful might be excited to contemplation of the most Holy things...by these visible signs of Religion and Piety.' It further recommended that 'the Images of Christ, of the Virgin, and of other Saints, ought especially to be had and kept in Churches', not only because the 'Honour and Veneration...which is given them, redounds to the Prototypes, which they represent', but also so that by means of 'Pictures, and other Similitudes, the people are instructed and confirmed...and may be stirred up to adore and love God, and exercise and delight in Godliness' (*Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, 'Doctrine of the Sacrifice of the Mass' 22.5; 'Concerning the Invocation, Worship, and Relicks of the Saints, and Holy Images' 25). See also Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, 'Image'. Among authors Hume is known to have read, Saint-Evremond said that it is 'a commendable thing...to *Worship God in Spirit and Truth*... But when we endeavour to discharge our Souls from all Commerce with our Senses, can we assure our selves that an abstracted Understanding will not lose it self in wandering Thoughts?... Images; which, in a manner, fix what's so hard to be settled, the Mind...[and] the Images of our Saints may surely kindle in us the Ardour of their Zeal' (*Works*, 2: 192). See also ann. 331.20; *EHU* 5.16; 'Superstition and Enthusiasm' 2–4; *HE* 31 [3: 252–3].

70.17–18 **foregoing principle]** See 69.10–13.

- 1.3.8.5 70.27 **two hundred leagues distant**] Assuming that a league is equal to approximately three miles (so Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, and *OED*, 'League'), La Flèche, where much of the *Treatise* was drafted, is about 200 leagues from Hume's home in Scotland.

n. 21.1–9 (70) *Naturane...disciplina*] Hume quotes a passage from Cicero, *De finibus bonorum et malorum* 5.1.2. Piso, an interlocutor in this dialogue is speaking: 'Shall I say that it is due to nature, he said, or to some kind of illusion that when we see those places in which we have heard that memorable men have passed much time, we are more moved than when we hear of their deeds or read something that they have written? As I am now moved. For Plato comes before my mind, who we have heard was the first to practise disputation here: and his gardens nearby not only bring him to mind, but seem to set him here himself before my eyes. And this is where Speusippus was, and Xenocrates and his pupil Polemo, and that is actually Polemo's seat that we see there. Again when I used to look at our Senate House, I mean the Senate House of Hostilius, not the new one which is somehow diminished since it was enlarged, I always used to think of Scipio, Cato and Laelius, and above all of my grandfather. Places have so much capacity to remind us, that we have properly developed a mnemonic technique from them. Cicero, *On Ends*, Book 5.' (The same passage, with minor revisions, is cited in *EHU* 5 n. 9; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), p. lxvii.)

Piso is Marcus Piso, consul in 61 BC. In *De finibus* he is made the spokesman for Antiochus (*fl.* 86–68 BC), restorer of the Old Academy, whose lectures Cicero attended. Speusippus (*c.* 407–339 BC), Xenocrates (*fl.* 339–314 BC), and Polemo (d. 273 BC) were, in that order, heads of the first Academy after Plato's death in 348 BC. Hostilius, a legendary king, mid-seventh century BC, was reputed to have built the original Senate House. Scipio (*c.* 185–129 BC), Cato (234–149 BC), and Laelius (*fl.* 140 BC) were prominent statesmen. The grandfather of whom Piso speaks is presumably Lucius Piso Frugi, consul in 133 BC.

- 1.3.8.6 71.2–3 **best relicts...handy-work of a saint...his cloaths and furniture**] Aquinas, explaining veneration of the relics of saints, suggested that 'a person who holds another in affection will venerate whatever remains of him after his death; not only his body and its parts, but also his material possessions such as clothing and the like' (*Summa Theologiae* 3a.25, 6). See also 2.3.8.2; ann. 277.25; *HE* 31 [3: 252–3], 34 [3: 340–1].

71.9 **precedent definition**] See 1.3.6.15, 1.3.7.5.

- 1.3.8.10 72.3–4 **CUSTOM...past repetition**] See also *Abs.* 15–16, 21; ann. 410.44; *EHU* 5.5–9.

- 1.3.8.12 72.20 **sentiment**] A term with a broad range of meanings, several of which may be found in *THN*; see, e.g., 1.4.3.8, 2.1.11.1, 3.1.1.26, 3.1.2.8, 3.2.5.4, and the relevant annotations to these paragraphs. Chambers took *thought* or *sentiment* to be 'a general Name for all the Ideas consequent on the Operations of the Mind, and even for the Operations themselves' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Thought'). *OED*, with examples of use from

the early modern period, suggests that a sentiment is 'What one feels with regard to something; mental attitude (of approval or disapproval, etc.)'; 'A mental feeling, an emotion'; 'A thought or reflection coloured by or proceeding from emotion' (s.v. 'sentiment', 6.a, 7.a, 8.a).

1.3.8.13 73.3 **that principle]** See 1.3.6.5.

1.3.8.14 73.16–17 **attain the knowledge of a...cause...by one experiment...made with judgment]** Barrow made much the same claim: 'the Truth of Principles does not solely depend on *Induction*, or a Perpetual Observation of Particulars...since only one Experiment will suffice (provided it be sufficiently clear and indubitable) to establish a true Hypothesis, to form a true Definition; and consequently to constitute true Principles' (*Mathematical Lectures*, 116). Malebranche provides an example of what he took to be such a single experiment (eating for the first time a new kind of fruit) from, as Hume puts it, 'common life'; see *Elucidations* 13 [646]. See also Galileo, *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*, 122; Hooke, 'Method of Making Experiments', in *Philosophical Experiments and Observations*, 26–8. Hume returns to this issue at 1.3.15.6; see also *EHU* 7.27.

73.32–4 **difficult to talk...of the mind...common language has seldom made...nice distinctions]** Bacon reached a similar conclusion about common language, saying that 'words are mostly bestowed to suit the capacity of the common man, and they dissect things along the lines most obvious to the common understanding. And when a sharper understanding, or more careful observation, attempts to draw those lines more in accordance with nature, words resist. Hence it happens that the great and solemn controversies of learned men often end in disputes about words and names' (*New Organon* 1.59). See also Locke, *Essay* 2.21.30; Berkeley, *New Theory of Vision* 120.

1.3.8.16 74.15–16 **that certain je-ne-scai-quoi]** This phrase was current in France before 1635, the year in which Jean Ogier de Gombauld presented a paper on it to the newly founded Académie française. Bouhours discusses the notion at some length in his *Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugène*. Boileau, in a representative use, said: 'Now, if any Man asks me, What this Agreeableness and this Salt is? I Answer, That it is a *Je ne scay quoy*, which may be better conceiv'd than describ'd. But yet in my Opinion, it principally consists in offering nothing to the Reader but true Thoughts and just Expressions' (Preface, *Works* [p. cxxiii]). For a discussion of the French use of the phrase in the seventeenth century, see Dumonceaux, *Langue et Sensibilité au XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle*, 424–6.

1.3.9 *Of the effects of other relations and other habits*

1.3.9.1 74.24 **foregoing arguments]** See 1.3.5–8.

1.3.9.2 74.32 **often observ'd]** See 1.1.4, 1.3.6.13.

74.35 **also observ'd]** See 1.3.8.3–6.

- 1.3.9.4 75.29–30 **I form an idea of Rome, which I neither see nor remember]** Hume's example (belief that there is a city of Rome corresponding to an idea of Rome) showing that judgement 'peoples the world' had been used in earlier discussions aimed at showing, as Descartes put it, that 'some things are considered as morally certain, that is, as having sufficient certainty for application to ordinary life... Thus those who have never been in Rome have no doubt that it is a town in Italy' (*Principles of Philosophy* 4.205). Filleau de la Chaise, in a brief work first published along with an edition of Pascal's *Pensées*, said that 'as for Matters of Fact, they are certain, or they be not. There is a City of Rome, or there is not... the things that prove there is a City of that Name, shews it us as plain, as if we had liv'd there all our Life; there is no difficulty in the Case' (*Treatise*, 370). Huet supposed it was Constantinople that he knew to exist with a moral certainty (*Philosophical Treatise* 1.1 [14]). See also Locke, *Essay* 4.16.8; Hume, *Letters*, 1: 187.
- 1.3.9.9 76.45–77.2 **with a lively image of the Red-Sea... Jerusalem... never doubt of any miraculous events]** T. Browne observed that 'Some beleeve the better for seeing Christ his Sepulchre, and when they have scene the Red Sea, doubt not of the miracle' (*Religio Medici* 1.9 [18]). Bayle repeated Browne's observation in Explanation 3 (*Dictionary* 5: 834–5). See Exod. 14 for the account of the miraculous separation of the waters of the Red Sea that allowed the Israelites, under the leadership of Moses, to escape the pursuing Egyptians. Making water drinkable and the provision of food (manna) in the desert, are described in Exod. 15: 22–5 and 16: 4–36, works traditionally ascribed to Moses. The 'miraculous events' described by the 'Evangelists' (Matthew, Mark, Luke, John) as taking place in Jerusalem include Christ healing the lame and blind in the temple (Matt. 21: 14), his resurrection (Luke 24: 1–6), his reappearance to his disciples (John 20: 11–30). Matt. 14: 22–5 reports that Christ walked on the Sea of Galilee. Mark 6: 35–41 reports that he stilled a tempest thereon, and on its shores fed 5,000 people with five loaves and two fish.
- 1.3.9.10 77.8 **have remark'd]** See 1.3.2.5 and 1.3.6.1.
- 77.14–17 **philosophers have imagin'd...might immediately infer the motion...without...past observation]** Hobbes and Malebranche may be among these philosophers. Hobbes, by supposing it to be axiomatic that 'whatsoever body being at rest is afterwards moved, hath for its immediate movement some other body which is in motion and toucheth it', suggested that a reasonable man, lacking any relevant previous experience, could (as Hume puts it) 'infer the motion of one body from the impulse of another' (*Decameron physiologicum*, 86). Malebranche supposed that from the 'distinct and particular' ideas of fire and soft mud one could infer that exposing such mud to fire 'must...leave it dry and hard' (*Search* 6.2.2 [444]; cf. 4.2.5 [276]). See also ann. 54.39; *EHU* 4.9–13.
- 77.36 **according to my hypothesis]** See 1.3.6.15, 1.3.7; *Abs.* 35.

- 1.3.9.11 77.37–8 **universally allow'd... the eye at all times sees an equal number of physical points]** We are unable to establish that this view was held by all 'writers on optics', but it was held by Berkeley, and it is his account of the matter that Hume loosely paraphrases here. 'Of these visible points', said Berkeley, 'we see at all times an equal number. It is every whit as great when our view is contracted and bounded by near objects, as when it is extended to larger and remoter. For it being impossible that one *minimum visibile* should obscure or keep out of sight more than one other, it is a plain consequence, that when my view is on all sides bounded by the walls of my study, I see just as many visible points as I could, in case that by the removal of the study-walls and all other obstructions, I had a full prospect of the circumjacent fields, mountains, sea, and open firmament' (*New Theory of Vision* 82). Hooke, translating Descartes, *Optics* 6, gives a physical explanation of the phenomenon: 'And the *Retina* being like a piece of Plush, with the ends of the Threads turn'd towards the *Crystalline*, all the other ends of them being terminated in the *Brain*, there can be no more distinct Sensations than there are distinct Threads to convey the Impression on them: So that if the whole Picture of the Object be smaller than one single Thread of this Plush, it cannot affect or move a less part than one of those small Threads or Filaments of the *Retina*, and therefore the Sensation is the same as if the Object did take up or cover the whole end of the Thread or Filament' ('Lectures of Light', 98). See also Malebranche, *Search* 6.1.5 [432].
- 1.3.9.12 78.11–12 **weakness of human nature... CREDULITY... too easy faith in the testimony of others]** At *EHU* 10.30 Hume observed: 'The *avidum genus auricularum*, the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and promotes wonder'. The words '*avidum genus auricularum*' are a shortened version of a line from Lucretius, who, speaking of those who relate 'miraculous tales', said '*humanum genus est avidum nimis auricularum*'—i.e. 'all mankind are too greedy for ears to tickle' (*Nature of Things* 4.592–4). Glanvill said that 'the most of mankind is led by *opinionative* impulse; and *Imagination* is prædominant. Hence we have an ungrounded *credulity* cry'd up for *faith*' (*Vanity of Dogmatizing* 11 [104]). Arnauld and Nicole touch on credulity in their important discussion of testimony and the 'rules for directing reason well in beliefs' about, among other things, miracles (*Logic* 4.13–15). See also Meric Casaubon, *Treatise Concerning Enthusiasme*.
- 1.3.9.13 78.34–5 **universal carelessness... future state]** See also 2.3.7.3.
- 78.39–42 **eminent theologians have not scrupled to affirm... vulgar... nothing like... a belief of... eternal duration]** Pascal, having said that nothing is so important to us and more fearful than our eternal state, complained: 'Our imagination so much enlarges the present by constantly reflecting on it, and so much shrinks eternity because we fail to reflect on it, that we turn eternity into nothingness and nothingness into eternity' (*Port-Royal Pensées*, 11, 186 [B195; Kr432]; cf. 125 [B194; Kr 427]). Sherlock supposed that if the vulgar had 'a warm

and constant Sense' of death, the last judgement, heaven and hell, it would be 'morally impossible Men should live such careless Lives, should so wholly devote themselves to this World' (*Practical Discourse concerning Death*, 1–2; see also his *Practical Discourse concerning a Future Judgment*, 3). Butler warned that the imagination typically overcomes reason, leading us to 'lose ourselves in gross and crude conceptions of things' and to presume 'that death will be our destruction' (*Analogy of Religion* 1.1.9). See also Erasmus, *Enchiridion* 10 [85–6]; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.1.11; Bayle, *Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet* 133; Locke, *Essay* 2.21.44; Saint-Evremond, *Works*, 2: 260–1; Addison, *Spectator* 575; Mandeville, *Enquiry into the Origin of Honour*, 19, 35; *THN* 3.2.7.8, 3.2.12.5; anns. 345.10, 365.22; 'Public Credit' 31; 'Immortality of the Soul' 13; *DNR* 10.1, 12.13–14.

79.1–2 **the strongest figures are infinitely inferior to the subject]** Nicole said that, although God and eternal things are infinitely more important than temporal ones, 'yet the smallest pleasures and the least worldly advantages are every day preferred before GOD and eternal happiness; because we have a quick sense of those pleasures and advantages, whereas GOD and eternal things are but weakly conceived' (*Préjuges légitimes contre les calvinistes*, as quoted by Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Pellison' [E]). Malebranche said that 'the senses represent objects as present, and the imagination represents them only as absent . . . Thus, the soul is more occupied with a simple pinprick than with lofty speculations, and the ills and pleasures of this world impress it more than the terrible pains or infinite pleasures of eternity' (*Search* 1.18.1 [79–80]; cf. 4.12; 5.5 [365]).

- 1.3.9.14 79.30 **Gunpowder-treason]** The reference is to an alleged plot of a few English Roman Catholics to blow up the Houses of Parliament while the King, Lords, and Commons were assembled on 5 Nov. 1605. Guy Fawkes, for whom the day now commemorating this event is named, was one of those implicated in the plot. For Hume's account, see *HE* 46 [5: 25–33].

79.30 **massacre of St. Bartholomew]** In 1572 the feast-day (24 Aug.) honouring St Bartholomew marked the beginning of a massacre of French Protestants, first in Paris and then throughout France. For Hume's accounts, see *HE* 40 [4: 162–3], 70 [6: 470–1].

- 1.3.9.15 79.40–3 **fear and terror . . . soften'd by the want of belief]** As Dennis explained, 'tho' sometimes a vigorous lively Imitation of Creatures that are in their Natures noxious, may be capable of giving us Terror, yet Nature, by giving us a secret Intelligence that the Object is not real, can turn even that tormenting Passion to Pleasure' (*Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry* [1: 264]). See also 1.3.10.10; ann. 85.9.

- 1.3.9.16 80.17 **foregoing explication]** For Hume's earlier account of 'belief and judgment' as the effect of transfers of attention and vivacity, see 1.3.5–8,

esp. 1.3.5.6–7, 1.3.7.5–7 and n. 20 (67), 1.3.8.13; and the earlier paragraphs of the present section.

1.3.9.18 80.33–4 **A person, that has lost a leg or an arm...endeavours...to serve himself with them]** Descartes 'heard that those who had a leg or an arm amputated sometimes still seemed to feel pain intermittently in the missing part of the body', and offered a physiological explanation of the phenomenon; (*Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 77]; *Principles of Philosophy* 4.196). See also Gassendi, *Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 333]; Rohault, *System* 1.2.30. The sensation of continued feeling in amputated limbs (the phantom limb phenomenon) was first described in the mid-sixteenth century; see Price and Twombly, *Phantom Limb Phenomenon*.

1.3.9.19 80.41 **argument from education]** Locke's discussion of the association of ideas included comments about the negative effects of education, as well as of custom and chance, in forming unreasonable and unshakeable opinions or prejudices; see *Essay* 1.3.20, 2.33.2–8. See also *NHR* 11.3, 15.1.

n. 22 (81) This note was prepared as Book 2 of the *Treatise* was being printed, and was added here by means of a cancel. For further details about this addition, see *Editing the Texts*, Sect. 1.2.2.

n. 22.4 (81) **the word, imagination, is commonly us'd in two different senses]** Malebranche had encountered a similar problem with the term *imagination*. Having distinguished two faculties of the imagination, one active and the other passive, he went on to say: 'In this work we shall call both of these things indifferently by the word *imagination*, and we shall not distinguish them by the words *active* and *passive*, which we might well assign to them. This distinction will not be made because it will be sufficiently clear from the context.' Elsewhere he said that 'The mind is termed *sense* or *imagination* when its body is the natural or occasional cause of its thoughts, and it is called *understanding* when it acts by itself—or rather, when God acts in it and when His light illuminates it in various ways, with no necessary relation to what is occurring in the body' (*Search* 2.1.1.2 [88]; 5.1 [337]).

1.3.10 *Of the influence of belief*

1.3.10.1–3 81.12–82.9 **But tho' education...tranquillity]** The first edition text of this material (1.3.10.1–2) was abbreviated in order to allow the addition of n. 22, by means of a cancel, to the end of sect. 9. We have here restored the original version of this material. For further details, see *Editing the Texts*, Register B, entries 81.10–82.1.

1.3.10.1 81.12–15 **education...is the cause why all systems...are apt to be rejected at first]** Malebranche offered a similar explanation of the resistance met by new ideas. 'Now all precipitous judgements', he said, 'are always in agreement with prejudices. Thus, authors who oppose prejudices cannot fail to be condemned by all those who consult their long-held opinions as if they were laws according to which they should always



decide' (*Elucidations*, Preface [539]). See also Glanvill, *Vanity of Dogmatizing* 14–15; Locke, *Essay* 1.3.25.

81.23–4 **consideration afterwards...of the passions...sense of beauty**] The passions are the principal subject of Book 2, and beauty, as a cause of pride, is the subject of 2.1.8. There is no substantial discussion of the sense of beauty itself in the *Treatise* as published, and the term *sense of beauty* occurs only at 2.1.1.3; 2.2.11.2, 4; 3.3.1.8; and 3.3.6.1. A discussion of the sense of beauty would likely have been included in the examination of criticism that Hume proposed to publish as part of a longer *Treatise*. See the Advertisement preceding Book 1; ann. n. 71.28 (324).

- 1.3.10.2 81.25–7 **good or evil, or...pain and pleasure...chief spring...of...actions**] The identification of good and evil (although not necessarily moral good and evil) with pleasure and pain, was not uncommon. Locke said that 'Good and Evil...are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which occasions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us' (*Essay* 2.28.5; cf. 2.20.2, 2.21.42); Hutcheson, that 'nothing is *Advantageous* or *naturally Good* to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure *mediately*, or *immediately*' (*Inquiry* 2, Intro. [113]; see also anns. 231.20, 303.29). Rapin reminded his readers that Aristotle reduced 'the Principles of all Humane Actions to Pleasure, and Pain; which are the Universal Springs of the Passions' (*Whole Critical Works* 1: 409; cf. 1: 403; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.1–5). Malebranche, by contrast, argued that pleasure and pain are not themselves good and evil, but only 'the soul's natural signs for distinguishing good from evil' (*Search* 5.3 [348]).

- 1.3.10.4 82.37 **prevailing passion**] That individuals are typically under the influence of a single, predominating passion or character trait was widely accepted. Gracian said that there is 'no Will that hath not its predominant Passion' (*Art of Prudence*, 26). See also Charron, *Of Wisdom* 2.1; Roscommon, *Essay on Translated Verse*, 7; Locke, *Essay* 4.20.12; *Conduct of the Understanding* §43; S. Clarke, *Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion* 1.2; Hume, 'The Sceptic' 2; *HE* 23 [2: 499], 25 [3: 37], 26 [3: 66, 73].

83.4–6 **mystery...already a little acquainted...farther occasion...this treatise**] Hume may allude to remarks found above at 1.2.1.1 and 1.3.8.2–7, and to those that follow at 2.1.8.6, 2.3.5, and 2.3.8. As there is in the *Treatise* no further discussion of 'miraculous relations' as such, he may also allude to his essay, 'Of Miracles'. Although this essay was not published until 1748, in the work now entitled *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Hume at one time thought of including it in the *Treatise*. For details, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 2.

- 1.3.10.5 83.14–15 **Poets...tho' liars by profession...endeavour to give an air of truth to their fictions**] Aristotle claimed that 'Homer more than any other has taught the rest of us the art of framing lies in the right way... A likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility' (*Poetics* 1.24, 1460<sup>b</sup>19–20, 27–8). The unidentified Pisos, to whom Horace addressed *Ars Poetica*, had said that 'Painters and poets' may hazard 'anything'. But not, Horace replied, 'that savage should mate

with tame...lambs with tigers' (*Ars poetica* 9–13). One of Dryden's interlocutors cautioned that, however high the poet's imagination may soar, due proportion must be given to 'verisimilarity' (*Essay of Dramatick Poesy*, 74). See also Plato, *Republic* 377–83C; Plutarch, 'How to Study Poetry' 16, A–B [*Moralia*, 1: 82–3]; Raleigh, *History of the World* 2.21.6; and Hume, *HE* 1 [1:22].

- 1.3.10.6 83.36–7 **tragedians...borrow...from some known passage in history]** Aristotle noted that tragic poets 'adhere to the historic [i.e. mythical or legendary] names', but he allowed comic writers to 'choose any names that occur to them, instead of writing like the old iambic poets about particular persons' (*Poetics* 1.8, 1451<sup>b</sup>11–26). Strabo said that Homer 'took the Trojan War, an historical fact, and decked it out with his myths...he took the foundations of his stories from history' (*Geography* 1.2.8–9). Dryden noted that the French tragedies 'are always grounded upon some known History...and in that they have so imitated the Ancients that they have surpass'd them' (*Essay of Dramatick Poesie*, 35). Hume later said: 'But poets, though they disfigure the most certain history by their fictions, and use strange liberties with truth where they are the sole historians, as among the Britons, have commonly some foundation for their wildest exaggerations' (*HE* 1 [1: 22])
- 1.3.10.7 84.11 **pipes or canals]** Compare Addison: 'I consider the Body as a System of Tubes and Glands, or to use a more Rustick Phrase, a Bundle of Pipes and Strainers... This Description does not only comprehend the Bowels, Bones, Tendons, Veins, Nerves and Arteries, but every Muscle and every Ligature' (*Spectator* 115).
- 1.3.10.8 84.22–3 **colours of eloquence...vivacity produc'd by the fancy]** Hume discussed such phenomena in his essay, 'Of Eloquence'. See also 2.3.6.7; ann. 273.32.
- 1.3.10.9 84.27–31 **lively imagination...degenerates into madness...extraordinary ferment of the...spirits]** Malebranche supposed that of the 'two kinds of people who have a strong imagination', the one kind have deeply imprinted brain traces caused by 'an involuntary and disordered impression of the animal spirits'. To this he added that these individuals are 'completely insane', and that 'all those agitated by some violent passion are among their number' (*Search* 2.3.1.4 [162–3]). Locke also associated madness with a violent imagination; see *Essay* 2.11.13.
- 1.3.10.10 84.41–85.44<sup>APP</sup> **We may observe...dimensions at ten.<sup>APP</sup>** These three paragraphs were first published in the Appendix of the *Treatise*, and are added here as Hume instructed. The paragraph with which this section originally ended, made redundant by Hume's additions, is reprinted in *Editing the Texts*, Register B, entry 84.41.

85.3 **lowest species of probability]** See ann. 50.title.

85.9–11 **A passion...disagreeable in real life...entertainment in a tragedy]** Malebranche noted that we 'are generally pleased to be affected by any given passion', and even 'pay to be touched with sadness by the presentation of some tragedy' (*Search* 5.8 [387]; see also Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 2.94). Hutcheson criticized

Hobbes for supposing that we desire to see tragedies only because of the 'secret Pleasure' that arises from finding ourselves safe from the evils represented in them ('Hibernicus's Letters', *Works*, 7: 110; cf. *Inquiry* 2.5.8 [239]). In 'Of Tragedy' Hume expressed partial dissatisfaction with the explanations of this phenomenon found in Dubos (*Critical Reflections* 1 [1: 1–2]) and Fontenelle, and then went on to offer his own 'account' of it. He also mentioned the phenomenon in correspondence with Adam Smith; see above, Historical Account, Sect. 9.7. See also 1.3.9.15; ann. 79.40; *EPM* 7.26. For a discussion of eighteenth-century explanations of the phenomenon Hume mentions, see Wasserman, 'The Pleasures of Tragedy'.

1.3.10.11 85.27–8 afterwards...remark...differences betwixt a poetical enthusiasm...serious conviction] Perhaps a further allusion to the projected volume on criticism (see ann. 81.23), for in the *Treatise* as published there is no further comparison of 'poetical enthusiasm' and 'serious conviction'. Dennis, having said that 'Passion is the chief Thing in Poetry', described 'Poetical Enthusiasm' as 'a Passion guided by Judgment, whose Cause is not comprehended by us' (*Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry* [1: 216–17]).

1.3.10.12 85.42 understanding corrects the appearances of the senses] See 2.2.8.3, 6; anns. 240.22, 241.39, 372.20.

1.3.11 *Of the probability of chances*

86.title *probability of chances*] *EHU* 6.2–3 is a significantly truncated version of material found in this section.

1.3.11.2 86.5–6 philosophers...divided human reason into knowledge and probability] Locke is foremost among those who distinguished between knowledge and probability and then defined knowledge, as Hume puts it here, as 'that evidence, which arises from the comparison of ideas'. For others who made this distinction, see ann. 50.title; for Locke's definition of knowledge, see his *Essay* 4.1.2. In *EHU* 6 n. 10, a much-shortened version of *THN* 86.5–21, Hume says that Locke 'divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable'.

86.12–13 appear ridiculous, who wou'd say, that 'tis only probable the sun will rise to-morrow] Hume's suggestion that it 'wou'd appear ridiculous' to doubt tomorrow's sunrise is a variation on a common theme. Bramhall wondered 'Who ever deliberated, whether the Sun should rise to morrow' (*Defence of True Liberty*, 91), while Wilkins asked, 'Who is there so wildly Sceptical as to question, whether the Sun shall rise in the East, and not in the North or West, or whether it shall rise at all?' (*Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* 1.3.4). See also Locke, *Essay* 4.3.14, 4.15.2, 4.16.6; 'Gravesande, *Mathematical Elements* 1: p. xv; Butler as quoted in ann. 90.9. Pascal combined the two examples used by Hume, and argued that probabilities of the sort mentioned have greater effect than demonstrations: 'How little has been demonstrated? Only proofs convince the mind, and our strongest proofs come from custom... Who has demonstrated that it will be day tomorrow, and that we will die? But what is more universally believed? It is custom that persuades us

of these things' (*Port-Royal Pensées*, 61 [B252; Kr821]). Wollaston reached much the same conclusion. 'No man can demonstrate', he said, 'that the sun will rise again, yet every one doth, and must act, as if that was certain... There is no apodictical argument to prove, that any particular man will die: but yet he must be more than mad, who can presume upon immortality here, when he finds so many generations all gone to a man... These and such like, tho in strictness perhaps not certainties, are justly current for such. So great is their probability' (*Religion of Nature Delineated* 3.16 [57]). For the views of Hobbes and Leibniz on sunrises, see ann. 62.40. Philosophical reasons for discussing sunrises and the universality of death are a subject of *LG* 26–30. The question of the sunrise tomorrow is treated as a 'matter of fact' in *EHU* 4.1, and as a matter of proof in *EHU* 6 n. 10. The ridiculousness of disputing the authority of experience is a topic of *EHU* 4.20. For further references to the related set of issues raised here, see ann. 61.14.

86.17–18 **several degrees of evidence...from knowledge...proofs...probabilities**] Hume's tripartite division of 'evidence' resembles that found in A. M. Ramsay, who suggested that the 'Source of *Pyrrhonism* is frequently the not distinguishing between *Demonstration*, *Proof* and *Probability*', and then went on to explain that a '*Demonstration* is where the contradictory is impossible: A *Proof* where there are strong Reasons for believing, and none against it. A *Probability*, where the Reasons for believing are stronger than those for doubting' (*Travels of Cyrus* 6 [2: 38 n.]; Laird notes that this passage was quoted by Baxter, *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, 2: 317 n.; see *Hume's Philosophy*, 90 n.). Huygens had said that by experimental demonstrations, 'It is always possible... to attain a degree of probability which very often is scarcely less than a complete proof' of the kind found in geometry (*Treatise on Light*, Intro.). For other suggestions about 'degrees of evidence', see anns. 50.title, 90.9, 97.39. A similar tripartite division of 'arguments' is repeated in *EHU* 6 n. 10; see also *EHU* 10.3–12; *DNR* 2.7.

- 1.3.11.4 86.30–1 **chance is nothing real...merely the negation of a cause**] That chance is nothing real was widely agreed and often repeated: 'Chance is but a mere Name, and really Nothing in it self' (Bentley, *Eight Boyle Lectures*, sermon 5 [9]); 'as to *chance*, *hazard*, or *fortune*...Divines unanimously agree, that those words have no meaning' (Collins, *Philosophical Inquiry*, 107); 'Chance seems to be only a term, by which we express our *ignorance* of the cause of any thing' (Wollaston, *Religion of Nature Delineated* 5.14). See also Arbuthnot, 'Preface', p. [xiv]; S. Clarke, sermon 98, *Works*, 1: 619; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Chance'; Butler, *Analogy of Religion* 2.4.4. Cf. 'Rise and Progress' 1; *EHU* 6.1, 8.25.
- 1.3.11.5 87.2–5 **perfect...indifference is essential to chance...acknowledg'd by every one**] De Moivre said that chance, properly understood, 'imports no determination to any *mode of Existence*; nor indeed to *Existence* itself, more than to non-existence' (*Doctrine of Chances*, 253).

- 1.3.11.6 87.19 **A dye . . . certain number of spots]** A similar die, and belief in the most likely outcome of throwing it (see the remainder of this section), is discussed again at *EHU* 6.2–3.
- 1.3.11.7 87.31 **arguments we employ'd]** See 1.3.8.
- 1.3.11.8 88.4 **which are identical propositions, and of no consequence]** Locke had pointed out that '*purely identical Propositions . . . contain no instruction*' (*Essay* 4.8.1–3).
- 1.3.11.10 88.22–4 **dye form'd as above, contains . . . Certain causes . . . which determine it to fall . . . and to turn up one of its sides]** Arbuthnot, writing of a single die subject to 'second Causes' said: 'It is impossible for a Dye, with such a determin'd force and direction, not to fall on such a determin'd side', although on which side the die will fall is unknown ('Preface', pp. [xiii-xiv]).
- 1.3.11.11 88.32 **already observ'd]** See 1.3.6.
- 1.3.11.13 89.36 **inferior destroys the superior, as far as its strength goes]** See also 1.3.12.19, 1.3.13.20, 2.1.2.3, 2.3.1.12. Hume's conclusion that the resulting belief is an effect that remains when the force of the weaker belief cancels just that much force of the stronger belief (and not an effect proportioned to the evidence pro and con) resembles that of Arnauld and Nicole. They, discussing 'beliefs about events', said that certain 'common circumstances' that would by themselves give us grounds for believing 'with high probability' that given events will occur, may be 'counter-balanced by other particular circumstances that *weaken or destroy in the mind* the grounds for belief that the mind derives from [these] common circumstances' (*Logic* 4.15 [270], italics added). On the medieval doctrine of full proof, half proof, and the addition and subtraction of proofs, see Lévy, *La hiérarchie des preuves dans le droit*, 67–130. Wollaston offered a subtraction or 'cancellation' account of the relation of pleasure and pain: '*When pleasures and pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: when the one exceeds, the excess gives the true quantity of pleasure or pain. For nine degrees of pleasure, less by nine degrees of pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of one, less by three degrees of the other, give six of the former, net and true*' (*Religion of Nature Delineated* 2.5). See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Pellison' [E]; Chambers's discussion of the Jansenist account of 'Relative Necessity' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Necessity'); *Treatise* 2.1.2.3, 2.3.9.10–17; *EHU* 10.11–13.
- 1.3.12 *Of the probability of causes*
- 89.title *probability of causes]* *EHU* 6.4 is a significantly truncated version of material found in this section.
- 1.3.12.1 89.42–90.1 **what the vulgar call chance is nothing but a secret and conceal'd cause]** Gassendi remarked that there are many who count fortune and fate among 'second' or natural causes, then went on to say that 'fortune is not a proper cause at all' and that 'fate is really nothing other than natural causes insofar as they act on their own according to their innate powers' (*Syntagma* 2.1.4.8 [423]). Chambers said

that 'some vainly imagine, that *Chance* it self can be the Cause of any Thing' and that '*Chance* is frequently personify'd, and erected into a chimerical Being, whom we conceive as acting arbitrarily, and producing all the Effects, whose real Causes do not appear to us; in which Sense, the Word coincides with the . . . *Fortuna* of the Antients' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Chance'). See also ann. 86.30.

90.1–2 **That species of probability, therefore, is what we must chiefly examine]** Hume here undertakes a task which Butler had in effect recommended to logicians, but saw as outside his purposes: 'It is not my design to inquire further into the nature, the foundation, and measure of probability; or whence it proceeds that *likeness* should beget that presumption, opinion, and full conviction, which the human mind is formed to receive from it, and which it does necessarily produce in every one; or to guard against the errors, to which reasoning from analogy is liable. This belongs to the subject of Logic; and is a part of that subject which has not yet been thoroughly considered' (*Analogy of Religion*, Intro. §7). Hume in the *Abstract* mentions Leibniz's observation that 'the common systems of logic' are 'too concise when they treat of probabilities'; see *Abs.* 4; ann. 408.3.

- 1.3.12.2 90.9 **by these slow steps . . . judgment arrives at a full assurance]** Butler, although he limited his own discussion of probability and degrees of evidence (see the previous annotation), none the less illustrated the slow steps by which we come to have 'full assurance' concerning the behaviour of the oceans or of the sun tomorrow: 'Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption . . . the slightest possible presumption . . . often repeated, will amount even to moral certainty. Thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow of the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumption, though the lowest imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow: but the observation of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will ["happen again tomorrow"]'. And then: 'there is no man can make a question, but that the sun will rise to-morrow, and be seen, where it is seen at all, in the figure of a circle, and not in that of a square' (*Analogy of Religion*, Intro. §§1–2, 7).

- 1.3.12.3 90.28 **second species of probability]** The two species of probability are enumerated at 1.3.11.3.

- 1.3.12.5 90.39–91.13 **The vulgar . . . opposition of contrary causes]** This paragraph is repeated, nearly verbatim, at *EHU* 8.13; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lxi–lxx.

90.42–3 **philosophers observing . . . springs and principles, which are hid]** Glanvill had observed that our 'ignorance is no wonder; since we cannot profound into the *hidden things* of Nature, nor see the first springs and wheeles that set the rest a going' (*Scepsis scientifica* 4 [13]). See also ann. 5.42. Watts said that 'Principles are any sort of Springs whatsoever' (*Brief Scheme of Ontology* 10).

91.5–7 **peasant...no better reason for the stopping of any clock...it does not go right]** On this matter, Malebranche said that philosophers are as uninformed as peasants: 'Philosophers cannot, through their principles, explain...how dust stops a watch' (*Search* 6.2.4 [455]).

92.7–8 **that the future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments...but is deriv'd...from habit]** Glanvill also contended that it is not deductive arguments, but concomitance or customary conjunctions, that lead us to causal conclusions: 'Now we cannot conclude, any thing to be the cause of another; but from its continual accompanying it: for the *causality* it self is *insensible*. Thus we gather fire to be the cause of heat...because where ever fire is, we find there's heat...But now to argue from a concomitancy to a causality, is not infallibly conclusive: Yea in this way lies notorious delusion' (*Vanity of Dogmatizing* 20.1 [189–90]). See also Hobbes, *Elements of Law* 1.4.10. Hume, perhaps with Locke's *Essay* 2.21.1 and 4.16.6 in mind, may have attributed to him the view that it is as the result of a reason-based argument that we conclude that the future will resemble the past' (see anns. n. 28 and 106.15). 'Gravesande, having premised that 'We must look upon as true, whatever being denied would destroy civil Society, and deprive us of the Means of Living', went on to say: '*the Cohesion and Gravity of the Parts of Bodies, which I never saw altered, nor heard of having been altered, without some intervening external Cause, will not be altered to Night, because the Cause of Cohesion and Gravity will be the same to Morrow as it is to Day. Who does not see, that the Certainty of this Reasoning depends only upon the Truth of the fore-mentioned Principle?*', and that 'In Physics then we are to discover the Laws of Nature by the Phænomena, then by Induction prove them to be general Laws' (*Mathematical Elements*, 1: pp. xv–xvi). See also Malebranche, *Elucidations* 15 [662]; Ditton, *Discourse*, 126–8; above, ann. 86.12; *Abs.* 14–16, 25; *EHU* 4.16–21, 5.5–6.

1.3.12.11 92.39 **fully explain'd]** See 1.3.11, esp. ¶13.

1.3.12.15 93.18 **been observ'd]** See 1.3.11.5–6.

1.3.12.16 93.34–5 **gravity of a body encreases or diminishes by the encrease or diminution of its parts]** Compare Cotes's account of gravity as found in his Preface to the second edition of Newton's *Principia*: 'the attractive force of the entire bodies arises from and is composed of the attractive forces of the parts, because...if the bulk of the matter be augmented or diminished, its power is proportionately augmented or diminished. We must therefore conclude that the action of the earth is composed of the united actions of its parts' (*Principia*, 1: p. xxii).

1.3.12.19 95.4–5 **mind is determin'd...with that force, which remains after subtracting]** For more on this topic, see 1.3.11.13; ann. 89.36.

1.3.12.23 n. 23 (96) **Sects. 9, 10]** The reference is to 1.3.9–10.

96.19–20 **understand better afterwards]** Which later discussion and which phenomenon Hume had in mind is not clear. If the phenomenon is the 'union of forces' (96.20) or the uniting of ideas 'that are of the same kind' (96.5–6), then he

may have in mind 1.4.2.35, where he argues that 'resemblance . . . naturally connects together our ideas' of distinct perceptions, making 'us ascribe an *identity* to *different* objects'. If the phenomenon is the limited effect of the repetition of 'a voluntary act of the imagination' (96.8), there may be no further discussion. On the importance of impressions of sensation or memories thereof for 'reasonings from causes or effects', see 1.3.4.1; for more on the effects of 'education' (96.10), see 1.3.9.13, 16–19.

1.3.12.24 96.29 **above-mention'd]** See ¶6 of this section.

97.5 **explain presently]** See 1.3.13.7–13.

1.3.12.25 97.7 **ANALOGY]** Locke also treated analogy as a mode of probability; see *Essay* 4.16.12, 'In things which Sense cannot discover, Analogy is the great Rule of Probability'. For other discussions of this complex notion, see Berkeley, *Alciphron* 4.21; 'sGravesande, *Mathematical Elements*, 1: p. xvi; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Analogy'; Butler, *Analogy of Religion*, Intro. §7; and Hume, *EHU* 9.1.

97.9 **above-explain'd]** See 1.3.4–8.

97.20–1 **above-explain'd]** See 1.3.11 and the preceding paragraphs of the present section.

1.3.13 *Of unphilosophical probability*

1.3.13.1 97.33–4 **above-explain'd]** See 1.3.12, esp. ¶¶6–12, 25.

97.39–40 **difference in these degrees of evidence be not receiv'd by philosophy as solid]** Locke's discussion of '*Degrees of Assent*' may provide background to Hume's discussion here and in the following paragraphs. Although Locke said in the title of *Essay* 4.16.1 that '*Assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of Probability*', he immediately went on to consider the factors that lead to a diminution of the degree or force of assent that any given opinion commands, or to, in other words, the circumstances that minimize the effect of the 'grounds' that ought to regulate our assent. He noted, for example, that '*Assent* is not always from an actual view of the Reasons that first prevailed', for it may be impossible, or at least 'very hard, even for those who have very admirable Memories, to retain all the Proofs' that originally convinced them of the likelihood of the opinion in question. Moreover, in some cases an opinion presently held will be based on nothing more than a recollection that proofs of it, no longer themselves remembered, were once seen. For Descartes's concerns about similar issues, see *Meditations* 5; *Objections and Replies* 2 [AT 7: 69–70, 140, 146]. See also ann. 86.17.

98.5 **foregoing system]** See 1.3.7.

1.3.13.4 98.44–99.1 **evidence of all antient history . . . lost . . . as the chain of causes increases]** Locke included in his discussion of '*Degrees of Assent*' consideration of testimony remote from, as he put it, 'the original Truth' or the 'Being and Existence' of the thing or event attested to by the testimony. He concluded that 'any Testimony, the farther off it is from the original Truth, the less force and proof it has'. Applying



this conclusion to 'traditional Truths' (to, in effect, the claims or records of history), he further concluded that 'each remove' (each 'transition', as Hume says at 98.29) 'weakens the force of the proof'. Consequently, 'the more hands the Tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them', while that which 'has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of one only Witness, must stand or fall by his only Testimony . . . and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker . . . the farther still it is from the Original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it, than in his from whom he received it' (*Essay* 4.16.10–11). Locke also made similar suggestions about the effects of lengthy demonstrations; see *Essay* 4.2.4, 6; and below, anns. 99.11; 121.1, 15. Descartes suggested ways of reducing the deleterious effect of transitions of the sort Hume is discussing here; see *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, rules 7, 11 [AT 10: 387–8, 407–8].

99.4 a thousand ages] 100,000 years, an age being equivalent to 100 years; see *OED* 'age' 10.3.

- 1.3.13.5 99.11 celebrated argument against the *Christian Religion*] Locke's suggestion that the force of historical reports diminish as they are passed from individual to individual may have led Craige to argue that the credibility or persuasive force of the testimony establishing the truth of Christianity will be, as it is passed from person to person, completely exhausted by about AD 3150 (*Mathematical Principles*, prop. 18). In opposition, Hooper maintained that a 'Written Tradition' preserved by only a single set of successive copies will not lose half its credibility until at least 7,000, perhaps 14,000, years have passed, and if this tradition is preserved by concurrent successive copies, its credibility may by then have actually increased ('Calculation of the Credibility of Human Testimony', 364). As Hume suggests, Craige's argument was widely discussed. See Fréret, 'Réflexions', 123–4; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Explanation' 3.7; Ditton, *Discourse*, 162–71; Montmort, *Essay d'analyse*, pp. xxxvii–xxxix; Edwards, *Some New Discoveries*, 85–6; Houtteville, *Religion Chrétienne*, 335; Tindal, *Christianity as Old as the Creation*, 163; Warburton, *Divine Legation*, 1: 2; Berkeley, *Alciphron* 6.3. For further details, see Nash, *John Craige's Mathematical Principles*; ann. 99.29 below.

n. 24 (99) Part 4. Sect. 1] See 1.4.1.8–11.

- 1.3.13.6 99.29–30 This circumstance alone preserves the evidence of history] Pufendorf also supposed that historical claims do in fact retain their 'evidence' or force and vivacity, but he did not address the objection Hume considers, viz. that 'a chain of arguments of almost an immeasurable length' (98.39) would diminish the evidence or subjective credibility of a given historical proposition to nothing, as Craige and others had suggested (see ann. 99.11). Nor did Pufendorf suggest that the 'art of printing' may have made a significant difference in this matter. He granted that many fables have passed for historical truths, but said that the 'Faith we give to

Historians is reckon'd morally certain, when they testify a Thing vastly remote from our Memory and Knowledge, and of which there is no real and demonstrative Proof now extant; and especially, if many agree in the Relation: Because it is not probable that many Persons should join together by Compact, in putting a Trick on Posterity, or should entertain any Hopes, that the Lye would not in Time be discover'd' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 1.2.11). For his part, Locke suggested that it is the agreement of historians that provides the foundation of our belief or assent: 'If all Historians that write of *Tiberius*, say that *Tiberius* did so, it is extremely probable [that he did do so]. And in this case, our Assent has a sufficient foundation to raise it self to a degree, which we may call *Confidence*' (*Essay* 4.16.7–8). See also 2.3.1.15.

Berkeley has Crito argue that the antiquity of known manuscripts suggests that we are 'only two or three links' from the primitive Christians, who 'were careful to transcribe copies of the gospels' for both private and public use, and concluded that these facts were enough to prove the authenticity of the 'writings of classic authors, or ancient records'. In response, the free-thinking Alciphron grants that it is 'possible, for a tradition to be conveyed with moral evidence through many centuries', but goes on to insist on the limits of testimony: 'a thing demonstrably and palpably false is not to be admitted on any testimony whatever, which at best can never amount to demonstration...no testimony can make nonsense sense; no moral evidence can make contradictions consistent' (*Alciphron* 6.3, 7.1; cf. 6.30). Given that Craige himself supposed that printed histories preserve evidence better than oral ones do (see his *Mathematical Principles*, ch. 2), it may be that Hume did not know Craige's work at first hand. See also ann. 260.23; *Abs.* 33; *EHU* 5.7, 10.3–13.

1.3.13.7 100.1 **An Irishman...a Frenchman...a prejudice against them...in spite of sense and reason]** That the inhabitants of different countries have distinct national characters was a widely held corollary of the view that physical or moral causes, more or less unique to countries and regions, determine these characters. La Rochefoucauld claimed that 'The Character of a Mans Native Country is as Inherent to his Mind and Temper, as the Accent of it to his Speech' (*Moral Reflections and Maxims* 342). Watts had noted that 'The various Nations...have their particular Characters and Tempers assigned to them by various Writers, and are accordingly more or less susceptible of different Passions' (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 13 [73]). For further discussion of this topic, see 2.1.11.2; ann. 206.20; 'National Characters'.

1.3.13.8 100.7–8 **why men form general rules...contrary to present observation]** Bacon and Malebranche observed this phenomenon and attempted brief explanations of it. Bacon said that the 'mind loves to leap to generalities, so that it can rest; it only takes a little while to get tired of experience', and that once the 'understanding has settled on something...it draws everything else also to support and agree with it' (*New Organon* 1.20, 46; cf. 1.45, 125). Malebranche noted that the human mind has an 'aptitude...for imagining and supposing resemblances, especially where it does not visibly recognize differences', and gave as an example the tendency to form

prejudices about national characters (*Search* 3.2.11 [258]; cf. 2.2.1.1 [132]). See also Locke, *Essay* 4.16.3; Hume, 'Remarkable Customs' 1.

100.23 **have accounted for]** See 1.3.12.25.

1.3.13.10 100.43–4 **familiar instance ... a man ... hung out ... in a cage of iron]** Variations on this familiar experiment date from ancient times. Seneca observed that a man 'will become dizzy when he stands at the edge of a high precipice and looks down. This is not fear; it is a natural feeling which reason cannot rout' (*Moral Epistles* 57.4–5). Montaigne proposed the version Hume mentions: 'Put a philosopher in a cage of thin iron wire in large meshes, and hang it from the top of the towers of Notre Dame of Paris: he will see by evident reason that it is impossible for him to fall, and yet ... he cannot keep the sight of this extreme height from terrifying and paralyzing him' ('Apology for Raymond Sebond', 449; cf. 'Of drunkenness', in *Complete Essays*, 250). Pascal, arguing that the imagination is our dominant faculty, repeated the suggestion in modified form (*Port-Royal Pensées*, 191 [B82; Kr44]). Malebranche explained such phenomena as the effect of brain traces: 'there are traces in our brains that are naturally tied to one another ... the trace of a great elevation one sees below oneself ... is naturally tied to the one that represents death to us, and to an emotion of the spirit that disposes us to flight and to the desire to flee' (*Search* 2.1.5.2 [106]). See also 2.3.9.23; *EPM* 5.14.

1.3.13.11 n. 25 (101) **Sect. 15]** See 1.3.15.

1.3.13.12 102.9–10 **following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability]** Trublet reached a similar conclusion. A 'prepossession', he said, 'may be well grounded, and nevertheless be found false. Such are, for example, the prepossessions grounded upon general rules. They are true in ordinary cases, false in some particular ones, that are an exception to the general rule, and, by consequence, equally well founded in both one and the other; for it is reasonable to build upon general rules, so long as we keep within the bounds of a mere presumption only; but as the exceptions from general rules are frequently very numerous; the judgments made in consequence of presumptions, which have no other foundation but these rules, are often false' ('Of Prepossession', *Essays* 8 [126–7]).

1.3.13.17 n. 26 (103) **Part. 4. Sect. 1]** See 1.4.1.10–11.

1.3.13.18 103.39–40 **those observations of the Cardinal DE RETZ]** Hume is paraphrasing De Retz, who said: 'There are matters upon which it is certain that the world desires to be deceived', and that 'it is more unbecoming a minister to speak foolishly, than act foolishly' (De Retz, *Memoirs* 2: 60; 1: 82).

1.3.13.19 104.7–9 **confidence ... equals in many respects the assurance of a demonstration]** Locke granted that the distinction between probability and demonstration breaks down in practice. Some of 'the Propositions we think, reason, discourse, nay act upon', he said, 'border so near upon Certainty, that we make no doubt at all about them; but *assent* to them as firmly, and act, according to that Assent, as resolutely, as

if they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our Knowledge of them was perfect and certain'. Moreover, on some occasions 'Probability... carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the Judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe, or disbelieve, as a Demonstration does' (*Essay* 4.15.2, 4.16.9). See also ann. 86.12.

104.13 **below this degree of evidence there are many others]** For Locke's suggestions about lower degrees of 'evidence', see ann. 50.title.

1.3.13.20 104.39–41 **larger collection... prevails... force proportionable to its superiority]** See also 1.3.11.8–13; ann. 89.36.

1.3.14 *Of the idea of necessary connexion*

105.title *Of the idea of necessary connexion]* *EHU* 7 has the same title and repeats, usually in modified form, many of the arguments of this section; see also *Abs.* 26.

1.3.14.1 105.1–3 **Having thus explain'd... particular effects]** The issue mentioned is raised at 1.3.2.15, and discussed throughout 1.3.3–13.

105.4–5 *What is our idea of necessity... two objects are necessarily connected together]* This question is first raised at 1.3.2.12–13.

105.6 **had occasion to observe]** See 1.1.1.7, 1.2.3.1, 1.2.5.23, 1.3.1.7.

1.3.14.2 105.27–8 **already establish'd]** See esp. 1.3.4–8.

1.3.14.3 105.41–106.2 **no question... caus'd more disputes... than this concerning the efficacy of causes]** Although it was widely agreed that the Deity is the first cause, there was, as Gassendi observed, a 'well-known controversy among philosophers' over the nature of the '*initiating force*' of the second or natural causes that produce the physical, mental, and moral effects we observe. He followed this observation with a sketch of the competing views of the Pythagoreans and Platonists, Peripatetics, Stoics, and Atomists (*Syntagma* 2.1.4.8 [409 ff.]). Chambers summed up these disputes about causes by saying: 'Tis certain the Philosophers are strangely puzzled, and divided about the manner of their Agency: Some maintain 'em to act by their *Matter*, *Figure*, and *Motion*... others by a *substantial Form*... many by *Accidents*, or *Qualities*; some by *Matter* and *Form*; others by certain *Faculties* different from all these... Again, the Philosophers are divided as to the Action whereby *Second Causes* produce their Effects: Some maintain, that the *Causality* cannot be produc'd, since 'tis that produces; others will have 'em to act truly by their Action; but they are still at a loss about that Action. Such Variety is there in the Sentiments even of modern Philosophers; and those too our Neighbours: nor are the Antients, and those at a Distance from us, better agreed' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Cause'). See also Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 3.13–16; anns. 106.42, 108.24, and, for suggestions regarding the history of theories of 'the efficacy of causes', *LG* 30–2.

1.3.14.4 106.7–8 **terms of efficacy, agency, power... productive quality]** Compare *Abs.* 26; *EHU* 7.3.

106.10–11 **vulgar definitions...philosophers have given of power]** Berkeley's Alciphron gave just such a definition: 'Force is that in bodies which produceth motion and other sensible effects' (*Alciphron* 7.6). Martin, in a single definition of cause and effect, managed to use three of the terms Hume mentions: 'A *Cause* is any Power or Influence productive of Existence; and an *Effect* is the Product, or Existence resulting from the *Energy* of the *Cause*' (*Bibliotheca Technologica*, 'Of Metaphysics' [244]). See also Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 3.18 [186]; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Power'; above, ann. 55.3; and *EHU* 7.29 n. 17.

- 1.3.14.5 n. 28 and 106.15–19 **most popular explication...arrive...by this reasoning at the idea of power]** In the chapter, 'Of Power' in his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* Locke describes how the mind, 'observing a constant change of its *Ideas*...and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like Changes will for the future be made, in the same things, by like Agents, and by the like ways...comes by that *Idea* which we call *Power*'. He also suggests that given the existence of change, the mind necessarily arrives at the idea of power: 'Since whatever Change is observed, the Mind must collect a Power somewhere, able to make that Change' (*Essay* 2.21.1, 4). *EHU* 7.8 n. 12 attributes to Locke the view that 'we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power'.

106.20–4 **two very obvious principles...have been sufficiently explain'd]** See, for discussions related to the first of these principles, 1.1.1.5–12, 1.2.3.10. For the second, see 1.3.3, 1.3.6.11–15.

- 1.3.14.6 106.35–6 **innate ideas...almost universally rejected in the learned world]** According to Chambers, Locke seemed to have put the matter of innate ideas 'out of dispute, having made it appear that all our *Ideas* are owing to our Senses; and that all innate, created, factitious, &c. *Ideas*, are mere Chimera's' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Idea'). Watts, however, showed that Locke's triumph was not universal. He granted that Locke had refuted some accounts of innate ideas, but Watts still believed 'that many *simple Ideas* are innate in some Sense, tho' not actually formed in the Mind at the Birth; and perhaps also some *general Principles* both of *Truth* and *Duty* may be called in some Sense innate, tho' not in the explicit Form of Propositions' (*Philosophical Essays* 4.1). See also 1.1.1.12; ann. 10.34.

- 1.3.14.7 106.41–2 and n. 29 **philosophers, who have pretended to explain the secret force and energy of causes]** As the note indicates, the reference is to *Search* 6.2.3 [446], where Malebranche says that the most dangerous error in the philosophy of the ancients was to think that objects have a power to act or to be causes, and to *Elucidations* 15 [657, 659], which returns to the subject, 'the efficacy attributed to secondary causes'. In the later discussion, Malebranche says that the diversity of opinion about second or natural causes 'gives us the right to view men as often talking about things they do not know, and that since the power of creatures is a fiction of the mind of which we naturally have no idea, it is fancy that leads everyone to imagine it'.

106.42–107.4 **There are some, who maintain...thousand different ways]** This sentence is a paraphrase of Malebranche: 'Il y a des Philosophes qui assurent que les causes secondes agissent...par une *forme substantielle*. Plusieurs, par les *accidens* ou les *qualitez*; quelques-uns par la *matière* & la *forme*; ceux-ci, par la *forme* & les *accidens*; ceux-là par certaines *vertus* ou *facultez* distinguées de tout ceci' (*Eclaircissement* 15 [*Recherche de la vérité* 3: 205]; see *Elucidations* 15 [658]). A similar paraphrase is found in Chambers, who also suggested, to use Hume's words, that opinions regarding causes are 'mix'd and vary'd in a thousand different ways' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Cause'). See also ann. 105.41.

107.20 **defiance...oblig'd frequently to make use of]** See ann. 8.39.

- 1.3.14.8 107.22–4 **small success...oblig'd philosophers to conclude...ultimate force...unknown]** Hume may again allude to Malebranche, who said that there were 'many reasons' preventing him 'from attributing to *secondary* or *natural* causes a force, a power, an efficacy to produce anything'. The second of these reasons, he said, is the fact that 'when I think about the different opinions of philosophers on this subject, I cannot doubt what I am proposing. For if they clearly saw what the power of creatures is, or what in them truly has this power, they would all agree in their opinion about it' (*Elucidations* 15 [658]; cf. *THN* 1.4.5.31). Others professing agnosticism about the ultimate forces of nature include Boyle, 'Essay, Containing a Requisite Digression', 169–70; Newton, *Principia* 3 [2: 546–7]; Locke, *Essay* 2.23.9, 28; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 3.12. See also ann. 5.42; *LG* 32; *EHU* 4.12.

107.27–31 **Cartesians...acquainted with the essence of matter...extension]** Descartes concluded that '*The nature of body consists not in weight, hardness, colour, or the like, but simply in extension*' (*Principles of Philosophy* 2.4); Malebranche, that 'the essence of matter consists only in extension' (*Search* 3.1.1.1 [198]; cf. 3.2.2 [220–1]).

- 1.3.14.9 107.35–43 **Matter...inactive...deity...bestows on it all...motions...and qualities]** The views that Hume here attributes to the Cartesians are all found in Malebranche. Having found that 'the idea we have of all bodies makes us aware that they cannot move themselves, it must be concluded', he said, 'that it is minds' that move bodies. But, because we find that finite minds cannot move bodies, we 'must therefore say that only [God's] will' can do so (*Search* 6.2.3 [448]; cf. ann. 46.3). To this he later added that 'it is the will of God that gives existence to bodies...when this volition ceases...it is necessary that bodies cease to exist...it is this same volition that puts bodies at rest or in motion' and that 'the motive force of a body is but the efficacy of the will of God, who conserves it successively in different places' (*Dialogues* 7.6, 11; cf. *Search* 6.2.9 [515]). Other Cartesians made similar claims; see, e.g., Descartes, *Meditations* 3 [AT 7: 48–9], *Principles of Philosophy* 1.21; 2.36, 42; La Forge, *Treatise on the Human Mind* 16. See also ann. 108.5.

- 1.3.14.10 108.1–2 **have establish'd...all ideas are deriv'd from impressions]** See 1.1.1.7–12; *EHU* 7.4–5.

108.5–8 **Cartesians...innate ideas...deity...immediate cause of every alteration in matter**] Cartesians who supposed that their innate ideas of God led to the conclusion that the Deity is 'the only active being in the universe' include Descartes and La Forge. The former supposed that the innate idea of God is the idea of a Being who is not only omnipotent and omnific, but who actively preserves all creatures through their entire existence by re-creating them at each subsequent moment following the initial act of creating them. Not only does this act of preservation require 'the same power and action' that was needed 'to create that thing anew if it were not yet in existence', but any changes to the thing, including changes of location (apparent motion) are effected by this activity on the part of the Deity. See *Meditations* 3 [AT 7: 40, 45, 48–9]. For La Forge's view, see *Treatise on the Human Mind* 10 [89, 96]; see also Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 3.1, 10–12. The occasionalist hypothesis is mentioned again at 1.4.5.31. Hume discusses it more fully at *EHU* 7.21–5, where (n. 16) he says that Descartes 'insinuated' the occasionalist position 'without insisting on it', and that 'Malebranche and the other CARTESIANS made it the foundation of all their philosophy'. See also *LG* 32.

Malebranche was critical of the view that there are innate ideas (see *Search* 3.2.4 [226–7]), a feature of his philosophy overlooked in Hume's criticism of the Cartesians in these lines, a criticism that focuses on Malebranche. Note 29 mentions him by name and refers to those parts of his works that explicitly set out and defend the thesis that God is the only active force in the universe, while, as several other annotations to pages 107–8 show, much of what is said about 'the Cartesians' is drawn from just those works. Note also that in the *Abstract* Hume selects 'Father Malebranche' as a philosopher whose views on innate ideas are contrary to those of 'Mr. Locke' (*Abs.* 6).

1.3.14.11 108.24–6 **those, who maintain the efficacy of second causes, and attribute a derivative, but a real power...to matter**] Boyle said that '*local motion seems to be indeed the principal amongst second causes, and the grand agent of all that happens in nature*' ('Origin of Forms and Qualities', 19; cf. 44, 69). Arbuthnot said that 'it is no Heresie to believe, that Providence suffers ordinary matters to run in the Channel of second Causes' ('Preface', p. [xiii]). *LG* 32 reports that Newton 'plainly rejects' the occasionalist hypothesis, 'substituting the Hypothesis of an Ætheral Fluid, not the immediate Volition of the Deity, as the Cause of Attraction'. At *EHU* n. 16 Hume claimed that 'LOCKE, CLARKE, and CUDWORTH... suppose... that matter has a real, though subordinate and derived power'. Malebranche undertook to refute those, especially several scholastic philosophers, who suppose second causes are efficacious; see *Elucidations* 15 [657 ff.].

108.26–7 **confess, that this energy lies not in any of the known qualities of matter**] Some of those who supposed that second or natural causes are efficacious, but who confessed that the efficacy or energy of these causes is not found in any of the 'known qualities of matter', are listed in ann. 54.39.

- 1.3.14.12 108.35 **Some have asserted, that we feel... power, in our own mind]** At *Essay* 2.21.4, entitled '*The clearest Idea of active Power had from Spirit*', Locke said that, if we consider carefully, we will see that 'Bodies, by our Senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an *Idea of active Power*, as we have from reflection on the Operations of our Minds' (cf. 2.23.28). Lee agreed that we derive the notion of active power 'from the observation of our own Minds or other Spirits' (*Anti-Scepticism* 2.19.3 [96]). P. Browne argued that 'the Idea or Notion we have of *Power*' derives from the observed operations of 'things purely Material one upon another; or from the Operation of the *Mind* upon its *Ideas*, and its voluntary moving of the *Body*' (*Procedure* 3.2.4). Watts, on the other hand, suggested that children gain the idea of power 'much more from their Sensations of Bodies moving Bodies, than from their Reflection of any Act of their Spirits' (*Philosophical Essays* 12.4). See also the following annotation, and, for Hume's later discussions of activity of the mind and the idea of power, *EHU* 7.9–20.

108.42–3 **far from perceiving the connexion betwixt an act of volition, and a motion of the body]** Malebranche denied that there is any 'necessary connection between our will to move our arms' and their movements. He also denied that his will was 'the true cause of my arm's movement, of my mind's ideas, and of other things accompanying my volitions, for I see no relation whatever between such different things' (*Search* 6.2.3 [449–50]; *Elucidations* 15 [669]; cf. *Search* 6.2.7 [495]). Locke, although he said that the mind daily 'affords us *Ideas* of an active power of moving of Bodies', granted that we no more understand how minds communicate motion to bodies than we understand how bodies communicate motion to other bodies (*Essay* 2.23.28). See also Berkeley, *Principles* 1.19.

- 1.3.14.13 109.11 **has been establish'd]** See 1.1.7.1–16.

109.30 **already been rejected]** See the preceding paragraphs of the present section and ann. 61.14 for references to relevant texts and annotations.

- 1.3.14.14 110.3–4 **clear and determinate ideas]** Locke had introduced the notion of '*determinate or determin'd*' ideas, representing this as an improvement over the more common but not well understood phrase, '*clear or distinct Ideas*', used by Descartes (*Essay*, Epistle to the Reader [13]).

- 1.3.14.16 110.25–6 **has been observ'd]** See 1.3.6.2–3.

- 1.3.14.17 n. 31 (110) **Sect. 6]** 1.3.6.2–3.

- 1.3.14.18 111.11 **billiard-balls]** At *Abs.* 9–17, 24–6, billiard-balls are used to illustrate the processes whereby we gain the ideas of cause, effect, and necessary connection (cf. ann. 409.20). See also ann. 54.39; *EHU* 4.8–11; 7.6, 21, 28, 30.

- 1.3.14.20 111.30 **feel a determination of the mind]** For variations on this conclusion, see *Abs.* 26; *EHU* 7.28–30.



- 1.3.14.24 112.24 **we repeat to ourselves]** Hume also summarizes his findings at 2.3.1.4. See *EHU* 7.30 for his recapitulation of 'the reasonings' in the account of the idea of necessary connection found in that work.
- 1.3.14.25 112.39–40 **common observation...mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects]** Malebranche made this observation on several occasions, saying that the mind has a tendency 'to spread itself onto the objects it considers by clothing them with what it has stripped from itself', and that, since 'the sin of the first man, the mind constantly spreads itself externally' (*Search* 1.12.5 [58]; *Elucidations* 15 [657]; cf. *Search* 1.11.1 [54]; 4.10.2 [310–11]; *Elucidations* 9 [609]). Rohault noted the 'popular Error' of 'ascribing [our] own Sensations to the Objects which cause them' (*System*, 'Preface', [b7]; cf. 1.32.11–12). More generally, those who distinguished primary from secondary qualities supposed that ideas or sensations properly only in the mind are ascribed to the objects that appear to cause them. See Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 1.9 [49]; Locke, *Essay* 2.8.16.
- n. 32 (113) **Part 4. sect. 5]** See esp. 1.4.5.8–14.
- 1.3.14.26 113.9 **above-mention'd]** See ¶¶24–5 of this section.
- 1.3.14.27 113.23–4 **blind man...scarlet is not...the sound of a trumpet]** For similar suggestions, see Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 1.1 [28]; Malebranche, *Search* 3.2.9.4 [250]; Locke, *Essay* 2.4.5, 3.4.11; S. Clarke, *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 10 [77]. Thomas Blacklock, the blind poet, told Hume that his associations with colour terms were 'of the intellectual kind'; see *Letters*, 1: 201.
- 1.3.14.28 113.41 **have observ'd]** See 1.3.2.6–7, 1.3.6.2–3.
- 1.3.14.31 114.29–32 **two definitions...CAUSE]** These definitions are restated in ¶35 of this section; cf. 2.3.2.4. Similar definitions are found in *EHU* 7.29; see also *EHU* 8.26.
- 1.3.14.32 115.15–17 **distinction...betwixt efficient causes...final causes]** Aristotle distinguished between material, efficient, formal, and final causes at, for example, *Physics* 2.3 and *Metaphysics* 5.2. According to Hobbes, that feature or quality of an 'agent or patient, without which the effect cannot be produced, is called *causa sine qua non*' (*Elements of Philosophy* 2.9.3). Cudworth, translating from Plato's *Phaedo*, mentioned those who had failed to distinguish between final cause, or 'the True and Proper Cause of things, and the Cause *Sine qua non*, that without which they could not have been effected' (*True Intellectual System* 1.4 [382]). Chambers had succinctly defined the five remaining kinds of cause mentioned by Hume: 'Causes, in the School Philosophy, are distinguish'd into, *Efficient Causes*, which are the Agents that produce any thing...*Material Causes*, the Subjects whereon the Agent works, or whereof the Thing is form'd...*Formal Causes*...that which determines a Thing to be this, and distinguishes it from every thing else...*Final Causes*...the End for which the Thing is done...Some add the *Exemplary Cause*, which is the Model the Agent forms, or proposes, and by which he conducts himself in the Action; but this

is not properly any *Cause* at all' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Cause'). Arnauld and Nicole review the four traditional Aristotelian causes, and distinguish approximately twenty subclasses of efficient cause (*Logic* 3.18); Watts, after suggesting fourteen distinctions among causes, settles on four additional 'chief particular kinds...*Emanative, Efficient, Instructive* and *Suasive*' (*Brief Scheme of Ontology* 10 [363]).

115.20 **distinction betwixt *cause* and *occasion***] Malebranche and the Occasionalists argued that there is no causal efficacy, force, or power in nature or the mind, and that the Deity is the only effective or true *cause* in the universe. On this hypothesis, those movements of bodies or acts of the mind that to us appear to cause subsequent movements or events, although confusingly called *occasional causes*, are merely *occasions* on which the Deity exercises, in conformity with general rules or laws he has established, his causal power. Malebranche undertook to prove 'that there is only one true cause because there is only one true God; that the nature or power of each thing is nothing but the will of God; that all natural causes are not *true* causes but only *occasional causes*' (*Search* 6.2.3 [448]).

- 1.3.14.33 115.25–6 **common distinction betwixt *moral* and *physical necessity***] That there is or is not a viable distinction between a moral and a physical determination of the will had been contested by Bramhall and Hobbes. Bramhall claimed that there is a meaningful 'difference between physical or natural, and moral efficacy', and that 'Where the determination is natural, the liberty to suspend its act is taken away from the will, but not so where the determination is moral' (in Hobbes, *Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance* 11 [108]). Hobbes claimed that the distinction is meaningless because, whether the determination or necessity is physical or moral, the net effect is the same (*Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance* 11 [104–5]). S. Clarke distinguished between the '*physical Efficient Cause of Action*' and 'the *last Judgment of the Understanding*, [which] is not itself a *physical Efficient*, but merely a *Moral Motive*' which brings the physical efficient cause into play, and then went on: 'the *Necessity* therefore, by which the *Power of Acting* follows the *Judgment of the Understanding*, is only a *Moral Necessity*; that is, *no Necessity at all*, in the Sense wherein the Opposers of Liberty understand *Necessity*. For *Moral Necessity*, is evidently consistent with the most perfect *Natural Liberty*' (*Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 10 [98–9]). The distinction is also made by Collins, *Philosophical Inquiry*, pp. iii, 110–12; Chambers, (*Cyclopædia*, 'Necessity'); Balguy, *Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 10. See also 2.3.1.15–17; anns. 260.23, 261.20; *LG* 26; *EHU* 8.19, 10.3, 12.21.

- 1.3.14.35 115.39 **foregoing reasoning**] See 1.3.3.

115.42 **foregoing definitions**] See ¶31 of this section.

- 1.3.14.36 116.16–17 **following reasonings**] See 1.4.3, esp. ¶¶4–6.

1.3.15 *Rules by which to judge of causes and effects*

- 1.3.15.1 116.20 **precedent doctrine**] See, e.g., 1.3.2.5, 1.3.6.1–2.

- 116.23 **Any thing may produce any thing]** Compare *EHU* 12.29.
- 116.26 **explain'd above]** See 1.3.6.2–3; 1.3.14.14–21, 30–1.
- n. 33 (116) **Part 1. Sect. 5]** The contrariety of existence and non-existence are the subject of 1.1.5.8.
- 1.3.15.5 116.36 **constant union betwixt the cause and effect]** See 1.3.6.3; ann. 61.38.
- 1.3.15.6 116.38–9 **same cause...same effect...same effect...same cause]** The second half of Hume's rule corresponds to Newton's second rule, viz. '*Therefore to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes*' (*Principia* 3 [2: 398]). John Keill made this rule into an axiom: '*Natural Effects of the same kind have the same Causes*' (*Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 8, axiom 6). For applications of this rule, see, e.g., 1.3.16.2, 1.4.4.4, 2.1.12.6, 2.2.7.3, 2.3.1.5, 3.1.2.6, 3.3.1.10. See also 2.1.3.5–7; *EHU* 4.20, 9.2; *DNR* 2.17, 5.1.
- 1.3.15.7 117.6–7 **different objects produce the same effect...some quality...common amongst them]** For applications of this rule, see 2.1.12.1, 2.2.4.5.
- 1.3.15.8 117.10–11 **difference in the effects]** For an application of this rule, see 2.1.8.3.
- 1.3.15.9 117.16–18 **compounded effect...different effects...from...different parts of the cause]** Earlier efforts to come to grips with compound causes include those of Keill and Desaguliers. The former said only that '*Effects are proportionable to their adequate Causes*' (*Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 8, axiom 4), while Desaguliers focused on a means of determining the predominant cause: 'For, as many Causes concur in the Production of compound Effects, we are liable to mistake the predominant Cause, unless we can measure the Quantity of the Effect produc'd, compare them with, and distinguish them from each other, to find out the adequate Cause of each single Effect, and what must be the Result of their joint Action' (*Course of Experimental Philosophy*, Preface). For applications of this rule, see 1.3.12.16, 2.2.8.4.
- 1.3.15.10 117.26–7 **an object, which exists for any time...not the sole cause]** See also 1.3.2.7; ann. 54.20. For an application of this rule, see 2.2.6.5.
- 1.3.15.11 117.34–6 **scholastic head-pieces and logicians...long system of rules]** Arnauld and Nicole included in their *Logic* three rules concerning the conversion of propositions, fifteen rules of reasoning, and approximately twenty-five rules relating to method. Along with these rules they provided a substantial number of axioms, some of which are functionally equivalent to rules. These authors do, however, reduce their 'scientific method' to eight main rules (*Logic* 4.11). Mariotte began his *Essai de logique* with a list of 100 'Fundamental Principles and Propositions of Reasoning'. Of these, thirty (nos. 11–40) are said to be concerned with establishing the fundamental principles of the knowledge of natural things, and thirteen (nos. 41–53) are principles relating to probable propositions. Many of these principles concern causation. Watts's *Logick* contains, as its subtitle indicates, a 'Variety of

Rules to guard against *Error*', numbering well over 100. These include 'General Directions relating to our Ideas', 'Special Rules to direct our Conception of Things', 'General Directions to assist us in judging aright', 'Special Rules to direct us in judging of particular Objects', 'Some general Rules to direct our Reasoning', and 'General and Special Rules of Method' (*Logick* 1.5–6, 2.4–5, 3.4, 4.2). As Hume intimates, many of the rules found in these lengthy lists were mere commonplaces. In contrast to such long systems, Malebranche suggested eight rules 'to be observed in the search after truth' (*Search* 6.2.1 title [437]). Rohault's 'principal Axioms of Natural Philosophy' were eight in number; five of these have to do with causes (*System* 1.5.2–10). Newton proposed only four 'Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy' (*Principia* 3), while Keill provided a list of fifteen axioms, most having to do with causes (*Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 8). For Hume's generally low opinion of professors, see his letter of 18 May 1735, in Mossner, 'Hume at La Flèche, 1735'. See also Laird, *Hume's Philosophy*, 100.

1.3.16 *Of the reason of animals*

118.title *Of the reason of animals*] *EHU* 9 has a similar title and uses in modified form some of the material found in this section. For Hume's discussion of animal passions, see 2.1.12, 2.2.12, and the annotations to them. See also 'Dignity or Meanness' 5.

- 1.3.16.1 118.15–17 **that beasts are endow'd with...reason...obvious**] Although Hume claims that even the 'ignorant' get this matter right, he would have known that the question of the intellectual capacity of animals had been, from the beginnings of Western philosophy, a fiercely contested one and that many of the learned denied that animals are able to reason. Malebranche criticized Montaigne for defending the 'extravagant' opinion of the ancient sceptics: viz. that animal minds are essentially like those of humans, and that even spiders can 'deliberate, think, and draw conclusions'. In contrast, Malebranche argued that the intelligence of animals and plants is distinct from them in the same way that 'the intelligence that arranges the wheels of a watch is distinct from the watch... Thus, in animals, there is neither intelligence nor souls as ordinarily meant. They... know nothing; and if they act in a manner that demonstrates intelligence, it is because God... made their bodies in such a way that they mechanically avoid what is capable of destroying them' (*Search* 2.3.5 [189–90], 6.2.7 [494–5]; for Montaigne's comment, see 'Apology for Raymond Sebond', 333). Locke supposed that while at least some animals have the 'faculty of laying up, and retaining' ideas, they have only a limited capacity to compare ideas and to form complex ideas (*Essay* 2.10.10; 2.11.5, 7; cf. ann. 119.37). According to Bayle, Descartes and his followers 'deny that beasts have any soul' or mind and that animals have any capacity to sense or feel, while Aristotle and his followers 'maintain that animals are endowed with sense, with memory, and with passions, but not at all with reason'. Bayle goes on to add that 'it is a long time since it has been maintained that the souls of beasts are rational', and, in two articles in his *Dictionary*, those on Pereira and Rorarius, discussed the issue at great length. Taken together, the notes of these

two articles outline the views on animal intelligence of a substantial number of writers who constitute a virtual *Who's Who* of Western philosophy to c.1700. Bayle begins with the pre-Socratics and carries on through Plato, Aristotle, and their followers; Hellenistic thinkers, including philosophers (well-known Stoics, Sceptics, Atomists, Cynics, Neoplatonists), Galen, and Pliny; the Church Fathers; and a long list of early modern writers, some still well known (Montaigne, Grotius, Descartes, Gassendi, Malebranche, Locke, Leibniz); some still regularly mentioned in scholarly studies of early modern thought (e.g., Charron, Le Grand, Cordemoy, Rohault, Geulincx, Digby, Lamy); and some whose names are now seldom encountered outside Bayle himself (e.g., Craanen, Crellius, Cyprian, Dilly, Hurtado de Mendoza, Poisson, Schuyt). Addison gave the debate a popular turn when he noted that the sceptics argue 'for the Reason of Animals...telling us it is only our Pride and Prejudices that will not allow them the Use of that Faculty' (*Spectator* 120; cf. ann. 120.2). Additional seventeenth-century perspective is provided by Topsell, *History of Four-footed Beasts*; Pardies, *Discours de la connoissance des bestes*; and Willis, *Two Discourses concerning the Soul of Brutes*. See also Charron, *Of Wisdom* 1: 34; Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* 1.1.2.10; Descartes, *Discourse on Method* 5 [AT 6: 58–9]; Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 3.13. Early eighteenth-century views may be found in Mayne, *Two Dissertations*, 16, 46–7, 171; Colliber, *Free Thoughts concerning Souls* 2; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 9.7; Butler, *Analogy of Religion* 1.1.21; Argens, *Philosophical Dissertations* 4.14.

Among the ancients, several pre-Socratics, Plato at times, Plutarch, and Porphyry argued for the rationality of animals. Plutarch concluded 'that animals have a natural endowment of reason and intellect' ('Beasts are Rational' 992C; cf. 'Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer' 960A [*Moralia*, 12: 531; 325]). Porphyry undertook to demonstrate 'that there is a rational power in animals' (*On Abstinence from Animal Food* 3.9). Aristotle said that animals have sense, feeling, imagination, and memory, 'but in none but [man] is there intellect', belief, or reason (see *Parts of Animals* 1.1, 641<sup>b</sup>8–9; cf. *On the Soul* 2.3, 3.3). The Stoics also denied that animals are rational; Seneca, for example, said that animals cannot be subject to anger because anger can arise 'only where reason dwells... Wisdom, foresight, diligence, and reflection ('*cogitatio*') have been granted to no creature but man' ('On Anger' 1.3.4–7, in *Moral Essays*, 1). See also ann. 389.17.

Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals*, provides details regarding more than two millennia of debate on this issue. Boas, *The Happy Beast*; Rosenfield, *From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine*; and Gontier, *De l'homme a l'animal*, survey the extensive early modern French literature on the topic. See also Thomas, *Man and the Natural World*, 121–42.

- 1.3.16.2 118.21–3 **other creatures...perform like actions...to like ends...a like cause]** Montaigne argued that there is 'no apparent reason to judge that the beasts do by natural and obligatory instinct the same things that we do by our choice and cleverness. We must infer from like results like faculties, and consequently confess that this same reason...is also that of the animals' ('Apology for Raymond

Sebond', 336–7). Bayle asked for a theory capable of accounting for the 'thinking and reasoning' of animals and insects, known phenomena that are not explicable by those who claim these creatures have only the power of sensation (*Dictionary*, 'Rorarius' [G] [4: 909b]). In support of the view that animals and humans are intellectually different, Hobbes argued that 'CURIOSITY' or the desire 'to know why, and how . . . is in no living creature but *man*: so that man is distinguished, not only by his reason, but also by this singular passion . . . of knowing causes' (*Leviathan* 1.6 ¶35). Malebranche granted that 'all actions performed by animals show intelligence', but he also noticed that 'everything we see done by plants . . . signifies intelligence', and thus denied that this purposive behaviour proves these beings have minds or the ability to 'sense, will, think, and reason even as we do' (*Search* 6.2.7 [494]). See also *EHU* 9.2–4.

118.22–3 **principles of reason...existence of a like cause]** See rule 4, at 1.3.15.6; ann. 116.38.

- 1.3.16.3 118.40–2 **such a subtlety...exceeds the capacity of...children...common people]** Hume may here allude to the Cartesians, whose model of proper reasoning set standards few could maintain. See, e.g., Descartes, *Meditations* 4, 6; Malebranche, 'Understanding: or Pure Mind' and 'Pure Understanding: The Nature of Ideas', *Search* 3.1 and 3.2; *Elucidations* 10. Bayle pointed out that arguments concluding that animals lack a soul because of the great difference between animal and human intelligence equally show that children and the insane have no souls, for 'most beasts shew more reason than children of one year of age, and distracted persons' (*Dictionary*, 'Pereira' [E] [4: 549b]). See also *EHU* 4.23, 9.5.

- 1.3.16.5 119.11–12 **dog, that avoids fire...instance of the first kind]** These 'common capacities' were also commonly reported. Sextus Empiricus said of the dog, 'held to be the most worthless of animals', that it 'welcomes and guards its friends and benefactors but drives off strangers and evil-doers'. Argus, Odysseus's dog, is mentioned as a model (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.62, 67–8). Plutarch said that 'the evidence by which the philosophers demonstrate that beasts have their share of reason is their possession of purpose and preparation and memory and emotions and care for their young and gratitude for benefits . . . [and] their ability to find what they need ('Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer' 966B; cf. 963E [*Moralia*, 12: 361; 345]). Bayle told his readers that Porphyry had emphasized the 'admirable sagacity and foresight' that animals show 'in pursuing what is useful, and avoiding what is hurtful to them' (*Dictionary*, 'Pereira' [E] [4: 549a]).

119.12–16 **bird, that chooses with such care...instance of the second]** Shaftesbury was impressed by the fact that animals have 'Perceptions, Sensations, and *Pre-sensations* . . . Their Females, newly pregnant . . . have a clear Prospect or *Pre-sensation* of their State which is to follow; know what to provide, and how, in what manner, and at what time. How many things do they . . . comprehend? The Seasons of the Year, the Country, Climate, Place, Aspect, Situation, the Basis of their

Building, the Materials, Architecture; the Diet and Treatment of their Offspring, in short, the whole Oeconomy of their Nursery' (*Moralists* 2.4 [307–8]; cf. *Miscellaneous Reflections* 4.2 n. [215]). For accounts of the cleverness or sagacity of birds, see Aristotle, *History of Animals* 9.7–36; Aelian, *On the Characteristics of Animals* 9.17; Plutarch, 'Whether Land or Sea Animals are Cleverer' 971CD, 973AB [*Moralia*, 12: 391; 401]; Montaigne, 'Apology for Raymond Sebond', 333; Willis, *Two Discourses concerning the Soul of Brutes*, 35. See also *EHU* 9.6.

1.3.16.6

119.21–2 **dog ... foresees his own punishment]** The behaviour of dogs confronted with a means of punishment was widely discussed. Sextus Empiricus noted that a dog 'slinks away from a raised whip' (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.66). Bayle said that an Aristotelian, when he hears the Cartesians claim 'that beasts are only *automata*, or machines, presently objects, that a dog that hath been beaten for falling foul upon a dish of meat, touches it no more when he sees his master threatning him with a stick' (*Dictionary*, 'Rorarius' [B][4: 901a]). Willis observed that a 'Dog being by a staff struck, or by the flinging of a stone, perceives the hurt received by the senses, and easily retains the Idea in his Memory, but the Instinct dictates to him that the like stroke may be shunned afterwards, wherefore, when he sees a staff held out before his eyes, or a stone taken up, fearing thence the like hurt, he hastily flies away' (*Two Discourses concerning the Soul of Brutes*, 37). Malebranche surveyed the same accounts of dog behaviour, but remained unconvinced that dogs or any other animals have intelligence or any form of mind (*Elucidations* 15 [661]; cf. ann. 118.15). For Leibniz's view, see ann. 119.41.

1.3.16.8

119.37–40 **Beasts...never by any arguments form a general conclusion]** Although Locke said that he was uncertain whether animals could significantly compound ideas, he was certain they lacked the power of abstracting or forming general ideas, and therein lay the 'perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes' (*Essay* 2.11.10–11). On the other hand, Montaigne maintained that what passes through the head of, for example, the clever fox which avoids thin ice is 'the same reasoning that would pass through ours...a ratiocination and conclusion drawn from natural common sense: "What makes a noise, moves; what moves is not frozen; what is not frozen is liquid; and what is liquid gives way under a weight?" ...to attribute this simply to a keenness of the sense of hearing, without reasoning or inference, is a chimera' ('Apology for Raymond Sebond', 337). See also Hobbes, *Objections and Replies* 3 [AT 7: 182]. See also 3.3.4.5; ann. 389.17.

119.41–2 **by means of custom alone, that experience operates upon them]** Leibniz reached a similar conclusion, and also applied it to humans: 'There is interconnection among the perceptions of animals which bears some resemblance to reason, but this interconnection is only founded in the memory of *facts* or effects, and not at all in the knowledge of *causes*. That is why a dog runs away from the stick with which he was beaten, because his memory represents to him the pain which the stick caused him. And men, to the extent that they are empirical, that is, in three fourths of their actions, act only like beasts' ('Principles of Nature and Grace' 5; cf. 'Monadology' 28). See also *EHU* 9.5.

1.3.16.10 120.2–4 **men...admire the *instinct* of animals, and find a difficulty in explaining it]** Addison supposed that there is nothing 'more mysterious in Nature than this Instinct in Animals, which thus rises above Reason, and falls infinitely short of it. It cannot be accounted for by any Properties in Matter, [nor can one] think it the Faculty of an intellectual Being. For my own part, I look upon it as upon the Principle of Gravitation in Bodies, which...according to the best Notions of the greatest Philosophers, is an immediate Impression from the first Mover' (*Spectator* 120). See also *EHU* 9.6.

120.5–6 **reason is nothing but a...unintelligible instinct in our souls]** Compare *EHU* 9.6: 'experimental reasoning... is nothing but a species of instinct'.

1.4 *Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy*

121.title *Of the sceptical...philosophy]* The sceptical system of philosophy, as Hume styles it, dates from classical times. Diogenes Laertius, in his *Lives of the Philosophers*, and many others since, have taken Pyrrho of Elia to be the founder of scepticism, but it is not clear that there was a single founder or foundation. Later classical figures who have traditionally been regarded as sceptics include Philo, Arcesilaus, and Carneades, who joined the Academy initially begun by Plato. The fullest account of scepticism extant from classical times is that provided by Sextus Empiricus in his *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* and *Against the Mathematicians*. Other important sources are Cicero's *Academica*, the work of Diogenes mentioned, and Augustine's *Against the Academicians*. Both Sextus Empiricus and Cicero insist that there is a substantial difference between the followers of Pyrrho, the Pyrrhonians, and the sceptics associated with the Academy, the Academic sceptics. Hume says nothing explicit about these different forms of scepticism in the *Treatise*, but at *Abs.* 27 he does use the term *Pyrrhonian*. In the *Letter from a Gentleman*, Hume characterizes scepticism as 'a Kind of *Jeux d'esprit*' intended only 'to abate the Pride of mere human Reasoners' and having no adverse consequences for religious belief (*LG* 21). In the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Hume distinguishes between Pyrrhonian and Academic scepticism, and, while criticizing the former, associates his position with the latter (5.1, 12.21–5). See also anns. 123.2, 6; 125.2; 142.6; 172.37; 176.5.

There is no external evidence that, before writing the *Treatise*, Hume had read Sextus Empiricus, whose writings would have been available to him in Greek, Latin, French, and English (see Fosl, 'Bibliographical Bases of Hume's Understanding of Sextus'). Hume's only explicit references to Sextus Empiricus are to his account of the origin of religious worship in *Against the Mathematicians* (*EPM* 2 n. 6), and to his report of a law of Solon in 'Populousness' (§39 n. 58). On the other hand, we can be confident that he had read *Academica* before writing the *Treatise*, for Cicero was one of the favourite authors of his youth. (On Hume's early reading, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1.) Hume could also have learned about ancient scepticism from the articles on Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Pyrrho, and the 'Explanation concerning the



Sceptics', found in Bayle's *Dictionary*, a work recommended in Hume's letter of August 1737 to his friend M. Ramsay, and cited at 1.4.5.22 n. 47 (159). Shaftesbury, another author cited in the *Treatise*, also discussed and allowed an interlocutor, Philocles, to attempt a defence of epistemological scepticism; see *Sensus Communis* 2.2 [95–6]; *Miscellaneous Reflections* 2.2 [71–6]; *Moralists* 1.2 [206–7], and the description of these passages in the Index in vol. 3 of *Characteristicks*. Ancient sceptical arguments were also recounted positively and in detail in Montaigne's 'Apology for Raymond Sebond', a work to which Hume appears to allude at 1.3.13.10. A lengthy, sympathetic treatment of scepticism was also available in Huet's *Philosophical Treatise concerning the Weakness of Human Understanding*, a work mentioned at LG 24. In addition, it is safe to conclude that Hume knew of the use to which Descartes had put sceptical arguments in *Meditations* 1 (see the letter to Ramsay just mentioned), and that he had read Bayle's account of the sceptical turn given the 'new philosophy' by Foucher (see *Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [B]). He later said of Berkeley that 'most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, BAYLE not excepted' (EHU 12.15 n. 32).

Hume could also have learned about scepticism from *Of Wisdom* by Charron; from *Quatre dialogues* or *Discours pour monstrier que les doutes de la philosophie sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences* by La Mothe Le Vayer, or from Gassendi's *Syntagma* 2.3 [303–16]. There was no shortage of criticisms or refutations of scepticism. These included Mersenne, *La Vérité des sciences. Contre les sceptiques ou pyrrhoniens*; Lee, *Anti-Scepticism*; Barbeyrac, *Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 25; and Crousaz, *Examen du pyrrhonisme ancien & moderne*. We have found no compelling evidence that Hume read any of these half-dozen works, but there are grounds for supposing that he had read the briefer, negative assessments of scepticism found in the *Logic* of Arnauld and Nicole and in the *Port-Royal Pensées* of Pascal (see ann. 123.6), as well as that in the *Search after Truth* of Malebranche (see 2.3.5 [184–190]). For further background regarding scepticism in the early modern era, see Popkin, *History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle*.

1.4.1 *Of scepticism with regard to reason*

- 1.4.1.1 [21.1–3 **rules are certain... uncertain faculties... fall into error**] Arnauld and Nicole set out five rules that ought to govern geometrical demonstrations, then went on to catalogue six mistakes commonly made by those following these rules (*Logic* 4.3, 9), thus implicitly endorsing the view that, however 'certain', as Hume puts it, the rules may be, our faculties let us down. Locke explained how it happens that error infects the demonstrative sciences. Reliable demonstrations require, he said, the accurate perception of the agreement or disagreement of certain ideas through the mediation of other, intervening ideas, but in long demonstrations, using many such perceptions, 'the Memory does not always so readily and exactly retain: therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive Knowledge, and Men embrace often Falshoods for Demonstrations' (*Essay* 4.2.2, 7).

121.9–10 **By this means all knowledge degenerates into probability]** Boyle observed that some 'geometrical and other mathematical demonstrations...are fetched, by intermediate conclusions, from principles so very remote, and require so long a series of mediums to be employed about them', that 'even sedulous and heedful perusers do find themselves oftentimes unable to carry along such a chain of inferences in their minds, as clearly to discern, whether the whole ratiocination be coherent, and all the particulars have their due strength and connection ('Reconcilableness of *Reason* and *Religion*', 175). Locke explained this phenomenon: the results of demonstration, he said, often lack 'that evident lustre and full assurance, that always accompany' intuitive knowledge. Just as a face, reflected through a succession of mirrors, gradually loses its 'perfect Clearness and Distinctness...till at last, after many removes, it has a great mixture of Dimness', so is it 'with Knowledge, made out by a long train of Proofs' (*Essay* 4.2.6; cf. 4.3.19). Descartes recognized the problem, and proposed a solution. When faced with a 'chain of inferences' so long that, upon reaching a conclusion, we find it difficult to recall the steps by which we reached that result, we should then carry out an 'enumeration, or induction'. This enumeration is to be 'a thorough investigation of all the points relating to the problem at hand, an investigation which is so careful and accurate that we may conclude with manifest certainty that we have not inadvertently overlooked anything'. If we follow this procedure, he said, we will make 'the truth of our conclusions more certain than any other kind of proof (simple intuition excepted)', or, should 'the object of our inquiry elude us', we will at least 'perceive with certainty that [this object] could not possibly be discovered by any method known to us' (*Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, rule 7 [AT 10: 388–9]).

1.4.1.2 121.15–16 **Every time he runs over his proofs, his confidence increases]** Locke also observed that some demonstrations are so 'long and perplex'd' that 'even those, who are able to master such intricate Speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at Certainty' (*Essay* 4.17.15).

1.4.1.7 123.2–3 **one of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain]** Many of Hume's early modern predecessors supposed that all sceptics take the view that everything is uncertain. Arnauld and Nicole say that sceptics 'take pride in maintaining that nothing is certain' (*Logic*, Discourse 1 [7]). Malebranche levels the same charge against Montaigne; see *Search* 2.3.5 [189]. Berkeley has Hylas say, 'I said indeed, that a *sceptic* was one who doubted of every thing; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things' (*Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 173]). Huet says that the Pyrrhonians 'never affirm'd, defin'd, nor judg'd of any Thing; that they did not believe that any Thing was one Thing rather than another...that they maintain'd that there was nothing true...and that even then when they advanc'd all these Propositions, they did not affirm them' (*Philosophical Treatise* 1.14 [95]). Reference works of the period enshrine this conception of the sceptic. Harris, for example, defined 'Sceptick' as a 'Person who maintains there is nothing Certain, and no real

Knowledge at all to be had; but that a Man ought to Doubt of, and Disbelieve every thing' (*Lexicon Technicum*, 'Sceptick'). In contrast to this view, Shaftesbury observed that the extent of scepticism is clearly limited. We may be able to doubt 'of every thing about us', but 'we cannot doubt of what passes *within ourselves*'. He also wondered why such a fuss was 'rais'd about the simple name of SCEPTICK', for this in its original sense means nothing more than "'That State or Frame of Mind in which every one remains, on every Subject of which he is *not certain*'" (*Inquiry 2, Conclusion* [173]; *Miscellaneous Reflections* 2.2 [71]). See also Cicero, *Academica* 2.24.77; Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, 'Scepticks'; below, ann. 176.5; Hume, *DNR* 12.8 n.

123.6–7 **Nature...has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel]** Hume's position here resembles that of Pascal, who asked what the man caught in the throes of scepticism would do: 'Will he doubt of everything? Will he doubt whether he is awake when he is pinched or burned? Doubt whether he doubts? Whether he exists? He cannot come to that. I contend that there never was an actual, perfect Pyrrhonian. Nature assists [*souffient*] our weak reason, saving it from such a degree of extravagance...Nature confounds the Pyrrhonian, and reason confounds the dogmatist' (*Port-Royal Pensées*, 161 [B434; Kr131]). Arnauld and Nicole also doubted that there could be genuine sceptics, calling those who claim to be sceptics a 'sect of liars'. No one, they say, 'ever seriously doubted whether there is an earth, a sun, or a moon, or whether the whole is greater than its part... people can bring themselves to say... that they doubt these things, because they can lie. But they cannot assert them in their minds' (*Logic*, Discourse 1 [7]; Hume refers to the suggestion that sceptics are a 'sect of liars' at *DNR* 1.15). Bayle reported that Arcesilas 'suspended his Judgment in every thing, and disputed only to convince himself, that the Affirmative Reasons were no better than the Negative'. Bayle also said that we do not need to be concerned about the effects of scepticism because 'there never was, and there never will be' more than 'a small number of men capable of being deceived by the arguments of the Sceptics' and because there is a natural human 'inclination... to be peremptory' (*Dictionary*, 'Arcesilas' [E] [1: 410b]; 'Pyrrho' [B] [4: 654a]; cf. 'Nicolle', [C] [362b]). See also ann. 125.33; *Abs.* 27; *LG* 21–2; *EHU* 5.2; 12.2, 21–3; *EPM* 9.13.

123.10–11 **seeing the surrounding bodies...in broad sun-shine]** Compare Locke: 'But if I turn my Eyes at noon towards the Sun, I cannot avoid the *Ideas*, which the Light, or Sun, then produces in me' (*Essay* 4.11.5).

1.4.1.8 123.17 **my hypothesis]** See, e.g., 1.3.7.6, 8; 1.3.8.12; *Abs.* 18–22; App. 2–9; 1.3.7.7 (first published as part of the Appendix).

123.30 **foregoing arguments]** See this section, ¶¶3–6.

1.4.1.11 124.40–1 **conviction...diminishes in proportion to the efforts...imagination makes]** Malebranche explained that the human mind is subject to error because, among other things, 'it is inconstant...and cannot keep its perception fixed on a subject long enough to examine it completely', then later summed up his view by saying that 'attention greatly tires the mind' (*Search* 3.1.4.1 [211], 3.2.10.1 [252]).

- 1.4.1.12 125.2–5 **If the sceptical reasonings be strong ... If weak ... This argument is not just]** The view that, if sceptical arguments are correct they refute themselves, was common enough. Bayle said that when one has seen 'all the ways of suspending ... judgment' found in Sextus Empiricus, one may well think that his is the most subtle logic of which the human mind is capable. But then one will see 'that such a subtilty ... confounds itself; for if it were solid, it would prove that it is certain that we must doubt. Therefore there would be ... a certain rule of truth', and the sceptical 'system would be destroyed by it' (*Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [C][4: 655b]; cf. 'Arcesilas' [F] [1: 411b]). Chambers offered a variation on this theme. He granted that Pyrrhonian scepticism has some plausibility, but that the 'very Principle' of this view 'destroys itself: For if there be nothing certain, then must that Dogma itself be precarious; and if no one thing be more probable, or liker to Truth than another, why shall the Principle of the *Pyrrhonians* be believed preferably to the opposite one' (*Cyclopaedia*, 'Pyrrhonian'). Baxter said that 'the fate of the generality of Sceptics' is that 'their very design opposes and defeats itself', then illustrated his point with examples drawn from Diogenes Laertius' account of Pyrrho (*Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, 2: 272). See also Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 3.20.9 [213]. Sextus Empiricus himself both attempted to deflect this argument and also used it against other forms of scepticism; see *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.7, 10; *Against the Logicians* 1.398–400. See also Huet, *Philosophical Treatise* 3.5, 13. Compare *EHU* 12.21–3.

125.22 **nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments]** See ann. 123.6.

1.4.2 *Of scepticism with regard to the senses*

- 1.4.2.1 125.33–4 **Whether there be body or not ... we must take for granted]** Arnauld and Nicole, and Locke, made similar claims. The former said that 'it is impossible to doubt one's perceptions, separating them from their objects. Whether there is or is not a sun or an earth, I am certain that I imagine seeing one' (*Logic* 4.1 [228]). Locke said that, assuming we allow our senses to function, belief in the existence of external objects will not be a matter of choice: 'our *Will hath no Power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind* one way or other; that is done only by the Objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And therefore, as far as Men's Senses are conversant about external Objects, the Mind cannot but receive those *Ideas*, which are presented by them, and be informed of the Existence of Things without' (*Essay* 4.13.2). But Hume would certainly have known, both from his own reading of Meditation 6, and from other sources, that Descartes undertook to prove the existence of external objects, and thus that he did not take them for granted. Malebranche reported that Descartes 'wanted to establish his philosophy on unshakable foundations', and thus thought that 'he could not assume that there are bodies, and that he should not prove that there are on the basis of sensible proofs, even though [these latter] would seem very persuasive to the ordinary man'. Malebranche himself supposed that while 'we have a strong inclination to believe there are bodies', this inclination can be resisted even by those whose religious faith teaches them that God has created an external world (*Elucidations* 6 [572, 574–5]; cf. *Search* 3.2.1.1 [217–18]). Hume would also

have known the views of Bayle and Berkeley. Bayle said that, thanks to the efforts of those who attempt to distinguish between primary and secondary qualities, we have no satisfactory proof of the existence of bodies (see ann. 129.4). Although Berkeley famously denied (as his spokesman Philonous put it) that 'there is any unthinking *substratum* of the objects of sense, and in that acceptance that there is any material substance' or body, he was none the less careful to qualify this denial by saying that 'if by *material substance* is meant only sensible body, that which is seen and felt... then I am more certain of matter's existence than you, or any other philosopher, pretend to be' (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 237]; cf. *Principles* 1.37). But this qualification did not prevent Chambers from saying that, 'Against the *Existence of Bodies*, or any *External World*, Mr. *Berkley* argues very strenuously' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Body'; for Hume's later assessment of Berkeley's writings, see ann. 150.14). Collier also explicitly denied that there is any body or matter external to or independent of the mind; see *Clavis universalis*, *passim*. Much of the first part of *EHU* 12 (see esp. 12.3–16) addresses the issues raised in this section.

1.4.2.2 n. 34 (126) **Part 2. Sect. 6]** See 1.2.6.8–9.

1.4.2.3 126.17 **To begin with the SENSES]** The inability of the senses to establish that there are external objects had been remarked by several of Hume's early modern predecessors. Malebranche asked: 'What evidence do you have that an impression that is deceptive not only with regard to sense qualities but also with regard to the size, figure, and motion of bodies, is not so with regard to the actual existence of these same bodies?' (*Elucidations* 6 [573]; cf. *Search* 1.11–14 [54–70]). See also Descartes, *Meditations* 6; Foucher, *Critique of the Search after Truth* 5; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [B]; Huet, *Philosophical Treatise* 1.9; Berkeley, *Principles* 1.18.

1.4.2.5 126.34–5 **If our senses... suggest any idea of distinct existence... a kind of fallacy]** Malebranche outlined a fallacious process which allegedly has just the effect Hume mentions. This process leads us to take certain immediate objects of the mind, the mere images or sensations of things, to be 'external to the soul' or mind. This error results from the fact that it is not in the mind's power to see these images at will. They can be perceived only when certain motions in our sense organs, the motions 'to which the ideas of these objects are joined by nature', occur in the brain. But, because the mind is not aware of these motions in the sense organs (it is aware only of its sensations), and because it knows that these sensations are not self-produced, it is led to suppose that the sensations themselves are external to it. Moreover, judgements of this kind have been made so often that even informed minds go on making them (*Search* 1.14.2 [68–9]; cf. ann. 127.43). Rohault suggested that we commonly 'look upon the Sensation, which now upon more mature Deliberation, we acknowledge only as an accidental Mode of existing, to be *without us*, and therefore we refer it to *external Objects*; and we have so often made this Judgement, that we are accustomed to do it without any Difficulty, and without the least Suspicion of its not being conformable to Truth' (*System* 1.32.11).

1.4.2.6 127.1–3 **question...concerning identity...uniting principle, which constitutes a person**] See 1.4.6; App. 10–21.

1.4.2.7 127.12–13 **nor is it conceivable...senses...capable of deceiving us**] That the senses do not themselves deceive us had been succinctly stated by Malebranche: 'Error is found not in our sensations but only in our judgments' (*Search* 1.14.3 title [69]). See also Descartes, *Meditations* 4, where error is said to derive from the will, not the intellect or that faculty that allows us to perceive ideas.

127.15–16 **sensations...must necessarily...be what they appear**] Locke and Berkeley, using the terminology of ideas, reached similar conclusions. Locke said that everyone 'knows the *Ideas* he has' and 'he knows also, when any one is in his Understanding, and what it is... Which always being so... he can never be in doubt when any *Idea* is in his Mind, that it is there, and is that *Idea* it is' (*Essay* 4.7.4); Berkeley, that, 'since [ideas] and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived' (*Principles* 1.25). See also Descartes, *Meditations* 2 [AT 7: 29]; Gassendi, *Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 277–8].

1.4.2.9 127.35–6 **'tis not our body we perceive...but certain impressions**] Malebranche concluded that we cannot, 'on the basis of what the senses report', assure ourselves of the existence or nature of our own bodies. We may have sensory impressions of, as Hume puts it, our 'members', but these do not establish the existence of our body or of body in general. 'I know nothing of the matter', said Malebranche, 'when I judge only according to my senses... I do not even know for sure that I really have hands' (*Elucidations* 6 [570–1]). Descartes raised the same doubt; see *Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 76–7].

n. 35 (127) Sect. 5] See esp. 1.4.5.8–16.

127.43–128.2 **sight informs us not of...outness...immediately...rational philosophers**] Malebranche and Berkeley are the likely subjects of this allusion. The term 'outness' occurs in an early translation of Malebranche; see *Father Malebranche his Treatise concerning the Search after Truth*, *Illustration* 6 [112]. Malebranche doubted 'that we perceive bodies external to us and even at some distance from the body we animate and that therefore we can judge that they are external to us without our judgments extending beyond our perceptions', but he none the less supposed that 'these bodies we see external to us really [are] external to us'. There are, he says, 'outnesses and distances [des dehors & des éloignemens]... in the intelligible world that is our mind's immediate object' (*Elucidations* 6 [572]; *Recherche de la vérité* 3: 60–1). Berkeley said that his *New Theory of Vision* had 'shewn that distance or outness is neither immediately of it self perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or any thing that hath a necessary connexion with it: but that it is only suggested to our thoughts, by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation, either with distance, or things placed at a distance' (*Principles* 1.43). See also Hall, 'Hume's Actual Use of Berkeley's *Principles*' and 'Yes, Hume Did Use Berkeley'; Conroy, 'Did Hume Really Follow Berkeley?'; ann. 42.1.

1.4.2.10 128.5 **shall see afterwards]** See, e.g., ¶¶14, 21, and 37–47 of the present section.

1.4.2.12 128.22–6 **three different kinds of impressions...cutting of our flesh with steel]** In supposing that there are three kinds of impressions, Hume follows closely a familiar part of Locke's *Essay*. There Locke distinguished the ideas of those qualities supposed to be in bodies, the '*primary Qualities*': viz. the ideas of 'Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, and Number' which were said to resemble or represent the primary qualities, from those ideas produced by certain 'Powers' or '*secondary Qualities*' of bodies: viz. the ideas of '*Colours and Smells...Tastes and Sounds, and other the like sensible Qualities*', including heat and cold. These latter ideas, he said, have no more resemblance to anything in bodies than does a third kind of idea, 'the *Idea of Pain*', for example, resemble 'the motion of a piece of Steel dividing our Flesh' (*Essay* 2.8.9, 13–14; cf. 2.8.22–3). On primary and secondary qualities, see also below 1.4.4; anns. 149.40, 150.4; 'The Sceptic' 17n; *EHU* 12.15.

128.28–30 **vulgar only regard the second...the third to be merely perceptions]** Malebranche said: 'Almost everyone believes that the heat he feels...is in the fire causing it, that light is in the air, and that colors are on colored objects... True, they do not judge that the pain is in the needle pricking them as they judge that the heat is in the fire' (*Search* 1.11.1–2 [54]; cf. *Elucidations* 6 [574]). S. Clarke supposed that 'the Vulgar thinks Colours and Sounds to be Properties inherent in Bodies' (*Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 8 [56]). Locke, in the discussion cited in the preceding annotation, supposes exactly the distribution of beliefs outlined by Hume. For Bayle's view, see ann. 129.4.

1.4.2.13 128.34–8 **So strong is the prejudice...people imagine...senses contradict this philosophy]** Rohault supposed it 'the general Opinion of Mankind' that colours, sounds, etc. are in bodies or the air about us, and this because of the way in which the senses present such qualities to us (*System* 1.2.20, 34–5). In July 1762 Hume criticized Thomas Reid for saying 'that the Vulgar do not believe the sensible Qualities of Heat, Smell, Sound, & probably Colour to be really in Bodies'. To say this, Hume said, is to imagine 'the Vulgar to be Philosophers...Philosophy scarce ever advances a greater Paradox in the Eyes of the People, than when it affirms that Snow is neither cold nor white: Fire [neither] hot nor red' (*Correspondence of Thomas Reid*, 18–19).

128.44–5 **as far as the senses are judges, all perceptions...same in the manner of their existence]** According to Foucher, Malebranche claimed 'that our senses do not give us knowledge of things that are outside of us', and that for two reasons. First, although the senses furnish the mind with ideas, these ideas are unlike anything external. As Foucher points out, Malebranche supposes that the mind 'has nothing in it that is *like* matter and extended beings'. Second, he also supposes that all ideas are modifications of the mind. Consequently, it will not be possible to distinguish between those ideas said to represent things external to us and those said to represent only what is within us. All ideas 'belong to us equally and are, properly

speaking, only our soul disposed in such and such a way' (*Critique of the Search after Truth* 5). Bayle said that Foucher's argument revealed that the Cartesians had given the sceptic excellent grounds for doubting the existence of body, for it shows that there is no more reason to think that extension and motion exist independently of the mind than that colours, sounds, or heat so exist; see *Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [B], some of which is cited in the following annotation. Berkeley then further developed the argument, turning it into his well-known criticism of the attempt to distinguish the ideas of primary qualities from those of secondary qualities; see *Principles* 1.9–15.

1.4.2.14 129.4–6 **arguments philosophers may fancy...are known but to very few]**

Bayle made much of this point. He noted that the new philosophers (i.e. the Cartesians) suppose that bodies are not really coloured. As a consequence, according to Bayle, these philosophers leave us without 'one good proof of the existence of bodies. The only proof they can give me for it, is, that God would deceive me, if he imprinted in my soul the ideas I have of body, if there were no bodies, but that proof is very weak... Ever since the beginning of the world all men, except, perhaps, one in two hundred millions, do firmly believe that bodies are coloured, and yet it is a mistake. I ask, whether God deceives men with respect to those colours? If he [does], what hinders but he may deceive them with respect to extension' or existence (*Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [B] [4: 654a]). The argument Bayle targets is found in Descartes; see *Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 74–80; cf. 16–17]; for a variant form of the appeal to the Deity, see Locke, *Essay* 4.11.3. Rohault, although he did not appeal to God's veracity, did argue that 'it is chiefly from Reasoning that we are assured of' the existence of things external to us (*System* 1.2.36 [1: 11]; cf. 1.2.10 ff.). See also Cicero, *Academica* 2.47.144–6; *EHU* 9.5.

129.10–12 **philosophy informs us...vulgar confound perceptions and objects]**

At least one philosopher held all three of the views enunciated in this sentence. Berkeley said that the only 'objects of human knowledge' are ideas; that the 'objects of sense exist only when they are perceived'; and that those of a 'vulgar cast... simple enough to believe' their senses, believe 'that the real things are those very things' they 'see and feel, and perceive by [their] senses' (*Principles* 1.1, 45; *Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 229]).

129.19 **appear presently]** See ¶¶46–55 of the present section.

1.4.2.16 129.33–4 **neither upon account of the involuntariness...nor of their superior force]**

Locke, surveying the grounds or causes of our belief in external objects, concluded that the involuntariness and superior force of certain ideas contribute significantly to such belief; see *Essay* 4.11.3, 5. Descartes, although he was in the *Meditations* at first impressed by such involuntariness, went on to say that, 'despite the fact that the perceptions of the senses were not dependent on my will, I did not think that I should on that account infer that they proceeded from things distinct from myself' (*Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 76–7]; cf. 3 [AT 7: 38–9]). See also Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 1.9 [49]; Berkeley, *Principles* 1.29, 33, 56.



- 129.40–1 **heat of a fire, when moderate...the pain, which it causes]** The common supposition that heat is in the fire, but pain is not, was widely discussed. Descartes said that ‘although I feel heat when I go near a fire and feel pain when I go too near, there is no convincing argument for supposing that there is something in the fire which resembles the heat, any more than for supposing that there is something which resembles the pain’ (*Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 83]). Baxter supposed phrases like ‘that heat’ are equivocal, and ‘may either stand for the *sensation* excited in the mind, or the *quality* in external bodies, raising that sensation’ (*Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, 2: 299 n.). See also Rohault, *System* 1.2.42–3; Locke, *Essay* 2.8.2, 16; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 179]; above, ann. 128.28.
- 1.4.2.18 130.1–2 **objects, to which we attribute a continu’d existence, have a peculiar constancy]** Hume’s remarks here about the constancy, and then in the following paragraph, about the coherence of objects, resemble Berkeley’s observation about ‘ideas of sense’. These, he said, ‘are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series’ (*Principles* 1.30; cf. 1.33).
- 1.4.2.20 131.5–6 **receive a letter...from a friend]** See *EHU* 4.4 for a variation on this example.
- 1.4.2.21 131.31–2 **inference arises from the understanding, and from custom in an indirect and oblique manner]** Hume returns to this subject at ¶¶47 and 54 of this section and at 1.4.7.4; See also 1.3.2.2; *EHU* 12.9–16, 29.
- 1.4.2.22 n. 36 (132) **Part 2. Sect. 4]** See esp. 1.2.4.24; also 1.3.13.9–10. The comparison of the mind and ‘galley put in motion by the oars’ (132.11) is repeated at ‘Of Eloquence’ 20.
- 132.12 **have assign’d]** See 1.2.4.18–30.
- 1.4.2.24 133.6 **precedent reasoning]** See 1.3.7.
- 1.4.2.25 133.8–9 **First...principle of identity]** See ¶¶26–30 of this section.
- 133.9–11 **Secondly, Give a reason...attribute an identity to them]** See ¶¶31–6 of this section.
- 133.11–12 **Thirdly, Account for that propensity...to unite these broken appearances]** See ¶¶37–40 of this section.
- 133.13–14 **Fourthly...Explain that force and vivacity of conception]** See ¶¶41–2 of this section.
- 1.4.2.26 133.15 **principle of individuation]** Hobbes noted that ‘the same body may at different times be compared with itself. And from hence springs a great controversy among philosophers about the *beginning of individuation*, namely, in what sense it may be conceived that a body is at one time the same, at another time not the same it

was formerly' (*Elements of Philosophy* 2.11.7). Watts observed that while children seem 'to know what 'tis for one Thing to be *the same* with itself and not another Thing, Philosophers are deeply entangled in the Search thereof, and frequently confounded in their Thoughts' (*Philosophical Essays* 12.7; cf. *Brief Scheme of Ontology* 13). Locke in contrast thought it 'easy to discover, what is so much enquired after, the *principium Individuationis*'. It is 'Existence it self which determines a Being of any sort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the same kind' (*Essay* 2.27.3). For criticism of Locke's view, see Sergeant, *Solid Philosophy* 14.4–10; Lee, *Anti-Scepticism* 2.27.3; *Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence* 5.26. For additional background, see Thiel, 'Individuation'.

1.4.2.29 n. 37 (133) **Part 2. Sect. 5]** 1.2.5.28–9; see also 1.2.3.6–11.

**134.7 idea of unity]** We have previously suggested that 'unity' should be emended to 'identity', and did so emend the first several impressions of the Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the *Treatise*. We continue to believe this emendation may be called for, but we have concluded that the case for the change needs to be made at a length inappropriate to an annotation or note, and so have retained the reading of the copy-text. Briefly stated, our view is that 1.4.2.29 is intended to explain how we arrive at the idea of the relation of identity, a relation that is said to 'lie in something that is neither' number nor unity, a seemingly impossible position (1.4.2.28). To this end, Hume begins ¶29 by reminding us that the idea of time is dependent on a succession or change of objects, and thus that it is only by means of a 'fiction of the imagination' that an unchanging object gives rise to the 'notion of identity', the notion, that is, of remaining the same over time. He then tells us that we may consider any two points of time or moments as simultaneous, 'in which case they give us the idea of number'. Or we can think of these two moments as succeeding one another in the normal way (as instantiating the required change of object that produces the idea of time), and then *imagine* that this succession has taken place without the required succession or change of object. This exercise of the imagination gives rise, he continues, to an 'idea, which is a medium betwixt unity and number... And this idea we call that of identity'. In the interim, however, he or his compositor has written that it is the 'idea of unity' that is the 'medium betwixt unity and number'. This appears to be a mistake. To reply to the question, 'What idea occupies the middle ground between the idea of unity and the idea of number?' with 'The idea of unity' is either to fail to answer the question or to begin an infinite regress. Given that (1) Hume has undertaken to provide the provenance of the idea of identity; (2) he goes on to say of the idea that occupies the middle ground in question that it is 'this idea we call that of identity'; and (3) this response is an intelligible answer to the question raised, we conclude that the copy-text here is suspect.

**134.8–9 idea... a medium betwixt unity and number... is either of them]** Berkeley maintained, through Philonous, that there is no idea of identity *per se*: 'If you should say, we differed in our notions; for that you superadded to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you

I know not what you mean by that *abstracted idea of identity*; and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you understood yourself' (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 248]).

- 1.4.2.31 134.21 *second part of my system*] See ¶25 of this section.  
 134.28 *already observ'd*] See ¶¶12–14 of this section.  
 134.40–1 *shall... give warning*] See ¶46 of this section.
- 1.4.2.32 n. 38 (135) **Part 2. Sect. 5**] See 1.2.5.20–1.  
 135.7–8 *have observ'd*] Hume refers again to the discussion at 1.2.5.20–1.
- 1.4.2.34 135.29 *foregoing principle*] See ¶32 of this section.
- 1.4.2.35 136.1 *shall afterwards see*] See, e.g., 1.4.3.3, 1.4.6.6.
- 1.4.2.36 136.17–19 **unphilosophical part of mankind... all of us... perceptions... their only objects**] Montaigne, speaking of 'the common herd', added that 'we are all of the common herd' ('Apology for Raymond Sebond', 429). Rohault said that 'we have within our selves the Sensations of many Things, which we cannot help thinking are without us, though they really are not', and that the 'common Way of Speaking' makes it virtually impossible to give up this 'vulgar Notion' about these things (*System* 1.2.31). Berkeley had Philonous say: 'the vulgar' are 'of opinion, that *those things they immediately perceive are the real things*' (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 262]). See also *EHU* 12.8.  
 136.31 *third part... hypothesis I propos'd*] See ¶25 of this section.
- 1.4.2.37 n. 40 (137) **Sect. 6**] See 1.4.6.6–10.
- 1.4.2.39 137.38–9 **what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions**] See also 1.4.6; the first three anns. to it, and anns. 165.17, n. 50 (166), 169.5, 170.40.
- 1.4.2.41 138.21–2 *From whence arises such a belief?... fourth member of this system*] The fourth prerequisite mentioned in ¶25 of this section was an explanation of 'that force and vivacity of conception, which arises from the propensity' to believe in the continued existence of external objects. Hume here begins, and continues over the next several paragraphs, this explanation. He also touched briefly on the subject in ¶24 of this section, in *Abs.* 27, and addressed it in detail in *EHU* 12.7 ff.  
 138.22 *prov'd already*] See 1.3.7; ann. 65.37.
- 1.4.2.43 139.18–19 **fiction of a continu'd existence... false... acknowledg'd by all philosophers**] See ann. 140.1; *EHU* 12.9–16.
- 1.4.2.44 139.34 *already observ'd*] See ¶2 of this section.
- 1.4.2.45 140.1–2 **experiments... convince us... perceptions are not possess of any independent existence**] The 'experiments' or phenomena to which Hume appeals

had been used in arguments reaching a similar conclusion. Descartes briefly reviewed some of his 'experiences' (changes in the size, shape, or colour of objects), and then concluded that, so far as 'the judgements of the external senses' are concerned, he could be sure of neither the nature nor the independent existence of external objects (*Meditations* 6 [AT 7: 76–7]; cf. *Discourse on Method* 4 [AT 6: 39]; *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, rule 12 [AT 10: 423]). Rohault presented eight such 'Experiments' which, taken together, show that we have within us sensations of many things we mistakenly suppose to have distinct and independent existence; see *System* 1.2.22–31. Others discussing the phenomena sketched in Hume's account include Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 4.324–78; Cicero, *Academica* 2.25.79–2.26.82; Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.91–123; *Against the Logicians* 1.191–8, 208–9, 411–14; Montaigne, 'Apology for Raymond Sebond', 443–55; Malebranche, *Search* 1.7.4–5 [34–6]; Norris, *Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World* 1.4.21; Berkeley, *Principles* 1.14–15; *Three Dialogues* 1, 3 [*Works*, 2: 176–8, 185–92, 258]; *Alciphron* 4.9; Huet, *Philosophical Treatise* 1.3; 1.5; Baxter, *Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, 2: 342–3 n.

140.3–4 **press one eye...perceive all the objects to become double**] The experiment and effect Hume describes were well known to his early modern predecessors. See Montaigne, 'Apology for Raymond Sebond', 447; Hobbes, *Human Nature* 2.5; Rohault, *System* 1.2.25; Collier, *Clavis universalis* 1.1 [24], 1.2.1 [30–2]; Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, 'Visible'. The experiment is also found in classical writers. See Aristotle, *Problems* 3.20; Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 4.447–52; Cicero, *Academica* 2.25.80; Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.47; *Against the Logicians* 1.192. Hume comments on this and other 'sceptical topics' at *EHU* 12.6.

140.7–8 **disposition of our nerves and animal spirits**] Rohault appealed to the nerves to explain the double vision that results when we press on one of the eyes. The 'Images which are then impressed on the two Eyes', he said, 'do not fall upon *the Sympathetick Nerves*, nor reunite in the Brain, so we cannot fail to see the Object double' (*System* 1.32.29–30).

1.4.2.46 140.15–17 **philosophers...distinguish, (as we shall do for the future) betwixt perceptions and objects**] Hume began supposing, like the vulgar, that there is 'a single existence' and calling it 'indifferently *object* or *perception*', at 1.4.2.31 above. For some of those who distinguish between perceptions and objects, see anns. 129.40, 149.13.

140.23–5 **no principles...lead us directly to...double existence of perceptions and objects**] Berkeley found the supposition of 'a twofold existence of the objects of sense, the one *intelligible*, or in the mind, the other *real* and without the mind' to be 'a most groundless and absurd notion' (*Principles* 1.86). Earlier in the same work he said that 'philosophers having plainly seen, that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar', viz. the supposition that ideas can exist independently of the mind.

But these philosophers 'at the same time' made another mistake 'which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those objects on the mind' (*Principles* 1.56; we owe this second reference to Ayers, 'Berkeley and Hume: a Question of Influence', 317). Compare *EHU* 12.10–14.

- 1.4.2.47 140.45–141.1 **no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions]** See 1.2.6.7; ann. 49.4.
- 1.4.2.50 142.6–8 **a few extravagant sceptics ... never able to ... to believe it]** Hume may have counted Pyrrho and Berkeley among these 'few extravagant sceptics'. Pyrrho had been portrayed as doubting the existence of external objects, but as being unable to maintain this attitude. It is alleged that, when startled by a dog, he fled up a tree. When onlookers laughed at him, he defended himself by saying that it is 'very difficult entirely to strip off the man'. The story is found in Diogenes Laertius, 'Pyrrho' [*Lives* 9], and is repeated by Montaigne ('Of virtue', in *Complete Essays*, 533) and Bayle (*Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [G]); the last disputes the truth of the anecdote. Baxter took Berkeley, by his arguments against the possibility of material substance, to have endeavoured 'to overturn *the evidence of sense universally*' and 'to introduce the *wildest and most unbounded Scepticism*, let his pretences be what they will'. Moreover, Baxter supposed Berkeley's arguments to be necessarily self-contradictory, and then later added that no one 'can ever be seriously persuaded, that this Author's scheme is true in fact, let him use the utmost violence possible to his reason. The thing itself is of such a nature, that it will not admit of belief' (*Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, 2: 285, 301). Hume was clearly familiar with Berkeley's immaterialist hypothesis (see his letter to M. Ramsay, quoted above, Historical Account, Sect. 1), and was later to say that, whatever may have been Berkeley's intent, his arguments 'are, in reality, merely sceptical', for, among other things, they '*produce no conviction*' (*EHU* n. 32). See also Collier, *Clavis universalis* 2.10, Objection 2, Answer 2; anns. 123.6, 150.14.
- 1.4.2.54 143.25 **already shown]** See ¶¶21, 47 of this section.  
143.30 **above-explain'd]** See 1.1.3.2.
- 1.4.2.55 n. 41 (143) **Sect. 5]** See 1.4.5.12. See also ¶¶32, 35–40 of the present section, 1.4.3.3, 1.4.6.6.
- 1.4.2.56 143.43 **I begun this subject]** See ¶1 of this section.  
144.21–2 **impossible ... to conceive, objects to be ... any thing but ... same with perceptions]** See also 1.2.6.8–9, 1.4.5.19–20, 1.4.6.13.
- 1.4.2.57 144.30–3 **doubt ... encreases, the farther we carry our reflections ... Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy]** In contrast to Hume, Arnauld and Nicole, and Malebranche, perhaps taking a cue from Descartes,

claimed that doubt arises from inattention. Descartes had said that, as long as he attended to the proof, he could not but believe that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, but then observed that 'as soon as I turn my mind's eye away from the proof... I can easily fall into doubt about its truth' (*Meditations* 5 [AT 7: 70]). Arnauld and Nicole said that 'lack of attention' is 'the source of Pyrrhonism', and that the mental disorder of doubting 'what is clear and certain' arises from 'a failure to make oneself attentive enough to discern the truth' (*Logic*, Discourse 1 [7, 8]). Malebranche, having said that error is the too 'hasty consent of the will' caused by the failure of the understanding to pay adequate attention, went on to say that we need to look for ways of preventing our perceptions from becoming 'confused and imperfect', and that, 'because, as everyone knows, there is nothing that makes them clearer and more distinct than attentiveness, we must try to find the means to become more attentive than we are' (*Search* 6.1.2 [411–12]).

144.36–7 **intend to examine some general systems both antient and modern]** See the next four sections.

144.38 **proceed to...enquiry concerning our impressions]** Hume refers in this general way to Book 2.

1.4.3 *Of the antient philosophy*

1.4.3.1 144.40–2 **moralists have recommended...knowing our progress...to recollect our dreams]** According to Plutarch, Zeno 'said that every man might fairly derive from his dreams a consciousness that he was making progress if he observed that during his period of sleep he felt no pleasure in anything disgraceful', and that Plato had realized this even earlier ('How a Man may become Aware of his Progress in Virtue' 82–3 [*Moralia*, 1: 441]). Among moderns, Montaigne said 'that dreams are faithful interpreters of our inclinations; but there is an art to sorting and understanding them' ('Of experience', in *Complete Essays*, 843). See also *Spectator* 586, and, for additional references, Solomon, 'Some Sources for Hume's Opening Remarks to *Treatise* I.IV.III'.

1.4.3.2 145.12–13 **confest by...philosophers...ideas of bodies are...collections form'd by the mind]** See 1.1.6.2; ann. 16.16.

1.4.3.6 146.25–9 **peripatetic philosophy...original matter...fire, water, earth, and air...substantial form]** Much of what Hume says about the Peripatetics is both familiar and general. Harris said that 'now a days [c.1700] by the *Peripatetick Philosophy*, we understand that which was founded on the Principles of *Aristotle* and his Commentators and Followers'; Theophrastus, Boethius, Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham are among the commentators mentioned (*Lexicon Technicum*, 'Peripateticks'). Chambers said the '*Peripateticks*' were 'a Sect of Philosophers, the Followers of *Aristotle*...call'd also *Aristotelians*' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Peripateticks'). Aristotle's views on matter, form, and the elements are set out in, among other places, *Metaphysics* 7–9. Malebranche several times outlines, only to criticize, the philosophy of the Peripatetics or 'school philosophers'; see, e.g., *Search* 1.16.3–4 [74–5], 6.2.2.

Relatively lengthy accounts of Peripatetic views were available to Hume in Boyle, *Examen of the Origin and Doctrine of Substantial Forms*; Rapin, *Reflexions upon Ancient and Modern Philosophy*, and Stanley, 'Containing the Peripatetick Philosophers', *History of Philosophy* 6. A briefer, critical account was to be found in Bayle, *Système abrégé de philosophie* 3.1.1; see also his *Dictionary*, 'Gorlaeus' [A]; 'Morinus' [M]. A still briefer overview could have been collected from such articles as 'Element', 'Form', 'Matter', and 'Substantial' in Chambers, *Cyclopædia*. Criticism of Aristotelian metaphysics was commonplace and often routinely dismissive. See also Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, 140; Descartes, *Principles of Philosophy*, Preface [AT 9b: 4–9]; Hobbes, *Leviathan* 4.46 ¶¶8, 11, 14–16; Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 3.19.2; Locke, *Essay* 3.6.10, 24; 3.10.14. Hume, 'Rise and Progress' 20.

- 1.4.3.7 146.37–41 **notion of accidents...properties...require a subject...support them**] Hume's language here is similar to Locke's, who suggested that those 'who first ran into the Notion of *Accidents*, as a sort of real Beings, that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word *Substance*, to support them' (*Essay* 2.13.19). The Aristotelian position on accidents was more complex than either Locke or Hume suggest (see also Descartes, *Objections and Replies* 2, def. 5, 7 [AT 7: 161]; Rohault, *System* 1.4.5). Watts reminded his readers that the '*Peripatetick Philosophers*' often used the term *accident* to refer to both such *accidental* modes as size, texture, and colour, and also to such *essential* modes as shape or thinking (*Logick* 1.2.3). Chambers reported that the 'Schoolmen distinguish three Kinds of *Accidents*; *Verbal*, *Predicable*, and *Predicamental*'. But he argued that only the last of these is truly an accident, i.e. 'a *Mode* or *Modification* of some created *Substance*, inhering or depending thereon, so as not to be capable of subsisting without the same' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Accident'). See also Bayle, *Système abrégé de philosophie* 1.2; E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 170; *Treatise* 1.1.6; anns. 16.3, 16, 20.

146.42 **above-mention'd**] See ¶¶2–5 of this section.

- 1.4.3.8 147.6–7 **fictions...sentiments concerning occult qualities**] Newton said that 'the *Aristotelians* gave the Name of occult Qualities, not to manifest Qualities, but to such Qualities only as they supposed to lie hid in Bodies, and to be the unknown Causes of manifest Effects: Such as would be the Causes of Gravity... Such occult Qualities put a stop to the Improvement of natural Philosophy, and therefore of late Years have been rejected' (*Opticks* 3.1, qu. 31 [401]). According to Chambers, 'Weak Philosophers, when unable to discover the Cause of an Effect, and unwilling to own their Ignorance, say it arises from an *occult* Virtue, an *occult* Cause, an *occult* Quality.' Such qualities are 'secret, hidden, or invisible' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Occult'). See also ann. 148.1, and on Newton, *HE* 71 [6: 542].
- 1.4.3.9 147.20–3 **philosophers...discover...no known connexion among objects**] On the assumption that Hume is in this section criticizing theories of substance and accident (those who 'both suppose a substance supporting...and an accident supported', as he says in the previous paragraph), it seems likely that he here alludes

not only to those who found no *causal* connection between objects, but also to those who found no *substantial* connection between the parts or qualities of objects. Descartes concluded that there is 'no glue binding together the parts of hard bodies', and that we cannot even conceive of such a glue. We can conceive only that these parts are at rest relative to one another (*Principles of Philosophy* 2.55). With this much of Descartes's position Malebranche agreed at some length, showing that there cannot be minute and indivisible bonds holding together the parts of a body. However, he then went on to argue that the parts in question are at relative rest because of the motion of other tiny bodies that 'push and compress' them. Given that Malebranche denies that we have any direct experience of such causal activity as this account presupposes, he too can be taken to have concluded that there is no known substantial connection of the parts or qualities of objects (*Search* 6.2.9 [esp. 521]). For Locke's view that we have no real idea of substance, of that which would serve to connect the parts or qualities of objects, see *Essay* 2.23.15. See also anns. 16.16, 20; 146.37; 153.2; 154.1.

147.38–9 **punishments of Sisyphus and Tantalus**] In Greek myth the gods of the underworld punished Sisyphus for his offences by ordering him to roll a rock to the top of a hill. On each attempt, just as he reached the summit, the rock escaped from his hold and rolled back down again. When Tantalus, a son of Zeus, offended the gods, he was compelled to stand underneath the branches of a fruit tree in a pool of water up to his chin. The water receded when he tried to drink, and the wind blew the fruit out of his reach when he tried to eat.

1.4.3.10 148.1–2 **invention of the words *faculty* and *occult quality***] Criticism of the Peripatetic philosophers for the invention of such empty terms as *faculty* and *occult quality* may be found in many of Hume's early modern predecessors. Addison, e.g., said that because of the 'New Philosophy' we 'no longer pay a blind Veneration to that barbarous *Peripatetick*-Jingle, those obscure Scholastick Terms of Art, once held as Oracles' (*Oration in Defense of the New Philosophy*, 196–7). See also Bacon, *New Organon* 1.15; Charleton, *Physiologia* 3.15.1–3; Rohault, *System* 1.4.1; Malebranche, *Search* 1.19.2 [82–4], 6.2.3 [446]; *Elucidations* 12 [642–3]; Locke, *Essay* 2.31.6, 3.10.2, 3.11.8, 4.6.4; Keill, *Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect.1 [2].

1.4.3.11 148.17 **their *sympathies*, *antipathies*, and *horrors of a vacuum***] A *sympathy* was said to be produced by two natural things thought to have an affinity or preference for one another and thus to influence one another positively in such a way that the two things work together or co-operate. An *antipathy* was said to be produced by two natural things having a disaffinity or aversion for one another. Thus the natural antipathy between foxes and chickens was said to make chickens fly in terror at the sound of a harp strung with fox-gut strings (Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Sympathy', 'Antipathy'). Bailey reported that 'some say the Reason of Antipathy between Animals is, that by the Sight of [some particular] Objects certain Impressions are transmitted thro' the Fibres of the Nerves into the Brains, which convey the animal



Spirits into the Nerves; which upon the Blood being rarified after another manner than is usual, sends into the Brains those Spirits, which are adapted to the Fomenting or Cherishing of Terror' (*Dictionarium Britannicum*, 'Antipathy'). See also Pliny, *Natural History* 24.1–3 [7: 3–4]. For lists of antipathies and sympathies, see Erasmus, 'Amicitia', in *All the Familiar Colloquies of Erasmus*. See also Bacon, 'Sympathy and Antipathy', *passim*; *Natural History* 97, 479, 910–11, 960, 986–8, 997. For the use of sympathy and antipathy in explaining certain passions, see Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* 4.8. According to Chambers, the Peripatetics argued that the fact that bodies (e.g., water rising in a pipe) are 'frequently seen to move contrary to their own Nature and Inclination; and for no other apparent Reason, but to avoid a Vacuum', shows that nature abhors a vacuum (*Cyclopædia*, 'Vacuum'). According to Grant, the phrase *horror vacui* and its equivalents date from the thirteenth century, but the concept implicit in these phrases may be said to derive from Aristotle; see *Much Ado About Nothing*, 67–9. For a brief set of criticisms of the concepts mentioned here, a set that Hume likely would have read, see Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 3.19.2–3. Locke adduces 'Instinct, Sympathy, and Antipathy' as words without meaning because there are no corresponding ideas; see *Essay* 3.11.8.

148.18 **remarkable inclination in human nature**] See 1.3.14.25; ann. 112.39.

148.20–1 **inclination ... only takes place in children ... ancient philosophers**] Arnauld and Nicole also observed that children have an inclination to attribute to physical objects internal, self-motivating principles or other powers, and that these juvenile prejudices subsequently shaped the views of philosophers (*Logic* 1.9 [51–3]). Malebranche thought the most dangerous error of the ancients was that of thinking that objects have within them 'forms, faculties, qualities, virtues, or real beings capable of producing certain effects through the force of their nature' (*Search* 6.2.3 [446]). Spinoza supposed this inclination a common one; see *Ethics* 1 App.

1.4.4 *Of the modern philosophy*

1.4.4.1 148.28–9 **imagination, according to my own confession ... judge of all systems of philosophy**] See 1.3.8.12, 1.4.2.14; cf. n. 22 (81).

148.32–5 **principles ... taken notice of**] See 1.4.3.11.

149.1 **an articulate voice in the dark**] An articulate voice in the dark is also heard at *EHU* 4.4 and *DNR* 3.3; one from the clouds is hypothesized at *DNR* 3.2.

149.4–6 **one ... tormented ... with the apprehension of spectres in the dark, may ... reason naturally**] Locke offered a natural explanation, based on the association of ideas, of just such a phenomenon: 'The *Ideas* of *Goblins* and *Sprights* have really no more to do with Darkness than Light; yet let but a foolish Maid inculcate these often on the Mind of a Child, and raise them there together, possibly he shall never be able to separate them again so long as he lives' (*Essay* 2.33.10).

1.4.4.2–3 149.13–19 *modern philosophy...fundamental principle...opinion concerning colours...impressions in the mind*] Bayle similarly characterized the 'new Philosophy' as saying that 'heat, smell, colours, &c. are not in the objects of our senses; they are only some modifications of my soul; I know that bodies are not such as they appear to me' (*Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [B] [4: 654a]). Chambers said that 'the *Modern Philosophy commences*' with Galileo' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Modern'; cf. 'Quality'). This may also suggest that the distinguishing feature of modern philosophy is the acceptance of some form of the distinction between what Locke called primary and secondary qualities, for Galileo may have been the first among the moderns to make that distinction (*Assayer*, 273–4). For Descartes's version of the distinction, see *The World or Treatise on Light*, ch. 2; *Meditations* 6; *Principles of Philosophy* 4.189–201; see also Malebranche, *Search* 6.2.2 [441]. For perhaps the most detailed seventeenth-century discussion of the distinction and the grounds for it, see Boyle's 'Origin of Forms and Qualities', a discussion from which Locke apparently drew substantially for the account found in *Essay* 2.8. Gassendi's version of the distinction derives from the classical atomists Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius (*Syntagma* 2.1.5.7 [424–34]). Bayle suggests that the version of the distinction found in Democritus furnished the classical sceptics with arguments against the reliability of the senses (*Dictionary*, 'Democritus' [2: 642]; cf. Democritus, *Fragments* 9, 125). See also 1.4.2.12–13, 3.3.1.26; anns. 128.44, 129.4, 149.40, 150.14, 301.42; *EHU* 12.15.

1.4.4.3 149.22 *variations of those impressions*] Variations of the sort that Hume goes on to discuss are presented by Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (see esp. 1.79–91, 100–23), and repeated by, among others, Montaigne (see anns. 140.1, 2). See also the next four annotations.

149.24 *Upon the different situations of our health*] Modern philosophers who presented examples of sense variations deriving from changes in the health of individuals include Malebranche (*Search* 1.13.5–6 [63–6]); Locke (*Essay* 2.11.3, 2.20.4); and Berkeley (*Principles* 1.14; *Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 185]).

149.26 *Upon the different complexions and constitutions of men*] During the early modern period the terms *complexion* and *constitution* were used interchangeably to mean the temperament or physical and mental qualities and propensities of a person. According to Galen and the medieval medical tradition, a person's temperament depended on the relative strength of the four humours, phlegm, blood, cholera, or melancholy, in the composition of that person. The person was said to be phlegmatic (calm), sanguine (confident), choleric (irascible), or melancholic (sad), depending on which humour dominated. Although Hume talks about the 'mixture of humours' at 2.1.12.2, by the 1730s few physicians were still using Galen's categories. The newer theory divided the humours, now meaning the fluid parts of the body, into nutritious, natural, and morbid. For discussions of sense variations deriving from such 'different complexions and constitutions', see Malebranche, *Search* 1.13.5 [63–5]; Locke, *Essay* 2.21.55; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Zeno' [C] [5: 612a]; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 180].

149.27–8 **Upon the difference of their external situation and position]** For discussions of sense variations deriving from differences in 'external situation and position', see Descartes, *Meditations* 1, 6; Rohault, *System* 1.32.5; Malebranche, *Search* 1.13.5 [63–5], 6.2.2 [440–5]; Locke, *Essay* 2.8.16, 21; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Zeno of Elea' [G] [5: 612a]; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues* 1, 3 [*Works*, 2: 184–6, 189, 258]. See also 1.4.2.16, 45; 2.2.8.2; anns. 129.40, 140.3.

- 1.4.4.4 149.38–9 **many of our impressions have no external model]** Sextus Empiricus described the sixth of ten sceptical modes as leading sceptics to 'conclude that, because none of the real objects affects our senses by itself but always in conjunction with something else... we shall not be able to say what is the exact nature of the external reality in itself' (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1. 124). See also anns. 49.11; 140.1, 34; 149.22).

149.39 **archetype]** Hume uses a term given currency by Locke, who said that by 'real Ideas, I mean such as have a Foundation in Nature; such as have a Conformity with the real Being, and Existence of Things, or with their Archetypes' (*Essay* 2.30.1). See also *EHU* 12.15; *DNR* 8.11.

149.39–40 **from like effects we presume like causes]** See rule 4 at 1.3.15.6; ann. 116.38.

149.40–2 **Many...impressions...arise from causes...no way resemble them]** Descartes, for example, said that 'we have every reason to conclude that the properties in external objects to which we apply the terms light, colour, smell, taste, sound, heat and cold... are, so far as we can see, simply various dispositions [in the shapes, sizes, positions and movements of their parts] in those objects which make them able to set up various kinds of motions in our nerves' (*Principles of Philosophy* 4.198). See also Locke, *Essay* 2.8.24–5; above, ann. 149.13.

- 1.4.4.5 150.4–6 **primary qualities are extension and solidity... figure, motion, gravity, and cohesion]** Hume's list of primary qualities resembles, but does not exactly duplicate, those found in Newton, Locke, and Berkeley. Newton said that we know from 'experiments' that bodies have the qualities of extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, inertia, gravity, separability, and (possibly) indivisibility (*Principia* 3, rule 3 [2: 398–9]). Berkeley mentions 'extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number', and later added gravity (*Principles* 1.9; *Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 187]). For Locke's list, see ann. 128.22. See also Galileo, *Assayer*, 274; Boyle, 'Origin of Forms and Qualities', 18, 41; ann. 149.40.

150.8–9 **of fire, of light, water, air, earth, and of all the elements]** Empedocles proposed that four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, compose all things, and that by a mixture or separation of these four elements everything came into being. The rarefied air, or aether, in which the Greeks imagined the gods to live became with Aristotle a fifth incorruptible element that constitutes the cosmos from the sphere of the moon outward (see *On the Heavens* 1.2–3, *Meteorology* 1.2–3). Newton's *Opticks*,

subtitled *A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections & Colours of Light*, may have suggested that light is an element; we are indebted to Lorne Falkenstein for this suggestion.

150.9–10 **One figure and motion produces another figure and motion]** Hume's language is reminiscent of Locke's, who considered the 'Power that is in any Body, by Reason of the particular Constitution of its primary Qualities', to make changes 'in the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of another Body' (*Essay* 2.8.23).

- 1.4.4.6 150.14–16 **utterly annihilate all these objects...reduce ourselves to...extravagant scepticism]** Bayle maintained that the modern or new philosophy is significantly more sceptical than ancient Pyrrhonism. Modern philosophers, having said that 'heat, smell, colours' are only 'modifications of my soul' (see ann. 149.13), wanted none the less to maintain that 'extension and motion' are in objects themselves. This, according to Bayle, they were unable to establish: For 'if the objects of our senses appear to us coloured, hot, cold, smelling, tho' they are not so, why should they not appear extended and figured, at rest and in motion', though they are not so. He then concluded: 'I might therefore feel cold and heat, see colours, figures, extension, and motion, tho' there was not one body in the world. I have not therefore one good proof of the existence of bodies' (*Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [B][4: 654a]). Hume's objection had also been posed by Berkeley, who says that accepting the principles of modern philosophy leads to the denial of 'the reality of sensible things' and to 'downright...scepticism' (*Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 206; cf. 187–93]; see also *Principles* 1.9–15). At *EHU* 12.15 n. 32 Hume says that 'most of the writings of that very ingenious author', Berkeley, 'form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, BAYLE not excepted. He professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and free-thinkers.' For further discussion, see Raynor, 'Hume and Berkeley's *Three Dialogues*'. See also 1.2.3.15; anns. 128.44, 142.6.

- 1.4.4.7 150.22–4 **idea of motion necessarily supposes...body moving...idea of extension]** Berkeley argued that it is 'impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body moving', and that 'to conceive motion, there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied' (*Principles*, Intro. 10, 1.112).

- 1.4.4.8 150.26–7 **have prov'd]** See 1.2.3.4–5.

150.31–2 **simple and indivisible parts...non-entities, unless conceiv'd as colour'd or solid]** Berkeley maintained that the same arguments 'which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in the mind...may with equal force, be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion'. He later added that 'if extension be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity, since

they all evidently suppose extension. It is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have denied them all to have any real existence' (*Principles* 1.15, cf. 1.11; *Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 191]).

- 1.4.4.9 150.43 **idea of extension on that of solidity**] In contrast to Hume's claim that the idea of extension derives from the idea of solidity, Berkeley, arguing that the modes of motion and extension ('*great and small, swift and slow*') are mind-dependent and relative, suggested the converse. 'Without extension solidity cannot be conceived', he said, and then added that, since extension has no existence outside the mind, 'the same must also be true of solidity' (*Principles* 1.11).
- 1.4.4.11 n. 42 (151) **Part 2. Sect. 4**] See 1.2.4.4–7.
- 1.4.4.12 151.31–2 **impressions...affirm'd by modern philosophy**] See ¶4 of this section; ann. 149.13.
- 151.36–7 **imagine, that we feel the solidity of bodies...need but touch...to perceive this quality**] Hume here and in the following paragraphs appears to address Locke's account of the origin of the idea of solidity. This idea, Locke said, 'we receive by our Touch; and it arises from the resistance which we find in Body, to the entrance of any other Body into the Place it possesses, till it has left it'. Persons awake feel this resistance more or less constantly from whatever it is that supports them, while 'the Bodies which we daily handle', as long as they remain in our hands, 'do by an insurmountable Force, hinder the approach of the parts of our Hands that press them'. He then defined *solidity* or *impenetrability* as that which 'hinders', in the manner described, 'the approach of two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another' (*Essay* 2.4.1; cf. 2.4.6). Chambers said that solidity is 'usually called *Impenetrability*', and that the latter is the Cartesian term for solidity (*Cyclopædia*, 'Solidity'). For examples of this usage, see Rohault, *System* 1.7.6; Malebranche, *Search* 3.2.8.2 [243–7]. See also ann. 32.1.
- 1.4.4.13 151.42 **the palsey**] A 'Disease, wherein a Body or some of its Parts, lose their Motion, and sometimes their Sensation' (Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Palsy'). For another early modern description, see Willis, *Two Discourses concerning the Soul of Brutes*, 161–2.
- 152.4–5 **it does not follow...sensation, motion, and resistance are...resembling**] Compare Berkeley: 'as for *solidity*; either you do not mean any sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses: it being evident, that what seems hard to one animal, may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain, that the resistance I feel is not in the body' (*Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 191]).
- 1.4.4.15 152.23 **direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses**] Hume also draws attention to conflicts between reason and the senses at 1.4.2.14, 21, 47, 54; 1.4.7.4.

1.4.5 *Of the immateriality of the soul*

1.4.5.1 152.35–7 **intellectual world...not perplex'd with...contradictions, as...the natural]** Descartes also supposed, as Hume does here, that 'the nature of the mind' is more easily and better known than that of 'external objects'. See Meditation 2, entitled *The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body*; cf. *Objections and Replies* 2, Postulates; *Principles of Philosophy* 1.8, 11. Hume later contrasted the 'hopes' he expresses here with the 'labyrinth' in which he found himself involved; see App. 10. Glanvill suggested that knowledge of our selves may seem easier to obtain than that of the material world, but went on to conclude that we are also ignorant of the nature of the soul; see Glanvill, *Vanity of Dogmatizing* 3. Argens surveyed opinions about the nature of the soul, considered arguments for and against it being material, and then followed Gassendi in concluding that it is only by revelation that we know the soul to be of a spiritual nature (*Philosophical Dissertations* 4.11–19).

1.4.5.2 152.39–41 **they promise to diminish our ignorance...at the hazard of running us into contradictions]** At the outset of his *Meditations*, Descartes reminded his readers that Pope Leo X had 'expressly enjoined Christian philosophers...to establish the truth' about the nature of the soul, and then went on to buttress the conclusion he had already reached in his earlier *Discourse on Method*, viz. that self or soul is 'a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and which does not require any place, or depend on any material thing, in order to exist' (*Meditations*, Dedicatory Letter, *Discourse on Method* 4 [AT 7: 3; 6: 33]). Materialists also fit Hume's description. Hobbes, attempting to rectify the ignorance induced by 'vain philosophy', appears to produce one of the contradictions to which Hume alludes: 'every part of the universe', said Hobbes, 'is body, and that which is not body, is no part of the universe...spirits...have dimensions, and are therefore really *bodies*' (*Leviathan* 4.46 ¶¶14–15). S. Clarke and Collins, in their extensive exchange of papers discussing, pro and con, the possibility that properly organized matter could think, each also undertook, as Hume puts it, to 'diminish our ignorance' about the nature of the soul or mind, and openly contradicted one another; see S. Clarke, *Works*, 3: 749–913. Arnauld and Nicole followed a more moderate course, noting first that 'the word "soul" is equivocal', and a likely cause of confusion, and then giving the term a new 'nominal definition': 'To avoid this confusion I will view the word "soul" as if it were a sound that does not yet have a meaning, and I will apply it uniquely to the principle of thought in us, saying: By "soul" I mean the principle of thought in us' (*Logic* I.12). Malebranche, unlike earlier Cartesians, concluded that '*we have no clear idea either of our soul's nature or of its modifications*', and supposed this conclusion confirmed by 'the ignorance of most men with regard to [the nature] of their own soul' (*Elucidations* 11 [633]; cf. *Search* 3.2.7.4 [237–9]).

153.2–3 **ask these philosophers...What they mean by substance and inhesion]** Locke raised much the same question and returned a sceptical answer. Having concluded that 'we have no clear, or distinct *Idea* of that *thing* we suppose a Support'

of sensible qualities, he went on to argue that the 'same happens concerning the Operations of the Mind, viz. Thinking, Reasoning, Fearing, etc.'. These we are likely to suppose to be 'the Actions of some other *Substance*, which we call *Spirit*', but 'it is evident, that...by supposing a Substance, wherein *Thinking, Knowing, Doubting*...do subsist, *We have as clear a Notion of the Substance of Spirit, as we have of Body*; the one being supposed to be (without knowing what it is) the *Substratum* to those simple *Ideas* we have from without; and the other supposed (with a like ignorance of what it is) to be the *Substratum* to those Operations, which we experiment in our selves within' (*Essay* 2.23.4–5; cf. 2.13.19–20; 2.23.15, 22, 28; 4.3.17). Voltaire said that, before Locke, 'several great Philosophers had declar'd, in the most positive Terms, what the Soul of Man is; but...these absolutely knew nothing about it' (*Letters concerning the English Nation* 13 [94–5]). Berkeley, famously critical of the notion of *material substance* (see, e.g., *Principles* 73–4, 77), was yet able to argue that 'the terms *soul, spirit, and substance*', while they do not refer to ideas, do 'mean or signify a real thing', viz. 'that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about [ideas]. What I am my self, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by *soul or spiritual substance*' (*Principles* 139; cf. *Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 234]). See also ann. 16.16; *LG* 35; 'Immortality of the Soul' 3.

1.4.5.3 153.6 **question ... found impossible to be answer'd]** See 1.1.6.1–2, 1.4.3.

153.11–12 **how can an impression represent a substance, otherwise than by resembling it]** Berkeley concluded that, because 'an *idea* cannot resemble a *spirit*, in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by it self...it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing' (*Principles* 1.137–8).

1.4.5.5 153.24 **definition of a substance ... something which may exist by itself]** Hume addresses a commonplace definition of substance, one found in Descartes (*Objections and Replies* 4 [AT 7: 222]); Spinoza (*Ethics* 1 D3); and Rohault (*System* 1.4.3–4). Locke, although critical of some concepts of substance, suggested that 'every one who understands the Language' supposes qualities to inhere in 'that unknown common Subject, which inheres not in any thing else' (*Essay* 2.23.6). Chambers gives only one definition of substance, saying that 'In Physicks, [it is] something that we conceive to subsist of itself, independantly of any created Being, or any particular Mode or Accident' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Substance').

153.30 **already acknowledg'd]** See 1.2.2.8, 1.2.6.4.

153.32 **another principle]** See 1.1.7.3, 17; 1.2.1.3; 1.2.3.10; cf. 1.4.6.16.

1.4.5.6 153.44–5 **Inhesion...is suppos'd...requisite to support...the existence of our perceptions]** Hobbes pointed out to Descartes that 'all philosophers make a distinction between a subject and its faculties and acts', and that we are unable 'to conceive an act without its subject'. In response, Descartes agreed, saying that we 'cannot conceive of thought without a thinking thing' (*Objections and Replies* 3 [AT 7: 173, 175]; cf. *Principles of Philosophy* 1.11). Defending himself from Stillingfleet's

criticism, Locke said that from his 'principles' it can be shown that 'there is a spiritual substance in us'. First, he said, 'we experiment in ourselves thinking. The idea of this action or mode of thinking is inconsistent with the idea of self-subsistence, and therefore has a necessary connexion with a support or subject of inhesion: the idea of that support is what we call substance; and so from thinking experimented in us, we have a proof of a thinking substance in us, which in my sense is a spirit' (*Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, Works*, 4: 32; cf. *Essay* 2.23.5; Stillingfleet, *Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter*, 8 ff.). See also S. Clarke, *Second Defence*, props. 2–8, *Works*, 3: 795–7.

154.1–4 **What possibility...of answering...do not...understand...the question]** Compare Locke's ironic comment: 'were the Latin words *Inhaerentia* and *Substantia*, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called *Sticking on* and *Under-propping*, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the Doctrine of *Substance and Accidents*, and shew of what use they are in deciding of Questions in Philosophy' (*Essay* 2.13.20). Berkeley allows Hylas to say that 'Words are not to be used without a meaning. And as there is no more meaning in spiritual substance than in material substance, the one is to be exploded as well as the other' (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 233]).

- 1.4.5.7 154.5–8 **argument commonly employ'd...impossible any thing divisible can be conjoin'd to a thought]** Cudworth, convinced that all ideas and thought are indivisible, undertook to prove that 'the *Human Soul*', because it is able to entertain ideas or thoughts that are devoid of magnitude, must itself 'be *Unextended* and Devoid of *Magnitude*, and *Indivisible*'. For how, he asked, 'could the Soul...if it were a *Magnitude*, Understand that which hath no *Magnitude*? and with that which is *Divisible*, Conceive what is *Indivisible*?' (*True Intellectual System* 1.5 [827]; cf. ann. 154.17). S. Clarke elaborated a second and more commonly used argument regarding divisibility and thought. That the soul cannot possibly be material is evident, Clarke said, from a single consideration regarding the unity of consciousness: 'For *Matter* being a divisible Substance' always made up 'of actually separate and distinct parts, 'tis plain, that unless it were essentially Conscious, in which case every particle of Matter must consist of innumerable separate and distinct Consciousnesses, no System of it in any possible Composition or Division, can be any individual Conscious Being: For, suppose three or three hundred Particles of Matter, at a Mile or any given distance one from another; is it possible that all those separate parts should in that State be one individual Conscious Being? Suppose then all these particles brought together into one System, so as to touch one another; will they thereby, or by any Motion or Composition whatsoever, become any whit less truly distinct Beings, than they were when at the greatest distance? ... If you will suppose God by his infinite Power superadding Consciousness to the united Particles, yet still those Particles being really and necessarily as distinct Beings as ever, cannot be themselves the Subject in which that individual Consciousness inheres' (*Letter to Mr. Dodwell, Works*, 3: 730; cf. *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop.



10 [93–4]; *Defence of an Argument*, *Works*, 3: 761). For variant versions of the argument Clarke uses, see H. More, *Appendix to the foregoing Antidote*, 188; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Leucippus' [E]; Wollaston, *Religion of Nature Delineated* 9.7; E. Law, in King, *Essay on the Origin of Evil*, n. 13 [32]; *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 104–6; Windle, *Enquiry into the Immateriality of Thinking Substances*, 10. For discussion of this argument, see Mijuscovic, *Achilles of Rationalist Arguments*, ch. 3.

154.17–18 **can any one conceive a passion of a yard in length**] Cudworth listed a number of things, themselves devoid of magnitude, the perceptions of which must consequently also be unextended. It is, he said, 'certain, that we have *Notions* of many things which are . . . altogether *Unimaginable*, and therefore have nothing of *Length*, *Breadth*, and *Thickness* in them, as *Vertue*, *Vice*, &c. . . *Justice and Honesty*, and the like, are things *Devoid of Magnitude*, and therefore must the *Intellections* of them, needs be such too' (*True Intellectual System* 1.5 [827]). E. Law suggested that an extended soul is as incomprehensible as 'a *Cube of Virtue*' (in King, *Essay on the Origin of Evil*, n. 13 [32]). See also Malebranche, *Search* 4.1.4 [274]; ann. 157.25.

- 1.4.5.10 154.41–2 **I deliver a maxim, which is condemn'd by several metaphysicians**] The maxim endorsed by Hume, 'an object may exist, and yet be no where', was explicitly rejected by Gassendi. According to the latter, 'there is no substance and no accident for which it is not appropriate to say that it exists somewhere, or in some place' (*Syntagma* 2.1.2.1 [384]). Others had reached the conclusion Hume endorses. Fairfax said: 'a Mathematical point or Geometrical figure are no where, good and evil are no where, this Treatise, before written here, was no where . . . as 'tis now, whilst written; the words are only here, the meaning's by them set forth, as much no where as before: so true is it, that whatever is, is somewhere, is untrue' (*Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge*, 44). Watts explicitly denied the 'ancient' axiom, 'That which is nowhere, has no Being', arguing that spirits, because they have 'no such Relation to *Place* as Bodies have', may be said to 'exist or reside nowhere', or to 'have a real Existence, and yet have no proper Place' (*Philosophical Essays* 6.4; cf. *Brief Scheme of Ontology* 12). See also Locke, *Essay* 2.10.2, 2.13.24.

155.12 **already establish'd**] See 1.2.3.3–5, 15.

- 1.4.5.11 n. 43 (155) **Part 1. Sect. 5**] See 1.1.5.1.

- 1.4.5.12 156.1–2 **shall explain more fully**] See 1.4.6.6. For previous discussions of the 'quality' to be explained, see 1.4.2.32, 35–40; 1.4.3.3.

n. 44 (156) **Sect. 2, towards the end**] See 1.4.2.42–4, 54–5.

- 1.4.5.13 156.32–3 **scholastic principle . . . totum in toto & totum in qualibet parte**] Cudworth traces this principle ('the whole is in the whole, and the whole in every part', as Hume translates it in the next paragraph) to Plotinus (*True Intellectual System* 823–9; cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.2.1, 4.3.3, 4.7.2). The principle is found in Augustine (*On the Trinity* 6.6), and a version of it is quoted by Aquinas in his discussion of the relation of the soul to the body (*Summa Theologiae* 1a.76.8). Cudworth, in the course of

arguing that 'we cannot Conceive a *Life or Mind or Thought...to be Extended*', concludes that those who suppose the contrary will be forced to conclude that the soul 'must of necessity be All *Undividedly*, both in the *Whole of it*, and in every *Part*' of the relevant extension, so that, do what they will, 'this *Whole in the Whole and in every Part... will like a Ghost still haunt them, and follow them every where*' (*True Intellectual System* 1.5 [830–1]; we owe the references to Cudworth to Laird, *Hume's Philosophy*, 164). See also Descartes, *Meditations* 6, *Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 86, 389]; Malebranche, *Search* 2.1.5.1 [101–5]; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Leucippus' [E], 'Simonides' [F] [5: 143b].

1.4.5.14 156.36 **All this absurdity**] The intelligibility of the principle, *totum in toto, etc.*, was challenged by Gassendi, who, suspecting Descartes of being committed to it, asked him what he meant by it (*Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 339]). Hobbes noted that some say of the soul that it is 'all of it in his little finger, and all of it in every other part, how small soever, of his body; and yet no more soul in the whole body, than in any one of those parts. Can any man think that God is served with such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to believe, to those that will believe the existence of an incorporeal soul' (*Leviathan* 4.46 ¶19).

1.4.5.15 157.9–10 **materialists, who conjoin all thought with extension**] In opposition to Descartes, Hobbes suggested that 'the mind will be nothing more than motion occurring in various parts of an organic body' (*Objections and Replies* 3 [AT 7: 178]), while Gassendi said that Descartes had not shown 'that being capable of thought is inconsistent with the nature of body' (*Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 337]). Locke worried that we may 'never be able to know, whether any mere material Being thinks, or no' (*Essay* 4.3.6). Collins vigorously defended Locke's suggestion that mind could be, in effect, a 'compound' of matter; see, for example, his *Letter to the Learned Mr. Henry Dodwell, Reply to Mr. Clarke, Reflections on Mr. Clarke's Second Defence*, and *Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence*, all reprinted in S. Clarke, *Works*, 3: 749 ff. where Clarke's responses to Collins are also found. The materialist hypothesis is also defended by Strutt, *Philosophical Enquiry into the Physical Spring of Human Actions, and the Immediate Cause of Thinking*. Collier said that 'our Modern Corporealists seem... to hazard their Cause (with the Ancient *Atomists*) on the Supposition of [the soul] being a Composition, or, at least, the Result of a Composition of such Particles' or atoms (*Free Thoughts concerning Human Souls* 1.3 [15]). Arnauld and Nicole briefly review ancient, materialist theories of mind at *Logic* 1.9.

157.9–11 **materialists... their antagonists**] See ann. 154.5.

157.12–14 **vulgar philosophy informs us... image or perception**] See 1.2.6.7; ann. 49.4.

1.4.5.16 157.24 **free-thinker**] Collins, one of those who defended the possibility that the mind could be made up of matter (see ann. 157.9), also defined and defended free-thinking, which he took to mean '*The Use of the Understanding, in endeavouring to find out the Meaning of any Proposition whatsoever, in considering the nature of the Evidence for or*

against it, and in judging of it according to the seeming Force or Weakness of the Evidence' (*Discourse of Free-Thinking* 1). Berkeley's was a negative assessment. Free-thinkers ('minute philosophers' in his terminology), he says, seek 'to undermine the foundations of morality' by showing 'there is no Providence, no spirit, no future state, no moral duty' (*Alciphron* 1.13). For a review of English free-thinkers and their opponents, c.1690–1740, see Rivers, *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment*, 2: 7–84.

157.25–6 may ask ... how ... incorporate a simple ... subject with an extended perception] Gassendi, often viewed as a free-thinker (a *libertin érudit*), asked exactly the question Hume raises. 'I do not so much dispute', he said to Descartes, 'that you have an idea of this body as insist that you could not have such an idea if you were really an unextended thing. For how ... do you think that you, an unextended subject, could receive the semblance or idea of a body that is extended? If such a semblance comes from a body then it is undoubtedly corporeal, and has a number of parts or layers, and so is extended. If it is imprinted in you from some other source, since it must still represent an extended body, it must still have parts and hence be extended ... If it lacks extension, how will it represent an extended thing? ... If it has no position, how will it represent a thing which has upper and lower parts, parts on the right and parts on the left, and parts in the middle' (*Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 338]). Colliber, dissatisfied with the Cartesian account of mind, found himself 'more strongly confirm'd in the Opinion that Cogitation can't be without some sort of Extension' because he could not see how any entirely unextended 'Being should either form or receive Ideas or Images of Extended Things'. He then suggested that Malebranche devised the hypothesis of 'our seeing All Things in God' in order to avoid just the problem Hume has raised, for Malebranche says that it is 'impossible we should be able by our Selves to perceive Material Things; because they being Extended and our Souls not, there's no proportion between 'em' (*Two Discourses concerning Space and Duration*, 222; cf. Malebranche, *Search* 3.2.1.1 [219]). See also Locke, *Examination* 18; Berkeley, *Principles* 1.49, *Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 249–50]. Cudworth asserted the contrary position: 'the Soul Conceives Extended things themselves, Unextendedly and Indivisibly ... the Thought of a Mile Distance, or of Ten thousand Miles ... takes up no more Room in the Soul, nor Stretches it any more, than does the Thought of a Foot or Inch, or indeed of a Mathematical Point' (*True Intellectual System* 1.5 [827]).

1.4.5.17 157.35 have condemn'd] See ¶¶2–6 of this section. See also *Abs.* 28; *LG* 35.

157.37–8 doctrine of the immateriality ... of a thinking substance is a true atheism] In the early modern period it was widely understood (as Hume's phrase, 'a true atheism', suggests) that atheism could take diverse forms. Cudworth, the subtitle of whose *True Intellectual System* tells us that the work is an attempt to confute 'All the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism', attacked what he took to be all the conceivable forms of atheism. These prove to have in common, not a denial of the existence of God (at least two of the four forms are explicitly theistic), but a commitment to fatalism and a denial of the existence of any 'Incorporeal Substances'

(Preface, 3.30 [135]). Bentley, whose 'Folly of Atheism' (the first of his Boyle Lectures), counts as atheists those who allow 'no Natural Morality' and those who, 'though they *do not, nor cannot* really doubt in their hearts of the *Being* of God, yet do openly deny his *Providence*' (*Eight Boyle Lectures*, 3, 5). S. Clarke counted as atheists those who either do or claim to 'disbelieve the Being of God...deny the Principal Attributes of the Divine Nature, and suppose God to be an Unintelligent Being, which acts merely by Necessity' (*Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, Intro.). See also Mandeville, *Enquiry into the Origin of Honour*, 179; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Atheist'. Hume himself, in his surviving 'Memoranda' wrote: 'Three kinds of Atheists according to some. 1. Who deny the Existence of a God. Such as Diagoras, Theodorus. 2. Who deny a Providence, Such as the Epicureans & the Ionic Sect. 3. Who deny the Free will of the Deity; Such as Aristotle, the Stoics. &c.'. (These 'Memoranda' were probably prepared after the *Treatise* was completed; see Stewart, 'Dating of Hume's Manuscripts'.) See also *DNR* 4.3–4. For more on renaissance and early modern conceptions of atheism, see Wootton, 'New Histories of Atheism'; for more on atheism in Britain, see Berman, *History of Atheism in Britain*.

- 1.4.5.18 157.43–4 **fundamental principle...of Spinoza...unity of that substance]** Spinoza's views on substance are set out in his *Ethics*. Having defined substance as that which 'is in itself and is conceived through itself', he went on to conclude that there can be only one infinite, indivisible substance, and that thought and matter are attributes of this substance. There is no known evidence that Hume read this work, while everything that he says about Spinoza could have been derived from Bayle. In the article on Spinoza, cited in n. 47 (159), Bayle reported that Spinoza maintained 'that there is but one substance in nature, and that this [unique] substance is endowed with infinite attributes, and among others, with extension and thought', so that every modification of mind, and every modification of matter, prove to be modifications of the same substance, which itself proves to be God (*Dictionary*, 'Spinoza' [N] [5: 208b]). That many early eighteenth-century writers learned of Spinoza's ideas indirectly, and often through Bayle, is confirmed by Moreau, 'Spinoza's Reception and Influence', 410, and discussed in detail by Vernière, *Spinoza et la pensée française avant la Révolution*. Writers of this period who challenged Spinoza's views include Howe, *Living Temple: Containing Animadversions on Spinoza*, pp. i–xxi, 1–69; S. Clarke, *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God* [26–9, 47–50, 60–70, 85–8]; Fénelon, *Demonstration of the Existence, Wisdom and Omnipotence of God*, 245–308; Fiddes, *Theologia Speculativa*, 32–7. See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Spinosism'; above, Historical Account, Sect. 1, Hume's letter to his friend M. Ramsay.
- 1.4.5.19 n. 45 (158) **Part 2. Sect. 6]** See 1.2.6.8–9.
- 1.4.5.20 n. 46 (158) **Sect. 2]** See 1.4.2.19–22.
- 1.4.5.21 159.7–8 **Spinoza...tells me, that these are only modifications]** Spinoza said of particular things of the sort that Hume mentions that they 'are nothing but

affections of God's attributes, *or* modes by which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way' (*Ethics* 1p25 cor).

159.14–16 **theologians ... indivisible substance**] See ann. 154.5 for some of those who argued that the mind must be 'one simple, uncompounded, and indivisible substance'.

1.4.5.22 159.33–4 and n. 47 **all the absurdities ... found in the system of Spinoza**] See esp., in the article 'Spinoza' cited by Hume, notes [N], [CC], [DD]; and 'Averroës' [E], all in Bayle, *Dictionary*. Hume outlines the relevant 'absurdities' in ¶¶23–5 of this section; see also anns. 157.43; 159.35; 160.5, 14, 19.

1.4.5.23 159.35–9 **said against Spinoza ... suppos'd to inhere**] Hume here appears to have recast and condensed claims made by Bayle, who said that, 'according to Spinoza, God and extension are the same thing'. Bayle then went on to say: (a) that it is 'impossible that the universe should be the only substance; for whatever is extended must necessarily consist of parts', while Spinoza must say that extension is a simple substance, no more compounded than are mathematical points; (b) that Spinoza grants, 'as all other Philosophers do, that the attribute of a substance does not really differ from that substance; and therefore he must acknowledge that extension in general is a substance: from whence it ought to be concluded, that each part of extension is a particular substance'; (c) that 'it is manifest, that a substance unextended by its nature, can never become the subject of the three dimensions; for how could they be placed upon a mathematical point?' (*Dictionary*, 'Spinoza' [N][5: 208b and margin]). On what Hume calls the 'scholastic way of talking', see 1.4.3.10–11; anns. 148.1, 17.

1.4.5.24 160.5–7 **has been said ... no idea of substance ... not applicable to every distinct portion of matter**] Bayle, while criticizing Spinoza and discussing the proposition, 'That extension is composed of parts, each of which is a particular substance', said that the 'idea of matter still remains the idea of a compound being, of a system of several substances ... Modifications are beings, which cannot exist without the substance they modify; and therefore there ought to be a substance wherever there are modifications; nay, it must needs be multiplied in proportion as modifications inconsistent one with another are multiplied: so that wherever there are five or six such modifications, that are also five or six substances' (*Dictionary*, 'Spinoza' [N][5: 209a and margin]). See also Locke, *Essay* 2.13.18; *THN* 1.4.3.4–9; ann. 146.37.

160.9 **already prov'd**] See 1.1.6.1–2, 1.4.3.4, this section, ¶¶2–5.

1.4.5.25 160.14–17 **objected to the system of one simple substance ... round and square figures are incompatible**] Bayle had raised this objection, saying in his critique of Spinoza that when 'I see a round table, and a square table, in a room, I may affirm that the extension, which is the subject of the round table, is a substance distinct from the extension, which is the subject of the other table; for otherwise the square figure and the round figure would be at the same time in one and the same subject; which is impossible' (*Dictionary*, 'Spinoza' [N]).

160.19–20 **same question concerning the impressions of these tables]** Locke had directed a similar question to Malebranche. 'The mind or soul that perceives', Locke observed, is said to be 'one immaterial indivisible substance. Now I see the white and black on this paper, I hear one singing in the next room, I feel the warmth of the fire I sit by, and I taste an apple I am eating, and all this at the same time. Now I ask, take "modification" for what you please, can the same unextended indivisible substance have different, nay inconsistent and opposite (as these of white and black must be) modifications at the same time? Or must we suppose distinct parts in an indivisible substance, one for black, another for white...and so of the rest of those infinite sensations...some whereof are opposite, as heat and cold, which yet a man may feel at the same time?' (*Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God*, 39). Bayle reported that a critic of Pompanazzi had asked: 'How can That Contrariety of Opinions, and Notions, which we so often observe among Men, concerning one and the same Subject, ever subsist in one, and the same, Intellect?' By this question, Bayle added, 'is also *Spinozism* invincibly confuted' (*Dictionary*, 'Averroës' [E][1: 555a]; cf. 'Spinoza' [N]).

- 1.4.5.26 160.25–7 **if instead of calling thought a modification...give it...name of an action]** Hume may allude to the views of one or more of several philosophers, among whom Arnauld is perhaps most likely. He supposed the mind to be 'active absolutely and by nature', and denied that a *tertium quid* or idea-object stands between mind and external object or that there are or could be representative entities, *ideas*, distinct or separable from the act of perception. He also took 'the *idea* of an object and the *perception* of that object to be the same thing', and said that 'it is certain that there are *ideas* in this sense, and that they are attributes or modifications of our mind'. Consequently, although it is correct to say that ideas are modifications of the mind, these modifications can be nothing other than actions (*On True and False Ideas* 27 [202]; 5, def. 3 [65]). Earlier, Descartes had said that *idea*, 'taken materially', denotes 'an operation of the intellect', and that ideas may be taken 'simply as modes of thought' as well as images of things (*Meditations*, Preface, 3 [AT 7: 8, 40]; cf. *Objections and Replies* 4 [AT 7: 232]). Spinoza says that he calls an 'idea' a 'concept of the Mind' rather than a '*perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the Mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the Mind*', and that it is a mistake to suppose 'that an idea is something mute, like a picture on a tablet, and not a mode of thinking, viz. the very [act of] understanding' (*Ethics* 2d3; p43Schol.; bracketed phrase added by the translator). For additional discussion, see McRae, "'Idea" as a Philosophical Term'; Nadler, *Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas*, 107–26.

160.28–9 **abstract mode...neither distinguishable, nor separable from its substance]** What Hume here calls an *abstract mode*, Descartes called a 'conceptual distinction'. He then went on to observe, much as Hume does, that 'we have some difficulty in abstracting the notion of substance from the notions of thought and extension, since the distinction between these notions and the notion of substance

itself is merely a conceptual distinction' (*Principles of Philosophy* 1.62–3). See also 1.1.7.17–18; anns. 21.32, 22.1.

- 1.4.5.27 160.33–4 **action...can never justly be apply'd to any perception]** In contrast, P. Browne supposed that whenever the 'Word *Idea*...is apply'd to the Operations of our Mind...it is used in a very *Loose* and *Improper* Manner', for '*Thinking* and *Willing*, with all the various Modes of them, are not Ideas; but the *Actions* and *Workings* of the Intellect upon *Ideas*' (*Procedure* 1.2 [63–5]).

160.38–40 **instance of motion...rather confounds than instructs us]** Those instancing the relationship of motion to body as analogous to, and thus instructive about, the relationship of perception to mind include Locke, who said that motion and perception are each operations (but not essences) of their respective substances (*Essay* 2.1.10); and Buffier, who said that 'our ideas...are not more distinguished from our understanding than motion is from a body moved' (*First Truths*, 311).

- 1.4.5.28 161.17 **above-explain'd]** See esp. ¶¶15–16 of this section.

- 1.4.5.29 161.24–6 **commonly said...matter and motion...produce only a difference in...situation of objects]** A second common argument to show that matter cannot, in any circumstances, be made to think, began with the assumption that matter, unlike mind, is inert and passive, then went on to maintain that no change in the mere modalities of matter (variations in size, shape, position, number, or motion) could change this fundamental characteristic. Bayle traced a form of the objection to ancient critics of atomism, for example, Plutarch and Galen, who said, in effect, that because 'each atom is inanimate, it follows that no collection or combination of atoms can become a sensitive being' (*Dictionary*, 'Leucippus' [E margin]; cf. 'Epicurus' [F]). Arnauld and Nicole argued that 'it is impossible to imagine that there is any relation of the motion or shape of subtle or coarse matter to thinking, or that a piece of matter which does not think when it is at rest like the earth, or in moderate motion like water, could succeed in knowing itself if one just shook it more or made it boil three or four times faster' (*Logic* 1.9 [53]). S. Clarke, intent on proving that mind is not an effect of matter and motion, argued: 'All possible Changes, Compositions, or Divisions of *Figure*, are still nothing but *Figure*: And all possible Compositions or Effects of *Motion*, can eternally be nothing but mere *Motion*' (*Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 10 [55]). The issue is laboriously canvassed in the exchanges between Clarke and Collins, with Collins challenging the view that the soul cannot be material. See in S. Clarke, *Works*, 3: 749–913. See also Locke, *Essay*, 4.10.13–16; E. Law, *Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time*, 105–7; ann. 154.5.

- 1.4.5.30 161.39 **prov'd at large]** See, e.g., 1.3.2.9, 11–12; 1.3.14.12. See also anns. 55.18, 108.42.

n. 48 (161) **Part 3. Sect 15]** See 1.3.15.1.

162.4 **precedent reasoning]** See ¶27 of this section.

1.4.5.31 162.36–7 **our idea of that supreme being is deriv'd from particular impressions]** That our idea of the Deity is derived from particular impressions was the view of both Gassendi and Locke. The latter said that, having 'from what we experiment in our selves, got the *Ideas* of Existence and Duration; of Knowledge and Power; of Pleasure and Happiness... when we would frame an *Idea* the most suitable we can to the supreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our *Idea* of Infinity; and so putting them together, make our complex *Idea of God*' (*Essay* 2.23.33). For Gassendi's view, see *Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 287]. See also *EHU* 2.6.

162.38–40 **may be said...connexion...is necessary and unavoidable]** Malebranche had made exactly the claim that Hume articulates: 'when one thinks about the idea of God, i.e., of an infinitely perfect and consequently all-powerful being, one knows there is such a connection between His will and the motion of all bodies, that it is impossible to conceive that He wills a body to be moved and that this body not be moved' (*Search* 6.2.3 [448]).

n. 49 and 163.11–15 **agency...asserted...pretext, to avoid the dangerous consequences]** As Hume's note indicates, the 'several philosophers' are Malebranche and the other Cartesians mentioned in anns. 107.35 and 108.5. Malebranche argued that matter is inactive and powerless, that finite minds cannot move bodies, and that the active and continuous exertion of the Deity is the only true cause of motion or change. But Malebranche also maintained that there is one active and free feature of the human mind: viz. will or volition. Consequently, while whatever perceptions and ideas appear before the (generally passive) mind do so through the agency of God, what is made of or done with these perceptions and ideas is determined by the free volitions of individual minds, not by the Deity. Any judgements, whether epistemological or moral, about those items appearing before the mind, and any decisions to act in consequence of such judgements, can be, and always are, made by individual minds (*Search* 1.2.2 [8–10], 1.4.1 [16–17], 6.2.3 [449]). The 'dangerous consequences' that these Cartesians seek to avoid are succinctly observed by Berkeley's Hylas: In 'making God the immediate author of all the motions in Nature', he said, 'you make him the author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins'. Berkeley's response, through Philonous, is not unlike that of Malebranche. He allowed 'to thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions', and thus to exonerate God (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 236–7]). Chambers parodied the occasionalist hypothesis: the 'Motions...of the Soul and Body', those philosophers say, 'are only Occasional Causes of what passes in the one or the other...the Consequences that follow from this fine Reasoning are very unlucky, not to say ridiculous: Thus, 'tis not the Cannon-Ball that kills the Man, or beats down the Wall, but 'tis God that does it: the Motion of the Cannoneer, whose Arm, mov'd by the Power of God, apply'd Fire to the Poudre, determin'd God to inflame that Poudre; the Poudre inflam'd, determin'd



God to drive out the Ball; and the Ball driven, with an inconceivable rapidity, to the exterior Surface of the Body of a Man...determines God to break the Bones of the Man... A Coward, who runs away, does not run away at all; but the Motion of his Pineal Gland, agitated by the Impression of a Squadron of Enemies coming on him, with Bayonets at the Ends of their Muskets, determines God to move the Coward's Legs, and carry him from them' (*Cyclopaedia*, 'Cause'). See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Averroës' [E]; 'Spinoza' [N]; EHU 8.32–6. In response to this objection, Malebranche argued that the occasionalist hypothesis (neither matter nor finite minds possess causal efficacy) is fully consistent with the view that 'God is in no way the author of sin' (*Elucidations* 1 [549]; cf. *Elucidations* 15, proofs 6–7 [668–85]; *Treatise of Morality* 1.1.21).

- 1.4.5.34 164.1 **foregoing arguments...dangerous to religion**] If Hume's arguments constituted a challenge to immaterialist accounts of the mind, then some would have seen these arguments as dangerous to religion. Malebranche said that 'the truth that the soul is spiritual and immortal is essential to religion and morals' (*Search* 3.2.8.2 [247]). Cudworth took 'Atheists and Materialists' to be indistinguishable. Consequently, those who challenge the immaterialist account of mind are necessarily atheists (*True Intellectual System* 1.5 [822]). S. Clarke argued that it is 'utterly destructive of Religion' to suppose that 'the *Mind* of Man [is] nothing but a certain *System of Matter*; and *Thinking*, nothing but a certain *Mode of Motion* in that System' (*Third Defence, Works*, 3: 851; for Collins's reply, see his *Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence*, in S. Clarke, *Works*, 3: 871–5). See also Berkeley, *Principles* 1.93; Colliber, *Free Thoughts concerning Souls* 1. In contrast to these writers, Bayle, taking a fideist view of reason and religious belief, maintained that the controversy about thinking matter, *qua philosophical* controversy, was theologically and religiously neutral, thus adding credence to Hume's claim here. Every Christian, 'as a Christian', Bayle said, 'believes the Immortality of the Soul, Heaven, Hell, &c. because these are Truths which God has revealed to us', and consequently, any who believe in the immortality of the soul only because of 'those Philosophical Ideas, which their Reason furnishes them with, would be no farther advanced in the Kingdom of God, than those who believe that the Whole is greater than it's Part' (*Dictionary*, 'Dicæarchus' [M]). Voltaire observed that Locke's suggestion that we will never be able to determine whether a purely material being is capable of thought was by his critics taken to be 'a scandalous Declaration that the Soul is material and mortal', and as evidence that Locke 'intended to destroy Religion', even though the matter was 'purely Philosophical, altogether independent on Faith and Revelation' (*Letters Concerning the English Nation* 13 [101]). See also Watts, *Philosophical Essays*, Preface, p. [xii]. Wishart maintained that Hume's arguments in this section were dangerous to religion; see *LG* 8, 18.

164.2 **apology**] For Hume's description of his efforts to remove from the *Treatise* material that might offend the religious, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1. For a brief defence of the *Treatise* against the charge of denying the immateriality of the soul, see *LG* 35.

1.4.5.35 164.6–7 **evident principle, that whatever we can imagine, is possible**] See 1.2.2.8, 1.2.4.11; ann. 26.37.

1.4.6 *Of personal identity*

1.4.6.1 164.15–23 **some philosophers...if we doubt of this**] No single philosopher appears to make all the claims found in this paragraph; thus who Hume had in mind is not obvious. Commenting on this section at *Abs.* 28, he summarizes his own view ('the soul, as far as we can conceive it, is nothing but a system or train of different perceptions, those of heat and cold, love and anger, thoughts and sensations; all united together, but without any perfect simplicity or identity'), and then characterizes Descartes's view ('that thought was the essence of the mind; not this thought or that thought, but thought in general') as being 'absolutely unintelligible, since every thing, that exists, is particular'. No other philosopher is mentioned. When in the Appendix to Vol. 3 of the *Treatise* Hume again addressed the issue of personal identity, his reference to the views of others is even more general: 'Most philosophers seem inclin'd to think, that personal identity *arises* from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception' (App. 20). The following four annotations show that some of what Hume claims here about his predecessors can be found in Descartes, and also in several other philosophers we know him to have read and reflected on as he prepared the *Treatise*: Malebranche, Shaftesbury, Locke, Berkeley, and Butler.

Also germane to issues touched on in this paragraph are Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 1.9 [49]; La Forge, *Treatise on the Human Mind*; Malebranche, *Search* 3.1.1 [197–202]; Rohault, *System* 1.2.2–3; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Dicæarcus' [C], 'Rorarius' [E]; Harris, *Lexicon Technicum*, 'Identity'; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 233]; *Of Motion* 21; Bragge, *Essay concerning the Soul of Man*, 1, 19; P. Browne, *Procedure* 1.2, 3.5 [66, 412]; Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 3.2. See also the several longer annotations to this section of the *Treatise*, and, for further comments on the self in this work, 2.1.2.2–3, 2.1.11.4, 2.2.2.15, App. 10–21. Hume's letter of July 1746, to Henry Home (later Lord Kames), the relevant parts of which are quoted above, Historical Account, Sect. 9.1, comments briefly on personal identity. For additional seventeenth-century background on the issues raised in this section, see Thiel, 'Personal Identity'.

164.15–16 **every moment intimately conscious of...our SELF**] Drummond, Hume's logic teacher, is said to have argued 'that the mind's acts are known to itself directly just by being internal or "intimate" to it, without need of any "vicarious" representation' by means of ideas; See Stewart, 'Hume's Intellectual Development', 13. Butler, rebutting the views of Collins (see ann. 165.17), insisted that we have, of that unitary 'agent' which we call the self, a 'certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves' ('Of Personal Identity' §7; cf. *Analogy of Religion* 1.1 §10). Earlier, Mayne had described consciousness as 'that inward Sense and Knowledge which the Mind hath of its own Being and Existence', and then claimed that 'it is impossible to be Conscious of any

Act whatever, without being sensible of, or perceiving one's *Self* to be that which Does it. And it is this Sense or Perception of *Self*, which constitutes the true Nature of any Act considered as *Conscious*' (*Two Dissertations*, 144, 148; cf. 156, 158–9, 175–6, 189). See also ann. 170.40.

164.16–18 **feel its existence... certain, beyond... demonstration... of its perfect identity and simplicity**] Descartes argued that knowledge of one's existence is not the result of a demonstration: 'When someone says "I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist", he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind' (*Objections and Replies* 2 [AT 7: 140]). Arnauld attributed to Augustine the discovery 'that there is nothing at all that we can do that does not at the same time bring with it compelling proof of our own existence', and went on to say that the thought of one's 'own soul' is 'to be found in all other thoughts', so that one knows oneself 'in knowing other things' (*On True and False Ideas* 2 [52–3], citing Augustine, *City of God* 11.26). Malebranche said that we do not know the soul 'through its idea... we know it only through *consciousness*', and also that of 'all our knowledge, the first is of the existence of our soul; all our thoughts are incontestable demonstrations of this, since there is nothing more obvious than that what actually thinks, is actually something' (*Search* 3.2.7.4 [237], 6.2.6 [480]; cf. *Elucidations* 11 [633–8]). S. Clarke defined '*Consciousness*' as 'the *Reflex Act* by which I know that I think, and that my Thoughts and Actions are my own and not Another's', then said that the consciousness we have is '*One Consciousness*', and that consequently it 'must of necessity be a Quality of some *Immaterial Substance*'. Clarke went on to argue that, while a person who has undergone continual, partial change 'may be called the *same Person*, by a mere *external imaginary Denomination*; in such a Sense as a *Statue* may be called the *same Statue*, after its whole Substance has been changed by piecemeal: But he cannot be *really and truly* the *same Person*' unless he is constituted by 'the *same individual numerical Consciousness*' (*Second Defence, Works*, 3: 784, 798–9; *Third Defence, Works*, 3: 844). Butler said that 'upon comparing the consciousness of one's self... in any two moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity', and that this comparison 'also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two moments' ('Of Personal Identity' §2). See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Leucippus' [E] [3: 791b]. Rohault, in contrast to Descartes, supposed that each of us 'must necessarily reason in this manner: *I think*; that which thinks must of necessity *exist*; therefore *I exist*' (*System* 1.2.2).

164.18–20 **strongest sensation, the most violent passion... fix it the more intensely**] Locke argued that 'if I know *I feel Pain*, it is evident, I have as certain a Perception of my own Existence, as of the Existence of the Pain I feel... Experience then convinces us, that *we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence*, and an internal infallible Perception that we are. In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are conscious to our selves of our own Being; and, in this Matter, come not short of the highest degree of *Certainty*' (*Essay* 4.9.3; cf. 2.1.10, 19; 2.27.9–17, 23–5).

164.22–3 **nor is there any thing, of which we can be certain, if we doubt of this]** Descartes had famously reported that his attempt at comprehensive doubt was brought to an end by his discovery that if he was thinking, or even doubting, he must exist. Knowledge of his existence was the bedrock of all knowledge; see *Discourse on Method* 4; *Meditations* 2 [AT 6: 32; 7: 24–5]. Butler, supposed it had been asked ‘whether we may not possibly be deceived’ about our own identity ‘as far back as our remembrance reaches’. This question, he said in reply, ‘may be asked at the end of any demonstration whatever: because it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory. And he who can doubt, whether perception by memory can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also, whether perception by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed whether intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions, whose truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind’ (‘Personal Identity’ §11).

- 1.4.6.2 164.25–6 **nor have we any idea of self, after the manner . . . explain’d]** Gassendi told Descartes that, ‘far from having a clear and distinct idea of yourself you have no idea of yourself at all . . . you recognize that you are thinking . . . [but] since it is only this operation that you are aware of, the most important element is still hidden from you, namely the substance which performs this operation (*Objections and Replies* 5 [AT 7: 338]). P. Browne claimed that it is ‘evident, that we have no *Immediate or Direct* Idea or Perception of Spirit, or of any of its Operations, as we have of Body and its Qualities. And because we are sure we can have no such Idea of it . . . we are naturally led to express it by a *Negative*, and call it an Immaterial Substance; that is, something that hath a *Being*, but is not Matter; something that *Is*, but is not any thing we directly know’ (*Procedure* 1.3 [78]). D. Forbes said that a ‘Man has not the least Idea of the Matter or Substance of his own Soul, or of it’s manner of acting, or being acted upon’ (*Letter to a Bishop*, 11). See also Glanvill, *Vanity of Dogmatizing* 3; Saint-Evremond, *Works*, 1: 7–9; Berkeley, *Principles* 1.136; Argens, *Philosophical Dissertations* 4.14 [43].

164.26 **from what impression cou’d this idea be deriv’d]** See also *Abs.* 7; ann. 409.9.

164.30–1 **that to which . . . impressions and ideas . . . have a reference]** Compare 1.4.5.2–6, 21.

- 1.4.6.3 165.2–3 **I always stumble on some particular perception]** See also App. 15.

165.5–7 **When my perceptions are remov’d . . . insensible of myself . . . said not to exist]** Locke explored the implications of the insensibility of self caused by sleep, and concluded that, if we think while sleeping, but without being aware of our thoughts, we would apparently constitute two different persons, one of which would be said not to exist whenever the other one did: ‘For if we take wholly away all Consciousness and Sensations . . . it will be hard to know wherein to place personal Identity’ (*Essay* 2.1.11). Collins argued that, supposing personal identity to consist

in consciousness or memory, we could retain our identity even if our existence were interrupted, even if we suppose ourselves 'taken to Pieces every Night after we are asleep, and our Parts put into the same Form and Order which they would have been in the Morning had we continued sleeping' (*Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence*, in S. Clarke, *Works*, 3: 876).

- 1.4.6.4 165.17–19 **the rest of mankind... a bundle... of different perceptions... in a perpetual flux**] Shaftesbury, discussing continuing bodily change and renewal, said: 'What you Philosophers are... may be hard perhaps to determine, but for the rest of Mankind, I dare affirm, that few are so long themselves as *half* seven years. 'Tis good fortune if a Man be *one and the same* for only a day or two' (*Moralists* 3.1 [350]). Berkeley's Hylas said: 'to me it seems, that according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that you are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them' (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 233]). In 1727 Hutcheson told a correspondent that he was unpersuaded by the 'notion of our mind as only a system of perceptions' (Berman, 'Francis Hutcheson on Berkeley'). Butler attributed to Collins the view that 'personality is not a permanent but a transient thing: that it lives and dies, begins and ends continually: that no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together, than two successive moments can be one and the same moment: that... [it is] consciousness alone, which constitutes personality; which consciousness, being successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently the personality constituted by it' ('Of Personal Identity' §6). For his part, Collins explicitly claimed that 'we are not conscious, that we continue a Moment the same individual numerical Being', and that 'Personal Identity consists in Consciousness', which itself 'is only a Mode in a fleeting System of Matter' (*Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence*, in S. Clarke, *Works* 3: 870, 876; see also Collins, *Reflections on Mr. Clarke's Second Defence*, in S. Clarke, *Works*, 3: 809, 819–20); Huet, *Philosophical Treatise* 1.5 [47].

Cudworth, arguing that mind and extension are necessarily distinct, said that it is inconceivable that 'the several Parts of an *Extended Magnitude*', a 'whole *Heap* or *Bundle* of things, should be *One Thinker*. A *Thinker*, is a *Monade*, or one *Single Substance*, and not a *Heap of Substances*' (*True Intellectual System* 1.5 [822]; we owe this reference to Raynor, 'Hume and Berkeley's *Three Dialogues*', 237). The terms *bundle* and *collection* were used, in ways similar to Hume's use here, by Locke, *Essay* 2.23.4, 14; 3.3.20; 3.5.13, and by Berkeley, *New Theory of Vision* 110, while the bundle view of the self may be implicit in Locke; see *Essay* 2.14.3, 2.27.16. Bayle considered a hypothesis which would make the soul 'an *Ens per aggregationem*, a collection and heap of substances' (*Dictionary*, 'Rorarius' [L] [4: 915b]; cf. 'Rorarius' [E] [4: 906a]). See also 1.4.2.39; ann. 16.16; *Abs.* 28; App. 15; *DNR* 3.13, 4.2–3.

165.23–6 **mind... no simplicity... at one time, nor identity in different**] Bayle pointed out that, given the Cartesian doctrine that the 'conservation of creatures is a

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continuous creation', we cannot know that our present soul is the same one we had at some previous time (*Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [B]).

- 1.4.6.5 165.34–5 **personal identity...as it regards our passions]** See 2.1.2.2–3, 2.1.11.4, 2.2.2.15.

- 1.4.6.6 165.41–2 **idea...of identity or sameness]** For an earlier discussion of identity and perfect identity, see 1.4.2.26–30, 36.

166.3–5 **action of the imagination...same to the feeling]** The similarity of feelings aroused by distinctive but resembling operations of the mind is the topic of 1.2.5.21, 1.4.2.32–5, 1.4.3.3.

166.22 **run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance]** See also 1.4.2.36–40, App. 18–19.

n. 50.2–3 (166) **Shaftesbury's reasonings concerning the uniting principle of the universe and the identity of plants and animals]** Shaftesbury's spokesman Theocles suggests that, from what is visible to us, we must imagine 'the Universe to be *one Intire Thing*'. He also says that, by virtue of 'a *Sympathizing of Parts*...[and] a plain *Concurrence in one common End*...[a] Tree is a real *Tree*; lives, flourishes, and is still *One and the same*; even when by Vegetation and Change of Substance, not one Particle in it remains *the same*.' He then applies the same argument to individual persons: 'there is a strange *Simplicity* in this YOU and ME, that in reality they shou'd be still *one and the same*, when neither *one Atom of Body*, *one Passion*, nor *one Thought* remains the same' (*Moralists* 3.1 [347–51]).

- 1.4.6.7 166.31 **controversy concerning identity is not merely a dispute of words]** Locke, near the beginning of his chapter, 'Of Identity and Diversity', says that 'we must consider what *Idea* the Word [*identity*]...stands for... Which if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented a great deal of that *Confusion*, which often occurs about this Matter... especially concerning *Personal Identity*'. Near the end of the same chapter he says 'that the difficulty or obscurity' about the identity of individual substances and modes arises more from 'Names ill used, than from any obscurity in things themselves' (*Essay* 2.27.7, 28). Berkeley supposed that disputes about the meaning of 'the *same thing*' are disputes 'about a word' (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 247–8]; cf. *Principles*, Intro. 23). See also Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 12.7 [295]; Hume's further comment in ¶21 of the present section.

167.4–6 **from the resemblance...that the error arises]** On resemblance and resembling acts as a source of error, see also ¶6 of this section; ann. 166.3.

- 1.4.6.8 167.16–17 **pronounce a mass of matter the same, where we find so trivial an alteration]** Locke, also concerned with the identity of a mere 'Mass of Matter' (in contrast to an oak tree), said that this identity consists in nothing more than 'the Cohesion of Particles of Matter any how united'. Earlier in the same chapter he

suggested that identity is attained when the ideas 'attributed to' a thing 'vary not at all from what they were that moment, wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present' (*Essay* 2.27.4, 1). Watts explained that, for Locke, 'Identity' had different meanings 'according as 'tis applied to various sorts of Beings; so the Sameness of an *Atom* is distinct from the Sameness of a *Mass of Atoms*; and that is different from the Sameness of *Vegetables*, of *Animals*, of *Spirits*, of *Men*' (*Philosophical Essays* 12.7 [295]). See also ann. 168.8.

- 1.4.6.10 167.33–5 **change ... produc'd gradually and insensibly**] Locke observed that the 'Idea of a *Man* in most Peoples Sense' includes that of 'a *Body* so and so shaped ... the same successive *Body* not shifted [changed] all at once' (*Essay* 2.27.8 [335]). Commenting on this observation, Watts asked whether a man 'would be the same man if [his body] were shifted all at once? If *Golia[t]h* at a Month old should have at once received that vast Addition to his bulk which increased by degrees in forty or fifty years', why should this alter the case? He concluded that the requirement that change be gradual may be 'the true Notion of the Sameness of *Man* as relating to this World only' (*Philosophical Essays* 12.7 [299]).
- 1.4.6.11 168.2–5 **A ship ... chang'd by frequent reparations ... common end ... is the same**] A ship, frequently repaired until at last nothing remained of the original, was widely used as an example of a thing retaining its identity through change. See Plutarch, 'Theseus and Romulus', *Lives* 1; Barbeyrac, in Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.9.3 n. 3; Hobbes, *Elements of Philosophy* 2.11.7. S. Clarke objected that, although 'a *Ship* is called the *same Ship*, after the whole Substance is changed by frequent Repairs', only 'the *Name* of the *Ship*, is the same ... the *Ship itself*, is not at all the same' (*Third Defence, Works*, 3: 844).
- 1.4.6.12 168.8–10 **sympathy of parts to their common end ... reciprocal relation of cause and effect**] While Locke said that a mass of matter retained identity through nothing more than the cohesion of its particles (see ann. 167.16), he supposed that a plant, a particular oak, for example, has 'such a disposition of [particles] as constitutes' its parts, and 'such an Organization of those parts, as is fit to receive, and distribute nourishment, so as to continue, and frame the *Wood*, *Bark*, and *Leaves*, etc. ... in which consists the vegetable Life'. Consequently, the tree in question 'continues to be the same *Plant*, as long as it partakes of the same *Life*, though that *Life* be communicated to new *Particles of Matter*'. He also said that a machine, for example, a watch, is 'nothing but a fit Organization, or Construction of *Parts*, to a certain end', and that in this respect it is very much like the body of an animal (*Essay* 2.27.4–5). Butler granted that in 'a loose and popular sense ... the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of parts', but then went on to say that 'in a strict and philosophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be the same with that, with which it hath indeed nothing the same' ('Of Personal Identity' §4; cf. *Analogy of Religion* 1.1.12). For Shaftesbury on the 'Sympathizing of Parts' and 'one common End', see ann. n. 50 (166).

168.16–19 **oak, that grows...still the same oak...a man...fat...lean, without any change in his identity]** The first of these clauses is a slightly shorter version of Locke on the same subject: 'An Oak, growing from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lopp'd, is still the same Oak.' The second also follows Locke, but changes the example. Locke said: 'a Colt grown up to a Horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the same Horse: though, in both these Cases, there may be a manifest change of the parts' (*Essay* 2.27.3). Collins also instanced an oak (*Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence*, in S. Clarke, *Works*, 3: 875). Shaftesbury (see anns. 165.17, n. 50 (166)) and Butler ('Of Personal Identity' §4) mention only a generic tree; 'sGravesande only a plant (*Introduction* 1.7). See Hall, 'Hume's Use of Locke on Identity', for other similarities between Hume and Locke.

1.4.6.13 168.21–2 **distinguish...betwixt numerical and specific identity]** See also 1.2.6.8–9; 1.4.2.2, 56; and esp. 1.4.5.19–20.

1.4.6.14 168.41–3 **nature of a river consists in...change of parts...same during several ages]** S. Clarke, discussing the nature of identity, observed that 'a *River* is called the *same River*, though the Water of it be every Day new ... And the continued *Name* of the River signifies Water running in the same Channel, but not at all the *same Water*' (*Third Defence*, *Works*, 3: 844).

1.4.6.15 169.5–7 **personal identity...so great a question...especially of late years in England]** From the publication of the 2nd edn. of Locke's *Essay* (1694), which discussed both personal identity (see esp. 2.27.9–29), and the possibility that an omnipotent Deity could 'superadd to Matter a Faculty of Thinking' (4.3.6 [541]), views of the nature of the self and of personal identity were widely and vigorously debated in England. See in addition to the works mentioned in other annotations to this section, Stillingfleet's two replies to Locke, *The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter*, pp. 74 ff., and *The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter*, pp. 32 ff.; Lee, *Anti-Scepticism*, 2.27, 4.3; Budgell, *Spectator* 578; Felton, *Resurrection of the Same Numerical Body*; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Identity'; Perronet, *Second Vindication*; see also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Dicæarcus' [c]. The *Memoirs of Martinus Scriblerus*, by Pope, Arbuthnot, and others, includes (ch. 12) an informed parody (the views of Descartes and Collins are among those targeted) of philosophical concern with the notion of personal identity. Although written in the early part of the century, this work was not published until 1741.

169.11 **identity...ascribe to the mind of man...a fictitious one]** Butler said that, when those who hold that personality is a 'transient thing' speak of personal identity, they do not mean 'that the person is *really* the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense' ('Of Personal Identity' §6).

1.4.6.16 169.30 **already prov'd at large]** See esp. 1.3.3–7, 14.

169.38 **relations above-mention'd]** See ¶7 of this section.



170.2–3 **principles above-explain'd]** See ¶¶9–10 of this section, 1.4.2.34, 1.4.3.3–4, App. 20.

- 1.4.6.18 170.14–15 **memory...faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions]** Locke said that the '*laying up of our Ideas in the Repository of the Memory, signifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power, in many cases, to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Perception annexed to them, that it has had them before*' (*Essay* 2.10.2). On the memory as a faculty, see also 1.1.3; n. 22 (81); 3.3.4.13.

- 1.4.6.20 170.40–2 **memory...the source of personal identity]** Locke argued that personal identity consists in the 'consciousness' that 'always accompanies thinking, and... makes every one to be, what he calls *self*'. He went on to say that the identity of any person extends as far as 'consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action or Thought'; and later added that 'Any thing united to ["the present thinking being"] by a consciousness of former Actions makes also a part of the *same self*, which is the same both then and now' (*Essay* 2.27.9, 25; sects. 2.27.23–5 are entitled '*Consciousness alone makes self*'). Collins, defending a Lockean view against Clarke, argued that 'personal Identity consists in Consciousness, or a Memory extending to past Actions' (*Answer to Mr. Clarke's Third Defence*, in S. Clarke, *Works*, 3: 876). Against this view Butler argued that 'consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity', and that 'though present consciousness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are; yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings' ('Of Personal Identity' §3). See also Sergeant, *Solid Philosophy* 14.12; Lee, *Anti-Scepticism* 2.27.9 [121–30].

170.42–3 **Had we no memory, we never shou'd have any notion of causation]** See also 1.3.6.2–6.

171.6–7 **will he affirm, because he has entirely forgot...present self is not the same person]** Locke anticipated this objection: 'suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my Life...so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same Person, that did those Actions, had those Thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have now forgot them?' (*Essay* 2.27.20). Butler objected that to say as Locke did that 'consciousness of what is past...makes personal identity... is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember' ('Of Personal Identity' §3).

- 1.4.6.21 171.15–16 **rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties]** For Hume's view of the role of grammarians, in contrast to that of philosophers, see 3.3.4.4.

171.21–2 **disputes...are merely verbal]** Arnauld and Nicole suggested that verbal disputes arise because 'people hardly ever use nominal definitions to remove

the obscurity from names and to fix them to certain clearly designated ideas' (*Logic* 1.12 [62]). On verbal disputes, see also 2.1.7.8, 2.3.1.16, 3.1.2.8, 3.3.4.1,4; *EPM* Appx. 4, 'Of Some Verbal Disputes'; *DNR* 12.6–8n.

171.23 **already observ'd**] See ¶7 of this section.

1.4.6.22 171.24–6 **notion of identity ... may be extended ... to that of simplicity**] For Hume's earlier comments linking identity and simplicity, see ¶¶1, 3, 4 of this section and 1.4.2.39. For the views of some of his predecessors, see anns. 154.5, 164.16. Hume returned to the notion of personal identity in App. 10–21, and there (¶21) concluded that at least some aspects of the issue were 'too hard for my understanding'.

1.4.6.23 171.38 **proceed in the accurate anatomy of human nature**] This is the first of several occasions on which Hume describes the *Treatise* as being concerned with the anatomy of human nature, or more specifically, of the human mind. See also *Letters*, 1: 32–3 (quoted, *Historical Account*, Sect. 5); 2.1.12.2, 3.3.6.6; *Abs.* 2; *EHU* 1.8. Allusions to such moral or intellectual anatomies were not unusual. Thomas Rogers published *A Philosophicall Discourse, Entituled The Anatomie of the Minde* in 1576, and Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* followed early in the next century. Bacon made repeated use of the metaphor; see Vickers, *Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose*, 57. Shaftesbury supposed that the 'Parts and Proportions of the *Mind*, their mutual Relation and Dependency, the Connexion and Frame of those Passions which constitute the Soul or Temper, may easily be understood by any-one who thinks it worth his while to study this inward Anatomy' (*Inquiry* 2.1.2 [83]). Voltaire applauded Locke for his attempt to lay out 'the human Soul, in the same Manner as an excellent Anatomist explains the Springs of the human Body' (*Letters concerning the English Nation* 13 [98]). Colliher complained that 'tho' the Anatomy of Bodies ... hath been well studied and improved of late Years, yet the Anatomy (if I may so speak) of Souls ... hath been less regarded; and when attempted, the Success has been less remarkable' (*Free Thoughts concerning Souls*, Preface).

1.4.7 *Conclusion of this book*

1.4.7.1 172.2–4 **like a man ... to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel**] Hume's metaphor was of ancient origin. Montaigne, quoting Catullus, had said: 'My judgment does not always go forward; it floats, it strays, "Like a tiny boat, | Caught by a raging wind on the vast sea"' ('Apology for Raymond Sebond', 426). See also Horace, *Odes* 1.7.32. The metaphor was common enough for Isaac Barrow to give it an academic twist. Worried that he was floating on an 'Ocean of *Philosophico-Mathematical* Disquisitions', he fretted: 'Indeed to one who runs over this Subject in his Thoughts, so many Difficulties offer themselves to be explained, so many Questions to be discussed, and so many different Sentiments to be considered, that I can scarce sustain the entring so great a Sea for want of Time, the Term being so near an End' (*Mathematical Lectures*, 243–4). Bacon had been more optimistic: 'we should reveal and publish our conjectures, which make it reasonable to have hope: just as Columbus did, before his wonderful voyage across the Atlantic Sea' (*New Organon* 1.92).

172.6–9 **memory of past errors...wretched condition...of the faculties...almost to despair]** Watts, reviewing the debate on the nature of space, was similarly despairing: 'What have we learnt then by all this Train and Labour of Argument, but the Weakness of our own Reasoning? We seem to be urged on every Side with huge Improbabilities, or glaring Inconsistencies: We are lost and confounded in the most familiar and common Things we can speak of...a shameful Perplexity and Darkness hangs heavy upon the boasted Reason of Man' (*Philosophical Essays* 1.6). Watts, like Hume, recovered his philosophical equilibrium and went on with his enquiries.

172.16–17 **forlorn solitude, in which I am plac'd]** Berkeley observed that philosophers find so many 'paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies', they are finally ready to 'sit down in a forlorn scepticism' (*Principles*, Intro. 1).

- 1.4.7.3 172.37 **truth...by what criterion shall I distinguish her]** Questions about the criterion by which one could distinguish the true from the false or the real from the apparent were often raised by the sceptics. Cicero, explaining and defending the views of the Academics, challenged the Stoics to show that there is a criterion (*judicium*) by which true presentations may be distinguished from false, and with such acumen that those using this criterion never mistakenly assent to something found to be untrue. He then notes that each of the philosophers or schools (Protagoras, Epicurus, Plato, Aristotle, the Cyrenaics, and the Stoics are mentioned) proposes a different criterion, incompatible with those of the other schools (*Academica* 2.17.53, 18.57, 21.68, 24.77, 26.80–4, 27.88, 30.95, 46.142). Sextus Empiricus is even more explicit and detailed. In the first book of his *Against the Mathematicians* he outlines the issue, and then shows, at length, the inadequacies of the criterion proposed by each of the schools of philosophy known to him; see also *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 2.14–79. At *EHU* 12.8 Hume associates the issue of the 'criterion' of truth and falsehood with the sceptics, saying that certain 'sceptical topics' or examples show only that before the senses can become 'the proper *criteria* of truth and falsehood', their 'evidence' must be corrected 'by reason, and by considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ'.

- 1.4.7.4 n. 51 (173) **Sect. 4]** See 1.4.4.15.

173.17–19 **nor is it possible for us to reason justly...from causes and effects, and...believe the continu'd existence of matter]** See also 1.3.2.2; 1.4.2.14, 21, 47, 54; 1.4.4.15.

- 1.4.7.5 n. 52 (173) **Part 3. sect. 14]** See also 1.3.2–7.

- 1.4.7.6 174.13 **angels, whom the scripture represents as covering their eyes with their wings]** 'Above it stood the seraphims: each one had six wings; with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet, and with twain he did fly' (Isa. 6: 2).

- 1.4.7.7 n. 53 (174) **Sect. 1]** See 1.4.1.3–10.

- 1.4.7.9 175.14–17 **fortunately ... nature ... cures me ... by some avocation, and lively impression]** Malebranche said that 'all those who seriously wish to apply themselves to the search after truth must be careful to avoid ... all sensations that are too strong, such as loud noise, strong light, pleasure, pain ... they must continuously guard the purity of their imagination and ... above all halt the impulses of the passions that form impressions in the body and soul so powerful that it is ordinarily next to impossible for the mind to think about anything but the objects exciting these impulses' (6.1.2 [413]). See also 'Refinement in the Arts' 3–5.
- 1.4.7.10 175.23 **common affairs of life]** See also 1.4.1.7; ann. 123.6; *Abs.* 4; *EHU* 1.6.
- 175.30–2 **submitting to my senses ... I show ... my sceptical disposition and principles]** Sextus Empiricus insisted that the (Pyrrhonian) sceptic 'gives assent to the feelings which are the necessary results of sense-impressions', and he does not attempt to 'overthrow the affective sense-impressions which induce our assent involuntarily' (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.13, 19).
- 1.4.7.11 176.5–6 **if we are philosophers, it ought only to be upon sceptical principles]** Hume provides little clue to the sceptical principles he has in mind. Sextus Empiricus described the Pyrrhonians or 'Sceptics' as taking a middle course between those (the Dogmatists) who claim 'to have discovered the truth', and those (Carneades and other Academics) who treat truth as 'inapprehensible'. Those taking the recommended middle or sceptical way, he said, 'keep on searching' (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.1–2). Bayle said of the Pyrrhonians that they were called '*examiners, inquirers, suspending, and doubting men*'; of Pyrrho, that he 'reduced all his conclusions to a *non liquet*, let the matter be further enquired into'; and that 'the art of disputing about every thing, without doing anything else but suspending one's judgment is called *Pyrrhonism* (or Scepticism)' (*Dictionary*, 'Pyrrho' [A], also 4: 653). Cicero disputed the claim that Carneades asserted that nothing is true. He said rather, according to Cicero, that 'all true sensations are associated with false ones so closely resembling them that they contain no infallible mark to guide our judgement and assent', and thus the best that can be said is that 'many sensations are *probable*, that is ... they are yet possessed of a certain distinctness and clearness, and so can serve to direct the conduct of the wise man' (*De natura deorum* 1.5.12). Bayle, who in his explication of Carneades as an 'earnest Stickler for Uncertainty' quoted this same passage, also cited another Ciceronian description of Carneades' view (*Dictionary*, 'Carneades' [B]). This is the view that 'the wise man' will sometimes assent to something not known with certainty; that is, he will sometimes 'hold an opinion, but with the qualification that he will understand that it is an opinion and will know that there is nothing that can be comprehended and perceived' or known with certainty (Cicero, *Academica* 2.48.148). Shaftesbury, influenced by both Bayle's theory and his practice, has one of his interlocutors, the sceptic Philocles, recommend the '*Academick Philosophy*', a 'certain way of Questioning and Doubting', a 'way of DIALOGUE, Patience of Debate and Reasoning' (*Moralists* 1.1 [189, 191]). Huet, after concluding that 'the Sect of the *Academicks*, and that of the *Pyrrhonians*, was one

and the same', conjectured that sceptical philosophers prefer to associate themselves with the Academics because 'both *Pyrrho* and his Disciples have been ridicul'd, as if they had entirely reduc'd Mens Lives to a State of Inactivity' (*Philosophical Treatise* 1.14.38; cf. 2.4). See also anns. 121.title, 123.2; *EHU* 5.1–2 (where Hume recommends the 'ACADEMIC or SCEPTICAL philosophy'), and 12.20.

- 1.4.7.12 176.14–17 **a curiosity to be acquainted with...actuate and govern me]** The subjects mentioned are, in the order mentioned, the topics of 3.1, 3.2, and 2.1–3.

176.25–6 **loser in point of pleasure]** See also *EHU* 1.10; *DNR* 1.9, 15.

- 1.4.7.13 176.30 **superstition...more bold in its systems and hypotheses than philosophy]** Bayle supposed that, even in enlightened times and places, superstition will prevail. Philosophers, he said, should not expect to overcome 'the crafty spirit' of those who institute superstition or superstitious practices, or to cure 'the credulous spirit of the mob' (*Dictionary*, 'Scamander' [D] [5: 78a]). See also ann. 70.4; 'Superstition and Enthusiasm'.

176.45–177.2 **CYNICS...from reasonings purely philosophical...as great extravagancies of conduct as any Monk or Dervise]** Diogenes of Sinope, the most famous of the Cynics, was, according to Bayle, 'one of those extraordinary Men who are upon Extrems in every thing, without excepting Reason, and who verify this Maxim, *That there is no great Wit without a Mixture of Folly*'. Diogenes not only embraced the principles of Cynicism (a general disdain of material possessions and social convention), but carried these to the extreme of living naked in some form of tub. Bayle also described him as 'calling Reason to the Assistance of his Passions', or '*Going mad with Reason*', a state exemplified by his argument that, because 'it was a lawful thing to lie with a woman... there was no harm in lying with her in public' (*Dictionary*, 'Diogenes', [L] [2: 669b]). See also Barbeyrac, *Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 22; *EPM* 9.3. For an extensive description of the behaviour of monks, see Erasmus, *Praise of Folly*, 119–33. According to the *Encyclopedia of Religion* (s.v. 'Postures'), a *Dervise* was a member of a Sūfī order of dancing or whirling dervishes founded in the thirteenth century by Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī. For an eighteenth-century account of the behaviour of dervishes, see Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Dervis'.

177.3–4 **errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous]** Lucretius remarked on the great tendency of religion to lead to evil ('*Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum*', *Nature of Things* 1.101). Berkeley's *Alciphron* said: 'if you appeal to the general experience and observation of other men, you shall find it grown into a proverb that religion is the root of evil', and then quotes this same line from Lucretius (*Alciphron* 5.15). Bacon worried about the widespread 'corruption of philosophy from *superstition* and a dash of theology' and 'the *apothecosis* of error' that results (*New Organon* 1.65; cf. *Essays*, 'Of Atheism', 'Of Superstition'). Malebranche warned that an infinity of philosophical errors is less dangerous than a single error of religion resulting in heresy (*Search* 4.3.3 [280]). For Hume's explanation, based on 'the nature of the human mind' and of the 'misery and devastation' that

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result from religious differences, see 'Parties in General' 11–14. See also 'Coalition of Parties' 17; 'Standard of Taste' 33–5; *HE* 37 [3: 431–41]; 39 [4: 53–4]; Appx. 4 [5: 130], 53 [5: 254–7]; and the two anns. to 79.30.

- 1.4.7.14 177.14 **gross earthy mixture**] Hume alludes to one of the four elements (earth, air, fire, and water) and the corresponding humours and temperaments. On that account, increasing the proportion of the 'gross earthy mixture' constituting a person would moderate fiery excesses. See also ann. 149.26.

177.42–3 **true sceptic will be diffident of his philosophical doubts**] Compare *DNR* 3.7.

- 1.4.7.15 178.9 *'tis evident, 'tis certain, 'tis undeniable*] Although Hume does on a few occasions write of what is undeniable (see 1.3.6.5, 1.3.13.15–16, 2.1.7.6, 2.1.8.7, 2.2.3.1), the phrase 'tis undeniable' is not found elsewhere in the *Treatise*. The phrase 'tis evident' occurs over 150 times, and 'tis certain' just under 100 times. Relatively speaking, the two phrases are used most frequently in Book 2 (a total of approximately eighty-five uses), and least often in Book 3 (a total of approximately sixty-five uses). Hume also uses other locutions (see, e.g., 1.1.3) to suggest that facts, arguments, or conclusions are obvious. For early reactions to this apparent confidence, see *Historical Account*, 7.4, 7.6; for Hume's later assessment of what he called the 'positive Air, which prevails' in the *Treatise*, see his letter of Feb. 1754 to John Stewart (*Letters*, 1: 185–6), quoted above, *Historical Account*, 9.2.

178.10–15 **fallen into this fault...such expressions...imply no dogmatical spirit**] Hume's apology contrasts with that of Boyle, who said: 'you will wonder... that in almost every one of the following essays I should speak so doubtingly, and use so often, *perhaps, it seems, it is not improbable*, and such other expressions, as argue a diffidence of the truth of the opinions I incline to, and that I should be so shy of laying down principles, and sometimes so much as venturing at explications' (*Certain Physiological Essays*, 307). Locke said that 'it becomes the Modesty of Philosophy, not to pronounce Magisterially, where we want that Evidence that can produce Knowledge' (*Essay* 4.3.6 [541–2]). See also *EHU* 4.22; *EPM* 9.13.

## Book 2. *Of the Passions*

Title-page **TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE**] See p. 688 above.

**EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF REASONING**] See p. 688 above.

*Rara . . . licet*] See p. 688 above.

**Book 2. *Of the Passions***] The original Volume 2, which was entitled *Of the Passions*, included Contents and Book 2 of the *Treatise*, which was also entitled *Of the Passions*. Except for the contents list which is included in the Contents for vol. 1, pp. xiv–xvi, Book 2 of this edition is textually equivalent to the original Volume 2.

*Of the PASSIONS*] Several of the philosophers whose work we know to have been important to Hume in the period leading up to the publication of the first two volumes of the *Treatise* had produced substantial discussions of the passions. Among ancient philosophers these would include Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, the three moralists mentioned in his letter of 1734 to the unnamed physician (see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1). Hume also shows, at 2.3.1.10, an acquaintance with Plato's *Republic*. Cicero, in his *Tusculan Disputations*, esp. bks. 3–4, focused on the passions, and at one point provided a brief history of philosophical accounts of them. It was, he said, Pythagoras and Plato who first divided the soul into two parts, one of which partakes of immortal reason. The other part, devoid of reason, is the locus of the passions. The Stoics, Cicero added, took each passion to be not a simple disorder, but a disease (*pathos*), 'an agitation of the soul alien from right reason and contrary to nature' (4.6.11). Seneca's Stoic view of the passions may be found throughout his prose works, but 'On Anger' and 'On Benefits' in his *Moral Essays*, and 'On the Diseases of the Soul' and 'On Self-Control' in his *Moral Epistles*, are of special importance. Plutarch's fundamentally Platonic perspective on the passions is represented by such essays as 'On the Control of Anger', 'On Tranquillity of Mind', 'Whether the Affections of the Soul are Worse than those of the Body', and 'On Envy and Hate' (see *Moralia*, 6, 7).

Among early modern philosophers whose work Hume mentions, Descartes's *Passions of the Soul* and Hutcheson's *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*, as their titles show, obviously bear on the subject of *Treatise* 2. But so too do at least substantial portions of works by other authors mentioned in the *Treatise*: *Leviathan* by Hobbes (esp. 1.6); *Moral Reflections and Maxims* of La Rochefoucauld; *Search after Truth* by Malebranche (bk. 5, 'The Passions'); *Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet* by Bayle (esp. letters 8–9); and *Sensus Communis* (esp. 3.2–3) and *Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit* (esp. 2.1.2–3) by Shaftesbury. Still other early modern works available to Hume and whose titles show them to be on the passions include Vives, *Passions of the Soul*; Wright, *Passions of the Minde*; Coëffeteau, *A Table of Humane Passions*; and Reynolds, *Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man*; La Chambre, *Characters of the Passions*; Senault, *Use of the Passions*; Le Grand, *Man without Passion*; Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions*; Aylofffe, *Government of the Passions according to the Rules of Reason and Religion*; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd*; and a work that illustrates individual passions, Le Brun, *Conference... upon Expression, General and Particular*. There were, in addition, many works whose title-pages make no mention of the fact that they include significant discussions of the passions. Among well-known works of this sort is Spinoza's *Ethics* (esp. pts. 3–4). Among the virtually forgotten is A. Forbes's *Essays Moral and Philosophical*, where Hume could have read: 'Numberless Observations might be made on the Passions, each whereof would require a Book, if one was to consider their Rise, their Progress, their Decay, their Extinction, their Rising again, their giving way to other Passions quite opposite, their

Combinations, their Force, their Subtilty, their Enchantment, &c. All which are but the different turnings of Human Nature' ('A View of the Human Faculties', 50). Chambers provides a relatively lengthy discussion of opinions on the subject (*Cyclopædia*, 'Passion', 'Passions'); see also Cheyne, *Essay of Health* 6.

The works mentioned address the passions in a variety of ways, typically characterizing them in a general fashion: as affects complementing related actions; as emotions or feelings, or as distinct from emotions; as unnatural and inherently evil features of the soul (as rebellious desires or destructive impulses functioning as the cause of disorder and evil) to be controlled or repressed by reason or as diseases to be cured; as natural and inherently beneficial features of the soul (as desires and impulses providing guidance essential to the preservation and well-being of individuals and society) that make up for the weakness and passivity of reason; as a kind of natural phenomenon, perhaps even essentially physical, to be classified, examined, and explained as are other natural phenomena. For background and bibliographical guidance, see Fiering, *Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard*; Fisher, *Vehement Passions*; James, *Passion and Action*, esp. 4–14, 295–8; Levi, *French Moralists*, esp. 7–39, 338–44.

2.1 *Of pride and humility*

2.1.1 *Division of the subject*

2.1.1.1 n. 54 (181) **Book 1. Part 1. Sect. 2]** See also *Abs.* 5–7.

181.6–7 **animal spirits]** On animal spirits, see ann. 44.28.

181.11 **passions, and other emotions resembling them]** Malebranche, who offers a physiological account of the passions, first distinguished between a passion, characterized as a flow of bodily spirits, and the 'sensible emotion of the soul' that 'always accompanies this particular movement of the spirits', then went on to suggest that by the word *passion* several things are meant: 'the perception of a thing's relation to us, the soul's sensation and emotion, the disturbance in the brain and the motion in the spirits, a new sensation and a new emotion in the soul, and finally the agreeable sensation always accompanying the passions and making each of them pleasant—all these things are meant' (*Search* 5.3, 10 [349, 395]). In contrast, Descartes appears not to distinguish between passion and emotion; see *Passions of the Soul* 1.27–8. Bailey defines 'emotion' as 'vehemence of passion' (*Dictionary Britannicum*, 'Emotion').

2.1.1.2 181.15–17 **examination...wou'd lead...into...anatomy and natural philosophy]** Malebranche and Hutcheson had also, in different ways, limited their enquiries into the causes of the passions. The former said: 'In order to give a detailed explanation and proof of all the things we have just said it would first be necessary to provide a general survey of physics and then a very precise account of the human body... if I were to push this matter any further I would soon be led away from my present topic; for here it is enough that I should give a rough and general idea of the



passions' (*Search* 3.5 [355]). Hutcheson said: 'Let Physicians or Anatomists explain the several Motions in the *Fluids* or *Solids* of the Body, which accompany any Passion... 'Tis only to our Purpose in general to observe "that probably certain *Motions* in the Body do accompany every Passion by a fixed Law of Nature"' (*Essay* 1.2.7 [56]). In contrast to these authors, Burton makes a substantial 'Digression' into the anatomy of the body before turning to melancholy (*Anatomy of Melancholy* 1.1.2.1–4). See also ann. 11.16.

- 2.1.1.3 181.18–19 **arising either from the original impressions, or from their ideas]** See ¶4, where passions distinguished in this way are called, respectively, *direct* and *indirect*.

181.25–182.2 **reflective impressions... the calm and the violent... commonly distinguish'd]** A search of the text of the *OED* shows that the phrase 'violent passion[s]' was used widely in the non-philosophical literature of the early modern period (see, e.g., entries for 'abater', 'concession', 'decade', 'mad', 'miscall', 'moral' [adj. 7.a], 'unbeseeming', 'unthinking'). In contrast, the phrase 'calm passion[s]' is not found in the entire text of the *OED*; but the phrase is found in a poem, 'Life Made Agreeable', published by Henry Grove in 1729. Among philosophical works, Hutcheson in the third and later editions of his *Inquiry* wrote of '*calm Affections*', including '*calm Self-Love*' and '*Calm Goodwill*' (see 2.3.9–10). He mentions '*violent Passion[s]*' and the '*violent selfish Passions*' in both earlier and later editions of the *Inquiry* (see 2.6.3 of editions 2–4). Others making what seems to be a similar distinction, but in different terms, include the neo-Stoic Du Vair, who said that the passions deriving from the irascible part of our nature are 'more powerfull and more difficult to tame' than those derived from the concupisibile part (*Morall Philosophy of the Stoicks*, 20); Descartes, who contrasted lesser passions with stronger or more violent ones, but did not use the term *calm* (*Passions of the Soul* 1.46, 2.85); Malebranche, who distinguished between calm, general desires or 'natural inclinations' and 'violent passions' (a distinction repeated with approval by Hutcheson at *Essay* 1.2.2), and between the 'quieter passions' and the noisier ones (*Search* 5.2, 7 [345, 378–9]); Butler, who, apparently following Malebranche, contrasted 'cool or settled' general desire with 'passionate or sensual' passions (*Three Sermons*, Preface §29). Chambers provided a digest of Malebranche's account of the passions; see *Cyclopaedia*, 'Passion'. See also Charron, *Of Wisdom* 2.1; La Rochefoucauld, *Moral Reflections and Maxims* 266, quoted ann. 268.37; Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* 2.7, 4.4; Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 5.12 [209]; Shaftesbury, *Inquiry* 2.1.3; *Spectator* 121 (cf. ann. 212.6). In contrast to these authors, Le Grand maintained that all passions are 'nothing else but a violent motion of the Soul against Reason' (*Man without Passion*, 70).

182.4–5 **having said all I thought necessary concerning our ideas]** The subject of Book 1 of the *Treatise* was 'a particular account of ideas' (1.1.2.1).

- 2.1.1.5 182.7–8 **passions... a division of them into direct and indirect]** The direct passions are the subject of 2.3.9; two indirect passions, pride and humility, are the subjects of 2.1.2–12; love and hatred and several mixed passions that derive from them (e.g., compassion, malice, and envy) are the subjects of 2.2. See also *DP* 2.1.

182.12–14 **pride, humility, ambition, vanity...hope, fear, despair and security]** Although the choice of names may vary, Hume's inventory of the passions includes none not found in earlier discussions of the subject. See, e.g., Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.2–11; Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 4.7–10; Vives, *Passions of the Soul*, Contents; Wright, *Passions of the Minde* 1.6; Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 2.51–67; Hobbes, *Leviathan* 1.6. ¶¶13–48; Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* 5; Malebranche, *Search* 5.7, 10 [373–84, 394–8]; Locke, *Essay* 2.20.3–14, 2.21.39; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 4–12.

2.1.2 *Of pride and humility; their objects and causes*

2.1.2.1 182.16–17 **PRIDE AND HUMILITY BEING SIMPLE AND UNIFORM... 'TIS IMPOSSIBLE WE CAN... GIVE A JUST DEFINITION]** Hume's view of the indefinability of simple passions resembles that of Locke regarding simple ideas: 'The *Names of simple Ideas are not capable of any definitions*', because 'the several Terms of a Definition, signifying several *Ideas*... can all together by no means represent an *Idea*, which has no Composition at all' (*Essay* 3.4.4, 7). Locke's view of indefinability is repeated by such popularizers as Brightland, *Grammar of the English Tongue*, 196; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Definition'.

182.20–2 **pride and humility... every one... will be able to form a just idea of them]** Pride and humility were widely discussed in the early modern philosophical literature on the passions, where they were commonly treated as an antithetical pair. There was not, however, widespread agreement about the meaning of the terms or even about which terms to use. Descartes, for example, treated pride and humility as subspecies of self-esteem and self-contempt (*Passions of the Soul* 2.54, 3.150–2). Hobbes treated pride as a subspecies of 'Glory, or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind', saying that 'this passion, by them whom it displeaseth, is called pride: by them whom it pleaseth, it is termed a just valuation of himself'; humility he treated in a similar way (*Elements of Law* 9.1–2). See also Vives, *Passions of the Soul* 24; Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* 5.9–10; Spinoza, *Ethics* 3, 'Definitions of the Affects', 26, 28–9; H. More, *Account of Virtue* 1.8.4–5 [56–7].

2.1.2.2 182.25–6 **pride and humility... have yet the same OBJECT... self]** Descartes distinguished between two kinds of self-esteem, but took the self to be the object of both kinds; see *Passions of the Soul* 3.204.

2.1.2.3 182.37–183.3 **passions are directly contrary... remainder only... continues to operate upon the mind]** For more on contrary passions, see 2.3.9.10–17. Compare the account of conflicting beliefs at 1.3.11.13, 1.3.12.19, 1.3.13.20, 2.3.1.12; ann. 89.36.

2.1.2.4 183.10–11 **distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions]** Compare *DP* 2.3.

183.16–17 **The first idea... is that of the cause... This excites the passion]** Hume's description of the passions as the immediate effect of impressions and ideas

and the principles of association contrasts with accounts, offered by several of his early modern predecessors, explaining them as the effects of physiological factors (most notably the animal spirits). Descartes defined the passions 'as those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer particularly to it, and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the [animal] spirits' (*Passions of the Soul* 1.27), while Malebranche said: 'I call *passions* all the emotions that naturally affect the soul upon occasion of extraordinary motion in the animal spirits' (*Search* 5.1 [337]). See also Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 2; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Passion'. On the other hand, according to Cicero, the Stoics supposed that passions are unnatural 'disorders of the soul' (*pathos*), agitations of that part of the soul that is alien to 'right reason and contrary to nature', and explicitly said that these 'disorders are... due to judgment and belief' (*Tusculan Disputations* 4.5.9–4.7.14). Le Grand in his neo-Stoic phase agreed, saying 'that sense and opinion are the causes' of the passions (*Man without Passion*, 69). Ayloffe, highly critical of the Stoic view of the passions, offered another variation on this causal story: a passion is 'a motion of the sensitive Appetite, occasioned by imagination of a real or an apparent good, or evil' (*Government of the Passions*, 13). See also pp. 820–1 above.

- 2.1.2.5 183.31–3 **Our country, family, children, relations... cause either of pride or of humility**] Watts had made a similar point in similar language: 'We have so much of *Pride, Vanity, and Self-love* in us by Nature, that we take all Occasions to borrow from every Thing that has any Relation to us, some fine Plumes to dress ourselves in... We value ourselves for our Country or Nation, for our native Town, for our Ancestors or Family, if any Thing excellent or honourable have been ever reported concerning them' (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 6 [28]). See also 2.2.4.2.

2.1.3 *Whence these objects and causes are deriv'd*

- 2.1.3.4 184.29–30 **in all nations and ages, the same objects still give rise to pride and humility**] Dubos said his conclusions rested on the assumption 'that men of all ages and countries resemble one another with respect to the heart' (*Critical Reflections* 2.34 [2: 356–7]). For a discussion of Hume's use of Dubos, see P. Jones, *Hume's Sentiments*, 93–118.
- 2.1.3.5 184.37–8 **causes of pride and humility... not original**] Malebranche had also argued that the 'passions should not be listed... according to their objects, which are infinite, but only according to the principal relations they can have with us', and that the 'passions... should not be multiplied according to the different objects causing them' (*Search* 5.7, 9 [374, 391]). Compare Hume's discussion of property at *EPM* 3.40–6.
- 2.1.3.7 185.26 **that maxim, that nature does nothing in vain**] Boyle, arguing that the best way 'to investigate the commonly received opinion of nature' is to consider what '*axioms* do pass as current about her', cited Aristotle: '*Natura nihil facit frustra*' [Nature does nothing in vain] ('Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion

of Nature', 182; cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens* 2.11). This axiom, in varying guises, was a commonplace among early modern authors. See Malebranche, *Elucidations* 8 [589]; Newton, *Principia* 3, rule 1, *Opticks* 3.1 qu. 31 [400–2]; J. Keill, *Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 8, axiom 5; Cheyne, *English Malady* 1.8.5; Hume, 'Immortality of the Soul' 43; *DNR* 12.2.

185.26–8 **intricate systems of the heavens ... more simple and natural]** The Ptolemaic astronomy, favoured in Europe prior to the acceptance of the Copernican alternative, had explained the apparent movement of the sun and five planets, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, by means of a set of major and minor epicycles. Initially, the heliocentric view, first formulated in modern times by Copernicus in 1543, also relied on epicycles, but by Hume's time could aptly be described as simpler, and in that sense more natural. For further details, see Kuhn, *Copernican Revolution*, ch. 2. Hume comments further on the Copernican system at *DNR* 2.25–8; see also *HE* Appx. 4 [5: 153].

185.28–9 **invent without scruple a new principle to every new phenomenon]** La Chambre may be an example of the kind of approach targeted. He suggested 'that since in every Passion the appetite hath an emotion and a particular end, the means it useth ought also to be particular; and that the motion of the spirits must be conformable to the intention it hath, and to the agitation it gives it self: and therefore that that is done in one passion, is different from those [things] which are done in others...although to speak Truth, our spirit is not clear-sighted enough to discern exactly all these differences' (*Characters of the Passions*, 15–16). In contrast, Descartes suggested that 'very different passions agree in that they partake of love', and, moreover, that there is no need 'to distinguish as many kinds of love as there are different objects of love' (*Passions of the Soul* 2.82). Malebranche supposed that with wide experience and careful study of the passions, 'we perhaps shall have less difficulty in guessing most of [men's] actions than astronomers do in predicting eclipses', and then went on to list the seven things that 'can be distinguished in each of our passions' (*Search* 5.2, 3 [345, 347]; *Search* 5.3 is also quoted in part in ann. 181.11). See also Reynolds, *Treatise of the Passions*, 41. On not multiplying causes unnecessarily, see also 1.3.15.6, 3.3.1.10; *DNR* 5.9.

2.1.4 *Of the relations of impressions and ideas*

2.1.4.2–5 185.39–187.4 **In order to this...lend each other]** These four paragraphs (2.1.4.2–5), revised and shortened, make up *DP* 2.6–9; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

2.1.4.2 186.1 **association of ideas ... often observ'd and explain'd]** See esp. 1.1.4; also 1.3.6.12–15, 1.3.9.2; *Abs.* 35. That an association of ideas has a role in the formation of some 'Sympathies and Antipathies' had been suggested by Locke (*Essay* 2.33.7). Gay explicitly suggested that association has a role in the formation of the passions (*Dissertation*, pp. xiv, xxxii). These earlier philosophers appear only to have observed what Hutcheson called 'the casual Conjunctions of Ideas' (*Inquiry* 1.6.3), thus

accounting for Hume's claim that, while the association of ideas has a 'mighty influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions', this influence is not typically 'much insisted on by philosophers'.

- 2.1.4.3 186.11–13 **Grief and disappointment give rise to anger...till the whole circle be completed]** 'There is in the Heart of Man a perpetual Succession of Passions, insomuch, that the ruin of one is almost always the rise of another' (La Rochefoucauld, *Moral Reflections and Maxims* 10). See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Passions' [761b].

186.16–18 **Human nature is too inconstant... Changeableness is essential to it]** The changeableness of individual humans was a common topic of essayists, philosophers, and poets. Montaigne said that 'there is as much difference between us and ourselves as between us and others', and then cited Seneca saying it is '*a great thing to play the part of one single man*' ('Of the inconsistency of our actions', in *Complete Essays*, 244; cf. Seneca, *Moral Epistles* 120.22); Malebranche, that 'Man never remains the same for very long' (*Search* 2.1.1.3 [90]). See also Spinoza, *Ethics* 4 p33; Dryden, *Plutarch's Lives*, 281–2; Saint-Evremond, *Works*, 1: 164, 320; Addison, *Spectator* 162; Budgell, *Spectator* 564; Huet, *Philosophical Treatise* 1.5 [47]; Voltaire, *Letters concerning the English Nation* 25.4; and Hume, *THN* 2.2.2.22, 2.3.1.11, 2.3.3.10, 2.3.8.13; 'The Platonist' 1; 'The Sceptic' 3; *EHU* 8.15; 'Remarkable Customs' 8; *DNR* 4.8.

- 2.1.4.4 186.26–8 **man, who, by any injury... is apt to find a hundred subjects of discontent]** Gay noted that the 'Power of *Associ[a]tion* [is] so great... that it is able to transfer [our passions] to improper Objects, and such as are of a quite different Nature from those to which our Reason had at first directed them' (*Dissertation*, p. xxxi). See also Locke, *Essay* 2.33.12.

- 2.1.4.5 186.35 **an elegant writer]** The elegant writer is Joseph Addison; the text quoted is from *Spectator* 412; see also *Editing the Texts*, Register B, entries 186.38–187.2. Hutcheson explicitly linked the reactions that Addison mentions with the '*Association of Ideas*', saying this 'is one great Cause of the apparent Diversity of Fancies in the *Sense of Beauty*... The *Beauty of Trees*, their *cool Shades*, and their *Aptness* to conceal from Observation, have made *Groves* and *Woods* the usual Retreat to those who love *Solitude*... And do not we find that we have so join'd the Ideas of these Dispositions of Mind with those external Objects, that they always recur to us along with them?... That often all the Circumstances of *Actions*, or *Places*, or *Dresses* of Persons, or *Voice*, or *Song*, which have occur'd at any time together, when we were strongly affected by any Passion, will be so connected that any one of these will make all the rest recur' (*Inquiry* 1.6.11 [83–4]).

2.1.5 *Of the influence of these relations on pride and humility*

- 2.1.5.1 187.15–16 **pride... humility a separate uneasiness]** Compare *DP* 2.13.

- 2.1.5.2 187.20–1 **virtue and vice]** For a fuller account of how virtue and vice give rise to pride and humility, see 2.1.7.

- 187.22–3 **beauty or deformity of our person, houses, equipage, or furniture]** Hutcheson observed that '*Dress, Retinue, Equipage, Furniture, Behaviour, and Diversions* are made Matters of considerable Importance', i.e. matters of honour and vanity, by certain ideas that are customarily associated with them (*Essay* 1.1.2 [10]). For Hume's fuller account of the manner in which beauty and deformity give rise to pride and humility, see 2.1.8.
- 187.24–5 **same qualities... transferr'd to subjects... no relation, influence not... these affections]** For experiments said to support this claim, see 2.2.2.5–10.
- 2.1.5.3 187.33–4 **self, or that individual person, of whose... sentiments each of us is intimately conscious]** According to Malebranche's account of the passions, we have an 'inner sensation... of ourselves when we are moved by some passion' (*Search* 5.10 [397]).
- 2.1.5.4 187.39–41 **second quality... in these passions... sensations, or... peculiar emotions they excite]** Malebranche also claimed that 'we can note in each of our passions... the sensation accompanying them—a sensation of love, aversion, desire, joy, or sadness. These sensations always differ from one passion to another' (*Search* 5.3 [348]).
- 2.1.5.11 190.4–5 **already explain'd... have observ'd]** See 1.3.6–8, esp. 1.3.7.5–7, 1.3.8.2–5.
- 2.1.6 *Limitations of this system*
- 2.1.6.2 n. 55 (190) **Part 2. Sect. 4]** See 2.2.4.10–13; see also 2.2.8.
- 2.1.6.4 191.5 **peculiar to ourselves]** Compare *DP* 2.43.
- 191.7 **to explain afterwards]** See 2.3.5; cf. 3.2.3.4.
- 191.7–8 **every thing... often presented... loses its value in our eyes]** The association of novelty with admiration had been noted by Montaigne, who said: 'It is a marvellous testimony of the weakness of our judgment that it recommends things for their rarity or novelty, or even for their difficulty, even if they are neither good nor useful' ('Of vain subtleties', in *Complete Essays*, 226). See also Cicero, *De divinatione* 2.22.49; Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* 5.3; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 4; and Hume, *THN* 2.3.5.2, 'British Government' 4, 'The Sceptic' 33.
- 2.1.6.6 191.40–1 **explain afterwards]** See esp. 2.1.11.1–2, 9–19.
- 2.1.6.7 191.43–192.7 **what is casual... our existence]** A revised version of these eight lines makes up *DP* 2.42; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.1.6.8 192.11–35 **general rules... found to do]** A revised and shortened version of these twenty-four lines make up *DP* 2.46–7; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

192.16 **principles, that explain'd the influence of general rules]** See 1.3.13.7–13.

- 2.1.6.9 192.22–3 **person full-grown . . . on a sudden transported into our world]** A specific such person, Adam, is posited at *Abs.* 11–14. See also ann. 410.17; *EHU* 4.6, 5.3; *DP* 2.47; *NHR* 1.6; *DNR* 10.15; 11.2, 4.

192.33 **shall hereafter ascribe]** See, e.g., 2.1.10.9, 2.2.5.6–7.

- 2.1.6.10 192.37–8 **persons, who are proudest . . . are not always the happiest]** Mandeville observed: 'Was impartial Reason to be Judge between real Good and real Evil, and a Catalogue made accordingly of the several Delights and Vexations differently to be met with in both Stations, I question whether the Condition of Kings would be at all preferable to that of Peasants' (*Essay on Charity*, 316).

2.1.7 *Of vice and virtue*

- 2.1.7.2 193.8–12 **To begin with VICE . . . education]** A revised version of this sentence is found in *DP* 2.14.

193.10–12 **controversy . . . Whether these moral distinctions be founded on natural and original principles, or arise from interest and education]** Concerning the 'Notions advanced of moral Good and Evil' and of the 'Senses, Instincts, or Affections' that could account for these, Hutcheson said: 'There are two Opinions on this Subject entirely opposite: The one that of the old *Epicureans* . . . which is revived by *Hobbes*, and followed by many better Writers', including certain '*Christian Moralists*'. This opinion has it "'That all the Desires of the *human Mind*, nay of all *thinking Natures*, are reducible to *Self-Love*, or *Desire of private Happiness*". The 'other Opinion' is "'That we have not only *Self-Love*, but *benevolent Affections* also toward others . . . That we have a *moral Sense* or Determination of our Mind, to *approve every kind Affection* either in ourselves or others . . ." These two Opinions seem both intelligible, each consistent with itself. The former seems not to represent human Nature as it is; the other seems to do it' (*Essay 2*, Intro. [207–11]; in later editions Hutcheson also named La Rochefoucauld as a modern Epicurean).

The controversy to which Hume alludes was complex. Those involved typically claimed that moral distinctions derive from one or more of the following: the eternal and unchangeable principles of reason; the decrees of the Deity or of lawmakers; specifiable features of human nature; custom or convention. Hutcheson himself contributed to the controversy with his *Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* and his *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With Illustrations on the Moral Sense* (the work cited in the previous paragraph), as well as by shorter works. Other early eighteenth-century contributors include Shaftesbury, *An Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit*; S. Clarke, *A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion*; Wollaston, *The Religion of Nature Delineated*; Mandeville, *An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*; W. Law, *Remarks upon . . . The Fable of the Bees*; G. Burnet (the Younger), *Letters . . . concerning the True Foundation*

of *Virtue*; Butler, *Three Sermons* and 'Of the Nature of Virtue'; J. Clarke, *The Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice*; A. Campbell, *An Enquiry into the Original of Moral Virtue*; Balguy, *The Foundation of Moral Goodness*; Gay, *Dissertation concerning the Fundamental Principle and Immediate Criterion of Virtue*; Mole, *The Foundation of Moral Virtue Consider'd* and *The Foundation of Moral Virtue Re-consider'd*; Forster, *Two Essays: the One on... the Foundation of Morality*.

Those who had earlier contributed to the controversy include Montaigne, 'Apology for Raymond Sebond'; Charron, *Of Wisdom*; Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace*, 'Preliminary Discourse'; Hobbes, *De Cive*, *The Elements of Law*, and *Leviathan*; La Rochefoucauld, *Moral Reflections and Maxims*; Pufendorf, *Of the Law of Nature and Nations*; Cumberland, *A Treatise of the Laws of Nature*; Esprit, *Discourses on the Deceitfulness of Humane Virtues*; Malebranche, *A Treatise of Morality*; Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*; Cudworth, *A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*; Berkeley, *Alciphron*. The debate was continued after the publication of the *Treatise* by Hume's own *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* (1751); Chubb's *An Enquiry into the Ground and Foundation of Morality* (1740); Price's *A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals* (1758); and Clap's *An Essay on the Nature and Foundation of Moral Virtue and Obligation* (1765).

Eighteenth-century accounts of the controversy were provided by Barbeyrac, *An Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality*, and Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* 7.2–3; further relevant titles are listed in Johnson, *Quæstiones philosophicæ*, ch. 11.1.2–22; and Grove, *A System of Moral Philosophy* 2.2.1–6. For recent discussions of the controversy, see M. Kuehn and D. F. Norton, 'The Foundations of Morality Debate'; Rivers, *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment*, 2: 199–205. For more general background, see N. Fiering, *Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard and Jonathan Edward's Moral Thought and Its British Context*; J. B. Schneewind, *The Invention of Autonomy*.

193.12–13 **examination... I reserve for the following book**] As promised, Hume discusses the foundation of morals throughout Book 3; see esp. 3.1.1–2; 3.2.1–2, 5–7; 3.3.1. See also anns. 294.7; 298.17; 302.title; 311.26; 313.3; 316.27; 321.6, 16, 45; and, for Hume's later discussions, *LG* 36–9; *EPM* 1–2, 6.4–5, Appx. 1–3, *A Dialogue*.

- 2.1.7.3 193.19–21 **Every passion... to our advantage... gives a delight... thence the approbation**] One likely object of Hume's reference to this 'hypothesis' is Hobbes, who was notorious for having said: 'Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like manner that which displeaseth him evil', and that 'the habit of doing according to these and other laws of nature that tend to our preservation, is that we call VIRTUE; and the habit of doing the contrary, VICE' (*Elements of Law* 1.17.14; cf. 1.7.1; *Leviathan* 1.6.¶7). Several of those mentioned in ann. 193.10 (La Rochefoucauld, Esprit, Mandeville, J. Clarke, and Campbell) argued that moral distinctions derive ultimately from self-interest—from consideration of what is, as Hume puts it, to 'our advantage or prejudice'.



- 2.1.7.5 193.40–1 **those, who maintain that morality is something real, essential, and founded on nature]** Grotius took issue with those ancient and modern writers who claimed that 'Right' is 'nothing but an empty Name'. As, he said, 'it would be a vain Undertaking to treat of Right, if there is really no such thing; it will be necessary, in order to shew the Usefulness of our Work, and to establish it on solid Foundations, to confute here in a few Words so dangerous an Error' (*Rights of War and Peace*, 'Preliminary Discourse' 3, 5). Cudworth undertook to demonstrate, against both ancient and modern sceptics, that the differences between '*Moral Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Honest and Dishonest*' are absolute and immutable, and that they derive, at least in part, from an 'inward, and vital Principle, in intellectual Beings... whereby they have a natural Determination in them to do some Things, and to avoid others' (*Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* 1.2.1, 4.6.4). Shaftesbury, 'being, in respect to VIRTUE... a Realist', criticized both Hobbes and Locke for their moral scepticism, and undertook to show that virtue is 'really something *in it-self*, and in the nature of Things: not arbitrary... not... dependent on *Custom, Fancy, or Will*, not even the *Supreme Will* it-self' (*Moralists* 2.3 [267]). Among those whose works are mentioned in ann. 193.10 and who supposed morality to be something real and well-founded are Malebranche, S. Clarke, Wollaston, Hutcheson, Butler, G. Burnet (the Younger), J. Clarke, Campbell, Balguy, Mole, and Forster. There was substantial disagreement, however, regarding the nature of this foundation.
- 2.1.7.5–7 193.42–194.35 **The most probable hypothesis... arises from them]** These three paragraphs (2.1.7.5–7), revised and shortened, make up part of *DP* 2.14 and 2.15–16; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.1.7.5 193.42–3 **most probable hypothesis... to explain the distinction betwixt vice and virtue]** Hutcheson's moral sense theory is one of two likely references of this allusion to theories that trace the origin of moral distinctions to distinctive feelings of pain or pleasure that arise as a consequence of the 'primary constitution' of human nature. Hutcheson hoped that his *Inquiry* (a work found in the Hume Library) would help 'to prove what we call the *Reality of Virtue*', and argued that humans have a 'Moral Sense *by which we perceive Virtue and Vice, and approve or disapprove them in others*'. This sense he described as '*a Determination of our Minds to receive amiable or disagreeable Ideas of Actions, when they occur to our Observation, antecedent to any Opinions of Advantage or Loss to redound to our selves from them*' (*Inquiry*, Preface [xi], 2.1 title [117], 2.1.8 [135]). Furthermore, because we have this sense, 'as soon as any Action is represented to us as flowing from *Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, a Study of the good of others*... we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author... every Action represented as flowing from *Hatred, Delight in the Misery of others, or Ingratitude*, raises Abhorrence and Aversion' (*Inquiry* 2.1.2 [121]). Hume later credited Hutcheson with reviving this 'ancient' view (see *LG* 37). Shaftesbury, whose *Characteristicks* Hume purchased in 1726, made similar claims (see *Inquiry* 1.2–3). R. S. Crane noted that such a view was

not uncommon in the second half of the seventeenth century, and mentions Nathaniel Culverwel (*Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature*), Isaac Barrow's collected sermons, and John Hartcliffe (*Treatise of Moral and Intellectual Virtues*); see Crane, 'Review of W. Alderman, "Shaftesbury and the Doctrine of Moral Sense"':

- 2.1.7.7 194.20 **according to the vulgar systems of ethicks]** Which ethical 'systems' Hume took to be the vulgar or common ones is not clear. At 3.1.1.27 he uses a similar phrase, 'vulgar systems of morality', to refer to those theories that implicitly claim to deduce 'some new relation or affirmation', one including an 'ought, or ought not', from 'the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*'. For suggestions regarding the 'systems' there alluded to, see ann. 302.7. Here Hume may refer to such 'systems' of Christian ethics as that found in Allestree's *The Whole Duty of Man*, a popular moral guidebook which he had read and taken seriously in his youth (see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1). Allestree listed and ranked the kinds of thing in which pride is, always mistakenly, taken: 'It is a foolish thing for a man to be proud of the *endowments* of his *mind*: as wit, memory, judgment, prudence...of [his] goodness, virtue, justice, temperance, integrity...pride of *bodily endowments* is yet more foolish and vain...[and even] more vain and foolish is that pride...upon things... adventitious or foreign, or in the mere power of other men, as pride of wealth, of honour, of applause, of successes in actions, of titles, gay clothes, many attendants, great equipage, precedency... there is scarce a man... in the world, who hath not some elation of mind, upon the account of these and the like petty, vain, inconsiderable advantages' ('Of Humility: Its Opposite Vices', *Whole Duty of Man* [126–8]).

194.24–5 **No one has ever been able to tell what *wit* is]** Addison complained that 'nothing is so much admired and so little understood as Wit', and that those who mention the topic provide only 'little short Reflections... without entering into the Bottom of the Matter', but went on to say that Locke had given 'the best and most philosophical Account' of wit (*Spectator* 58, 62; cf. Locke, *Essay* 2.11.2). See also Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, 'Wit'; *EPM* 8.3.

194.27–8 **only by taste...nor are we possess of any other standard]** On the standard of taste, see *EPM* 1.9; 'Standard of Taste', esp. 23–8.

- 2.1.7.8 194.36–9 **some...accustom'd to...schools and pulpit...surpriz'd to hear...virtue as exciting pride]** The Bible provided ample grounds for the traditional denunciation of pride. For example: 'Every one that is proud in heart is an abomination to the Lord'; 'Pride goeth before destruction, and an haughty spirit before a fall' (Prov. 16: 5, 18; cf. Prov. 8: 13; Mark 7: 21–2; Jas. 4: 6). Hume's contemporary W. Law said that 'because an *humble state* of soul is the very state of Religion, because humility is the *life* and *soul* of piety, the *foundation* and *support* of every virtue and good work, I shall recommend humility to you... This virtue is so essential to the *right state* of our souls, that there is no pretending to a *reasonable* or *pious* life without

it'; and that 'not only the beauty of our persons, the gifts of fortune, our natural talents, and the distinctions of life; but even our *devotions* and *alms*, our *fastings* and *humiliations*, expose us to fresh and strong temptations of this evil spirit [pride]' (*Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* 16 [294–5]). See also Erasmus, 'Rules for Christian Life: Against Pride' [*Enchiridion*, 192]; Allestree, *Whole Duty of Man* (see ann. 194.20); Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 6, 18.

By the early eighteenth century, however, many had adopted a more positive view of pride. Steele concluded that there is 'what we may call a vertuous and laudable Pride' (*Spectator* 462); Hutcheson observed that 'sometimes *Pride* denotes Joy upon any apprehended *Right* or *Claim* to Honour', but added that 'generally it is taken in a bad Sense, when one claims that to which he has no Right' (*Essay* 1.3.3). See also 3.3.2.8; 'Dignity or Meanness' 11; *EPM* 7.10.

2.1.8 *Of beauty and deformity*

- 2.1.8.1 195.6–8 **body ... those philosophers, who regard it as something external, it must still be ... near enough connected**] Hume may allude to Descartes here, for, notwithstanding his well-known claim that the mind and body are distinct, Descartes hypothesized that 'emotions or passions of the soul' are 'confused thoughts, which the mind ... experiences as a result of something happening to the body with which it is closely conjoined' (*Principles of Philosophy* 4.190). In contrast, Malebranche, explaining the passions, insisted that were 'philosophers ... to judge the matter by the light of reason and its evidence, they would soon realize that the mind and the body are two entirely contrary kinds of beings, that the mind cannot by itself join itself to the body', and hence 'that only through the union it has with God is the soul hurt when the body is struck' (*Search* 5.5 [366]; cf. 1.10.1 [49], 3.2.10 [253]). For additional claims or theories maintaining that, while the soul and body are distinct, they are none the less closely related, see, among authors Hume read or is likely to have read, Seneca, 'On Benefits' 3.20.1; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Averroës' [E], 'Ovid' [H]; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 240–1]. See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Metempsychosis'.

195.12–17 **beauty of all kinds ... perfect transition**] A revised version of these lines make up *DP* 2.17; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

- 2.1.8.2 195.24–8 **all the hypotheses ... resolve into this, that beauty ... is fitted to give a pleasure**] Those resolving beauty into pleasure include Locke, who said that beauty is a complex idea, 'consisting of a certain composition of Colour and Figure, causing delight in the Beholder' (*Essay* 2.12.5); and Hutcheson, who said that 'Beauty has always relation to the *Sense* of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally the Objects which occur to us, are *beautiful*, we mean that such Objects are agreeable to the *Sense* of Men' (*Inquiry* 1.2.1). See also Addison, *Spectator* 412; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Deformity'. Alternative accounts of beauty, deriving from Diogenes Laertius, are found in *Spectator* 144, by Steele. See also 'The Sceptic' 11–17.

195.32–4 **a great part of the beauty ... deriv'd from the idea of convenience and utility]** Berkeley emphasized the connection between beauty and utility by pointing out that 'architects judge a door to be of a beautiful proportion, when its height is double of the breadth. But if you should invert a well-proportioned door, making its breadth become the height, and its height the breadth, the figure would still be the same, but without that beauty in one situation, which it had in another. What can be the cause of this, but that [the inverted door] would not yield a convenient entrance to creatures of a human figure?' Berkeley also said that the 'subordinate relative nature of beauty' (i.e. that it resolves into utility) is illustrated in the 'beauties of a horse' (*Alciphron* 3.9). See also Plato, *Gorgias* 474D; Quintilian, *Institutes* 8.3.10–11 (quoted in *THN* n. 83); Shaftesbury, *Miscellaneous Reflections* 3.2 [180–1]. Hutcheson, referring to Berkeley, objected that 'some Use perceived or imagined' is not a sufficient basis for beauty ('Additions and Corrections', *Inquiry*, 4th edn. [305]).

195.38–42 **rules of architecture...top of a pillar...more slender than its base]** The Roman architect Vitruvius advised that 'for the purpose of bearing the load, what is below ought to be stronger than what is above, and also, because we ought to imitate nature as seen in the case of things growing; for example, in round smooth-stemmed trees' (*On Architecture* 5.1.3). Perrault saw that following this rule would provide the sense of security of which Hume goes on to speak: 'To give Satisfaction in two Points that are the most important in Architecture; namely, Solidity or Strength, and the Appearance of Solidity, which ... makes a very principal Part in the Beauty of Buildings; all Architects have made their Columns lesser above than below, which is call'd the Diminution' (*Treatise of the Five Orders in Architecture* 1.8 [24]; Hume cites this work at *EPM* Appx. 1.15). See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Beauty'.

195.42 **wit, cannot be defin'd]** On the definition of wit, see 2.1.7.7; ann. 194.24.

2.1.8.2–3 196.4–9 **essence of beauty ... power of producing pleasure]** Compare *DP* 2.18.

2.1.8.3 196.12 **natural and moral beauty]** See also *EPM* Appx. 1.13–15; cf. 3.1.2.4; ann.303.3.

196.13–14 **common effect supposes always a common cause]** Cf. rule 4 at 1.3.15.6.

196.18–19 **original difference ... cause of all their other differences]** Cf. rule 6 at 1.3.15.8.

2.1.8.5 196.32–6 **Concerning all other ... nothing else]** A revised version of these lines make up *DP* 2.19; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

2.1.8.6 196.40 **surprise is nothing but a pleasure arising from novelty]** Addison, in his well-known papers on the pleasures of the imagination, wrote: 'Every thing that is *new* or *uncommon* raises a Pleasure in the Imagination, because it fills the Soul with an

agreeable Surprise...and gives it an Idea of which it was not before possess' (*Spectator* 412; cf. 413). Trublet said that 'admiration springs from surprize, and surprize from novelty' ('Of the Effects of Habit', *Essays* 5 [95]). See also Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 2.70–8; Hobbes, *Elements of Law* 1.9.18; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 1.3.4. See also anns. 191.7, 277.4.

196.45–197.6 **we are vain... their vanity**] A revised version of these lines make up most of *DP* 2.20; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

2.1.8.7 197.8 **according to the known rules**] For Hume's version of these rules, see 1.3.15.3–10.

197.10–11 **double relations above-mention'd**] For Hume's initial discussion of double relations, see 2.1.5, esp. 5, 8–10.

2.1.8.8 197.24–5 **the second and fourth limitations, propos'd**] See 2.1.6.4, 7.

2.1.8.8–9 197.28–198.5 **as health and sickness... judgment of themselves**] A revised version of these lines make up *DP* 2.44–5; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

2.1.8.8 197.42–3 **custom of estimating every thing by comparison more than by its intrinsic worth and value**] Compare 2.2.8.2, 3.3.2.4.

2.1.8.9 198.2–3 **epilepsy; because it gives a horror to every one present**] Some of Hume's predecessors and contemporaries associated epilepsy with divine punishment or possession by evil spirits. Consequently, the convulsions associated with some forms of this illness produced aversion and fear in those who witnessed them. Hobbes said that 'epileptics' and others 'troubled with such diseases' were by some called '*demoniacs*' (*Leviathan* 3.34 ¶19). Chambers summarizes early eighteenth-century medical theories of the illness; see *Cyclopaedia*, 'Epilepsy'.

198.3 **the itch; because it is infectious**] The *itch* was the name for a disease (probably what is now known as *scabies*) caused by a mite which penetrates the skin and causes pustules that itch intensely. The pest could move from person to person, and thus was said to be 'infectious'. According to Chambers, microscopic examination of this mite showed it to be shaped like a tortoise, with six feet, a sharp head, and two little horns at the end of its snout (*Cyclopaedia*, 'Itch'). The same term was used to refer to venereal diseases, likewise infectious.

198.3 **king's-evil**] This disease, also known as *scrofula* or *struma*, is now classified as a tuberculosis of the lymphatic system and is thought to be genetically transmitted. The popular name, *king's-evil*, derived from the belief that a sovereign's touch could cure the sufferer. Evelyn reported that 'there was so greate & eager a concourse of people with their children, to be touch'd of the Evil, that 6 or 7: were crush'd to death by pressing at the *Chirurgions* doore for Tickets' (*Diary*, 28 March 1684). Queen Anne was the last monarch to touch for the evil, and touched, among others, Samuel

### Editors' Annotations

Johnson. Chambers discusses competing claims about the origin of this practice; see *Cyclopædia*, 'Evil'. The Physiological Library catalogue lists Quincy's edition of *Medicina Statica*, a work that included an essay on the king's-evil. See also *HE* 3 [1: 146].

198.5–6 **foregoing reasonings**] See, e.g., 2.1.6.6, 2.1.7.7.

198.7 **explain'd afterwards**] See 2.1.11, esp. ¶¶1–2 and 9–19.

#### 2.1.9 *Of external advantages and disadvantages*

2.1.9.1 198.8–23 **But tho' pride...easy and natural**] This paragraph (2.1.9.1), revised and shortened, makes up *DP* 2.21; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

198.12 **We found a vanity upon houses, gardens, equipages**] See also 2.1.9.7; anns. 183.31, 187.22.

198.18–19 **thing that neither belongs, nor is related to us, has no...influence on our vanity**] See 2.2.2.5–8 for experiments confirming and explaining this phenomenon.

2.1.9.6–13 200.5–202.5 **Men are vain...brother to brother**] These eight paragraphs, revised and shortened, make up *DP* 2.2.22–9; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

2.1.9.9 200.30–1 **qualities, which...produce pride...when discover'd in persons related to us**] For an experiment confirming and explaining this phenomenon, see 2.2.5.11–13.

2.1.9.11 200.42–4 **those, who boast of the antiquity of their families...uninterrupted proprietors**] Hume wrote of himself: 'I was of a good Family both by Father and Mother. My Father's Family is a Branch of the Earl of Home's, or Hume's; and my Ancestors had been Proprietors of the Estate, which my Brother possesses, for several Generations. My Mother was Daughter of Sir David Falconar, President of the College of Justice: The Title of Lord Halkerton came by Succession to her Brother' ('My Own Life', *Letters* 1: 1).

2.1.9.13 n. 56 (201) **Part 2. Sect. 2**] See 2.2.2.19–26.

201.40 **doctrine above-explain'd**] See 1.3.13.7–13, 2.1.6.8–9.

#### 2.1.10 *Of property and riches*

2.1.10.1 202.8–9 **come to treat of justice and the other moral virtues**] For Hume's account of justice, see 3.2.1–6; for his account of the other moral virtues, see 3.2.7–12 and 3.3.1–5.

202.9–11 **property...a relation betwixt a person and an object as permits him, but forbids any other, the free use and possession of it**] Pufendorf and Locke had also noted the exclusivity of property rights. The former said: '*Property or Dominion,*

is a Right, by which the very Substance, as it were, of a Thing, so belongs to one Person, that it doth not in Whole belong, after the same manner, to any other' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.1); the latter: 'Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his *Labour* with . . . and thereby makes it his *Property*. . . hath by this *labour* something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men' (*Two Treatises* 2.5.27). See also Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 7.2 [313–14]; Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.9.237; and *THN* 3.2.6.3, 7; *EPM* 3.35.

202.13–14 **property . . . species of causation**] Compare *DP* 30 n.3.

202.16–17 **justice, according to . . . certain philosophers . . . an artificial . . . virtue**] Hobbes and Pufendorf are likely among the philosophers alluded to here; see ann. 308.39. Hume also takes justice to be an artificial virtue; see 3.2.1–2, 6.

202.18 **natural conscience**] This term dates from at least the early seventeenth century (see *OED*, 'over' 9.b; 'snub'). It is also used by T. Burnet (see ann. 302.title); by Shaftesbury (*Inquiry* 2.2.1 [120]); and by Butler in his sermons on 'The Natural Supremacy of Conscience' (*Three Sermons*, sermon 2 §3).

202.25–6 **foregoing system**] See 2.1.5.5–10.

2.1.10.2 202.28–203.2 **Every thing belonging . . . here advanc'd**] This paragraph (2.1.10.2), revised and shortened, makes up *DP* 2.31; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

2.1.10.3 203.8–9 **Paper . . . riches . . . money**] For Hume's fuller account of these topics, see 'Of Money'.

2.1.10.4 203.15–17 **distinction . . . betwixt a power and the exercise of it . . . frivolous**] See 1.3.14.34, 2.2.5.7–9.

2.1.10.5 203.27 **scholastic doctrine of free-will**] For further discussion of this topic, see 2.3.1–2; ann. 262.12–13.

2.1.10.6 203.44 **foregoing book**] See esp. 1.3.6.

2.1.10.9 n. 57 **Part 3. Sect. 2**] See esp. 2.3.2.2.

2.1.10.12 206.2 **will appear afterwards**] See 2.2.8.7–20.

2.1.11 *Of the love of fame*

2.1.11.1 206.5–7 **Our reputation . . . name are considerations of vast weight and importance**] Humankind's deep-seated desire for praise or admiration was a recurring theme in the *Spectator* and elsewhere. Steele took for granted that 'the Love of Praise is implanted in our Bosoms as a strong Incentive to worthy Actions' (*Spectator* 38; cf. 224, 467). A. Campbell said that 'the Desire of *Esteem*, or of being regarded, is an Appetite that universally prevails over all Mankind' (*Enquiry* 1.3 [53]). See also *EPM* 9.10–11; Appx. 2.12.

206.7–8 **other causes of pride...little influence, when not seconded by the...sentiments of others]** Descartes in his discussion of pride remarked: 'seeing that we are esteemed highly by others is a reason for esteeming ourselves' (*Passions of the Soul* 3.204), while Hutcheson said: 'Every one is delighted with the Esteem of others' (*Inquiry* 2.5.7 [236–7]). See also *Spectator* 467; ann. 210.3.

2.1.11.1–2 206.10–13 **sympathy...inclinations and sentiments]** Compare *DP* 2.33.

2.1.11.2 206.11–12 **quality of human nature...propensity...to sympathize with others]** Claims that some form of sympathy or fellow-feeling is part of the human frame became commonplace in Restoration and early eighteenth-century Britain. Isaac Barrow, for example, argued that our reactions to the distresses of others, 'Even the stories of calamities, that in ages long since past have happened to persons, no-wise related to us, yea the fabulous reports of tragical events, do (even against the bent of our wills, and all resistance of reason) melt our hearts with compassion, and draw tears from our eyes: and thereby evidently signify that general sympathy, which naturally interceeds between all men, since we can neither see, nor hear of, nor imagine anothers grief without being afflicted our selves' (*Of the Love of God*, 276–7; we owe this reference to Crane, 'Suggestions toward a Genealogy of the "Man of Feeling"'). Shaftesbury praised Whichcote for saying: 'Whatsoever...some have said; *Man's Nature* is not so untoward a Thing (unless it be abused) but that there is a secret *Sympathy* in Human Nature, with Vertue and Honesty; which gives a Man an Interest even in bad Men' (see Whichcote, *Select Sermons*, Preface, p. [xii]). Among early eighteenth-century writers, Hughes said that, 'By a generous Sympathy in Nature, we feel ourselves disposed to mourn when any of our Fellow Creatures are afflicted' (*Spectator* 302). Watts called rejoicing about the good befalling others '*Sympathy of Joy*', and grieving about the evil befalling them, '*Pity and Sympathy of Sorrow*' (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 11; cf. 7 [37]). See also Vives, *Passions of the Soul* 7; Fiering, 'Irresistible Compassion'. Hume commented briefly on sympathy in correspondence with Adam Smith (see *Historical Account*, Sect. 9.7). See also *EPM* 5.18–46.

206.13 **receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments]** Malebranche observed that 'all men have some disposition to adopt the same manners and perform the same actions as those with whom they wish to live'. Explaining the 'Contagious Communications of Strong Imaginations', he noted the 'disposition of the brain all men have to imitate those with whom they converse, to form the same judgments they make, and to share the same passions by which they are moved' (*Search* 2.1.7.2 [113], 2.3.1.1 [161]). Trublet explained that 'We are mechanically disposed to receive an impression from sentiments with which others are affected; and this disposition is so strong in the generality of men, that it is almost an infallible method to persuade them of any thing... The bulk of mankind are not so much to be led right by good arguments, or seduced by sophistry, as they are carried away by strong and forcible impressions' ('Of the Natural', *Essays* 23 [328]). See also 'National Characters' 9.



206.20–1 **more probable...resemblance arises from sympathy, than...soil and climate]** Cicero, presenting Stoic views, expressed the contrary opinion: 'For it may be observed that the inhabitants of those countries in which the air is pure and rarefied have keener wits and greater powers of understanding than persons who live in a dense and heavy climate' (*De natura deorum* 2.16.42). Montaigne said that 'we feel palpably by experience that the form of our being depends on the air, the climate, and the soil where we are born—not only the complexion, the stature, the constitution and countenance, but also the faculties of the soul...so that just as fruits are born different, and animals, men too are born more or less bellicose, just, temperate, and docile...or rebellious, good or bad, according to the influence of the place where they are situated—and take on a new disposition if you change their place' ('Apology for Raymond Sebond', 433). Bodin, linking such physical factors as soil and climate to the four humours, provided one of the most detailed statements of the view that physical factors determine national character; see his *Method of the Easy Comprehension of History*, ch. 5. See also Hippocrates, *On Airs, Waters, Places*; Aristotle, *Politics* 7.7; Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 5.5.23; Bacon, *New Organon* 1.129; Pufendorf, *On the Duty of Man* 1.1.12; Temple, *Essay upon the Original and Nature of Government*, 45–6; Bellegarde, *Letters*, 16; Butler, *Three Sermons*, sermon 1 §10; Dubos, *Critical Reflections* 2.12–20 [2: 95–234]; Arbuthnot, *Essay Concerning the Effects of Air on Human Bodies*, ch. 6; Berkeley, *Alciphron* 2.17; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 13. For Malebranche's view, see the previous annotation; for Hume's expanded discussion of the subject, see 'Of National Characters'. See also 1.3.13.7–8; ann. 100.1. For further background, see Glacken, *Traces on the Rhodian Shore*.

206.25–7 **cheerful countenance infuses a sensible complacency...sorrowful one throws a sudden damp]** Hutcheson had made a similar suggestion: 'Observation of the Happiness of others is made the necessary Occasion of Pleasure, and their Misery the Occasion of Pain to the Observer,' and attributed such reactions to 'Sympathy' (*Essay* 1.1.3; cf. *Inquiry* 2.5.8). See also Malebranche, *Search* 5.3, 7 [348–9, 377]. Hume argued that there is 'a disagreeable Sympathy, as well as an agreeable' in a letter to Adam Smith; see *Letters*, 1: 312–13, quoted above, Historical Account, Sect. 9.7.

2.1.11.3 206.31–2 **any affection...infus'd by sympathy...first known...by those external signs]** Berkeley and Hughes made similar claims about our knowledge of the feelings of others: 'It is evident that when the mind perceives any idea, not immediately and of it self, it must be by the means of some other idea: Thus, for instance, the passions which are in the mind of another are of themselves to me invisible. I may nevertheless perceive them by sight, though not immediately, yet by means of the colours they produce in the countenance. We often see shame or fear in the looks of a man, by perceiving the changes of his countenance to red or pale' (Berkeley, *New Theory of Vision* 9; cf. 23); 'Nature her self has assigned, to every Emotion of the Soul, its peculiar Cast of the Countenance, Tone of Voice, and Manner of Gesture;

and the whole Person, all the Features of the Face and Tones of the Voice answer, like Strings upon musical Instruments, to the Impressions made on them by the Mind' (Hughes, *Spectator* 541, paraphrasing Cicero, *De oratore* 3.57.216–17; cf. *Spectator* 86). See also Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 3.5, 10, 11. For Hume's description of sympathy at work in a particular case, with the identifiable steps or stages by which a sentiment is communicated and a passion produced, see 2.2.5.14. See also Le Brun, *Conference . . . upon Expression, General and Particular*.

2.1.11.5 207.8–9 **nature has preserv'd a great resemblance among all human creatures]** See also *EHU* 8.7–12; 'Populousness' 1.

2.1.11.6 207.23–5 **sentiments of others have little influence, when far remov'd]** Malebranche elaborated on this phenomenon: 'we have natural relations to all things around us that are very useful . . . But these relations are not all equal. We are much more closely attached to France than to China . . . to our own house than to our neighbour's . . . to men than to beasts, to our parents and friends than to strangers' (*Search* 2.1.7 [112]). n. 58 (207) **Part 2. Sect. 4]** See 2.2.4.3.

2.1.11.7 207.32 **has been remark'd]** See 1.1.1.1.

2.1.11.8 208.9 **foregoing system]** See 1.3.5–7, esp. sect. 7.

2.1.11.9 208.39 **already explain'd]** See 2.1.7, 9, 10.

208.42 **hypothesis above-explain'd]** The hypothesis concerning the double relation of impressions and ideas in the formation of pride and humility is first formulated explicitly at 2.1.5.5, and is discussed frequently thereafter.

n. 59 (209) **Book 1. Part 3. Sect. 10]** See esp. 1.3.10.4, 9.

2.1.11.11 209.14–16 **we receive . . . hate and despise]** A revised version of these lines make up *DP* 2.35; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

2.1.11.13 209.29–30 **praises of others . . . chiefly excel]** A revised version of this sentence makes up *DP* 2.39; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

209.31–2 **soldier little values the character of eloquence . . . a merchant of learning]** Gracián, citing Tacitus, said: 'Soldiers have not much Occasion for Wit, because . . . they make more use of their Hands than their Heads . . . Besides, their Authority serves them instead of Eloquence . . . On the contrary, Gown-Men require a great deal of Quickness and Circumspection by reason of the many Impositions and Shifts which are frequent at the Bar' (*Art of Prudence*, 105 n.). Books delineating such 'character' types as gownmen and modelled on that prepared by Theophrastus constituted a popular literary genre of the early modern period; see, e.g., La Bruyère, *Characters*. For further references, see Greenough, *Bibliography of the Theophrastan Character*. Hume comments again on the 'character of different professions' in 'National Characters' 4–6.

- 2.1.11.15 210.3–4 **most uneasy under the contempt of persons...both related...and contiguous]** Locke and A. Campbell had reported phenomena of the sort Hume explains in this and the following paragraphs. Locke observed that 'no Body, that has the least Thought, or Sense of a Man about him, can live in Society, under the constant Dislike, and ill Opinion of his Familiars, and those he converses with' (*Essay* 2.28.12), while Campbell saw 'that every Man's social Appetite as necessarily requires *Esteem* and Regard from those Persons with whom we chuse to associate our selves, as our Hunger and Thirst do the common Necessaries of Life...a Man cannot but desire the Esteem of his *Family*, to whose Society he is confin'd by his Circumstances' (*Enquiry* 1.4 [72–3]). Hume's discussion here may also reflect his own decision, in 1734, to remove himself from his family and friends, and his reluctance, in late 1738, to return to them before he had accomplished something of significance. For details, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 2.
- 2.1.11.17 210.26 **system...above-explain'd]** At 2.1.2–6; see esp. 2.1.5.3–5.
- 2.1.11.19 211.1–2 **Plagiaries are delighted with praises]** Erasmus, through his character Folly, praises those writers 'who transcribe whole Discourses from others, and then reprint them as their own. By doing so, they make a cheap and easy Seizure to themselves of that Reputation which cost the first Author so much Time and Trouble to procure. If they are at any time prick'd a little in Conscience for fear of Discovery, they feed themselves however with this Hope, that if they be at last found *Plagiaries*, yet at least for some time they have the Credit of passing for the genuine Authors. It is pleasant to see how all these several Writers are puff'd up with the least Blast of Applause, especially if they come to the Honour of being pointed at as they walk along the Streets, when their several *Pieces* are laid open upon every Bookseller's Stall' (*Praise of Folly*, 102–3).
- 211.3 **kind of castle-building]** Castle-building similar to that Hume describes had been Steele's subject in *Spectator* 136 and 167; see also Malebranche, *Search* 2.3.1.5 [164–5].
- 2.1.12 *Of the pride and humility of animals*
- 2.1.12.1 211.15–18 **have not only prov'd...have farther prov'd]** These proofs are found in the five preceding sections.
- 2.1.12.2 211.25–6 **anatomists...join their observations...on human bodies to those on beasts]** Early modern anatomists who make this comparison include Willis, *Two Discourses concerning the Soul of Brutes*, and Douglas, *A Comparative Description of the Muscles in a Man and Quadruped*. The Physiological Library included the Latin version of the latter work, as well as Aristotle, *Historia animalium*; Aelian, *De animalium natura*; Gassendi, *De animalibus* (in *Opera omnia*); Borelli, *De motu animalium*, with Jean Bernoulli, *Meditationes mathematicæ de motu musculorum*; and Perrault, *De la mécanique des animaux* (in *Œuvres diverses*) and *Natural History of Animals* (items 58, 64, 65, 133, 57, 148, and 67). After 1720 Alexander Monro, Professor of Anatomy at the University of Edinburgh, taught (among other things)

'a course of Anatomy, Human and Comparative' (*Scots Magazine*, 3: 1741). On the Physiological Library, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1. See also Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* 1.5 (645<sup>b</sup>); Harvey, *Circulation of the Blood* 6 [44]; Prior, 'An Epistle to Fleetwood Shephard' 45–50 [*Literary Works*, 1: 87]; Hume, 'Immortality of the Soul' 38; *DNR* 12.3. For additional background see Thomas, *Man and the Natural World*, 36–41, 129–35.

211.38–9 **muscular motion, the progress of the chyle, the circulation of the blood**] Chambers, who treated the whole animal creation (the 'Animal Economy') as a single unit, provided his readers with ten folio columns on the muscles, and shorter accounts of the chyle, chyfication, and circulation of the blood. See *Cyclopaedia*, 'Muscles', 'Chyle', 'Chyfication', 'Circulation'.

- 2.1.12.4 212.6–7 **almost in every species... evident marks of pride and humility**] The attribution of passions to animals was commonplace, but not uncontested. Addison took it as given that 'Beasts and Birds of Prey are wonderfully subject to Anger, Malice, Revenge, and all the other violent Passions that may animate them in search of their proper Food; as those... whose Safety lies chiefly in their Flight, are suspicious, fearful and apprehensive' (*Spectator* 121). Watts not only supposed that there were animal passions, but saw that explaining them posed a philosophical challenge: 'How few are there of the Passions as well as the Appetites of human Nature, which are not found among several of the brute Creatures? What Resentment and Rage do they discover? What Jealousy and Fear, what Hope and Desire, what wondrous Instances of Love and Joy, of Gratitude and Revenge? What amazing Appearances of this Nature are observed in Birds and Beasts of the more docile and domestick kind, that they utterly puzzle and pose the wisest of Philosophers to give a plain, fair and satisfactory Account how all these Things can be perform'd by Mechanism, or the Meer Laws of Matter and Motion?' (*Philosophical Essays* 9 [243–4]). See also Shaftesbury, *Inquiry* 1.2.1; Bougeant, *Philosophical Amusement*, 64.

In contrast to these writers, Descartes typically denies that animals feel pain or pleasure or that they have passions, suggesting that they are automata in which nature acts 'according to the disposition of their organs. In the same way a clock, consisting only of wheels and springs, can count the hours and measure time more accurately than we can with all our wisdom' (*Discourse on Method* 5; *Objections and Replies* 4, 6 [AT 6: 59, 7: 229–31, 425–7]; cf. *Passions of the Soul* 1.50). Malebranche left no doubt about his view, arguing that 'animals are insensible' (if they are not, then innocent creatures would be made to suffer pain), and that it is only because 'we naturally humanize all causes... [that] we judge that our dog knows and loves us, and feels pain like our own when injured' (*Search* 4.11.3, 5.3 [323, 352]).

Among the ancients, Galen thought Chrysippus shameless for claiming that 'no irrational animal feels desire or anger', then added that 'all the poets are against him in most of what they say, and ordinary men are also', and that 'wild animals', like children, 'are enslaved to anger and to very strong desires' (*On the Doctrines of*

*Hippocrates and Plato* 1.6, 3.4.19, 3.7.12). See also Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 3.288–306). On the intellectual capacity of animals, see 1.3.16; ann. 118.15.

212.7–8 **port and gait of a...peacock**] Pliny saw the peacock as first among 'plumage-birds...both because of its beauty and because of its consciousness of and pride in it...nearly equally proud and self-conscious are our Roman night-watchmen [farmyard cocks]' (*Natural History* 10.43–7 [3: 318–23]). Aelian said that the 'Peacock knows it is the most beautiful of birds...it prides itself on this and is haughty' (*On the Characteristics of Animals* 5.21). Watts observed that 'a stately and strutting Gait and Gesture' are signs of pride in humans (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 6 [28]). See also Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 13: 802; Mandeville, *Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, 44–5.

212.11 **vanity and emulation of nightingales in singing**] Emulation produced such 'animated rivalry' between singing nightingales, according to Pliny, that the 'loser often ends her life by dying, her breath giving out before her song' (*Natural History* 10.83).

212.12–13 **hounds in sagacity and smell**] That hunting dogs are renowned for their 'skill and sagacity' (*sollertia et sagacity*) was reported by Pliny (*Natural History* 8.61.147). The sagacity and keen noses of dogs were documented by Chrysippus, who, according to Sextus Empiricus, 'declares that the dog makes use of the fifth complex indemonstrable syllogism when, on arriving at a spot where three ways meet, after smelling at the two roads by which the quarry did not pass, he rushes off at once by the third without stopping to smell' (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.69; the story is repeated by Montaigne, 'Apology for Raymond Sebond', 339).

2.1.12.6 212.33 **According to all rules of analogy**] Compare *EHU* 9.1.

2.1.12.7 212.39–41 **A dog...contiguity...produces a relation among his ideas**] Willis also supposed that dogs retain ideas of their punishments; see ann. 119.21. See also Thomas, *Man and the Natural World*, 96–9; above 1.3.16.8.

## 2.2 *Of love and hatred*

### 2.2.1 *Of the objects and causes of love and hatred*

214.7 **already observ'd**] See 2.1.2.1.

2.2.1.1 214.12 **the immediate object of pride and humility is self**] See 2.1.2.2.

2.2.1.2 214.14 **object of love and hatred is some other person**] Compare *DP* 2.3.

214.16–17 **love...always directed to some sensible being external to us; and when we talk of self-love, 'tis not in a proper sense**] A. Forbes said that *self-love* is an incoherent term: 'As all Love implies both a Desire of obtaining the beloved Object, and a Delight in it after it is obtained; Self-Love in the first of these Views is Nonsense, and in the second, 'tis the next thing to Delusion' ('*Essay on Self-Love*',

267), while Seneca, using the same logic, concluded that it is impossible to give a benefit to oneself ('On Benefits'). That *self-love* is a coherent notion and that a love of self plays a central role was the more typical view. Malebranche said that 'the Author of nature unceasingly impresses on our will . . . the love of ourselves or of our own preservation' (*Search* 4.5.1 [287]); Dennis, that 'all our Passions are grounded upon the Love of Ourselves' (*Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry* [1: 230]); Gordon, that 'Self-love is the Parent of Moral Good and Evil' (*Cato's Letters* 44; cf. 31). See also La Rochefoucauld, 'Of Self-Love', in *Moral Reflections and Maxims*, 88–92; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.14; Butler, *Three Sermons*, Preface §29, sermon 1 §6 n.; A. Campbell, *Enquiry*, Preface, pp. [xvi–xvii], sect. 1; Pope, *Essay on Man* 2.53–4; Trublet, 'Of the Effects of Habit', *Essays* 5. See also 3.2.2.5–6; ann. 313.3; *EPM* 5.16, Appx. 2.

- 2.2.1.4 214.32–3 **love and esteem . . . hatred and contempt**] On several other occasions Hume uses the term *esteem* as a synonym for *love*, and *contempt* as a synonym for *hatred*, or says that esteem and contempt are 'at bottom' the same as love and hatred. See 2.2.2.10, 2.2.5.1, n. 88 (388).
- 2.2.1.6 215.9–10 **all the observations**] These observations are found in 2.1.2–12.
- 2.2.1.9 215.37–9 **few persons . . . desirous . . . of acquiring . . . approbation of mankind**] See also 2.1.11.1 and the explanation of this phenomenon in 2.1.11.9 ff.
- 216.5 *presensation*] Shaftesbury had used this term; see ann. 119.12.
- 216.7–8 **arguments . . . employ'd to prove**] See 2.1.5.1–5, 10.
- 2.2.2 *Experiments to confirm this system*
- 2.2.2.8 218.4–12 **Suppose I were travelling . . . establish'd passion**] A revised version of these lines makes up part of *DP* 4.13; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.2.2.10 219.10–11 **shall explain afterwards**] See 2.2.5; n. 88 (388).
- 2.2.2.11 219.14–16 **Let us suppose . . . friendship**] A revised version of this sentence is found in *DP* 4.3; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 219.15 **relations above-mention'd**] See ¶9 of this section.
- 2.2.2.14 220.11–12 **like causes must produce like effects**] See rule 4 at 1.3.15.6.
- 2.2.2.16 220.25 **have observ'd**] See 1.3.13.10, 2.1.4.4–5, 2.1.5.10.
- 2.2.2.18 221.20 **have already seen**] See experiments 4–6.
- 2.2.2.19 222.2–3 **passions . . . descend with greater facility than they ascend**] Vives cited a proverb, "Although love is like fire, it tends to descend, not to ascend." Parents love their children more than the children love them' (*Passions of the Soul* 2 [14]). Hutcheson claimed that the affection of parents for children 'is further

confirm'd to be from NATURE, because it is always observ'd to *descend*, and not *ascend* from *Children* to *Parents* mutually' (*Inquiry* 2.5.1 [217]).

- 2.2.2.20 222.13 **the *Satellites of Jupiter***] The moons of Jupiter, four of which were described by Galileo in 1609.

222.20 **that reproach of *Cornelia* to her sons**] Although *Cornelia* was the daughter of *Scipio Africanus*, Hume has misremembered *Plutarch's* account. Among *Cornelia's* twelve children were two sons, *Tiberius* and *Gaius Gracchus*, and a daughter, *Sempronia*. The latter married *Scipio Aemilianus*, a Roman military and political leader. *Plutarch* reports that *Cornelia* 'often reproached her sons [*Tiberius* and *Gaius*] because the Romans still called her the mother-in-law of *Scipio* [*Aemilianus*], but not yet the mother of the *Gracchi*' ('*Agis and Cleomenes, and Tiberius and Caius Gracchus*', *Lives* 19 [*Tiberius Gracchus* 8.5–6]).

- 2.2.2.22 223.4–5 **has been observ'd**] See 2.1.4.3.

- 2.2.2.26 224.7 **have observ'd**] See ¶24 of this section.

- 2.2.2.27 224.21 **have observ'd**] See esp. ¶¶14–15, 20 of the present section.

224.33 **have already establish'd**] See ¶¶20–1 of the present section.

2.2.3 *Difficulties solv'd*

- 2.2.3.1 225.17–18 **removing some difficulties ... causes of these passions**] These difficulties are the topics of the present and the following two sections.

225.18 **examining the compound affections**] Hume discusses the compound passions in 2.2.6–11.

- 2.2.3.2 225.29–30 **general of our enemies ... with difficulty ... character of a man**] Addison had also remarked our tendency to blacken or defame the character of those who oppose us (*Spectator* 243). See also 3.1.2.4.

225.30–1 **sorcerer ... as is reported of *Oliver Cromwell*, and the Duke of *Luxembourg***] *Oliver Cromwell* (1599–1658) was leader of the Parliamentary party and army during the English Civil War and Lord Protector of England from 1653 until his death in 1658. Published works on *Cromwell* that illustrate Hume's point include: *The Devils Cabinet-Councell Discovered... Laying Open All the Plots... of O. Cromwell, and the Long Parliament*; *The English Devil: Or, Crommel and his Monstrous Witch Discover'd at White-hall*; and *A True and Faithful Narrative of Oliver Cromwell's Compact with the Devil for Seven Years*. For Hume's assessment of *Cromwell*, see *HE* 61 [6: 107–10].

*François Henri de Montmorency-Bouteville, Duke of Luxembourg* (1628–1695), was a French general who defeated the Confederate armies (and *William of Orange*) in 1672, 1678, 1690, 1691, 1692, and 1693. *Luxembourg* was also thought to have been in communication with demons; see *The Bargain which the Duke of Luxembourg... Made with the Devil, to Win Battles*. Another work, perhaps by *John Sergeant*, *A Letter*

from a Trooper in Flanders...showing that Luxemburg is a Witch, and deals with the Devil, although apparently of the same genre, is in fact a thinly veiled attack on the incompetence of the Confederate generals.

2.2.3.3 226.1–3 **some, who add another condition...a particular design and intention]** Seneca, for example, asked: 'Can anything be more unjust than to hate a person who has trodden upon your foot in a crowd, or splashed you... Yet, since he actually does us an injury, what besides the fact that he did not know what he was doing exempts him from blame? The same reason keeps this man from having given us a benefit, and that one from having done us an injury; it is the intention that makes both the friend and the enemy... Nothing can be a benefit that does not proceed from goodwill' ('On Benefits' 6.9.1–3). Malebranche argued that pleasure itself is not love and pain itself is not hatred: 'it is clear that pain is different from hatred, for the former often subsists without the latter. A man, for example, who is suddenly injured suffers a real and piercing pain, but he has no hatred... since the cause of his pain does not deserve hatred, it cannot arouse it' (*Elucidations* 14 [655]). Butler said that 'our natural sense of gratitude... implies a distinction between merely being the instrument of good, and intending it: from the like distinction, every one makes, between injury and mere harm' ('Of the Nature of Virtue' §2; cf. sermon 8, 'Upon Resentment'). See also Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 2.1.1; *THN* 3.2.1.2–7; ann. 307.7.

2.2.3.4 226.8–10 **we must make a distinction...character...intention]** Hutcheson also discussed the difference between character and intention, saying first that the '*moral Beauty of Characters* arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions of the *publick Good*', but then adding: 'What then properly constitutes a *virtuous Character*, is not some few accidental Motions of *Compassion, natural Affection, or Gratitude*; but such a *fix'd Humanity, or Desire of the publick Good* of all... Every Motion indeed of the *kind Affections* appears in some degree *amiable*; but we denominate the *Character* from the *prevailing Principle*' (*Inquiry* 2.3.14). Butler spoke of 'those principles from which men would act, if occasions and circumstances gave them power; and which, when fixed and habitual in any person, we call his character' and of 'that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions as such' ('Of the Nature of Virtue' §4).

2.2.3.7 227.10–11 **real design of harming us, proceeding...from justice...draws not...our anger]** Compare Hutcheson: 'the Intervention of *moral Ideas* may prevent our Hatred of the Agent, or bad moral Apprehension of that Action, which causes to us the greatest *natural Evil*. Thus the Opinion of *Justice* in any Sentence, will prevent all Ideas of *moral Evil* in the Execution, or Hatred toward the *Magistrate*, who is the immediate Cause of our greatest Sufferings' (*Inquiry* 2.1.1 [120]).

2.2.4 *Of the love of relations*

2.2.4.1 227.36 **Having given a reason]** See the previous section.

2.2.4.2 227.41 **According to the preceding system]** For abbreviated accounts of this system, see 2.1.5.3–5 and 2.2.2.3–4.



- 2.2.4.4 228.21–6 **Those...declaiming against human nature...search after amusement...excite our spirits from the languid state]** Pascal described the natural human state as 'weak and mortal, and so miserable that we cannot be consoled if nothing diverts us from thinking of our condition and ourselves', and then added that, without diversion, even seemingly perfect happiness languishes (*Port-Royal Pensées*, 201–2 [B139; Kr136]; cf. ann. 289.8). Voltaire claimed that Pascal 'exerts the utmost efforts of his pen, in order to make us all appear wicked and wretched. He writes against the human species in much the same strain as he wrote against the *Jesuits*' (*Lettres philosophiques* 25, quoted from the 2nd edn. of *Letters concerning the English Nation* [197–8]). See also Malebranche, *Search*, Preface, pp. [xx–xxi].

According to Hume, Dubos held 'that nothing is in general so disagreeable to the mind as the languid, listless state of indolence, into which it falls upon the removal of all passion and occupation. To get rid of this painful situation, it seeks every amusement and pursuit... whatever will rouse the passions... Let it be disagreeable, afflicting, melancholy, disordered; it is still better than that insipid languor, which arises from perfect tranquillity and repose' ('Of Tragedy' 3). See also below 2.3.10.10; 'Dignity or Meanness' 1–2; *EPM*, 'A Dialogue' 54–6; 'Refinement' 3; 'Of Interest' 7, 11.

228.28–32 **mind...naturally seeks after foreign objects...whole man acquires a vigour]** Malebranche offered a similar account of the effects of novelty and wonder; see *Search* 5.7, 8 [383–4, 386–7]. See also 2.3.8.4; ann. 277.4

- 2.2.4.5 229.3–4 **parallel to our reasonings from cause and effect...education]** For Hume's account of our reasoning from cause and effect, see esp. 1.3.4–8. On kinship and causation, see 1.1.4.3. For Hume's account of the effects of education, see 1.3.9.16–19.

229.7–8 **influencing quality...produce all their common effects]** See 1.3.15.7 for the rule followed here.

- 2.2.4.6 229.12–13 **people associate...according to their particular tempers]** Coëffeteau suggested that it is 'some conformity of humours and complexions, which maketh melancholy men *love* the company of their like, and Joviall spirits delight in the company of them that are pleasant... which maketh *Philosophers* to love *Philosophers*; and *Painters* delight in *Painters*' (*Table of Humane Passions*, 141). Horace observed that the 'grave dislike the gay, the merry the grave, the quick the staid, the lazy the stirring man of action' (*Epistles* 1.18.89–90). See also 3.3.2.7.

- 2.2.4.9 230.5–7 **children esteem their relation to their mother...widow-hood]** Hume's mother was widowed at age 30, when Hume was 2, and she did not remarry. Of her he wrote: 'My Father... dyed, when I was an Infant; leaving me, with an elder Brother and a Sister under the care of our Mother, a woman of singular Merit, who, though young and handsome, devoted herself entirely to the rearing and educating of her Children' ('My Own Life', *Letters*, 1: 1).

- 2.2.4.11 230.44 **thought has no longer the vibration]** The term *vibration* was used in accounts of sensation and the operation of the nerves. Chambers said that 'Sensation is supposed to be perform'd by means of the *vibratory* Motion of the Nerves, begun by external Objects, and propagated to the Brain' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Vibration'; cf. 'Sensation').
- 2.2.4.12 231.4 **prov'd already]** See 2.1.9.13, 2.2.2.19–26.
- 2.2.5 *Of our esteem for the rich and powerful*
- 2.2.5.1 231.20–1 **Nothing has a greater tendency to...esteem...than...power and riches]** Malebranche mentioned the tendency of some to 'judge of what is not apparent by what is, of the grandeur, strength, and capacity of mind hidden from them, through the gallantry, titles, and riches known to them... the dependence men have on the great, the desire to share in their greatness, and the perceptible glamour surrounding them, often causes men to render divine honors to mere mortals, if I may so speak' (*Search* 2.3.2 [168]). In contrast, Hutcheson argued that while 'we necessarily love and approve' those possessed of such moral goods as '*Honesty, Faith, Generosity, [and] Kindness*', the possession of such '*natural Goods...as Houses, Lands, Gardens, Vineyards, Health, Strength, [and] Sagacity*... procures no Love at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of *Envy and Hatred*' (*Inquiry* 2, Intro. [112]).
- 2.2.5.3 232.1–2 **Mr. Philips has chosen Cyder for the subject of an excellent poem]** John Philips's blank verse poem *Cyder* is concerned with the cultivation of apples, and the manufacture, and virtues of cider.
- 2.2.5.7 232.43 **already observ'd]** See 1.3.14.34, 2.1.10.4–10.  
233.2 **have also observ'd]** See 2.1.10.8.
- 2.2.5.9–11 233.27–234.8 **'tis difficult to conceive...as acquaintance]** These lines, moderately revised, make up part of *EPM* 6.30, and all of 6.31–2; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lxi–lxii.
- 2.2.5.12 234.9–10 **influence of general rules]** On general rules, see also 1.3.13.7–13, 2.1.6.8–9.
- 2.2.5.15 234.43–4 **Every pleasure languishes when enjoy'd apart from company]** Hume's version of this familiar claim is reminiscent of Seneca's: 'No good thing is pleasant to possess, without friends to share it' (*Moral Epistles* 6.4). Similar sentiments are expressed by Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.1; Cicero, *De amicitia* 23.87–8; *De finibus* 3.20.65; Montaigne, 'Of vanity', in *Complete Essays*, 754; Hutcheson, *Essay* 1.2.6, 1.4.2; *Two Texts on Human Nature* 23; A. Forbes, 'A View of the Human Faculties', 44. See also ann. 342.32; *EPM* 9.18.
- 2.2.5.18 235.30 **nothing renders a field more agreeable than its fertility]** Hutcheson, distinguishing *moral* from *natural* good, had noted that 'a fruitful Field, or commodious Habitation' produces an agreeable sensation (*Inquiry* 2.1.1). See also ann. 303.29.

- 2.2.5.19 235.41–4 **rule in painting...ballancing the figures...on their proper centers...of pain]** These lines, moderately revised, make up *EPM* 6.28; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lx. Several precepts concerned with the disposition of figures are found in Dufresnoy's *Art of Painting*. All figures, according to precept 7, are to be 'equally balanc'd on their Centre' (*Art of Painting*, 88).
- 2.2.5.21 236.4–7 **minds of men are mirrors to one another...passions...decay away by insensible degrees]** The metaphor of mirrors and decaying images was a familiar one. For its use by Locke, see ann. 121.9; by Berkeley, *Alciphron* 6.3.21.22.
- 2.2.6 *Of benevolence and anger*
- 2.2.6.1 236.28–30 **compound...conjunction...mixture...entire union]** These terms appear to have acquired a technical meaning by the late 1720s. Chambers described a 'Compound' as 'the Result or Effect of a Composition of different Things; or that which arises therefrom. Strictly speaking, every new *Composition* does not produce a new natural *Compound*.' A 'Composition, in a Physical Sense', he said, is 'the uniting or joining of several different Things, so as to form one whole, call'd a *Compound*'; a 'Mixture, in a Philosophical sense, is an Assemblage, or Union of several Bodies of different Properties, in the same Mass'; and 'Union, in a philosophic Sense, is used... for one of the three ways of Mixture, being the Joining together of Atoms or insensible Particles' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Compound', 'Composition', 'Mixture', 'Union'; cf. 'Mixt'). *Conjunction* was used to refer to a 'Mixture or union of "elements" or substances; one of the processes in alchemy' (*OED*, 'conjunction' 2.d).
- 236.30–2 **colours, may be blended...uniform impression, which arises from the whole]** Newton had shown that '*the whiteness of the Sun's Light is compounded of all the primary Colours*' (*Opticks*, 1.2.5 title [134]).
- 2.2.6.2 236.38–41 **accounting for the operations of nature...some phenomenon...more stubborn]** See ann. 10.20.
- 2.2.6.3 237.10–18 **The passions of love...person hated]** A slightly revised version of these lines makes up part of *DP* 3.6; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 237.12–14 **pride and humility are pure emotions...unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action]** In contrast, Descartes maintained that 'Pride and shame have the same function, in that they move us to virtue, the one through hope and the other through anxiety' (*Passions of the Soul* 3.206); while Locke thought that there is 'scarce any of the Passions to be found without *desire* join'd with it' (*Essay* 2.21.39). Hutcheson also suggested that two of the passions are unaccompanied by desire or aversion, but nominated joy and sorrow (*Essay* 1.3.2 [59]).
- 2.2.6.4 237.27–9 **According to this system...desire and aversion constitute the very nature of love and hatred]** Hume may allude to Descartes, who supposed that the desire to benefit the object of love is an inseparable feature of love: 'as soon as we have

joined ourselves willingly to some object, whatever its nature may be, we feel benevolent towards it...this is one of the principal effects of love' (*Passions of the Soul* 2.81). In contrast to Descartes, Charleton said that desire can be separated from love: 'though *Desire* cannot be without *Love*, yet *Love* may be without *Desire*' (*Natural History of the Passions* 5.21).

- 2.2.6.6 238.1–5 **This order of things...is not necessary]** Ontological voluntarism, the view that the dispositions or norms presently characterizing nature are fully contingent, and thus that human nature could have been, or could yet be, constituted of a significantly different set of dispositions or characteristics, was not uncommon in the early modern period. Typically, however, this view was associated with philosophies positing a central, creative role to the Deity. Pufendorf, for example, said that humans 'were by the most wise Creator' provided with 'particular *Properties*, arising from the Disposition and Aptitude of their Substance, and exerting themselves in agreeable Actions, according to that Portion of Strength which their Divine Author and Founder hath imprinted on them', and that 'a certain Kind of Attributes have been impos'd on Things, and their natural Motions; whence there springs up a peculiar Agreement and Conveniency in the Actions of Mankind, a grateful Order and Comeliness for the Ornament of human Life'. The suggestion is that the Deity could have given us different dispositions, but he did not do so because he did not want humans to 'pass their Life like Beasts, without Culture and without Rule' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 1.1.2–3). Hutcheson, although his commitment to voluntarism was muted, did grant that the Deity could have given us 'a *different or contrary determination of Mind*, viz. to *approve* Actions upon another Foundation than *Benevolence*' (*Inquiry* 2.7.12). He then found himself under attack from Balguy, who argued that if our moral sense 'might possibly have been quite contrary to what it is at present', then virtue and vice might well be contrary to what they now are (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 25). See also ann. 318.33.

## 2.2.7 *Of compassion*

- 2.2.7.1 238.13–14 **Pity is a concern for, and malice a joy in the misery of others]** Descartes described pity as 'a kind of sadness mingled with love or with good will towards those whom we see suffering some evil which we think they do not deserve' (*Passions of the Soul* 3.185). Spinoza said that pity 'is a Sadness, accompanied by the idea of an evil that has happened to another whom we imagine to be like us', and that compassion 'is Love, insofar as it so affects a man that he is glad at another's good fortune, and saddened by his ill fortune' (*Ethics* 3, 'Definitions of the Affects' 18, 24). See also Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.8; Vives, *Passions of the Soul* 7; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 2.5.8; Butler, *Three Sermons*, sermon 5 §1. For the views of Hobbes and Mandeville, see ann. 239.6. For accounts of malice, see ann. 240.5. At 2.2.9.1 Hume summarizes the account of pity found in 2.2.7 and the account of malice found in 2.2.8; see also *DP* 3.7–8.

238.18 **secondary ones, arising from original affections]** Among Hume's predecessors, the view that some passions are 'secondary', deriving from more

primitive passions, was not unusual. Descartes said that there are only six 'primitive passions': 'wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness', and derived the remaining passions from these; see *Passions of the Soul* 2.69. H. More adopts Descartes's position on this issue; see *Account of Virtue* 1.7.3. Charleton called the same six passions simple, and said that the rest are mixtures of these (*Natural History of the Passions* 5.65). Watts supposed the 'first Rank of Passions' to include only admiration (or wonder), love, and hatred, and that the 'second Rank of chief Passions are the divers kinds of *Love and Hatred*' (e.g., esteem, contempt, benevolence, malevolence). The passions of the first two ranks he took to be 'primitive', while those of the 'third Rank' (e.g., desire and aversion) he considered 'derivative' (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 2, 9).

2.2.7.2 238.20 **precedent reasoning**] See 2.1.11.2–8, 2.2.5.14; see also 3.3.1.7–12.

2.2.7.3 238.30 **many tragedies end happily**] According to Aristotle, in the perfect tragic plot 'the change in the subject's fortunes must be not from bad fortune to good, but on the contrary from good to bad' (*Poetics* 1.13, 1453<sup>a</sup>14–15). Addison bemoaned the fact that the '*English Writers of Tragedy are possessed with a Notion, that when they represent a virtuous or innocent Person in Distress, they ought not to leave him till they have delivered him out of his Troubles, or made him triumph over his Enemies...[but] as the principal Design of Tragedy is to raise Commiseration and Terror in the Minds of the Audience, we shall defeat this great End, if we always make Virtue and Innocence happy and successful. Whatever Crosses and Disappointments a good Man suffers in the Body of the Tragedy, they will make but small Impression on our Minds, when we know that in the last Act he is to arrive at the End of his Wishes and Desires*' (*Spectator* 40). In the late seventeenth century some of Shakespeare's tragedies (e.g., *King Lear*) were revised to end happily; we are indebted to Isabel Rivers for this information.

238.34–5 **above-explain'd**] See 2.1.11.2–8.

238.35–6 **To except any one in particular must appear highly unreasonable**] See rule 4 at 1.3.15.6. See also 2.1.3.5–7; ann. 185.28.

2.2.7.4 239.3 **women and children are most subject to pity**] To account for this phenomenon, Malebranche said that the 'transport of spirits in the parts of our bodies that correspond to those parts one sees injured in others causes an acute impression in sensitive people with a vivid imagination and very soft and tender flesh... women and children... suffer much pain from the wounds they see others receive. They instinctively have much more compassion for the miserable' (*Search* 2.1.7.2 [114–15]; cf. 2.2.1 [130–1]). Mandeville maintained a similar view: 'Pity, tho' it is the most gentle and the least mischievous of all our Passions, is yet as much a Frailty of our Nature, as Anger, Pride, or Fear. The weakest Minds have generally the greatest Share of it, for which Reason none are more Compassionate than Women and Children' (*Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, 56). For his part, Descartes claimed that it is children and old people who are more likely to 'be utterly

overcome by trivial matters involving pain, fear, or pity' (*Passions of the Soul* 2.133). See also Montaigne, 'It is folly to measure the true and false by our own capacity', in *Complete Essays*, 132; Wright, *Passions of the Minde* 1.10; Hobbes, *Elements of Law*, 1.9.10, 14; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 2.5.8 [241]; below, 2.2.9.18; ann. 250.9.

239.6–7 **philosophers, who derive this passion from...subtile reflections]** Hobbes had famously defined pity as a passion motivated by the 'imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's present calamity' (*Elements of Law* 1.9.10). Butler, in a note to a sermon on 'Compassion', quoted Hobbes's definition of pity, and then at the end of the sermon criticized him and those other 'men of speculation' who claim to have discovered, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, that there is 'absolutely no such thing in mankind as affection to the good of others'. Elsewhere Butler associated with 'the Epicureans of old, Hobbes, [and] the author of *Reflexions, Sentences, et Maximes Morales*' [La Rochefoucauld] a 'strange affectation' of 'explaining away all particular affections, and representing the whole of life as nothing but one continued exercise of self-love' (*Three Sermons*, sermon 5 §§1 n., 16; Preface §29). See also Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.8; Vives, *Passions of the Soul* 7; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 2.5.8; Mandeville, *Essay on Charity*, 254–9.

- 2.2.7.6 239.39–40 **as historians readily observe of any infant prince]** An infant prince was any prince under the age of majority and subject to guardianship (*OED* 'infant' 2, 3). In his later account of the murder of Edward V and his brother, the duke of York, Hume said that the assassins 'found the young princes in bed, and fallen into a profound sleep', and then suffocated them 'with the bolster and pillows' (*HE* 23 [2: 506]). Hume cites as a source of his account of events 'Sir T. More'. He presumably has in mind More's *Tragicall Historie of the Life and Reigne of Richard the Third*, which reports that, these two 'children lying in their beddes', the assassins 'came into the chamber, and suddenly lapped them up amongst the cloathes, and so bewrapped them, keeping downe by force the fetherbed and pillowes hard under their mouthes, that within a while they smothered & stifled them' (205–6). See also *HE* 18 [2: 344–5], 22 [2: 492], 26 n. A [3: 468–9].

240.3–4 **'tis on the imagination that pity entirely depends]** Hume originally ended this paragraph with a footnote about the different senses in which he uses the word *imagination*. He apparently thought this note inadequate, and placed too late in his exposition, for he then expanded it substantially and arranged to have it deleted from this location and placed at the end of 1.3.9.19, where it is now found as n. 22. For further details, see *Editing the Texts*, Sect. 1.2.2.

2.2.8 *Of malice and envy*

- 2.2.8.1 240.5–7 **malice... joy in the sufferings... of others, without any offence... on their part]** Hutcheson offered a similar account of malice, viz. a '*disinterested Hatred*, or a sedate Delight in the Misery of others, when we imagine them no way pernicious to us, or opposite to our *Interest*', but he doubted human nature capable of

such a passion (*Inquiry* 2.2.7 [143]; cf. *Essay* 1.3.5 [74]). Butler said: 'malice and revenge meditates evil itself; and to do mischief, to be the author of misery, is the very thing which gratifies the passion... Other vices eventually do mischief: this alone aims at it as an end' (*Three Sermons*, sermon 9 §8). See also Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 7. For Hume's summary account of malice, see 2.2.9.1.

- 2.2.8.2 240.9 **judge more...by comparison than from...intrinsic worth]** The comparative nature of our judgements had also been remarked by others: Malebranche warned that 'when we say, for example, that a bird is small, let us not understand this absolutely, for nothing is either large or small in itself', and that 'we can sometimes judge through sight the approximate relation bodies have to our own as well as among themselves; but we must never believe that they have the size they seem to us to have' (*Search* 1.6.2–3 [31–2]). See also Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.135; *THN* 2.1.8.8, 3.3.2.4; 'Dignity or Meanness' 4; 'Standard of Taste' 20.

240.12–13 **an original quality of the soul]** On such original qualities of the soul, see 2.1.3.3–7.

240.14 **Let a man heat one hand and cool the other]** This example was a philosophical commonplace, dating from ancient times. Suppose, Berkeley's Philonous says, that 'one of your hands [is] hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other?' (*Three Dialogues* 1 [*Works*, 2: 178–9]). Locke explained the phenomenon at *Essay* 2.8.21; cf. *Mr. Locke's Reply*, *Works*, 4: 399. See also Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.102; Bacon, *New Organon* 2.13.41; Malebranche, *Search* 1.13.5 [65].

- 2.2.8.3 240.22–4 **an object augments or diminishes to the eye...image and idea ...still the same]** Compare Malebranche: 'But though the image on my retina of a child I see at ten feet from me is equal to the image I have of a giant thirty feet away, I yet see the giant three times larger than the child, because there occurs in my eye something that I can use to discover the difference in their distance, such as the image of intervening bodies between me and these two people, or the different disposition of my eyes when I fix them on each of them to see them distinctly, or one of the other means that can serve to disclose the distance of objects... Thus, knowing the distance between the child and the giant, and having besides this, according to the assumption, a perfect knowledge of optics, which teaches me that the images of objects on the retina must diminish with their distance, I give myself a perception of the giant three times the height of the child's' (*Elucidations*, 'Elucidation on Optics', ¶27 [734]). See also 1.3.10.12, 3.1.2.4, 3.3.1.16, 3.3.3.2; anns. 241.39, 372.20; *EPM* 5.41.

- 2.2.8.4 240.35–7 **two principles...accounted for]** The principle to be explained follows in the next sentence and is one of the subjects of this section; see also 2.2.10.9 and 2.3.3.3–4. The principle already accounted for is our tendency to adopt and follow general rules; see esp. 1.3.13.7–14, 2.1.6.8–9.

240.38–9 **maxim...no object is presented...but what is accompany'd with some emotion]** Watts, probably under the influence of Descartes and Malebranche, appears to articulate the 'maxim' to which Hume refers: 'when we perceive any Object...we find usually some Ferments of the Blood or natural Spirits, or some Alterations which affect the Body, as well as we feel special Impressions on our Minds.... It is not necessary that the Object which excites our Passions should be something actually present to us; for if there be but the Idea of it found in the Mind or Imagination 'tis sufficient to raise intense Passions' (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 3). See also 1.3.8.2.

241.1–6 **any very bulky object...excites in the mind a sensible emotion... admiration]** Malebranche and Addison made similar observations. The former noted and explained the effects of great size on the imagination, saying: 'Things that are perceptibly marked by greatness also agitate us a great deal, for they excite a great deal of motion in our spirits' (*Search* 5.7 [384]). The latter, having said that 'Admiration is one of our most pleasing Passions', later said that 'Greatness', by which he meant not only 'the Bulk of any single Object, but [also] the Largeness of a whole View, considered as one entire Piece. Such are the Prospects of an open Champian Country, a vast uncultivated Desert, of huge Heaps of Mountains, high Rocks and Precipices, or a wide Expanse of Waters...Our Imagination loves to be filled with an Object, or to graspe at any thing that is too big for its Capacity' (*Spectator* 237, 412; cf. 489).

n. 65 (241) **Book 1. Part 3. Sect. 15]** See in particular Hume's seventh rule by which to judge causes and effects, at 1.3.15.9.

2.2.8.6 241.39–40 **the metaphysical part of optics]** Malebranche's 'Elucidation on Optics' provided his readers with an account of what Hume calls 'the metaphysical part of optics'. Malebranche suggests that his account repeats what can be found in the optical treatises of Descartes and others, but none the less expects his elucidation to help the otherwise 'negligent reader' understand what he says about 'the errors and natural judgments of vision' and to 'know how we see objects [in order] to be in a position to discover an infinity of truths, not only in physics, but also in metaphysics concerning the nature of ideas, and the goodness [and]... wisdom of divine Providence' (*Elucidations*, 'Elucidation on Optics' [720]). For examples of intricate conclusions of the understanding said to be transferred to the senses, thus enabling us to make appropriate judgements about relative size, see esp. ¶¶27, 43 of this same account. See also Rohault, *System* 1.32.23–7; Perrault, *Treatise on the Five Orders in Architecture* 2.7 [105–16]; above, ann. 240.22.

2.2.8.9 242.16–27 **in all kinds of comparison...and gives us pleasure]** Approximately half of these lines are quoted at 3.3.2.4.

2.2.8.12 243.8–9 **envy is excited by...enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes...our own]** Hume, in tracing envy to the principle of comparison, articulates a view implicit in some of his early modern predecessors. Descartes said



that what is usually called envy is 'a vice consisting in a natural perversity which causes certain people to be annoyed at the good they see coming to others' (*Passions of the Soul* 3.182); Gay, that 'Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which arises in the Mind from observing the Prosperity of others' (*Dissertation*, p. xxxii). See also Vives, *Passions of the Soul* 15; Spinoza, *Ethics* 3, 'Definitions of the Affects' 23; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 11 [55–6].

- 2.2.8.13 243.24–33 **envy ... effects of the comparison]** About a third part of these lines is used at *DP* 4.6; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

243.24–6 **envy ... not the great disproportion ... produces it; but ... proximity]** The suggestion that envy is directed to those whose status is similar to one's own is, as Vives pointed out, an ancient one: 'potters envy potters, beggars envy beggars and poets envy poets, as Hesiod said. It is a disgrace and a natural source of pain to be of the same rank and not to be equal in every way ... If the other is really superior to us, we do not feel insulted or find reasons to complain' (*Passions of the Soul* 15 [81]). See also Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.4, 381<sup>b</sup>14–17; Coëffeteau, *Table of Humane Passions*, 142–3; Gay, *Dissertation*, p. xxxii; Trublet, 'Of the Effects of Habit', *Essays* 5 [97–100].

- 2.2.8.14 243.38 **have observ'd]** See 2.1.10.12.

- 2.2.8.15–19 244.6–245.5 **A poet is not ... scruple or difficulty]** These five paragraphs (2.2.8.15–19), revised and shortened, make up *DP* 4.7–11; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

- 2.2.8.16 244.12–13 **when a Flemish and a Welsh horse are seen together]** Locke observed: 'that will be a great Horse to a Welsh-man, which is but a little one to a Fleming' (*Essay* 2.26.5). See also 'Dignity or Meanness' 4.

- 2.2.8.17 244.16–17 **Guicciardin applies this remark to the wars in Italy]** Guicciardini, writing about early fifteenth-century Italy, claimed that 'it is a common human failing to prefer serving foreigners to yielding to one's own people' (*History* 3.4 [299]). Hume later said that 'subjection under a foreign enemy usually appears preferable to the dominion of fellow citizens' (*HE* 16 [2: 258]).

244.28–9 **travellers ... lavish of their praises to the Chinese and Persians ... depreciate those neighbouring nations]** As Voltaire said: 'Our European Travellers for the most Part are satirical upon their neighbouring Countries, and bestow large Praises upon the Persians and Chineses; it being too natural to revile those who stand in Competition with us, and to extol those who being far remote from us, are out of the reach of Envy' ('Advertisement', *Essay upon the Civil Wars of France*). For lavish praise of China, see also Navarrett, *Account of the Empire of China*, a work mentioned by Locke, *Essay* 1.4.8.

- 2.2.8.19 244.33–5 **treatise ... one part was serious ... another light ... neglect of all rules of art and criticism]** The rule in question is graphically expressed by

Horace: 'If a painter chose to join a human head to the neck of a horse, and to spread feathers of many a hue over limbs picked up now here now there, so that what at the top is a lovely woman ends below in a black and ugly fish, could you, my friends, if favoured with a private view, refrain from laughing? Believe me... quite like such pictures would be a book, whose idle fancies shall be shaped like a sick man's dreams, so that neither head nor foot can be assigned to a single shape... In short, be the work what you will, let it at least be simple and uniform' (*Ars poetica* 1–9, 23). Addison described 'Tragi-Comedy' as 'one of the most monstrous Inventions that ever enter'd into a Poet's Thoughts. An Author might as well think of weaving the Adventures of *Aeneas* and *Hudibras* into one Poem, as of writing such a motly Piece of Mirth and Sorrow', and later added that 'Sentiments which raise Laughter, can very seldom be admitted with any decency into an Heroic Poem' (*Spectator* 40, 279). See also Dryden, *Essay of Dramatick Poesy*, 34–5, 37–8; Blackmore, 'Essay on the Nature and Constitution of Epick Poetry', 47–8, 59–60; Hume, *EHU* 3.10–17; 'Standard of Taste' 9.

244.39–40 **makes us not blame Mr. Prior for joining his *Alma* and his *Solomon***] Prior's volume, *Poems on Several Occasions*, contains the witty *Alma: or, The Progress of the Mind* and the weighty *Solomon on the Vanity of the World*, as well as widely dissimilar shorter poems.

2.2.8.20 245.11 **have observ'd]** See 1.4.6.16, 2.1.5.10–11, 2.1.11.8.

2.2.9 *Of the mixture of benevolence and anger with compassion and malice*

2.2.9.1 245.24 **have endeavour'd to account for pity and malice]** In 2.2.7–8.

2.2.9.2 246.5 **impulses or directions]** For discussion of the impulses or directions of the mind itself, see 1.3.13.9–10, 1.4.2.22.

2.2.9.3 246.18–19 **has been already found]** See 2.2.6.6.

2.2.9.9 247.20 **principle... above-mention'd]** See ¶2 of this section.

2.2.9.11 247.36 **have endeavour'd to prove]** See 2.2.5, esp. ¶¶6–14, 21.

247.42 **a maxim... just now establish'd]** See ¶2 of this section.

2.2.9.12 248.9 **have mention'd]** See ¶2 of this section.

2.2.9.14 248.44–5 **pipes can convey no more water than what arises at the fountain]** This unremarkable observation about pipes and fountains may owe something to a formal study of hydrostatics. The course in natural philosophy that Hume is thought to have followed (see Historical Account, Sect. 1) included not only Robert Steuart's lectures on hydrostatics, but also a course of laboratory experiments demonstrating a variety of hydrostatic phenomena. A surviving account of at least some of these experiments reveals them to have been concerned with the behaviour of fluids under varying conditions and pressures; with the behaviour of bodies, including bodies of differing specific gravities, in fluids; and with the behaviour and characteristics of air

*Editors' Annotations*

(‘Excerptions from M<sup>r</sup> Stewarts Colledge of Experimentall Philosophy begun Febyry 6<sup>th</sup> 1724’, Glasgow University Library, MS Murray 273). We are indebted to Roger Emerson for this reference.

2.2.9.17 249.38–9 **has been already observ’d]** See 2.2.5.18.

2.2.9.18 250.8 **above-mention’d]** See ¶15 of this section.

250.9–10 **every one ... women ... contract a kindness for criminals, who go to the scaffold]** Hobbes made a similar claim: ‘every proper man finds pity amongst women, when he goeth to the gallows’ (*Elements of Law* 1.9.10). On the greater susceptibility of women to compassion, see also 2.2.7.4, ann. 239.3. Hume later recounted the entreaty of Queen Phillipa for the lives of ‘six heroic burgesses’ of Calais: ‘she threw herself on her knees before [Edward II], and with tears in her eyes begged the lives of these citizens’ (*HE* 15 [2: 238]). Hutcheson broadened the scope of those affected in this way, saying: ‘Every Mortal is made uneasy by any grievous Misery he sees another involv’d in, unless the Person be imagin’d *evil*, in a *moral Sense*: Nay, it is almost impossible for us to be unmov’d, even in that Case’ (*Inquiry* 2.5.8). Butler supposed that our natural dispositions show greater discrimination. Guilt and ill desert or punishment, he said, ‘are evidently and naturally connected in our mind[s]’. Thus, though the ‘sight of a man in misery raises our compassion towards him ... when we are informed, that the sufferer is a villain, and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty; our compassion exceedingly lessens’ (‘Of the Nature of Virtue’ §5).

2.2.10 *Of respect and contempt*

2.2.10.1 250.36 **remains only to explain the passions of *respect and contempt*]** See ann. 214.32.

250.37 **the *amorous* affection]** Or ‘*love betwixt the sexes*’, the topic of the next section.

2.2.10.3 251.6–8 **a mixture of pride ... particular proof]** A heavily revised version of this sentence is found in *EPM* Appx. 4 n. 67; for a comparison, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lx. See also ann. n. 88 (388).

2.2.10.4 251.16 **have already observ’d]** See 2.2.4.8.

2.2.10.6 251.38 **have suppos’d all along]** See 2.2.2.3.

2.2.10.8 252.17 **difficulty above-mention’d]** See ¶5 of this section.

2.2.10.9 252.37 **has already been observ’d]** See 2.2.8.4.

2.2.10.10 253.10–11 ***difference in the degrees of any quality is call’d a distance by a common metaphor]*** Chambers explained that the word *distance* ‘is also us’d figuratively for an Interval, not only in respect of Place, but also of Time, and Quality ... The *Distance* between the Creator and Creature, is infinite’ (*Cyclopædia*, ‘Distance’).

253.15–16 **shall...observe afterwards]** See 2.3.7.

2.2.11 *Of the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes*

- 2.2.11.1 253.21–2 **this affection...deriv'd from...three different impressions or passions]** Hume's view is reminiscent of that of Hutcheson, who said that love between the sexes 'is founded on something stronger, and more efficacious and joyful, than...the bare *desire of sensible Pleasure*. BEAUTY gives a favourable Presumption of *good moral Dispositions*, and *Acquaintance* confirms this into a *real Love of Esteem*... This raises an expectation of the greatest *moral Pleasures* along with the *sensible*, and a thousand tender Sentiments of *Humanity* and *Generosity*' (*Inquiry* 2.6.5 [255–6]). See also Castiglione, *Courtier* 1 [101]; Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 2.90; Hobbes, *Elements of Law* 1.9.16; Shaftesbury, *Inquiry* 2.2.1 [105–6]; A. Forbes, 'Essay on Self-Love', 268–9. See also *THN* 3.2.1.12; 'Rise and Progress' 39; 'Polygamy and Divorces' 9–10; *EPM* Appx. 2.9; 'Populousness' 4.

253.24–5 **explain'd from the foregoing reasoning]** See 2.2.2.9–10, 2.2.3.2.

- 2.2.11.3 253.33–4 **have observ'd]** See 2.2.9.2–3, 9, 15.

- 2.2.11.5 254.22 **account of love is not peculiar to my system]** See ann. 253.21.

- 2.2.11.6 254.31 **have observ'd]** See 2.1.2.2–4, 2.2.1.3–7.

254.35–6 **have already describ'd]** See 2.1.5.6, 2.2.2.9–10.

2.2.12 *Of the love and hatred of animals*

- 2.2.12.1 255.8–9 **their causes, as above-explain'd]** See 2.2.1.3–4 for a summary, and 2.2.4–11 for extended discussions, of these causes and their varying effects.

255.10–11 **Every thing is conducted by springs and principles...not peculiar to man]** Shaftesbury had claimed that 'Whatsoever therefore is done or acted by any Animal *as such*, is done only thro some Affection or Passion, as of Fear, Love, or Hatred moving him' (*Inquiry* 2.1.3 [86]). Philips extended 'Every thing' to plants: 'The Prudent will observe, what Passions reign | in various Plants (for not to Man alone, | But all wide Creation, Nature gave | Love and Aversion)' (*Cyder* 1.247–51). See also 1.3.16.2, 2.1.12.6–9.

- 2.2.12.3 255.18–19 **animals are but little susceptible...of the pleasures or pains of the imagination]** Montaigne supposed that 'Even animals are subject like ourselves to the power of imagination. Witness dogs, who let themselves die out of grief for the loss of their masters. We also see them yap and twitch in their dreams' ('Of the power of the imagination', in *Complete Essays*, 74). For Cumberland's view, see ann. 255.35; see also 2.1.12.7; ann. 212.39.

- 2.2.12.4 255.30–1 **ox confin'd...with horses, will naturally join their company]** Hume spent much of his youth on his family's farm, where he would have had ample opportunity to observe the behaviour of horses and oxen.

2.2.12.5 255.33–4 **affection of parents to their young...instinct in animals...as in our species]** This common observation was also made by Hutcheson: 'NATURE... has strongly determin'd *Parents* to the Care of their *Children*...this Principle seems not confin'd to *Mankind*, but extends to other *Animals*' (*Inquiry* 2.5.1 [217]; cf. 2.6.5). See also Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature*, Intro. 26, 2.20–1 [32–4, 128–36]; Shaftesbury, *Inquiry* 2.1.1, *Sensus Communis* 3.2; anns. 307.35, 312.32; *EPM* 6.16, App. 2.8, Appx. 3.2; *DP* 3.3 n. 4.

2.2.12.6 255.35–6 **sympathy...communication of passions, takes place among animals]** Cumberland, while he did not use the term *sympathy*, did, discussing animals, 'take this only for *granted*, "That the Imagination excites the Affections," and "That a like Imagination (as such) excites like Affections"...whence I would *infer* only thus much, "That a known Likeness of Natures, when discover'd, does somewhat promote Benevolence among those who are alike"' (*Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 2.18 [124–5]).

### 2.3 *Of the will and direct passions*

#### 2.3.1 *Of liberty and necessity*

257.title *Of liberty and necessity]* Hobbes and Trenchard had also used this title (see ann. 257.14). Hume uses the title again for *EHU* 8, which not only takes up many of the issues found in this and the following section, but occasionally follows closely the texts found here.

2.3.1.2 257.5–6 **the WILL...be not comprehended among the passions]** Hobbes conflated the will and the passions: 'Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions are not called voluntary; for they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not voluntary' (*Elements of Law* 1.12.5). Others emphasized the close relationship between the will and the passions. Cumberland said: 'Our *Acts of the Will*, whether *Chusing*, or *Refusing*... are call'd by the names of several *Passions*, on the one hand, of *Love*, *Desire*, *Hope*, *Joy*; on the other, of *Hatred*, *Fear*, *Aversion*, *Grief*' (*Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 5.12 [208]). Locke said that desire invariably accompanies voluntary actions, a fact which explains why '*will* and *desire* are so often confounded', and that passions accompanied by '*uneasiness*... influence the *will*' (*Essay* 2.21.39); Watts, that some of the passions 'include the Act of the Will in them', and that most 'have a tendency to excite the Person to lively and vigorous Actions' (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 3.3). Reynolds (*Treatise of the Passions*, 40, 42) and Descartes (*Passions of the Soul* 1.41, 46–9) include substantial accounts of the will in their discussions of the passions.

257.8–10 **will...internal impression...when we knowingly give rise to any new motion...perception]** Malebranche also spoke of the will as an impression, rather than a faculty, when he proposed 'to designate by the word WILL, or capacity the soul

has of loving different goods, *the impression or natural impulse that carries us toward general and indeterminate good* (Search 1.1.2 [5]). Hobbes said that 'In deliberation, the last appetite, or aversion, immediately adhering to the action, or to the omission thereof, is that we call the WILL; the act, not the faculty, of willing' (*Leviathan* 1.6 ¶53; cf. 4.46 ¶28). Chambers, although he repeats Malebranche's definition, also said that the will is 'usually defined a Faculty of the Mind, whereby it embraces or rejects any thing represented to it as Good or Evil by the Judgment', and attributes this point of view to Locke (*Cyclopædia*, 'Will'; cf. 'Liberty'). See also Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.7.2; Burton, *Anatomy of Melancholy* 1.1.2.11; Descartes, *Meditations* 4 [AT 7: 57–8]; Locke, *Essay* 2.21.6, 71; and the anonymous *Essay on the Freedom of Will*, 37.

257.10–11 **This impression . . . impossible to define**] Locke also remarked on the 'difficulty of explaining, and giving clear notions of internal Actions by sounds, that I must here warn my Reader that *Ordering, Directing, Chusing, Preferring*, etc. which I have made use of, will not distinctly enough express *Volition*, unless he will reflect on what he himself does, when he *wills*' (*Essay* 2.21.15). On indefinable entities, see also above 2.1.2.1, 2.2.1.1; ann. 182.16.

257.14–15 **long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity**] Collins and Chambers provided historical perspective on the 'long disputed question'. The former surveyed the views of several ancient and some twenty-five modern writers who had taken positions on the question of liberty and necessity (*Philosophical Inquiry*, 14–57). Chambers offered a briefer history of the dispute. Having concluded that '*Necessity* is usually confounded with *Constraint*', he said that Plato, Epictetus, Augustine, and many divines had distinguished two kinds of necessity, '*Violent*', or that which is 'opposite to *Liberty*', and '*Spontaneous*', or that which is consistent with liberty because it only '*necessitates* all things to act according to their *Nature*', while the Scholastics distinguished between *physical, moral, absolute, and relative* necessity, all of which are contrary to liberty (*Cyclopædia*, 'Necessity'). Elsewhere Chambers reported that Aristotle distinguished between *willing* (choosing an end) and *election* (choosing a means), while some of his followers divided acts of the will into the *elicit*, or those produced by the will itself, and the *commanded*, or those produced by sensitive, locomotive, or intellective powers acting on the will, and that 'Most of the Schoolmen confound *Liberty* and the *Will* together, and make one Definition serve for 'em both' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Will', 'Liberty'). Other early modern philosophers discussing this question typically made reference to classical and scholastic disputes about liberty, necessity, and the will. See Bramhall and Hobbes in the latter's *Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance*, *passim*.

Other works of the period explicitly on liberty and necessity include Erasmus, *Discourse on Free Will*; Luther, *Of the Bondage of the Will*; Bramhall, *Defence of True Liberty*; Hobbes, *Of Liberty and Necessity*; Sterry, *Discourse of the Freedom of the Will*; S. Clarke, *Remarks upon a Book, Entitled, a Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty*; Trenchard, 'Of Liberty and Necessity', *Cato's Letters* 110–11;

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Jackson, *Defense of Human Liberty, in Answer... Particularly to Cato's Letters*. Still further titles may be found in the eighteenth-century bibliographies provided by Bentham, *Introduction to Moral Philosophy*; Grove, *System of Moral Philosophy*; and Johnson, *Quaestiones philosophicae*. The phrase making up the lemma is repeated in *EHU* 8.2. For additional background, see Ja. Harris, *Of Liberty and Necessity*, 1–87.

2.3.1.3–4 257.16–258.4 **'Tis universally acknowledg'd...acknowledge a necessity]** Nineteen of these lines are repeated in *Abs.* 31–2. Omitted there are the words, 'Every object...actions; and', found here in lines 19–24.

2.3.1.3 257.17–18 **universally acknowledg'd...operations of external bodies are necessary]** This view was indeed widely asserted. Malebranche said: 'It is clear that no body, large or small, has the power to move itself' (*Search* 6.2.3 [448]; cf. 6.2.5 [473]; *Elucidations* 15 [660]); Keill, that 'Every Mutation induced in a natural Body, proceeds from an external Agent; for every Body is a lifeless Heap of Matter, and it cannot induce any Mutation in itself' (*Introduction to Natural Philosophy*, lect. 8, axiom 3). See also Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.7.2; Locke, *Essay* 2.21.9, 13; Cheyne, *Essay of Health* 6.1; Collins, *Philosophical Inquiry*, 53; Butler, *Three Sermons*, Preface §13; Anon., *Essay on the Freedom of Will*, 69. A similar claim is made in *EHU* 8.4.

257.19–21 **Every object is determin'd...to a certain degree and direction of its motion]** Pemberton, paraphrasing Newton's second law of motion, had used similar language: 'The second law of motion is, that the alteration of the state of any body, whether from rest to motion, or from motion to rest, or from one degree of motion to another, is always proportional to the force impressed. A body at rest, when acted upon by any power, yields to that power, moving in the same line, in which the power applied is directed' (*View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy* 1.1.5). See also Newton, *Principia*, axioms, law 2 [1: 13]; Hume, *EHU* 8.4.

257.22 **angel, or spirit, or any superior substance]** From ancient times through the eighteenth century it was widely supposed that all beings are hierarchically ordered, and that there are some which are superior to humans. Among well-known early modern philosophers, Descartes argued that there is greater reality or perfection in the Deity or an angel than in a human, and that this superiority is reflected in our ideas of these beings (*Meditations* 3 [AT 7: 40–4]). Locke thought it more probable that 'there should be more *Species* of intelligent Creatures above us, than there are of sensible and material below us' (*Essay* 3.6.12). For further documentation, see Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being*.

2.3.1.4 257.29 **has been observ'd]** See, e.g., 1.3.2.9, 11–12; 1.3.14.12; 1.4.5.30–1; anns. 55.18, 108.42. See also *Abs.* 10–13, 25–6; *EHU* 8.4, 21.

2.3.1.5 258.15–16 **slight and general view of the common course of human affairs]** A similar review, incorporating elements of the following paragraphs, is found in *EHU* 8.7–12.

258.20 **Like causes still produce like effects]** This is the fourth of Hume's rules by which to judge of causes and effects; see 1.3.15.6.

- 2.3.1.6 258.24–5 **Guienne... Champagne]** Guyenne and Champagne are two regions of France known for their wines, Guyenne for bordeaux, which is named after its capital city, the second for champagne.

- 2.3.1.8 258.37 **men always seek society]** See 3.2.2.4; anns. 312.11, 32.

258.39 **two flat pieces of marble will unite together]** That two pieces of flat, polished marble will adhere to one another was widely known. Boyle discussed the phenomenon on several occasions; see, e.g., *Works*, 1: 69, 173, 225, 407, 409; 3: 274–6; 4: 111. See also Galileo, *Two New Sciences*, 19–20; Hobbes, *Seven Philosophical Problems* 3 [17–18]; Malebranche, *Search* 6.2.9 [521]; Locke, *Essay* 2.4.4; Hume, *EHU* 4.7.

258.40 **savages]** Bailey defined 'savages' as those 'wild, barbarous People, who keep no fix'd Habitation, have no Religion, Law, or Policy' (*Dictionarium Britannicum*). Hume discusses the 'natural appetite betwixt the sexes' that initiates the process resulting in society at 3.2.2.4, and the impossibility of humans remaining in a 'savage condition' at 3.2.2.14; see also ann. 312.32.

- 2.3.1.9 259.1–3 **skin... nerves of a day-labourer... different stations of life influence the whole fabric]** According to Cheyne, 'those whose *Organs of Sensation* are... *un-elastic*, or intirely *callous*... for want of Exercise... have scarce any *Passions* at all, or any lively Sensations, and are incapable of lasting *Impressions*... such are *Idiots*, *Peasants* and *Mechanicks*, and all those we call Indolent People' (*Essay of Health* 6.5). Watts said: 'Different *Employments*, and different *Conditions* of Life, beget in us a Tendency to our different *Passions*' (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 13). See also 'National Characters' 3–6.

259.6–7 **Government... establishes the different ranks of men]** Compare 'Civil Liberty' 10; *HE* 17 [2: 290–3].

- 2.3.1.10 259.11 **Shou'd a traveller, returning from a far country]** Compare *EHU* 8.8.

259.17 **Plato's Republic]** Plato's *Republic* supposes that reason is the superior and guiding principle of human nature, and portrays a society in which reason, embodied in philosopher-kings, neatly organizes and rules two further classes of citizens, those embodying the two kinds of passions, the spirited and the appetitive.

259.17–18 **Hobbes's Leviathan]** Hobbes's *Leviathan* claims, notoriously, that humanity's natural state is a chaotic one, 'a condition of war of every one against every one' because, in that state, all behaviour is determined by ungoverned, selfish passions (*Leviathan* 1.14 ¶4; cf. 1.13 ¶8). See also anns. 308.36, 370.4. For Hume's assessments of Hobbes, see *EPM* Appx. 2.3; *HE* 62 [6: 153].

259.19–20 **characters peculiar to different nations]** See also 2.1.11.2; ann. 206.20.



- 2.3.1.11 259.24–5 **denying that uniformity of human actions]** See also 2.1.4.3; ann. 186.16; *EHU* 8.7–12.
- 2.3.1.12 259.37 **same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objects]** These maxims are systematically set out in 1.3.15.
- 259.40–1 **many inferior degrees of evidence... nor does one single contrariety]** Degrees and kinds of evidence and probability are the subjects of 1.3.11–13. On not abandoning a conclusion in the face of a 'single contrariety', see 1.1.1.10, 2.2.6.2; ann. 10.20.
- 259.42–3 **deducting the inferior from the superior]** On such 'deducting' or 'subtracting', see also 1.3.12.19; ann. 89.36.
- 2.3.1.13 260.9 **commonly allow'd that mad-men have no liberty]** Hobbes observed that even Bramhall, a defender of liberty, 'says that the actions of *children, fools, madmen, and beasts*, are indeed *determined*' (*Of Liberty and Necessity*, 242; see also *Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance* 8; Bramhall, *Defence of True Liberty*, 34, 40). Collins mentioned '*furious madmen*, whom all allow to be necessary agents' (*Philosophical Inquiry*, 92). Locke pointed out that the actions of the mad have, as Hume puts it, 'less regularity' than the actions of the prudent, and thus, if 'to break loose from the conduct of Reason... be *Liberty*, true Liberty, mad Men and Fools are the only Freeman' (*Essay* 2.21.50). See also Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.7.4; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Rorarius' [F].
- 2.3.1.15 260.23–5 **moral evidence... a conclusion concerning the actions of men]** At least some authors took 'moral evidence' to be constituted of credible testimony. According to Chambers, 'A Thing is said to be *morally Evident*, so far as I have a distinct Notion, or Knowledge thereof, by unexceptionable Witnesses'. In contrast, a thing is said to be '*Physically*' evident 'so far as natural Sense and Reason pointing out any Thing, convinces one thereof' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Evidence'). Hume comments again on the notion of moral evidence in the two following paragraphs of this section, and at *Abs.* 33; *LG* 26; *EHU* 8.19, 10.3, 12.21. See also anns. 99.29, 115.25.
- 260.37–8 **A general... makes account of a certain degree of courage]** Hume uses an idiom, 'makes account of' found in, among other works, Bacon's *Essays* ('Of Plantations' [92]; 'Of Gardens' [129]), and in the work attributed to Allestree, *The Whole Duty of Man* (8.18). Bailey defined 'To Esteem' as 'to value, to make account of, to believe, to judge, to reckon' (*Dictionarium Britannicum*, 1731). Early printings of the Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the *Treatise* mistakenly emend 'makes' to 'takes'.
- 2.3.1.16 261.1–2 **cause and the other effect... distinct and separate]** On the distinctness of causes and effects, see 1.3.3.3, 1.3.14.12, 1.3.15.1.
- 261.9–10 **necessary connexion... is merely a perception of the mind]** Similar remarks are found at 1.3.14.20–3.

- 2.3.1.17 261.20–39 **how aptly natural and moral evidence cement together...never change]** This paragraph is repeated, nearly verbatim, at *EHU* 8.19; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), p. lxx.

261.36 **what we...call a physical necessity]** On the supposed distinction between physical and moral necessity, see 1.3.14.33; ann. 115.25. Hume returns to this topic at *Abs.* 32–4; *EHU* 8.19–22.

- 2.3.1.18 262.1 **chance is commonly thought to imply a contradiction]** See 1.3.11.4; ann. 86.30.

2.3.2 *The same subject continu'd*

- 2.3.2.1 262.5–6 **the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty]** This phrase recurs as the opening words of *EHU* 8.22 n. 18.

262.12–13 **distinguishing...liberty of spontaneity...liberty of indifference]** Chambers explained that 'Spontaneous, in the Schools [is] a Term applied to such Motions of the Body and Mind as we perform of our selves, without any Constraint. Thus, in Morality, those Actions p[er]form'd from an inward and natural Principle, conformable to the Inclination of Nature, excluding all Constraint, but not excluding Necessity, are called *Spontaneous Actions*.' Of the two kinds of necessity, 'Violent' and 'Spontaneous' (see ann. 257.14), the latter, according to Chambers, 'necessitates all things to act according to their Nature...a thing that moves itself, must of Necessity be moved according to its own Nature', i.e. 'spontaneously' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Spontaneous'; 'Necessity'). Watts had argued that 'Liberty of the Will is always [at least] a *Liberty of Spontaneity* or *Voluntariness*...when an intelligent Being wills and pursues its own supposed Satisfaction or Happiness, this Being is called free herein, tho' this Action be necessary, and it cannot do otherwise' (*Brief Scheme of Ontology* 6).

King, whose avowal of liberty of indifference was at the centre of early eighteenth-century controversy on the topic, supposed that the will could be totally 'indifferent in respect of the Objects about which it exerts itself...no one thing is naturally more agreeable [to it] than another'. Between the will and the object or action it chooses, 'there is naturally no more suitability or connection than between it and any other thing'. It is, rather, that the 'Suitableness' or 'Goodness' of the object or action is a consequence of having been that thing which the will has freely chosen. Thus, while 'the Understanding directs a thing to be done no otherwise than by determining that it is better...the Goodness of things, with respect to this Power [the will], depends on its Determination' (*Origin of Evil* 5.1.3.4, 7 [173, 176]). Crousaz put the issue more abstractly, taking liberty to mean that the will is able to 'determine it self to will this or that so arbitrarily, and is so much the sole and immediate Cause of its own Resolution, Choice, and Determination, that we cannot possibly alledge any other Reason for our Will, than our Will it self' (*New Treatise of the Art of Thinking*, 1: 141). The concept is carefully delineated by E. Law in a note to King's rambling discussion of the topic: 'it appears that the true description of Free-will must include thus much. A Power of

choosing or not choosing, or of choosing either Side in any given Case; naturally independent of any mediate or immediate, external or internal force, compulsion, or necessity; physically indetermin'd by either bodily Sensations, Appetites, &c. or mental Perceptions, Reason, Judgment. 'Tis an Ability of determining either among equal and indifferent Objects, or of preferring the different from or contrary to them; or lastly, of preferring the very consideration of some unknown Objects to all the rest; of deliberating upon, or attending to some particular Ideas, and resolving to overlook others, tho' equally presented to the Mind, and suppos'd to be of equal Importance' (*Origin of Evil* n. 82 [212]). An anonymous critic of Dudgeon claimed that the mind has liberty of indifference and that the 'Transition from Idea to Idea in the Mind is the first Spring of Liberty', a fact that 'hath never before, as [far as] I know, been attended to' (*Some Reflections on a Late Pamphlet*, 32–3).

Leibniz criticized the view that 'true freedom' consists in 'an indifference... complete and absolute; so that, until the will has determined itself, there would be no reason for its determination... in choosing without reason one would cause what one chooses to be pleasing', and he told S. Clarke that 'A mere Will without any Motive, is a Fiction' (*Observations on The Origin of Evil*, in *Theodicy*, 406; *Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence* 4.2). Trenchard argued that it is absurd to suppose the Deity would make a creature with 'Capacities of Reasoning, Powers of Action, Means of Thinking, and present it with all its Objects of Thinking, yet leave it at liberty to act against them all... To say, that a Man has a Power to act, without any Motives or Impulse to act, seems to me to be a direct Blunder' (*Cato's Letters* 111). See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Buridan' [C], [E]; 'Jansenius' [G], [H]; 'Rorarius' [F].

For further eighteenth-century discussions of the liberty of indifference, see also the additional works mentioned in the remaining annotations to this section and in ann. 257.14. Important theologians who embraced the view that the will is free and, in some cases, the indifferentist hypothesis, include Molina, *On Divine Foreknowledge*; Arminius, 'On the Freewill of Man', 189–96; Limborch, *Complete System... of Divinity*; and Wesley, *The Question, What is an Arminian?* Those holding that the will is not free, that we have at best what Hume calls 'liberty of spontaneity', include Luther, *Of the Bondage of the Will*, and Calvin, *Concerning the Eternal Predestination*. Articles 10 and 17 of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, and Article 11 of the Westminster Confession of the Church of Scotland are also pertinent to the issues raised by Hume's remark.

262.12–15 **liberty of spontaneity...the most common sense of the word]** Chambers supposed the contrary, saying that *liberty* 'is usually understood of that State wherein a Man acts freely; or that Power by which he determines himself voluntarily either to Good or Evil, to this thing or to that', and that liberty is 'an active Indifference of the Will, to will, or not will any thing' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Liberty').

- 2.3.2.2 262.18–263.2 **a false sensation...of the liberty of indifference...foregoing doctrine]** This paragraph is repeated, with a few changes, at *EHU* 8.22 n. 18; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lxx–lxxi.

262.18–19 **a false sensation or experience even of the liberty of indifference]** 'The vulgar', Collins said, are 'constantly appealing to *experience* for a proof of their *freedom*, and being persuaded that they feel themselves free on a thousand occasions' (*Philosophical Inquiry*, 12). Claims to know by inner experience that the will is free were also commonly made by philosophers. Descartes said: 'I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice . . . is not . . . perfect, since I know by experience that it is not restricted in any way', and went on to speak of the 'indifference' he sometimes felt (*Meditations* 4 [AT 7: 56–9]; cf. *Principles* 1.39); Bramhall, that 'our own and other mens experience doth teach us, that the will hath a dominion over its own acts to will or nill without extrinsecall necessitation' (*Defence of True Liberty*, 221); Mayne, that 'the *Mind*, before ever it exerts its *Will* or Power of chusing, is *conscious*, and knows within itself, that it hath a Power of Choice and Preference . . . I could not possibly . . . do any voluntary Act, without knowing and being conscious to my self (before-hand) that I have such a Faculty or Power in my self' (*Two Dissertations*, 208). Hutcheson maintained, against King (see ann. 262.12–13) and the notion of liberty of indifference, that our inner experience shows that we do not act by '*mere Election*, without any previous *Desire*', and, moreover, that we would not respond to 'such kind of Action' with '*Approbation*' or moral approval (*Essay, Illustrations* 2.5 [286–7]). See also Spinoza, *Ethics* 1 app1; Malebranche, *Elucidations* 1 [552]; Locke, *Essay* 2.21.5; G. Burnet, *Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles* 10; S. Clarke, *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God*, prop. 10 [83–4]; Anon., *Some Reflections on a late Pamphlet*, 28–9.

262.34–6 **we perswade ourselves . . . upon a second trial]** Collins said that the vulgar 'frequently do actions whereof they repent: And because in the repenting humour, they find no present motive to do those actions, they conclude, that they might not have done them at the time they did them, and that they were *free* from necessity . . . in the doing them' (*Philosophical Inquiry*, 13)

262.37–8 **desire of showing our liberty is the sole motive]** The anonymous author of the *Essay on the Freedom of Will* appears to have granted Hume's point: 'if to demonstrate this Freedom [liberty of indifference], I determine to . . . turn my Face to the *North* . . . it was a mere arbitrary Volition to shew that I have within me this self-determining Power' (p. 26). Law, however, anticipated Hume's position with a counter-argument. To insist that in many instances we choose for no reason at all, and that 'to urge, that such Elections as these [choosing between two apparently identical eggs] are made on purpose to *try* my Liberty, which End, say some, becomes the Motive, is in effect granting the very thing we contend for, *viz.* that the Pleasure attending the exercise of the Will is often the sole reason of Volition' (E. Law, in King, *Essay on the Origin of Evil* n. 65 [164]). See also Crousaz, *New Treatise of the Art of Thinking*, 1: 141–2.

263.2 **foregoing doctrine]** The theory set out in the previous section; see esp. 2.3.1.10–12.

- 2.3.2.3-7 263.5–265.4 **There is no method of reasoning... never were criminal]** These five paragraphs, revised and shortened, make up *EHU* 8.26–30; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lxxi–lxxiii.
- 2.3.2.3 263.7–8 **blameable... to refute any hypothesis by a pretext of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality]** Bramhall argued that the belief ‘that there is no true liberty’ would be sufficient ‘to overthrow all societies and commonwealths in the world’. He also said that ‘moral praise is from the good use of liberty, moral dispraise from the bad use of liberty; but if all things be necessary, then moral liberty is quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dispraise’ (in Hobbes, *Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance* 14 [150, 171]). Chambers reported that ‘Tis held a grievous and dangerous Error, with regard both to Religion and Morality, to hold that human Liberty only consists in *Spontaneity*’ (*Cyclopædia*, Spontaneous’).
- On the other hand, many opposed this view. G. Burnet, although he found that morality presupposes freedom of choice, denied that it presupposes liberty of indifference: ‘the true Notion of Free-Will... is necessary to all rational Agents, to make their Actions morally good or bad; since... no man is accountable, rewardable or punishable, but for that in which he acts freely, without force or compulsion... [but] Indifferency to do or not to do, cannot be the true Notion of Liberty’ (*Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles* 10). In addition, Bayle argued that well-known religious sects (Calvinists, Jansenists, and Thomists) follow Augustine in explicitly or implicitly rejecting ‘Liberty of Indifferency’ (*Dictionary*, ‘Augustin’ [E]). King was among those who thought that a denial of the liberty of indifference could ‘prove detrimental to Morality’, but he granted ‘that, for the most part, one cannot argue well against an Opinion from its consequences, since a great many things are true which have consequences hard enough’ (*Origin of Evil* 5.1.1.19 [159]). See also the *Essay on the Freedom of Will*, 53–6. Hume commented again on this issue in *EPM* 8.26; see also *LG* 19.
- 2.3.2.4 263.16 **define necessity two ways... two definitions of cause]** See 1.3.14.31, 35.
- 2.3.2.5 263.39–40 **this kind of necessity... essential to religion and morality]** Hume’s position here was not without precedent. Collins argued that ‘if Man was not a necessary agent determin’d by pleasure and pain, there would be no foundation for rewards and punishments, which are the *essential supports* of Society’, because, without such necessary determinants, humans ‘would have no notion of *morality*, or motive to practise it; the distinction between morality and immorality, virtue and vice would be lost; and Man would not be a moral Agent’ (*Philosophical Inquiry*, 86, 89). Dudgeon undertook to show ‘that a moral necessity is not only reconcilable with virtue, but that it is the only foundation it can be built upon’ (*Letter to the Author*, 60).
- 2.3.2.6 264.4 **This reasoning is equally solid, when apply’d to divine laws]** Trenchard pointed out that the Deity relies on reward and punishment as causes of desired effects: ‘for what else can be meant by offering Rewards and denouncing Punishments, but

as Causes to produce the Effects designed, that is, to save those whom Almighty God in his deep Wisdom has preordained to Bliss, and to be influenced by those Motives?' (*Cato's Letters* 110). Locke suggested that 'divine laws' were involved in another way: superior beings, and even the Deity, are subject to necessity. 'If we look upon those *superiour Beings* above us, who enjoy perfect Happiness, we shall have reason to judge that they are more steadily *determined in their choice of Good* than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy, or less free, than we are' (*Essay* 2.21.49). See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Simonides' [F]. For Hume's views on the general ineffectiveness of the prospect of divine rewards and punishments, see 1.3.9.13.

264.15–16 **according to the doctrine of liberty ... this connexion is reduc'd to nothing**] Collins supposed that the indifferentist hypothesis amounted to suggesting that there could be a beginning (a choice or an action) without a cause, an absurdity (see ann. 57.25). Moreover, 'if a cause be not a necessary cause it is no cause at all. For if causes are not necessary causes; then causes are not suited to or are indifferent to effects; and the *Epicurean System* of chance is rendred possible' (*Philosophical Inquiry*, 58; cf. 82). King had anticipated this objection: 'If these things be true, you'll say, [the election or choice of] this Agent will be determin'd by *Chance*, and not by *Reason*; but in reality here's no room for *Chance*, if by *Chance* be understood that which happens beside the intention of the Agent; for this very Election is the Intention of the Agent, and it is impossible that a Man should intend beside his Intention' (King, *Essay on the Origin of Evil* 5.1.3.18 [181]). Hutcheson challenged the view that acting freely means '*acting without any Motive or exciting Reason*', and doubted that choosing and acting (without *Motive* or *Affection*, by *mere Election*, without prepollent *Desire of one Action or End* rather than its opposite' would produce moral merit (*Essay, Illustrations* 2.5 [286]). See also E. Law, in King, *Essay on the Origin of Evil* n. 65 [165].

265.8–9 **what I have advanc'd**] See 2.3.1.

265.12 **proceed to explain**] This explanation is found in the following six sections.

2.3.3 *Of the influencing motives of the will*

- 2.3.3.1 265.14–15 **Nothing is more usual ... than to talk of the combat of passion and reason**] Allusions to or descriptions of combat between the passions and reason, in one or another form, were indeed commonplace in the eighteenth century and earlier, and among both philosophers and non-philosophers. Seneca described the passions as 'heavy taskmasters' whose rule can be overcome only by 'wisdom' (*sapientia*) or 'reason' (*ratio*), and said that against vice and the passions we 'have a war to wage, a type of warfare in which there is allowed no rest or furlough' (*Moral Epistles* 37.4, 51.6). Bayle said that 'humane life is hardly any thing else but a continual combat betwixt the passions and the conscience' or reason (*Dictionary*, 'Helen' [y]). A. M. Ramsay spoke of the 'continual Revolt of the Passions against Reason' (*Essay upon Civil Government*, p. iv). See also Plato, *Republic* 439A–445B; Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 1.47–50, 3.211; Pascal, *Port-Royal Pensées*, 74, 166 [B412–13,

Kr410]; Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* 3.6–9; H. More, *Account of Virtue*, 1.6.4–5; Malebranche, *Search* 5.6 [369]; Shaftesbury, *Soliloquy* 1.2 [187–8].

Among non-philosophers, one of the most colourful expressions of the conceit came from Blackmore, who having begun by remarking the 'perpetual Strife and Opposition between our intellectual Faculties and our Senses... experienced by the greatest Part of Mankind', went on to say that those in whom this strife takes place 'feel a perpetual Conflict and Dispute between their exorbitant Appetites, and the Superior Faculties of the Soul; their Breasts are Theatres of Strife and Fields of Battle, where Reason and Passion always contend, but with various Success, for Power and Victory. Most Men are at Variance with themselves, and are constantly torn and distracted by the Civil Feuds and Tumults of two intestine Parties, that aim at Government; and had Mr. *Hobbs* thus explained himself, I should readily grant his Assertion, That every Man is born in a State of War' (*Letters of Religion*, 3–4). Among this group, see also Bouhours, *Art of Criticism* 1 [46]; Saint-Evremond, 'Essay in Vindication of Epicurus', 168–9; Dennis, *Advancement and Reformation of Modern Poetry* [1: 254]; Steele, *Spectator* 71; Pope, *Essay on Man* 2.42.

265.17–19 **any other motive...ought to...be entirely subdu'd]** The Stoics recommended that the passions be suppressed, not merely subdued. Seneca objected that the Peripatetics wished only to moderate, not to 'abolish the passions', and then went on to say that if the 'wise man has any passions whatever, his reason will be no match for them' (*Moral Epistles* 85.4, 6; cf. 116.1). Among neo-Stoics, Le Grand said that 'Passions... are but the diseases of Fools', and reported that the Stoics 'went about to Suppress them, as the Monsters of Humane Nature. Forbidding the wise man... any use of them', and 'that to live happily, a man need but be conformable to the Councils of Reason' (*Man without Passion*, 1, 22; see also Du Vair, *Morall Philosophy of the Stoicks*, 15). Watts, was more selective, granting that some passions are useful, but saying that the passions of pride, envy, malice, and revenge are 'properly called vicious and immoral; and these are of no use, but ought to be abolished and rooted out' (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 14 [78]).

Some supposed that reason can, and ought to, control the passions. Cicero said that 'we find that the essential activity of the spirit is twofold: one force is appetite... which impels a man this way and that; the other is reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and... left undone. The result is that reason commands, appetite obeys' (*De officiis* 1.28.101; cf. 1.36.132). For a discussion of classical views, see Plutarch, 'On Moral Virtue' [*Moralia*, 6]. Bacon said that 'the end of Morality is to procure the affections to obey reason' (*Advancement of Learning*, 238); Gracián, that it is 'the greatest of Dominions to govern one's Self and Passions: That is the triumph of Free-will' (*Art of Prudence*, 7–8); Budgell, that 'It is the Work of a Philosopher to be every Day subduing his Passions' (*Spectator* 564).

265.27 **reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will]** The contrary view, that reason alone can be a motive to volition and action, can be traced at least to Plato, who said that the inhibiting responses to desires arise 'from the

calculations of reason' (*Republic* 439CD; see also 444BD). Seneca simply presupposed that reason could be a motive: 'Along the whole path of life Reason must be our guide, all our acts, from the smallest to the greatest, must follow her counsel' ('On Benefits' 2.18.2). Among early modern philosophers, the view that Hume challenges was actively promoted by the neo-Stoics. Du Vair said that it is beyond doubt that 'the Beginners and movers of our actions, in us, are the Understanding, and the Will', and that 'Reason...should alwaies command in all things' (*Morall Philosophy of the Stoicks*, 7, 33). See also Le Grand, *Man without Passion*, 25–7. The intellectual rationalism of Descartes's *Meditations* is complex, but, given that he there says that we are obliged to 'refrain from making a judgement' whenever we fail to 'perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness' and that 'it is clear by the natural light that the perception of the intellect should always precede the determination of the will' (*Meditations* 4 [AT 7: 59–60]), he apparently thought that any given action of the will bearing on belief or doubt both could and should be determined by reason alone—just as it was reason alone that determined him to suspend belief (i.e. 'set aside just as if I had found it to be wholly false') about anything which admitted of the slightest doubt (*Meditations* 2 [AT 7: 24]). Balguy succinctly summarized the moral rationalist position when he argued that, were human nature 'void of *natural Compassion*, as well as *Benevolence*', we could none the less 'be induced to attempt the Relief of a Person in Distress, merely from the *Reason* of the Thing, and the *Rectitude* of the Action', and that our 'Understandings' alone 'would prompt us to undertake' our duty (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 12–13). See also S. Clarke, *Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion* 1.7.

The claim that reason alone cannot be a motive to the will was widely espoused. Locke, against 'the general consent of all Mankind', found himself 'forced to conclude, that *good*, the *greater good*, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the *will*, until our desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us *uneasy* in the want of it' (*Essay* 2.21.35). Gordon claimed that 'Dry Reasoning has no Force' (*Cato's Letters* 44). Hutcheson argued that reason without the aid of the passions is often too slow and feeble to guide our actions, and that 'no *Reason* can excite to Action previously to some *End*' (*Inquiry* 2.7.3; *Essay, Illustrations* 2.5 [286]). He later cited Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.2 in support of his view (*Essay*, 4th edn., 1.3.6 n.). Butler said: 'Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, is not in reality a sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as man' (*Sermons*, sermon 5 §4). See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.2, 13; Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.7.1; H. More, *Account of Virtue* 1.6; Addison, *Spectator* 255; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 14. See also 3.1.1.5–8; 'The Sceptic' 26–7, 34–49, 53; *DP* 5.1–2; *EPM* Appx. 1.18–21; *HE* 53 [5: 257].

- 2.3.3.3 266.12–13 **the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it]** Aristotle and Hutcheson again provide precedents for Hume. The former said: 'We deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends' (*Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3, 1112<sup>b</sup>12); the latter: 'Our *Moral Sense* and Affections determine our End, but



*Reason must find out the Means*' (*Letters between Burnet and Hutcheson*, 38; cf. *Inquiry* 2.3.15; *Essay* 2.1).

- 2.3.3.4 266.36 **Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions**] The contrary view, that reason can and should avoid enslavement and control the passions was widely held (see ann. 265.17). Galen recommended that one should each morning consider 'whether it is better to live as a slave to his passions or to apply reason to each of them' (*Diagnosis and Cure of the Soul's Passions* 5 [44]). Pufendorf said: 'Our Passions are to be governed by Reason' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 2.4.12 title); Ayloffe, that 'Reason and Care may bridle in our Passions, and of insolent Masters make serviceable and faithful Slaves' (*Government of the Passions*, 46; cf. 23–4, 51); A. M. Ramsay, that 'all Men ought to submit themselves to Reason; it is she alone who hath a Right to command' (*Essay upon Civil Government*, 31). Chubb's *Discourse concerning Reason... Wherein Is Shewn, that Reason Either Is, or Else That it Ought to Be, a Sufficient Guide in Matters of Religion*, was published in 1731. See also Montaigne, 'Of the affection of fathers for their children', in *Complete Essays*, 279; Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.7.4; Charron, *Of Wisdom* 2.1; Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 1.50; Balguy, *Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 2: 85–91.

Elaborations on the theme that human reason is, regrettably, enslaved by the passions are found in authors Hume knew well. Malebranche, criticizing Seneca, said: 'Men can indeed overcome their passions through contrary passions... but this is not really to conquer them, this is not really to be delivered from their servitude; it is, perhaps, to exchange masters for a while, or rather it is to extend one's slavery'; elsewhere he quoted Rom. 7: 23: 'I feel in my body a law that wars against the law of my mind, making me a slave to the law of sin that is in my members', then went on to say that the pleasure associated with the passions 'becomes the sole master of the heart' and to insist that 'reason alone' cannot free itself from this bondage (*Search* 3.2.4 [183]; 5.2 [342]; 5.4 [360–1]). In his *Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet*, Bayle argued at some length that 'Man Does Not Act According to His Principles' (§136; cf. §§135–8). In his *Dictionary* he said that those who have most 'carefully studied the springs and circumstances of their actions' are persuaded 'that their reason and their understandings are slaves', and that since the sin of Adam, 'Reason, philosophy, the idea of virtue, the knowledge of the true Interest of self-love, all this is unable to resist the passions' ('Helen' [v]). Ovid's famous line, '*video meliora, proboque deteriosa sequor*' ('I see the better and approve it, but I follow the worse', *Metamorphoses* 7.20–1) provides a subtext for this discussion, just as it did for Locke's discussion at *Essay* 2.21.35 (see ann. 265.27).

Another group of writers viewed positively the influence of the passions on our behaviour. Locke, Hutcheson, and Butler, each of whom concluded that reason alone can never be a motive to the will (see again ann. 265.27), thereby committing themselves to the view that reason needs the help of the passions. Writing just at the end of the seventeenth century, Hickman epitomized the views of the many who disagreed with those who denigrated the passions: 'Tis certain that when our Passions are well regulated and reformed, they are great assistances and encouragements to

Vertue. Our Reason is a cold and heavy principle, that moves us but slowly to our Work; but Passion puts an eagerness into our Desires... Our Reason has but little to do in the forming of our minds, and bringing us to a Vertuous Religious Life; 'tis our Passions and Affections that must do the work, for till they begin to move, our Reason is but like a Chariot when the Wheels are off, that is never like to perform the Journey' (*Fourteen Sermons*, 271–2). See also Senault, *Use of the Passions* 1.1, 5; Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 2.74, 3.212; *Spectator* 408; Gordon, *Cato's Letters* 39; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 3.3.

Hume's claim that reason 'can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey' the passions was not entirely without precedent. Nicole had argued that, because of its weakness, it is 'not our reason that makes use of our passions, but our passions that make use of our reason, to compass their ends; and this is all we make our reason serve for' ('Of the Weakness of Man', *Discourses* 2.48). Mandeville claimed that the passions 'are the very Powers that govern the whole Machine', and that 'All Human Creatures are sway'd and wholly govern'd by their Passions... even those who act suitably to their Knowledge, and strictly follow the Dictates of their Reason, are not less compell'd so to do by some Passion... [as those] whom we call Slaves to their Passions' (*Enquiry into the Origin of Honour*, 6, 31).

2.3.3.6 267.19–20 **not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world]** Hutcheson emphasized the moral indifference of reason by saying that, were there beings 'who knew all the *Truths* which can be known, but had no *Moral Sense*... they would grant, that equal Intenseness of Pleasure enjoyed by Twenty, was a greater Sum of Happiness than if it were enjoyed only by One; but to them it would be *indifferent*' (*Letters between Burnet and Hutcheson*, 21–2). He later raised the stakes to 'a *Million*' to one; see *Essay, Illustrations* 2.2.1 [222].

2.3.3.8 268.10–12 **passions are calm... taken for the determinations of reason]** See also 2.3.4.1, 2.3.8.13, 3.3.1.18; *EPM* 6.15; *DP* 5.2.

2.3.3.10 268.22–35 **The common error... motives and passions]** A revised version of this paragraph (2.3.3.10) makes up *DP* 5.4; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

2.3.4 *Of the causes of the violent passions*

2.3.4.1 268.37–8 **passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence]** La Rochefoucauld, whom Hume cites near the end of this section, said that it is 'a Mistake to believe that none but the Violent Passions, such as Ambition and Love, are able to Triumph over the other Passions. Laziness, as languid as it is... insensibly destroys and consumes both Passions and Vertues' (*Moral Reflections and Maxims* 266).

269.6 **take him by his inclination, than what is vulgarly call'd his reason]** Several of Hume's philosophical predecessors used the term *inclination* to denote a disposition or 'a tendency or bent of the mind, will, or desires towards a particular object' (*OED*, 'inclination' 6). Mandeville said of those who developed what passes

for morality that they 'opposed by the Help of Reason their most violent Inclinations' (*Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, 44). Butler said: 'Man may act according to that principle or inclination which for the present happens to be strongest, and yet act in a way disproportionate to, and violate, his real proper nature' (*Three Sermons*, sermon 2 §13). See also Hobbes, *Elements of Law* 1.12.2, *Leviathan* 1.6 ¶53; Malebranche, *Search* 5.1 [337–8]; Shaftesbury, *Inquiry* 1.2.4, 2.2.1 [38, 103]; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 2.5.6, 2.6.5 [230, 255].

2.3.4.1–10 269.15–271.4 **we shall here examine...force and violence]** A variation on the final sentence of 2.3.4.1 makes up *DP* 6.1, while a revised and slightly shortened version of the following nine paragraphs, the balance of 2.3.3, makes up *DP* 6.2–3, 5–11; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

2.3.4.3 269.33–6 **in love, the little faults...give additional force to the prevailing passion]** Malebranche elaborated a similar view: 'When we are moved by a passionate love for someone, we judge that everything about him deserves to be loved. His grimaces are pleasant, his ugliness is not offensive, his clumsy and unpolished actions are quite correct, or at least natural. If he never speaks, it is because he is a sage; if he is never silent, it is because he is very intelligent' (*Search* 5.6 [370–1]). See also Castiglione, *Courtier* 1 [46]; Vives, *Passions of the Soul* 4; Hume, 'The Sceptic' 9.

269.36–40 **common artifice of politicians...excite...delay...before they give him a full insight]** Hume later said that Shakespeare's *Othello* illustrates this 'common artifice': 'Had you any intention to move a person extremely by the narration of any event, the best method of encreasing its effect would be artfully to delay informing him of it, and first to excite his curiosity and impatience before you let him into the secret. This is the artifice practised by IAGO in the famous scene of SHAKESPEARE' ('Of Tragedy' 13).

270.2 **conversion of the inferior emotion into the predominant]** On this conversion, see also 'Of Tragedy' 10–28.

2.3.4.5 270.17–18 **we naturally desire what is forbid]** Locke made a similar suggestion: 'We naturally...even from our Cradles, love Liberty, and have therefore an aversion to many Things, for no other Reason, but because they are injoynd us' (*Some Thoughts concerning Education* 148).

2.3.4.10 270.44–5 **la Rochefoucault...absence destroys weak passions, but encreases strong]** Hume paraphrases La Rochefoucauld, who had said 'Absence lessens Moderate Passions, but encreases great ones, like the Wind which blows out Tapers, but kindles Fires' (*Moral Reflections and Maxims* 276).

2.3.5 *Of the effects of custom*

2.3.5.1 271.7–9 **Custom has two original effects...bestowing a facility...inclination towards it]** Addison observed that custom is a 'second Nature' able to give rise to new 'Inclinations and Capacities', and continued: 'I shall in this Paper consider one very remarkable Effect which Custom has upon Human Nature...its wonderful

Efficacy in making every thing pleasant to us. A Person who is addicted to Play or Gaming, tho' he took but little delight in it at first, by degrees contracts so strong an Inclination towards it . . . that it seems the only End of his Being . . . what was at first an Exercise, becomes at length an Entertainment . . . The Mind grows fond of those Actions she is accustomed to'. Pythagoras and Bacon, he added, maintained the same thesis (*Spectator* 447). Butler observed that '*facility*' is produced by custom: 'by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure, in it. The inclinations which rendered us averse to it grow weaker' (*Analogy of Religion* 1.5.12). See also Malebranche, *Search* 2.2.2 [134–6]; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 1.7.2.

- 2.3.5.2 271.11–23 **When the soul . . . greater tranquillity]** This paragraph, revised and shortened, makes up *DP* 6.12; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

271.18 **foregoing principle]** See 2.3.4.2.

- 2.3.5.6 272.2–4 **custom increases all active habits, but diminishes passive . . . late eminent philosopher]** Among 'late' or recent philosophers, Butler had distinguished between *active* and *passive* habits, saying that 'associations of ideas not naturally connected might be called *passive habits*; as properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight, or hearing of words. And our readiness in speaking and writing them is an instance of the latter, of active habits.' He went on to observe that 'from our very faculty of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker . . . being accustomed to danger, begets intrepidity, i.e. lessens fear; to distress, lessens the passion of pity', and then to conclude that the passive impressions that serve as the 'motives and excitements' of active habits are 'by proportionable degrees . . . less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen' (*Analogy of Religion* 1.5.6, 8).

We have found nothing to support the view that Hume is here referring to the manuscript of Hutcheson's *System of Moral Philosophy* 1.2.9, the suggestion of D. C. Yalden-Thomson (see 'An Index of Hume's References in *A Treatise of Human Nature*'). Indeed, what little evidence there is suggests a contrary conclusion. A manuscript of the *System* was in November 1737 sent to Ireland to be read by some of Hutcheson's Irish friends, but nothing suggests that it was available to Hume while he was in London the year (Aug. 1737–Sept. 1738) before the *Treatise* went to press. Moreover, correspondence between Hume and Hutcheson began only in September 1739, shortly before the two philosophers met for the first time, as Hume's letter of 4 March 1740 shows (on this meeting and correspondence, see above, Historical Account, Sects. 3, 5). Finally, the observations which Hume describes are much more like those of Butler than anything found in Hutcheson's *System*. See Scott, *Francis Hutcheson*, 113–14; Hume, *Letters*, 1: 32–8; cf. 'The Sceptic' 30–1.

2.3.6 *Of the influence of the imagination on the passions*

- 2.3.6.1 272.8–10 **\*Tis remarkable . . . the latter]** A revised version of this sentence makes up part of *DP* 6.13; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).

- 272.12 **principle above-mention'd]** See 2.3.4.2, 2.3.5.2.
- 2.3.6.2 272.16–19 **Any pleasure...notion of pleasure]** A revised version of these lines makes up part of *DP* 6.13; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.3.6.3 272.25 **a noted passage in the history of Greece]** This anecdote illustrating the superior influence of particular ideas is found in Cicero and Plutarch. Hume's version of the story is nearer to that of Plutarch, who says that 'When the fleet of the Hellenes, after the departure of Xerxes, had put in at Pagasae and was wintering there, [Themistocles] made a harangue before the Athenians, in which he said that he had a certain scheme in mind which would be useful and salutary for them, but which could not be broached in public. So the Athenians bade him impart it to Aristides alone, and if he should approve of it, to put it into execution, Themistocles accordingly told Aristides that he purposed to burn the fleet of the Hellenes where it lay; but Aristides addressed the people, and said of the scheme which Themistocles purposed to carry out, that none could be either more advantageous or more iniquitous. The Athenians therefore ordered Themistocles to give it up' ('Themistocles and Camillus', *Lives* 4 [20.1–2]; cf. 'Aristides and Cato Major', *Lives* 9 [22.2]). For Cicero's version, see *De officiis* 3.11.49.
- 2.3.6.4 n. 66 (272) **Mons. Rollin]** That is, Charles Rollin, in his *Ancient History of the Egyptians, Carthaginians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes and Persians, Macedonians, and Greeks*. Rollin repeats the story of Themistocles and Aristides; see in the work mentioned 4.2.13 [3: 193–5].
- 2.3.6.5 273.19–43 **Any satisfaction...situation of the object]** These five paragraphs (2.3.6.5–9), revised and shortened, make up *DP* 6.14–17; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.3.6.7 273.32–3 **orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these ideas]** Hume's conception of the role of the orator appears to be conventional for the period. Chambers said that 'True *Eloquence*', the product of the orator, 'depends principally on the Vivacity of the Imagination' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Eloquence'); Trublet, that eloquence 'is only the art of moving the passions. And it is upon this account, that it is obliged to address itself to the imagination, by representing objects under sensible images, which is commonly the only way of moving the passions; and it might well enough be defined, The art of reaching the heart thro' the imagination' (Trublet, 'Uncertainty of any Judgment...upon Human Actions', *Essays* 27 [389]). See also Hobbes, *Elements of Law* 2.8.14; Hume, 'Of Eloquence'.
- 2.3.6.8 273.38–9 **have already observ'd]** See 2.1.11.7–8.
- 2.3.6.10 273.44 **have already observ'd]** See 1.3.7.5–7 and 1.3.10.3.
- 2.3.7 *Of contiguity and distance in space and time*
- 2.3.7.1 274.4–10 **easy reason...particular examination]** Compare *DP* 6.18.
- 2.3.7.3 274.33–4 **If my reasoning be just]** See 2.3.6.5.

- 2.3.7.7 275.44–276.1 **Nothing but an absolute necessity can oblige an historian to break the order of time]** Although Hume may not have broken ‘the order of time in’ his *History of England*, he did begin that important and widely read work with an account of the years 1603–88, then wrote about the period, c.1475–1603, and finally took up the account from ancient times to 1475. He also said that he would ‘not always observe an exact chronological order in [his] narration’ (*HE* 12 [2: 4–5]). See also 1.1.3.3; ‘My Own Life’ (*Letters*, 1: 4–5); *EHU* 3.8–9; *Letters*, 1: 167–8; *HE* 28 [3: 119], 30 [3: 209].
- 2.3.7.8 276.4 **before observ’d]** See ¶¶1–3 of this section
- 2.3.7.9 276.35–6 **above-mention’d]** See ¶6 of this section.
- 2.3.8 *The same subject continu’d*
- 2.3.8.1 277.4–7 **now consider three phenomena...great distance...distance in time...distance in past time]** Earlier writers had observed phenomena of the sort that concern Hume. Malebranche claimed that ‘a stupid curiosity makes us admire those things farthest removed from us, the oldest things, those from the farthest or most unknown countries, and even the most obscure books’ (*Search* 2.2.3.2 [138]); Berkeley suggested that it is ‘a common prejudice to despise the present, and overrate remote times and things’ (*Alciphron* 5.12). More generally, Montaigne said, ‘We admire more, and value more, foreign things than ordinary ones’ (‘Apology for Raymond Sebond’, 342), while Gracián, citing Tacitus, said that ‘tis customary to esteem most what is most unknown’ (*Art of Prudence*, 19 n.).
- 2.3.8.2 277.13–16 **A wide plain, the ocean...a suitable greatness]** Cf. 2.2.8.4; ann. 241.1.
- 277.25–6 **a Greek medal...is always esteem’d a valuable curiosity]** Malebranche said: ‘We search for ancient medals although they are encrusted with rust, and we carefully guard the lantern and worm-eaten slipper of some ancient: their antiquity constitutes their price’ (*Search* 2.2.3.2 [138–9]; cf. 5.7 [382]). See also 1.3.8.6; ann. 71.2.
- 2.3.8.3 277.33 **regard with more veneration the old]** Hume’s remark resembles Malebranche’s complaint about scholars who ‘glory in knowing’ the ‘rarest and most ancient histories’, and, although they ‘do not know the genealogy of currently reigning princes...carefully research those of men who have been dead for four thousand years’ (*Search* 4.7 [297–8]). Locke observed that the ‘little Controversies’ of the chronologists ‘are endless, and most of them of so little Importance to a Gentleman, as not to deserve to be inquir’d into...all that learned Noise and Dust of the Chronologist is wholly to be avoided’ (*Some Thoughts concerning Education* 183). Notwithstanding Locke’s advice, the chronology of the ancient world was widely canvassed in the early eighteenth century; Watt’s *Bibliographia Britannica* of 1824 lists forty titles (including Newton’s widely read *Chronology of the Ancient Kingdoms Amended*) published between 1700 and 1738, on the subject of chronology and universal history. See also the final paragraph (185) of ‘Populousness’.

- 2.3.8.5 278.5–6 *Spumantemque...leonem*] Virgil tells of a boy, Ascanius, the son of Aeneas, who, riding through the valleys on his spirited horse, hopes for an opportunity to prove his valour and keep his vows: 'Among the timid herds he longingly prays to be granted a foaming boar or a tawny lion descending from the mountain' (Virgil, *Aeneid* 4.158–9). Reading Quintus Sextius the Elder, said Seneca, gives one 'the spirit of a man who seeks where he may make trial of himself, where he may show his worth'. Then, after citing the same two lines that Hume has used, he went on: 'I want something to overcome, something on which I may test my endurance' (*Moral Epistles* 64.4–5).
- 2.3.8.7 278.19 *Atque...penna*] 'And spurns the wet earth on fleeing wing' (Horace, *Odes* 3.2.23–4). This line occurs at the end of a passage which, taken as a whole, may be translated: 'Virtue opens heaven to those who do not deserve to die, striving to make its way by a path denied to others, and speeds away and leaves below the common crowd and the grossness of earth.'
- 2.3.8.8 278.39 **in music and poetry...the fall or cadency of the harmony or period**] 'Cadence, in the modern Musick, may be defin'd, a certain Conclusion of a Song, or of the Parts thereof in divers Places of a Piece; which divide it, as it were, into so many Members or Periods. The *Cadence* is, when the Parts fall and terminate on a Chord or Note; the Ear seeming naturally to expect it... Cadence, in Poetry, [is] a certain Measure of Verse, varying as the Kinds of Verse vary' (Chambers, *Cyclopaedia*, 'Cadence').
- 2.3.8.9 279.10–11 **Milton represents...with the angels...descent is adverse**] Milton has the angel Moloc, arguing in favour of the attempt to regain heaven, say that 'in our proper motion we ascend | Up to our native seat: descent and fall | To us is adverse. Who but felt of late | ... | With what compulsion and laborious flight | We sunk thus low?' (*Paradise Lost* 2.75–81).
- 2.3.8.13 280.22–3 **men so different...in different times**] See also 2.1.4.3; ann. 186.16.
- 2.3.9 *Of the direct passions*
- 2.3.9.5–7 281.12–18 **When good...or body**] These three paragraphs, slightly revised, make up *DP* 1.4–6; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.3.9.5 281.12 **When good is certain or probable, it produces joy**] Hume's view is not unusual. Hobbes said that some pleasures 'arise from the expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the end, or consequence of things... these are *pleasures of the mind* of him... and are generally called joy' (*Leviathan* 1.6 ¶12); Locke, that 'Joy is a delight of the Mind, from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a Good' (*Essay* 2.20.7). See also Hutcheson, *Essay* 1.3.2 [60–1], where the taxonomy of Malebranche (*Search* 5.7 [373–84]) is acknowledged; Reynolds, *Treatise of the Passions* 19–22; Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 2.62; Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* 5.50; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 11.

281.12–13 **When evil is in the same situation there arises GRIEF or SORROW]** Again, Hume's account echoes earlier writers. Anticipated pains, Hobbes said, 'are called GRIEF' (*Leviathan* 1.6 ¶12). Hutcheson supposed that the 'Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect of it... is the Occasion of the Sensation of *Sorrow*' (*Essay* 1.3.2). Descartes and Watts focused on the present, saying that 'consideration of a present evil [of our own] arouses sadness' (*Passions of the Soul* 2.62); and 'if the Evil which we would avoid, be actually come upon us, all our former *Hopes* and *Fears* about it sink into present *Grief or Sorrow*' (*Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 11). Locke included the past as well as the present: '*Sorrow* is uneasiness in the Mind, upon the thought of a Good lost, which might have been enjoy'd longer; or the sense of a present Evil' (*Essay* 2.20.8).

2.3.9.6 281.14–15 **When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to FEAR or HOPE...degrees of uncertainty]** Hobbes had given a similar account: 'Hope is expectation of good to come, as fear is the expectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us expect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working in our minds: if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than those that make us expect evil, the whole passion is hope; if contrarily, the whole is fear' (*Elements of Law* 1.9.8). Locke introduced the element of probability: '*Hope* is that pleasure in the Mind... upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of a thing... *Fear* is an uneasiness of the Mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befall us' (*Essay* 2.20.9–10). See also Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.5; Reynolds, *Treatise of the Passions* 23, 27; Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 2.58; Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* 5.26; Hutcheson, *Essay* 1.3.2; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 10.

2.3.9.7 281.16 **DESIRE arises from good...AVERSION is deriv'd from evil]** Hume's position is a common one, and is expressed in terms similar to those used by Hutcheson: 'Apprehension of Good, either to our selves or others, as attainable, raises *Desire*: The like Apprehension of Evil, or the Loss of Good, raises *Aversion*, or *Desire* of removing or preventing it' (*Essay* 1.3.2 [61]). See also Hobbes, *Leviathan* 1.6 ¶¶2–7; Butler, *Analogy of Religion* 1.2.4; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 9.

2.3.9.8 281.19–23 **direct passions...arise from a natural impulse...produce good and evil]** Hume's account is again similar to that of Hutcheson, who said that the 'Appetites', unlike the other 'Desires and Aversions', *produce* good and evil or pleasure and uneasiness. There is, he said, 'an obvious Difference among our Desires, viz. that "some of them have a *previous*, painful, or uneasy Sensation, antecedently to any *Opinion* of Good in the Object; nay the Object is often chiefly esteemed good, only for its *allaying this Pain* or Uneasiness . . .". These Desires we may call *Appetites*... [they include] *Hunger* and *Thirst*, and the Desires between the *Sexes*... there is something like this in the Desire of *Society*... Our Benevolence and Compassion... are *Determinations of our Nature*, previous to our Choice from Interest, which excite us to Action, as soon as we know other sensitive or rational Beings' (*Essay* 1.4.2 [90]). See also *EPM* Appx. 2.12–13; *DP* 1.1–2.



- 2.3.9.9–12 281.25–282.22 **None of the direct affections . . . hope and fear**] These four paragraphs, revised and shortened, make up *DP* 1.7–10; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.3.9.9 281.30 **already advanc'd**] See esp. 1.3.11–12.
- 281.35–6 **imagination or understanding, call it which you please**] Compare n. 22, ann. n. 22.4(81).
- 2.3.9.12 282.6–9 **mind . . . resembles a string-instrument**] The analogy with similarly tuned strings was widely used. Vives suggested that the 'feeling of sympathy is like the plucking of a faculty to which similar faculties are attuned, as they say about the strings of two different lyres' (*Passions of the Soul* 7 [46]); Chetwood, that 'Nature has endu'd us with the tenderest Passions: We are all Counterparts one of another: The Instruments *tun'd* Unison: the doleful Cry of one in extreme Distress, makes the Strings tremble at our very Hearts' (*Sermon*, as quoted by Crane, 'Suggestions toward a Genealogy of the "Man of Feeling"', 208). See also ann. 230.44.
- 2.3.9.13 282.26 **already explain'd**] See 2.3.4.2–5.
- 2.3.9.14–17 282.32–283.33 **When the contrary passions . . . unite and incorporate**] These four paragraphs, revised and shortened, make up *DP* 1.21–4; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.3.9.17 283.30–1 **an *alcali* and an *acid* . . . destroy each other**] In early eighteenth-century chemistry, alkalis and acids were fundamental and polar substances. According to Chambers, despite their 'seeming Opposition and Hostility', the two types could mix in such a manner as to (as we would say) neutralize one another. One explanation of this phenomenon supposed '*Acids* to be little, solid, pointed Bodies, swimming at liberty in an aqueous Fluid', and alkalis 'to be spongy Bodies' with 'Pores' or 'Cavities . . . framed as it were on purpose' to receive the acids. The process by which acids enter these pores and drive out the 'aerial Matter' filling them was said to be 'effected with a great Velocity and a deal of Friction', thus producing a great deal of heat and the 'bubbles' typical of such mixtures (*Cyclopædia*, 'Alkaly', 'Acid').
- 283.32–3 **passions are like oil and vinegar . . . never perfectly unite and incorporate**] Oils, composed of smooth, rather than 'spongy Bodies' (see the previous ann.), would offer no openings into which the particles of an acid such as vinegar could fit, and thus the two substances would remain distinct. Rohault unhelpfully explained that oil does not mix with water because particles of oil unite with each other more readily than they unite with water. Thus 'if Water and Oil . . . be so shaken up together, that they seem to compose but one Liquor, they cannot continue so long, before the Particles of the Oil which meet each other, will entangle themselves so as to compose several Drops, which because of their Lightness, rise up, at the same time that the Particles of the Water . . . join together likewise, and compose other Drops

which sink downwards' (*System* 1.22.58). Pliny attributes the phenomenon to antipathy (*Natural History* 24.1.2.4 [7: 3–6]).

- 2.3.9.18–25 283.34–285.11 **As the hypothesis concerning hope...grief and joy]** These eight paragraphs (2.3.9.18–25), revised and shortened, make up *DP* 1.11–18; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.3.9.19 284.5–8 **in optics...a colour'd ray...proportionably more or less in the composition]** Hume's observation may reflect prop. 4, theorem 3 of Newton's *Opticks*, a theorem that begins: '*Colours may be produced by Composition*'. In illustration of his position, Newton reported that if the red and violet produced by two prisms were to be mingled, 'there will be generated according to their various Proportions various Purples' [132–3]. Hume may have observed the particular optical phenomenon he reports while studying natural philosophy as a student; see above, Historical Account, Sect. 1.
- 2.3.9.22 284.24–5 **cannot think of...tortures without trembling]** Cf. 3.3.1.7; ann. 368.21.
- 2.3.9.23 284.30 **when we tremble on the brink of a precipice]** Cf. 1.3.13.10; ann. 100.43; *EPM* 5.14.
- 2.3.9.26 285.13–14 **surprize is apt to change into fear]** Descartes observed that the 'principal cause of fear is surprize' (*Passions of the Soul* 3.176).
- 2.3.9.27–9 285.29–286.11 **Thus all kinds of uncertainty...passion to fix itself]** These three paragraphs, revised and shortened, make up *DP* 1.19–20; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *DP/NHR* (Clarendon Edition).
- 2.3.9.27 285.38–9 **Uncertainty is...as near ally'd to hope as to fear]** Hope and fear were often seen to be alike as responses to uncertainty. Descartes said that 'when we...consider whether there is much or little prospect of our getting what we desire, then whatever points to the former excites hope in us, and whatever points to the latter excites anxiety' (*Passions of the Soul* 2.58). Spinoza described hope as 'an inconstant Joy, born of the idea of a[n]...outcome we to some extent doubt', then argued that 'there is neither Hope without Fear, nor Fear without Hope', because those who hope for an outcome fear that it will not happen, and those who fear an outcome hope that it will not happen (*Ethics* 3, 'Definitions of the Affects', 12–13). See also Hobbes, *Elements of Law* 1.9.8; Mariotte, *Essai de logique* 1.62; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 10; and the following annotation.
- 2.3.9.28 286.1–4 **Horace has remark'd this phaenomenon. Ut assidens...praesentibus]** The lines from Horace illustrate Hume's observation about the connection between uncertainty and fear: 'Just as a nesting bird fears attacks by snakes against her featherless young, but fears more for them when she has left them, though she would not be able to give them more help even if she were with them' (*Epodes* 1.19–20).

The two preceding lines of the poem are also relevant to Hume's point: 'As your companion I shall be in less fear, whom a great fear holds for those absent.' Hutcheson cites the same passage to illustrate a similar point (*Essay* 1.6.6 [196]).

- 2.3.9.29 286.7–9 **virgin... fears and apprehensions... pleasure of the highest kind]** Montaigne, in his essay, 'How we cry and laugh for the same thing', said that 'however sweet the flame that warms the heart of wellborn maidens, still they have to be pulled by force from their mother's neck to be delivered over to their husband, no matter what this good companion says'. The good companion is Catullus, who had said: 'Is Venus really hateful to each blushing bride, | Or false those tears which dash their parents' joy and pride, | When on the bedroom threshold they pour out like rain? | Heaven help me, no; not from the heart do they complain' (*Complete Essays*, 173; Catullus, *De coma Berenices* 66.15).

- 2.3.9.31 286.19–21 **Terror, consternation, astonishment, anxiety... species and degrees of fear]** According to Cicero, the Stoics distinguished kinds or degrees of fear not unlike those mentioned by Hume, viz. 'sluggishness, shame, fright, timidity, consternation, pusillanimity, bewilderment, faintheartedness' (*Tusculan Disputations* 4.7.16). Descartes said that fear in the form of *terror* is a 'disturbance and astonishment of the soul which deprives it of the power to resist the evils which it thinks lie close at hand'; that *astonishment* is 'an excess of wonder, and it can never be other than bad'; and that *anxiety* is a 'disposition of the soul, which convinces it that its desires will not be fulfilled'. Jealousy and irresolution are among the other kinds of fear mentioned by Descartes (*Passions of the Soul* 3.174, 2.73, 3.165, 167, 170). See also Hobbes, *Leviathan* 1.6 ¶¶36–7; Spinoza, *Ethics* 3 p 39 schol., 52 p schol.; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 10.

286.24–7 **Love... in the shape of tenderness, friendship... same affections... same causes]** Descartes also supposed that the several forms of love are fundamentally the same, differing from one another only in the degree of esteem held for the object of this esteem (*Passions of the Soul* 2.83). See also Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 5.

2.3.10 *Of curiosity, or the love of truth*

- 2.3.10.1 286.38–9 **love of truth... first source of all our enquiries]** Curiosity, the 'love of truth' or desire for knowledge, was widely discussed, but among the moderns it was Hobbes who anticipated Hume's claim here. 'CURIOSITY', he said, 'is appetite of knowledge', a distinctively human appetite from which 'have arisen not only the invention of names, but also the supposition of such causes of all things as [humans] thought might produce them. And from this beginning is derived all philosophy' (*Elements of Law* 1.9.18). See also Descartes, *Passions of the Soul* 2.88; Malebranche, *Search* 4.3.1 [278–9], 5.11 [400]; Locke, *Some Thoughts concerning Education* 118; Addison, *Spectator* 237; Crousaz, *New Treatise of the Art of Thinking*, 1: 85. Compare 'Rise and Progress' 6.

2.3.10.2 287.3–5 **Truth is of two kinds...discovery of the proportions of ideas... conformity of our ideas of objects to their real existence]** This is Hume's first explicit formulation of this important distinction. See also 3.1.1.9, ann. 295.3–5.

2.3.10.3 287.17–18 **circumstance requisite to render truth agreeable, is the genius... employ'd in its invention]** Montaigne illustrated this insight with an anecdote: 'Democritus, having eaten at his table some figs that tasted of honey, immediately began to seek out in his mind whence came this unaccustomed sweetness; and to clear up the matter, he was about to get up from the table to see the situation of the place where these figs had been gathered. His maidservant, having heard the cause of this stir, laughed and told him not to trouble himself about it, for the reason was that she had put them in a vessel where there had been some honey. He was vexed that she had deprived him of this occasion for research and robbed him of matter for curiosity' ('Apology for Raymond Sebond', 378).

287.19 **What is easy and obvious is never valu'd]** The thought is an old one. Xenophon said that 'good things bring the greater pleasure, in proportion to the toil one undergoes beforehand to attain them; for toil gives a relish to good things' (*Cyropaedia* 7.5.80). Hutcheson made the same point: 'We may likewise observe, that *easy or obvious* Propositions... do not please us so much as those, which being less *obvious*, give us some *Surprize* in the Discovery: Thus we find little Pleasure in discovering... that *Equilateral Triangles are Equiangular*. These Truths... which Men have long possessed... do not give such sensible Joys as much smaller new *Additions* may give us' (*Inquiry* 1.3.4; cf. *Two Texts on Human Nature* 22). See also 'Stoic' 7; *HE* 71 [6: 541].

2.3.10.4 287.30 **The truth we discover must also be of some importance]** Hutcheson also made and illustrated similar claims: 'There is another *Beauty* in Propositions... which is, When one *Theorem* contains a vast Multitude of Corollarys easily deducible from it. Thus that *Theorem* which gives us the Equation of a *Curve*, whence perhaps most of its Propertys may be deduc'd, does some way please and satisfy our Mind above any other Proposition... there is the like *Beauty* in the Knowledge of some great *Principles*, or universal *Forces*, from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is *Gravitation*, in Sir ISAAC NEWTON's Scheme.' And: 'There is indeed another kind of *Surprize*, which adds to the Beauty of some Propositions less *universal*, and may make them equally pleasant with more *universal* ones; as when we discover a general Truth which seem'd before, upon some confus'd Opinion, to be a Falshood: as that *Assymptotes always approaching should never meet the Curve*' (*Inquiry* 1.3.5, 7 [33–4, 37]).

287.36–7 **philosophers have consum'd their time... health... fortune, in the search of such truths]** Malebranche said much the same about, not philosophers in general, but astronomers. These, he said, 'spend their time and wealth to get a precise knowledge of what is not only useless but impossible to know'. They 'spend whole nights hanging from a telescope in order to discover some spot or some new

planet in the sky'. As a consequence, they 'ruin health and lose wealth and abandon the demands of businesses'. Malebranche, unlike Hume (see 2.3.10.6), supposed such behaviour contrary to our true nature (*Search* 4.7 [295–6]; cf. 1.3.1 [12–14]). See also Erasmus, *Praise of Folly*, 70, 101–2; for Hume's own experience, see his letter to an unnamed physician, *Letters* 1: 12–18, quoted in part, Historical Account, Sect. 1.

2.3.10.6 288.14 **already remark'd]** See ¶3 of this section.

2.3.10.7 288.31 **above-mention'd]** See 2.2.9.2–3, 9, 15.

2.3.10.8 288.33–4 **two passions...nearly resembling...hunting and philosophy]**  
A similar comparison is made by Berkeley's Euphranor: 'There seems...to be some resemblance between fox-hunters and free-thinkers; the former exerting their animal faculties in pursuit of game, as you gentlemen employ your intellectuals in the pursuit of truth. The kind of amusement is the same, although the object be different' (*Alciphron* 5.1).

288.35–6 **pleasure of hunting consists in...difficulty...uncertainty]**  
Montaigne found this doubtless commonplace comment in Ariosto (*Orlando Furioso* 10.7), and himself later said: 'Agitation and the chase are properly our quarry.' The philosophical equivalent of taking 'pleasure in the chase' Montaigne described as a 'passion for study, which keeps us amused in pursuit of things of whose gain we have no hope' ('Apology for Raymond Sebond', 708, 378; cf. 'Of friendship' and 'Of the art of discussion', *Complete Essays*, 137). See, in addition to the next annotation, 2.2.4.4 and ann. 228.21.

2.3.10.9 289.8–9 **remark'd...pleasure of gaming arises not from interest alone]**  
Pascal explained 'why so many people take pleasure in gaming, in hunting and in the other diversions that occupy their minds completely. It is not in fact because happiness lies in that which can be acquired by means of these games, nor that we suppose that true bliss lies in the money we can win or in the hare we hunt. We would not want that if it were given to us. We do not seek a quiet, lifeless employment that allows us to think about our unfortunate condition, but the agitation that diverts us from such thoughts.' To this he added: 'A man spends his life without boredom betting every day a small amount. We would make him unhappy if we gave him every morning, on condition that he abstain from playing, the money he could win that day. One may say that he seeks the amusement of the game, rather than any gain. But let him play for nothing and he will not be aroused, but bored. It is not, then, only amusement that he seeks. A languishing, passionless amusement bores him. He must be aroused. He must pique himself by imagining that he will win that which he would not take on condition that he not play. He must set for himself an object of passion that excites his desire, his anger, his fear, his hope' (*Port-Royal Pensées*, 205–6 [B139, Kr136]). See also ann. 228.21; 'Of Interest' 11; 'Refinement in the Arts' 3.

2.3.10.12 289.34 **has been prov'd]** See 1.3.7.5–7.

Title-page **TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE]** See p. 688 above.

**EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF REASONING]** See p. 688 above.

*Duræ . . . honesti]* 'Constant lover of austere virtue, ask what virtue is, and ask [the oracle] to show you an example of a good man' (Lucan. *Civil Wars* 9.562-3). For commentary, see Russell, 'Epigram, Pantheists, and Freethought in Hume's *Treatise*'.

**Book 3. *Of Morals]*** The original Volume 3, which was entitled *Of Morals*, included an Advertisement, Contents, Errata, an Appendix illustrating and explaining some passages found in Book 1, as well as Book 3 of the *Treatise*, which was also entitled *Of Morals*. Thus, although the first four elements mentioned were part of Volume 3, they were not part of Book 3.

## Advertisement

292.3 *abstract reasonings contain'd in them]* Some early readers of Books 1 and 2 had complained that they were so abstruse as to be unintelligible. See the Preface to the *Abstract*; above, Historical Account, Sects. 3, 7. See also ann. 293.21.

292.6 *in the same sense as formerly]* See 1.1.1-4, 2.1.1.

### 3.1 *Of Virtue and Vice in General*

#### 3.1.1 *Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason*

293.title *Moral distinctions not deriv'd from reason]* For Hume's initial question about the origin of moral distinctions ('*Whether these moral distinctions be founded on natural and original principles, or arise from interest and education?*'), see 2.1.7.2; anns. 193.10, 19, 40, 42-3. Selected studies in the history of moral theory, including eighteenth-century accounts and bibliographies, are cited at the end of ann. 193.10.

#### 3.1.1.1 293.4 **leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life]** See also 'Study of History' 7.

293.21-2 **an age, wherein the greatest part...convert reading into an amusement]** Swift lamented that the greatest harm 'given to that general Reception, which the Writings of our Society have formerly received . . . hath been a superficial Vein among many Readers of the present Age, who will by no means be persuaded to inspect beyond the Surface and the Rind of Things' (*Tale of a Tub*, Intro. [64]). Butler said that many readers appear to read only to be entertained, and remarked the 'great number of books and papers of amusement, which . . . have in part occasioned, and most perfectly fall in with and humour, this idle way of reading and considering

things' (*Three Sermons*, Preface §§1–2). See also Crousaz, *Commentary on Mr. Pope's... Essay on Man* 300; Hume, 'Essay Writing'.

3.1.1.2 293.24–5 **has been observ'd]** See 1.2.6.7, ann. 49.4.

3.1.1.4 294.7–11 **Those who affirm that virtue is...a conformity to reason...eternal fitnesses...immutable measures of right...impose an obligation...on human creatures...also on the deity]** S. Clarke had undertaken to prove that the 'same necessary and eternal *different Relations*, that different Things bear one to another; and the same consequent *Fitness or Unfitness* of the Application of different Things or different Relations one to another, with regard to which the Will of God always and necessarily *does* determine it self to choose to act only what is agreeable to Justice, Equity, Goodness and Truth...*ought* likewise constantly to determine the Wills of all subordinate rational Beings, to govern all their Actions by the same Rules, for the Good of the Publick in their respective Stations' (*Discourse concerning the Obligations of Natural Religion*, prop. 1 [148]). Balguy claimed that 'VIRTUE, or Moral Goodness, is the Conformity of our Moral Actions to the Reasons of Things. VICE the contrary'; that the 'RELATIONS *between Things, or Persons*...are certainly real, unalterable, and eternal'; and, later, that the 'Goodness of the Deity himself' derives from the same principle of reasonableness that constitutes the foundation of human morality (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 30–1, 57). See also W. Law, *Remarks upon... The Fable of the Bees*, 22–4; Jackson, *Existence and Unity of God*, 128–31; Chubb, *Discourse concerning Reason*, 33 ff. Locke also argued that our 'Actions are considered, as Good, Bad, or Indifferent' in so far as they are in 'Conformity to, or Disagreement with some Rule, that makes them to be regular or irregular, Good or Bad', but he does not insist that the rules in question must be eternal or immutable (*Essay* 2.28.15; cf. ann. 294.11).

Hume was later (*EPM* 3 n. 12) to suggest that the view that morality depends on certain relations can be traced to Malebranche, who said that 'it is evident that there are such things as True and False, Right and Wrong, and that too in respect of all intelligent Beings; that whatsoever is true in respect of Man, is true also in respect of Angels, and of God himself; that what is Injustice or Disorder with relation to Man is so also with relation to God. For all Spiritual Beings contemplating the same intellectual Substance necessarily discover in it the same Relations of Greatness, or the same speculative Truths. They discover also the same practical Truths, the same Laws' (*Treatise of Morality* 1.1.7). In this same note, Hume also attributes this relational account to Montesquieu, Cudworth, and S. Clarke. Ferguson had earlier (1673) reported that philosophers use the term *virtue* 'to signifie a *habit* or facility of working or acting conformably to the Law of *Right Reason*', and that 'Whatever actions were found agreeable and conformable to Reason, they stiled them *vertues*; and on the contrary, any act that was *morally* evil, they called it *vice*; stating withal the obliquity of *vice* in a difformity to Reason'. He then cited philosophers (e.g., Aristotle, Cicero, Hooker) who appeared to him to adopt this usage (*Sober Enquiry into Moral Virtue*, 10, 14).

Hutcheson offered extensive criticism of rationalist moral theory in his correspondence with the younger G. Burnet (see their *Letters concerning the True Foundation of Virtue*), and then elaborated on this in his *Illustrations upon the Moral*

*Sense* (*Essay* 2.1–2; see also *Inquiry* 2.7.3). J. Clarke complained that those who derive our obligation to virtue ‘from what they call the Eternal Differences of things’ produce ‘a pompous Shew of great Exactness, and vast Profundity, [which] when it comes to be examined into, seems little more than a Heap of unintelligible Words, amassed together to no purpose, and has a Tendency to make Morality appear ridiculous’ (*Examination Relating to Moral Obligation*, 7–8). Hume returned to the issue raised in this and the following section in *EPM* 1 and Appx. 1; see also *LG* 37.

294.11–12 **systems concur . . . morality . . . discern’d . . . by ideas, and . . . their . . . comparison]** The eighteenth-century rationalists whom Hume is criticizing appear to owe at least part of their moral epistemology to Locke. Once moral rules are established, Locke argued, ‘the Mind is easily able to observe the Relation any Action hath to it; and to judge, whether the Action agrees, or disagrees with the Rule: and so hath a Notion of *Moral Goodness or Evil*, which is either Conformity, or not Conformity of any Action to that Rule: And therefore, is often called Moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing but a Collection of several simple *Ideas*, the Conformity thereto is but so ordering the Action, that the simple *Ideas*, belonging to it, may correspond to those, which the Law requires. And thus we see, how Moral Beings and Notions, are founded on, and terminated in these simple *Ideas*, we have received from Sensation or Reflection’ (*Essay* 2.28.14). Barbeyrac, quoting Locke at length, concluded that the ‘Rules of Morality’ are more easily demonstrated than ‘Speculative truths’, thus showing that he also supposed morality discerned by the comparison of ideas (*Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 2). See also Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 1.2.

3.1.1.5 294.19–20 **Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical]** Aristotle made this distinction, saying that ‘the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action’ (*Metaphysics* 2.1, 993<sup>b</sup>20–1). Among moderns, Locke made the distinction at the beginning and again at the end of the *Essay*, where he says that ‘*natural Philosophy*’ broadly conceived, has the goal of ‘bare speculative Truth’. He then describes the practical (*Praktiké*) as the ‘Skill of Right applying our own Powers and Actions, for the Attainment of Things good and useful’, and adds that the ‘most considerable under this Head, is *Ethicks*’ (4.21.2–3; cf. 1.2.2, 1.3.1–3). Butler, citing Cicero and M. Aurelius, said that ‘the object of this [the moral] faculty is actions, comprehending under that name active or practical principles’ (‘Of the Nature of Virtue’ §4; cf. ann. 226.8). See also Barbeyrac, *Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 1; Hutcheson, *Letters between Burnet and Hutcheson*, 28; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, ‘Philosophy’; *THN* 3.3.6.6; ann. 395.30.

3.1.1.6 294.28 **already prov’d]** See 2.3.3, esp. ¶¶1–7; anns. 265.14, 17, 27; 266.12, 36; 267.19; *EPM* Appx. 1.18–21.

295. 3 **Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood]** Locke suggested that the discovery of truth is one role of reason (*Essay* 4.17.4; cf. 4.18.8, 4.19.14). Hutcheson supposed ‘Reason is understood to denote our *Power of finding out true Propositions*’ (*Essay* 2.1; we owe this reference to S. Darwall, ‘Hutcheson on Practical Reason’, 74).



3.1.1.9 295.3–5 **Truth or falshood...agreement or disagreement...real relations of ideas...real existence and matter of fact]** Malebranche suggested a similar set of relations: 'Truth is nothing else but a real relation, whether of equality or inequality. Falsehood is but the *negation* of truth, or a false and imaginary relation.' And 'because all truths are but relations...in all questions we search only for the knowledge of some relations, be they relations between ideas or between things and their ideas' (*Search* 6.1.5 [433]; 6.2.7 [489]). Locke said that '*Knowledge* then seems to me to be nothing but *the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas.*' He then distinguished three kinds of agreement or disagreement (identity, relation, coexistence) between ideas, and a fourth, 'that of *actual real Existence* agreeing to any *Idea*' (*Essay* 4.1.2–7). When Hume in *EPM* returned to the issue of the origin of moral distinctions, he said: 'Reason judges either of *matter of fact* or of *relations*' (Appx. 1.6); see also ann. 50.3; *EHU* 4.1.

295.7–8 **passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible...agreement or disagreement]** Balguy articulated the view with which Hume here disagrees: 'Moral Actions, like other Things, agree or disagree, essentially and unalterably. Hence flow those Relations and Reasons whereon Morality is founded, and which derive Obligations upon all Agents capable of perceiving them' (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 2: 9). See also 2.3.3.5.

3.1.1.10 295.13 **actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason]** In the second of his letters to the younger G. Burnet, Hutcheson wrote: 'If there be any particular Kind of Conformity which constitutes *Moral Goodness*, I wish it were explained, and distinguished from that *Conformity* between every *Object* of our Knowledge and the *Truths* which we know' (*Letters between Burnet and Hutcheson*, 57). In his *Illustrations upon the Moral Sense* Hutcheson argued that a '*Conformity to Truth*...cannot make a Difference among Actions'; that no '*Conformity of Actions to Reason*' can excite to action in the absence of a proposed end; and that the reasons given to justify ends, including ultimate ends, presuppose a moral sense (*Illustrations* 2.1 [213–16]). Consequently, he was satisfied that virtue and vice derive from a moral sense.

3.1.1.12 295.33 **has been observ'd]** See 2.3.3.2–3.

296.5–6 **a mistake of fact...not generally suppos'd criminal]** Shaftesbury maintained that 'A MISTAKE therefore *in Fact* being no Cause or Sign of ill Affection, can be no Cause of Vice. But a Mistake of *Right* being the Cause of unequal ["any undue, irregular, or unsocial"] Affection, must of necessity be the Cause of vitious Action, in every intelligent or rational Being' (*Inquiry* 1.2.3 [33–4]). In contrast, Descartes appears to have made mistakes of fact morally culpable; see ann. 265.27. On the distinction between mistakes of fact and right, see also *EPM* Appx. 1.12.

3.1.1.13 296.20–1 **nor will there be any difference...concerning an apple or a kingdom]** Montaigne noted that the Stoics took all vices to be equally reprehensible, then referred to Horace, who had said: 'nor will Reason ever prove this, that the sin is one and the same to cut young cabbages in a neighbour's garden and to steal by

night the sacred emblems of the gods' ('Of drunkenness', in *Complete Essays*, 244; Horace, *Satires* 1.3.115–17). Wollaston, comparing the theft of a book to the theft of an estate, defended his own rationalist position by challenging the Stoic view that all crimes are equal: 'For neither all evil, nor all good actions are equal. Those truths which they respect, tho they are equally true, may comprise matters of very different importance; or more truths may be violated one way than another: and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be equally (one as well as the other) said to be crimes, but not *equal crimes*' (*Religion of Nature Delineated* 1.9).

- 3.1.1.15 n. 68.1–3 (297) **a late author ... affirm'd, that such a falshood is the foundation of ... moral deformity]** Wollaston, the author to whom Hume refers, affirmed that '*A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds, as well as by express words or another proposition.*' To this he added that, so far as free and rational agents are concerned, '*Every Act ... and all those omissions which interfere with truth (i.e. deny any proposition to be true; which is true; or suppose any thing not to be what it is, in any regard) are morally evil, in some degree or other: the forbearing such acts, and the acting in opposition to such omissions are morally good.*' And that 'the distinction between moral good and evil ... is founded in the respect, which mens acts bear to truth' (*Religion of Nature Delineated* 1.3, 9, 10). Others objecting to Wollaston's moral theory include Hutcheson (*Illustrations* 2.3); Bott, *Principal and Peculiar Notion*.

n. 68.10 (297) **vain to urge, that inanimate objects act without liberty and choice]** Wollaston, having said that an act, to '*be denominated morally good or evil, must be the act of a being capable of distinguishing, choosing, and acting for himself: or more briefly, of an intelligent and free Agent*', went on to add that, properly speaking, 'no act at all can be ascribed to that, which is not indued with these capacities. For that, which cannot distinguish, cannot choose', and thus 'is in reality only *an instrument* in the hand of something which imposes the necessity; and cannot properly be said *to act*, but *to be acted*' (*Religion of Nature Delineated* 1.1).

n. 68.28–9 (297) **is property ... intelligible, without an antecedent morality]** Hume returns to this issue at 3.2.1.10–18, 3.2.2.11, 3.2.6.4.

- 3.1.1.18 298.17–21 **opinion ... morality is susceptible of demonstration ... equal certainty with geometry]** That 'morality is susceptible of demonstration' was a view widely held. Hobbes said that 'politics and ethics ... can be demonstrated *a priori*; because we ourselves make the principles' (*De Homine* 10.5). Cumberland maintained that 'the science of *Morality* and *Politicks*, both can, and ought to, *imitate* the *Analytick Art* (in which I comprehend ... Algebra), as the noblest Pattern of Science' (*Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 4.4 [185]; cf. 1.7 [45]). Pufendorf, although he insisted that moral principles are ultimately of divine, not human, origin, said that practical truths about right, justice, or obligation may not only be demonstrated, but that 'all these Kinds of Truths we maintain to be so clearly and certainly deducible from their genuine Principles and Causes, that no Man in his right Wits, can entertain a Doubt concerning them' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 1.2.8). Locke argued that because moral ideas are mixed

modes having no archetypes, '*Morality is capable of Demonstration*, as well as Mathematics: Since the precise real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may be perfectly known' (*Essay* 3.11.15–16; see also 4.3.18). S. Clarke said 'That from these *different relations* of different things, there necessarily arises an *agreement or disagreement* of some things with others, or a *fitness or unfitness* of the application of different things or different relations one to another; is likewise as plain, as that there is any such thing as *Proportion or Disproportion* in *Geometry and Arithmetick*' (*Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion* 1.1 [174–5]). Balguy, although he said that the relation between such ideas as '*Bounty and Gratitude*... springs from the same *Necessity of Nature* that makes the *Three Angles of a Triangle equal to Two Right ones*', granted that such terms as '*Equality or Proportion*' are used in a 'somewhat figurative' sense 'when they are used to denote *Moral Fitness*' (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 2: 6; cf. 1: 36, 38). Hume returned to this topic at *EPM* Appx. 1.7–8.

298.22–3 '**'tis allow'd...no matter of fact is capable of being demonstrated]** This view was commonplace among early modern philosophers. Grotius said that 'as to Facts we cannot have Demonstration' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.7.8); Pufendorf, that about 'Matters of Fact' we can only 'be *morally certain*...this latter Sort of moral Certitude is nothing else but a strong Presumption grounded on probable Reasons' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 1.2.11); Locke, that concerning bodies and minds, '*Certainty and Demonstration*, are Things we must not...pretend to' (*Essay* 4.3.26). A. M. Ramsay has an interlocutor say that to 'demonstrate is to prove, not only that a Thing is, but the Impossibility of its not being. You cannot prove in this Manner the Existence of Bodies...One may *demonstrate* the Connection of *Ideas*, but *Facts* can be proved only by the Testimony of the Senses' (*Travels of Cyrus* 6 [2: 37]). See also Hobbes, *Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance* 33 [390]; Crousaz, *Commentary on Pope's Essay on Man*, 19. For further references to the related set of issues raised here, see ann. 61.14.

3.1.1.19 n. 69.2–3 (298) **do not say, that morality lies in the relations...distinguishable by reason]** Some of those who asserted that morality is demonstrable may have claimed that 'morality lies in the relations'. Locke said that '*Morally Good and Evil* then, is only the Conformity or Disagreement of our voluntary Actions to some Law' (*Essay* 2.28.5; cf. 2.28.14–15, quoted anns. 294.7, 11). Balguy, having defined virtue as '*the Conformity of our Moral Actions to the Reasons of Things*', went on to say that '*REASON, or Intelligence, is a Faculty enabling us to perceive, either immediately or mediately, the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, whether Natural or Moral*' (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 30, 32–3).

3.1.1.21 299.10 **moral good and evil belong only to the actions of the mind]** Hume returns to this issue at 3.2.1.2–7, 3.3.1.19–21; see also anns. 307.7, 373.19.

299.15–17 **if these relations cou'd belong to internal actions...might be guilty of crimes in ourselves]** Many Christians did suppose that some 'internal actions' are in themselves moral transgressions or sins: 'But I say unto you,

That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart' (Matt. 5: 28). On motives not acted upon, see 3.3.1.19; ann. 373.19.

- 3.1.1.22 299.28–31 **relations...have...influence in directing the will of the deity]** Malebranche, having shown what he supposed to be 'the nature of the immutable order of justice and how this order has the force of law', went on to say: 'We can conceive how this law is universal for all minds as well as for God himself, why it is necessary and absolutely without exception' (*Elucidations* 10 [619–20]). Chubb argued: 'It being equally as unreasonable and unfit, that God should make an unreasonable law, or a law which answers no good end, as that any other lawgiver should act thus, seeing the reason of things is, and ought to be, as much a rule of action to him, as to any other intelligent being' (*Discourse concerning Reason*, 55). For the similar views of S. Clarke and Balguy, see ann. 294.7. See also Cicero, *De legibus* 1.7.23; Locke, in contrast to these philosophers, declared that we know nothing of the higher intellectual world. See his *Reasonableness of Christianity* 14 [141]; *Essay* 3.11.23, 4.3.27; see also Mandeville, *Enquiry into the Origin of Honour*, pp. ix–x.

On the matter of morality and higher beings, Hume, just as he was composing his final draft of *Treatise* 3, wrote to Hutcheson: 'I wish from my Heart, I could avoid concluding, that since Morality, according to your Opinion as well as mine, is determin'd merely by Sentiment, it regards only human Nature & human Life. This has been often urg'd against you, & the Consequences are very momentous. If you make any Alterations on your Performances, I can assure you, there are many who desire you would more fully consider this Point; if you think that the Truth lyes on the popular Side. Otherwise common Prudence, your Character, & Situation forbid you touch upon it. If Morality were determin'd by Reason, that is the same to all rational Beings: But nothing but Experience can assure us, that the Sentiments are the same. What Experience have we with regard to superior Beings? How can we ascribe to them any Sentiments at all? They have implanted those Sentiments in us for the Conduct of Life like our bodily Sensations, which they possess not themselves' (letter of 16 March 1740, *Letters*, 1: 40). See also 'Immortality of the Soul' 20–6; *DNR* 3.13, 11.16, 12.31.

299.40 **already prov'd]** See 2.3.3.2, 6–7; ¶¶7–9 of the present section.

300.1 **has been shown]** See 1.3.2–7, 14, esp. 1.3.2.5, 1.3.6.1–2, 1.3.14.28–9.

- 3.1.1.24 300.17–19 **Of all crimes...most horrid...is ingratitude...against parents]** Seneca said that 'Homicides, tyrants, thieves, adulterers, robbers, sacrilegious men, and traitors there will always be; but worse than all these is the crime of ingratitude, unless it be that all these spring from ingratitude, without which hardly any sin has grown to great size' ('On Benefits' 1.10.4). Cicero explained why some found ingratitude so heinous: 'all men detest ingratitude and look upon the sin of it as a wrong committed against themselves also, because it discourages generosity; and they regard the ingrate as the common foe of all the poor' (*De officiis* 2.18.63; see also

*De legibus* 2.7.16). Gassendi was explicit about ingratitude and parents: 'if ingratitude to others be hateful, that which is shewn to parents must certainly be the most horrid and detestable' ('Doctrine of Epicurus', in Stanley, *History of Philosophy* 3.29 [3: 934]). See also Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 3.3.17; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 2.7.9.13, 15; Balguy, *Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 2: 9–11; Hume, *EPM* 5 n. 18, 7 n. 42; 'Immortality of the Soul' 28.

300.30 any inanimate object] Compare *EPM* Appx. 1.17.

300.36–7 'Tis not sufficient to reply, that a choice or will is wanting] Wollaston, Balguy, and others argued that involuntary actions could have no moral merit. Hutcheson argues the contrary view; see anns. 388.3, 15. See also 3.3.4.3–4, ann. 388.6.

- 3.1.1.25 301.1–3 why incest in the human species is criminal...in animals...not] Ferguson said: 'There are many things generally practised by the *Brute Animals*, the imitation of which would be abominable in men. That which in us would be *incest*, is not so in them.' But he also noted that Diogenes and Chrysippus held that what is permitted to animals, is also permitted to humans (*Sober Enquiry into Moral Virtue*, 79). To the objection that some cultures do not treat incest as morally wrong, Hutcheson replied that it is none the less the case that our disapprobation of incest derives from a moral sense: 'Had we no *moral Sense natural* to us, we should only look upon *Incest* as hurtful to our selves, and shun it, and never hate other *incestuous Persons*, more than we do a *broken Merchant*; so that still this Abhorrence supposes a *Sense of moral Good*' (*Inquiry* 2.4.6 [213]). Ovid graphically noted that only humans treat incest as morally wrong (*Metamorphoses* 10.321–30). See also Locke, *Essay* 3.5.6–7. Hume considers the reason of animals at 1.3.16, and their dispositions to pride and humility or love and hatred at 2.1.12 and 2.2.12, respectively.

The moral status of animals had been a topic of much interest since ancient times; see, e.g., Cicero, *De officiis* 1.4.14. For brief early modern discussions, see Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.2–3; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Barbara', [C]. For references to more recent studies, see ann. 118.15.

- 3.1.1.26 301.32–4 Wilful murder...Examine it...find that matter of fact...you call vice] Locke used the same example, asking his readers to 'consider the complex *Idea* we signify by the Word Murther', and predicted that 'when we have taken it asunder, and examined all the Particulars, we shall find them to amount to a Collection of simple *Ideas*, derived...from Reflection on the Operations of our own Minds...[and] from Sensation'. From these sources he supposed we derive that 'Collection of those simple sensible *Ideas*...of some Action, whereby we put an end to Perception, and Motion in the Man; all which simple *Ideas*, are comprehended in the Word Murther'. He then concluded that this 'Collection of simple *Ideas*, being found by me to agree or disagree, with the Esteem of the Country I have been bred in; and to be held by most Men there, worthy [of] Praise, or Blame, I call the Action vertuous or vitious...by what Standard soever we frame in our Minds the *Ideas* of

Vertues or Vices, they consist only . . . of Collections of simple *Ideas*, which we originally received from Sense or Reflection' (*Essay* 2.28.14). Berkeley, also using the same example, came to the conclusion that 'sin or moral turpitude doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful, though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder' (*Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 236–7]). Hume later used as an example 'the crime of *ingratitude*' to reach conclusions similar to those reached here; see *EPM* Appx. 1.5–6; see also ¶16 of that same Appendix.

301.38 **a sentiment of disapprobation**] The feelings or sentiments of approbation and disapprobation had been associated with moral evaluations by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler, and even Balguy. In his *Illustrations upon the Moral Sense* Hutcheson supposed that in our responses to *actions*, the third of three items to be distinguished, is the '*Perception of Approbation or Disapprobation* arising in the Observer, according as the *Affections of the Agent* are apprehended *kind* in their *just Degree, or deficient, or malicious*' (*Illustrations* 2.4 [283]; cf. 2.1 [243]; *Inquiry* 2, Intro.; ann. 303.3). Butler said that moral 'approbation and disapprobation are altogether different from mere desire of our own . . . happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occasion of this last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasiness: whereas the object of the first is active behaviour' ('Of the Nature of Virtue' §8; cf. §§1–2, 13; *Three Sermons*, Preface §15). See also Shaftesbury, *Inquiry* 2.1 [105, 107]; Balguy, *Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 24; Watts, *Doctrine of the Passions Explain'd* 6; below, 3.1.2.3.

301.40–2 **when you pronounce any action . . . vicious . . . you have a . . . sentiment of blame**] Locke, appealing to precedents in Virgil and Cicero, said that 'Men every where . . . give the Name of *Virtue* to those actions, which amongst them are judged praise worthy; and call that *Vice*, which they account blamable'; that 'the measure of what is every where called and esteemed *Virtue* and *Vice* is this approbation or dislike, praise or blame'; that 'by this approbation and dislike [men] establish amongst themselves, what they will call *Virtue* and *Vice*'; and that 'everywhere *Virtue* and Praise, *Vice* and Blame, go together. *Virtue* is every-where that, which is thought Praise-worthy; and nothing else but that, which has the allowance of publick Esteem, is called *Virtue*' (*Essay* 2.28.10–11). See also ann. 303.3.

301.42–4 **Vice and virtue . . . compar'd to sounds, colours . . . according to modern philosophy . . . perceptions in the mind**] Hume discusses the status that 'sounds, colours, heat and cold' are given by 'modern philosophy' in 1.4.2.12–14 and 1.4.4; see also anns. 128.22, 28, 34, 44; 129.4; 149.13, 38, 40. Addison 'supposed that my Reader is acquainted with that great Modern Discovery, which is at present universally acknowledged by all the Enquirers into Natural Philosophy: Namely, that Light and Colours, as apprehended by the Imagination, are only Ideas in the Mind, and not Qualities that have any Existence in Matter . . . this is a Truth which

has been proved incontestably by many Modern Philosophers, and is indeed one of the finest Speculations in that Science' (*Spectator* 413, with a reference to Locke, *Essay* 2.8).

In correspondence with Hutcheson, Hume expressed doubts about a slightly different version of this passage, the text of which is found above, Historical Account, Sect. 5. Hutcheson himself had said that, although our moral sentiments are the effects of sensed actions and inferred passions ('*Affections*') of agents, the '*Approbation or Disapprobation*' felt by observers 'cannot be supposed an *Image of any thing external*, more than the *Pleasures of Harmony, of Taste, of Smell*. But let none imagine, that calling the *Ideas of Virtue and Vice* Perceptions of a *Sense*, upon apprehending the *Actions and Affections* of another does diminish their *Reality*, more than the like *Assertions* concerning all *Pleasure and Pain, Happiness or Misery*' (*Illustrations* 2.4 [283]). See also ann. 302.title; 'The Sceptic' 11, 17n; *EPM* Appx. 1.21; 'Standard of Taste' 7, 16.

- 3.1.1.27 302.7–13 **In every system of morality ... instead of the usual copulations ... is, and is not, I meet...with an ought, or an ought not**] Some of Hume's predecessors supposed that *ought* statements are derivable from *is* statements in a variety of ways. Malebranche argued that 'our duty to God...is the easiest part of morals. For, first of all...Everything that God has made proves His existence... In the second place, it is obvious that we must follow the commands of God in order to be happy... we are indispensably obliged not to turn away from Him... this single principle of morality—that, in order to be virtuous and happy, it is absolutely necessary to love God above all things and in all things—is the foundation of the whole Christian morality. Nor is it necessary to work very hard in order to derive from this principle all the consequences we need to establish the general rules of our conduct' (*Search* 4.2.3 [270–1]). Locke suggested that the '*Idea* of a supreme Being... whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend; and the *Idea* of our selves, as understanding, rational Beings...would...if duly considered, and pursued, afford such Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Action, as might place *Morality amongst the Sciences capable of Demonstration*; wherein I doubt not, but from self-evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as incontestable as those in Mathematicks, the measures of right and wrong might be made out' (*Essay* 4.3.18; cf. 4.13.3; see also Barbeyrac, *Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 4, 6). S. Clarke, having said that the eternal relations and fitnesses of things that determine the will of God *ought* 'to determine the Wills' of all rational creatures (see ann. 294.7), went on to say that 'these eternal and necessary differences of Things, make it *fit and reasonable* for Creatures so to act; they cause it to be their *Duty*, or lay an *Obligation* upon them, so to do', and then that he had 'endeavoured to deduce the *original Obligations* of *Morality*, from the *necessary and eternal Reason* and *Proportions of Things*' (*Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion* 1 [148, 223]). For an extended version of the argument, see Wilkins, *Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* 1.4–17. The presumed connection between the divine benefaction of creation and our obligation as the resulting creatures was made

explicit by Chubb: 'God indeed is our Creator, and as he called us into being without our consent, so hereby he became our common parent, and the natural guardian of our happiness: and hereby he has, in reason, a right to govern us... As this rule of action is founded in the reason of things; so our obligation to obedience is founded on the same principle. That is, we are, in reason, obliged to yield obedience to this law' (*Discourse concerning Reason*, 55–6). See also Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 4.1 [179–81]; Carmichael, 'Supplements and Observations', *Natural Rights*, 17; Balguy, *Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 2: 8–9; Jackson, *Existence and Unity of God*, 131–6.

302.14–15 **this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation...shou'd be...explain'd]** The anonymous 'Gentleman' who raised objections to Balguy's *Foundation of Moral Goodness* argued that (1), 'If we had otherwise no Idea of Obligation, the Ideas of Gratitude, Ingratitude, and Bounty, could never so much as afford us a general Idea of Obligation it self; or inform us what is meant by that Term; much less could we be able to deduce the particular Obligation to Gratitude from these Ideas'; that (2), 'I know not well what you mean by this Expression, viz. *That our Understandings are capable of Moral Perceptions*. I believe every body agrees that in some Sense they are; that is, that the Mind is capable of receiving or forming Moral Ideas: But it will not follow from hence, that Obligation is deducible merely from our Moral Ideas, without supposing any Sentiment'; and that (3), 'This Moral Perception, whereby the Reasonableness of Goodness and Gratitude appears so clearly, is no doubt something distinct from the Ideas themselves of Gratitude and Goodness. I cannot find any sort of Obligation is included merely in those Ideas. Besides, this Moral Perception must not only be an Idea... but it must comprehend some Proposition, or Affirmation; as that a Man ought to be grateful, or that he ought to desire the Good of others. But I do not see any such Propositions as these included in those Ideas' (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 2: 8, 11–12, 53–4). The anonymous gentleman is likely a certain James, Lord D'Arcy of Bromshall, Yorkshire (d. 1733); see *Biographia Britannica*, 'Balguy, James'. We are indebted to John Stephens for this identification, which revises that he made in the *Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century Philosophers*.

### 3.1.2 *Moral distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense*

302.title *Moral distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense]* The view that moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense is often traced to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. The former uses the term 'moral sense' sparingly in the text of his work (see *Moralists* 2.1 [240]), and several times in the margins of his *Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit* (see 1.3.1–2 [46, 41–54]). There are also eight references to the term in the index to Shaftesbury's collection, *Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*. Hutcheson, most notably in *An inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* and *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections. With illustrations on the Moral Sense*, argued that we have an innate moral sense that, among



other things, enables us to distinguish virtue and vice by means of the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation. In the first two editions of *EHU*, Hume credited Hutcheson with being the first to recognize that 'That Faculty, by which we discern Truth and Falshood, and that by which we perceive Vice and Virtue had long been confounded with each other, and all Morality was suppos'd to be built on eternal and immutable Relations, which to every intelligent Mind were equally invariable as any Proposition concerning Quantity or Number'. For the balance of this note, see *EHU*, Editorial Appendix (Clarendon Edition), 232–3. Hume later credited Shaftesbury with being the first to observe the difference between supposing 'virtue is nothing but conformity to reason' and supposing that 'morals' derive 'their existence from taste and sentiment'. See *EPM* 1.4, and for further discussion of the origin of moral distinctions, the whole of *EPM* 1 and Appx. 1–3.

Although the term 'moral sense' may have been a relatively late invention, views relevantly like those of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were espoused before the publication of Shaftesbury's *Inquiry*. H. More suggested that, while moral good is transcendently so, 'the Savour and Complacency thereof, is most effectually tasted' through the 'Boniform Faculty', and that the passions help us in 'the rating of things that are laudable and just according as we find [them] excited' by these things (*Account of Virtue* 1.5.1, 7, 1.6.13). T. Burnet, criticizing Locke's account of morality, spoke of a 'Natural Conscience' and described this as 'a Natural Sagacity to distinguish Moral Good and Evil, or a different perception and sense of them, with a different affection of the Mind arising from it; and this so immediate as to prevent and anticipate all External Laws, and all Ratiocination' (*Third Remarks*, 7–8; cf. *Remarks*, 5). For further background, see anns. 193.10, 42–3; 294.7; Rivers, *Reason, Grace, and Sentiment*, *passim*.

- 3.1.2.1 302.31–2 **custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance]** See also 1.2.5.21, 1.4.6.6, 2.3.3.8.
- 3.1.2.2 302.41–303.1 **A very play...may afford us...this pleasure...and pain]** Hutcheson argued that it is the presence in us of a moral sense that accounts for our moral reactions to 'even *feign'd Characters*, in the most distant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear *Kind, Faithful, Compassionate*, or of the *opposite Dispositions*, toward their imaginary Contemporaries' (*Inquiry* 2.1.2 [121]). See also 2.1.7.6, 2.2.7.3; ann. 206.11.
- 3.1.2.3 303.3–4 **distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are...particular pains or pleasures]** In the third edition of his *Inquiry*, Hutcheson clarified his position by saying that approbation is a distinctive feeling representing a quality in an observed moral agent. When approbation is felt, the 'admired Quality is conceived as the Perfection of the Agent, and such a one as is distinct from the *Pleasure* either in the Agent or the approver...The Perception of the Approver, tho attended with Pleasure, plainly represents something quite distinct from the Pleasure; even as the Perception of *external Forms* is attended with

Pleasure, and yet represents something distinct from the Pleasure' (*Inquiry* 2.1.8, edn. of 1729). Berkeley's Alciphron, representing the moral sense philosophers, said that 'Moral beauty is of so peculiar and abstracted a nature, something so subtile' as to be indefinable, something 'rather to be felt than understood, a certain *je ne sais quoi*. An object, not of the discursive faculty, but of a peculiar sense, which is properly called the *moral sense*, being adapted to the perception of moral beauty, as the eye to colours, or the ear to sounds' (*Alciphron* 3.5). Berkeley, in the same work, was critical of the moral sense theory.

303.6–7 **principles...make us feel a satisfaction or uneasiness from...any character**] It was to such a principle or faculty of mind that Hutcheson gave the name *moral sense*; see anns. 193.42–3, 303.3.

3.1.2.4 303.19 **have objected**] See 3.1.1.21.

303.23–7 **may...be objected...any object...animate or inanimate...might become morally good**] Responding to Hutcheson's views, Balguy objected that the moral sense theory would have the consequence Hume considers: 'And indeed, if the Reasons and Relations of Things are out of the Question, and this *Moral Sense* means no more than a natural Determination to receive agreeable or disagreeable Ideas of certain Actions; I think it will be very difficult to prove Brutes incapable of such a Sense', incapable, that is, of making distinctions between virtue and vice based on agreeable and disagreeable feelings (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 26; cf. 2: 84–5). See also *EPM* 5 n. 17.

303.29–30 **under the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations...very different from each other**] Hutcheson had opened his discussion of the moral sense by arguing that we have introspective proof that 'the Perceptions of *moral Good* and *Evil*, are perfectly different from those of *natural Good*, or *Advantage*', and then instancing the different 'Sentiments and Affections' produced by 'a *fruitful Field*, or *commodious Habitation*', on the one hand, and 'a *generous Friend*, or any *noble Character*', on the other. Several additional examples of such differing responses are offered (*Inquiry* 2.1.1). See also *EPM* 9.5–8, Appx. 1.

303.40–1 **good qualities of an enemy...still command our esteem**] Compare *EPM* 5.11, 9.6.

304.4–5 **a man of...judgment may preserve himself from these illusions**] On correcting perceptions or judgement, see 2.2.8.2–4; anns. 240.22, 241.39, 372.20.

3.1.2.5 304.10 **preceding system of the passions**] For brief accounts of the 'preceding system', see, e.g., 2.1.5.5, 8; 2.2.1–3; 2.2.2.2–3. See also 3.3.1.3, 26.

3.1.2.7 304.36–8 **definition of the word, nature...ambiguous and equivocal**] Butler observed 'that *nature* is considered in different views, and the word used in different senses' (*Three Sermons*, sermon 2 §6). Chambers reported that *nature* is 'a Term very variously used. *Aristotle* has a whole Chapter [*Metaphysics* 5.4] wrote expressly to

enumerate the various Acceptations of the *Greek Word Φύσις*, render'd in *English, Nature*', and that 'Mr. Boyle, in a precise Treatise of the *vulgarly receiv'd Notion of Nature*, gives us eight principal' meanings (*Cyclopædia*, 'Nature'; cf. Boyle, 'Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature', 176–91). See also Watts, *Philosophical Essays* 3.11 n., 11.3; Crousaz, *Commentary on Pope's Essay on Man*, 7, 165. A few months before completing Book 3 of the *Treatise*, Hume discussed the meaning of *natural* in correspondence with Hutcheson; see above, Historical Account, Sect. 5. See also ann. 311.20; *LG* 38.

3.1.2.8 305.8–9 **sentiments...rooted in our constitution and temper**] See also 3.2.5.9; ann. 334.39; 'Standard of Taste' 12.

3.1.2.9 305.12 **nature may also be oppos'd to artifice**] See 3.2.1.19; ann. 311.20.

305.20–1 **appear afterwards...our sense of some virtues is artificial...of others natural**] This distinction is developed throughout 3.2–3. A key difference between the two types is mentioned at 3.2.5.6.

3.1.2.10 305.24–6 **systems, which assert...that virtue is...what is natural...vice...unnatural**] Compare Seneca: 'Virtue is according to nature; vice is opposed to it and hostile' (*Moral Epistles* 50.8); and Butler: 'nothing can possibly be more contrary to nature than vice; meaning by nature not only the *several parts* of our internal frame, but also the *constitution* of it' (*Three Sermons*, Preface §14; cf. Preface §8, sermon 2 §§2–8). See also Barbeyrac, *Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 27; Shaftesbury, *Inquiry* 2.1; Hutcheson *Essay*, Preface [p. xvii]; and for a contrary view, Castiglione, *Courtier* 4 [290–1].

3.1.2.11 306.4–5 **a state of the question...so free from ambiguity and obscurity**] Hume credits himself, in effect, with fulfilling the first of Malebranche's 'Rules to be observed in the search after truth', viz. that 'the state of the question we propose to resolve must be very distinctly conceived' (*Search* 6.2.1 [437–8]; cf. 6.2.7 [488–97]). See also Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature*, Contents, ch. 1.

## 3.2 *Of justice and injustice*

### 3.2.1 *Justice, whether a natural or artificial virtue?*

307. **title *Justice...natural or artificial virtue***] The distinction between the natural and artificial virtues is briefly characterized at *LG* 38; see also 'Original Contract' 33–4. Hume returned to the topic of justice and its origin in *EPM* 3 and Appx. 3.

3.2.1.1 307.1 **already hinted**] See 3.1.2.9.

3.2.1.2 307.7–9 **when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives...and consider the actions as signs...of...certain principles in the mind**] The view that actions are themselves only signs of 'principles in the mind and temper'—of 'design and intention' (see 305.34) or 'motives'—and that our approbation or

disapprobation is ultimately directed to these, is a venerable one that was widely repeated in the early modern period. Seneca had said that the 'same act may be either shameful or honourable: the purpose and the manner make all the difference', and that 'the act itself is of no great consequence, since it appears that the man who from evil intent actually renders a service has not given a benefit' (*Moral Epistles* 95.43; cf. 95.57; 'On Benefits' 2.19.1, 3.6.1–2, 3.18.2, 6.7.2, 6.8.1, 6.12.2; ann. 333.40). Montaigne said 'That intention is the judge of our actions' (the title of Essay 1.7) and that 'a sound intellect will refuse to judge men simply by their outward actions; we must probe the inside and discover what springs set men in motion' ('Of the inconsistency of our actions', in *Complete Essays*, 244). Religious writers, especially Protestants reacting to Roman Catholic formalism, found the inner state of the believer, not acts or 'works', the essential component of a proper moral and religious life. Luther, e.g., said that 'good works are purely and simply outward signs. They proceed from faith, and, like good fruits, prove that man himself is already righteous at heart' ('Preface to Romans', *Selections*, 27). The authors of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England pronounced that actions or 'Good Works' that 'spring not of faith... have the nature of sin' (arts. 12–13). See also Cicero, *De finibus* 3.9.32; Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.4.3; Shaftesbury, *Inquiry* 1.3.1; Addison, *Spectator* 213; Blackmore, 'Essay upon False Vertue', 243–7; Gay, *Dissertation*, pp. xxiii–xxvi; Mandeville, *Enquiry*, 56; Hutcheson, *Inquiry* 2.2.1, 4–6; 2.3.1, 14; Butler, 'Of the Nature of Virtue' §7; *THN* 2.2.3.3–5, 2.3.2.6, 3.3.1.19–21; anns. 226.1, 8; 333.40; 373.19.

3.2.1.3 307.15–16 **one...shou'd be influenc'd by the proper motive]** Hutcheson and Butler had also traced vice to a defect of motive, including neglect. The former said that 'my *prior Negligence*, in not examining the Tendency of my Actions, is a plain Evidence of the want of *that Degree* of good Affections which is necessary to a virtuous Character; and consequently the *Guilt* properly lies in this *Neglect*' (*Inquiry* 2.3.12 [189]); the latter that 'vice in human creatures consist[s] chiefly in the absence or want of the virtuous principle' ('Of the Nature of Virtue' §6).

3.2.1.5 307.35–6 **blame a father for neglecting his child...shows a want of natural affection]** That parents have a natural affection for their children was a common observation. Steele quoted Cicero, 'What is there in nature dearer than a man's own children to him?' (*Spectator* 431, from Cicero, *Speeches... Post reditum ad Quirites* 1.2; cf. *De finibus* 3.19.62; *De officiis* 1.4.12). Hutcheson said that 'NATURE, who seems sometimes frugal in her Operations, has strongly determin'd *Parents* to the Care of their *Children*, because they universally stand in absolute need of Support from them' (*Inquiry* 2.5.1 [217]); Butler, that 'natural affection leads to this', that 'a parent has the affection of love to his children: this leads him to take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them', while a 'reflection' that this 'is his proper business' leads him to 'a much more settled principle, and carries him on through more labour and difficulties for the sake of his children' (*Three Sermons*, sermon 1 §8). See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.1, 12 (1155<sup>a</sup>16–19, 1161<sup>b</sup>17–28); Montaigne, 'Of the affection of fathers for their children', in *Complete Essays*, 278–93; Cumberland,

*Treatise of the Laws of Nature*, Intro. 26 [32–3]; Shaftesbury, *Miscellaneous Reflections* 4.2; A. Forbes, 'Essay on Self-Love', 267–74; *THN* 2.2.12.5; ann. 255.33; 'The Sceptic' 10.

- 3.2.1.6 308.7–8 **We regard these actions as proofs of the greatest humanity]** Shaftesbury treated 'Humanity' as synonymous with a '*Sense of Publick Good*, and the *common Interest* of Mankind' and 'Good-nature' (*Sensus Communis* 3.1 [105], *Inquiry* 2.1.2 [81]; cf. Whichcote, *Select Sermons*, 381). Hutcheson, discussing the '*moral Beauty of Characters*' spoke of a '*fix'd Humanity*, or *Desire of the publick Good* of all', and later of the '*thousand tender Sentiments of Humanity and Generosity*' (*Inquiry* 2.3.14 [191], 2.6.5 [256]). For defining uses similar to these in *EPM*, see 2.5; 5 n. 19; 5.18, 46.
- 3.2.1.7 308.11–13 *no action can be virtuous...some motive...distinct from the sense of its morality]* Hume in a letter to Hutcheson, traced this view to Cicero; for the text of Hume's remark, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 5. Cicero had said that the Stoics, 'who have no other standard in view but abstract right and morality, will not be able to find a source and starting point for duty and for conduct', were in that respect mistaken, because 'Considerations of conduct or duty do not supply the impulse to desire the things that are in accordance with nature; it is these things which excite desire and give motives for conduct' (*De finibus* 4.17.46, 48). See also 3.2.6.6; ann. 307.7.
- 3.2.1.8 308.16–20 **person...may perform the action without the motive...to acquire...that virtuous principle...disguise to himself...his want of it]** Hutcheson, having granted that pursuing self-interested motives does not produce virtue, thought that such 'Motives may make us desire to have *benevolent Affections*, and consequently turn our *Attention* to those Qualities in Objects which excite them' (*Inquiry*, 3rd edn. 2.2.6 [149]). Some took the more cynical view that those lacking virtuous motives undertake what appear to be virtuous actions to disguise their lack of virtue, not to themselves, but to others: 'Who is there who does not wish to seem beneficent? who, even in the midst of his crimes and injuries, does not aspire to a reputation for goodness?' (Seneca, 'On Benefits' 4.17.2); 'As bad as Men are, they dare not appear to be the Enemies of Vertue' (La Rochefoucauld, *Moral Reflections and Maxims* 489).
- 308.23–4 **fix our attention on the signs, and neglect...the thing signify'd]** Hutcheson noted that, while vice or guilt lies in intention, '*Human Laws* however, which cannot examine the *Intentions*, or secret Knowledge of the *Agent*, must judge in gross of the Action itself; presupposing all that Knowledge as actually attain'd which we are oblig'd to attain' (*Inquiry* 2.3.12 [189]).
- 3.2.1.9 308.36–7 **in his rude and more natural condition]** Hume was later to point out that the 'fiction of a state of nature' was not invented by Hobbes, for Plato had challenged the notion in his *Republic*, and Cicero supposed the hypothesis of such a state 'certain and universally acknowledged' (*Pro Sestio* 42.91–2, quoted in *EPM* 3

n. 11, where Hume's comment is found). Among modern writers, Hobbes had created the most notice by undertaking to 'demonstrate' that 'the state of men without civil society, which state we may properly call the state of nature, is nothing else but a mere war of all against all; and in that war all men have equal right unto all things' (Hobbes, *De Cive*, Preface [p. xvii]; cf. *Leviathan* 1.13 ¶13 and 1.13 ¶8, quoted in ann. 259.17–18). For Cumberland's criticisms of Hobbes on the 'state of nature', see *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 1.26–35 [74–91]. Pufendorf described the 'natural State of Man' as 'such a State as we may conceive Man to be plac'd in by his bare Nativity, abstracting from all . . . Rules and Institutions', but went on to acknowledge that 'all Mankind did never exist together in a mere natural State' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 2.2.1, 4; see also *On the Duty of Man* 2.1.3–6). Locke said that 'Men living together according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them, is properly the State of Nature' (*Two Treatises* 2.3.19; cf. 2.2, 'Of the State of Nature'). See also A. Campbell, *Enquiry* 1, App. [240 ff.]; Pope, *Essay on Man* 3.147–50. See also below 3.2.2.14–15, 28; 3.2.7.1; 'Remarkable Customs' 16; 'Coalition of Parties' 5.

308.39–40 *Wherein consists this . . . justice . . . in restoring a loan*] Hobbes said that 'injustice against men presupposeth human laws, such as in the state of nature there are none' (*De Cive* 1.10n.); Pufendorf, that in 'our present state there are a large number of affirmative precepts which seem to have had no place in the primeval state. This is partly because they presuppose institutions which (for all that we know) did not exist in mankind's condition of felicity . . . For example, we now have among the precepts of natural law . . . return borrowed money at the agreed time' (*On the Duty of Man*, Preface). Seneca, *Moral Epistles* 90.46. See also *LG* 38–9; 'Original Contract' 37; *EPM* 9.8 n. 57.

3.2.1.10 309.10–12 **self-love, when it acts at its liberty . . . the source of all injustice and violence**] A. M. Ramsay had spelled out the likely form of a society founded entirely on private interest or self-love: 'if it was permitted everyone to seize upon what he stands in need of, because everyone hath an equal Right according to the Law of Nature, the generality of Mankind would so serve themselves from this Principle, as became so many Thieves and Robbers: it would be impossible to preserve the Order and Peace of Society, and they would continually be falling into Anarchy and Confusion. But for avoiding these Inconveniencies, it is necessary that there should be Civil Laws, as Contracts and Successions for regulating the Division of Estates' (*Essay upon Civil Government*, 64).

3.2.1.11 309.20 **shown . . . hereafter**] See 3.2.2.2–22.

3.2.1.12 309.31–2 **no such passion . . . as the love of mankind, merely as such**] Butler, noting that 'moral writers' had suggested, for the 'object for our benevolence, mankind', objected that this 'is an object too general, and very much out of our view', or beyond our reach. Love of our neighbour, he says, or 'that part of mankind . . . which comes under our immediate notice', is what scripture (Rom. 13: 9)

enjoins, and what we can achieve (*Three Sermons*, sermon 12 §2). Although Hutcheson, in contrast, suggested that there is such a general love of mankind, he none the less granted that our 'strong Instincts' of love or attachment 'are by *Nature* limited to small Numbers of Mankind, such as *our Wives or Children*' (*Inquiry* 2.3.10 [181]; cf. 2.2.11, 2.5.1–2; ann. 317.35 ). See also Cicero, *De finibus* 3.19.63, 65.

310.7–10 **love...Englishman in Italy...Europæan in China...a man...in the moon**] Compare Berkeley: 'Two *Englishmen* meeting at *Rome* or *Constantinople*, soon run into a Familiarity. And in *China* or *Japan*, *Europeans* would think their being so a good Reason for their uniting in particular Converse. Further, in case we suppose our selves translated into *Jupiter* or *Saturn*, and there to meet a *Chinese*, or other most distant Native of our own Planet, we should look on him as a near Relation, and readily commence a Friendship with him' (*Guardian* 126). This similarity was first noted by Hall, 'Did Hume Read Berkeley Unawares?'

- 3.2.1.13 310.14–15 **much less can private benevolence, or a regard to the interests of the party concern'd**] Butler also argued that private benevolence could not, of itself, provide a foundation for morality. It may be observed, he said, 'that benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case...our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to every thing, but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting...But...suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his labour, with intent to give it to a third, who he thought would have as much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it; suppose also, that no bad consequences would follow: yet such an action would surely be vicious' ('Of the Nature of Virtue' §12). See also *EPM* Appx. 3.11 n. 65.16–22.

- 3.2.1.14 310.28–9 **greater cruelty to dispossess a man of any thing, than not to give it him**] Trublet speculated that there 'is not a man who enjoys twenty thousand a year, that would refuse to accept of twenty more, upon condition of having it taken from him, if he was not the happier for it; and yet he would make but a sorry bargain in taking it upon these terms. Probably, this addition to his estate would make no essential addition to his happiness...But if he should then be deprived of this accessional fortune, for not coming up to the terms upon which he had received it, he would certainly be made very unhappy: his situation would be considerably lower, than that he was in before his advancement' ('Of Happiness', *Essays* 14 [171]). Hume later suggested that in 'depriving me' of property that 'is mine, and ought to remain perpetually in my possession...you disappoint my expectations, and doubly displease me, and offend every bystander. It is a public wrong, so far as the rules of equity are violated: It is a private harm, so far as an individual is injured' (*EPM* Appx. 3.11).

- 3.2.1.16 310.36 **A man's property is suppos'd to be fenc'd against every mortal**] See 2.1.10.1; ann. 202.9.

3.2.1.18 311.9 **œconomy of a certain species]** Shaftesbury spoke of the 'System of all Animals; an *Animal-Order* or *Oeconomy*, according to which the Animal Affairs are regulated and dispos'd', and of the 'Constitution or *Oeconomy* of a particular Creature, or Species' (*Inquiry* 1.2.1, 2.1.3 [19, 91]).

3.2.1.19 311.20 **the word, natural, only as oppos'd to artificial]** The term *natural*, according to Chambers, is 'used for something coming immediately out of the hands of Nature, in opposition to *Factitious*, or *Artificial*, which signifies something wrought by Art' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Natural'; cf. 'Nature'). Rohault said that Aristotelian 'Forms are commonly distinguished into *Natural* and *Artificial*: They call those *Natural*, which belong to the Subject without the Assistance of Men...*Artificial Forms* are those that proceed from Art'. This distinction, he went on, is not satisfactory: '*Artificial Forms* are as natural as the *Natural Forms* themselves, because they proceed from Causes purely natural' (*System* 1.18.7). See also Watts, *Brief Scheme of Ontology* 18; *THN* 3.1.2.7–10; *LG* 10, 38; anns. 304.36; 305.20, 24; *EPM* Appx. 3.9 n. 64.

311.20–2 **In another sense...no virtue is more natural than justice]** Cumberland, considering whether the agreement 'express'd by *Covenants*' should be called *natural* (as he preferred), or *artificial* (as Hobbes preferred) concluded that such agreement 'ought either not to be called *Artificial*, or if it be so called that Term is to be taken in such Sense, as to be consistent with, not oppos'd to, what is *natural*, as if such Agreement were less constant or lasting, as *Hobbes* would have it' (*Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 2.22 [142]). See also Castiglione, *Courtier* 4 [290–2].

311.23–5 **where an invention is obvious...as...natural as any thing...immediately from original principles]** Barbeyrac had distinguished between those duties that are in Hume's terms 'natural' (those that derive from 'the natural and primitive Constitution of Man immediately') and 'artificial' (those that depend on or presuppose 'human Establishment' and 'are but the Consequence of the former'), but he took the two sorts to be alike in being natural in so far as both are 'prescribed by the Law of Nature' (in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.22 n.).

311.26 **rules of justice be artificial...not arbitrary]** Cicero associated the notion that justice is artificial with Carneades, whom he represented as saying that 'the justice which we are investigating is a product of government, not of nature at all; for if it were natural, then like heat and cold, or bitter and sweet, justice and injustice would be the same thing to all men' (*De re publica* 3.8.13). Cicero himself said, ambiguously, that nature is the 'foundation of Justice', and that justice is natural because it can be said to 'originate in our natural inclination to love our fellow-men' (*De legibus* 1.10.28 ff., esp. 15.43). Grotius treated the view that justice is not natural as a form of moral scepticism, and to this end cited Lactantius's account of Carneades: 'Laws (says [Carneades]) were instituted by Men for the sake of Interest; and hence it is that they are different, not only in different Countries, according to the Diversity of their Manners, but often in the same Country, according to the Times. As to that which is called NATURAL RIGHT, it is a mere Chimera...either there



is no Justice at all, or if there is any, it is extreme Folly, because it engages us to procure the Good of others, to our own Prejudice' (*Rights of War and Peace*, Preliminary Discourse 5, citing Lactantius, *Institutes Divine* 5.16.3). Among moderns, Hobbes, although sparing in his use of the term *artificial*, argued that justice is the product of a covenant among men and a specific 'law of nature' (viz. that '*men perform their covenants*'), for 'where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust... the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the *not performance of covenant*' (*Leviathan* 1.15 ¶¶1–2; see also *De Homine* 10). Cudworth complained of those, Hobbes especially, who said 'that Justice, Honesty and Morality are but thin, airy and phantastical Things... not natural, but artificial and factitious' (*Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* 4.6.5; see also ann. 193.40). S. Clarke insisted that justice is in no sense artificial: '*Justice... must needs be obligatory, antecedent to any consideration of positive compact, and unalterably and independently on all Humane Constitutions whatsoever*' (*Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion* 1.7.3 [232]); see also A. Forbes, 'Essay on Self-Love', 276–81. In contrast to these authors, H. More took '*Justice in general*' to be '*the first of the three principle Virtues, which are term'd Derivative*' (*Account of Virtue* 2.4 title). See also 2.1.7.3; 3.2.5.5–6, 11; the three preceding annotations; and anns. 193.10, 42–3.

311.27–8 **call them laws of nature; if by natural we understand what is common to any species]** The leading natural lawyers maintained that the laws of nature relevant to morality may be determined by observation of the human species. Pufendorf claimed that the '*true Original of the Law of Nature is derived from the Condition of Man*', and that laws of nature 'can be traced out and known by the light of man's native reason and by reflection on human nature in general' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.14 title; cf. 4.4.14; *On the Duty of Man* 1.2.16). Cumberland repeatedly supposed that it is observation of humanity that discovers natural laws; see, e.g., *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 1.3; 2.2,12; 5.1–3 [40–1, 112, 189–95]. Barbeyrac said that the very notion of natural law itself shows that its 'Principles ought to be deduced from the Nature of Man' (in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.14 n.). See also Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace*, Preliminary Discourse 6–11, as well as Montaigne, 'Of age', in *Complete Essays*, 237; Hobbes, *Leviathan* 2.26 ¶8; Shaftesbury, *Inquiry* 2.1.1.

3.2.2 *Of the origin of justice and property*

3.2.2.1 311.34 **begin with the former]** Hume turns to the second question at ¶23 of this section.

3.2.2.2 311.36–7 **nature seems... to have exercis'd more cruelty... towards man]** Plato traced this 'cruelty' to Epimetheus who, left to distribute 'suitable powers to each kind' of creature, 'used up all the available powers on the brute beasts', leaving 'man naked, unshod, unbedded, and unarmed'. Prometheus was able to steal for man 'the gift of skill in the arts, together with fire'. These enabled humans to overcome these defects (*Protagoras* 320D–322B). Pliny suggested that it is difficult to judge

whether nature 'has been more a kind parent to man or more a harsh stepmother' (*Natural History* 7.1.1–5 [2: 506–11]). Other classical writers pursued the theme. Seneca said that, taken singly, humans are the 'prey of all creatures, their victims', and that 'while other creatures possess a strength that is adequate for their self-protection, and those that are born to be wanderers and to lead an isolated life have been given weapons, the covering of man is a frail skin; no might of claws or of teeth makes him a terror to others; naked and weak as he is, his safety lies in fellowship' ('On Benefits' 4.18.2; cf. *Moral Epistles* 90.19). Addison began *Spectator* 441 saying: 'Man, considered in himself, is a very helpless and a very wretched Being'. See also Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 5.222–34; Erasmus, 'Dulce bellum inexpertis', 310–11; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations*, 7.1.6 n.; *On the Duty of Man* 1.3.3; Shaftesbury, *Moralists* 2.4 [300]; Hume, *DNR* 11.9.

- 3.2.2.3 312.11 **by society alone he is able to supply his defects]** Discussions of the human need for, and the benefits of, society are found among both classical and early modern writers. Lucretius observed that humans are born 'in need of every kind of vital support', then went on to say that the first humans, though hardier than their civilized progeny, knew nothing of agriculture and building nor of the use of fire and clothing, were unable to communicate by speech, and had no understanding of morals and the common good. These diverse skills and institutions, which have enabled our species to survive and thrive, were only developed gradually over the course of ages (*Nature of Things* 5.223–4, 925–1160). Pufendorf, to bring home his claim that the weakness of individuals is the fundamental motivation for the development of society, cited Lactantius: 'If each Man alone had sufficient Strength to ward off all Dangers, and stood in need of no Assistant: what Society would there be in the World? What mutual Reverence or Respect? What Order? What Reason? What Humanity? What would be more vile than Man? What more extravagant? What more fierce and cruel? But now while each single Person is poor and indigent, and cannot subsist without the Help of his Fellows, all desire Society for Ornament and Defence of common Life' (*De opificio Dei* 4, as found in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.1.6 n.; see also 2.3.15; *On the Duty of Man* 1.3.1–7). Hobbes said that outside of 'any society' we are each protected only 'by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it, no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a dominion of passions, war, fear, poverty, slovenliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, cruelty; in it, the dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, society, elegance, sciences, and benevolence' (*De Cive* 10.1).

The closely related view that humans are innately sociable was also widely held. According to Seneca, God's gifts to humankind include fellowship or a disposition to society: 'Take away this fellowship, and you will sever the unity of the human race on which its very existence depends' ('On Benefits' 4.18.4). Grotius maintained that 'Now amongst the Things peculiar to Man, is his Desire of Society, that is, a certain Inclination to live with those of his own Kind, not in any Manner whatever, but peaceably, and in a Community regulated according to the best of his Understanding', and then added that this natural 'Sociability... is the Fountain of Right' (*Rights of*

*War and Peace*, Preliminary Discourse 6, 8). Barbeyrac, in a note to this same discussion, said that the 'natural Inclination of Mankind to live in Society is a Principle which has been admitted by the Wise and Learned of all Ages', and then cited, among others, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Diogenes Laertius, Epictetus, and Shaftesbury. Locke cited approvingly Hooker's claim that to overcome the defects of living alone, we humans 'are naturally induced to seek Communion and Fellowship with others', then later added: 'God having made Man such a Creature, that, in his own Judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong Obligations of Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination to drive him into *Society*, as well as fitted him with Understanding and Language to continue and enjoy it' (*Two Treatises* 2.2.15, 2.7.77; cf. *Essay* 3.1.1; Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.10.1). See also Butler, *Three Sermons*, sermon 2 §4; below, ann. 342.32; and *EHU* 8.17; *EPM* 5.5; 'Immortality of the Soul' 30; *DNR* 10.10.

3.2.2.4 312.27–9 **impossible, in their wild uncultivated state...to attain this knowledge]** That the advantages of society could not have been seen 'by study and reflection alone' was maintained by both ancient and modern writers. Lucretius said that early humans 'could not look to the common good, they did not know how to govern their intercourse by custom and law. Whatever prize fortune gave to each, that he carried off, every man taught to live and be strong for himself at his own will' (*Nature of Things* 5.958–61). Bayle said: 'I cannot persuade my self, that Communities were form'd, because Men foresaw, by consulting the Ideas of Reason, that a solitary Life would be no Honour either to their own Species, or to their Creator, or to the World in general. 'Twas the *present Satisfaction, and the approaching Hope of living securely*, or else *Force*, that produced the first Commonwealths... Mankind are too cold and remiss, when they are spurr'd on by nothing but Reason' (*Nouvelles lettres* 17.2, as quoted in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.1.7 n.; cf. 7.1.4).

312.32–5 **original principle of human society...appetite betwixt the sexes...concern for their common offspring]** The view that the origin of society can be traced to love or an 'appetite betwixt the sexes' was common enough. Before humans formed societies, Lucretius said, 'Venus joined the bodies of lovers in the woods'. Then men and women 'got themselves huts and skins and fire, and woman mated with man... and they saw offspring born of them, then first the human race began to grow soft... Venus sapped their strength, and children easily broke their parents' proud spirit by coaxings. Then also neighbours began to join friendship amongst themselves in their eagerness to do no hurt and suffer no violence... a good part [of them], indeed the most, kept the covenant [of friendship] unblemished, or else the race of mankind would have been even then wholly destroyed' (*Nature of Things* 5.962, 1011–26). Pufendorf said that 'it pleas'd the most wise GOD' to imbue 'the two different Sexes with a natural Power of Propagating their Kind... he implanted in each Sex a passionate Love, a most ardent Propension towards the other, with a most deep and tender Affection for their Common Issue, that so they

might not only willingly, but joyfully contribute their Service to the Preservation and the Continuance of [the] Human Race (*Law of Nature and Nations* 6.1.2; cf. 2.1.8); Locke, that the 'first Society was between Man and Wife, which gave beginning to that between Parents and Children; to which, in time, that between Master and Servant came to be added... each of these... came short of *Political Society*' (*Two Treatises* 2.7.77). See also Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2; Cicero, *De officiis* 1.4.12, 1.17.54; Du Vair, *Morall Philosophy of the Stoicks*, 33, 99; Temple, *Essay upon the Original and Nature of Government*, 63–8; Pope, *Essay on Man* 3.117–30; above, ann. 255.33; *EPM* 3.20–1.

- 3.2.2.5 313.3–6 **selfishness...descriptions, which certain philosophers...form of mankind]** Hume later attributed to 'EPICURUS and his sect' (Horace and Atticus are mentioned) and to 'HOBBS and LOCKE' the view that all motivations are, at bottom, interested or 'a modification of self-love' (*EPM* Appx. 2.3). Although early modern critics of the Epicureans typically supposed them to hold some version of psychological egoism (see Butler's comment below in this annotation), the sect was criticized in classical times for supposing that our most fundamental desires are for pleasure or avoidance of pain, not self-preservation or self-interest. See M. R. Wright, 'Cicero on Self-Love and Love of Humanity', 171–2, and J. Brunschwig, 'The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism'. The view that 'selfishness', in the form of self-interest or self-love, motivates all human actions is implicit in Hobbes's accounts of the passions of pity (see ann. 239.6) and laughter ('the passion of laughter is nothing else but a sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmities of others'), and in his account of humanity in the state of nature (see ann. 308.36). While there may be little reason to suppose Locke a psychological egoist, there were other modern moralists who do appear to fit Hume's description. La Rochefoucauld suggested that 'Self-Love' continuously permeates and directs, deviously and often secretly, all our thoughts and actions ('Of Self-Love', in *Moral Reflections and Maxims*, 88–92). Mandeville began his *Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue* by saying that 'All untaught Animals are only solicitous of pleasing themselves, and naturally follow the bent of their own Inclinations, without considering the good or harm that from their being pleased will accrue to others'; for further background, see Kaye's Introduction to this work, esp. 1: pp. lxxvii–cxiii). Criticisms of the view Hume mentions were common. An anonymous reviewer applauded Shaftesbury's *Sensus Communis* for its attack on the moral sceptics' 'favourite Principles, concerning Virtue and Society. This seems to be the main design of this Work. These New Scepticks, after the Example of *Hobbes*, allow of no *Generous Passion*, no *Social Affection*. Our Author therefore shews that these Sentiments are implanted in the Heart of Man' (*Memoirs of Literature* 1: 26–7). Butler said: 'There is a strange affectation in many people of explaining away all particular affections, and representing the whole of life as nothing but one continued exercise of self-love. Hence arises that surprising confusion and perplexity in the Epicureans of old, Hobbes, the author of *Reflexions, Sentences, et Maximes Morales* [La Rochefoucauld], and this whole set of writers'

(*Three Sermons*, Preface §29). See also Pufendorf, *On the Natural State of Men* 17–18; Shaftesbury, *Sensus Communis* 3.3; Hutcheson, *Hibernicus's Letters*, 101–69; *Inquiry* 2.1.4. Hume returned to the issue of human selfishness in 'Dignity or Meanness' 8–11; *EPM* 5.6, 16–17; 6.21–2; 9.4–7, 19–25; Appx. 2 (from 1751 through 1772, the material in Appx. 2 constituted Part 1 of *EPM* 2, 'Of Benevolence'). At 'The Sceptic' 1, Hume noted the tendency of philosophers to use a single, 'favourite principle' to explain 'every phaenomenon, though by the most violent and absurd reasoning'. For Hume's later assessment of Hobbes, see *HE* 62 [6: 153].

313.6–7 **wide of nature ... accounts of monsters**] Compare *EPM* 6.4–5.

3.2.2.7 313.30 **three different species of goods**] Rapin said that Aristotle distinguished three kinds of good, of mind, of body, and of fortune (*Whole Critical Works* 1: 404; cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.8 (1098<sup>b</sup>11–13), *Politics* 7.1 (1323<sup>a</sup>24–6)). References to three kinds of good—those of, in one guise or another, soul, body, and external objects or property—are also found in Plato (*Laws* 743E), Seneca (*Moral Epistles* 66.29), and Cicero (*De finibus* 5.84).

3.2.2.8 313.45–314.1 **That virtue ... wou'd never have been dream'd of among rude and savage men**] Hume later said: 'Whatever we may imagine concerning the usual truth and sincerity of men, who live in a rude and barbarous state, there is much more falsehood, and even perjury among them, than among civilized nations: Virtue, which is nothing but a more enlarged and more cultivated reason, never flourishes to any degree, nor is founded on steady principles of honour, except where a good education becomes general; and where men are taught the pernicious consequences of vice, treachery, and immorality' (*HE* App. 1 [1: 179–80]).

3.2.2.10 314.44 **This convention is not of the nature of a promise**] Those holding a contrary view include Cicero: 'The foundation of justice, moreover, is good faith—that is, truth and fidelity to promises and agreements' (*De officiis* 1.7.23); and Hobbes, supposing that a 'covenant is but a promise', also said that justice has its origin in a covenant among men, and 'that the nature of justice, consisteth in keeping of valid covenants' (*Elements of Law* 2.8.6; *Leviathan* 1.15 ¶3). See also *EPM* Appx. 3.7–8.

315.11–21 **Two men, who pull ... measures of exchange**] Several phrases and concepts found in these lines are repeated at *EPM* Appx. 3.8.

315.11–12 **men, who pull the oars of a boat ... have never given promises**] In *EPM*, Hume used this same example to illustrate the role of 'common interest' and 'human convention and agreement' in the development of justice, then went on to offer Grotius's account of the origin of property. According to Grotius, 'we learn from the Sacred History ... and the Poets and Philosophers ... upon what Account Men departed from the antient Community, first of *moveable*, and then of *immoveable* Things: Namely, because Men being no longer contented with what the Earth produced of itself ... wanted to live in a more commodious and more agreeable Manner; to which End Labour and Industry was necessary, which some employed

for one Thing, and others for another. And there was no Possibility then of using Things in common . . . Thus also we see what was the Original of Property, which was derived not from a mere internal Act of the Mind . . . but it resulted from a certain Compact and Agreement . . . For as soon as living in common was no longer approved of, all Men were supposed, and ought to be supposed to have consented, that each should appropriate to himself, by Right of first Possession, what could not have been divided' (Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.2.2.3–5; the original of the passage is quoted in *EPM* Appx. 3.8 n. 63). Pufendorf devoted a section to the 'Origin of Dominion', and in it concluded that 'the Property of things has flow'd immediately from the compact of Men, whether *tacit* or *express*' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.4). In a note to this same text, Barbeyrac disagreed, saying: 'the immediate Foundation of all particular Right, which any Man has to a thing which was before common, is the first Possession', and then appealed to Locke, who had undertaken to show how we might have come to have property 'without any express Compact of all the Commoners' (*Two Treatises* 2.5.25). See also Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 1.21–3, 7.1–9 [62–8, 313–24]; Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.9.233–6. Hume's account of promises is found in 3.2.5.

- 3.2.2.11 315.29–30 **use . . . property, or right, or obligation, before they have explain'd the origin of justice]** Hume may allude to those who defined justice as '*a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due*'; see 3.2.6.2; ann. 338.7.

315.32–3 **man's property is some object related to him. This relation is not natural, but moral]** Pufendorf said that '*Property and Communion* are moral Qualities, which do not affect the Things themselves, as to their intrinsic Nature, but only produce a moral Effect with regard to other Persons', and consequently that 'tis an idle Question, Whether the Property of things arise from Nature, or from Institution? Since we have plain evidence, that it proceeds from the Imposition of Men; and that the natural Substance of things suffers no Alteration, whether Property be added to them, or taken from them' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.1). See also 3.2.3.7, 9; 3.2.4.2; 3.2.6.3.

- 3.2.2.12 315.42–4 **property . . . necessary to the establishment of human society]** Pufendorf claimed that the common saying, '*Meum and Tuum are the cause of all the Wars and Quarrels in the World*', is false, for 'on the contrary the Distinction of *Meum* and *Tuum* was rather introduc'd to prevent all Contention', and that, as 'the Peace and Beauty of Society could not be kept up without distinct Dominions of things; such Dominions were therefore settled; and this very rightly and agreeable to the Aim of nature's Laws, human Affairs plainly requiring it to be done' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.7, 14; cf. 4.12.5). See also Aristotle, *Politics* 2.3, 5; Hobbes, *De Cive* 1.10–13; Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature*, Intro. 26; 7.2–4, 8–9, 12 [32–4, 313–16, 322–4, 326].

316.7–9 **avidity alone . . . destructive of society]** Pufendorf also suggested that uncontrolled avarice would destroy society: 'But that infinite Field of Hostilities and

Strifes ariseth only from hence, That the Avarice of Man is ever aiming to break through those Bounds of *Meum* and *Tuum*, which have been by Law or Covenant establish'd' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.7). See also 'Rise and Progress' 6; *HE* 25 [3: 37], 26 [3: 66, 75].

3.2.2.13 316.27–8 **question ... concerning the wickedness or goodness of human nature]** Hume alludes here to the dispute between those who emphasized the 'wickedness', the self-regarding character of human nature (e.g., Hobbes, La Rochefoucauld, Mandeville), and those who emphasized the 'goodness', the other-regarding character of this nature (e.g., Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Butler; cf. ann. 313.3). In an essay first published in 1741, Hume wrote: 'Whoever desires to see this Question treated at large, with the greatest Force of Argument and Eloquence, may consult Lord SHAFTESBURY'S Enquiry concerning Virtue' ('Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature' 2, editions of 1741–8 only). See also *EPM* 9.4.

3.2.2.15 317.12–28 **This state of nature ... justice and injustice]** These lines, reordered and moderately revised, make up most of *EPM* 3.14; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lvi–lvii. On the supposed state of nature, see also *EPM* 3.15–16; cf. 'Coalition of Parties'; *HE* Appx. 1.

317.13 **the golden age, which poets have invented]** The metaphor of a Golden Age is typically traced to Hesiod, whose golden race of men lived at a time when life on earth was idyllic (*Works and Days* 109–20). Later Roman poets recast Hesiod's notion of a golden race into that of a Golden Age; see Virgil, *Georgics* 2.536; Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 1.90–112. Pufendorf noted that 'Passages from the poets' are adduced to show that in this beginning age private property was unknown; by way of illustration he quoted Virgil: 'No Fences parted Fields: nor Marks, nor Bounds Distinguish'd Acres of litigious Grounds: But all was common' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.8, citing Dryden's translation of *Georgics* 1.125). On the 'Legend of the Ages', and in particular the Golden Age, see Lovejoy and Boas, *Primitivism*, 24–8.

317.16–19 **seasons ... so temperate ... rivers flow'd with wine ... oaks yielded honey]** Of the Golden Age Ovid boasted: 'Then spring was everlasting, and gentle zephyrs with warm breath played with the flowers that sprang unplanted ... Streams of milk and streams of sweet nectar flowed, and yellow honey was distilled from the verdant oak' (*Metamorphoses* 1.106–12). Pufendorf supposed this notion of perpetual spring 'no truer than the extravagant rant' of the Greek comic poet Pherecrates, who wrote of rivers running 'with Oatmeal and black Broth, | Murmuring, when new-bak'd Biskets stopp'd their Speed. | Links and hot Sausages in Fish-pools stood, | And fatted Oysters skimm'd the wealthy stream' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.8). See also Seneca, *Moral Epistles* 90; Pope, *Essay on Man* 3.147–60; *EPM* 3.2.

317.22–6 **more furious tempests were unknown to human breasts ... mine and thine ... banish'd]** Seneca spoke of 'the fortune-favoured period when the bounties of nature lay open to all', the time 'before avarice and luxury had broken the bonds which held mortals together' and 'men ... enjoyed all nature in partnership',

then went on twice more to blame avarice for ending this happy state (*Moral Epistles* 90.36–8). Grotius appears to have believed the evidence for early states marked by innocence and mutual affection, and quoted, among others, Tacitus: ‘The first Men . . . being free from vicious Inclinations, lived in Innocence, without committing any Crime or dishonest Action; and therefore there was no Need to keep them to their Duty through the Fear of Punishment.’ This harmony was destroyed by ‘ambition’ (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.2.2, citing Tacitus, *Annals* 3.26 [3: 562–3]). See also ann. 315.42; *EPM* 3.7.

- 3.2.2.16 317.35 *limited generosity*] As noted in ann. 309.31, Hutcheson in the first two editions of his *Inquiry* explained the greater virtue resulting from benevolent dispositions directed toward strangers by saying that our ‘strong Instincts are by Nature limited to small Numbers of Mankind, such as our Wives or Children’. In the 3rd edn. (1729) he revised this passage, and spoke of ‘the *nearer Attachments of Nature*, such as *that between the Sexes, and the Love of our Offspring*’ as ‘the more *limited Instincts*’ (*Inquiry* 2.3.10 [184]). See also 3.2.1.11.
- 3.2.2.17 318.14–16 **distinction of property is entirely lost . . . with regard to air and water**] Pufendorf said that ‘some things there are, which, tho’ very beneficial to Mankind, yet by reason of their vast Extent, are inexhaustible . . . And on this account ’tis usual to attribute an exemption from Property to the Light and Heat of the Sun, to the Air, to the running Water, and the like’; and that ‘the Air, the Sky, the heavenly Bodies, and the vast Ocean not being appropriated, can bear no Price, how serviceable soever they may be to human Life’. Barbeyrac noted reports of taxes levied on shade and wind (in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.5.2, 5.1.5, 4.5.2 n.). See also Justinian, *Institutes* 2.1.1; Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.2.3, 2.3.7–13; *EPM* 3.4–5.
- 3.2.2.20 318.33–4 **an alteration . . . in the temper and circumstances . . . alter our duties and obligations**] In contrast to Hume, Grotius concluded that ‘the Law of Nature is so unalterable, that God himself cannot change it’, though he granted that there may be an appearance of change, as ‘when God commands any Man to be put to Death, or his Goods to be taken away, Murder and Theft do not thereby become lawful, which very Words always include a Crime; but that cannot be Murder or Theft, which is done by the express Command’ of God (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.1.10.5–6). Ferguson said that ‘*every Law of nature is of an Unchangeable obligation*’ (*Sober Enquiry into Moral Virtue*, 109). See also Cudworth, *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* 4.6.3; and above 3.1.1.4, 10, 17–23; ann. 238.1.
- 3.2.2.22 319.27 **single acts of justice may be contrary, either to public or private interest**] Others had observed the tension between the system of justice and public and private interest. Tacitus maintained that ‘Every exemplary punishment has in it some injustice against individuals, which is compensated by public utility’ (*Annals* 4.44). Hutcheson made a similar point in different language. He described ‘External’ rights as those arising ‘when *the doing, possessing, or demanding of any Thing is really*



*detrimental to the Publick in any particular Instance, as being contrary to the imperfect Right of another*', and said that *'the universally denying Men this Faculty of doing, possessing, or demanding that Thing, or of using Force in pursuance of it, would do more mischief than all the Evils to be fear'd from the Use of this Faculty'*. As an example of such an external right, he mentioned the right *'of a wealthy Miser to recal his Loan from the most industrious poor Tradesman at any time'*, it being supposed that such a tradesman has only an *'imperfect'* right to the assistance of the miser or of the public in general (*Inquiry* 2.7.6 [280–1]). Barbeyrac, concerned about this issue, argued that it is *'not that there is any Inconsistency between the [several] Virtues themselves'*. It is only that some of them *'cannot be put in practice at the same time, and with regard to the same Object... It is no more than a seeming Conflict between certain Duties'* (*Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 3). See also 3.2.3.2, 3.2.6.9, 3.3.1.12; ann. 322.28; *EPM* 9.22, Appx. 1.2, Appx. 3.3–6; *'Passive Obedience'* 2; *'Rise and Progress'* 11.

3.2.2.23 320.12 **already establish'd]** See 3.2.1.7, 3.2.2.18–21.

320.15–16 **moral obligation...sentiment of right and wrong]** See also, e.g., 3.2.5.6, 3.2.6.11, 3.2.8.4, 3.2.9.3–4, 3.2.11.4. At *EPM* 9 Hume considered first *'the moral approbation attending merit or virtue'*, and then *'our interested obligation to it'* (9.14).

320.16 **requisite to examine the natural virtues]** *Treatise* 3.3.1–3 examines the natural virtues.

3.2.2.24 320.31–2 **never fail to observe the prejudice we receive... from the injustice of others]** A. Forbes, writing about disinterestedness and the sources of *'Natural Virtue'*, had reached a similar conclusion. A *'Man feels'*, he said, *'when the Rules of Equity are broke to his own prejudice, and he sees when they are broke to the prejudice of his Neighbour, if the Injury is done by a third Person; for he does not always see it when it is done by himself'*; he also said that this *'Sense or Relish of Virtue, without any View to Self-Interest, is one Source of moral Actions, tho' often very unable to produce them'* (*'Essay on Self-Love'*, 276, 278–9). See also Barbeyrac, *Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 3.

320.44–321.4 **Thus self-interest...sentiments of approbation or blame]** These sentences were added to the text after the initial printing of the *Treatise*. For details, see above, *Historical Account*, Sect. 5 and *Editing the Texts*, Register B, entry 320.45. Hume discussed the relationship of sympathy and moral approbation in his letter responding to Hutcheson's criticisms of the manuscript of Book 3 of the *Treatise*; see above, *Historical Account*, Sect. 5.

3.2.2.25 321.6–10 **artifice of politicians...carry'd too far by certain writers on morals]** The allusion is likely to Mandeville, who said that *'the first Rudiments of Morality, broach'd by skilful Politicians, to render Men useful to each other as well as tractable, were chiefly contrived that the Ambitious might reap the more Benefit*

from, and govern vast Numbers of them with the greater Ease and Security' (*Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, 47).

321.16–17 **in vain for politicians to talk of honourable...or blameable]** Mandeville also suggested that the same skilful politicians contrived to create moral notions and language: 'the Notions of Honour and Shame' and 'the Notions of Good and Evil, and the Distinction between *Virtue* and *Vice*' (*Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, 43, 50). In contrast, Butler argued that the fact that we have 'a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action' is shown by the existence of 'the words, *right* and *wrong*, *odious* and *amiable*, *base* and *worthy*, with many others of like signification in all languages, applied to actions and characters' ('Of the Nature of Virtue' §§1–2), while Hutcheson said that there are natural limits to what we can be taught to apprehend or distinguish: '*Education* never makes us apprehend any Qualitys in Objects, which we have not *naturally* Senses capable of perceiving' (*Inquiry* 1.7.3 [91]). Hume repeats his criticism at 3.3.1.11 and *EPM* 5.3; see also 'Study of History' 7.

- 3.2.2.28 321.45–322.4 **in the state of nature...no such thing as property...justice or injustice]** Hobbes had scandalized many by saying that in the state of nature 'the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have...no place', and that there is in that state 'no propriety, no dominion, no *mine* and *thine* distinct; but only that to be every man's, that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it' (*Leviathan* 1.13 ¶13). See also ann. 308.36.

3.2.3 *Of the rules, which determine property*

322.title *rules, which determine property]* Some of the issues taken up in this and the following section are revisited in *EPM* 3.22–48.

- 3.2.3.2 322.28–9 **Justice...never regards the fitness or unfitness of objects to particular persons]** Hume later illustrated this point with a story about Cyrus, the Persian king: 'CYRUS, young and unexperienced, considered only the individual case before him, and reflected on a limited fitness and convenience, when he assigned the long coat to the tall boy, and the short coat to the other of smaller size. His governor instructed him better; while he pointed out more enlarged views and consequences, and informed his pupil of the general, inflexible rules, necessary to support general peace and order in society' (*EPM* Appx. 3.4). This story and the moral drawn from it are found in Xenophon (*Cyropaedia* 1.3.17) and Grotius (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.1.8.2). See also 3.2.2.22, ann. 319.27.

- 3.2.3.3 323.3–4 **suppose those reflections to be form'd at once, which...arise insensibly and by degrees]** Pufendorf, after saying that the preservation of society required the institution of property (see ann. 315.42), went on to say that there was 'no express and determinate Command of the Law of Nature, by virtue of which all things ought to be brought under *Property*, immediately upon the Origin of Mankind, or in all Places alike; but *Property* was gradually introduc'd, according as it appear'd requisite to the common Peace' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.14).

Barbeyrac in a note to the same work (see 4.4.10 n.) insisted that 'Mankind never met together to regulate and order, what every one for the future should possess as his own, out of those Goods, which were before common. They possessed themselves of them by insensible degrees.'

323.5–7 **several persons...may be oblig'd to form a new society among themselves]** Hume returns to this issue at 3.2.8.3–6.

3.2.3.4 n. 71.10 (323) **have already observ'd in human nature<sup>a</sup>]** Note<sup>a</sup> on p. 324 reads Book 1. Part 4. Sect. 5. See 1.4.5.12. Book 1. Part 4. Sect. 5 See 1.4.5.12.

n. 71.13–14 (323) **Many of our impressions are incapable of place]** On this issue, see 1.4.5.10–14.

n. 71.23 (323) **easily accounted for from the known properties of human nature]** See 1.1.4.

n. 71.28 (324) **when we come to treat of beauty]** Beauty is again discussed at 3.3.1.8–10, 15, 20, and 3.3.5.3–4, but the issue raised here is not mentioned. Hume initially proposed that the *Treatise* would be composed of additional volumes, one of which was to be concerned with criticism and would likely have included significant discussions of beauty; see the 'Advertisement' that precedes Book 1.

3.2.3.5 324.7–8 **OCCUPATION, PRESCRIPTION, ACCESSION, and SUCCESSION]** For comment on these terms, see anns. 324.9, n. 72.4 (324), 326.14, 329.1.

324.9 **beginning with occupation]** Chambers defined *Occupancy* as 'the Possession of such things as at present belong to no private Persons, but, however, are capable to be made so; as by seizing or taking of Spoils in War; of things wild by Nature... or by finding things before undiscovered, or truly lost' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Occupancy'). Pufendorf quoted a Roman lawyer saying: 'All Animals taken on the Land, on the Sea, or in the Air, that is, wild Beasts, Birds, and Fish, belong to those who take them: For what is yet no Body's, natural Reason assigns to the first Occupant' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.6.5; cf. *On the Duty of Man* 1.12.6). Barbeyrac said that 'the immediate Foundation of all particular Right, which any Man has to a thing which was before common, is the first Possession' (in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.4 n.). See also Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.4; Carmichael, 'Supplements and Observations', *Natural Rights*, 92–9; Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.9.241; *THN* n. 73 (325–6), 3.2.6.3.

3.2.3.6 n. 72.1–2 (324) **philosophers account for the right of occupation... property in his own labour]** Hume alludes to Locke; see ann. 202.9. Pufendorf supposes that original dominion or property right is given to 'the first Occupant; that is, to him who, before others, took bodily Possession of it, with Intention to keep it as his own', or that one can 'acquire by Occupancy Things in which the *Dominion* they before lay under is extinct'. The latter can take place if a someone 'openly throws aside a certain Thing, with sufficient Indications, that he desires it should no longer be his own, but

should lie free for the first Taker' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.6.2, 12). These may be some of the 'several kinds of occupation' wherein, as Hume here puts it, 'we cannot be said to join our labour to the object we acquire'. See also Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.9.242–9.

n. 72.4–5 (324) **possess a meadow by grazing our cattle...accounts...by means of accession]** Once property is owned, it may be added to in many ways. The legal concept, 'accession', deriving from Roman law, provided a framework for such additions. Thus Pufendorf, noting that many forms of property increase in value, went on to say that some of these 'swell their inward Substance to larger Dimensions, some receive external Improvements; others are attended with several Fruits and Advantages of a different kind from themselves; many rise very considerably in Value, from the Fashion and Figure which human Industry hath put upon them. All these additional Profits may be comprised under the general Term of *Accessions*' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.7.1; cf. *On the Duty of Man* 1.12.7). See also Justinian, *Institutes* 2.1.20–38; Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.250 ff. Locke mentioned 'the Grass my Horse has bit', but supposed only that the grass, not the meadow itself, became thereby his property (*Two Treatises* 2.5.28; see also 2.5.32).

3.2.3.7 n. 73.6–8 (325) **A person, who has hunted a hare...advancing to pluck an apple]** As Locke said: 'the Hare that any one is Hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the Chase', and he 'that is nourished by the Acorns he has pickt up under an Oak, or the Apples he gathered from the Trees in the Wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself' (*Two Treatises* 2.5.30, 28). See also Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.4.13; Barbeyrac, in the same work, 4.4.4 n.; Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.244–6.

n. 73.17–18 (325) **maxim, that even a whole continent belongs to the nation, which first discover'd it]** Although Europeans obviously acted on this principle, we have found no earlier statement of it.

n. 73.26–8 (325) **in almost every writer...of the laws of nature. Two Grecian colonies]** This story of the colonists from Andros and Chalcis is told by Plutarch and retold by Grotius and Pufendorf, both of whom address the disputed issue. Although Hume's account of the matter is more like that of Pufendorf, the latter concluded that 'a spear does not appear to be a proper instrument with which to occupy an immovable thing, since we can strike with a spear many things which we cannot approach with our body', the latter being the common means by which occupation is achieved (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.6.8). See also Plutarch, 'Greek Questions' 298A [*Moralia*, 4: 210–13]; Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.8.6.

3.2.3.8 326.4–8 **A person who lands on...a small island...desart and uncultivated, is deem'd...new possessor]** On taking possession of deserted and uncultivated places, see Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.2.4, 17; 2.8; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.5.8–10; 4.6.

3.2.3.9 326.14 **long possession or prescription]** 'Prescription in its negative aspect is the extinction of a right through nonassertion of that right for some period of time. In its positive aspect it is the creation of a new right through de facto occupancy, use and so on, for some period, of things to which somebody else's right has been (or was being) extinguished in the former way' (Haakonssen, *Practical Ethics*, 332 n. 42). Chambers reported: 'Some make a Difference between *Prescription* and *Usucaption*, maintaining that the latter is only used with regard to Moveables, and the former with regard to Immoveables.—But there is no essential Difference between 'em' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Usucaption'). For discussions of prescription and usucaption, see Justinian, *Institutes* 2.6; Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.4; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.12.1; Stair, *Institutions* 2.12. See also 'Populousness' 61.

326.22–3 **same facts have not the same influence after so long an interval of time]** On the effects of time on arguments or proofs, see 1.3.13.2–6; on the passions, see 2.3.7–8.

326.24 **preceding doctrine]** See 3.2.2.

326.27–8 **property ... is not any thing real in the objects]** See also 3.2.2.11; ¶7 of this section, 3.2.4.2, 3.2.6.3; ann. 315.32.

3.2.3.10 n. 75.1 (327) **source of property ... explain'd but from the imagination]** Compare *EPM* 3.31, 46; 4.19 and n. 19; Appx. 3.10 and n. 65; 'Original Contract' 39. Some of the topics taken up in n. 75 (e.g., present possession, occupation, accession, alluvion) are also taken up in *EPM* n. 65.

n. 75.4 (327) **observ'd above]** See n. 71.10–36.

n. 75.25 (327) **already observ'd]** See 2.2.2.19–26.

n. 75.55–9 (328) **the sea is incapable of becoming the property of any nation ... friths and bays]** Grotius, in *The Free Sea* [*Mare liberum*], argued that the open sea cannot be owned. Selden supported the contrary view in his *Right and Dominion of the Sea*. According to Pufendorf, the usual reasons given for saying that the sea cannot be an 'Object of Property' are either 'physical' (e.g., its vastness makes effective control by one nation impossible and impractical) or 'moral' (e.g., the use of the sea is inexhaustible and sufficient to serve all humanity). Unconvinced by these reasons, Pufendorf argued that claims of dominion over the vast, open ocean 'would not only be unprofitable, but unjust'; that not 'one of those Reasons, which first moved Men to the Settlement of *Property*, doth affect the main Sea'; and that 'it is clear, that to sail the Ocean in a peaceful manner both is and ought to be the free Privilege of all Nations', and that 'not a single one of those reasons [labour, occupation] which led to the introduction of proprietorship in things can be applied to the open ocean', and thus that 'peaceful navigation of the ocean belongs to all men and is free'. Grotius and Pufendorf, both 'strenuous advocates for the liberty of the seas', granted that parts of the 'friths and bays' can be acquired by those who own the contiguous land. As Pufendorf put it, 'Gulphs and Channels, or Arms of the Sea, are, according

to the regular Course, supposed to belong to the People with whose lands they are encompassed' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.5.6–10). See also Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.3.7–15; Seneca, 'On Benefits' 4.28.3; Bijnkershoek, *On the Ownership of the Seas*.

n. 75.63–74 (328) **The property of rivers...sufficiently join them]** These two paragraphs, slightly revised, make up *EPM* Appx. 3.11 n. 65.31–42 (100).

n. 75.63–4 (328) **property of rivers, by the laws of most nations...proprietors of their banks]** According to Grotius, 'a River, considered merely as such, is the Property of the People through whose Lands it flows, or of him under whose Jurisdiction that People is', but to this he added that 'if this River be considered as a running Water, it is so far common, that any Body may drink or draw thereof' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.2.12; see also 2.3.7, 18).

n. 75.69–70 (328) **accessions...made by...alluvion]** Chambers described *alluvion* as a form of lawful acquisition: 'an Accession or Accretion made along the Sea-shore, or the Banks of large Rivers, by means of Tempests or Inundations' (*Cyclopaedia*, 'Alluvion'; cf. 'Accretion'). Pufendorf said that what 'Lawyers have so labouriously deliver'd concerning Increment by rivers, depends, for the most part, not so much on any constant and natural Reason, as on the positive Ordinances of particular Nations' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.7.11). See also Justinian, *Institutes* 2.1.20–4; Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.8.8–17; Stair, *Institutions* 2.1.34–5; Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.9.250–4.

n. 75.71–2 (328) **any considerable portion torn... from one bank, and join'd to another]** Pufendorf discussed precisely these eventualities, noting that Roman laws decreed that 'in case the Violence of the Current adds a piece to my Land, which it hath torn from yours, it shall remain your Property as before... But if it hath stuck long upon my Banks, and the Trees which it brought with it have there taken Root, from that time forward it shall be deem'd an acquisition to my Estate' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.7.12). See also Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.9.255.

n. 75.82–3 (328) **subtlety of the Roman law, in distinguishing betwixt confusion and commixtion]** The distinction between *confusio* and *commixtio* was made in Justinian's *Institutes*: 'When the goods of two owners are, with their consent, mixed together, the whole resultant mass is the common property of both' (2.1.27). As Hume goes on to say, mixture or *confusio* applied to commodities that cannot, once mixed, be again separated, as, e.g., your burgundy and my claret, or my wine and your honey, while *commixtio* applied to commodities, which though mixed could in principle be again separated into their original sets, as, e.g., two flocks of sheep. Justinian on *commixtio* is quoted in the next paragraph of this note.

n. 75.91–7 (328–9) *Quod si frumentum... frumentum fuerit]* 'But if Titius' corn has been mixed with your corn: if it is by the will of both of you, the corn will be

common: because individual items, that is, the individual grains which belonged to each of you, have been made common by the will of you both. But if the mixing was by accident, or Titius mixed them without your will, it does not seem to be common, because individual grains persist in their own substance. The grain is no more made common in those cases than a flock is regarded as common, if the flocks of Titius have been mixed with your flocks. And if that corn is kept by either one of you, an action *in rem* lies for the quantity of corn belonging to each one. But it is at the discretion of the judge to estimate for himself the quality of the corn that belonged to each one' (Justinian, *Institutes* 2.1.28).

n. 75.116–17 (329) **superficies yields to the soil...writing to the paper... canvas to the picture**] The principles set out in this paragraph are found in Roman law, and reviewed by Pufendorf. Rules concerning buildings constructed on the land of another were complex. If the building was built in innocence and could be moved, the builder retained ownership. If guileful intent to steal the ground from its owner was demonstrated, the building was forfeit to the landowner. If there was no guile or 'knavery', and the building could not be removed without being demolished, Roman law said that the building '*shall go along with the Soil; yet so, as that, in case the Builder be in actual Possession, the Lord of the Soil shall pay the Price of the Materials, and the Expence of the Work*'. Roman lawyers extended the view that, by and large, the 'superficies yields to the soil' to 'include papers and parchments', so that the person who, 'with a good and honest Intention... wrote somewhat on another Man's Paper', lost ownership in that writing. Pufendorf objected to this extension, saying that the Roman lawyers were 'more in the right' when they said 'the *Table* [panel or board] shall go along with the *Picture*; the latter being usually of far greater Value than the former' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.7.6–8). See also Justinian, *Institutes* 2.1.25–34; Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.8.19–22; Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.9.256–65; Haakonssen, *Practical Ethics*, 'Commentary' 39, 328–31.

n. 75.120 (329) **disciples of Proculus and Sabinus**] Proculus and Sabinus were Roman jurists of the first century AD. Grotius reported: 'If any Body had formed a Thing out of another's Materials, the *Sabinians* gave the Property to him whose the Materials were, but *Proculus* [gave it] to him who had given the Form, because he gave to a Thing an Existence which it had not before' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.8.19).

n. 75.129–30 (329) **Tribonian**] Roman jurist (died c.545) who collaborated in the preparation of Justinian's *Institutes*.

3.2.3.11 329.1 **right of succession is a very natural one**] The 'right of *succession*' is the right to transfer full rights to property or governance to heirs. The latter may be determined by certain 'natural' relationships (as father to son), by tradition or political institution (as in hereditary monarchies) which may follow these same 'natural' lines, or by testament or will. Heineccius, noting 'that testament-making, according to Roman law, is not of the law of nature', argued that testamentary dispositions 'with

regard to succession after death' are none the less 'lawful by the law of nature'. He also argued that (legitimate) 'children [are] justly preferred' to other potential heirs (*Methodical System of Universal Law* 1.11.291, 297). Pufendorf argued that when there is no 'particular express Act of the former Lord' or owner of property, we should follow what one supposes is the '*natural Inclination*' in such matters, viz. 'to make the most plentiful Provision for those who descend from our own Body, and next to these for the rest who are allied to us in the degrees of Consanguinity' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.11.1–2). See also Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.7.3–11.

n. 76.4–7 (330) **dispute arises among his relations...assign each part to the family, from whence it is deriv'd]** According to Grotius, when a person dies intestate and without children, his or her property should in some circumstances be returned to those from whom it came, according to the formula: '*The Father's Effects to the Father's Relations, the Mother's to the Mother's*' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.7.9.1). See also Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.11.3, 17–18.

3.2.4 *Of the transference of property by consent*

3.2.4.1 330.8–9 **present possession...occupation, prescription, accession, and succession]** See 3.2.3.4–11; anns. 324.9, n. 72.4 (324), 326.14, 329.1.

330.13–14 **every man to seize...what he judges...fit...wou'd destroy society]** Cf. 3.2.2.15–16; ann. 315.42.

330.24–5 **translation of property by consent is founded on a law of nature]** Compare Grotius: 'Since the Establishment of Property, Men, who are Masters of their own Goods, have by the Law of Nature a Power of disposing of, or transferring, all or any Part of their Effects to other Persons; for this is in the very Nature of Property' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.6.1.1). See also Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.9.1; *THN* 3.2.5.8.

3.2.4.2 330.28–9 **delivery, or a sensible transference...commonly requir'd by civil laws...by the laws of nature, according to most authors]** Grotius argued that, to effect the transfer of property, two things are required, 'the one in the Giver, and the other in the Receiver. In the former it is required, that whatever he does in this Kind should appear by Words, or by some other open or external Sign, the mere internal Act of his own Will and Mind being no Ways sufficient...So also in the Receiver (without any Regard to the Civil Law) it is naturally required, that his Willingness to accept of what is given him do appear by some outward Sign' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.6.1–2). See also Hobbes, *De Cive* 2.4–8; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.9.3, 5.

330.30–331.1 **property...taken for something real, without any reference to morality...inconceivable]** See also 3.2.2.11; ann. 315.32.

331.16–18 **a symbolical delivery...giving the keys...giving of stone and earth]** Pufendorf observed that '*Delivery is either true, or feign'd and suppos'd*' and counted the giving of keys of the latter type; see *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.9.9.



331.20–4 **Roman Catholics represent...mysteries...by a taper, or habit...lawyers...like inventions]** Donne suggested that ecclesiastics 'in secular habits, lose their respect. Though the very habit be but a Ceremony, yet the distinction of habits is rooted in nature, and in morality: And when the particular habit is enjoyed by lawful Authority, obedience is rooted in nature, and in morality too' (*Sermons* 7: 430; cf. 5: 108). See also Pascal, *Port-Royal Pensées*, 306–7; *THN* 1.3.8.4; ann. 70.4.

3.2.5 *Of the obligation of promises*

- 3.2.5.3 331.38–41 **act of the mind, exprest by a promise...not a resolution... desire...willing]** The nature and expression of promises were widely discussed. Hobbes said that 'Words alone, if they be of the time to come, and contain a bare promise, are an insufficient sign of a free-gift, and therefore not obligatory. For if they be of the time to come, as, *to-morrow I will give*, they are a sign I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth till I transfer it by some other act' (*Leviathan* 1.14 ¶15; cf. *De Cive* 2.7–14). Grotius, just before a section headed, a '*bare Assertion does not lay one under an Obligation*', distinguished 'three Degrees or Manners of speaking about Things future, which either really are, or at least are thought to be in our own Power'. The first of these he called 'a bare Assertion', a statement of 'what we intend hereafter, in the Mind we are now in'. We are obliged to speak truly of our present intention, because 'the Mind of Man has not only a natural Power, but also a Right to alter a Design' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.11.1–2). Pufendorf observed that 'there are two Ways of speaking about giving, or doing a thing to another, which now is, or which we imagine, will hereafter be in our Power. The first Way is, when we barely express our present Mind about a future Act; yet so as to lay no Necessity on ourselves, of persevering always in the same Resolution' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 3.5.5). For more on the distinctions mentioned here, see ann. 335.12.

331.42–332.1 **a promise...regards...future time, and the will has an influence only on present actions]** Compare Hobbes: 'there is a great difference in the signification of these words... *I will that this be thine tomorrow*, and, *I will give it thee tomorrow*: for the word *I will*, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will present; but in the latter, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to come: and therefore the former words, being of the present, transfer a future right; the latter, that be of the future, transfer nothing' (*Leviathan* 1.14 ¶15; cf. *De Cive* 2.6–7). See also Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 3.5.8.

- 3.2.5.4 332.17–18 **can...no more change our own sentiments, than the motions of the heavens]** Hutcheson had argued for the integrity of our moral sentiments: 'This *moral Sense*, either of our *own* Actions, or of those of *others*, has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire of *Virtue* may be counterballanc'd by *Interest*, our Sentiment or Perception of its *Beauty* cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of *Advantage*' (*Inquiry* 2.1.5). J. Clarke agreed, saying both that 'We are not at Liberty to love as we list; and

therefore where Love rises in the Mind, it is not the Product of any Act of the Will exerted at that time', and that a 'Bribe may prevail with a Man to perform such Actions, as Benevolence will produce; but will never make him feel a Pleasure from Objects, which they are not by Nature fitted to give' (*Foundation of Morality*, 84, 86).

n. 77.2–3 (332) **Every new imposition of morality**] Pufendorf explained the notion of *Imposition* in morality thus: 'As the original Way of producing natural Entities is by *Creation*, so the Manner of framing moral Entities cannot be better expressed than by the Term of *Imposition*. For these do not proceed from Principles ingrafted in the Substance of Things, but are added, at the Pleasure of intelligent Creatures, to Beings already perfect in their Nature, and to the real Productions of those Beings; and consequently obtain their whole Existence from the Determination of their Authors. The same Power assigns them such and such Effects, which, when it sees convenient, it can destroy, without causing any natural Alteration in the Subject to which they were apply'd. Hence their Force and Ability...[consists] partly in shewing Men how they ought to govern their Freedom of Actions, and chiefly in making them capable of receiving Benefit or Injury, and of exercising several Works towards other Persons, with some peculiar Effect.' A note remarks that in French *imposition* is rendered by '*Institution*, which being used in *English* for every Thing that proceeds from mere human Invention and Appointment, in Opposition to what proceeds from Nature, may be better used here'. Barbeyrac also noted that Pufendorf distinguished two kinds of *Institution*, the arbitrary and the necessary (*Law of Nature and Nations* 1.1.4, and notes thereto). Cf. 3.2.2.24; ¶11 of the present section, 3.2.8.6, 3.2.9.1–2.

3.2.5.6 333.4–5 **reasoning, which prov'd justice ... an artificial virtue**] See 3.2.1.9–19.

333.5–7 **No action can be requir'd ... unless ... in human nature some actuating passion or motive**] Hume in the remainder of this paragraph restates views set out in 3.2.1.2–8.

333.14 **natural virtues**] See 3.3.1.1 for a definition of the natural virtues.

3.2.5.7 333.28–9 **promises are human inventions, founded on the necessities and interests of society**] Pufendorf, having distinguished between *natural* and *adventitious* obligations, between those '*born with Men*' and those that arise 'by virtue of some Act of theirs', counted the obligation attending promises and contracts among the latter. He also said that 'there must needs pass such a mighty number of Promises amongst Men, whilst they continually want the Assistance of each other' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 3.5.1, 11). Hutcheson said: 'The *Labour* of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessarys, tho it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one sort: Hence the *Right of Commerce*, and *alienating* our Goods; and also the *Rights from Contracts and Promises*, either to the *Goods* acquir'd by others, or to their *Labours*' (*Inquiry* 2.7.8 [287]). See also Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 1.24 [68]; *THN* 3.2.8.6; *LG* 39.

3.2.5.8 333.31 **already found]** See 3.2.2.2–8, 12–14, 18–22.

333.40–1 **to bestow...favours with a view to self-interest...takes off from the obligation]** Seneca argued that an advantage bestowed from reasons of self-interest is not a *benefit*, and thus produces no obligation of gratitude (an essentially spontaneous desire to acknowledge and return the favour done) on the part of the recipient: 'a benefit is always something that is conveyed to us, in the first place, by some intent, in the second place, by some intent that is kind and friendly'. He then asked: 'If anyone has done us a service for his own sake, are we...under any obligation to him?', and to this he replied in the negative. 'He who looks wholly to his own interest, and does us a service only because he could not otherwise do himself a service, seems to me to be in a class with the man who provides food for his flock' or with those who are engaged in trade ('On Benefits' 6.7.2, 6.12–14; see also 4.14.2–4 in the same work; *Moral Epistles* 95.43, 57; ann. 307.7). In contrast, Hobbes argued that 'no man giveth, but with intention of good to himself; because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object is to every man his own good', and then suggested that gratitude is an effort to ensure that '*he which giveth [a gift], have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will*' (*Leviathan* 1.15 ¶16).

3.2.5.9 334.39–40 **omnipotence...alone able to new-mould the human mind]** Pufendorf dealt explicitly with some of the ontological issues implicit here. He argued that there is a natural human state, 'not because such a *State* flows from the internal Principles of human Essence, antecedent to the Power of Imposition; but because it was impos'd by GOD himself, not by Man, and affects us immediately upon our Nativity'. Presumably the omnipotent Deity who has formed this specific nature could, if it chose, 'new-mould the human mind', thus producing a different nature, a nature with different 'passions and principles', to use Hume's terms (see *THN* 334.33). That this different nature would or would not be a *human* nature is likely a moot point, but Pufendorf also supposed that the fundamental moral features of human nature as presently constituted are fixed or 'inalterable': 'the very being a Man is a *State* obliging to certain Duties, and giving a Title to certain Rights' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 1.7). See also 2.2.6.6, 3.3.6.5; anns. 238.1, n. 77 (332).

334.42 **better satisfy our appetites in an oblique and artificial manner]** Cf. 3.2.2.9–13.

3.2.5.10 335.12–23 **a certain form of words invented...certain symbols or signs instituted]** Examples of such words and signs are provided by Grotius as he continues his discussion of the 'three Degrees or Manners of speaking about Things future', either in or thought to be in our power (see ann. 331.38). By the second manner of speaking about such things, i.e. 'when the Will determines itself for the Time to come...by giving some positive Token, that sufficiently declares the Necessity of its Perseverance', he said, an 'imperfect Promise' (a promise that 'obliges either absolutely or conditionally; but yet gives no Right, properly so called') is made. Similarly, the third such manner of speaking, the manner that produces 'perfect'

promises (those creating a real or legal right) requires 'a sufficient Declaration of our Will to confer on another a real Right of demanding the Performance of our Promise'. While Roman law, he noted, supposed that a promise made without 'a Stipulation in Form, an undoubted Sign of a deliberate Mind', to have no legal standing, Grotius himself supposed that 'there may be naturally other Signs of a deliberate Mind, besides this Stipulation, or any other Thing like it' required by civil law (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.11.3–4). See also Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 3.5.5–6.

3.2.5.11–12 335.40–3 **interest is the first obligation... Afterwards a sentiment of morals... becomes a new obligation]** Compare 3.2.2.23–6, 3.2.6.11.

3.2.5.12 336.7 **prov'd already]** See ¶3 of the present section.

3.2.5.13 336.10–28 **'Tis evident... those of deceit]** These lines, moderately revised, make up most of *EPM* 3 n. 13; for details see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition) p. lvii.

336.18–20 **knows not the meaning... uses without any intention of binding himself... uses it in jest only]** Grotius also discussed circumstances affecting the validity of apparent promises, of claiming, e.g., that 'the Promiser should have the Use of his Reason; therefore the Promises of Madmen, Ideots, and Infants are void' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.11.5.1). Pufendorf said that 'we do not attribute a Power of *obliging* to any Promises, but to such as are made upon serious and deliberate Purpose; and he that mistakes Jest for Earnest, ought to pay for his Want of Apprehension'; and that 'we should take care to distinguish between such Terms of Honour and Esteem, as Persons make use of to express, in an indefinite manner, their good Affection towards us; and such particular Engagements as they bind themselves by, to perform somewhat on our behalf' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 3.5.10; cf. 3.6.4–5). Barbeyrac observed that, among the Romans, 'for a long Time, every Promise made with Stipulation, though in Jest, was valid in Law, and produced its full Effect in the same Manner, as if it had been made seriously' (in Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.11.4 n. 8). See also Carmichael, 'Supplements and Observations', *Natural Rights*, 82–5.

3.2.5.14 336.35–7 **transubstantiation... holy orders... changes... nature of an external object... a human]** According to Roman Catholic teaching, the bread and the wine of the Eucharist are transformed into different substances, namely, the body and blood of Christ, but continue to display the qualities or appearances of bread and wine. In the same church, and in the Anglican Church, holy orders is a sacrament which is said to give a distinctive and ineradicable spiritual character to the person ordained.

337.4–6 **Theologians... perceiv'd... the external form of words... requires an intention]** Aquinas argued that the intention of the priest who utters the words associated with a sacrament is an essential element in an efficacious sacrament, and

offered arguments against the contrary view. Intention, he said, directs an action to an end, as the intention to baptize directs the action of immersing or sprinkling to baptism rather than to one of the many other ends that can be imagined. He also said that a priest, in administering a sacrament, does so in the person of the Church, and that the intention of the Church is expressed in the words of the sacrament. Consequently, the priest cannot *secretly* withhold the required intention. On the other hand, Aquinas granted that a priest may intend not to carry out a sacrament; he may act derisively or perversely, and then the form of the sacrament has no value, 'especially when he makes his intention explicit' (*Summa Theologiae* 3a.60, 3, 7–8, 10). Suárez, *Tractatus de legibus* [Treatise on the Laws] 4.13, takes a less nuanced view. We are indebted to Alexander Broadie for these references. The Council of Trent decreed: 'If any one shall say, That that Intention of Acting, at least as the Church does, is not required in Ministers, while they give and administer the Sacraments; Let him be Accursed' (*Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent* 7, 'Of the Sacraments', canon 11). Later, when dealing with similar issues, Hume directed attention to Bayle's *Dictionary* (see *EPM* 3 n. 13). There Bayle observed that the Jesuits did not, as Pascal had suggested, invent the notion of mental reservation, an act of mind akin to that of withholding of intent ('Loyola' [T]). The reference to Pascal is to his *Provincial Letters*, where a theologian is quoted as saying: 'Promises are not binding if one has no intention of being bound when making them' (Letter 9 [142]). See also Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 2.16.1; Chillingworth, *Religion of the Protestants*, 78–9.

3.2.5.15 337.19 **force, which is suppos'd to invalidate all contracts]** In his lengthy chapter on just this topic, Pufendorf began by saying both that '*Consent is required to make Promises and Pacts*' and that 'there can be no better Argument to hinder a Man from complaining' of the burden a promise or pact imposes than to point out that 'he took it upon him by his own free Will and *Consent*, when he had full Power to refuse it'. Granting that a consent may be given tacitly as well as expressly, he then went on to list circumstances that, in effect, do or may interfere with consent: a lack of reason by virtue of being under age or intoxicated, erroneous beliefs or presuppositions, fraud, or fear (*Law of Nature and Nations* 3.6). See also the following annotation; *HE* 3 [1: 147].

337.24–7 **A man...who promises...a surgeon...one, who promises...a robber]** Whether or not one was obliged by promises made in response to unjust constraint or threats of violence, such as those of a robber, was a long-standing question. Plato (*Laws* 920D), Cicero (*De officiis* 3.29.107), and Seneca the Elder (*Controversies* 4.3.9) took the negative view, as did Pufendorf, Locke (*Two Treatises* 2.16.176, 186), and Barbeyrac. The last summed up this position: 'We must then conclude, that, by natural Right, all Force, and every Kind of Violence, direct or indirect, all Menaces, and in general all unlawful Influences, which oblige Men, contrary to their Inclination, to give their Consent, which otherwise they would not, takes away that Liberty which is necessary to make an Engagement valid, and consequently renders

all Promises and Agreements in such Cases null and void' (in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 3.6.10 n.; cf. 4.2.8 n.). Montaigne and Hobbes took the contrary view. The former said: 'What fear [of a robber's violence] has once made me will, I am bound still to will when without fear' ('Of the useful and the honorable', in *Complete Essays*, 608). Hobbes argued that 'compacts extorted from us through fear', even those 'to redeem my life from the power of a robber', are not without validity, for if they are, 'then it would follow, that those promises which reduced men to a civil life, and by which laws were made' would also be without validity (*De Cive* 2.16; cf. *Leviathan* 1.14 ¶27). Grotius took the unusual view that promises made under threat of violence are valid, but that those to whom such promises are made must, upon request, release the promisers from all obligation (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.11.7). See also Carmichael, 'Supplements and Observations', *Natural Rights*, 85–6. For a historical example, see *HE* 3 [1: 147–8].

- 3.2.6 *Some farther reflections concerning justice and injustice*
- 3.2.6.1 337.30 **have now run over the three fundamental laws of nature]** See 3.2.3–5.
- 337.34–5 **Society ... necessary for the well-being of men]** See also 3.2.2.3; ann. 312.11.
- 3.2.6.2 338.7–8 **Justice ... a constant and perpetual will of giving every one his due]** This common definition of justice dates from ancient times. Cicero, with Plato in mind, said: 'For they say, it is the duty of a good and just man to give everyone that which is his due' (*De re publica* 3.11.18; cf. Plato, *Republic* 331E–332C). Hobbes said that 'the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools' is 'that *justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own*', and accepted this view (*Leviathan* 1.15 ¶3; cf. 2.24 ¶5; *De Cive* 18.3). This was, according to Cumberland, '*Justinian's Definition of Justice*' (*Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 7.4 [316]). Pufendorf observed that 'the Definition of Justice so much in vogue with the *Roman Lawyers*, in which they call it, *A constant and perpetual Inclination to give every one their Due*, belongs to the Justice of *Persons*, not to that of *Actions*' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 1.7.6; cf. 8.3.15; *On the Duty of Man* 1.2.12). See also Seneca, *Moral Epistles* 81.7; Justinian, *Institutes* 1.1; John Harris, *Lexicon Technicum*, 'Justice'; Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Justice'.
- 338.11 **already observ'd]** See 3.2.2.11.
- 3.2.6.3 338.14 **imaginary qualities of the peripatetic philosophy]** On this topic, see also 1.4.3.10–11.
- 338.16–17 **property does not consist in ... sensible qualities of the object]** See also 2.1.10.1; 3.2.2.11; 3.2.3.7, 9; 3.2.4.2; ann. 315.32.
- 3.2.6.6 339.16–18 **rules ... too numerous to have proceeded from nature]** Cf. 2.1.3.5–7.
- 339.25–6 **wou'd never have restrain'd themselves by these rules]** Cf. 3.2.2.18–19.
- 3.2.6.7 339.38 **foregoing principle]** See ¶1 of this section.

339.42–3 **civil laws may talk of a perfect *dominion*, and of an imperfect]** To be completely free to alienate and transfer property was to have 'perfect *dominion*' or property right. If after a property has been alienated (sold or otherwise transferred to another), the first owner retains any legitimate claim to it (because of mortgage, servitude, usufruct, or even tacit conditions), then the new owner would have only 'imperfect' or limited dominion. The distinction is set out by Pufendorf (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.9; cf. 4.4.2; *On the Duty of Man* 1.12.8, 1.15.15), and mentioned, but in other terms, by Grotius (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.1.4–5). We are indebted to Kaud Haakonssen for this clarification.

340.1–3 **man that hires a horse . . . for a day, has as full a right to make use of it . . . as . . . its proprietor has . . . any other day]** Seneca had emphasized the rights of the renter: 'Suppose I have rented a house from you; you still have some "right" in it, and I have some right—the property is yours, the use of the property is mine. Nor, likewise, will you touch crops, although they may be growing on your own estate . . . Nor, although you are the owner, will you set foot on what I have rented . . . and if I have hired a carriage from you, you will be receiving a benefit if I permit you to sit in your own vehicle' ('On Benefits' 7.5.2–3). Pufendorf, however, said that '*Use* . . . is when a Man receives from a thing belonging to another, only the daily and necessary Service, the Substance remaining as before . . . the Person to whom it is granted being only allowed to take such Advantage from the thing, as is sufficient for himself and his Dependents; which Allotment is measur'd according to his Dignity and Condition' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.8.8).

3.2.6.9 341.13–14 **No action can be . . . morally good . . . unless there be some natural passion or motive to impel us to it]** Cf. 3.2.1.2–7; anns. 307.15, 308.11.

341.29–36 **particular judgments . . . general rules]** Saint-Evremond explained why 'particular judgments' are sometimes in conflict with 'general rules': 'Generous Men, are not usually the most Just. Justice includes a Regularity that lays a Constraint upon them, as being founded on a constant Method of Reason, opposite to those natural Impulses, which are the Hinges upon which Liberality almost always moves' (*Works* 1: 351). A. Forbes argued that 'Benevolence it self, must be regulated by Justice, as appears in that Precept, *Not to respect the Person of the Poor*: for in a Claim of two Persons, the one in great Poverty, the other flowing in Riches, there would be a natural Byass in the poor Man's favour; which would also be increased, if he were found to be the honestest Man: and yet both these Considerations must be over-ruled, and Right take place' ('View of the Human Faculties', 103). See also *Spectator* 564; *THN* 3.2.1.13, 3.2.3.2, 3.3.1.12; anns. 310.14, 322.28.

342.10–13 **distinction betwixt justice and injustice . . . two different foundations . . . self-interest . . . morality]** See, e.g., 3.2.2.1, 23–6.

3.2.7 *Of the origin of government*

342.title *Of the origin of government*] Hume returned to many of the themes of this and the following four sections in *EPM* 4, in his essays 'First Principles of Government', 'Original Contract', and 'Origin of Government', and in *HE* 23 [2: 518–25].

- 3.2.7.1 342.24–7 **men...govern'd by interest...nor is it usual...to look farther than...nearest friends**] Hooker, having posited that government is necessary in order to eliminate 'mutual grievances, injuries, and wrongs', went on to say that men 'knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, inasmuch as every man is towards himself and them whom he greatly affecteth partial; and therefore that strifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent all to be ordered by some whom they should agree upon' (*Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.10.4). Shaftesbury suggested that it is the natural '*Sense of Fellowship*', the very principle that brings humans together, that leads to disorder in society: 'this *herding* Principle and *associating* Inclination, is seen so *natural* and strong in most Men, that one might readily affirm 'twas even from the Violence of this Passion that so much Disorder arose in the general Society of Mankind' (*Sensus Communis* 3.2 [110–11]). On interest and limited generosity, see also 3.2.2.5–6, 8, 16–20, 24; ann. 317.35.

342.32–4 **interest...in the upholding of society...evident...to the most rude...of human race**] Compare Hooker, who, having argued that the disadvantages of a solitary existence led early humans 'to seek communion and fellowship with others', supposed that governed societies followed as a consequence: 'This was the cause of men's uniting themselves at the first in politic Societies, which societies could not be without Government' (*Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.10.1). Pufendorf, although he granted humanity's 'natural Desire for Society', supposed that the desire for *civil* society had a different, limited, and later origin: 'This', he says, 'is what Mr. *Hobbes* proves in the following manner. Civil Society consists not in a bare Assembly of Men; but in an Assembly combined together by mutual Leagues and Covenants. The Force of these Covenants ignorant People and Infants do not at all apprehend... the former are utterly incapable of instituting a civil State, as being ignorant of its Nature; the latter are wholly regardless of it, as not being any way sensible of its Benefit... therefore, all Men being born Infants, are, by Birth, unqualified for civil Society, and so a great Number of them remain to their dying Day: And the rest are formed and adapted to it by the Force of Discipline, not of Nature.' Pufendorf goes on to conclude that 'the true and leading Cause, why the Fathers of Families would consent to resign up their natural Liberty, and to form a Commonwealth, was thereby to guard themselves against those Injuries, which one Man was in Danger of sustaining from another' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.1.3, 7; cf. 2.3, 7.2.6). For Hobbes's views on this issue, see *De Cive* 1.2; for Locke's, *Two Treatises* 2.9.123; for Barbeyrac's, see ann. 346.42. See also 3.2.8.1; ann. 312.11.



3.2.7.2 342.41 **has been observ'd]** See esp. 2.3.6 and the discussions of comparison at 2.2.8.2–8.

3.2.7.5 343.40–1 **what in an improper sense we call *reason*]** Cf. 2.3.3.8–10.

3.2.7.6 344.17–18 **'tis impossible to change or correct any thing material in our nature]** Other references to the seemingly fixed character of human nature are found at 3.2.5.9 and 3.3.6.5. See also 'Original Contract' 21; 'Perfect Commonwealth' 4.

344.27–8 **Here then is the origin of civil government and allegiance]** Hume also provides a summary of the fundamental conclusions of this section at 3.2.10.2.

3.2.7.7 344.42–3 **that above-mention'd]** In, that is, the preceding paragraph.

3.2.7.8 345.10–13 **no quality...causes more fatal errors...desire objects more according to their situation than their intrinsic value]** Butler observed the human tendency to put present gratification ahead of intrinsic value. While the 'nature of man', he said, 'leads him to attain the greatest happiness he can for himself [and]...to a right behaviour in society, to that course of life which we call virtue', it happens that men do not entirely 'follow or obey their nature in both these capacities and respects...[just] as they neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures...so there is a manifest negligence in men of their real happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is inconsistent with a present gratification'. To this he later added: 'nothing is more common, than to see men give themselves up to a passion or an affection to their known prejudice and ruin, and in direct contradiction to manifest and real interest, and the loudest calls of self-love' (*Three Sermons*, sermon 1 §16; sermon 11 §18). See also 1.3.9.13, 2.2.2.20–6, 2.3.7, 3.2.12.5; anns. 78.39, 365.22.

345.20–1 **Political society easily remedies both these inconveniencies]** Pufendorf had perceived much the same set of 'inconveniencies' and 'remedies'. A thorough examination of the 'common Bent and Genius of Mankind', he said, reveals that there are two 'Vices...which especially hinder any Number of Persons from long continuing in the same general Design. One is, the great Variety of Inclinations and Judgments, about discerning what is most expedient for the common End... The other...is a sluggish Coldness in Business, and an Aversion to doing willingly what we know to be for our Interest... The former of these Evils may be remedied, by uniting in a perpetual Bond the Wills of all the Parties, or by so ordering things, that in all Affairs relating to the common Good of the Society, there should be but one Will to govern their Proceedings. The latter, by constituting some Power, which shall be able to inflict a present and sensible Punishment, on those who oppose or hinder the publick Benefit' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.2.5).

3.2.8 *Of the source of allegiance*

345.title *allegiance]* Discussions of allegiance, the subject of this and the two following sections (and of Hume's 'Original Contract'), were commonplace in the late Renaissance and early modern period, especially in England. There, in large part

because of religious divisions, even hereditary transfers of the monarchy raised questions of loyalty. There were besides the civil wars and the execution of Charles I, an interregnum filled by the Commonwealth and the Protectorate, the Restoration of Monarchy in 1660, the Revolution of 1688, and the Hanoverian Succession of 1715. To give external form to successive demands for allegiance resulting from these changes, between 1534 and the early eighteenth century, more than a dozen new oaths, covenants, or abjurations were introduced. Along the way countless discussions—ranging from highly partisan to highly theoretical, about the sources, the measures or limits, and the objects of allegiance—were published. For brief, early eighteenth-century guides to this literature, see Johnson, *Quæstiones philosophicæ* 11.3.38, and Grove, *System of Moral Philosophy* 2.2.17. Among recent studies, Jones, *Conscience and Allegiance in Seventeenth Century England*, provides the texts of many of the oaths, etc. mentioned, and a brief but helpful bibliography of relevant primary sources.

- 3.2.8.1 345.32–3 **government...is not necessary in all circumstances]** The position taken by Hume was put succinctly by Bayle: 'There have been peoples who have subsisted without laws, without magistrates, without any form of government'; he then gave as examples the aboriginal people of Italy and Africa (*Continuation des pensées diverses* 118). Sallust's *War with Catiline* and *Jugurthine War* were cited in evidence of this view; see, e.g., Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 1.4.2. See also ann. 346.20.

346.3–4 **some philosophers...men are utterly incapable of society without government]** Hobbes was charged with the view that there could be no society without government (see Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.1.7–9; Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 2.22 [136–43]), and did say of the state of nature, of the war of all against all, that it was never generally found 'over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of America, except the government of small families, the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner' (*Leviathan* 1.13 ¶11). Sidney, supposing that our 'natural love to liberty is tempered by reason', claimed that 'we find no place in the world where the inhabitants do not enter into some kind of society or government to restrain' their liberty (*Discourses concerning Government* 2.20 title). See also 'Original Contract' 3, 5–6.

- 3.2.8.2 346.20–1 **the American tribes...live in concord...without any establish'd government]** Locke cited Acosta, who had reported 'that in many parts of America there was no Government at all' and that the natives of Peru 'for a long time had neither Kings nor Common-wealths, but lived in Troops, as they do this day in Florida, the Cheriquanas [an Andean tribe], those of Bresil, and many other Nations, which have no certain Kings, but as occasion is offered in Peace or War, they choose their Captains as they please' (*Two Treatises* 2.8.102, quoting Acosta's *Naturall and Morall Historie of the Indies*). Barbeyrac insisted that 'a long Time after Mankind began to increase and multiply, there were Nations that for several Ages lived without Laws, without Magistrates, or without any Form of Government...Nay, even to this Day there are

several Examples of it to be found among the People of *Africa* and *America*' (in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.1.6 n.; cf. 7.2.9 n.).

346.30 **all governments are at first monarchical]** In contrast to Hume, Pufendorf said: 'Let us conceive in our Mind a Multitude of Men, all naturally free, and naturally equal, going about voluntarily to erect themselves into a new Common-wealth. Here it will be necessary, first of all, that they covenant each with each in particular, to join into one lasting Society.' Only then would they decide on the 'Form of Government' their new state is to have, and monarchy would be one of the several forms available for selection (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.2.7–8). Locke supposed that monarchy is only the most likely form of a first government: 'looking back as far as Records give us any account of Peopling the World, and the History of Nations, we commonly find the *Government* to be in one hand', but none the less 'the *beginning of Politick Society* depends upon the consent of the Individuals, to joyn into and make one Society; who, when they are thus incorporated, might set up what form of Government they thought fit' (*Two Treatises* 2.8.106). See also ann. 346.35; *HE* Appx. 4, n. P [5: 127, 561–3].

346.32 **Camps are the true mothers of cities]** La Bruyère supposed that 'Twas the Injustice... of the first Men, that was the Original and only Source of War; and which put them under the Necessity of submitting to some Power that might settle and establish their Rights and Pretensions: For if they would have been contented with their own, and not have invaded the Rights of their Neighbours, the World would have enjoy'd an undisturbed Peace and Liberty' (*Characters* 11.9, as quoted by Barbeyrac, who himself argued 'that the Original of States and Empires is partly to be attributed to *Force*', or war; see Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.1.7 n.; cf. 7.2.8 n.). That war had been the occasion of the formation of commonwealths was denied by Pufendorf, who, claiming Grotius as an ally, supposed that struggles between *individuals* led to the formation of civil society: 'the true and leading Cause, why the Fathers of Families would consent to resign up their natural Liberty, and to form a Commonwealth, was thereby to guard themselves against those Injuries, which one Man was in Danger of sustaining from another', and said that we need not 'pitch upon War for the Original and Fountain of Government'. Pufendorf none the less granted that the 'Band of Men, which first conspired to invade their Neighbours, voluntarily engaged in Subjection to a common Leader' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.1.7; 7.3.5). See also Cicero, *De officiis* 2.73; Machiavelli, *Discourses* 1.1; Locke, *Two Treatises* 2.8.110; Hume, 'Original Contract' 5.

346.35–6 **the common one deriv'd from patriarchal government]** A leading early modern exponent of the patriarchal basis of government was Robert Filmer, whose *Patriarcha; or the Natural Power of Kings* is criticized throughout Locke's *Two Treatises of Government*. Filmer, who traced the authority of governments to the powers conferred on Adam at creation and then passed on to his male descendants, insisted for just that reason that society without government is impossible: all humans are descendants of Adam and subject to the authority passed on by him. See,

e.g., *Patriarcha* 1, 5, and for additional criticism, Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government*, *passim*.

346.42 **many years must elapse**] Barbeyrac challenged those who supposed that 'the Rise and Settlement of all States' can be explained by 'one general and uniform Principle, such as some suppose *Fear* to be', so that 'in the first Ages of the World, several *Fathers of Families* met together, to consult in what Manner they might most commodiously provide for their Security, or for their Necessities; and that, upon mature Deliberation, they agreed that it was absolutely necessary for 'em to form among themselves a *civil Society*'. This view, he said, 'is not agreeable either to History, or to common Experience, which demonstrate that all human Institutions of Government had but small Beginnings; that they were at first very rude and defective, and that it was by Degrees, and in a long Series of time, that they arrived to any tolerable Perfection...an Idea of *civil Societies*...is a Thing that requires a long Experience' (in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.1.7 n.; for Pufendorf's views, see 7.1.4–8, 10–11). See also above 3.2.3.3; anns. 323.3; 342.32.

- 3.2.8.3 347.16 **creed of a party amongst us**] Hume alludes to the Whigs, who unambiguously maintained that the authority of government derives ultimately from consent of the governed. Hume described his essay 'Original Contract' as being 'against the original Contract, the System of the Whigs' (*Letters* 1: 113). See also ann. 347.31; *HE* 12 [2: 6–7].

347.17–19 *All men, say they, are born free and equal... Government... can only be establish'd by consent*] Locke had said: 'Men being... by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political Power of another, without his own *Consent*. The only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty, and *puts on the bonds of Civil Society* is by agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite into a Community'; that 'every Man, by consenting with others to make one Body Politick under one Government, puts himself under an Obligation to every one of that Society, to submit to the determination of the *majority*'. He also said that '*Allegiance* being nothing but an *Obedience according to Law*', and that the supreme magistrate, being nothing more than 'the publick Person vested with the Power of the Law... the Image, Phantom, or Representative of the Commonwealth', has no right to allegiance when he violates the law (*Two Treatises* 2.8.95, 97, 151). On natural equality and freedom outside a compact, see also Hobbes, *Leviathan* 1.13; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.3.3, 7; Barbeyrac, in the same work, 6.2.10 n. For 1730s versions of this creed, see Bolingbroke, *Craftsman* 377, 430. See also *HE* 51 [5: 192–5], 59 [5: 533–7].

347.25 **duty of allegiance**] Hume returned to the 'duty of allegiance' at *EPM* 4.1; 'Original Contract' 8, 35–6; 'Passive Obedience' 2. See also anns. 353.43; 360.42.

- 3.2.8.4 347.31–4 **those philosophers, who... assert that... consent alone... binds us to any submission**] Grotius had said that 'those who had incorporated themselves into any Society, or subjected themselves to any one Man, or Number of Men, had

either expressly, or from the Nature of the Thing must be understood to have tacitly promised, that they would submit to whatever either the greater part of the Society, or those on whom the Sovereign Power had been conferred, had ordained' (*Rights of War and Peace*, Preliminary Discourse 16); Locke, that 'Every Man being... naturally free', nothing is 'able to put him into subjection to any Earthly Power, but only his own Consent' (*Two Treatises* 2.8.119). See also Hooker, *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.10.1; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.2.7–9. Hume referred again to these unnamed philosophers at 'Original Contract' 6–8, and to the role of consent throughout that essay.

3.2.8.5 348.9 **already shown**] The 'three fundamental laws of nature' are discussed at 3.2.3–5; see also 3.2.2.8–18.

3.2.8.7 350.5 *the artifice of politicians*] On the artifice of politicians, see also 3.2.2.25, 3.2.6.11, 3.3.1.11; anns. 321.6, 16.

3.2.8.8 350.15 **appeal to popular authority**] At 3.2.9.4, the 'general opinion of mankind' is said to be 'perfectly infallible' in morals. Appeals to 'common sense' are found at 1.3.13.4; 2.3.2.5; 2.3.8.8; 3.2.10.7, 16. Hume later observed 'that, though an appeal to general opinion may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or astronomy, be deemed unfair and inconclusive, yet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as criticism, there is really no other standard, by which any controversy can ever be decided' ('Original Contract' 46; cf. *DNR* 1.10).

350.19–21 **pleasure or pain cannot be unknown... so much vice or virtue... as every one places in it**] Locke, discussing judgements of '*present Good or Evil*', said: 'Things in their present enjoyment are what they seem; the apparent and real good are, in this case, always the same. For the Pain or Pleasure being just so great, and no greater, than it is felt, the present Good or Evil is really so much as it appears' (*Essay* 2.21.58; see also 2.21.63).

n. 80.2–3 (350) **a right or a wrong taste in morals, eloquence, or beauty... consider'd afterwards**] No sustained discussion of such a 'taste' is found later in the *Treatise*, but see 3.3.1.8–10, 15, 20, 23; 3.3.5.2–4, 6. See also anns. 2.6, n. 71.28 (324).

3.2.8.9 350.36–9 **magistrates... conceal... their origin from thence**] According to Pufendorf, Hobbes resolved 'to deny that there is any such Thing as a Covenant between Subjects and their Sovereign' in order to prevent 'seditious and turbulent Spirits' from using as a justification for rebellion the claim 'that there is a reciprocal Faith between the Prince and the People, and that when the former departs from what he engaged by Promise, the latter are releas'd from their Obedience; as also to hinder restless and factious Persons from interpreting every Action of their Prince, which suited not with their own Humour, as a Breach of his Faith' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.2.9).

351.3–6 **A tacit promise... a will there must certainly be**] Pufendorf had supposed that the consent or submission necessary to constitute a state amounted to

conscious acts of the will: 'For whether we look on the first Decree, for the Establishment of the Democracy, as the bare Act of many Wills conspiring in one Desire, or as the Covenant of each Man with each, to this Purpose, *I will submit my Will to a general Assembly for us all, upon Condition you will do the like*' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.2.8). In contrast, Locke explained '*tacit Consent*' as requiring no act of will, no conscious act of mind of any kind, but only such an act of submission as begins and ends with the enjoyment of any possession, whether this enjoyment consist of ownership or of so small and brief a thing as 'Lodging only for a Week; or...barely travelling freely on the Highway'. Moreover, a transient is as much 'obliged to Obedience to the Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it' permanently (*Two Treatises* 2.8.119). On tacit consent, see also 'Original Contract' 27–9.

351.10 **born to such an obedience**] Locke had anticipated a like objection: viz. '*That all Men being born under Government, some or other, it is impossible any of them should ever be free, and at liberty to unite together, and begin a new one, or ever be able to erect a lawful Government*' (*Two Treatises* 2.8.113; cf. 1.2.6).

3.2.9 *Of the measures of allegiance*

352.title *measures of allegiance*] A concern with the *measures* of allegiance, meaning the *bounds* or *limits* (cf. *OED*, 'measure' 12.a–b: an 'extent not to be exceeded; a limit') of allegiance, was explicit in the title of a mid-seventeenth-century work by Rous, *The Bounds & Bonds of Publique Obedience*. Locke said that 'the *end and measure*' of political power 'in the state of Nature' is preservation of the society of 'Mankind in general', and consequently that such power 'can have no other *end or measure*, when in the hands of the Magistrate, but to preserve the Members of that Society in their Lives, Liberties, and Possessions; and so cannot be an Absolute Arbitrary Power over their Lives and Fortunes' (*Two Treatises* 2.15.171). See also anns. 345.title; 352.15.

- 3.2.9.1 352.3–4 **political writers...recourse to a promise, or original contract, as the source of our allegiance**] As Hume suggests, the view that governments, at least legitimate ones, derive from the consent of the governed, such consent constituting a promise, compact, or contract that serves as the basis for an expectation of allegiance or obedience to the governments so formed, was not uncommon among 'political writers' of the early modern period. Hooker said that without 'consent there were no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another' and that 'the assent of them who are to be governed seemeth necessary' (*Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* 1.10.4). Pufendorf criticized Hobbes for maintaining 'that every Monarch, properly and truly such, hath an absolute and unlimited Power', and correlatively denying that the sovereign enters into a covenant with his subjects. For his part, Pufendorf maintained that there is 'a reciprocal Faith between the Prince and the People', and that 'Whilst I voluntarily subject my self to a Prince, I promise Obedience, and engage his Protection: On the other hand, the Prince, when he receives me as his Subject, promiseth his Protection, and engageth my

Obedience' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.2.9). Locke wrote of the 'original Compact' that formed 'one Body Politick under one Government', adding later that the only act that can make persons 'Subjects or Members' of a commonwealth is their 'actually entering into it by positive Engagement, and express Promise and Compact', and that 'Political Power' has 'its Original only from Compact and Agreement, and the mutual Consent of those who make up the Community' (*Two Treatises* 2.8.97, 122; 2.15.171). See also anns. 347.31, 351.3; 'Original Contract', *passim*; HE 71 [6: 521].

352.15–16 **instead of protection...they meet with tyranny...they are freed from their promises]** Sidney, another of the 'political writers', said that the 'nature also and measure' of his submission to the magistrate or state 'must be determined by the reasons that induced me to it'; that the 'people, for whom and by whom' magistrates are created, know 'whether the end for which they were created, be performed, or not... They do not set up one or a few men, that they and their posterity may live in splendor and greatness, but that justice may be administred, virtue established, and provision made for the public safety'; and that 'the whole body therefore of the nation cannot be tied to any other obedience than is consistent with the common good, according to their own judgment' (*Discourses concerning Government* 3.41 and 36, title). Locke said that '*Governments are dissolved...* when the Legislative, or the Prince, either of them act contrary to their Trust'. If '*Legislators endeavour to take away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to reduce them to Slavery under arbitrary Power, they put themselves into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from any farther Obedience*' (*Two Treatises* 2.19.221–2; see also 2.17–18). Although Pufendorf also said both that the contract between subjects and governments is conditional, leaving subjects the right 'to deny and withdraw their Obedience which they promis'd', and that the magistrate was created and received his 'Power on this Condition, that those who conferr'd it on him should not, by his means, miss of their Aim', he concluded that 'those Persons are not to be endured, who assert in gross, that a King, when he degenerates into a Tyrant, may be deprived of his Crown, and brought to Punishment by the People' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.2.5, 9; 7.8.6; cf. Barbeyrac's notes to 7.8.5–6). See also anns. 353.38, 43; 356.38; 359.16.

3.2.9.3 353.4–5 **we have frequently taken notice of...general rules]** See 1.3.13.7–14, 2.2.5.12–13, 2.2.8.5.

3.2.9.4 353.38–9 **no nation...were blam'd for their resistance]** The right of citizens or subjects to engage in armed resistance to sovereign power was not universally recognized. Pufendorf said that, generally, even tyrants must be left in power (see ann. 352.15), as did those who maintained the doctrine of passive obedience (see ann. 353.43). A. M. Ramsay, a Jacobite, in a chapter entitled '*Rebellion is never allowed*', said that the 'Lovers of Independency, and enraged Republicans, believe, that the only Remedy against the Abuses of the Sovereign Authority, is to permit the People to take up Arms against unjust Princes, to depose them, and treat them as Criminals' (*Essay upon Civil Government*, 74; cf. 55). On the other hand, first Grotius

and then Locke noticed that, as Locke put it, 'Barclay himself, that great Assertor of the Power and Sacredness of Kings, is forced to confess, That it is lawful for the people, in some Cases, to resist their King'. The 'some Cases' included those of a king already a tyrant, and of a king revealing the intent of becoming a tyrant (Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 1.4.7; Locke, *Two Treatises* 2.19.232, 239; Barclay, *De regno et regali potentate* 1.3.8, quoted at length by Locke). In response to Pufendorf, Barbeyrac said that 'the People have as natural and as unquestionable a Right to defend their Religion by Force of Arms against a Sovereign, who endeavours to compel them to renounce it, or to forbid them the free Exercise of it, as they have to defend their Lives, their Estates, and Liberties against the Attempts of a Tyrant' (in Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.8.5 n.). See also 'Public Credit' 30.

353.40 *Dionysius or Nero, or Philip the Second*] Dionysius II (fl. 360 BC), the despotic ruler of Syracuse (Sicily) was successfully overthrown in 344 BC after his subjects appealed to their mother-city, Corinth, for assistance. After Boudicca of Britain took up arms against the abusive rule of Nero (AD 37–68), other rebellions followed, until Nero fled from Rome and committed suicide. The persecution of non-Catholics reached its height during the reign of Philip II (1527–98), king of Spain, and was among the causes of the rebellion of the Netherlands. See ann. 362.28.

353.43–4 **such an absurdity as...passive obedience**] The doctrine of passive obedience, associated with those who maintained the divine right of kings or favoured a strong hereditary monarchy, is the view that, no matter how inhumane, unjust, or incompetent any given government may be, it is immoral to resist the commands or attempt to overthrow this government. Manwaring, in a sermon given in the presence of Charles I, said that commands clearly 'against the Law of God' may be resisted by subjects, but only to the point of refusing to obey and enduring 'with patience, whatsoever penalty [the King's] *pleasure* should inflict upon them...By which patient and meeke suffering...they should become glorious *Martyrs*'. Of those commands not in opposition to God's 'originall Lawes', he said that 'no Subject may without hazard of his own Damnation...*question, or disobey* the will and pleasure of his *Sovereigne*' (First Sermon, 18–19, in *Religion and Alegiance*). Berkeley undertook 'to prove that there is an absolute unlimited non-resistance or passive obedience due to the supreme civil power, wherever placed in any nation' (*Passive Obedience* 2). Grotius said that sovereign commands 'contrary to the Law of Nature, or the Commands of God...are not to be obeyed', but if the sovereign power inflict any other injury or injustice, 'we ought rather to bear it patiently, than to resist by Force' (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.4.1). See also Filmer, *Patriarcha* 25; Tillotson, *Vindication of Passive-Obedience and Non-Resistance*; G. Burnet, *Vindication of...Passive Obedience*; A. M. Ramsay, *Essay upon Civil Government*, ch. 10. For contrary views and criticism, see Hobbes, *Answer to Bishop Bramhall's Book*, 380–1; Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government* 3.20; the anonymous *Vox populi, vox Dei*; Bolingbroke, *Craftsman* 430. Hume returned to the question of the right of resistance in 'Passive Obedience', an essay he described as being 'against passive



Obedience, the System of the Tories' (*Letters*, 1: 113; cf. ann. 347.16). In a note included in 'Parties of Great Britain' from 1741–67, Hume said that the 'doctrine of passive obedience is so absurd in itself, and so opposite to our liberties, that it seems to have been chiefly left to pulpit-declainers, and to their deluded followers among the vulgar'. See also 'Parties of Great Britain' 8–10; 'Original Contract' 1; *HE* 32 [3: 288], Appx. 3 [4: 367–8], Appx. 4 and n. Q [5: 127, 563], 50 [5: 177], 66 [6: 293–4], 69 [6: 441], 70 [6: 488]; ann. 360.42.

3.2.10 *Of the objects of allegiance*

- 3.2.10.1 354.34–6 'tis only in cases of grievous tyranny... that the exception can take place] Even writers who argued that rebellion may in principle be justified recommended a cautious approach to its use. Locke thought that 'the Inconveniency of some particular mischiefs that may happen sometimes, when a heady Prince comes to the Throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the Publick, and security of the Government, in the Person of the Chief Magistrate, thus set out of the reach of danger: It being safer for the Body, that some few private Men should be sometimes in danger to suffer, than that the head of the Republick should be easily, and upon slight occasions exposed' (*Two Treatises* 2.18.205). Barbeyrac gave a second rationale for this restraint: 'whoever submits to human Authority, must be sensible that the Person, in whose Favour he divests himself of part of his Liberty, is and always will be Man, that is, subject to Mistakes, and Failures in the Discharge of his Duty... Consequently, he at the same Time grants him a Right... that he shall not be divested of his Authority, for every Abuse of it.' None the less, he added, if there is no reason to think 'that Resistance will occasion greater Evils and Disorders, than those to which the Society already is exposed, or those to which it is in Danger of being exposed, we may safely employ our whole Right [of resistance]' (in Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 1.4.2 n. 1). See also Carmichael, 'Supplements and Observations', *Natural Rights*, 162–74. Hume commented again on tyrannicide or rebellion at *EPM* 2.19; 'Original Contract' 14; 'Passive Obedience' 3; *HE* 14 [2: 173–4], 59 [5: 537–46].

354.39 already establish'd] See 3.2.7.

- 3.2.10.2 355.4–5 convention, which establishes government, will also determine the persons... to govern] Locke said that 'In all lawful Governments the designation of the Persons, who are to bear Rule, is as natural and necessary a part, as the Form of the Government it self... Hence all Common wealths with the Form of Government established, have Rules also of appointing those, who are to have any share in the publick Authority; and settled methods of conveying the right to them' (*Two Treatises* 2.17.198). On aspects of this issue related to seventeenth-century England, see 'Parties of Great Britain' 5–12; *HE* 50–5 [5: 156–385].
- 3.2.10.3 355.16–18 suppose ourselves born to submission... bound to obey] A similar sentiment is expressed in 'Original Contract' 7, 23; *HE* 59 [5: 536].

355.34–6 **The case is here the same as ... concerning the stability of possession]** Grotius dealt with the acquisition of property and of sovereignty in a single section, '*Of an Acquisition derived to one by Vertue of some Law*' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.7). See also 3.2.3.1, 3–4.

- 3.2.10.4 356.10–11 **long possession in any one form of government, or succession of princes]** Grotius argued that '*even the Right of Sovereign Power may be obtained either by a King or by a People by long Possession*' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.4.11 title; see also anns. 324.9; 326.14). Locke imagined it possible that civil society began when '*a Family by degrees grew up into a Common-wealth, and the Fatherly Authority being continued on to the elder Son, every one in his turn growing up under it, tacitly submitted to it ... till time seemed to have confirmed it, and settled a right of Succession by Prescription*' (*Two Treatises* 2.8.110). See also Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.6.3, with Barbeyrac's notes thereon; Hume, 'Protestant Succession'; 'Perfect Commonwealth' 1; *HE* Appx. 1 [1: 161–2], 23 [2: 525], 51 [5: 193–5].

356.12–13 **scarce is any race of kings ... not primarily founded on usurpation]** Sidney considered, without endorsing, the view that the first kings, and all English kings, were usurpers (*Discourses concerning Government* 1.8, 3.30). See also 'Original Contract' 9, 19, 22; *HE* 6 [1: 251–4].

- 3.2.10.5 356.33–4 **kings of France have not been possess'd of absolute power for above two reigns]** The Bourbon dynasty began with Henri IV (1553–1610, king of France from 1589), but, on Hume's account, fully consolidated its power after defeating the Fronde, a rebellion starting in 1648 in the reign of Louis XIV (1643–1715). Regarding Louis XIV, see *HE* 64 [6: 216–17].

356.35–6 **what has been said concerning accession]** See 3.2.3.10, n. 72.3–4 (324), n. 75.4–74 (327–8).

- 3.2.10.6 356.38 **present possession is sufficient to supply its place]** Grotius, having asked the extent to which a usurper is to be obeyed, replied: 'The Acts of Sovereignty exercised by such an Usurper may have an obligatory Force, not by vertue of his Right, (for he has none) but because it is very probable that the lawful Sovereign, whether it be the People themselves, or a King, or a Senate, chuses rather that the Usurper should be obeyed during that Time, than that the Exercise of the Laws and Justice should be interrupted, and the State thereby exposed to all the Disorders of Anarchy.' He went on, however, to say that any new laws promulgated by a usurper need not be obeyed, and that in typical circumstances the right to resist a usurper, by force, remains with the populace (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.4.15; cf. Barbeyrac's comment in 1.4.15 n. 2). On the same issue, Pufendorf concluded that 'he who actually possesseth the Sovereignty, by whatsoever Means he acquires it, is so long to be acknowledg'd by the Subjects for their lawful Prince, as there appears no one who can claim the Crown by a better Right ... It being the common Interest of the People, that the Care and Direction of the State should rather lie in any one Person, than that, on the Account of having no certain Head, it should be involv'd in endless

Disputes and Disturbances' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.8.9). See also 'Original Contract' 28; 'Politics to a Science' 16; 'Coalition of Parties' 13–19; *HE* 18 [2: 333–7], 24 [3: 3–11].

356.42 **principles above-mention'd]** See ¶3 of the present section.

356.45 **when we observ'd]** See 3.2.3.5.

- 3.2.10.7 357.10–11 **extravagant paradox...shock the common sense...of mankind]** Hume may allude to Locke, who described usurpation as a kind of 'domestic Conquest' by which the usurper takes '*Possession of what another has Right to*', and concluded that 'an Usurper can never have Right on his side' (*Two Treatises* 2.17.197). Sidney argued that, according to Filmer, 'there neither is, was, or can be, a usurper', for we are only to consider 'the power, and not at all the means and ways by which it is obtained', and are equally obliged to submit to the commands of 'a king and a tyrant'. In taking this view, he added, Filmer 'seems to have set himself against humanity and common sense, as much as against law and virtue' (*Discourses concerning Government* 3.30). See also 'Original Contract' 46; 'Remarkable Customs' 14.

357.19–20 **from the dissolution of the Roman liberty, to the final extinction of that empire by the Turks]** That is, from the end of the Roman Republic c.40 BC to the capture of Byzantium or Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453.

- 3.2.10.8 357.29 **right of conquest...a third source of the title of sovereigns]** That conquest gave just title was a matter of dispute. Grotius said that just 'as Property, or Right to the Goods of an Enemy, may be acquired by a lawful War...so may also Civil Dominion, or an absolute Right to command and govern the Enemy' be obtained in this way (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.3.8). See also Sidney, *Discourses concerning Government* 3.9. Pufendorf and Locke thought the issue more complex. The former granted that conquest, a political form of *occupancy*, 'is a proper Means for the obtaining of Sovereignty' only in so far as it is the consequence of 'a just Cause of the Invasion, and is confirm'd by the Consent of the Subject, and by subsequent Articles and Covenants. For without these mutual Ties the *State of War* continues; and there can be no Fidelity or Obligation... how can Allegiance be due to him, who hath not purchas'd and receiv'd it by some certain Terms of Agreement?' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.7.3). Locke argued that, although 'many have mistaken the force of Arms, for the consent of the People, and reckon Conquest as one of the Originals of Government... *Conquest* is as far from setting up any Government, as demolishing an House is from building a new one in the place'. Those who have been subdued by the leader of a just cause against them do not, he then went on to argue, automatically owe allegiance to that leader (*Two Treatises* 2.16.175). See also 'Original Contract' 19.

- 3.2.10.9 357.38 **right of succession]** Hume's predecessors tended not to treat the issues he raises under this heading as distinct or separable from those raised when he considers the first and fifth of the 'principles' (*long possession* and *positive laws*) set out

in ¶14 of this section. In the matter of 'Succession of Crowns', Grotius distinguished kingdoms that are 'possessed with a full Right of Property, and as a Patrimony' from those that 'are enjoyed in a certain Manner, determined by the Consent of the People'. While the former may exactly correspond to the 'hereditary monarchies' Hume mentions in n. 82, succession in the latter is also from one family member to another in accordance with one or more of a set of principles that Grotius articulated; see his *Rights of War and Peace* 2.7.12 ff. See also Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 2.7.141–3; anns. 359.5, 22; 'Populousness' 72–3.

3.2.10.11 358.13–16 **elective monarchies...son of their deceas'd monarch]** Grotius pointed out that Roman emperors were elected; Barbeyrac added that there were in these elections no 'fixed and fundamental Laws concerning the Order of the Succession. We find, however, that the Sons, either natural or adopted, commonly succeeded' (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.3.10; cf. 2.9.11, and for Barbeyrac's view, 2.9.11 n. 4). Pufendorf reported that such elections are 'usually divided into *free* and *limited*. By the former any Person, without Exception, may be *designed*...By the latter no Person can rightly be pitch'd upon who is not of such a Nation, or of such a Family, or endued with such a particular Qualification' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.7.6). On elective monarchies, see also Hobbes, *De Cive* 7.15–16; *Leviathan* 2.19; Locke, *Two Treatises* 2.10.132.

3.2.10.12 358.24 **The history of Artaxerxes, and the younger Cyrus]** There are two relevant histories of Persian successions. The earlier is found in Herodotus, who reports that Darius I had three sons by his first wife and, after he became king, four by his second wife, Atossa. The oldest of the first group of sons was Artabazanes, and of the second, Xerxes. Artabazanes claimed the right to succession as being the eldest of all these sons; Xerxes on the grounds, among others, that he was born after his father became king, whereas Artabazanes was born while his father was still a subject. Xerxes was advised to offer this argument by a Spartan who said that by the law of Sparta a son born during a kingship would have precedence over those born before his father became king. Xerxes won the contest and became king, but rather because of the great influence of his mother, Herodotus suggests, than because of the Spartan precedent (*History* 7.2–5). Darius II had two sons, Artaxerxes, who was born before his father became king, and Cyrus the Younger, who was born after that event. In this case, the elder brother became king. Expressly considering the topic, whether '*The Son born before his Father's coming to the Crown [is] to be preferred before one born after*', Grotius concluded, under the following heading, that this should be the case, '*Unless it appears that the Crown was conferred on some other Condition*', and goes on to say: 'For as to *Persia*, that *Xerxes* obtain'd the Crown to the Prejudice of *Artabazanes*, was, as *Herodotus* observes, owing more to the Power of *Atossa* his Mother, than to the Justice of his Cause. For in the same *Persia*, when a like Dispute arose between *Artaxerxes Mnemon* and *Cyrus*, the Sons of *Darius* and *Parisatis*, *Artaxerxes* as the elder, tho' born when his Father was a private Person, was yet declared King' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.7.28–9). See also Plutarch, 'Aratus and Artaxerxes', *Lives* 23, 24.

358.28–9 **above-mention'd]** See ¶¶4, 10, 11 of the present section, and 2.2.8.5, 2.3.6.

- 3.2.10.14 359.5 **the fifth source of authority, viz. positive laws]** Grotius reported that where a kingdom was held as a fief—that is, subject to homage and service owed to a superior—succession was determined according to ‘their own Laws and Customs concerning Things held in Fee’, and later said that succession may be determined according to ‘the Civil Laws of a Country’. Such laws could call for kingdoms to be divided among heirs of a certain type (e.g., sons), to give preference to a dead king’s younger brother over the son of a deceased elder brother, or to establish still other rules regarding the form succession is to take (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.7.21–37). Pufendorf said that ‘in Kingdoms which were first constituted by the voluntary Act of the People, the Order of the Succession doth likewise originally depend on the Peoples Will’, and reviewed the laws or customs expressing this will (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.7.12). Locke argued: ‘If the Agreement and consent of Men first gave a Scepter into any ones hand . . . that also must direct its descent and conveyance . . . in this Case Inheritance or Primogeniture, can in it self have no Right, no pretence to it, any farther than that Consent, which Established the Form of the Government, hath so settled the Succession. And thus we see the Succession of Crowns, in several Countries places it on different Heads, and he comes by Right of Succession to be a Prince in one place, who would be a Subject in another’ (*Two Treatises* 1.9.94). See also anns. 357.38; 359.22.

359.16–20 **legislative power . . . changes all on a sudden the whole system of government . . . subjects . . . at liberty to return to the antient government]** Hume appears to describe in general terms the Commons-led Revolution that changed the form of English government from 1649 to 1660, and the subsequent Restoration of the monarchy in 1660. For Hume’s account of these events and the interregnum, see *HE* 54–62; see also *HE* 23 [2: 525].

359.22 **the Salic law . . . in France]** The Salic Law of France was an example of the principle of *agnatic* succession, itself a form of *lineal* succession (a right of transmitting the succession of the crown within a family line). On the principle of agnatic succession, as Grotius put it, ‘a Succession of Males only, who are descended of Males’, may succeed to the monarchy. This principle differed from *cognatic* succession, or that in which ‘Females, and their Children, are not excluded, but only postponed’ in favour of equally related males and their descendants. Agnatic succession, Grotius adds, was ‘commonly called the *French* Succession’, and ‘was principally designed to exclude Females, to prevent the Crown’s passing into a strange Family by the Marriage of the Daughters’ (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.7.23, 22). See also Justinian, *Institutes* 3.2; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 7.7.11. The Salic Law was emphatically maintained by the French house of Valois (1328–1589), and the succeeding house of Bourbon (1589–1792); see Rapin, ‘Dissertation upon the Salic-Law’, *History of England*, 500–7. See also *HE* 15 [2: 196–8], 18 [2: 347–8].

- 3.2.10.15 359.36–8 **history . . . philosophy . . . original qualities of human nature]** Compare ‘Original Contract’ 21.

360.1–12 **Who shall tell me . . . recent an usurpation?**] These lines are repeated, with only minor revisions, as 'Original Contract' 40.

360.1–2 **whether Germanicus, or Drusus, ought to have succeeded Tiberius]** Tiberius, Roman emperor AD 14–37, adopted Germanicus (born 24 May, 15 or 16 BC) in AD 4. As Tiberius was immediately thereafter adopted by Augustus, Germanicus became a member of the Julian family and in direct line of succession. Drusus was born to Tiberius and his wife Vipsānia c.13 BC and thus was already a member of the Julian family at the time of Tiberius' adoption by Augustus (*Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 'Julius Caesar' (1), 'Germanicus', 'Drusus'). See also the following annotation.

360.3–6 **right of adoption . . . had already, in two instances, taken place in the public]** The 'two instances' of adoption prior to that of Germanicus would be the adoption of Octavian (Augustus) by Julius Caesar, and the adoption of Tiberius by Augustus. These same examples bear on Hume's further question, 'Ought the *Roman* empire at that time to be esteem'd hereditary, because of two examples', in which leadership of the empire passed from Julius, to Augustus, to Tiberius Caesar. In Roman law of intestate succession the rights of adopted children were equal to those of biological children; nor did the law make a distinction between the age of children in the inheritance of property (see Justinian, *Institutes* 3.1). Also, Roman emperors used adoption as a means of attempting to designate a successor. Consequently, the case for Germanicus was at least as strong as that for Drusus. As it happens, both Germanicus and Drusus died (probably from poison) before Tiberius did. We are indebted to Michael Silverthorne for his assistance with these details.

3.2.10.16 360.17–18 **that famous revolution . . . a happy influence on our constitution]** Hume refers to the Revolution of 1688, styled the 'Glorious Revolution' by his Whig contemporaries. On 30 June 1688 a self-appointed group of seven English aristocrats issued to William of Orange, a staunch Protestant whose wife, Mary, was the daughter of James II, the reigning and Roman Catholic king of England, an invitation to intervene in the affairs of England. In general terms, the immediate aim of this proposed intervention was to protect English institutions from what was perceived as James's use of arbitrary power and his sympathy with the French and with Roman Catholicism. When in November of the same year William with his army landed in England, he claimed to seek only to reverse the steps taken by the misguided king and to ensure that 'a free and lawful Parliament assembled as soon as possible'. James, although in possession of a superior force, declined to engage his army, and in the following month fled the country. This left William as the only obvious source of public order. Subsequently, a Convention (later proclaimed a Parliament) was formed by means of a general election. After three weeks of debate the Convention concluded that James had abdicated and invited William and Mary to take up joint sovereignty. In addition, then, to interrupting hereditary sovereignty by deposing a living king (and his heir, James, the prince of Wales, later known as the 'Old Pretender') and proclaiming new sovereigns, Parliament *influenced*, to use Hume's term, both immediately and over

the ensuing years, the loosely structured English Constitution (the 'British Constitution' only after 1707 and the Act of Union with Scotland). The most obvious immediate influences appear to have been, first, the passage of the Bill of Rights, which asserted 'the true, ancient, and indubitable rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom' and also limited the powers of the monarchy (e.g., the 'pretended power of suspending laws' and that of 'raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace' without the consent of Parliament); and second, a revised oath of office requiring new monarchs to 'solemnly promise and swear to govern the people of this kingdom of England . . . according to the statutes in parliament agreed on, and laws and customs of the same'. Some of the notable later changes to the Constitution, still during the reign of William III, include the Toleration Act of 1689 (an act applying to certain Protestant Dissenters), the Triennial Act of 1694 (an act requiring general, parliamentary elections every three years), and the Act of Settlement of 1701 (an act requiring that the monarch of the kingdom be a Protestant, and if married, married to a Protestant, and also establishing for the first time that the English sovereign owes his title to Parliament). For further details of these and the many other relevant acts of similar importance, see Browning (ed.), *English Historical Documents 1660–1714*, or Williams (ed.), *The Eighteenth-Century Constitution 1688–1815*; for a detailed chronology of events and a discussion of their significance, see Holmes, *The Making of a Great Power*. Hume again discussed this revolution in 'Original Contract' 15 and at length in *HE* 70–1; see also 'British Government', 'Independency of Parliament'.

360.19 **already remark'd]** See 3.2.9.

360.24–6 **impossible . . . to establish any particular rules . . . when resistance is lawful]** In contrast to Hume, Grotius, although he argued that there is no general or natural right to rebellion, specified circumstances justifying war against a sovereign, and thereby appeared to produce just such 'particular rules'. These rules included (1) 'Princes who depend on the People . . . may not only be resisted by Force; but if it be necessary, may be punished by Death'; (2) 'If a King, or any other Prince, has abdicated his Government, or manifestly abandoned it', he may be resisted by force (Barbeyrac, in 1.4.9 n. 1 points out that this principle was invoked in 'the Debates between the two Houses of Parliament on the Abdication of *James II. King of England*'); and (3) 'he that declares himself an Enemy to the whole Nation, is presumed by that very Act to renounce the Government', and may thus be resisted (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.4.2, 8–9, 11). See also the following annotation.

360.42–4 **where the chief magistrate . . . wou'd encroach on the other parts of the constitution]** Grotius also said that 'If a King should have but one Part of the sovereign Power, and the Senate or People the other, if such a King shall invade that Part which is not his own, he may justly be resisted' (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.4.13). Hume may have had the encroachments of Charles I and James II in mind; see 'Passive Obedience' 6; *HE* 53 and n. W [5: 278 and 568–70], 59 [5: 533–5], 70 [6: 293–4]; ann. 353.43.

- 3.2.10.18 361.22 **the lords and commons in our constitution]** The reference is to the two houses of the British Parliament. In the eighteenth century the House of Lords consisted of English hereditary peers and (after 1707) representative peers from Scotland, together with the archbishops and bishops of the Church of England. The House of Commons consisted of representatives of English and (after 1707) Scottish boroughs and counties.
- 361.43–4 **The mind naturally runs on with any train of action]** See also 1.2.4.24, 1.3.13.9–10, 1.4.2.22.
- 362.2 **his infant son]** The infant son in the case was the James (born 30 June 1688) who became in time 'the Old Pretender'; see also ann. 360.17.
- 3.2.10.19 362.10–11 **accession of the Prince of Orange...occasion to many disputes]** Some were never reconciled to the deposing of James II. Some argued that the crown should pass only to Mary Stuart, wife of the William of Orange, while still another group argued that William should be Regent until the young James became able to assume power. Some Anglicans, led by W. Sancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury (the *non-jurors*), seceded from the Church of England because they could not accept the deposition of James II. For bibliographical guidance, see Holmes, *Making of a Great Power*, 176–91, 212–28.
- 362.12–13 **those three princes, who have succeeded him upon the same title]** The successors of William III were Queen Anne (1702–14); George I (1714–27), the Elector of Hanover; and his son George II (1727–60). The Elector of Hanover was chosen to succeed as George I because none of Anne's children survived, because he was directly descended from James I, and because he was a Protestant. The succession of Anne by George I did not preclude many, mainly Tories, retaining an allegiance to the Stuarts, an allegiance which could range from the sentimental to the rebellious, well into the eighteenth century. Hume weighs the issues involved in the Hanoverian succession in his essay 'Protestant Succession'.
- 362.19–20 **Julius Caesar...Sulla...Marius]** Julius Caesar (100–44 BC) formed about 60 BC the 'first triumvirate' with Pompey and Crassus. Caesar eventually assumed dictatorial power, putting an end to the Roman republic, and is often regarded as the first of the Roman emperors. Earlier, Lucius Cornelius Sulla (c.138–78 BC), Roman general and leader of forces supported by the Senate and noble families of Rome, had been elected dictator after a brutal civil war, largely between forces loyal to him and those led by Gaius Marius (157–86 BC), a leader of the popular party who was six times elected a consul by the Roman Senate. With his allies, Marius seized power in Rome in 87 BC, and proceeded to execute those whom he perceived to be his enemies. A year later Sulla regained control and, once in power, set about ruthlessly exterminating his enemies. Although Caesar may have been as much a usurper as either Marius and Sulla were, they each ruled for only a short time, and each failed to establish a settled form of government.



362.26–7 **present king of France...Hugh Capet...Cromwell]** Louis XV of the House of Bourbon ruled France in 1740. Hugh Capet (c.938–96), who had been a powerful vassal of the last Carolingian kings, Lothair and Louis V, displaced the next Carolingian in line, Charles of Lorraine. The direct Capetian line ended in 1328, but the Bourbons who ruled France in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were a branch of that line. Oliver Cromwell, Protector from 1653 to 1658, may have been no more a usurper than Caesar or Hugh Capet, but because he failed to found a surviving form of government, he is often taken to have been an illegitimate ruler. Barbeyrac repeated the question: how could it be that two supposedly legitimate lines, the Carolingian and the Capetian, had been established by, respectively, Pepin and Capet, if it were true, as some had claimed, that 'the Successors of an Usurper can never acquire a lawful Right of Force against the *Posterity* of the King unjustly dethroned'? See Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 4.12.11 n. Hume returned to Hugh Capet and his claim to the French throne in 'Original Contract' 45 n. 4. See also *HE* 8 [1: 297–9], 61 [6: 55–110].

362.28–9 **establish'd liberty of the Dutch...resistance to Philip the Second]** The northern Dutch provinces, constituting what is now the Netherlands, successfully defended their civil and religious liberties against Philip II (1527–98), King of Spain and The Netherlands. See also *HE* 40 [4: 170–4]. These liberties, which curtailed significantly their sovereign's right to interfere with local affairs, were established first by twelfth-century charters that allowed, within a feudal state, what were practically self-governing republics. The liberties were later confirmed by the 'Great Privilege', a charter signed by the ruling Carolingian monarch, Mary of Burgundy, in 1477. Holland and four other northern provinces, in response to the threat from the Catholic southern provinces and Philip II, signed the Union of Utrecht in 1579. This bound the northern provinces together to maintain their rights and liberties, including complete freedom of worship and of religious opinion.

3.2.11 *Of the laws of nations*

- 3.2.11.1 362.33–4 **Political writers tell us...a body politic is to be consider'd as one person]** Hobbes had said that individuals, in submitting themselves to the sovereign, create a 'civil society; and also a civil person. For when there is one will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one person...having its own rights and properties' (*De Cive* 5.9); Pufendorf, that by means of 'Covenants...a Multitude of Men are so united and incorporated, as to form a civil State; which is conceived to exist like *one Person*, endued with Understanding and Will, and performing other particular Acts, distinct from those of the private Members... So that the most proper Definition of a civil State seems to be... "a compound moral Person"' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.2.13; cf. 7.4.2). See also Locke, *Two Treatises* 2.8.95–6.

362.39–363.2 **a new set of rules...different societies]** These lines of text form the basis of a similar comment at *EPM* 4.2; for details see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lvii–lviii.

362.39–40 **new set of rules, which we call the laws of nations]** The distinction between the *laws of nature* and the *laws of nations* was commonly made, but there was disagreement, as Pufendorf put it, regarding the answer to the question, ‘Whether or no there be any such thing as a particular and positive *Law of Nations*, contradistinct to the *Law of Nature*?’ (*Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.23). Grotius supposed those laws of nature that are fully independent of the human will are unalterable even by the Deity, and thus are everywhere the same. The laws of nations he took to be significantly different because ‘that which is reputed the Right or Law of Nations in one Part of the World, is not so in another’ (*Rights of War and Peace* 1.1.10.5, 14; cf. 2.18.4; ann. 318.33 above). Hobbes said that ‘the natural law may be divided into that of *men*, which alone hath obtained the title of *law of nature*; and that of *cities*, which may be called that of *nations*. . . The precepts of both are alike’ (*De Cive* 14.4; cf. *Elements of Law* 2.10.10; *Leviathan* 2.30 ¶30). Pufendorf himself agreed with Hobbes, saying that while the law of nations ‘flows from the Consideration of human Indigence, the Relief of which seems to be the main End and Design of Society . . . whatever is deducible from Reflections on the Indigence of human Nature, we refer immediately to *natural Law*’ (*Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.23). Justinian used the same terminology to draw a quite different distinction: ‘the law of nature is that which she has taught all animals; a law not peculiar to the human race . . . those rules prescribed by natural reason for all men are observed by all peoples alike, and are called the law of nations’ (*Institutes* 1.2.1). See also Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 5.2, 6.1 [193, 305]; Carmichael, ‘Supplements and Observations’, *Natural Rights*, 85–6. On the law of nations, see also 3.3.1.9; *EPM* 4.2–4.

362.41 **sacredness of the persons of ambassadors]** Grotius showed that ambassadors representing sovereign states had been generally supposed, from classical times, to be of a ‘*sacred Character*’, which is to say that even those representing enemy states were protected (their persons were kept safe) and absolved from punishment in the event they broke the laws of their hosts. He described this as a right deriving from a ‘voluntary Law of Nations’—from ‘the Will and Pleasure of Nations’ rather than from those ‘sure and infallible Principles’ that produce natural rights (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.18.1, 4.1–2). Pufendorf agreed that the ‘Persons of [*bona fide*] Ambassadors are sacred and inviolable, even amongst Enemies’, but argued that this sacred character is grounded in, or an aspect of, the law of nature: ‘For inasmuch as such Persons [as ambassadors] are necessary for the procuring, the preserving, or the strengthening of Peace by Leagues and Covenants; and since the Law of Nature enjoins us to embrace Peace by all honest Ways it must, at the same time be suppos’d to have provided for the Security of those Men, without whose Intervention this good End cannot be obtain’d’ (*Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.23).

362.41 **declaration of war]** As Grotius shows, the principle, that a war cannot be just unless openly declared, dates to classical times; see, e.g., Cicero, *De officiis* 1.11.36; Livy, *Histories* 1.27.3. Grotius himself supposed the principle to be a

precept of the law of nations, but noted exceptions in which the laws of nature would take precedence (*Rights of War and Peace* 3.3.5–14).

362.41–363.1 **abstaining from poison'd arms]** Grotius reviews earlier opinions on this topic, and reports that poisoning 'the Heads of Darts... is contrary to the Law of Nations, tho' not of all, yet of the *European*, and others civilized like them' (*Rights of War and Peace* 3.4.16). Heineccius, in contrast, claimed that the use of poisoned arms is allowable; see *Methodical System of Universal Law* 2.9.199.

363.1 **other duties of that kind]** There were additional precepts regarding the poisoning of wells, the use of assassins, rape, truces, safe-conduct, ransom, and on the more general duty to be moderate in the execution of war. See Grotius, *Rights of War and Peace* 3.4.18–19, 3.11, 3.21; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 8.6–7.

- 3.2.11.3 363.13–16 **maxim ... a system of morals... for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons]** Barbeyrac suggested that it may be because we distinguish between *natural law* and the *law of nations* that we 'judge otherwise of the Actions of Princes, or Commonwealths, than of [those of] private Persons'. In support of this supposition he cited Buddeus: 'If one private Person offends another without Cause, we call that Action *Injustice*; but if one Prince encroaches upon another without Cause, by invading his Dominions, by robbing his Subjects, and plundering his Towns and Provinces, it is called *War*, and 'twere too much Boldness to call it *unjust*. To break Bargains made and agreed on, is a *Crime* between one Man and another: But among Princes, to break the most solemn Alliance, is *Prudence*, i.e. the Art of Governing. 'Tis true, they always alledge some plausible Pretences, but they matter not whether they are believed just or unjust. Be they called Cheats, Frauds, Lies, Double-dealings, Rapine, Theft, or the like Crimes, which are abhorred in the common Sort, all the World will commend, or at least excuse them, if a Prince or a whole Nation commits them' (Buddeus, *Elementa philosophiæ instrumentalis*, 236, as quoted by Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 2.3.23 n.). See also Machiavelli, *Prince* 18; the following annotation.

Some also supposed a sovereign to be outside or above the civil law of the state he or she governed, and consequently to have a freedom of action unknown to subjects. Hobbes, for example, maintained that, because the sovereign remains outside the covenant establishing the commonwealth, 'there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign', who is left to administer with 'untied hands' the laws that he establishes for his subjects (*Leviathan* 2.18 ¶4). Pufendorf said that the sovereign, because he is suppos'd the *supreme* ruler, must for that very reason 'be suppos'd exempt from human Laws, or, to speak more properly, *above* them' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.6.3). See also Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 9.7 [351–2]; Locke, *Two Treatises* 2.7.90–3; Bolingbroke, 'Freeholder's Political Catechism', *Craftsman* 377; Hume, *HE* 13 [2: 133].

363.17–18 **nor will any one ... assert, that... treaties ought to have no force among princes]** Grotius maintained the even stronger position that agreements or

treaties between princes or non-monarchical states ought to have full force. 'Faith', he said, 'is to be kept with all Sorts of Enemies', including even 'Pirates and Tyrants' and the faithless, and even to the smallest detail: 'Neither can I here admit of any Distinction between the Articles of Peace, as if some were of greater Concern than others: For whatever is inserted in the Articles, ought to be regarded as important enough to be observed' (*Rights of War and Peace* 3.19.1–2.titles, 3.20.35; cf. 2.15–16). Pufendorf's position was more complex. Having said that it is morally allowable to deceive an enemy, he then went on to say that this permission 'is by no Means, to be extended to any Pacts or Treaties...about concluding... War. For since the Law of Nature commands us to maintain Peace as far as may be done with Convenience, and to repair any Breach that may happen in it, we must suppose ourselves commanded at the same time to use those Means without which this End can ne'er be obtain'd.' Still later in the same work he argued that some compacts between nations leave the contending parties in a state of war, and it is absurd to suppose that those who propose to remain enemies can rely on one another sufficiently to reach a *bona fide* treaty of peace. It seems more likely that two such parties intend only 'to impose upon and ensnare one another, and by making each other heedless and secure, to lay Trains for further Mischiefs', and thus, he argued, Grotius was mistaken when he claimed that *all* compacts made with an enemy are to be observed. Barbeyrac claimed that Pufendorf had been inconsistent, and sided with Grotius, saying that the compacts in question 'ought to be as religiously observed as any other...from the very Moment that the Treaty is concluded...till either the Time is expir'd, or the Enemy's Violation of the Engagement on his Side, dispenses with the observing ours any longer' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 4.1.17, 19; 8.7.2, 2 n.).

Hume later said: 'That neglect, almost total, of truth and justice, which sovereign states discover in their transactions with each other, is an evil universal and inveterate; is one great source of the misery to which the human race is continually exposed; and it may be doubted, whether in many instances it be found in the end to contribute to the interests of those princes themselves, who thus sacrifice their integrity to their politics' (*HE* 13 [2: 133]). See also Hobbes, *Leviathan* 1.14 ¶27; Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature* 7.12 [326 margin]; Heineccius, *Methodical System of Universal Law* 2.9.200–1.

363.19–20 **princes...form treaties...must propose some advantage from... them]** As Pufendorf noted, 'ordinary Treaties propose, for the most part, as their Aim, only some particular Advantage of the States thus transacting; their Interests happening, at present, to fall in with each other' (*Law of Nature and Nations* 7.5.18; cf. 7.1.9).

3.2.12 *Of chastity and modesty*

3.2.12.2 364.25–8 **some philosophers...show...no foundation in nature for... modesty...we require of the fair sex]** Montaigne copiously illustrated his opinion that 'chastity is a fine virtue, whose utility is well enough known; but to treat it and justify it according to nature is as hard as it is easy to justify it according

to custom, laws, and precepts' ('Of custom', in *Complete Essays*, 84). Poulain de La Barre supposed 'that the Regards of Decency and Undecency are almost all, in their Original, nothing else but the Effects of Imagination, and the Capriciousness of Men' (*Woman as Good as the Man*, 142–3). Mandeville said that 'the Modesty of Women is the Result of Custom and Education, by which all unfashionable Denudations and filthy Expressions are render'd frightful and abominable to them' (*Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, 65; cf. *Enquiry into the Origin of Honour*, 29, 53–9). See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Alesius' [D]; 'Jonas' [C] [3: 581b]; Barbeyrac, *Historical and Critical Account of the Science of Morality* 22; Addison, *Spectator* 433. Esprit maintained the contrary view that 'Humane Modesty is a real Virtue' founded in nature. It is, he said, one of several virtues 'peculiar to... Women; because Nature hath endow'd Women with Inclinations and Tendencies, which make the practice of these Virtues easie... the cold Temper, and natural Timidity of Women, is of mighty use to make them Chast and Modest'. He granted, however, that 'Education' and the 'fear of being Disgrac'd' were ancillary causes of modesty ('Of the Modesty of Women', in *Discourses*, 258–9). See also Hume, 'Polygamy and Divorces' 7.

- 3.2.12.3 364.35–6 **there must be an union... of considerable duration]** Locke explained in similar terms the need for a long-lasting relationship between human parents, saying that 'the chief, if not the only reason, *why the Male and Female in Mankind are tyed to a longer conjunction* than other Creatures, *viz.* because the Female is capable of conceiving, and *de facto* is commonly with Child again, and Brings forth too a new Birth, long before the former is out of a dependancy for support on his Parents help, and able to shift for himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his Parents: whereby the Father, who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an Obligation to continue in Conjugal Society with the same Woman longer than other Creatures' (*Two Treatises* 2.7.80). See also Seneca, 'On Benefits' 3.11.1–3; Pufendorf, *Law of Nature and Nations* 6.1.5; Pope, *Essay on Man* 3.131–2; the following ann.; Hume, 'Polygamy and Divorces' 1–2, 15–22; *EPM* 4.5–9.

364.38–9 **they must believe, that the children are their own]** Pufendorf, agreeing that the education of children is most conveniently carried out by parents united in their efforts, added that 'a constant Cohabitation' makes the husband 'much more secure of his Wife's Chastity, than if they dwelt at a Distance. Such Matrimony then, as is regular and perfect, conformable to natural Reason, and to the Ends of civil Life... doth imply an Agreement on the Woman's Side, that she will constantly dwell with the Man, and unite in the strict Society of a Family; as well for the Education of the Children, as for mutual Aid and Pleasure.' He then went on to quote the claim of his contemporary, Matthæus: 'Altho' it be unjust in the Husband, to require a stricter Chastity of his Wife, than he practiseth himself; yet this by no means proves the Sin on both Sides to be equal. For every one knows, that the Wife is, upon many Accounts, obliged to a much severer Degree of Moderation and Purity; in regard, as well to the Modesty of the Sex, as to the Danger of confus'd Amours, and of a supposititious Breed', of i.e. children not *known* to be those of her

husband (*Law of Nature and Nations* 6.1.10, 18). See also Castiglione, *Courtier* 2 [195–6]; Carmichael, 'Supplements and Observations', *Natural Rights*, 128–33. Esprit maintained that the 'earnest desire that young Women have to get Husbands, contributes very much to their Modesty', and said that these women 'make use of their Modesty to Insinuate, that they that Marry them run no risque, and to give a sort of Security for their Virtue' ('Of the Modesty of Women', in *Discourses*, 260).

365.1–2 **generation goes from the man to the woman, an error . . . impossible with regard to the latter**] Grotius provided a theoretical explanation of this alleged impossibility: 'as to Facts', he said, 'we cannot have Demonstration; but that which is usually done in the Sight of Men, is considered as certain in its Kind, on Account of the Testimony they give of it. In this Sense it is said, that it is certain such a Woman is Mother to such a Child, because there are some Persons of both Sexes to be found, that assisted at its Birth, and were Witnesses of its Education. But it is impossible to have such an Assurance of the Father.' Consequently, he added, 'Recourse was to be had to some Means whereby the Father of every Child might be probably discovered. And this Means was Marriage' (*Rights of War and Peace* 2.7.8).

- 3.2.12.4 365.14–15 **no restraint possible, but in the punishment of bad fame or reputation**] Bayle suggested that a concern about reputation was the central motivation for 'the majority of human virtues and the chastity of women in particular . . . I am certain, that the fear of "what will people say?" has contributed more to it than anything else.' There is, he added, 'a certain shame that comes from education and that often prevents the most amorous from making all the advances . . . the love of a fine reputation; the desire to acquire the esteem of those whom one resists; the hope of thereby gaining for oneself a husband [etc.] . . . if you add . . . all this together, you will find the true principle of the sex's continence' (*Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet* §164). See also La Rochefoucauld, *Moral Reflections and Maxims* 205, 241.

- 3.2.12.5 365.22–4 **All human creatures, especially the female . . . over-look remote motives in favour of any present temptation**] Bayle, discussing chastity or the lack thereof, noted that 'we frequently act against our true interests, when we have a mind to satisfy a violent passion' (*Dictionary*, 'Julia' [E] [3: 604a]). For earlier discussions of our tendency to overlook remote concerns, see 2.2.2.20–6, 2.3.7, 3.2.7.2–6, 3.2.8.1; for the claim that women and children are 'most guided' by the imagination and nearby objects, see 2.2.7.4. See also 1.3.9.13, 3.2.7.8; anns. 78.39, 239.3, 345.10.

- 3.2.12.7 366.8–18 **And tho' all these maxims . . . original principle**] Parts of these lines are used in the opening sentences of *EPM* 4.7.

366.12–13 **impose not the same laws, with the same force, on the male sex**] See ann. 364.38.

- 3.2.12.8 366.23 **shall see afterwards**] Courage is again discussed at 3.3.2.13–15, 3.3.3.3–4.

366.26–7 **as the obligations of the law of nations do to those of the law of nature]** At 3.2.11.4–5 princes, in so far as their actions are subject to the laws of nations, are said to have interests that cause their moral obligations to be different from those of subjects, whose actions are to be governed by the stricter laws of nature.

3.3 *Of the other virtues and vices*

3.3.1 *Of the origin of the natural virtues and vices*

3.3.1.3 367.17 **already observ'd]** See 3.1.2.1–4.

367.18–19 **mental quality ... gives us a satisfaction]** Compare *EPM* Appx. 1.10.

3.3.1.7 368.21–2 **preparation of the instruments ... the heating of the irons]** Seneca made a similar point about the effects of the anticipation of pain: that 'just as the torturer accomplishes more in proportion to the number of instruments which he displays ... [so] of all the agencies which coerce and master our minds, the most effective are those which can make a display' (*Moral Epistles* 14.6). Descartes wrote of a patient who 'used to have her eyes bandaged whenever the surgeon visited her, to prevent her being upset by the surgical instruments' (*Principles of Philosophy* 4.196).

n. 83 (369) *Decentior equus...modici iudicii est]* 'The horse whose flanks are compact is better looking; but he is also faster. The athlete whose muscles bulge as a result of exercise is handsome to look at; and he is better prepared for the contest. Never in fact is appearance divorced from usefulness. But it takes only a modicum of judgement to see this' (Quintilian, *Institutes* 8.3.10–11). See also Castiglione, *Courtier* 4 [330–3]. Quintilian's text is repeated, with minor changes, at *EPM* 5 n. 21; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lviii; see also *EPM* 6.24.

3.3.1.9 369.9 **good-manners]** Hume expanded on the origin and usefulness of good manners at *EPM* 4.10–20; see also *EPM* 8.1–3; 9.18; 'Rise and Progress' 40.

3.3.1.10 369.31–3 **inviolable maxim ... not to multiply causes without necessity]** See also 1.3.15.6, 2.1.3.6–7; anns. 185.26, 28.

369.34–5 **experiments ... sole cause of our approbation]** Compare *EPM* 5.17.

3.3.1.11 370.4–5 **some philosophers have represented all moral distinctions as the effect of artifice and education]** Mandeville may be one of these philosophers (see anns. 321.6, 364.25), but Hobbes is also a possibility (see anns. 193.10, 298.17, 302.title, 311.26, 321.45). See also *EPM* 5.3.

370.13 **already observ'd]** At 3.2.2.25; see also ann. 321.16.

3.3.1.12 370.23–34 **single act of justice ... whole scheme ... of law and justice]** See ann. 319.27.

3.3.1.13 370.43–4 **the imagination is more affected by what is particular, than by what is general]** On why this is so, see 1.1.5.3, 2.3.6.2.

370.45–371.3 **Now every particular act...society alike]** A sentence in *EPM* Appx. 3.3 resembles these lines.

3.3.1.16 372.17 **Marcus Brutus, as represented in history]** For one such representation, see Plutarch, 'Dion and Brutus', *Lives* 22. See also *Letters*, 1: 35.

372.20–1 **Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses]** Hutcheson had pointed out that 'we judge of all our *Senses* by our *Reason*, and often correct their *Reports* of the *Magnitude, Figure, Colour, Taste* of Objects, and pronounce them *right or wrong*, as they agree or disagree with *Reason*', and then that just as these 'Sensations are often corrected by *Reasoning*', so are 'our *Approbations* of Actions as *Good or Evil*' (*Essay* 2.1 [236–7]). Balguy criticized this aspect of Hutcheson's moral sense theory because it makes it difficult to distinguish between the moral observer's reactions and the measure of the moral quality apprehended: 'the stronger Men's *Affections* are, the greater must be their *Virtue*; so it may be concluded, that the stronger and quicker their *Moral Sense* is, the higher must their *Approbation* of virtuous Actions rise' (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 26). See also Berkeley, *New Theory of Vision* 3; *THN* 1.3.10.12, 2.2.8.3–6, 3.1.2.4, 3.3.3.2; anns. 240.22, 241.39; *EPM* 5.41.

3.3.1.18 372.45 **formerly said]** See 2.3.3.8; ann. 268.10.

3.3.1.19 373.19–21 **a character, that...is beneficial to society, we esteem... virtuous...tho' particular accidents prevent its operation]** Hume wrote to Hutcheson on this issue; for the text of his remarks, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 5. The view expressed here was not uncommon. Among Protestant moralists Ames maintained that the 'outward act without the inward is properly neither good nor evil. But the inward can be good or evil without the external, because the goodness of an act depends first and chiefly upon the will, and this is often acceptable to God, although the outward deed is lacking' (*Marrow of Sacred Divinity* 2.2.26, as quoted by Fiering, *Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard*, 94). Butler said that 'Acting, conduct, behaviour, abstracted from all regard to what is... the consequence of it, is itself the natural object of the moral discernment'; that 'Intention of such and such consequences, indeed, is always included' in this discernment; and that 'though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of the action as if they did' ('Of the Nature of Virtue' §4). For other views, see Seneca, 'On Benefits' 4.21.3–4; 7.15.1–3; Hutcheson, *Inquiry*, 2.3.15. See also 3.1.2.3, 3.2.1.2–5; anns. 307.7, 376.38; 'Politics to a Science' 19; 'Moral Prejudices' 2; *EPM* 2.19, 5.41 n. 24, 'A Dialogue' 15.

373.22 **Virtue in rags]** This figure is also found in Dryden's translation of Horace: 'Content with poverty, my Soul I arm; | And Vertue, tho' in rags, will keep me warm' ('Horace, Ode 29, Book 3' 86–7 [*Works*, 3: 84]). See also Du Vair, *Morall Philosophy of the Stoicks*, 6.



- 3.3.1.22 374.17–19 **observ'd by critics...words...difficult to the pronunciation, are disagreeable...whether a man hear them...or read them silently]** Quintilian's claim that 'Nothing can penetrate to the emotions that stumbles at the portals of the ear' (*Institutes* 9.4.10) was widely repeated and embellished. Boileau said: 'Le vers le mieux rempli, la plus noble pensée | Ne peut plaire à l'esprit, quand l'oreille est blessée (*L'Art poétique* 1.111–12). Constable extended the observation in the direction Hume takes, saying that 'experience teaches us, that such is the connection between sense and reason in man, that harmony, tho' no part of the argument, is commonly a part of the persuasiveness... Nor is this to be understood only of reciting or speaking, but also of writing. For the eye calls upon the ear, if I may use the expression, in the way to the understanding; and the sound of the words, tho' you read them in silence, gets as soon to the ear, as the sense to the mind' (*Reflections upon Accuracy of Style*, 89). See also Chambers, *Cyclopædia*, 'Numbers'; Rollin, *Method of Teaching and Studying*, 2: 149–51; *EPM* 5.36.
- 3.3.1.23 374.29 **frequently observ'd]** See 3.2.2.16–18, 24; 3.2.5.8.
- 3.3.1.27 376.34–6 **many systems of morality...two...merit our attention]** The first of the two worthy 'systems of morality' alluded to is likely that of Hutcheson, for in that system 'Moral good and evil are certainly distinguish'd by our *sentiments*, not by *reason*', and such distinguishing sentiments typically arise 'from the mere species or appearance of characters and passions' (*THN* 376.36–8). For more about Hutcheson's theory, see anns. 295.13; 301.1, 38, 42; 302.title, 41; 303.3, 6, 29; 307.15; 308.23; 332.17. The second system is presumably that of Hume himself.
- 376.38–9 **reflections on their tendency]** Hume's response to Hutcheson's comments on an earlier version of Book 3 includes a discussion of the tendencies of moral 'Qualityts'; for the text of this response, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 5. See also ann. 373.19.
- 376.41–2 **decisions concerning most kinds of external beauty]** See also 2.1.8.2; anns. 195.24, 32.
- 3.3.1.29 377.21 **foregoing principles]** Those 'principles' discussed in this section, ¶¶2 ff.
- 377.25–7 **four different sources...useful to others...person himself...agreeable to others...person himself]** Further exposition of these four sources of pleasure and pain is the central topic of *EPM* 5–8, while *EPM* 9 provides analysis and summation.
- 3.3.2 *Of greatness of mind*
- 378.title *greatness of mind]* Hume returned to greatness of mind and the heroic virtues mentioned in ¶13 of this section in *EPM* 7.4–17.
- 3.3.2.1 378.5 **here explain'd]** See 3.3.1.30.
- 3.3.2.2 378.15 **above-mention'd]** See 3.3.1.7–12; cf. 2.1.11.2–8, 2.2.5.14–21.

- 3.3.2.4 379.12–17 *In all kinds of comparison...pleasure*] Hume quotes from what he says about comparison at 2.2.8.9 (see n. 84). In doing so, he omits four sentences following the words 'immediate survey', and the words 'to us' (here restored) from the last sentence quoted. See also ann. 197.28.
- 3.3.2.5 n. 85 (379) *Suave mari...suav' est*] 'It is a joy to watch from land someone struggling out at sea as the winds churn up the waters; not that someone's being in trouble is an agreeable pleasure in itself, but because it is a joy to see what ills you yourself are spared' (Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 2.1–4). This passage was widely quoted. Montaigne cited it to illustrate his contention that 'in the midst of compassion we feel... I know not what bittersweet pricking of malicious pleasure in seeing others suffer' ('Of the useful and the honorable', in *Complete Essays*, 599). See also Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, 167; 'Of Truth', in *Major Works*, 342; Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Mahomet' [Q].
- 3.3.2.7 380.28–30 **trite observation...our own pride...makes us...displeas'd with the pride of other people**] La Rochefoucauld, a useful source of such observations, suggested that 'If we were not Proud our selves, we shou'd not complain of the Pride of others' (*Moral Reflections and Maxims* 34). Mandeville, after saying that pride is a universal 'Natural Faculty', then went on to say that 'none are so much offended at their Neighbour's Pride, as the proudest of all... I think we may justly infer, that [pride] being odious to all the World, is a certain Sign that all the World is troubled with it' (*Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue*, 124).
- 380.31–2 **The gay...associate...with the gay, and the amorous with the amorous**] See also 2.2.4.6, ann. 229.12.
- 3.3.2.8 381.2–3 **nothing...more laudable, than...a value for ourselves, where... have qualities that are valuable**] See also 2.1.7.8; ann. 194.36.
- 381.11–12 **Fortune commonly favours the bold and enterprizing**] This sentiment is expressed in several Latin writers. Virgil has King Turnus, about to do battle with Aeneas, proclaim: 'Fortes fortuna juvat'—'fortune favours the bold' (*Aeneid* 10.284). See also Seneca, *Medea* 159 [240–1].
- 3.3.2.9 381.17 **been observ'd**] See 3.1.2.1–4, 3.3.1.3.
- 3.3.2.10 381.20–2 **self-satisfaction...allowable, but...avoid all signs**] Milton's Raphael tells Adam that 'self-satisfaction' is more than merely allowable: 'Oft-times nothing profits more | Than self-esteem, grounded on just and right | well-manag'd' (*Paradise Lost* 8.871). La Rochefoucauld said that 'Tis as commendable in a Man, to entertain a good Opinion of himself, as 'tis ridiculous to shew it' (*Moral Reflections and Maxims* 307); Trublet, that 'true politeness... requires, that we talk and act equally with an air of modesty, and an air of freedom' ('Of Politeness', *Essays* 22 [308]). See also Cicero, *De officiis* 1.38.137, *Tusculan Disputations* 1.29.71; Castiglione, *Courtier* 1 [59]; Montaigne, 'Of practice', in *Complete Essays*, 274; Malebranche, *Search* 4.13.1

[333–4]. Compare *EPM* 8.9–11, where Hume discusses the views of Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics* 4.3).

381.29 *rules of good-breeding*] Examples of decency and good or ill breeding are mentioned at 1.3.13.15; 2.2.10.10; and ¶¶11, 14, 17 of this section. See also *EPM* 8.1–4, 12.

- 3.3.2.12 382.30–8 *Go, says Alexander...had found subjects*] These lines are repeated, with minor revision, at *EPM* 7.6; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lxii. Hume's text follows closely that of Saint-Evremond: 'Go, says [Alexander], go you ungrateful Cowards, and tell your Country-men, that you have left Alexander with his Friends, labouring for the Glory of Greece, amongst Nations that will obey him better than you. Of all the Passages of his Life, the Prince of Condé used to admire nothing more than this Haughtiness he shew'd to the Macedonians, and this Confidence in himself. Alexander, says he, left by his own Men, amongst barbarous Nations, who were not thoroughly subdued, was so sensible of his own Worth and Capacity to Command, that he thought it not in the Power of Men to refuse to pay him Obedience. To reside in Europe or in Asia, amongst Greeks, or Persians, was indifferent to him; he thought he could not want Subjects, wherever he met with Men' (*Works*, 1: 67–8). Budgell associated this story with a 'Strength of Mind that is not to be overcome by the Changes of Fortune' (*Guardian* 31).

- 3.3.2.13 382.45–383.2 *religious declaimers...represent...humility in the rank of virtues*] Christian writers built on Matt. 5: 5: 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.' See also 2.1.7.7–8; anns. 194.20, 36.

- 3.3.2.16 383.37–8 *preceding hypothesis*] See 3.3.1.30.

383.38 *principles above-explain'd*] See ¶¶2, 4 of the present section.

- 3.3.2.17 n. 87 (384) *Book 2. Part 2. Sect. 5*] See 2.2.5.21.

3.3.3 *Of goodness and benevolence*

- 3.3.3.2 384.36–7 *judgments concerning external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by their distance*] See 2.2.8.3–6; anns. 240.22, 241.39, 372.20.

385.2–15 *In like manner...in the schools*] A shortened and revised version of these lines is found at *EPM* 5.42; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lviii–lix. Compare 'Standard of Taste' 1–6.

385.10–11 *general inalterable standard, by which we may approve or disapprove of characters*] Butler recognized just such a standard: 'as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists...yet, in general, there is in reality an universally acknowledged standard of it. It is that, which all ages and all countries have made profession of in public: it is that, which every man you meet puts on the show of; it is that, which the primary and fundamental laws of all civil constitutions... make it their business and endeavour to enforce the practice of upon mankind' ('Of the Nature of Virtue' §3). See also *EPM* 9.5–6; 'Standard of Taste' 31–2.

3.3.3.8 386.27–8 **Anger and hatred are passions inherent in our very frame and constitution]** The passions had traditionally been divided between the irascible and the concupiscent, i.e. those deriving from anger and those deriving from desire, with Plato suggesting that the soul itself is divided into three parts: the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscent. Watts said that 'Our irascible Passions can scarce be indulg'd a Moment, but they are ready to defile the whole Man' (*Reliquiae juveniles* 60). See also ann. 181.25.

3.3.3.9 386.36–42 **enumerate the good qualities . . . character . . . allow'd to be perfect]** Compare the description of Cleanthes, of whom Hume wrote: 'A philosopher might select this character as a model of perfect virtue' (*EPM* 9.2).

3.3.4 *Of natural abilities*

3.3.4.1 387.1–5 **No distinction is more usual . . . than that betwixt natural abilities and moral virtues . . . merely a dispute of words]** Among early modern writers, Le Bossu made just this distinction: 'A right distinction should be made between Real Vertues, and those that appear such, and are only mere Qualities. The Real Vertues, such as Piety, Prudence, and the like, make those who are Masters of them Good, Praise-worthy, and Honest-men', while 'Meer Qualities in their own Nature . . . such as Valour, Art, the Knowledge of Sciences, and the like' fail to have such moral effects (*Treatise of the Epick Poem*, 160). So did Hutcheson, who distinguished between 'natural Abilitys', and 'moral Qualitys'. As examples of the former he mentioned 'a penetrating Judgment, a tenacious Memory, a quick Invention; Patience . . . a Contempt of Wealth, Rumour, Death', and went on to say that 'a Veneration for these Qualitys, any further than they are employ'd for the publick Good, is foolish, and flows from our moral Sense, grounded upon a false Opinion; for if we plainly see them maliciously employ'd, they make the Agent more detestable' (*Inquiry* 2.3.10 [182]). Hutcheson later said of natural abilities that 'we seem to have a natural Relish for them distinct from moral Approbation' (*Inquiry* 2.3.10, 4th edn. [186]). See also Wilkins, *Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* 2.14 [213–14]; Mandeville, *Enquiry into the Origin of Honour*, pp. vi–vii.

Hutcheson must have raised the question of the relationship of natural abilities and virtues in his comments on the manuscript of Book 3. For Hume's response, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 5; for his later remarks regarding abilities and virtues, in another letter to Hutcheson, see *Letters*, 1: 46–7. Hume returned to this issue in *EPM* Appx. 4, 'Of some Verbal Disputes', where substantial portions of the discussion found in this section are repeated. He again mentions Cicero's *De officiis*, and quotes (n. 72) from the latter a passage (*De oratore* 2.84) that is said to be 'most clear and express' in supporting the view that there are no defining differences between virtues and abilities. Hume also mentions, and in some cases provides explicit references to, the writings of Aristotle, Epictetus, Solomon, David, Euripides, Plutarch, Livy, Polybius, and Guicciardini, as providing further support of this view (Appx. 4.12–19).

387.14–20 **the figure a man makes . . . parts and understanding**] These lines, slightly revised, are found at *EPM* Appx. 4.5; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lix.

- 3.3.4.2 387.27–31 **It may, indeed . . . virtues**] These two sentences, significantly revised, make up a part of *EPM* Appx. 4.6; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lix.

387.28–30 **sentiment of approbation . . . different from that, which attends the other virtues**] Compare *EPM* Appx. 4.3.

387.31 **catalogue of virtues**] As part of his response to Hutcheson's comments about the distinction between abilities and virtues, Hume said: 'Upon the whole, I desire to take my Catalogue of Virtues from *Cicero's Offices*, not from the *Whole Duty of Man*. I had, indeed, the former Book in my Eye in all my Reasonings' (letter of 17 Sept. 1739; *Letters*, 1: 33–4). *The Whole Duty of Man* is the title given to two very different works, one by Allestree, the other by Pufendorf; for more about these works and the full text of Hume's comment, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 5. There is not, literally, in *De officiis* a 'Catalogue of Virtues', but Cicero does there suggest that 'all that is morally right rises from some one of four sources', so that virtue is concerned either with (1) the perception of truth or wisdom; (2) the maintenance of society, or justice; (3) greatness of mind and spirit, or moral and physical fortitude; or (4) the orderliness and moderation that constitute temperance. He also mentions more particular virtues that may be subsumed under these four headings, e.g., activity, fidelity, generosity, humility, decorum, wit, and modesty (*De officiis* 1.5.15, 17, 19, 23, 42, 90, 94, 103, 126). Elsewhere, Cicero mentions the virtues of industry and perseverance (*De finibus* 1.15.49). See also *EPM* 6.21; 9.3, 12; Appx. 4.1, 11 n. 72; *HE* 33 [3: 322].

387.33–388.2 **The characters of Caesar . . . excite love**] These lines, moderately revised, make up a part of *EPM* Appx. 4.6; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lix.

387.33–6 **characters of Caesar and Cato, as drawn by Sallust . . . amiable . . . awful**] Caesar is here Julius Caesar. Cato is Marcus Cato of Utica, known for his unbending Stoic morality and his support of the Roman republic against the triumvirate that included Caesar. Sallust is the Roman historian, Gaius Sallustius Crispus, who said that Caesar was 'famous for his gentleness and compassion'; Cato for his 'austerity . . . one was a refuge for the unfortunate, the other a scourge for the wicked' (*War with Catiline* 53–4 [*Sallust*, 109–13]). Addison, discussing this passage in Sallust, described 'Cato's Character' as 'rather awful than amiable' (*Spectator* 169).

n. 88 (388) **Love and esteem . . . eminent degree**] This note, slightly revised, makes up the first six lines of *EPM* Appx. 4 n. 67; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lx. See also ann. 251.6.

3.3.4.3 388.3–5 **natural abilities...entirely involuntary, and have therefore no merit]** Wollaston made exactly this claim: 'If *fortitude* be taken for natural courage...this is constitution and the *gift of God*, not any *virtue* in us: because if it be *our virtue*, it must consist in something, which *we* produce, or do our selves' (*Religion of Nature Delineated* 9.4 [182]). Trublet presupposed this position when he maintained that 'Good humour is almost always a natural quality, and the effect of temperament: yet sometimes too it is a virtue, and the fruit of our endeavours. It may be acquired, at least, to a certain pitch' ('Of Good Humour', *Essays* 11 [140]). See also Balguy, *Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 10–20.

Hutcheson, at the outset of his defence of the moral sense (*Essay* 2.5 [285]), considered the objection that actions motivated by instinct cannot, because they are not voluntary, be meritorious: 'Some will not allow any *Merit* in *Actions* flowing from *kind Instincts*: "*Merit*", say they, "attends *Actions* to which we are excited by *Reason* alone, or to which we *freely* determine ourselves. The Operation of *Instincts* or *Affections* is *necessary*, and not *voluntary*; nor is there more *Merit* in them than in the *Shining of the Sun*...or the *Overflowing of a Stream*, which are all *publicly useful*.'" He devoted the remainder of the section to answering this objection. See also *EPM* Appx. 4.2.

388.6–8 **many of those qualities...the ancients, comprehend...moral virtues, are...involuntary]** Hume later said that the ancients 'little regarded' the distinction between voluntary and involuntary. He then cited Plato, Horace, and Seneca, who, because they give a negative answer to the question *Can virtue be taught?* must have supposed virtue to be involuntary (*EPM* Appx. 4.20–1). Seneca said that leisure enables us to cultivate at least some of the virtues, and also that those who have leisure may serve the commonwealth of humanity by inquiring 'what virtue is, and whether it is one or many; whether it is nature or art that makes men good' ('On Leisure' 1.1, 4.2, *Moral Essays*). Horace asked, 'Does wisdom beget virtue, or Nature bring her as a gift?', but left the question unanswered (*Epistles* 1.18.100). Aristotle, to whom Hume also looked for support of some of his views (see anns. 381.20, 387.1), granted there are both intellectual and moral virtues, but supposed the former kind 'in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching... while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit'. He also granted that 'each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for self-control or brave or have other moral qualities', but he went on to say that once reason has been acquired, that makes 'a difference in action', so that only then will a person's 'state, while still like what it was...be virtue in the strict sense' (*Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1, 13 (1103<sup>b</sup>15–17; 1144<sup>b</sup>4–6, 11–14).

388.15–16 **give me a reason, why virtue and vice may not be involuntary]** Neither could Hutcheson see 'for what Reason some will not allow that to be *Virtue*, which flows from *Instincts*, or *Passions*'. As the '*ultimate End* propos'd by the common *Moralists*', he said, 'is the *Happiness* of the *Agent* himself, and this certainly he is

determin'd to pursue from *Instinct* . . . may not another *Instinct* toward the *Publick*, or the *Good* of others, be as proper a Principle of *Virtue*, as the *Instinct* toward *private Happiness*?' To this question he returned an affirmative reply, then went on to argue that actions can be virtuous even if 'not the Effect of *Prudence* and *Choice*' (*Inquiry* 2.3.15 [192–3]; cf. the altered text of this passage in the revised 4th edn. of this work [192]). See also ann. 388.3.

388.21 **have shown**] See 2.3.1–2.

- 3.3.4.4 388.29–32 **natural abilities and moral qualities...former are almost invariable...latter...may be chang'd**] The view Hume articulates is assumed by Balguy, who argued that virtue cannot 'consist in an *Instinct*, and the Effects of that *Instinct*' (the position he attributed to Hutcheson) because '*Virtue* may be *taught*, or promoted by *Instruction*'. And, just as the 'Ignorant' may be taught what their duties are, so may they 'be induced and prevailed upon' to conform to these duties, 'not only by external Motives, but by internal Reasons drawn from the Nature of Morality' (*Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 1: 60–1).

389.5–7 **antient moralists...no scruple of placing prudence at the head of the cardinal virtues**] Hume's historical claim may derive from his reading of Cicero's *De officiis*. There Cicero, saying that what is 'morally right' derives from one of four sources (see ann. 387.31), describes the first of these sources as 'the full perception and intelligent development of the true', and then says that 'wisdom and prudence' (*sapientiam et prudentiam*) require 'the search after truth and its discovery'. Moreover, Cicero appears to make what Hume here calls 'penetration' a feature of this virtue: 'the more clearly anyone observes the most essential truth in any given case and the more quickly and accurately he can see and explain the reasons for it, the more understanding and wise (*prudentissimus et sapientissimus*) he is generally esteemed' (*De officiis* 1.5.15–16). See also *EPM* Appx. 4.11. Seneca defended the conclusion that 'the prudent man is happy, and prudence is sufficient to constitute the happy life' (*Moral Epistles* 85.2). Among modern moralists, Butler identified prudence as 'a species of virtue, and folly of vice', but then added: 'if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as not applicable to prudence and folly; but must beg leave to insist, that the faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions, and disapproves imprudent ones' ('Of the Nature of Virtue' §§10–11). See also H. More, *Account of Virtue* 2.2.

389.9–10 **grammarians...denomination of virtue**] According to Chambers, *grammarian* was 'antiently a Title of Honour', but is 'now frequently used as a Term of Reproach; A mere *Grammarian*; A dry, plodding *Grammarian*... a Person wholly attentive to the *Minutiæ* of Language; industriously employ'd about Words, and Phrases; incapable of perceiving the Beauties, the Delicacy, Finesse, Extent, &c. of a Sentiment. See Pedant' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Grammarian'). See also ann. 171.21; *EPM* Appx. 3.9 n. 64, Appx. 4, 'Of Some Verbal Disputes'.

- 3.3.4.5 389.17–18 **Men are superior to beasts principally by the superiority of their reason]** Cicero concluded that the ‘most marked difference between man and beast’ lies in the fact that the beast, ‘moved by the senses and with very little perception of past or future, adapts itself to that alone which is present at the moment; while man—because he is endowed with reason, by which he comprehends the chain of consequences, perceives the causes of things, understands the relation of cause to effect and of effect to cause, draws analogies, and connects and associates the present and the future—easily surveys the course of his whole life and makes the necessary preparations for its conduct’ (*De officiis* 1.4.11). See also *THN* 1.3.16; anns. 118.15–120.5.
- 3.3.4.6 389.23–30 **When it is ask’d...his undertakings]** These lines are repeated, with minor revision, as *EPM* 6.17; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lx.
- 3.3.4.7 389.37 **incapacitate us for business and action]** Other qualities having this same effect are suggested at *EPM* 6.1.
- 3.3.4.9 390.3–5 **conversation is a transcript of the mind as well as books...consider afterwards]** Cicero, aiming to ‘secure propriety in every circumstance of life’, turned his attention to conversation, saying that one ‘should be on the watch that his conversation shall not betray some defect in his character’, and that our conversations, like our minds themselves, ‘ought to be free’ of excessive emotion (*De officiis* 1.37.134–38.136). The *Treatise* offers no further discussion of this observation, a discussion of which would have been appropriate in the projected volume on criticism. See also anns. 2.6; n. 71.28 (324).
- 3.3.4.10 390.9–15 **In this view, cleanliness...in other instances]** This paragraph, moderately revised, makes up *EPM* 8.13; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lxii.
- 3.3.4.11 390.20–1 **Some moralists account for all the sentiments of virtue by this sense]** Hume may have Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in mind. See anns. 295.13; 301.1, 38, 42; 302.title; 303.3; 332.17.
- 390.24 **tendencies are sufficient alone to give a strong sentiment of approbation]** On tendencies and approbation, see also 3.3.1.19; ann. 373.19.
- 3.3.4.12 390.27–8 **decorum...of a quality, with regard to the age, or character, or station]** Cicero treated *decorum* or ‘propriety’ as an aspect of temperance, saying that ‘what is proper is morally right’, and that ‘all things just are proper; all things unjust, like all things immoral, are improper [*indecorum*]’. Later in the same work, having said that ‘the duties that properly belong to different times of life are not the same’, he first sketched the duties of youth and age, then those of magistrates, private citizens, and aliens, and concluded that he had given ‘a fairly clear view of our duties when the question arises what is proper and what is appropriate to each character, circumstance, and age’ (*De officiis*, 1.27.93–4; 1.34.122, 125). See also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.11.



- 3.3.4.13 390.40–2 **memory ... complain of a bad one ... sacrifice it to the praise of genius**] Montaigne thought his memory 'monstrously deficient' and suggested that good memories are associated with 'feeble judgments' ('Of liars', in *Complete Essays*, 21–2). La Rochefoucauld observed that 'Every Body complains of his Memory, but no body of his Judgment' (*Moral Reflections and Maxims* 89). Steele drew attention to those who mean to 'add to their own Merit ... by impairing it', and thus say that 'they have the worst Memory in the World' (*Spectator* 473; cf. 284). Trublet noticed that some preen themselves: 'I cannot say much of my reading, and less of my memory, and have always spent most of my time in thinking for myself', and later added: 'In general ... in speculation, we set a greater value upon genius, than upon memory and knowledge; but in practical life, and upon particular occasions, we admire knowledge and memory more than genius' ('Of Pride', *Essays* 9 [134]; 'Of Reading and Memory', *Essays* 15 [199]). See also *EPM* 6.19.
- 3.3.5 *Some farther reflections concerning the natural abilities*
- 3.3.5.1 391.31 **has been observ'd**] See 2.1.7–11, 2.2.4–5.  
391.37–8 **have assign'd**] See, e.g., 3.3.1.30, 3.3.2.16.
- 3.3.5.2 392.3–11 **we may observe ... those talents**] These lines, slightly revised, were, in the edition of 1751 only, included as a note to *EPM* 6.27; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), pp. lx–lxi.  
392.7 **good women's men**] Steele described 'Woman's Man' as those whose 'Air and Behaviour [are] quite different from the rest of our Species', whose 'Business is to entertain', to give pleasure (*Spectator* 156).
- 3.3.5.3 392.22–3 **Broad shoulders ... signs of force and vigour**] This clause is repeated, with minor revision, at *EPM* 6.25; for details, see Introduction, *EPM* (Clarendon Edition), p. lx. Seneca took a negative view of such physical endowments: 'reverence is due to justice, duty, loyalty, bravery, and prudence; on the contrary, those attributes are worthless with which the most worthless men are often blessed in fuller measure,—such as a sturdy leg, strong shoulders, good teeth, and healthy and solid muscles' (*Moral Epistles* 92.19). See also 2.1.8.2, 3.3.1.8.
- 3.3.5.5 392.38 **have observ'd**] See 2.2.5.2.  
393.9–10 **my hypothesis**] For Hume's hypothesis, see 2.2.5.5–6, 14–16, 21.  
393.21 **have observ'd**] See esp. 3.3.4.8, 13.
- 3.3.5.6 393.35–6 **convenient house ... virtuous character, cause not the same feeling**] On this issue, see also 3.1.2.4, 3.3.4.2; *EPM* Appx. 4.6; and, for Hutcheson's view, ann. 303.29.  
393.38–9 **something very inexplicable in this variation of our feelings**] See also *EPM* 8.14.

3.3.6 *Conclusion of this book*

394.title *Conclusion of this book*] See Ed. App. 1 for a facsimile of a draft manuscript of this section.

3.3.6.3 394.38 **Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts**] Hutcheson intimates, if he does not explicitly say, that the moral sense is an instinct; see *Inquiry* 2.2.9, edns. 1, 2. On instincts and morals, see also anns. 317.35; 388.3, 15, 29. For further details of the moral sense theory, see anns. 295.13; 301.1, 38, 42; 302.title; 303.3, 6; 332.17.

3.3.6.6 395.30 **anatomist ought never to emulate the painter**] Hume first drew the contrast between the moral anatomist and the moral painter in a letter to Hutcheson. This important earlier comment is quoted in full above, Historical Account, Sect. 5. See also 1.4.6.23; ann. 171.38; *Abs.* 2; 'Study of History' 7; *EHU* 1.8.

## Appendix

396.title **Appendix**] The Appendix to Vol. 3, 'Wherein some Passages of the foregoing Volumes are illustrated and explain'd', was published in late October 1740. In its original form it included nine relatively brief passages, with directions for inserting these in Book 1. The present edition follows these directions; see anns. 398.37 and 401.4 for the locations of these passages. In addition, the Appendix contained the remarks on belief and personal identity found at 396–401 of the present edition. The complete Appendix, with its parts in their original order, is found below in Ed. App. 2.

App. 1 396.1–2 **an opportunity of confessing my errors**] For Hume's expression of a similar sentiment in his correspondence with Hutcheson, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 5. Montaigne wanted the young to be taught 'that to confess the flaw he discovers in his own argument, though it be still unnoticed except by himself, is an act of judgment and sincerity' ('Of the education of children', in *Complete Essays*, 114). Boyle told his readers that, 'for a man...to adhere to whatever he once took for truth, though by accession of more light he discover it to be erroneous, is but a proud obstinacy, very injurious to truth, and very ill becoming the sense we ought to have of human frailties' (*Certain Physiological Essays*, 311). See also Locke, *Essay*, Epistle to the Reader, 7.

396.7–8 **mistakes in the reasonings...in the preceding volumes**] In i.e. Vols. 1 and 2, containing the Introduction and Books 1 and 2 of the *Treatise*. The Appendix, however, contains nothing about Book 2.

396.8 **except on one article**] Hume goes on to say, after a review of the discussion of personal identity in 1.4.6: 'I find myself involv'd in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent' (App. 10; see also App. 20–1; 1.4.5.1).

App. 2 396.19 **no abstract idea of existence**] See 1.2.6.2–7; *Abs.* 19.

- 396.22–3 **mind has the command over all its ideas]** See 1.1.4.1, 1.3.7.4; *Abs.* 20.
- 396.26 **belief consists merely in a certain feeling]** For further characterizations of belief, see, in addition to the next seven paragraphs of the Appendix, 1.3.7.5–8, 1.3.8.15, 1.3.9.13, 1.3.10.3, 1.4.1.8, *Abs.* 21–4. Three accounts of the kind of feeling that belief is, those at 1.3.5.4–5, 1.3.7.7, and 1.3.10.10, were originally published as parts of this Appendix (see ann. 398.37). See also anns. 65.37, 68.15.
- App. 4 397.18–19 **All men... reasoning to be merely an operation of our... ideas]** Locke said: 'Every Man's Reasoning and Knowledge, is only about the *Ideas* existing in his own Mind' (*Essay* 4.17.8; cf. 4.17.2, 'Wherein Reasoning consists'). See also 1.2.6.7; ann. 49.4.
- 397.21–7 **I hear at present... different to the feeling]** These lines are repeated, with a few changes, at *EHU* 5.12; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), p. lxx. See also 1.3.7.7; ann. 68.18.
- 397.40 **imagination spreads out the whole figure]** See also *DNR* 6.2.
- App. 6 398.10 **inference concerning a matter of fact]** On this topic, see also 1.3.6, esp. ¶¶3, 12; n. 20 (67).
- 398.15 **effects of belief, in influencing the passions and imagination]** On this topic, see also 1.3.10.1–2.
- App. 9 398.29–30 **The transition from a present impression, always enlivens and strengthens any idea]** Similar claims are made at 1.3.8.2, 5, 7; 1.3.9.16; 1.3.11.13; 1.3.13.3, 19. The relation of 'transition' and 'inference' is specified at 1.3.14.21.
- 398.33–4 **have prov'd at large]** See esp. sects. 1.3.5, 7–8; see also ann. 65.37.
- 398.37 **I have added a few illustrations on other points]** At this point, five 'illustrations' followed. These are now found, as Hume directed, at 1.3.5.4, 1.3.7.7, n. 21 (70), 1.3.10.10–12, and 1.3.14.12. They can be read in the order in which they first appeared in Ed. App. 2.
- App. 10 398.39–42 **I had entertain'd some hopes... of the material world]** See 1.4.5.1; ann. 152.35.
- App. 11 399.8 **talk of self or substance]** Hume had discussed 'contradictions, and absurdities' surrounding 'talk' of substance in 1.4.3 and 1.4.5.1–6. On words used in place of ideas, see 1.2.5.21; ann. 45.15.
- 399.9–10 **Every idea is deriv'd from preceding impressions]** See, e.g., 1.1.1.7, 1.2.3.2; Advertisement to Book 3.
- 399.10–11 **we have no impression of self or substance, as something simple and individual]** See 1.4.6.1–3.
- App. 12 399.12–13 **Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable...separable by the thought or imagination]** See 1.1.3.4, 1.1.4.1, 1.1.7.3, 1.4.6.3.

*Editors' Annotations*

- App. 13 399.16–18 **nothing is present to me but particular perceptions...the doctrine of philosophers]** See 1.2.6.7; 1.4.2.14, 21, 47; 1.4.5.15.  
399.18–19 **this table...may...exist separately...doctrine of the vulgar]** See 1.4.2.14, 31.
- App. 15 399.29–31 **When I turn my reflection on myself...any thing but the perceptions]** See 1.4.6.3–4.
- App. 16 399.33 **Suppose the mind to be reduc'd even below the life of an oyster]** Locke supposed that some species of animals may have few, and only 'obscure and dull' forms of perception, then illustrated his point by saying: 'We may, I think, from the Make of an *Oyster*, or *Cockle*, reasonably conclude, that it has not so many, nor so quick Senses, as a Man, or several other Animals' (*Essay* 2.9.12–13). See also Hume, 'Suicide' 9.
- App. 17 399.38 **The annihilation, which some people suppose to follow upon death]** The 'people' mentioned may well be Epicurus and his followers, who argued that death is of no concern to us because upon death 'the body being dissolved, the soul itself is dissipated, and hath no longer the same faculties, nor is any longer moved, nor any longer hath sense' (Gassendi, 'Doctrine of Epicurus' in Stanley, *History of Philosophy* 2.3.22 [3: 895]). See also Lucretius, *Nature of Things* 3.323–36, 445–58, 830–42, 884–903, 978 ff.; *EHU* 11.
- App. 19 400.3–4 **Philosophers...no idea of external substance, distinct from the ideas of particular qualities]** For philosophers 'reconcil'd' to this view, see anns. 16.16, 146.37.
- App. 20 400.19–20 **Most philosophers...think, that personal identity arises from consciousness]** See ann. 164.15–23 for philosophers who associate personal identity with consciousness.
- App. 22 401.4 **the truth]** At this point in the Appendix as originally printed, a short paragraph called attention to and corrected two 'errors of the press' (for details, see *Editing the Text*, Register B, entries 127.17 and 171.34). Following this paragraph there were four segments of text with directions for their insertion in Book 1. These segments are now found, in the order of their original appearance, at n. 5 (18–19), 1.2.4.22, 1.2.4.31, and n. 12 (46–7). These materials can most easily be read in the order in which they first appeared in Ed. App. 2.

AN ABSTRACT OF . . . A TREATISE OF  
HUMAN NATURE

- Title-page *Abstract of a Book lately Published]* The *Abstract* was printed in February 1740, about eight months before the Appendix. For information about the writing and publishing of the *Abstract*, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 3.

## Preface

- Preface 1 405.2–3 *my intentions are to render a larger work more intelligible... by abridging it*] In a letter to Henry Home (later Lord Kames) written two years earlier, Hume had said that he was unable to abridge the *Treatise*. For the relevant text, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 3.
- Preface 2 405.12–13 *work... has been complained of as obscure and difficult*] This criticism is found in the reviews of volumes one and two of the *Treatise*; the earliest of these reviews was in the *History of the Works of the Learned*. For further details, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 7.
- Preface 3 405.23–7 *Author... must be judged by the FEW... more apt to be corrupted by... prejudice*] Throughout the *Abstract* Hume speaks of himself in the third person. Malebranche, in the Preface to his *Elucidations*, made an observation like that Hume makes here; see ann. 81.12. Hume also told Kames, in February 1739, that the *Treatise* would have to be judged by the few (see above, Historical Account, Sect. 3).

## An Abstract of... A Treatise of Human Nature

- Abs.* 1 407.1–22 *works... a great vogue of late years... late philosophers*] Compare Intro. 7; see also anns. 4.44, 5.3.
- 407.7–13 *philosophers of antiquity, who treated of human nature... without... forming... a regular science*] Hume voiced a similar objection against ancient philosophers in a letter composed in 1734. The relevant text is quoted above, Historical Account, Sect. 1.
- Abs.* 2 407.23–4 *proposes to anatomize human nature in a regular manner*] Hume first spoke of the ‘anatomy of human nature’ at 1.4.6.23. He returned to the metaphor at 3.3.6.6, published some eight months after the *Abstract*; see also ann. 395.30; *EHU* 1.8. The remainder of *Abs.* 2 reflects parts of Intro. 4–9, including n. 1 (5).
- Abs.* 3 407.35–8 *The sole end of logic... morals and criticism... politics... dependent on each other*] Hume quotes, with minor variations, from Intro. 5.
- 407.38–9 *This treatise... seems intended for a system of the sciences*] The Advertisement to Vol. 1 envisages treatises on five subjects: the understanding, the passions, morals, politics, and criticism; see also ann. 2.6.
- Abs.* 4 408.3–6 *Leibnitz... common systems of logic... too concise when they treat of probabilities*] Leibniz said that ‘common logic (although it is more or less sufficient for the examination of arguments that tend toward certainty) is relegated to schoolboys; and there is not even a thought for a kind of logic which should determine the balance between probabilities, and would be so necessary in deliberations of importance’, and that ‘nothing is more imperfect than our logic when we pass beyond necessary arguments. The most excellent philosophers of our time, such as the

authors of *The Art of Thinking*, of *The Search for Truth* and of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, have been very far from indicating to us the true means fitted to assist the faculty whose business it is to make us weigh the probabilities of the true and the false: not to mention the art of discovery' ('Preliminary Dissertation' 31, *Theodicy*).

408.6–7 **probabilities...other measures of evidence on which life and action...depend**] Probability, as Butler succinctly put it, is the 'very guide of life', but he explicitly eschewed giving an explanation of how probability results in belief or full conviction, saying that this is a part of logic 'which has not yet been thoroughly considered' (*Analogy of Religion*, Intro. §§4, 7). The necessity of relying on probabilities or their equivalent had also been pointed out by Arnauld and Nicole, *Logic* 4.15 [270]; Wilkins, *Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* 1.3; 'Gravesande, *Mathematical Elements*, 1: pp. xiv–xv. Sextus Empiricus objected to those who professed to 'use probability as the guide of life' (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.231). Malebranche asked that we temporarily reject probabilities, for in relying on them we run a great risk of being deceived (*Search* 6.1.1 [409]). See also anns. 90.1, 9 *EHU* 4.20; 10.3–4; cf. ¶16 below, *EHU* 5.6.

408.8–9 **this censure...comprehends *The Essay...Le Recherche...L'Art de penser***] Leibniz's censure includes works by, in the order given here, Locke, Malebranche, and Arnauld and Nicole.

*Abs.* 5 408.17–20 **begins with some definitions...perception...impressions and ideas**] Hume goes on to paraphrase 1.1.1.1; see also *EHU* 2.1–3.

*Abs.* 6 408.27–8 **first proposition...all our ideas...derived from our impressions**] See 1.1.1.7–9, 11; see also *EHU* 2.3–9.

408.30–1 **Mr. Locke...no ideas are innate**] See 1.1.1.12; *EHU* 1.9 n. 1.

408.37–41 **Father Malebranche would find himself at a loss...sources**] Although Hume appears to take Malebranche as a representative of those who maintain that there are innate ideas, Malebranche explicitly rejected this view. See ann. 10.34.

408.42–3 **our passions are a kind of natural instinct**] Compare *EHU* 5.8.

*Abs.* 7 408.45–409.6 **Our author...and composition**] Hume quotes, with minor alterations, 1.2.3.1, which itself derives from 1.1.1.7, 11.

409.9–10 **always asks, *From what impression that pretended idea is derived***] A variation on this question is found at 1.4.6.2. The question is often implicit; see, e.g., 1.1.6; 1.3.2.4; 1.3.14.4, 27; 1.4.3.19; App. 11. A slightly different version of this question is recommended at *EHU* 2.9.

409.11–12 **after this manner he examines our idea of substance and essence**] See 1.1.6, 1.4.3, 5.

- Abs.* 8 409.14–15 **all reasonings concerning matter of fact...cause and effect]** See also 1.3.6.12, 1.3.7.2, App. 2. Variant versions of this clause are found at *EHU* 4.4 and 4.14; for details, see Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), p. lxiii. On matters of fact, see also *EHU* 4.1–3.
- 409.17–18 **to understand these reasonings...acquainted with the idea of a cause]** Hume goes on to summarize or expand on material found at 1.3.2.4–12, 1.3.6.
- Abs.* 9 409.20–1 **Here is a billiard-ball...another ball moving towards it...They strike]** Billiard-balls are mentioned only once in *THN*; see 1.3.14.18. Malebranche had also used the example, saying: ‘When I see one ball strike another, my eyes tell me, or seem to tell me, that the one is truly the cause of the motion it impressed on the other’, but went on to argue that his reason shows him this cannot be the case (*Elucidations* 15 [660]; cf. *Search* 3.2.3 [222–5]). For Locke’s use of the example, see ann. 54.39. See also anns. 46.3, 55.18; *EHU* 4.8–11, 7.6, 21, 28, 30.
- 409.25 **no interval betwixt the shock and the motion]** See also 1.3.2.9; 1.3.14.1, 10–12, 15–16, 22; 2.3.1.4; *EHU* 7.6–9.
- 409.26–8 **Contiguity in time and place...Priority in time]** Compare 1.3.2.6–7.
- 409.31–2 **a third circumstance...a constant conjunction betwixt the cause and effect]** See 1.3.6, esp. ¶¶2–4, 1.3.14.12, 1.3.15.5, 2.3.1.4–18; ann. 61.38; *EHU* 5.5, 7.21–8, 8.5 ff.
- Abs.* 10 409.41–2 **inference...conclude from the one that the other has existed or will exist]** For discussions of this inference, see 1.3.6–7.
- Abs.* 11 410.10 **no inference from cause to effect...a demonstration]** That the maxim ‘whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence’ is not known intuitively or provable by demonstration is the subject of 1.3.3. For further references to the related set of issues raised here, see ann. 61.14.
- Abs.* 12 410.17–18 **necessary...Adam (if he was not inspired) to have had experience]** In Milton’s *Paradise Lost*, Adam, confronted with ‘each Bird and Beast’, was inspired: he ‘nam’d them as they passd, and understood | Their Nature, with such knowledge [as] God endu’d | [His] sudden apprehension’ (8.348–54). Glanvill supposed it likely that Adam, before his fall from grace, had a ‘sensible perception’ of causes and that he could with ‘his naked eyes’ see what we see with the aid of a telescope (*Vanity of Dogmatizing* 1 [5–6]; see also ann. 55.18). Butler supposed a person brought into the world with a mature understanding and adult bodily strength ‘would plainly at first be as unqualified for the human life of mature age, as an idiot’ (*Analogy of Religion* 1.5.14). Others, without explicit reference to Adam, speculate about the nature of human knowledge in an original state; see Malebranche, *Dialogues* 6.7; Cudworth, *Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* 4.3.10; Rohault, *System* 1.2.15–17; Locke, *Essay* 3.6.44. See also 2.1.6.9; ann. 192.22.

An early reviewer, reading this discussion of cause and effect, was led to say: 'This is close to the way that Sextus Empiricus argued earlier; see his *Hypotheses* (*Pyrrhonian Disputations*) 3, Chap. 3' (Review of the *Treatise of Human Nature*, *Bibliothèque raisonnée*, 55 n.)

- Abs.* 13–14 410.25–43 **all reasonings concerning cause and effect...without any proof]** These two paragraphs summarize much of 1.3.6. That all reasonings concerning cause and effect depend on experience is also claimed at 1.3.4.3, 1.3.14.36, 1.4.1.8. On the conclusion that like causes produce like effects, see also 1.3.8.14; 1.3.15.6–8, 10; 2.3.1.4–5. Hume returns to the matter of the uniformity of nature at *Abs.* 25 and 27. See also 1.3.6.4–5, 1.3.12.7 ff., 2.3.1.6–10; *EHU* 4.6–7, 18–21.
- Abs.* 14 410.35–42 **he could...betwixt them]** See *EHU* 4.21 for what may be a heavily revised version of these lines; for details, see Editor's Introduction, *EHU* (Clarendon Edition), p. lxiv.
- Abs.* 15 410.44–411.10 **CUSTOM...not...reason...the guide of life]** On custom and the manner in which it influences belief, see 1.3.8.10 ff. See also 1.3.9.13, 1.3.13.11, *Abs.* 4, and ann. 408.6. Hume's index to *ETSS*, following the heading 'Custom, the great Guide of Life', directs readers to *EHU* 5.6 (see *EHU*, Clarendon Edition, 308). Hume later said that 'men, guided more by custom than by reason, follow, without enquiry, the manners, which are prevalent in their own time' (*HE* 13 [2: 86]; cf. *HE* 30 [3: 192]).
- Abs.* 17 411.18–20 **What then is this belief...a new question unthought of by philosophers]** The nature of belief is the topic of 1.3.7, where, in n. 20 (67), Hume claims that his is the first philosophical account of belief. See also anns. 65.37, 68.15, 396.26; *Abs.* 27; App. 2–9; *EHU* 5.8, 10–22.
- Abs.* 18 411.23–4 **What is demonstratively false...cannot be conceived]** A revised version of this sentence is found at *EHU* 4.2, lines 19–21. See also 1.3.7.3; ann. 66.27.
- Abs.* 19 411.29 **To account for this, there are only two hypotheses]** The argument set out in this and the following paragraphs is not found in the two volumes of the *Treatise* published in 1739, but a variant of it is found in App. 2–9. See also above, Historical Account, Sect. 3.
- Abs.* 21 411.44 **MANNER of conceiving]** This phrase is first used at 1.3.7.4; see also 1.3.8.7.
- Abs.* 22 412.20–1 **a stronger...more lively, a more vivid, a firmer, or a more intense conception]** For such descriptions of belief in the *Treatise* as published in 1739 (before, that is, it was modified by passages from the Appendix of 1740), see, e.g., 1.3.7.8 ('more strong, firm, and vivid', 'more lively conception'), 1.3.8.11 ('force and vivacity', 'more vivid and intense'), 1.3.8.15 ('strong and lively', 'firmness, or solidity, or force, or vivacity'), or 1.3.9.2, 1.3.10.3, 1.3.13.11. Similar language is found at *Abs.* 27; see also App. 3–9; *EHU* 5.11–13, 20.



- 412.22–3 **feeling...a more forcible effect on the mind than...mere conception]** See, e.g., 1.3.10.3–5; 1.4.1.11; 2.3.6, esp. ¶10; App. 7; *EHU* 5.10–13, 6.3.
- 412.25–6 **Poetry...real life]** 1.3.10.10–12, originally published in the Appendix to Vol. 3, expands this discussion of the difference between poetry and real life.
- Abs.* 23 412.32–3 **by an analogy with other acts of the mind]** Hume returned to the analogy between belief and other acts of the mind in App. 9; *EHU* 5.13.
- Abs.* 24 412.37–8 **I shall only mention one]** The argument summarized is found in 1.3.12.
- Abs.* 25 413.4–5 **the same reasoning extends to the operations of the mind]** See also 2.3.1.3–4; *Abs.* 33; 1.3.14.12 (the last was added by the Appendix).
- Abs.* 26 413.16–17 **examines anew the idea of that relation]** See 1.3.14 for this examination; see also *EHU* 7.
- 413.19–20 **commonly supposed...a necessary connexion betwixt the cause and effect]** Compare 1.3.2.11; see also ann. 55.11.
- 413.25–6 **the Cartesians...assert, that matter is utterly deprived of energy]** See 1.3.14.7–10; anns. 107.22, 35; 108.5.
- 413.37–8 **determination of the thought...to pass from the cause to its usual effect]** Compare 1.3.14.20, 27; *EHU* 7.28–30.
- Abs.* 27 413.45 **narrow limits of human understanding]** See also 1.2.1.2; ann. 23.13; *EHU* 1.6; 7.24; 12.25.
- 413.45–414.1 **Almost all reasoning is there reduced to experience]** See the texts mentioned in ann. 410.25.
- 414.3–5 **believe any thing of external existence...sentiment of the same kind]** Belief in external existence is the subject of 1.4.2. For the sentiment to which Hume refers, see 1.4.2.24, 41–3; cf. *EHU* 12.7 ff.
- 414.5–6 **author insists upon several other sceptical topics]** In sections of *Treatise* 1.4 not discussed in detail in the *Abstract* (sects. 1.4.1, 3–7), Hume raises doubts about reason, ancient and modern philosophy, and theories of the nature of the human soul, and even about his own conclusions.
- 414.7–8 **Philosophy would render us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it]** See 1.4.1.7–11; anns. 123.6, 125.33. Compare *LG* 20–1, 24; *EHU* 12.2, 21–3; *DNR* 1.5–15, 12.5–6.
- Abs.* 28 414.11–13 **the soul...without any perfect simplicity or identity]** See 1.4.6, esp. ¶¶1–4, and several of the anns. from 164.15 to 165.5.
- 414.14 **Des Cartes maintained that thought was the essence of the mind]** See ann. 164.15–23.

- Abs.* 29 414.29–31 **author...obliged to refute those mathematical arguments... adduced]** For the arguments that follow here, see, e.g., 1.2.1.2, 1.2.2.2–10, 1.2.4, and the relevant annotations to these texts. Compare *EHU* 12.17–20; *DNR* 1.3.
- 415.7–9 **philosophers...asked what they mean by equality]** See 1.2.4.22 (added by the Appendix); ann. 35.40.
- 415.15–16 **philosophy and common sense...with regard to...infinite divisibility have waged most cruel wars]** Locke less picturesquely observed that ‘the notion of Body is cumbred with some difficulties very hard, and, perhaps, impossible to be explained, or understood by us...divisibility *in infinitum* of any finite Extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehensions consistent’ (*Essay* 2.23.31). For Hume’s discussion of infinite divisibility, see esp. 1.2.1–2, 4, and, for further background to this issue, the annotations to those sections.
- Abs.* 30 415.19–28 **PASSIONS...pride and humility...common circumstance...causes]** These aspects of Hume’s theory of the passions take up most of *Treatise* 2.1.
- 415.29 **theory...extends to love and hatred, and other affections]** Love, hatred, and a set of related passions are the subject of *Treatise* 2.2.
- Abs.* 31 415.32–3 **what our author says concerning free-will]** See 2.3.1–2.
- 415.34 **above-explained]** See *Abs.* 25.
- Abs.* 31–2 415.34–416.8 **’Tis universally acknowledg’d...acknowledge a necessity]** These lines are taken from, with some omissions and relatively insignificant changes, 2.3.1.3–4.
- Abs.* 31 415.37 **liberty.” — “Whatever]** Hume’s five hyphens mark the omission of fifty-nine words from the text of *Treatise* 2.3.1.3: ‘Every object is determin’d by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion, and can no more depart from that precise line, in which it moves, than it can convert itself into an angel, or spirit, or any superior substance. The actions, therefore, of matter are to be regarded as instances of necessary actions; and’.
- 415.37–8 **Whatever therefore is]** The text of the *Treatise* reads: ‘whatever is’.
- 415.40 **we may examine matter, and consider on]** The text of the *Treatise* reads: ‘we shall begin with examining matter, and considering on’.
- Abs.* 32 416.2 **influence is founded]** The text of the *Treatise* reads: ‘influence depends’.
- 416.4 **arises, when the mind is determin’d to pass]** The text of the *Treatise* reads: ‘arises. If objects had not an uniform and regular conjunction with each other, we shou’d never arrive at any idea of cause and effect; and even after all, the necessity, which enters into that idea, is nothing but a determination of the mind to pass’ (2.3.1.4).
- 416.6 **to regard]** The text of the *Treatise* reads: ‘to consider’ (2.3.1.4).

416.13 **opium . . . rhubarb**] A variation on this example is found in *EHU* 6.4.

*Abs.* 33 416.17–21 **constant conjunction . . . will . . . motives . . . moral evidence**] See also 1.3.6.2–3, 1.3.13.6, 1.3.14.33, 2.3.1.15–17; anns. 99.29, 115.25, 260.23; *LG* 26; *EHU* 8.19, 10.3, 12.21.

*Abs.* 34 416.23–4 **Our author pretends . . . controversy in a new light**] See 2.3.1.2, 18; 2.3.2.4. 416.32–3 **Our imagination has a great authority over our ideas**] Although the relative freedom of the imagination is noted at 1.1.3.2, 4, it was only in the Appendix to the *Treatise* that Hume spoke as he does here. See App. 2 and 1.3.7.7, a paragraph first published in the Appendix. See also ann. 12.5.

416.40 **These principles of association are reduced to three**] The principles of association are introduced at 1.1.4. Resemblance is illustrated by the example of a portrait and the person portrayed at 1.3.8.3. The example of St Denis and Paris, used here to illustrate the relation of contiguity, is not found in the *Treatise*. The causal relation between child and parent is noted at 1.1.4.3, 2.1.11.6.

## A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN

*Title-page* **A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh**] Hume's contributions to the *Letter from a Gentleman* were written as a letter to John Couatts, former Lord Provost of Edinburgh. For further details, see the following annotation and above, Historical Account, Sect. 8.

**Specimen of the Principles . . . said to be maintain'd in . . . A Treatise of Human Nature**] Two of the four parts of the *Letter*, the *Specimen* (§§4–12) and the *Sum of the Charge* that follows it (§§13–19), were apparently composed by the Revd William Wishart. The *Specimen* is largely constituted of, as Hume described them in §2 (see also §41), 'mair'd Excerpts' of the *Treatise*. Copies of these two parts were then circulated ('industriously spread about'; see §1) in an effort to discredit Hume as a candidate for a vacant post, Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the University of Edinburgh.

### [Preamble]

*LG* 3 420.13 **insert the Accusation . . . take notice of the Specimen**] Parts of this paragraph are repeated in §20.

### Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality, &c.

*LG* 4 420.17–18 **Rare Happiness . . . you think**] Wishart has translated the epigraph from Tacitus found on the title-pages of Vols. 1 and 2; see the annotation to the title-page of Vol. 1: *Rara . . . licet*.

- LG5 420.20–1 **Approbation of the Publick ... its Judgment ... my best Instruction]** Here and throughout, the *Specimen* alters the form of the text of the *Treatise*, adding or deleting italic and changing Hume's punctuation or spelling. It is not possible to determine the extent to which divergences from Hume's text are due to Wishart, someone (Henry Home?) who copied Wishart's Charge in order to send it to Hume, or the compositor. We give no further notice to changes of the form of the *Treatise* introduced in the *Letter*, or to minor changes of wording, but textual changes that appear to affect the sense are reported in the annotations that follow.
- LG6 420.22–3 **I am confounded ... my Philosophy]** The *Treatise* reads: 'I am first affrighted and confounded'. See 1.4.7.2 (172.16).
- 420.24–9 **I have exposed ... Theologians.—I have declared ... Approbation of others]** See 1.4.7.2 (172.23–31). The *Specimen* uses a long dash to indicate a discontinuity of quotation. Wishart's marginal references to page numbers of the *Treatise* generally indicate when he has combined materials from disparate locations.
- 420.29–34 **Can I be sure ... appear to me]** See 1.4.7.3 (172.36–41).
- 420.34–5 **The Memory ... the Imagination]** See 1.4.7.3 (173.10–11).
- 420.35–7 **No Wonder a Principle ... Variations]** See 1.4.7.4 (173.12–13).
- 420.37–421.2 **I have already shown ... none at all]** See 1.4.7.7 (174.20–37).
- 421.2–8 **Where am I ... and Faculty]** See 1.4.7.8 (175.7–13).
- 421.8–10 **If I must be a Fool ... agreeable]** See 1.4.7.10 (175.40–1).
- 421.10–13 **In all the Incidents of Life ... sceptical Principles]** See 1.4.7.11 (176.3–6). After the words 'sceptical principles', the *Treatise* continues: 'and from an inclination, which we feel to the employing ourselves after that manner'.
- 421.13–20 **I cannot forbear ... Good and Evil, &c. ... my Philosophy]** See 1.4.7.12 (176.14–26). The '&c.' replaces the words 'the nature and foundation of government, and the cause of those several passions and inclinations, which actuate and govern me'.
- LG7 421.21–5 **Let us fix our Attention ... there produced]** See 1.2.6.8 (49.12–13, 14–17).
- 421.25–7 **An Opinion or Belief ... present Impression]** See 1.3.7.5 (67.13–15).
- 421.27–8 **more properly ... than of the cogitive Part of our Natures]** 1.4.1.8 (123.19–20). For 'cogitive' the *Treatise* reads 'cogitative'.
- 421.28–9 **Belief in general ... an Idea]** See 1.4.2.41 (138.22–3).
- 421.29–31 **the Idea of Existence ... please to form]** See 1.2.6.4 (48.27–8, 31–2).
- 421.32–3 **Notion of an external Existence ... Absurdity]** See 1.4.2.2 (126.14–16).
- 421.33–6 **what we call a Mind ... perfect Simplicity]** See 1.4.2.39 (137.38–40).

421.36–7 **The only Existences, of which we are certain, are Perceptions]** See 1.4.2.47 (140.37–8).

421.37–41 **When I enter... If any one think... no longer with him]** See 1.4.6.3 (165.1–3, 4–5, 10–12). For 'If any one think', the *Treatise* reads: 'If any one upon serious and unprejudic'd reflection, thinks'.

421.41–4 **I may venture to affirm... Bundle of Perceptions... Movement]** See 1.4.7.4 (165.16–19). For 'Bundle of Perceptions' the *Treatise* reads: 'bundle or collection of different perceptions'.

422.1–2 **That all our Reasonings... Custom]** See 1.4.1.8 (123.17–18).

422.3–5 **if any pretend to define... Production]** See 1.3.2.10 (55.3–5).

422.5–10 **we may define a Cause... Idea of the other]** See 1.3.14.31 (114.32–5, 37–9).

422.11–14 **That all Causes are of the same Kind... final Causes]** See 1.3.14.32 (115.14–17).

422.14–16 **one Kind of Necessity, and the common Distinction betwixt Moral and Physical is... Nature]** See 1.3.14.33 (115.24–7). The *Treatise* reads: 'one kind of *necessity*, as there is but one kind of cause, and that the common distinction betwixt *moral* and *physical* necessity is... nature'.

422.16–17 **Distinction... betwixt Power... Exercise of it... without Foundation]** See 1.3.14.34 (115.36–7).

422.17–19 **Necessity of a Cause... intuitive]** See 1.3.14.35 (115.40–1).

422.19–21 **any Thing may produce any Thing... can imagine]** See 1.3.15.1 (116.23–5).

422.21–2 **This curious *Nostrum* he often repeats, p. 162, 163]** See 1.4.5.30, 32 (162.1, 163.24–5).

422.22–5 **That when we talk of any Being... Effect,—We... determinate Ideas]** See 1.3.14.14 (109.37–9, 110.2–4). At the dash Wishart has omitted: 'when we speak of a necessary connexion betwixt objects, and suppose, that this connexion depends upon an efficacy or energy, with which any of these objects are endow'd; in all these expressions, *so apply'd*,' (109.39–110.2).

422.25–30 **if we have really no Idea of Power... from each other]** See 1.3.14.27 (113.25–9).

422.30–4 **The Efficacy or Energy... Soul (or the Bundle of Perceptions)... Necessity]** See 1.3.14.23 (112.15–19). The parenthetical '(or the Bundle of Perceptions)', a shortening of Hume's 'bundle or collection of different perceptions' (1.4.6.4), has been inserted by Wishart.

422.35–7 **we may observe a Conjunction ... Objects]** See 1.4.2.47 (141.1–3).

422.37–9 **\*Tis impossible therefore ... this Particular]** This much of Wishart's sentence is taken from 1.4.2.47 (141.3–6), where nothing is said 'with regard to the Existence of a Supreme Being'.

422.40–1 *Whatever begins to exist must have a Cause of Existence]* Compare 1.3.3.1 (56.2–3).

422.44–5 **That it is neither ... demonstratively certain]** See 1.3.3.3 (56.19).

422.45–423.3 **Reason can never satisfy ... Custom]** See 1.3.7.6 (67.20–2).

423.3–6 **In that Proposition, God is ... Union]** See 1.3.7.5 (n. 20.9–11 (67)). In the present edition of the *Treatise*, the note and sentences just quoted by Wishart are on the same page.

423.7–9 *the Deity is the prime Mover ... Motions]* Wishart paraphrases, with substantive loss, a part of 1.3.4.9 (107.39–42).

423.9–10 **This Opinion ... very curious ... superfluous to examine it in this Place]** See 1.3.14.10 (107.44–5). Wishart omits, after 'curious', the words, 'and well worth our attention'. Hume's reason for suggesting it superfluous to examine the opinion described is set out in the balance of 1.3.14.10. At *LG* 33 below he repeats his reason, saying that he was discussing the '*Cartesian Doctrine, of secondary Causes*' when he said that '*it was a curious Opinion, but which it would appear superfluous to examine in that Place*'.

423.10–21 **For, if the very Idea be derived ... if no Impression implies any Force or Efficacy ... the Deity.—Since ... Instance of it]** See 1.3.14.10 (108.12–23). The *Treatise* reads: 'if every idea be deriv'd ... if no impression, either of sensation or reflection, implies any force or efficacy ... the deity. Since ... instance of it' (108.12, 14–15). Note that, despite the dash, Wishart omits nothing between 'Deity' and 'Since'.

423.21–3 **We have no Idea ... infinite Power]** See 1.4.5.31 (162.40–2).

*LG* 8 423.26–7 **We certainly may conclude ... Perception]** See 1.4.5.30 (162.28–9).

423.27–9 **any Thing may be the Cause ... Adversaries]** See 1.4.5.32 (163.24–6). The *Treatise* reads: 'antagonists', not 'Adversaries'.

423.29–32 **I assert, says he ... infamous]** See 1.4.5.17 (157.37–9).

423.32–3 **This hideous Hypothesis ... popular]** See 1.4.5.19 (158.16–18). Although the *Letter* here provides a page reference, and follows the text of the *Treatise*, it does not enclose the quoted sentence within quotation marks.

423.34–5 **that all the Absurdities ... Theologians]** See 1.4.5.22 (159.33–4). The *Letter* again follows the text of the *Treatise* and provides a page reference, but does not enclose the quoted material within quotation marks.

- 423.36–8 **We cannot advance one Step ... Atheism]** See 1.4.5.26 (160.23–5).
- LG 9 423.40–1 **Reason has no Influence on our Passions and Actions]** See 3.1.1.7 (294.34).
- 423.41–2 **Actions may be laudable ... unreasonable]** See 3.1.1.10 (295.18–19).
- 423.42–5 **all Beings in the Universe ... Experience]** See 3.1.1.22 (300.5–8).
- LG 10 424.2–4 **We may conclude ... Nature]** See 3.2.6.9 (341.11–12).
- 424.4–7 **I suppose (says he) a Person ... Money]** See 3.2.1.9 (308.29–32).
- 424.7–9 **Publick Interest is not naturally attach'd ... Rules]** See 3.2.1.11 (309.17–19).
- 424.9–13 **Unless we will allow that Nature ... Conventions]** See 3.2.1.17 (310.45–311.3).
- 424.13–16 **Here is a Proposition ... Origin]** See 3.2.2.18 (318.21–3).
- 424.16–17 **These Impressions ... Conventions]** See 3.2.2.21 (319.3–5).
- 424.18–24 **Without such a Convention ... Rules]** See 3.2.2.22 (320.4–9).
- 424.24–6 **in general it may be affirmed ... Relation to ourself]** See 3.2.1.12 (309.31–3).
- LG 11 424.29–34 **That the Rule of Morality ... Obligation]** See 3.2.5.1 (331.26–30).
- LG 12 424.35 **That Promises impose no natural Obligation]** See 3.2.5.1 (336.8).
- 424.36–42 **I shall further observe ... Creature]** See 3.2.5.14 (336.32–7).
- 424.42–5 **Force is supposed to invalidate all Contracts, such]** See 3.2.5.15 (337.19–22). For 'Contracts, such' the *Treatise* reads: 'contracts, and to free us from their obligation. Such'.

### Sum of the Charge

- LG 16 425.11–13 **The Idea of Existence ... Union]** Wishart quotes again from n. 20.9–11 (67). See also LG 7 (423.4–6).
- LG 17 425.16–17 **This Opinion ... very curious ... superfluous to examine it in this Place]** Wishart again quotes from 1.3.14.10; see LG 7 (423.9–10); Hume addresses this charge in ¶33.

### [Hume's Response]

- LG 20 425.26–8 **You see, Dear Sir ... Sum of the Charge]** See also ¶3 of the *Letter*.
- LG 21 425.32–4 **Doctrine of the Pyrrhonians ... a Kind of Jeux d'esprit, without any Influence on ... Conduct in Life]** At DNR 1.5, Cleanthes refers to 'this humourous

sect of the sceptics'. For Hume's earlier efforts to distinguish his position from the views 'of those sceptics, who hold that all is uncertain', and his stated intent 'in displaying... the arguments of that fantastic sect', see 1.4.1.7–8. For his view of the relative strength of Pyrrhonian doubts, compared to natural principles, see *Abs.* 27; ann. 414.7. For the views of some of those who argued that scepticism cannot be consistently maintained or lived, and thus can have, presumably, no effect on 'Conduct in Life', see anns. 123.2, 6; 125.2; 142.6; 176.5. See also *EHU* 12.21–5.

425.38–41 **Scruples... abate the Pride of mere human Reasoners... not able to attain... absolute Certainty**] See also *EHU* 5.1; 12.5–9, 24–5.

LG 22 426.4–5 **Principles of Religion... equally certain with the Objects of his Senses**] Hume may here allude to Intro. 4–5 or 1.4.1.8, but the phrase 'Principles of Religion' does not occur in the *Treatise*. See 1.3.13.5, 1.4.5.34–5, and 2.3.2.3–7 for Hume's comments regarding the effect of his system on religion.

LG 23 426.13–16 **those Principles... renounced... Effects of Philosophical Melancholy and Delusion**] See 1.4.7.9 (175.15–16), where Hume speaks of 'delirium' not '*Delusion*'.

LG 24 426.22–4 **antient Fathers... Reformers... Uncertainty of mere human Reason**] Huet (see also the next annotation), pursuing his intention of showing that both the '*Holy Scriptures and [the] Fathers*' maintain '*that Man cannot attain to a certain and perfect Knowledge of Truth, by the Help of Reason*', cites St Paul, Solomon, David, and Isaiah, as well as such ancient fathers of the church as Arnobius, Lactantius, Augustine, and Aquinas (*Philosophical Treatise* 1.2). Early reformers who are commonly taken to have denigrated reason include Luther (see *Commentary on Galatians, Selections*, 128) and Calvin (see *Institutes* 2.2.18–21; 'The Genevan Confession' 4–5).

426.24–7 **Huet... celebrated for his Demonstration Evangelique... wrote also a Book... to revive all the Doctrines of the antient Scepticks**] Hume refers to Huet's *Demonstratio evangelica* (there is no French edition of this work) and his *Philosophical Treatise concerning the Weakness of Human Understanding*. According to the 'Publisher' of the latter, Huet refrained from publishing this work during his lifetime because he was convinced that 'the generality of Readers would disapprove' of his sceptical conclusions about the understanding. Huet's publishers, both French and English, also assured readers that they could prove that the author of the *Demonstratio evangelica* was also the author of the *Philosophical Treatise*, a work described as a 'Defence of Pyrrhonism' (*Philosophical Treatise*, pp. i, iii). A similar appeal to the 'ancient Fathers', the 'Reformers', and Huet is made by Cleanthes in *DNR* 1.17.

LG 25 426.29–30 **Hereticks, the Arians, Socinians and Deists... too great a Confidence in... Reason**] Members of these three groups had in common doubts about the divinity of Christ and the Trinity. Arius, a third-century Lybian priest, argued that God the Son, because begotten of God the Father, could not be co-eternal and consubstantial with the Father. His view was rejected as heretical by the Council of Nicaea. Socinians were followers of two individuals known as Socinus, Lelio Sozini (1525–62) and his nephew, Faustus Sozini (1539–1604), who maintained that Jesus



was only a divine prophet. Some Deists of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries granted the existence of a Supreme Being, but rejected any supernatural or allegedly revealed, irrational aspects of religion. Orthodox Christian opponents of the three groups tended to blur the distinctions between them. See also Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Arius', 'Socinus'. At *DNR* 1.17, Cleanthes says that 'Locke seems to have been the first Christian, who ventured openly to assert, that *faith* was nothing but a species of *reason*', while Bayle is among those blamed for propagating, unintentionally, Locke's view.

426.33–4 **Reason... far from accounting for... the Trinity and Incarnation]** That reason can neither explain nor comprehend the 'Mysteries' of the Christian faith was commonly claimed. See, e.g., Bayle and the authors he cites at *Dictionary*, 'Perrot' [κ], 'Pyrrho' [β], Explanations 2, 3 [5: 816–21, 833–4]).

LG 26 426.41–2 **common for Philosophers to distinguish the Kinds of Evidence]** Some of the early modern figures who made the distinctions Hume mentions are discussed in ann. 50.title, which also provides locations of some of Hume's discussions, in the *Treatise* itself, of such distinctions. See also anns. 50.title, 86.17, 90.9, 97.39.

427.2 **Pages cited in the Specimen]** The 'Pages cited' are 56, 67, 107–8, and 162.

427.5–6 **same Kind with these Truths, That all Men must die, and that the Sun will rise To-morrow]** These propositions and the level of assurance we have in them is the topic of 1.3.11.2. See also ann. 86.12.

LG 27 427.10–12 **Arguments a posteriori from the Order... of Nature... remain still in their full Force]** Three years after the publication of the *Letter*, Hume returned to the question of the 'argument for a divine existence... from the order of nature' (the 'argument from design' as it is now known). On that later occasion he wrote: 'religious philosophers...indulge a rash curiosity, in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason; and they thereby excite, instead of satisfying, the doubts, which naturally arise from a diligent and scrupulous enquiry. They paint, in the most magnificent colours, the order, beauty, and wise arrangement of the universe; and then ask, if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire' (*EHU* 11.10–11). See also *THN*, n. 30 (109); ann. 428.10.

427.13–15 **metaphysical Argument a priori...Men of Learning cannot comprehend... show no great value for]** The argument in question is one among a family of arguments commonly known generically as the 'cosmological' argument. The cosmological argument has been popular since medieval times in the form of an argument for a first cause or first mover. The contentious 'metaphysical' argument described by Hume here, and at *DNR* 9, starts from the existence of contingent beings—beings which, in scholastic language, have the 'possibility' to be or not to be—and argues that only the existence of a necessary being can account for the fact

that any such possibilities have come to be realized. The argument is set out by King (*De origine mali*, ch. 1). In his *Dissertation upon the Argument a Priori* Waterland provided a selective history of the argument, noting that it had traditionally been seen as an a posteriori argument from effect to cause, and that the a priori element served only as an aid in the deduction of God's attributes. S. Clarke in his *Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God* followed the same pattern, but characterized the argument as a priori because he believed it demonstrated that God's existence was grounded in an 'antecedent' necessity (see also Clarke's 'Answer to a Seventh Letter concerning the Argument a priori'). Doubts about the priority and necessity involved here, and about the causal principle upon which Clarke relied, generated the mistrust of the argument to which Hume alludes. Clarke's staunchest disciple was Jackson, in *The Existence and Unity of God; Proved from his Nature and Attributes* and *A Defense of a Book entitled The Existence and Unity of God; Prov'd from his Nature and Attributes*. The opposition, which rallied behind Locke's more conventional argument for a first cause, was led by Law in *An Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity* and in the extensive annotations he added to his translation of King's work. For further background, see M. A. Stewart, 'Arguments for the Existence of God: British Thinkers', 713–17.

427.15–18 **Bishop Tillotson...That the Being of a God is not capable of Demonstration]** In the sermon Hume cites, Archbishop Tillotson (who was never a bishop) said only that no matter of fact can be demonstrated, and specifically that the 'being of a God is not *Mathematically* demonstrable, nor can it be expected it should, because only Mathematical matters admit of this kind of evidence' ('The Wisdom of Being Religious', *Works*, 18). Waterland, citing a different sermon, argued that Tillotson was one of those who did not value the metaphysical argument a priori. According to Waterland, Tillotson 'seems to have thought, that neither the *Existence* nor the *Attributes* of God could be demonstrated a priori' (*Dissertation upon the Argument a Priori*, 41).

LG 28 427.22 **Proposition above-mentioned]** See ¶4.

427.23–4 **other Arguments of the same Kind still remain; Des Cartes's]** Descartes's arguments for the existence of God are found in *Meditations* 3 and 5. It is not obvious whether Hume takes only one of these, or all, to be of 'the same Kind' with the metaphysical argument a priori.

427.44–5 **Author...asserted...can judge only of the Operations of Causes by Experience]** Hume here paraphrases the *Treatise*; see 1.3.12.5, 8 for similar language.

LG 30 428.1 **and that, reasoning a priori, any thing might appear able to produce any thing]** Hume paraphrases 1.3.15.1. See also LG 7 (422.19–21).

428.4–5 **no great Paradox...the Opinion of several Philosophers]** Philosophers holding opinions of this sort are mentioned in anns. 55.18, 61.38, 62.40, 63.17, 73.16, 86.12, 410.25.

428.10–17 **Wherever I see Order...there hath been Design...Writers concerning Natural Religion]** Writers on natural religion who had placed the argument in this light include Wilkins, *Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* 6; Ray, *Wisdom of God Manifested*; Bentley, *Eight Boyle Lectures*, sermons 2–8; Cheyne, *Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion*; Derham, *Physico-theology* and *Astro-theology*; Butler, *Analogy of Religion*. Boyle, with a different end in view (viz. superseding the Aristotelian explanation of the orderliness of nature), explicitly compared the orderly and predictable phenomena of nature with the famous striking clock of Strasbourg. The inanimate and intrinsically purposeless components of this clock, Boyle argued, 'are so framed and adapted' by their intelligent and designing artificer that 'each performs its part in order to [bring about] the various ends for which it was contrived'. Thus it is that 'the various motions of the wheels and other parts concur' to produce the effect intended by that artificer ('Essay, Containing a Requisite Digression', 160). For his part, Newton cautiously suggested that it appears 'from Phænomena that there is a Being incorporeal, living, intelligent, [and] omnipresent', then went on to add that his own form of natural philosophy 'is to be highly valued' because, although 'every true Step made in this Philosophy brings us not immediately to the Knowledge of the first Cause, yet it brings us nearer to it' (*Opticks* 3.1, qu. 28 [370]). Hume explores the argument from order to design in *EHU* 11 and throughout *DNR*.

LG 31 428.19–20 **Author...asserts...we have no abstract...Ideas, properly so speaking]** For Hume's account of abstract ideas and his acknowledgement of his debt to George Berkeley (Bishop of Cloyne after 1734), see 1.1.7.1–16; ann. 17.1.

428.25–6 **Author hath said...no general Idea of Existence, distinct from every particular Existence]** See 1.2.6.1–5, 1.3.7.2, n. 20 (67).

428.28–9 **might be justified before the University of Salamanca, or a Spanish Inquisition]** In 1572, two professors at the University of Salamanca denounced several of their colleagues to the Inquisition. Some of those denounced died in prison before judgement was passed, while others were released after several years only to be charged again or to be deprived of academic posts. It has been suggested that these denunciations were provoked not by the religious concerns of the Inquisition, but by envy or rivalry between theologians and classical scholars at the University of Salamanca. For details, see Bayle, *Dictionary*, 'Leon, A.'; H. Kamen, *Spanish Inquisition*, 122–7.

LG 32 428.41–2 **Epicurus and Strato...Force was original and inherent in Matter]** Hume's 'short History' of opinions about the reality of 'Force in Matter' (429.29–30) is not entirely reliable. Epicurus (341–271 BC) did maintain that all change is brought about by the self-induced rearrangement of the indestructible atoms out of which everything is made, but Strato of Lampsacus (d. c.270 BC) was a Peripatetic, a follower of Aristotle; see Stanley, *History of Philosophy* 6. See also ann. 105.41.

428.43–5 **Platonick and Peripatetick Schools ... one primary efficient Cause]** Hume links the Platonic and Peripatetic schools. Chambers did the same, attributing to Cicero the view that Plato left two principal disciples, Xenocrates and Aristotle. These, he said, 'founded two Sects, which only differ'd in Name', the one being called *Academics*, the other *Peripatetics*. Chambers goes on to say that the 'greatest and best Part of *Aristotles* Philosophy, he borrow'd from his Master *Plato*: *Serranus* affirms confidently, and says he is able to demonstrate it, that there is nothing exquisite in any part of *Aristotles* Philosophy, Dialectics, Ethics, Politics, Physics, or Metaphysics, but is found in *Plato*. And of this Opinion are many of the ancient Authors' (*Cyclopædia*, 'Peripateticks'). Hume comments on the Aristotelian account of causes at 1.3.14.32; see also anns. 115.15; 146.25, 37.

429.4–7 **Schoolmen supposed also a real Power in Matter... continual Concurrence of the Deity ... a perpetual Creation]** Hume offers no clue to the 'Schoolmen' he may have had in mind. Certainly many Scholastics held views substantively different from that described here. No Aristotelian Scholastic would have supposed that matter itself could have been created apart from form, or *energia*. Neither did those of this school suppose that preservation is achieved by a repeated or 'perpetual Creation' (a view one associates with the Cartesians). For these Scholastics, preservation was part of creation itself, an eternal act that eternally encompasses its effects in time (see, e.g., Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1 q. 4–6; we are indebted to George di Giovanni for guidance on this matter).

429.8–12 **No one, till Des Cartes and Malbranche ... substituted the Notion of occasional Causes]** For Cartesian views on these issues, see anns. n. 29 (106); 107.22, 35; 108.5; 115.20. In *EHU* Hume repeated, in similar language, much of the discussion found in the remainder of this paragraph. There he says that 'DES CARTES insinuated that doctrine of the universal and sole efficacy of the Deity, without insisting on it. MALEBRANCHE and other CARTESIANS made it the foundation of all their philosophy' (*EHU* 7 n. 16).

429.15–20 **Opinion... never gained great Credit... in England... Newton... rejects it]** When Hume later returned to this question he said first that it 'was never the meaning of Sir ISAAC NEWTON to rob second causes of all force or energy; though some of his followers have endeavoured to establish that theory upon his authority. On the contrary, that great philosopher had recourse to an ethereal active fluid to explain his universal attraction; though he was so cautious and modest as to allow, that it was a mere hypothesis, not to be insisted on, without more experiments'. Hume then said of the occasionalist hypothesis that it had 'no authority in England. LOCKE, CLARKE, and CUDWORTH, never so much as take notice of it, but suppose all along, that matter has a real, though subordinate and derived power' (*EHU* 7 n. 16). Newton himself said that the 'primitive Particles' making up bodies 'have not only a *Vis inertiae* ... but also that they are moved by certain active Principles, such as is that of Gravity, and that which causes Fermentation, and the Cohesion of Bodies. These Principles I consider, not as occult Qualities... but as general Laws of Nature, by

which the Things themselves are form'd; their Truth appearing to us by Phænomena, though their Causes be not yet discover'd' (*Opticks* 3.1 qu. 31 [400–1]).

LG 33 429.25–7 concerning this *Cartesian Doctrine...when he says...a curious Opinion*] See LG 7 (423.9–10); *THN* 1.3.14.10 (107.44–5).

LG 35 429.39–40 no distinct Idea of Substance...Opinion...in Mr. Lock...Bishop Berkeley] See esp. 1.4.5.33. Locke's claim that we have no distinct idea of substance is found throughout *Essay* 2.23, 'Of our Complex Ideas of Substances'. For Berkeley's similar complaints about the alleged idea of *material* substance, see *Principles* 1.37, 47, 95; *Three Dialogues* 3 [*Works*, 2: 237]. See also anns. 16.3, 16, 20; 125.33; 146.37; 153.2, 11, 24; 154.1.

LG 37 429.44–430.2 denied...Propositions of Morality were...Objects merely of Reason] See 3.1.1.4–27 and anns. 294.7, 11; 295.3, 7, 13; 296.5; n. 68.1 (297); 298.17, 22; n. 69.2 (298). On S. Clarke and Wollaston, see also, respectively, anns. 302.7, 296.20.

430.3–4 concurs with all the antient Moralists...Mr. Hutcheson] Although Hume may exaggerate the extent to which classical moralists supposed that the objects of morality are determined by feelings, he does on this matter follow Hutcheson, who proposed by his *Inquiry* to establish the 'Ideas of *Moral Good* and *Evil*...according to the Sentiments of the Antient Moralists' (title-page of the 1st edn.). The claim that the *Treatise* concurs with Hutcheson in rejecting the view that 'the Propositions of Morality were of the same Nature with the Truths of Mathematicks and the abstract Sciences' is beyond reproach. See 3.1.1.4–27 and many of the annotations thereto.

LG 38 430.9–11 Words that admit of an invidious Construction...Definitions and Explanations, to prevent it] See 3.1.2.7–10; 3.2.1.1, 19; 3.2.2.28; 3.2.6.11; anns. 14.32; 304.36; 305.20, 24; 311.20, 23, 26, 27. See also *EPM* Appx. 3.9 n. 64.

430.11–13 natural Virtues...natural Instinct] Hume first alludes to his distinction between natural and artificial virtues at 3.1.2.9, while his account of the natural virtues is found principally in 3.3.1–3. See also 2.1.7.

430.13–15 artificial Virtues...require...natural Instinct...Reflection.. Combination with others] The *Treatise* account of the artificial virtues occupies the whole of 3.2.

430.16 Speech is artificial] Language is said to be artificial, to be established gradually by convention, at 3.2.2.10.

430.18–20 Justice...so natural to Man, that no Society...no individual...entirely devoid of all Sense of it] See 3.2.1.19.

430.20–2 Some...displeas'd with Mr. Hutcheson's Philosophy...little of Reason] Hutcheson addressed precisely this objection; see ann. 388.3.

*Editors' Annotations*

- LG 39 430.26–8 **Men...never would have formed Contracts...independent of Society]** See 3.2.1.9.
- 430.29–31 **Author offers further to prove...not be attended with any Moral Obligation]** See 3.2.5.1–2, 5, 12.
- 430.34–5 **Laws of Justice are universal, and perfectly inflexible]** The key phrase here is found at 3.2.6.9.
- LG 40 430.42–3 **cannot now provide myself...with the Book referred to]** Hume was living near St Albans, about 25 miles north of London; see above, Historical Account, Sect. 8.
- LG 41 431.2–3 **the Author had better delayed the publishing of that Book]** For similar authorial assessments of the *Treatise*, see above, Historical Account, Sect. 10.
- 431.20–1 **Country of Freedom...Liberty, at least of Philosophy]** Milton reported in 1644 that ‘lernerd men’ in countries where ‘inquisition tyrannizes’ had congratulated him on being born ‘in such a place of *Philosophic* freedom, as they suppos’d England was’ (*Areopagitica*, 24). In Hume’s day, the idealization of Britain as the land of liberty was particularly the rhetoric of supporters of the Protestant Succession as effected by legislation in 1689 and 1714. The phrase, ‘the liberty of philosophy’, meaning the freedom of philosophical enquiry from ecclesiastical or political controls, gained currency in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries among the followers of Copernicus and Galileo, who were defending new modes of thought in natural philosophy, particularly in cosmology, against the Inquisition of the Roman Catholic Church. It surfaced again in the mid-seventeenth century when Protestant Dutch theologians attempted to prevent the teaching of Descartes’s natural philosophy because they judged its metaphysical foundations atheistic. In Britain, the phrase was popular with publicists such as Thomas Sprat and Joseph Glanvill, who, championing the new experimentalism of the Royal Society, opposed the Aristotelianism that still prevailed in the universities. See, by M. A. Stewart, ‘*Libertas philosophandi*’ and *Independency of the Mind*. For Spinoza’s application of the phrase to philosophy as a whole, rather than specifically to natural philosophy, see the annotation to the title-page of Vol. 1: *Rara... licet*.

## Bibliography

This Bibliography provides, in four sections, information about the works cited in this edition. The primary sources that are quoted or to which explicit reference is made, either by Hume or the editors, are listed in three of these sections.<sup>1</sup> Most of these sources are found in Section 1 where authors' dates are given; cross-references there guide readers to cited editions found only in Sections 2 or 3 (there are no exactly duplicated entries). Section 2 includes those primary sources that were included in the Physiological Library, a library open to students (at least those of Robert Steuart's Natural Philosophy class) at the University of Edinburgh; Hume enrolled in this library in December 1724.<sup>2</sup> Section 3 includes those primary sources that, as they were included in the Hume Library, could once have been owned by David Hume the philosopher.<sup>3</sup> Sections 2 and 3 also list alternative editions of the works cited by Hume or the editors, editions that Hume may have used. Thus, in addition to providing any necessary bibliographical references, Sections 2 and 3 may give readers a sense of the written resources available to Hume during the years leading up to the publication of the *Treatise* in 1739–40. They also add a degree of credence to suggestions that he had read particular works by the time he was writing the *Treatise*. Section 4 lists the secondary sources we have cited.

If there is no English translation of a work written in another language, the title of that work is given first in the language of the original, followed in square brackets by a translation if the sense of the original title is not relatively obvious. If a translation of the work is available, the original title is given only when that title appears to be appreciably different from the translated title. No translations of titles are provided for works typically cited by their original Latin titles, Cicero's *Academica* or *De finibus*, for example. Uncertain attributions are preceded by [?]. Loeb Library editions have been used for most of the classical works cited. The Loeb editions listed here were all published by Heinemann of London or Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. In place of this information, we say only 'Loeb', and provide the date(s) of the printing of the items we have used, not the dates of original publication or of revision.

Dates of birth and death for the authors of primary sources are provided in Section 1. For additional biographical or bibliographical information about the

<sup>1</sup> Bibliographical information regarding some of the books and periodicals mentioned in Sects. 6 and 7 of the Historical Account is not repeated here. Additional information about some of the reviews mentioned in Sects. 7 and 9 of the Account is found at 'Review' in Sect. 1 below.

<sup>2</sup> For further information about the Physiological Library, see Historical Account, Sect. 1, nn. 7, 52.

<sup>3</sup> See D. E. Norton and M. J. Norton, *The David Hume Library*.

individuals mentioned in these sections or elsewhere in these volumes, readers are advised to consult such standard reference works as *The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature*, *The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, *The Oxford Companion to English Literature*, *The Oxford Companion to French Literature*, and the relevant Cambridge histories of philosophy. There are also on-line resources that provide useful and reliable biographical or bibliographical information about many of these individuals.

Titles followed by an asterisk are available in digital form, in the editions cited, in the Past Masters Series published by the IntelLex Corporation. Although we have benefited from these digital materials, we have compared the texts they provide with the printed editions from which they are taken, and given precedence to the latter in the relatively few instances in which there are differences.

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<sup>10</sup> The citations of Hume's essays found in the Editors' Annotations are to this edition. Some essays are referred to by short titles; for a list of these, see above, Abbreviations and Conventions.

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<sup>12</sup> The *Port-Royal* edition of Pascal's *Pensées*, the only edition available to Hume, is significantly different from any of the several twentieth-century editions or English translations of that work. The *Port-Royal* edition, first published in 1670, augmented in the edition of 1678, and republished throughout the following 150 years, is significantly shorter than later editions. Pascal's prose has been silently rewritten, individual *pensées* broken up and reconstituted, and material by the editors treated as though by Pascal himself. In the Editors' Annotations we cite only from the *Port-Royal* edition, giving the page numbers of the original (as reproduced in a facsimile of the edition of 1678), but we also provide, whenever possible, references enabling readers to locate more authentic versions of the cited materials in (1) the Brunschvicg edition of the *Pensées*, for this typically provides the reference point for subsequent numberings of the *Pensées*, and in (2) what is probably the most widely available English translation, that by Krailshiemer. Our abbreviations for these twentieth-century versions are B and Kr, respectively, followed by the *pensée* number assigned in B and Kr. For further discussion of the *Port-Royal Pensées*, see Penelhum, 'Human Nature and Truth: Hume and Pascal', in *Themes in Hume*, 268–9; and Vamos, 'Pascal's *Pensées* and the Enlightenment', *passim*.

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- TETENS, JOHANN NICOLAS, 1736–1807.  
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- THOMAS AQUINAS, ST; see AQUINAS.
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*The Principles of Moral Philosophy. An Enquiry into the Wise and Good Government of the Moral World* (London, 1740).  
*A Treatise on Ancient Painting, Containing Observations on the Rise, Progress and Decline of that Art Amongst the Greeks and Romans* (London, 1740).
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*Letters concerning the English Nation* (London, 1733).  
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*The Divine Legation of Moses Demonstrated* (London, 1765).  
*Remarks on Mr. D. Hume's Essay on the Natural History of Religion, with Richard Hurd* (London, 1757).
- WARD, SETH, 1617–89.  
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- WARTON, THOMAS, 1728–90.  
*Observations on the Faerie Queene of Spenser* (London, 1754).
- WATERLAND, DANIEL, 1683–1740.  
*Dissertation upon the Argument a Priori for Proving the Existence of a first Cause, in Edmund Law, An Enquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity* (Cambridge, 1734).

WATT, ROBERT, 1774–1819.

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WATTS, ISAAC, 1674–1748; see also Sect. 2.

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*Logick; or, The Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth* (London, 1725).

*Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects, viz. Space, Substance, Body, Spirit, the Operations of the Soul in Union with the Body, Innate Ideas, Perpetual Consciousness, Place and Motion of Spirits...the Production and Operations of Plants and Animals: With some Remarks on Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding* (London, 1742; Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999).

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WESLEY, JOHN, 1703–91.

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*Select Sermons* (London, 1698).

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WORSTER, BENJAMIN, fl. 1722–30; see Sect. 2.

WOTTON, WILLIAM, 1666–1727; see Sect. 3.

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ARISTOTLE; see also Sect. 1.

*Historia animalia* (Venice, 1546).

BACON, FRANCIS, BARON VERULAM, VISCOUNT ST ALBANS; see also Sects. 1, 3.

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BENTLEY, RICHARD; see also Sect. 1.

*Dr. Richard Bentley's Folly of Atheism, and Confutation of it from the Faculties of the Soul, from the Structure and Origin of Humane Bodies, and from the Origin and Frame of the World* (Cambridge, 1724).

BERNIER, FRANÇOIS; see also Sect. 1.

*Abrégé de la philosophie de Gassendi*, 2nd edn., 7 vols. (Lyon, 1684).

BERNOULLI, JEAN.

*Meditationes mathematicæ de motu musculorum* (Leyden, 1710).

BORELLI, GIOVANNI ALFONSO.

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BOYLE, ROBERT; see also Sects. 1, 3.<sup>14</sup>

*Certain Physiological Essays* (London, 1661).

*Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature* (London, 1686).

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CHEYNE, GEORGE; see also Sect. 1.

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CICERO, MARCUS TULLIUS; see also Sect. 1.

*De natura deorum* (Cambridge, 1718).

CLARKE, SAMUEL; see also Sect. 1.

*Sermons at Mr. Boyle's Lecture: A Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation*, 4th edn. (London, 1716).

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*Astro-theology: or, a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from a Survey of the Heavens*, 4th edn. (London, 1721).

*Physico-theology: or, a Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, from His Works of Creation*, 6th edn. (London, 1723).

<sup>14</sup> The Physiological Library catalogue begins with a list of forty-one items said to be 'a complete Catalogue of the Honourable Robert Boyles's Works', and to claim that all but three of these works are in the library. There is also a list of twenty-four papers, by or about Boyle, in the library.

DESAGULIERS, JOHN THEOPHILUS; see also Sect. 1.

*Lectures of Experimental Philosophy* (London, 1719).

DESCARTES, RENÉ; see also Sect. 1.

*Epistolae* (London, 1668).

*Meditationes, &c.* (Amsterdam, 1685).

*Principia philosophiae, dissertatio de methodo, dioptrice, meteora, & tractatus de passionibus animae* (Amsterdam, 1692).

DIGBY, KENELME; see also Sect. 1.

*Treatise of Bodies and of Mans Soul* (London, 1658).

DITTON, HUMPHRY.

*A Discourse concerning the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. Wherein the... Nature and Obligation of Moral Evidence are Explained*, 3rd edn. (London, 1722).

DUFRESNOY, CHARLES ALPHONSE.

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EUCLID; see also Sect. 1.

[Extant Works] (Oxford, 1703).

FAIRFAX, NATHANIEL.

*A Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge of the World, wherein the Greatness, Littleness and Lastingness of Bodies, are Freely Handled* (London, 1674).

FILLEAU DE LA CHAISE, JEAN; see also Sect. 1.

*Traité ou l'on montre qu'il y a des demost[r]ations d'une autre espèce & aussi certaines que celles de la Géométrie & qu'on en peut donner de telles pour la Religion Chrétienne, in Pensées de M. Pascal sur la religion: et sur quelques autres sujets* (Paris, 1684).

GASSENDI, PIERRE; see also Sect. 1.

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GLANVILL, JOSEPH; see also Sect. 1.

*Scep̄sis scientifica; or, Confest Ignorance, the Way to Science* (London, 1665).

GRAVESANDE, WILLEM JACOB, 's; see also Sect. 1.

*Physices elementa mathematica experimentis confirmata* (Leiden, 1720–1).

GROTIUS, HUGO; see also Sects. 1, 3.

*De Veritate religionis Christianae* (Amsterdam, 1674).

HESIOD; see also Sect. 1.

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HOBBS, THOMAS; see also Sect. 1.

*Elementa philosophiae de corpore* (London, 1655).

HOOKE, ROBERT; see also Sect. 1.

*Micrographia; or, Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies made by Magnifying Glasses* (London, 1665).

HUYGENS, CHRISTIAAN; see also Sect. 1.

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LE GRAND, ANTOINE; see also Sect. 1.

*Institutio philosophiae secundum principia Renati Descartes* (London, 1680).

LOCKE, JOHN; see also Sects. 1, 3.

*Essay concerning Humane Understanding*, 5th edn. (London, 1706).

LUCRETIUS (TITUS LUCRETIUS CARUS); see also Sects. 1, 3.

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MALEBRANCHE, NICOLAS; see also Sects. 1, 3.

*De la recherche de la vérité... augmentée de plusieurs éclaircissemens*, 6th edn. (Paris, 1712).

MARIOTTE, EDMÉ; see also Sect. 1.

*Œuvres de Mr. Mariotte* (Leiden, 1717).

NEWTON, ISAAC; see also Sect. 1.

*Opticks: or, A Treatise of the Reflexions, Refractions, Inflexions and Colours of Light* (London, 1721).

*Philosophiæ naturalis principia mathematica*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1713).

PASCAL, BLAISE; see also Sect. 1 and FILLEAU DE LA CHAISE, JEAN.

*Pensées de M. Pascal sur la Religion, &c... & un Traité ou l'on montre qu'il y a des demonst[r]ations d'une autre espèce & aussi certaines que celles de la Géométrie & qu'on en peut donner de telles pour la Religion Chrétienne* (Paris, 1684).

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*De la mécanique des animaux*, in *Oeuvres diverses de physique et de mécanique* (Leyden, 1721).

*The Natural History of Animals containing the Anatomical Description of Several Creatures Dissected by the Royal Academy of Sciences at Paris*, trans. R. Waller (London, 1702).

PLINY, GAIUS PLINIUS SECUNDUS; see also Sect. 1.

*Historia naturalis* (Paris, 1723).

QUINCY, JOHN, d. 1722.

*Introduction concerning Mechanical Knowledge, and the Grounds of Certainty in Physick*, in *Medicina Statica: Being the Aphorisms of Sanctorius* (i.e. S. Santorio) (London, 1712).

SENECA, LUCIUS ANNAEUS (THE YOUNGER); see also Sects. 1, 3.

*Opera* (Antwerp, 1615).

TILLOTSON, JOHN; see also Sect. 1.

*Sermons on the Wisdom of being Religious, the Folly of Scoffing at Religion, and the Advantages of it to Societies and Particular Persons: The Excellency of the Christian Religion, &c.* (London, 1673).

VITRUVIUS POLLIO; see also Sect. 1.

*Abregé des dix livres d'architecture de Vitruve* (Paris, 1674).

WATTS, ISAAC; see also Sect. 1.

*Logick, or the Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth* (London, 1724).

WILKINS, JOHN; see also Sect. 1.

*Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion* (London, 1678).

WORSTER, BENJAMIN.

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### 3. SOURCES CITED FROM THE DAVID HUME LIBRARY

With a few exceptions, the list that follows derives from *The David Hume Library* cited in n. 3 above. The exceptions derive from the discovery, in 1997, of archival material dating from the late eighteenth century. This material includes a ledger recording a bookseller's purchase, in July 1797, of approximately 110 pre-1776 titles from Baron Hume. We have treated these titles as candidates for addition to Hume's library, and those published by 1740 as candidates for inclusion in this list. A superscript obelisk (†) identifies these additions. We are grateful to Rick Sher for bringing this unpublished material to our attention.

ADDISON, JOSEPH; see also Sect. 1.

*The Works of Joseph Addison* (London, 1721).

ANTONINI, ANNIBALE.

*Traité de la Grammaire Italienne* (Paris, 1726).

ARIOSTO, LODOVICO.

*Orlando furioso* (Venice, 1590).

AURELIUS, MARCUS ANTONINUS.

[*Meditations*] (Oxford, 1704).

BACON, FRANCIS, BARON VERULAM, VISCOUNT ST ALBANS; see also Sects. 1, 2.

*Opera, moralium et civilium* (London, 1638).

BAYLE, PIERRE; see also Sect. 1.

*Oeuvres diverses*, 4 vols. (La Haye, 1725–7).

BEATTIE, JAMES; see also Sect. 1.

*Essay on Truth*, i.e. *An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; In Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism* (Edinburgh, 1770).

BELLEGARDE, JEAN BAPTISTE, MORVAN DE; see also Sect. 1.

*Réflexions sur L'Elegance et la Politesse Du Stile* (La Haye, 1715).

BERKELEY, GEORGE; see also Sect. 1.

*The Analyst; Or, a Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician* (London, J. Tonson, 1734).

*A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics. In Answer to a Pamphlet of [James Jurin] Intituled, Geometry No Friend to Infidelity* (London, 1735).<sup>15</sup>

*An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (London, 1709).

BOETHIUS, ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS.

*De consolatione philosophiae* (Antwerp, 1607).

BOILEAU DESPRÉAUX, NICOLAS; see also Sect. 1.

*Oeuvres de Boileau, avec des éclaircissemens historiques*, 4 vols. (La Haye, 1722).

*The Works of Monsieur Boileau*, 3 vols. (London, 1736).†

BOUHOURS, DOMINIQUE; see also Sect. 1.

*Les Entretiens d'Ariste et d'Eugène* (Paris, 1671).

<sup>15</sup> We can say only that this and the preceding title, and the two James Jurin titles listed on p. 1021, may have been in the Hume Library. See Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 60–1.

BOYLE, ROBERT; see also Sects. 1, 2.

*Certain Physiological Essays* (London, 1661).

*New Experiments Physico-Mechanical, Touching the Spring of the Air, and its Effects. A Defence of the Doctrine Touching the Spring and Weight of the Air, against the objections of Franciscus Linus. An Examen of Mr T. Hobbes Dialogus Physicus De Naturâ Aëres*, 3rd edn. (London, 1682).

BURKE, EDMUND; see also Sect. 1.

*A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (London, 1764).

BUTLER, JOSEPH; see also Sect. 1.

*The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature* (London, 1736).

CAMPBELL, GEORGE.

*A Dissertation on Miracles: Containing an Examination of the Principles Advanced by David Hume, Esq; in an Essay on Miracles* (Edinburgh, 1762).

*The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 2 vols. (London, 1776).

CASTIGLIONE, BALDASSARE; see also Sect. 1.

*Il Cortegiano* (Venice, 1593).

CHARLETON, WALTER; see also Sect. 1.

*Natural History of Nutrition, Life, and Voluntary Motion Microform: Containing all the New Discoveries of Anatomist's and Most Probable Opinions of Physicians, Concerning the Oeconomie of Human Nature* (London, 1659).†

CHARRON, PIERRE; see also Sect. 1.

*Of Wisdom*, 2 vols., trans. G. Stanhope (London, 1707).†

DE RETZ, JEAN-FRANÇOIS-PAUL DE GONDI, CARDINAL DE; see also Sect. 1.

*Memoires de Cardinal de Retz*, 4 vols. (Amsterdam, 1731).

DUBOS, JEAN BAPTISTE; see also Sect. 1.

*Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture*, 2 vols. (Utrecht, 1732).

GROTIUS, HUGO; see also Sects. 1, 2.

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*The Guardian*, 2 vols. (London, 1729); see also Sect. 1.

GUICCIARDINI, FRANCESCO; see also Sect. 1.

*Della Istoria D'Italia*, 2 vols. (Venice 1738).

HUME, DAVID; see also Sect. 1.

*A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2 vols. (London, 1739).<sup>15</sup>

HUTCHESON, FRANCIS; see also Sect. 1.

*An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; in Two Treatises. I. Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design. II. Concerning Moral Good and Evil*, 2nd edn. (London, 1726).

<sup>15</sup> A bookseller's note reported that 'This Copy has got a Vast of Corrections and Additions in the handwriting of the Author'; see Norton and Norton, *David Hume Library*, 102–3.



JURIN, JAMES (1684–1750)

*Geometry No Friend to Infidelity: Or, a Defence of Sir Issac Newton and the British Mathematicians, in a Letter to the Author of the Analyst* (London, 1734).

*The Minute Mathematician; Or, the Free-thinker no Just-thinker: Set Forth in a Second Letter to the Author of the Analyst; Containing a Defence of Sir Issac Newton and the British Mathematicians* (London, 1735).

KAMES, LORD HENRY HOME; see also Sect. 1.

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## Index 1: Historical Account and Editing the Texts

Index 1 is an index to the two essays found in vol. 2 of this edition – to the ‘Historical Account of *A Treatise of Human Nature*, from its Beginnings to the Time of Hume’s Death’, and to ‘Editing the Texts of the *Treatise*, the *Abstract*, and the *Letter from a Gentleman*’. In this index, except for the titles of the three works making up vol. 1 of this edition, the titles of anonymous works, and the titles of periodicals, all publications cited or quoted in these two essays are indexed under their authors’ names. Materials found in footnotes are indexed by page number without an identifying *n*.

Review title abbreviations used in this index:

*BR*: *Bibliothèque raisonnée des ouvrages des savans de L’Europe*;

*GZ*: *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*;

*HWL*: *The History of the Works of the Learned*;

*NB*: *Nouvelle bibliothèque, ou histoire littéraire des principaux écrits qui se publient*;

*NZ*: *Neue Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen*.

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## Index 2: Hume's Texts and Editors' Annotations

Index 2 is an index to the critical texts of the *Treatise*, the *Abstract*, and the *Letter from a Gentleman* found in vol. 1 of this edition and to the 'Editors' Annotations' found in vol. 2. This index is denominated 'Index 2' and placed at the end of vol. 2 where it can be easily located by those primarily interested in the most important materials in these two volumes, the critical texts of the *Treatise*, the *Abstract*, and the *Letter from a Gentleman*.

In this index, references to page numbers 1–401 are references to the *Treatise*; references to pages 403–18 are to the *Abstract*. These pages and their numbers are identical to those of the Oxford Philosophical Texts (OPT) edition. References to pages 419–31 are to the *Letter from a Gentleman*, a short work not included in the OPT edition. References to pages 685–979 are to the 'Editors' Annotations'. Materials found in Hume's footnotes are indexed by page number without an identifying *n*.

Entries for books and other publications are by title for Hume's own works, for titles mentioned by Hume, for anonymous works, and for periodicals. Other titles are indexed under their authors' names.

This index differs significantly from that in the OPT edition of the *Treatise* and *Abstract*. First, it includes entries to the text of the *Letter from a Gentleman*. Secondly, index references to the texts of the *Treatise* and the *Abstract* have been substantially expanded and amended. Finally, index references to the annotations reflect in detail the extensive historical background provided by the 'Editors' Annotations'.

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