

COUP D'ÉTAT

COUP



ALFRED · A · KNOPF · NEW YORK · 1969

D'ÉTAT

a practical handbook

Edward Luttwak

THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK
PUBLISHED BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC.

FIRST AMERICAN EDITION

Copyright © 1968, 1969 by Edward Luttwak

All rights reserved under International and Pan-American
Copyright Conventions. Published in the United States
by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, and distributed by
Random House, Inc., New York.

Originally published in Great Britain
by Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 69-14737

Manufactured in the United States of America

To my Father and Mother



preface

AS THE EVENTS in France of May 1968 have shown yet again, insurrection, the classic vehicle of revolution, is obsolete. The security apparatus of the modern state, with its professional personnel, with its diversified means of transport and communications, and with its extensive sources of information, cannot be defeated by civilian agitation, however intense and prolonged. Any attempt on the part of civilians to use direct violence with improvised means will always be neutralized by the efficiency of modern automatic weapons; a general strike, on the other hand, can temporarily swamp the system, but cannot permanently damage it, since in a modern economic setting, the civilians will run out of food and fuel well before the military, the police, and allied organizations.

The modern state is therefore practically invulnerable to a direct assault. Two alternatives remain: guerrilla warfare and the coup d'état. The first works by a slow erosion of the human and physical infrastructure of the state, a long and bloody process. The coup d'état, on the other hand, relies on the use of precisely those parts of the state apparatus which guerrilla warfare seeks to destroy: the armed forces, the police, and the security agencies. The technique of the coup d'état is the technique of judo: the planners of the coup must use the power of the state against its political masters. This is done by a process of infiltration and subversion in which a small but critical part of the security forces are totally subverted, while much of the rest is temporarily neutralized. This book deals with

the military, political, and intelligence techniques which are required to carry out the coup, from the first stage of infiltration to the final phase in which targets are seized and post-coup stabilization begins. The techniques here discussed are politically neutral, and are concerned only with the objective of seizing control of the state, and not at all with subsequent policies. Readers interested in pursuing this subject further may wish to consult some of the standard academic works related to the subject, among which are: *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, edited by J. J. Johnson; *The Man on Horseback*, by S. E. Finer; and the chapter on armed forces organization in Marion J. Levy, Jr.'s, *Modernization and Structure of Societies*.

foreword

Evolgato imperii arcano, wrote Tacitus: "The secret of empire was out—an Emperor could be made elsewhere than in Rome." Nowadays the secret of empire is that a president can be made otherwise than by a general election and the key to that secret is the subject of this book. It is the coup d'état. In the last ten years, on my individual reckoning, there have been seventy-three coups in forty-six countries. On Luttwak's count, which goes back twenty-three years, there have been successful coups in no less than seventy-odd countries, which is to say well over half the total of sovereign states in existence today. The coup is a more widespread way of changing governments than elections.

Study of the coup has been overshadowed, one might almost say monopolized, by one short, brilliant book, Curzio Malaparte's famous *Technique of the Coup d'État*. This will no longer be so. The two books, Malaparte's and Luttwak's, will be studied and quoted side by side.

For not only was there room for a new look at the coup: there was a positive need for it. Malaparte wrote in 1931. His concern was Europe, and the efforts of the radical right and the radical left to wrest power from the parliamentary regimes. These were the redoubtable forces he described as the "new Catilines," and his theme was the way in which such great social movements could set aside the electoral process and seize by violence the control of the government; so his book contains instances of coups as various as the Bolshevik coup of October 1917, the abortive

Kapp Putsch of 1920, and the Mussolini coup of 1923. And his thesis was that to attack or defend the government it was futile to attack or defend the parliament buildings and the ministries. These were the mere simulacra of power. The objective must be to paralyze and control the technological power points of the modern state: the rail and road centers, the telecommunication networks, the power stations, and the factories. And to point up his lesson he selected first one, then another, case history, analyzing a successful coup and an unsuccessful one; so adding one corollary after another to the basic thesis.

Writing nearly four decades later, the differences in Luttwak's approach are themselves significant for our time. He deals only peripherally with Europe: his main setting is the Third World. He is not concerned with the efforts of powerful left-wing and right-wing movements to seize control of the state from parliamentary assemblies, but with those of narrow élite groups to seize power from one another in lands where the masses do not participate in the political process or even have much influence upon it, where the traditionally Western labels of "left" and "right" are confused and confusing, and where the coup is not necessarily directed at parliamentary regimes but to the power holders of the day which may be parliamentary, traditional monarchy, or a single-party regime, or even a military one.

But, like Malaparte, Luttwak is concerned with the technique of paralyzing and seizing the technological power points of the state. For today, Malaparte's lesson has been so thoroughly learned by all would-be conspirators as to have become the technical commonplace of even the most ham-handed. The lesson has equally been learned by all power holders; for it is necessary to meet fire with fire. Luttwak takes Malaparte's central proposition as read, as his starting point. But he supplies, as Malaparte did not, the

“fine print”—the details of how one sets about this daunting task. And hence the brilliant and original chapters on planning the coup, on executing it, and on legitimizing it once it is over.

One final comparison may be made: the approach. In a series of brilliant essays Malaparte proceeded by what one might call the approach of “comparative history.” First one coup is analyzed, then another, and so on. Luttwak’s book relies on a multitude of instances culled from contemporary history; but these are to provide illustrations and elaborations. His method is almost “geometrical,” in the sense that he lays down a set of basic requirements and then proceeds rigorously to deduce from these their logical entailment in insurrectionary practice. But a more apt adjective than “geometrical” is “military.” The approach is that of the Operation Order: first comes the situation report, then one’s resources, then the task, and finally the “method”—the orders to the troops. One of the more remarkable features of this book is the extraordinary constructive imagination by which the author has been able to cast himself in the role of coup leader and cold-bloodedly to analyze what he is up against and what precise steps he has to take.

Let me comment briefly on two or three of the more striking points in this original and rewarding work.

The first is the nature of the coup d’état itself. It stands in contrast to revolution or the now fashionable doctrines of “people’s war” on which so much paper and ink is being lavished. The coup is not an assault from the outside: it is (I quote) “a seizure of power within the present system.” By the same token, unlike revolution or people’s war it is politically *neutral*: what policy emerges out of it—and it can be left-wing as well as right-wing—is a matter for the post-coup government. The coup itself simply aims at substituting one ruling group for another. And thirdly,

its technique, unlike revolution, is not to confront, overwhelm, and smash down, by superior weight of power. On the contrary, it is the technique of judo in which the adversary's own advantages in weight and balance are turned into weapons against him. "The coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus which is then used to displace the government from control of the remainder." In just this way can a slight but artful use of leverage displace a vast boulder from its point of balance and turn its own mass against it to send it crashing down the hillside.

And so, whenever the coup is successful, it looks extremely easy. A hundred and fifty infantrymen in Gabon or in Togo overthrow the government; in Ghana, after all the pomp, panoply, and propaganda of the Nkrumah single-party regime, a mere five hundred troops out of an army of some ten thousand suffices to overthrow the government with hardly a shot fired. Or again, in Korea a General Park at the head of merely 3,500 men out of an army of 600,000 overturns the government and establishes himself in its place. The coup, in short, looks a pushover. It is not anything of the kind. The political calculations, the technical timetable have to be appraised to a nicety. A ten-minute hitch in the appearance of war planes, unexpected fog that prevented seaborne landings, and the failure of the political arrangements sufficed to turn the anti-Peron coup of June 1955 into a fiasco. Similar mishaps turned the traditional Spanish *cuartelazo* of 1936 into a horrible botch which provoked, as its consequence, one of history's more bloody and merciless civil wars. The simplicity of the bloodless coup with which the newspapers make us so familiar is not necessarily due to the feebleness or incompetence of the government, but to the skill of the plotters. For, as Luttwak rightly says, if overthrowing a government seems easy, that is because the crucial achieve-

ment passes unnoticed—"the dangerous and elaborate process by which the armed forces and other means of coercion are neutralized and the political forces temporarily forced into passivity."

But no matter how polished the technical preparations, the coup will not succeed everywhere; for there is bad coup-country as well as good. In specifying the conditions which make for a good target country, Luttwak adds significantly to our understanding of the Third World. Three conditions must be fulfilled for the coup-country to be favorable terrain. The first is that the social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to a small fraction of the population. (This is stated as an absolute condition, but I am not sure that it is as unqualified as this. Where the political forces in a developed country are well organized but polarized into bitterly hostile factions, there also is favorable terrain for a coup, and indeed it was with these situations that Malaparte was primarily concerned.) The second condition is that the target country must be politically independent in fact as well as in law, since the presence of alien forces on its soil—or the possibility of an airlift of alien forces to support the threatened government—will smother the coup; as indeed they did in Gabon, for instance. The third condition is that the target state must have a "political center." If it has many important regional centers, the "stroke of state" will strike the wind: the ill success of the Nigerian coup and counter-coup, the unlikelihood of a standard-type coup in India afford examples.

The heart of this book concerns itself with the technical preparations for and the execution of the coup. They will surprise by their penetration into the shadowy and ill-understood confines of the security and intelligence forces of the modern state, and by the same token show what formidable handicaps the coup leader has to reckon with

and surmount. It would be otiose even to try to summarize them here; but two reflections may be put forward.

The first is that these chapters provide us with a quite novel viewpoint on the new states, and new criteria by which to appraise them. Our usual way of approaching these states is to explain why they work in the way they do: which is to say we note the supports for the government, its popular appeal, its bureaucratic arrangements, its "capabilities." Yet, these states are proving extraordinarily fragile. This book provokes the question "How ripe is such and such a state for a coup?"—and this demands an appraisal of the state in terms of its weaknesses. It compels consideration of factors with which the student of politics has not hitherto much concerned himself: not merely the sociopolitical "preconditions" for the success of a coup, but the balance, the structure, and the capabilities of the political movements and the security forces inside that state. By turning the question from "What makes this state tick?" to the question "What factors make it likely that this government will be overturned by a coup?" new light will be shed on the new states of Africa and Asia, as well as on the new/old ones of Latin America.

My second reflection relates to a question that, I feel sure, thousands will ask (as they asked about Malaparte's book in his time): Is not this book so potentially subversive and dangerous, will it not provoke so many to attempt hitherto unconsidered coups, that it should never have been written? Luttwak's reply (am I permitted to take it with a pinch of salt?) is that he is simply "democratizing" the coup. This is democratization, however, in the sense that Tacitus used the word *evulgata*—to spread it around among the throng. Now the point that most strikes me in his catalogue of all that has to be done to organize a coup is the enormous premium this puts upon *insiders*: on those who know, even roughly, the layout of the security and in-

telligence forces of the state. How would the outsider, the common man, acquire the requisite knowledge of this layout? How is he likely to have personal contacts with it? Contrary to Luttwak (it is the only point on which I disagree with him), I think the impact of his book is likely to be this: it will not teach "old coup hands," i.e. the plotters and the insiders, a great deal they do not intuitively know, though it may provide them with a few wrinkles, but may very well suggest to the defenders of the government still more ways in which they can anticipate coups which deploy along the lines he describes. This book is as much a matter for the prevention of the coup as for initiating one.

But on the moral issue—if there is one at all—there seems very little to be said. The presses have been printing any number of books glorifying popular insurrection (Mao, Nasution, Giap, Fanon, Guevara, Régis Debray) and even larger numbers of books on counterinsurgency and anti-guerrilla operations. The coup is far more widespread than such popular upheavals and it would be simply ridiculous, not a question of morality, to take exception to this book on how to execute one.

I am delighted that this book has been written, delighted that it is being published. I feel honored to have been asked to introduce it.

S. E. FINER
June 19, 1968



acknowledgments

To Oliver Caldecott of Penguin Books for much helpful advice and encouragement throughout the writing stage.

To Tony Mott of Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, for patience and devotion at the production stage.

To Julia Hardy and Caroline Brenner of Penguin Books, for extracurricular typing and research.

To G. Anketell, E. Horesh, M. Farmer, M. Howells, W. J. Reeve, and V. Jucher for help and information.

To my dear friends G. and H. Elliott, W. and J. McClure, R. Perle, M. Kerin, and C. Roffe for all the advice and support they have given me.



contents

1/ WHAT IS THE COUP D'ÉTAT?	3
2/ WHEN IS A COUP D'ÉTAT POSSIBLE?	13
3/ THE STRATEGY OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT	47
4/ THE PLANNING OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT	102
5/ THE EXECUTION OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT	149
APPENDIX A. THE ECONOMICS OF REPRESSION	183
APPENDIX B. TACTICAL ASPECTS OF THE COUP D'ÉTAT	192
APPENDIX C. STATISTICS	200



figures

1/ Alternative forms of government. Party government in "socialist" countries and "Peoples' Republics" (Communist countries)	113
2/ The formal government and the real one	115
3/ Telecommunication facilities available to government (notional)	121
4/ The physical targets of the coup	123
5/ Physical targets in coastal city	126
6/ Operational sequence and timing	155
7/ Intelligence "noise" and analysis	158
8/ Lead time required by teams to reach their target by zero hour	160
9/ Simultaneous penetration of the defensive system and team warning time	162
10/ Political survival limit on taxation	188
11/ The Duvalier formula	189
12/ "Sophisticated" seizure of major defended targets	195
13/ General structure of blocking position	198



tables

1/ Formal structures and real chains of command	59
2/ Country X: potential forces of intervention	63
3/ Optimum infiltration strategy	67
4/ The role of ethnic minorities in Syrian politics	71
5/ Class of 19— at military academy of country X: present career position	74
6/ The Aref brothers in Iraq, 1958-68: a study in loyalty	76
7/ Battalion No. 1: recruitment prospects	78
8/ Infiltration of the armed forces in Portugal (notional)	84
9/ Infiltration of the armed forces in West Germany (notional)	84
10/ The groups which would influence the formation of American policy on Middle Eastern questions	106
11/ Alternative forms of government	111
12/ Mass communications in the Middle East and North Africa, mid-1967	116
13/ Police telecommunications facilities in Ghana	120
14/ The mechanics of intervention of the loyalist forces	153
15/ The first communiqué: a choice of styles	174

16/ National accounts data, country X	186
17/ National accounts data, country X (after propaganda and police expenditure)	187
18/ National accounts data, country X (funds available for development)	187
19/ Eve of the coup: forces of the state fully subverted (notional)	193

STATISTICS

I. Economic development and the coup d'état, 1946-67	200
II. Basic list of coups and attempted coups, 1945-64	204
III. The efficiency of the coup d'état	208
IV. The frequency of the coup d'état	209

COUP D'ÉTAT



1 / **What Is the Coup d'État?**

*I shall be sorry to commence the era of peace by a
coup d'état such as that I had in contemplation.*

—Duke of Wellington, 1811

*. . . no other way of salvation remained except
for the army's intervention . . .*

—Constantine Kollias, April 21, 1967, Athens

THOUGH THE TERM “coup d'état” has been used for more than three hundred years, the feasibility of the coup derives from a comparatively recent development: the rise of the modern state with its professional bureaucracy and standing armed forces. The power of the modern state largely depends on this permanent machinery which, with its archives, files, records, and officials, can follow intimately and, if it so desires, control the activities of lesser organizations and individuals. “Totalitarian” states merely use more fully the detailed and comprehensive information which is available to most states, however “democratic”: the instrument is largely the same though it is used differently.

The growth of the modern bureaucracy has two implications which are crucial to the feasibility of the coup: the development of a clear distinction between the permanent machinery of state and the political leadership, and the fact that, like most large organizations, the bureaucracy has a structured hierarchy with definite chains of com-

mand. The distinction between the bureaucrat as an employee of the state and as a personal servant of the ruler is a new one, and both the British and the American systems show residual features of the earlier structure.¹

The importance of this development lies in the fact that if the bureaucrats are linked to the leadership, an illegal seizure of power must take the form of a "palace revolution" and is essentially concerned with the manipulation of the body of the ruler. He can be forced to accept new policies or advisers, he can be killed or held captive, but whatever happens the palace revolution can only be conducted from the "inside," and by "insiders." The "insiders" can be the palace guard, as in ancient Rome, or the Ethiopia of the 1960's, and in a dynastic system they would seek to replace an unwanted ruler with a more malleable son.

The coup is a much more democratic affair. It can be conducted from the "outside" and it operates in that area outside the government but within the state which is formed by the permanent and professional civil service, the armed forces, and police. The aim is to detach the permanent employees of the state from the political leadership, and this cannot usually take place if the two are linked by political, ethnic, or traditional loyalties.

Both imperial China and present-day African states used ethnic bonds in the organization of their senior bureaucracy. The Manchu dynasty was careful to follow native Chinese customs and to employ "Han" Chinese in the civil service at all levels, but the crucial posts in the magistracy and the army were filled by the descendants

¹ In Britain there is the constitutional fiction that civil servants—as their name implies—are the servants of the Crown. In the U.S.A., while the days when party hacks moved on to Washington after an election victory are long passed, some civil-service jobs are still given to political associates, rather than to professionals.

of those who entered China with the founders of the dynasty. Similarly, African rulers usually appoint members of their own tribes to the strategic posts in the security services.

When a party machine controls civil-service appointments, either as part of a general "totalitarian" control, or because of a very long period in office (as in postwar Italy), political associates are appointed to the senior levels of the bureaucracy, partly in order to protect the regime and partly to ensure the sympathetic execution of policies. Thus "party men" hold the key jobs in the police and security services of France and Italy, just as in the Communist countries all senior jobs are held by party *apparatchiks*.

Saudi Arabia provides an instance of "traditional bonds."² In this case the lack of modern "know-how" on the part of the traditional tribal affiliates of the royal house has meant that what could not be done individually has been done organizationally. Alongside the modern army staffed by unreliable city-dwellers, there is the "White Army" of the Wahabi bedouin followers of the Saudis.

These examples of the possible bonds between the political leadership are not typical of the modern state. Apart from the cases noted above, the civil service and the leadership and the bureaucracy of the modern state may still be linked by class or ethnic affiliations, but whatever the nature of the bonds, such groupings will usually be large enough to be infiltrated by the planners of the coup.

As a direct consequence of the sheer size of the bureaucracy, and in order to achieve even a minimum of efficiency, the state bureaucracy has to divide its work into

² The bonds are religious in origin since the Saudi royal house is the traditional promoter of the Wahabi interpretation of Islam.

clear-cut areas of competence, which are assigned to different departments. Within each department there must be an accepted chain of command, and standard procedures have to be followed. Thus a given piece of information, or a given order, is followed up in a stereotyped manner, and if the order comes from the appropriate source, at the appropriate level, it is carried out.

In the more critical parts of the state apparatus, the armed forces, the police, and the security services, all these characteristics are intensified, with an even greater degree of discipline and rigidity. The apparatus of the state is therefore to some extent a "machine" which will normally behave in a fairly predictable and automatic manner.

A coup operates by taking advantage of this machine-like behavior: during the coup because it uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers; afterward because the value of the "levers" depends on the fact that the state is a machine.

We will see that some states are so well organized that the "machine" is sufficiently sophisticated to exercise discretion, according to a given conception of what is "proper" and what is not, in the orders that it executes. This is the case in some developed countries, and in such circumstances a coup is very difficult to carry out.

In a few states the bureaucracy is so small that the apparatus is too simple and too intimately linked with the leadership to be suitable for a coup, as perhaps in the ex-British Protectorates in southern Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Fortunately, most states are between these two extremes, the machine being both large and unsophisticated and thus highly vulnerable to those who can identify and seize the right "levers."

One of the most striking developments of the last century has been the great decline in general political stability. Since the French Revolution governments have

been overthrown at an increasing pace.³ In the nineteenth century the French experienced two revolutions and two regimes collapsed following military defeat. In 1958 the change of regime was a sophisticated blend of both these elements. Peoples everywhere have followed the French example, and the life span of regimes has tended to decrease, while the life span of their subjects has increased. This contrasts sharply with the relative attachment to the system of constitutional monarchy which was displayed in the nineteenth century: when Greeks, Bulgars, and Rumanians secured their freedom from the Turkish colonial system they immediately went over to Germany in order to shop around for a suitable royal family.

Crowns, flags, and decorations were designed and purchased from reputable (English) suppliers; royal palaces were built; and where possible, hunting lodges, royal mistresses, and a local aristocracy were provided as fringe benefits. Twentieth-century peoples have, on the other hand, shown a marked lack of interest in monarchies and their paraphernalia; when the British kindly provided them with a proper royal family the Iraqis made numerous efforts to get rid of it, before finally succeeding in 1958. Military and other right-wing forces have meanwhile tried to keep up with popular movements and have used their illegal methods in order to seize power and overthrow regimes.

Why have regimes in the twentieth century proved so fragile? It is, after all, paradoxical that this fragility has increased while the established procedures for securing changes in government have on the whole become more flexible. The political scientist will reply that though the procedures have become more flexible, pressures for change

³ Historically speaking, the trend was initiated by the American Revolution; its impact on the world at large was, however, attenuated by America's distance and exotic nature.

have also become stronger, and that the rate of increase in flexibility has not kept up with the growth of social and economic pressures.⁴

Violent methods are generally used when legal methods of securing a governmental change are useless because they are either too rigid—as in the case of ruling monarchies where the ruler actually controls policy formation—or not rigid enough. It was once remarked, for example, that the throne of Russia was, until the seventeenth century, neither hereditary nor elective but “occupative.” The long series of abdications forced by the great Boyar-landlords and by the “Archers” of the Guard had weakened the hereditary principle, so that whoever took the throne became Czar and precedence by birth counted for little.

Some contemporary republics have ended in this position, which comes about when a long series of illegal seizures of power leads to a decay of the legal and political structures which are needed to produce new governments. Thus postwar Syria has had more than a dozen coups, and the provisions for open general elections, written in the “Hourani” constitution, could not now be applied because the necessary supervisory machinery no longer functions. Assuming, however, that there is an established procedure for changing the leadership, then all methods other than this come within the range of illegality. What we call them⁵ depends on what side we are on, but, skipping some of the semantics, we have the following:

⁴ Perhaps the ultimate source of destabilizing pressures has been the spectacular progress of scientific discovery and the resultant technological change. This is, however, a problem far beyond the scope of this book.

⁵ The equation “insurgency = terrorism = war of national liberation” is particularly familiar.

REVOLUTION

The action is conducted, initially at any rate, by uncoordinated popular masses, and it aims⁶ at changing the social and political structures, as well as the actual personalities in the leadership.

The term has gained a certain popularity, and many coups are graced with it, because of the implication that it was "the people" rather than a few plotters who did the whole thing. Thus the obscure aims which Kassem had in mind when he overthrew the Faisal-Nuri-es-Said regime in Iraq are locally known as the "sacred principles of the July 14th Revolution."

CIVIL WAR

Civil war is actual warfare between elements of the national armed forces leading to the displacement of a government.

This term is unfashionable, and if you are Spanish and pro-Franco you call the events of 1936-9 *la cruzada*—the crusade. If you are not pro-Franco, but you may be overheard, you just call them "the events of . . ."

PRONUNCIAMIENTO

This is an essentially Spanish and South American version of the military coup d'état, but many recent African coups have also taken this particular form. In its original nineteenth-century Spanish version this was a highly ritualized process: first came the *trabajos* (literally the "works") in

⁶ In the initial stages no aims are conceptualized but the scope of the action may be clearly perceived.

which the opinions of army officers were sounded. The next step was the *compromisos*, in which commitments were made and rewards promised; then came the call for action, and, finally, the appeal to the troops to follow their officers in rebellion against the government.

The pronunciamiento was often a liberal rather than a reactionary phenomenon and the theoretical purpose of the takeover was to ascertain the "national will"—a typically liberal concept. Later, as the army became increasingly right-wing while Spanish governments became less so, the theory shifted from the neo-liberal "national will" to the neo-conservative "real will" theory. This postulates the existence of a national essence, a sort of permanent spiritual structure, which the wishes of the majority may not always express. The army was entrusted with the interpretation and preservation of this "essential Spain" and to protect it against the government and, if need be, against the people.⁷

The pronunciamiento was organized and led by a particular army leader, but it was carried out in the name of the entire officer corps; unlike the putsch, which is carried out by a faction within the army, or the coup, which can be carried out by civilians *using* some army units, the pronunciamiento leads to a takeover by the army as a whole. Many African takeovers, in which the army has participated as a whole, were therefore very similar to the classic pronunciamiento.

PUTSCH

Essentially a wartime or immediately postwar phenomenon, a putsch is attempted by a formal body within the armed forces under its appointed leadership. The Kornilov putsch is a clear example: Kornilov, a general in charge of an

⁷ Various versions of this theory became popular in parts of the French armed forces during the 1950's and early 1960's.

army group in north Russia, attempted to seize Leningrad, in order to establish a "fighting" regime which would prosecute the war. (Had he succeeded, the city would perhaps bear his name instead of Lenin's.)

LIBERATION

A state may be said (by supporters of the change) to be "liberated" when its government is overthrown by foreign military or diplomatic intervention. A classic case of this was the installation of the Communist leadership in Rumania in 1947. The U.S.S.R. forced the then King Michael to accept a new cabinet by threatening to use the Soviet army in the country in the event of a refusal.

WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, INSURGENCY, ETC.

In this form of internal conflict the aim of the initiating party is not to seize power within the state, but rather to set up a rival state structure. This can be politically or ethnically based.

The Viet Cong in South Vietnam aim at setting up a new social structure and, incidentally, a new state. The Kurds in Iraq, the Somalis in Kenya, the Karens in Burma, and the Nagas in India want to withdraw their areas from the state concerned.

THE DEFINITION OF THE COUP

A coup d'état involves some elements of all these different methods by which power can be seized, but, unlike most of

them, the coup is not necessarily assisted by either the intervention of the masses, or, to any significant degree, by military-type force.

The assistance of these forms of direct force would no doubt make it easier to seize power, but it would be unrealistic to think that they would be available to the organizers of a coup. Because we will not be in charge of the armed forces we cannot hope to start the planning of a coup with sizable military units already under our control, nor will the pre-coup government usually allow us to carry out the propaganda and organization necessary to make effective use of the "broad masses of the people."

A second distinguishing feature of a coup is that it does not imply any particular political orientation. Revolutions are usually "leftist" while the putsch and the pronunciamiento are usually initiated by right-wing forces. A coup, however, is politically neutral, and there is no presumption that any particular policies will be followed after the seizure of power. It is true that many coups have been of a decidedly right-wing character, but there is nothing inevitable about this.⁸

If a coup does not make use of the masses, or of warfare, what instrument of power will enable it to seize control of the state? The short answer is that the power will come from the state itself. The long answer makes up the bulk of this book. The following is our formal and functional definition:

A coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder.

⁸ The Greek coup has reinforced this image of the "reactionary coup," but the Syrian coup of 1966, the Iraqi of 1958, and the Yemeni of 1962 were all essentially leftist, if hardly liberal or progressive.

2 /

When Is a Coup d'État Possible?

The Bolsheviks have no right to wait for the Congress of Soviets. . . . They must take power immediately. . . . Victory is assured and there are nine chances out of ten that it will be bloodless. . . . To wait is a crime against the revolution.

—Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov Lenin, October 1917

SINCE 1945, the process of decolonization has more than doubled the number of independent states, so that the opportunities open to us have expanded in a most gratifying manner. We have to recognize, however, that not all states make good targets for our attentions. There is nothing to prevent us from carrying out a coup in, say, Britain, but we would probably be unable to stay in power for more than a short time. The public and the bureaucracy have a basic understanding of the nature and legal basis of government, and they would react in order to restore a legitimate leadership.

This reaction renders any initial success of the coup meaningless, and it would arise even though the pre-coup government may have been unpopular and the “new faces” might be attractive. The reaction would arise from the fact that a significant part of the population takes an active interest in political life, and participates in it. This implies a recognition that the power of the govern-

ment derives from its legitimate origin, and even those who have no reason to support the old guard have many good reasons to support the principle of legitimacy.

We are all familiar with the periodic surveys which "show" that, say, 20 per cent of the sample failed to name correctly the Prime Minister, and we know that a large part of the population has only the vaguest contact with politics. Nevertheless in most developed countries those who *do* take an active interest in politics form in absolute terms a very large group. Controversial policy decisions stimulate and bring to the surface this participation: pressure groups are formed, letters are sent to the press and the politicians, petitions and demonstrations are organized, and this adds up to a continuing dialogue between the rulers and the ruled.

This dialogue does not depend necessarily on the existence of a formally democratic political system. Even in one-party states, where power is in the hands of a few self-appointed leaders, a muted but nevertheless active dialogue can take place. The higher organizations of the party can discuss policy decisions, and in times of relative relaxation the discussions extend to the larger numbers in the lower echelons, and to publications reflecting different "currents"—though only within the wider framework of the accepted ideology and the broad policy decisions of the leadership. The value of the dialogue that takes place in nondemocratic states varies very greatly. In Yugoslavia,¹ for example, the Communist Party has become a forum for increasingly free and wide-ranging debates on major political issues; the press and the parliament, though unable to assert their opinions in the manner of their American or British counterparts, have also participated in the "opening" of the system. Policy decisions are no longer merely applauded

¹ And of late in Czechoslovakia.

but are actually examined, criticized, and sometimes even opposed.

It may well be that this particular one-party state is no longer good coup territory. When people have learned to scrutinize and question orders they will probably refuse merely to *accept* the orders of the coup, any more than they accept the orders of the government without ascertaining their legitimacy and desirability.

In Egypt, on the other hand, the single party, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), is still a mere rubber stamp. Policy decisions are made by Abdel Nasser² and his associates; they are then carried out by the bureaucracy, and the ASU can only cheer them along. When the question came up of whether the ASU-dominated National Assembly would accept Nasser's withdrawal of his "resignation," following the June 1967 débâcle, an observer pointed out that the Assembly "will jolly well do what it is told." Many one-party states are in this position.

The dialogue between the rulers and the ruled can only take place if there is a large enough section of society which is sufficiently literate, well fed, and secure to "talk back." Even then certain conditions can lead to a deterioration of the relationship, and this can sometimes generate sufficient apathy and distrust of the regime to make a coup possible.

The events of 1958 in France were in some respects similar to a coup. Twenty years of warfare, which had included the defeat of 1940, the Occupation, and, from 1946, the long and losing colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria, had undermined the political structure. The continual changes of government had lost for the regime the interest and respect of most Frenchmen and left the bu-

² Abdel Nasser = Servant of the Giver of Victory. "Nasser" or "Nasir" means "Victory," and this is rather inappropriate.

reaucracy leaderless since the complex business of the ministries could not be mastered by ministers who were only in power for brief periods. The military were left to fight the bitter Algerian war with little guidance from the Paris authorities, because more often than not, the ministries were too busy fighting for their survival in the Assembly to worry about the other, bloodier, war.

The cost of the war, in both money and lives, antagonized the general public from both the army and the government, and many Frenchmen felt a growing fear and distrust of this army, whose sentiments and ideology were so alien to them—and to the spirit of the times.

While the structures of political life under the Fourth Republic were falling apart, De Gaulle, in simulated retirement, gradually emerged as the only alternative to the chaos that threatened. When the army in Algeria appeared to be on the verge of really drastic action—far beyond the earlier street theatricals of Algiers—and yet another government was on the verge of collapse, De Gaulle was recalled.

He was able to impose his own terms. When on May 29, 1958, Coty, the last President of the Fourth Republic, called on him to form a government (which was invested on June 1), De Gaulle was given powers to rule by decree for six months and to write a new constitution. Under the terms of this constitution, presented for consultation in mid-August and approved by referendum in September, elections were held in which De Gaulle's newly formed UNR party won a majority. On December 21, De Gaulle became the first President of the Fifth Republic—an American-style President with wide executive powers, but without an American-style Congress to restrain them.

The France of 1958 had become politically inert and therefore ripe for a coup. The political structures of most developed countries, however, are too resilient to make

them suitable targets, unless certain "temporary" factors weaken the system and obscure its basic soundness. Of those temporary factors the most common are: (a) severe and prolonged economic crisis, with large-scale unemployment or runaway inflation; (b) a long and unsuccessful war or a major defeat, military or diplomatic; (c) chronic instability under a multi-party system.

Italy is an interesting example of an economically developed, socially dynamic, but politically fragile country. Until the formation of the relatively stable coalition which has since collapsed between the Democrazia Cristiana (DC) and the Socialists, the DC—though the largest single party—could only rule by allying itself with some of the many small parties of the center, as it rarely polled more than a simple majority.

Coalition governments are always difficult to form, and in Italy the problem became so complex that it resembled a particularly intricate puzzle. If you had been called to form a government you would have been facing a set of mutually exclusive propositions:

The DC is the single largest group in Parliament but, having only 30 per cent of the votes, it cannot rule alone. If the two small left-of-center parties (the Social Democrats and the Republicans) are brought in, the right wing breaks away and the government falls. If the right-of-center parties (the Monarchists and the Liberals) are brought in, the left wing breaks away and the government falls. If the large far-right-wing party (the Neo-Fascists) is brought in, all the left-wing groups will vote against the government. If . . .

So the ruling party has stayed in power since 1948 without a break, but has been unable at the same time to reform the swollen and inefficient bureaucracy. Everybody wanted reform, except that the right wing resisted changes in the structure of local government and the police,

while the left opposed any checks on the fantastic activities of the State Corporation.³ Meanwhile the parties out of power concentrated their efforts on trying to break the coalition rather than on scrutinizing governmental policy, so that abuses and inefficiency were unchecked.

Italians gradually lost interest in the goings-on in Rome, and had there been an Italian De Gaulle the Republic would no doubt have collapsed. (Even without a suitable man a coup almost took place.)

THE PRECONDITIONS OF THE COUP

The France of 1958 and, to a lesser extent, the Italy of 1964 were both countries where the dialogue between government and people had broken down. But in many—indeed most—countries of the world the dialogue cannot take place at all, regardless of the temporary circumstances.

If we draw up a list of those countries which have recently experienced coups, we shall see that though their ethnic and historical backgrounds differ very considerably, they share certain social and economic characteristics. If we isolate these we can develop a set of indicators which, when applied to the basic socio-economic data of a country, will show whether it will make a good target for a coup.

ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS

In countries without a developed economy and the associated prosperity, the general condition of the population

³ The activities of Enrico Mattei, the head of the National Hydrocarbon Corporation (ENI), have been described in almost Bondian terms in a number of books; he built up an industrial empire, battled the international oil industry, interfered in Italian politics, forced foreign policy changes, and died in unexplained circumstances.

is characterized by disease, illiteracy, high birth and death rates, and periodic hunger.

The average man in this state of deprivation is virtually cut off from the wider society outside his village and clan. He has little that he can sell. He has little with which to buy. He cannot read the forms, signposts, and newspapers through which society speaks to him. He cannot write, nor can he afford to travel, so that a cousin living as a city-dweller might as well be on the moon. He has no way of knowing whether a particular tax is legal, or merely the exaction of the village bureaucrat; no way of knowing about the social and economic realities that condition the policies that he is asked to applaud. His only source of contact with the outside world is the governmental radio—and he knows from past experience that it does not always tell the truth.

The complexity of the outside world and the mistrust that it inspires are such that the defenseless and insecure villager retreats into the safe and well-known world of the clan, the tribe, or the family. He knows that the traditional chiefs of tribe and clan prey on his very limited wealth, he often knows that their mutual interests are diametrically opposed, but nevertheless they represent a source of guidance and security that the state is too remote, and too mysterious, to be.

The city-dweller has escaped the crushing embrace of traditional society, but not the effects of ignorance and insecurity. In these conditions the mass of the people are politically passive and their relationship with the leadership is one-way only. The leadership speaks to them, lectures them, rouses hopes or fears, but never listens; the bureaucracy taxes them, bullies them, takes their sons away for the army, their labor for the roads, but gives very little in return. At best, in honest regimes, a dam or a steel mill is being built somewhere, far away from their village. These

projects will not bring them any direct benefit, will not lift them from their misery, but at least they are a consolation, a hope of a better future for their sons. Elsewhere the poor are even denied the consolation of hope: their taxes have been spent on palaces, tanks, planes, and all the bizarre things that politicians and their wives need. The urban poor, living by expedients, barely surviving in the day-to-day struggle for the necessities of life, are treated to the spectacle of the cocktail parties, limousines, and grandiose villas of the ruling élite.⁴

The mass of the people are politically passive, but it is the passivity of enforced silence, not inertia. All the time the terrible anger caused by deprivation and injustice is there, and at times it explodes. The mob may not have a clear political purpose, but its actions do have political consequences.

The 1952 coup in Egypt, which led to the end of King Farouk's "white telephone" monarchy and to the rise of what eventually became Abdel Nasser's regime, was preceded by one of these sudden explosions. January 26, 1952 ("Black Saturday"), was the appointed date of an organized demonstration against the presence and activities of the British forces in the Canal Zone. The poor of the city streamed out from their hovels and joined the procession, among them the agitators of the Muslim Brotherhood,⁵ who incited the crowd to arson and violence.

The agitators succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. The poor seized the opportunity and destroyed the facili-

⁴ Even then some of them retain their sense of humor; in some African languages a new word has been coined from the Wa- prefix which indicates a tribe, and where before there were only Wa-Kamba and Wa-Zungu now a new tribe has appeared: the Wa-Benz and the Wa-Rolls-Royce.

⁵ As in all Middle Eastern episodes, the affiliations of the agitators are not certain. It has been said that the palace organized the whole thing.

ties of the rich: hotels, department stores, the Turf Club, the liquor stores and fashion shops in the center of the city, which was given the appearance of a battlefield in one short day; only the wealthy suffered, as these were places that had always been closed to the poor. The middle-class organizers of the original demonstration had no wish to destroy their own favorite gathering places; the nationalists did not want to deprive Egypt of the 12,000 dwellings and 500 businesses that were destroyed. They spoke of anarchy, intrigue, and madness. For the poor, however, it was a general election: the voteless poor had voted with fire.

Apart from the violent and inarticulate action of the mob in response to some simple and dramatic issue, there is no arguing with the power of the state; there is no interest in, and scrutiny of, the day-to-day activities of government and bureaucracy. Thus if the bureaucracy issues orders they are either obeyed or evaded, but never challenged or examined.

All power, all participation, is in the hands of the small educated élite. This élite is literate, educated, well fed and secure, and therefore radically different from the vast majority of their countrymen, practically a race apart. The masses recognize this and they also accept the élite's monopoly of power, and unless some unbearable exaction leads to desperate revolt they will accept its policies. *Equally they will accept a change in government, whether legal or otherwise.* After all, it is merely another lot of "them" taking over.

Thus, after a coup, the village policeman comes to read out a proclamation, the radio says that the old government was corrupt and that the new one will provide food, health, schooling—and sometimes even glory. The majority of the people will neither believe nor disbelieve these promises or

accusations, but merely feel that it is all happening somewhere else, far away. This lack of reaction⁶ is all the coup needs on the part of the people in order to stay in power.

The lower levels of the bureaucracy will react—or rather fail to react—in a similar manner, and for similar reasons. Their own lack of political sophistication will mean that the policies and legitimacy of the old government were much less important to them than their immediate superiors. The “bosses” give the orders, can promote or demote, and, above all, are the source of that power and prestige that make them village demigods. After the coup, the man who sits at district headquarters will still be obeyed—whether he is the man who was there before or not—so long as he can pay the salaries and has links to the political stratosphere in the capital city.

For the senior bureaucrats, army and police officers, the coup will be a mixture of dangers and opportunities. Some will be too compromised with the old regime merely to ride out the crisis and they will either flee, fight the coup, or step forward as supporters of the new regime in order to gain the rewards of early loyalty. The course of action followed by this group will depend on their individual assessments of the balance of forces on the two sides. But for the greater number of those who are not too deeply committed, the coup will offer opportunities rather than dangers. They can accept the coup and, being collectively indispensable, can negotiate for even better salaries and positions; they can create or join a focus of opposition; or, as in Nigeria in 1966, can take advantage of the tem-

⁶ The crowds that demonstrated in Cairo to dissuade Nasser from resigning on June 10, 1967, gave impressive proof of his popularity. This was not, however, an *independent* reaction: peasants from the Delta had been trucked by the thousand to “stimulate” the demonstration, which was widely publicized by the state broadcasting service.

porary state of instability and stage a counter-coup and seize power on their own account.

Much of the planning and execution of a coup will be directed at influencing the decision of the élite in a favorable manner. Nevertheless, if, in an underdeveloped environment, they choose to oppose the coup, they will have to do so in terms of political rivalry. They would not be able to appeal to some general principle of legality as in politically sophisticated countries, because no such principle is generally accepted. So instead of operating for the sake of legitimacy, they would be fighting the planners of the coup as straight political opponents and therefore on the same plane. This would have the effect of bringing over to the coup *their* political or ethnic opponents. In any case, fighting the coup would mean facing organized forces with improvised ones, and in conditions of isolation from the masses, who, as we have seen, will almost always be neutral.⁷

As the coup will not usually represent a threat to most of the élite, the choice is between the great dangers of opposition and the safety of inaction. All that is required in order to support the coup is, simply, to do nothing—and this is what will usually be done.

Thus, at all levels, the most likely course of action following a coup is acceptance: by the masses and the lower bureaucracy because their interests are not tied with either side; by the upper levels of the bureaucracy because of the great dangers of any opposition conducted in isolation.

⁷ Many observers have commented on the lack of popular support for fallen political idols, as in the case of Nkrumah's overthrow when the Accra citizenry seemed as happy to cheer his enemies as they had been to cheer him a short while before the coup. This is not inanity, but highly rational behavior in the light of social and economic circumstances.

This lack of reaction is the key to the victory of the coup, and it contrasts with the spontaneous reaction that would take place in politically sophisticated societies.

In totalitarian states the midnight arrests, the control over all associations (however nonpolitical), are all part of the general tactic of insulating the individual who seeks to oppose the regime. In underdeveloped areas the opposition is isolated from the masses almost automatically by the effect of social conditions.

Our first precondition of a coup is therefore:

The social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to a small fraction of the population.

By participation we do not mean an active and prominent role in national politics, but merely that general understanding of the basis of political life commonly found amongst the masses in economically developed societies. This precondition also implies that, apart from the highest levels, the bureaucracy operates in an unresponsive and mechanistic manner because of its undereducated staff.

More generally the "economic precondition" excludes the possibility of a system of local government—or rather representative local government. It is true that in underdeveloped areas there is often a system of local government, based on traditional chiefs, but of their two possible roles, neither usually functions as a representative one.⁸ They are either individually powerful in their own right, which means in effect that the commoner is subjected to dual control, or else if their power has collapsed they are little more than somewhat old-fashioned civil servants. Neither of these two roles allows the commoner to par-

⁸ There are some tribal groupings in Africa (notably the Kabyles of Algeria) and elsewhere where an almost pure "Greek city" type of democracy exists. But they are exceptions to the rule.

ticipate in the small politics of the village or town in the manner of his Western counterpart.

Thus, in an economically backward environment the diffusion of power, which is characteristic of sophisticated democracies, cannot take place. There is either rigid centralized rule, or, as a transitional phase, a degree of power for individual regions that makes them de facto independent states (as was the case in northern Nigeria before the coup). Everybody knows that it is easier to take something concrete than something vague. Talking loosely, power in the centralized state run by a narrow élite is like a well-guarded treasure; power in a sophisticated democracy is like a free-floating atmosphere—and who can seize that?

The precondition of economic backwardness can be tested against the known facts of the degree of economic development of countries that have had coups in the last ten years or so and there is a clear connection between the two.⁹

This does not necessarily mean that (a) all underdeveloped countries are *ipso facto* vulnerable to a coup, nor (b) that the developed areas are never good coup territory. It does mean, however, that only the intervention of special circumstances will prevent a well-planned coup from succeeding in economically backward countries, while only exceptional circumstances (discussed in Chapter 1) will allow it to succeed in the developed areas.

POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

It is impossible to seize power within a state if the major source of political power is not there to be seized. The 1956 Hungarian revolution, for example, was totally successful and the leaders of the revolution quickly found themselves in control of all the traditional instruments of

⁹ See Appendix C, Table 1.

power: the armed forces, the police, the radio, and the communication facilities. The one thing that could not be seized in the streets of Budapest happened to be the major source of power to the previous regime: the presence of the Soviet Army in and around Hungary.

These armed forces—vastly superior to the Hungarian Army—were a greater source of power to a Kremlin-backed government than any element within the country. The control of the Red Army was in Moscow, thus the revolution would only have succeeded if it had been carried out in Moscow, not Budapest.¹

This dependence of one government on another is a widespread phenomenon; although there are very few colonial states left there are many pseudo-independent ones. In some cases these have less real autonomy than some of the old colonies.

In both East Germany and South Vietnam the armed forces of the greater “ally” are much more powerful than those of the country itself. In both countries the international and the domestic situations are so closely inter-related that the greater “ally” must have effective control over vast areas of domestic policy—even assuming that he had no wish to interfere for other reasons. The rulers of East Germany have always been very careful in ensuring the approval of the Soviet authorities for even the smallest policy changes, and each policy announcement can be traced back to a recent trip to Moscow. Similarly, in Saigon the U.S. embassy is generally recognized as a greater source of power than the presidential palace.

In these conditions a coup can only work with the approval of the greater “ally.” The first coup in Vietnam, which overthrew the unpopular Diem, and the still less

¹ The other cause of the failure of the revolution was, of course, the fact that Moscow's intervention was not stopped by Washington, but, again, the control of U.S. policy cannot be seized in Budapest.

popular Ngo family, was carried out by men who appreciated these realities of power. When the events in Hue of May 8, 1963, resulted in a break between Diem and the Buddhists, the long-suffering generals decided to act: they "sounded out" the opinion of the U.S. embassy in Saigon, and asked through an intermediary whether the Americans would report to Diem "possible consultations on eventual changes in the prevailing political structures." When, after some considerable debate between the CIA, the embassy, the Presidency, and the Pentagon, the U.S. authorities informed the plotters that they would not be reported to Diem, the following sequence of events took place:

- (a) *May 1963:* Beginning of intensified conflict between Buddhists and Diem.
- (b) *May–September:* Internal American debate on whether the Buddhists are neutralists (to be opposed) or nationalists (to be supported). The final conclusion reached was that "Hinayana Buddhists" were "bad" and "Mahayana² Buddhists" were "good."
- (c) *October 1963:* Standstill of all economic aid to Vietnam, i.e. to Diem's regime.
- (d) *October 22, 1963:* End of direct aid by CIA to Ngo Dinh Nhu's³ "Special Forces." These were the main source of direct power to the

² See *Buddhism* by Christmas Humphries (Hammondsworth: Penguin). For a fuller discussion of Buddhism in South Vietnamese politics see Chapter 4.

³ Diem's brother-in-law and sometime "strong man" of South Vietnam.

regime, entirely financed
and equipped by the CIA.

(e) *November 1, 1963:* Coup. *November 2:* death of
Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu.

The Viet Cong accused the generals and their "front man," Van Minh, of being stooges of the Americans, but in their dealings with the U.S. authorities they were merely being realistic: they saw that whatever power there was to be seized depended on the Americans. Seizing Saigon's fixtures and fittings without U.S. support would have been seizing an empty symbol.

East Germany and South Vietnam are two clear cases of dependence, but there are many more countries which are in the gray area between effective independence and total submission. Ex-colonies provide many of these more subtle cases of dependence, and the presence of the former mother country is very real, and very effective. Instead of large and expensive armies there are military and economic "advisers," there is economic aid and, above all, the tight web of long-established dependence in nonpolitical areas. Thus schooling follows patterns originally established in colonial days, the organization of the professions follows the "metropolitan" system, and this is very important where the ruling élite is composed largely of lawyers, whose whole *raison d'être* is based on the use of a particular procedure and code of law. Trade is often largely tied to the ex-colonial power because of the hold of inherited tastes, habits, and the fact that trade links are often based on established relationships and communications. Thus, five years after independence, it was still necessary for adjacent ex-French and ex-British colonies to route telephone calls through Paris and London, though a direct line would have been 300 instead of 5,000 miles long.

The power of these links between ex-colonies and the

former colonial power varies from case to case. But quite unobtrusive ties can sometimes give sufficient leverage to the latter to prevent or oppose a coup. Thus in 1964 the French reversed an otherwise successful coup in Gabon—without needing to use more than symbolic force. The power of the ex-colonial countries has waned from its peak in most places, but it is still considerable even in sheer military terms. Everybody remembers how a few companies of commandos stopped the mutinies in East Africa. Although the French have opted for a policy of neutrality to new coups in Gabon and elsewhere, should they want to intervene they still retain (1968) 6,000 troops in Africa, with air transport and efficient equipment.⁴ Six thousand does not sound like a large force, but it is huge compared to most armies in the ex-French colonies—the Central African Republic's army, for example, numbers 500 and the average for the whole group is about a battalion (1,000 men) per country.

A very specialized type of dependence is a by-product of modern technology and is found outside the ex-colonial sphere. This is the heavy mortgage placed on political independence by the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, particularly aircraft. The jet fighter is the crucial case: unlike ships and tanks, jet fighters confer an absolute advantage. Better training and morale can overcome the inferiority of equipment on the ground, but not in the air. The best pilots in the world using old-generation subsonic fighters can do very little about faster aircraft. Therefore it is vitally important for any country to match its potential rivals' aircraft. The political problem arises because (a) only a few countries make jet fighters, (b) the planes need a continual flow of spare parts, and (c) there is a long "gestation" period between the original order and

⁴ In fact the post-coup military regimes have tended to be even more pro-French than previous civilian regimes.

the time when training and ancillary equipment are sufficiently developed for operational use.

Thus, if a country wants to acquire jet fighters it has to be reasonably friendly with one of five countries: Sweden, U.S.A., France, Britain, or the U.S.S.R.⁵ Once a deal is made, it will need to stay friendly, otherwise the flow of supplementary equipment will stop. Thus the initial purchase is followed by years of dependence. Jet fighters don't "grow" in economically backward countries where the whole industrial base is lacking, so that the constant updating of electronics, air-to-air missiles, radar equipment, etc., has to be imported—and from the original source to whose aircraft they are related.

Both sides of the bargain recognize this dependence and the supply of sophisticated weaponry is usually allied with general trade and ideological and political links. At what point is the degree of dependence sufficient to affect the feasibility of the coup? Consider the following timetable of relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt from 1955 to 1967:

(a) 1955 "Czech" arms deal. This was the first arms supply contract between the Soviet Union⁶ and any Arab state; it was of great political importance for Egypt because it broke the Western arms monopoly⁷ and signified "true" independence. *Effect*: The commitment of (future) foreign-currency earnings, and the need to keep on friendly terms with the only possible supplier of spare parts.

⁵ Some other countries manufacture or are in the process of developing jet-fighter-type aircraft, including Japan, Italy, Canada, and India. But these suppliers are limited either in terms of designs, specifications, resale freedom, or production capabilities.

⁶ The arms supply contract was Czech in name only. Kermit Roosevelt of the CIA (State Department) was then Nasser's adviser and he suggested that it should be called "Czech" to pacify H. Trevelyan, the British ambassador.

⁷ Or rather, oligopoly.

(b) *1956 Suez/Sinai War.* The Egyptian defeat in the Sinai resulted in the loss of much equipment; this was quickly replaced by the Soviet Union. *Effect:* The commitment to the U.S.S.R. reinforced and financial indebtedness increased.

(c) *1962 Revolution and "civil war" in the Yemen.* After the death of Ahmad ibn Yahya, ruler of the Yemen, the subsequent revolution and civil war involved Egyptian-supported republicans and Saudi-supported royalists; Egyptian troops were sent to back the republicans. *Effect:* Soviet help needed to keep 30,000–50,000 troops in the Yemen. Moral and monetary debt increases.

(d) *1966 Final break with U.S.A.; end of U.S. wheat shipments.* The shortage in food supplies could not be covered by hard-currency purchases in the world market. *Effect:* Soviet food aid started, making Egypt dependent on the U.S.S.R. for a significant part of its supplies.

(e) *1967 June, Six-Day War, Egyptian defeat in the Sinai.* Israeli sources estimated on June 20 that 80 per cent of Egyptian military equipment of all kinds was destroyed or captured. *Effect:* As a condition for the re-equipment of Egyptian forces, the U.S.S.R. required close supervision over army training, the selection of senior military personnel, and the organization of intelligence services.

Thus, after twelve years a limited relationship, designed to free Egypt of its dependence on the West for arms supplies, has escalated to a much greater degree of dependence on the U.S.S.R.: Egypt is now dependent on Soviet good will for arms, wheat, and general economic aid. The Soviet navy has shore facilities in Alexandria and Port Said and there are several hundred Russian advisers and instructors in the Egyptian armed forces. Is this enough to allow the Soviet Union to oppose or reverse a coup?

The Soviet embassy in Cairo could act as a focus of counter-coup activity; it could inspire and deploy the forces

of the many Egyptians committed to the Soviet presence; it could certainly regulate appropriately the flow of aid supplies. Even after a coup, the U.S.S.R. could bring about a collapse of the new regime simply by cutting off all aid. Should the regime turn to the U.S.A. for help, this will automatically mean that the opponents of the coup will be joined by the anti-American element as well. This would at least severely complicate the position of its planners, and in present circumstances it would almost certainly lead to their defeat.

When countries are in such a position of direct and material dependence, the coup must be integrated with some immediate post-coup foreign policy planning; if the political inspiration of the coup is opposed to the greater power, then the coup may well fail unless this coloration can be concealed. The few remaining colonies, largely Spanish and Portuguese, are of course formally in a position of total dependence. There, too, as in South Vietnam and East Germany, no coup can succeed *in situ* but would have to be carried out in Lisbon or Madrid.

The second precondition of the coup is therefore:

The target state must be substantially independent and the influence of foreign powers in its internal political life must be relatively limited.

It is a cliché that countries are interdependent rather than independent; domestic political issues have international implications, while foreign political developments have domestic repercussions. The commercial, cultural, and military ties that link countries give each country a measure of influence in the affairs of the other; even the most powerful nations can be so influenced. Thus, in the period preceding the U.S. intervention in the Second World War, British-influenced and German-influenced political groupings and pressure groups were operating in American do-

mestic politics, just as today the parties in the Middle Eastern conflict exert pressure on the State Department through their respective lobbies.

If even a superpower can be influenced by such weak powers then any definition of independence must be as loose as reality.⁸ Nevertheless some more definite guidelines can be formulated:

(a) A coup is not worth attempting if a Great Power has significant military forces in the country concerned. If these forces are physically remote from the political centers, and/or if the pre-coup regime was moving toward an unfriendly position vis-à-vis the Great Power, the rule does not hold.

(b) The coup must seek the endorsement of the Great Power if large numbers of its nationals are serving as military or civilian "advisers."

The application of these guidelines excludes many otherwise potentially suitable targets: (a) the Spanish, Portuguese, and other colonies; (b) East Germany, Hungary, Outer Mongolia, and perhaps Poland; (c) Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam; and (d) some of the African territories still bound by defense agreements with France or the U.K. subject to the qualifications made above and limited to the smaller countries.

ORGANIC UNITY

In looking at the political consequences of economic backwardness we saw that the crucial element in these was the concentration of all power in the hands of a small élite. Conversely, in sophisticated political units power is diffuse and therefore difficult to seize in a coup.

⁸ In South Korea, for example, the civil disorders and subsequent coup of 1962 do not appear to have been influenced by the significant U.S. military presence in the country.

We now face another possible obstacle to a coup: power may be in the hands of *sectional* forces, who use the government as a "front," or *regional* forces, whose dependence on the supposed political center is only theoretical.

In both these cases the problem lies in the fact that the seizure of the supposed political center will not win the battle; the sources of political power may be in other centers which may be too difficult and/or numerous to seize. In both these instances the realities of power are in conflict with the theoretical structure of the state, just as in the cases where the political unit is not truly independent. Here, "power" is within the country—but not where it is supposed to be; not in this instance because the unit is unsophisticated enough to diffuse power through subsidiary entities, but because the unit is not really *organic*.

Sectional Interests

This is the age of the giant business enterprise. The same factors which have led to the unprecedented prosperity of the modern industrial economy have also systematically favored the larger business organization; mass production and mass distribution imply large business units. Where the advantages of large-scale production are particularly great, as in the automobile and the chemical industries, *only* the very large enterprise can survive. Elsewhere, where there is no such economic imperative, the giant corporation has developed because of the economies of large-scale marketing, or simply because of the natural dynamics of accumulation. In every industrially developed economy there are such firms: ICI in Britain, General Motors in the United States, Philips in the Netherlands, and Fiat in Italy are all firms which have been able to grow sufficiently to emerge from the rest of industry and to become one of its focal points. This position gives them a great deal

of economic power because their managerial decisions can affect the entire national economy.

In political terms, however, the power of the giant corporation is just one more element within the business community, and this in turn is just one of the forces competing in the political life of the nation. The corporation may be a giant, but it is a giant amongst many.

It is otherwise in economically underdeveloped countries. If the availability of mineral deposits or of particular crops leads to the development of industry, then because of the nature of these sectors there will be one large firm rather than many small ones. There is by definition little or no other industry; the tax revenues will be small—except for the company's taxes—and there will be very few jobs going, except for the company's jobs. If there are roads and railways, they will have been built by the company as "company transport facilities"; most of the schools and hospitals will be "company welfare services"; "company housing" may dwarf the capital city, and company security guards may be better equipped than the national police.

When the state is poor and fragile the rich and well-organized mining or plantation company will be a great power in the land,⁹ whether it seeks or avoids this power. In fact, it will almost always be forced to intervene in politics if only to preserve some status quo. When the company acts it has a wide range of different weapons it can use, and it can use them at many different levels. The company can slow the flow of tax income to the state by transferring production to some other country in which it

⁹ The material equipment available to the company will, in itself, constitute a considerable source of direct power: its planes, trucks, and telecommunication facilities may well compose a major part of the country's infrastructure.

operates;¹ it can boost a particular politician by giving real or sinecure jobs to his supporters; it can buy or bribe the press; and generally exercise the power it derives from being very rich amongst the very poor.

What an industrial empire can do, when set in a backward environment, was illustrated by the Katanga secession in the early 1960's. When Tshombe launched his independent Katanga Republic he had only the meager resources of a provincial governor of the Congolese Republic. Yet as the secession proceeded Tshombe acquired an army with jets, heavy weaponry, armored cars, as well as well-organized propaganda bureaus in London and New York; he was able to recruit (and pay very handsomely) mercenary soldiers and administrators. Katanga has only one major source of wealth: the mining industry owned by the Union Minière, part of the interrelated mining groups which operate in the copper belt and South Africa. It does not need a Peking propaganda pamphlet to convince us that Tshombe was financed by the Union Minière—and largely acting as an agent for the company.

But even the Union Minière was operating in what was a relatively unfavorable environment. The Congo is a large country, and there are other mineral deposits worked by other companies with different interests to protect. The typical large-scale enterprise operates in countries where it is the *only* major industry. Thus ARAMCO, the oil company working in Saudi Arabia, is the only major industrial organization in the country. Its "company town," built to house employees, dwarfs other cities in the area; its taxes constitute almost 90 per cent of government revenue; and it has been responsible for the building of most of

¹ The risks in the mining and plantation industries are very high and therefore most firms must be very large and they tend to operate in several different countries; they can therefore switch production from one to the other, drastically affecting the countries' finances.

the educational, transport, and medical facilities in the country. The Saudi regime has always been efficient at retaining political control over what was, until recently, a loose coalition of tribes; the old desert warrior and founder of the kingdom, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, was a past master at controlling the tribes and he treated ARAMCO just as another tribe. Nevertheless, it is clear that ARAMCO is a particularly powerful tribe.

A standard nationalist accusation against the large-scale foreign enterprise is that it is "a state within a state," and that it exercises political power, either through its direct control of the country's government or by using the "leverage" of its home country on the "host" country. The United Fruit Company has often been accused of exercising power through corrupt local cliques, while the oil companies in the Middle East have been accused of using both methods.²

A much less plausible accusation against the foreign company is that it engages in covert activities against the state, such as sabotage and espionage. Just why they should undertake such activities is not explained, but such accusations are widely believed. When the new regime of Husni al-Za'im was set up in Syria in 1949 one of its first actions was to limit the freedom of action of the Iraq Petroleum Company. IPC was informed (*a*) that its aircraft would have to obtain official permits for each flight; (*b*) that the company's security guards would have to be replaced by public security forces; and (*c*) that company personnel would need official permits to travel in the border zones. However unfounded the allegations of complicity in espionage (which were the supposed reasons for the rules), it should be noted that such restrictions (except for the

² Joseph Conrad's novel *Nostromo* is a brilliant and prophetic analysis of the causes and consequences of "neo-colonialism."

last one) are commonplace in most developed countries.

Even if the foreign company has no desire to interfere in the political life of the "host" country, it may be forced to do so merely in order to protect its installations and personnel. Typically, this is the case when the company is operating in areas which are not under the effective control of the *de jure* government, especially in remote areas inhabited by minority groups or—which may amount to the same thing—controlled by local insurgents. The French rubber plantation companies in South Vietnam, for example, have often been accused of financing the Viet Cong. There is no reason to impute sinister motives to them, because since the official government—which also collects taxes—is unable to guarantee law and order, the French plantation companies are simply paying their taxes to the *de facto* government.

The experience of the British Oil Company in Iran (originally Anglo-Persian, later renamed Anglo-Iranian and finally British Petroleum, before becoming part of the Iranian Oil Consortium) illustrates the case of a business enterprise which was forced to intervene in the domestic affairs of the "host" country under the pressure of local political realities. Anglo-Persian received its concession from the Persian government in 1901, but it soon discovered that the Tehran government had very little control over the remote areas where the company was actually exploring and later producing oil. The sheik of Mohammerah controlled the area at the head of the Persian Gulf, and the neo-Mongolian Bakhtiari Khans controlled the rest of Khuzistan; both the sheik and the Khans were nominally subject to the Tehran government, but in fact independent.

The company accepted local political realities and in order to protect the safety of its installations entered into

arrangements with the local rulers. The British government, however, tried to regularize the situation by supporting the autonomy of the sheik against the central government, and the company, being closely associated with the government,³ identified itself with the autonomy of the sheik. When Reza Pahlevi took power in Iran and restored the authority of the central government the company found itself penalized for its support of the sheik.

The relationship between the company and the Bakhtiari Khans was even more complicated. The company realized that its wells and pipelines could only be "protected" by coming to an arrangement with the local *de facto* power. This time, however, instead of one sheik there were many different Khans, all involved in the mutual conflict of tribal politics, with only loose coalitions whose instability prejudiced the security which the company had bought. The "natural" solution was adopted: the company, together with British consular authorities, entered into tribal politics in order to promote a paramount chief who would clarify and stabilize the situation. The feuds among the Khans, however, were never concluded, and the tribal politics of the company were only brought to an end when the central government of Reza Pahlevi disarmed the Khans and restored its control over the area.

Thus the company, merely in order to protect its installations and to avoid paying double taxation to two rival authorities, had to enter politics at three different levels. It operated in *tribal* politics to promote and maintain the power of the paramount chief of the Bakhtiari; in *national* politics to preserve the autonomy of the sheik of Mohammerah against the central government; in *inter-*

³ The British government bought 50 per cent of the shares of what was to become BP—certainly the best investment of taxpayers' money ever made.

national politics to “detach” the sheikdom from Iran acting in association with the British consular authorities in the Gulf.

What action must be taken by the planners of the coup in the event of the presence of such substates in the target country? In a few extreme cases their consent may be necessary: they tend to have their ears to the ground and will probably be aware of the coup before the official intelligence outfits. This consent can be obtained by a suitable mixture of threats and promises, and in this case promises do not always have to be kept. Elsewhere they will act as just one more factor with which the coup has to deal, but increasingly—after the political education they have received at the hands of nationalist forces everywhere—foreign business interests have learned that neutrality is sweet.

Regional Entities

The essence of the coup is the seizure of power within the main decision-making center of the state and, through this, the acquisition of control over the nation as a whole.

We have seen that in some cases the decision-making process is too diffused through the entire state bureaucracy and the country at large; in other cases the supposed political center is controlled by another, foreign center or by sectional forces which are independent of the whole state machinery.

A similar problem arises where power is in the hands of regional or ethnic blocs, who either use the supposed political center as an agency for their own policies, or ignore the claims of the center and regard themselves as independent. Practically every Afro-Asian state has border areas, typically mountainous, swampy, or otherwise inaccessible, which are inhabited by minority tribes, and where the control exercised by the government is only theoretical.

Where this sort of *de facto* autonomy extends to major population centers, the problem of the lack of organic unity arises; it is, however, of no importance for the coup if the organic unit is in itself large—the new regime can deal with local autonomies when it has seized power. Sometimes, however, the local units are so powerful that they control the center, or else the center rules only the immediate suburbs of the capital city.

This was often the case in the Congo in the period 1960–4 following independence and the mutiny of the Force Publique. Though the Congolese Republic was constitutionally a unitary and not a federal state, it quickly lost control of most of the “provinces,” which behaved as totally independent entities. Within each province local factions were in conflict, but the central government’s faction tended to be one of the weakest:

Political situation in South Kasai 1960–1

The following groupings were contending for the control of the province:

- (a) *The traditional chiefs.* Forces available: tribal warriors.
- (b) *The South Kasai separatists led by “King” Kalonji.* Forces available: well-equipped, undisciplined troops led by Belgian officers (“Ex-Belgian” Belgians).
- (c) *The central government.* Forces available: young and inexperienced administrators with loose control over the small national army (ANC) contingent in the eastern part of the province.
- (d) *The mining company Forminière.* Resources available: financial support and air transport occasionally made available to Kalonjiist and other groups.

The situation in Katanga was even more unfavorable to the central government; the northeast and the Stanleyville

area were in the hands of the Gizenga forces; much of the rest of the country could not be reached by government officials because of the breakdown in law and order and the disruption of transportation facilities. Thus a successful coup in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) would only have won control of a very small fraction of the great Congolese Republic; several different coups would have been needed in the various *de facto* capitals, Stanleyville, Elizabethville, Luluaburg, etc., in order to control the whole country.

Federal states represent the overt and constitutional recognition that regions have a local power base and are therefore granted a corresponding measure of local autonomy. In some cases the power of the center comes from the voluntary union of the regions, and until the central institution develops its own sources of power and authority it is the regions that rule, only using the center as an agency for their common policies.

The United States was the product of a more or less voluntary union of states and, until the development of presidential authority in the course of the nineteenth century, the government in Washington was little more than an agency for the common problems of the states. Thus a coup staged in Washington in, say, 1800 would have seized an empty symbol, but by 1900 the development of federal authority was such that a coup would have led to control over much of the country. The Soviet Union, Canada, India, and West Germany are all federal states, but the degree of autonomy of each component state or province varies from the near zero of the U.S.S.R. to the increasingly independent Canadian provinces. The fact that, constitutionally, Soviet republics are supposed to be fully autonomous (and even entitled to secede from the federation) is another example of the perpetual contrast between theoretical structures and political realities.

In the event, the realities of power—and of its internal dynamics—tend to lead to a decay of the federal system. The result is either growing centralization (e.g. the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.) or else growing separation (e.g. India, Canada, and pre-coup Nigeria).

The idea that political power should be concentrated in one controlling center for the nation as a whole derives from the presumption that the interests of each region are best served by decision-making in a national framework. This presumption, interestingly enough, is usually accepted only after the destruction of the local power structures. Thus it is agreed by most Englishmen and Frenchmen that major political decisions ought to be made in London and Paris, rather than on a local level. But this intellectual recognition followed, rather than preceded, the crushing of the “barons” and of the independent states of Burgundy, Provence, Anjou, and Wales.⁴

In many underdeveloped areas the power of the local “barons” is still very real and local movements, based on linguistic or ethnic affiliations, are actively attempting to gain either greater autonomy or else full *de facto* independence. As of January 1968 the central governments of India, Burma, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Tibet were all experiencing armed conflicts with separatist forces. Canada, India, and (as admitted, belatedly, in a grudging footnote) France and the United Kingdom are experiencing political conflicts with separatist elements. In Spain, Yugoslavia, and Italy, more or less violent separatist groups are operating.

Among all these instances, where the local population

⁴The rise of Celtic separatism in Wales, Scotland, France, and Spain has been so rapid and dramatic that perhaps only the absence of jungles is preventing some of their members from starting a home-grown Viet Cong.

does not accept the superiority of centralized decision-making, we have to differentiate between the various possible implications for the coup:

(a) *The regions are the real centers of power.* The coup must either confine itself to one region, or extend to all of them; the supposed center must be just one more target area. This extends and complicates the coup, while the weakness of the coup's forces in each single capital may invite counter-coup activity.

(b) *One or two regions dominate the whole country.* This was the situation in pre-coup Nigeria. The Northern Region, ruled by traditional Fulani and Hausa Emirs, was the largest region by far. Its ruler, the Sardauna of Sokoto (Ahmadu Belloh), was in full control of its internal politics, whereas in the other regions the situation was more fluid—and more democratic. Thus, Ahmadu Belloh, in association with political forces in one other region, dominated the whole federation. The young Ibo officers, who carried out the first coup, therefore had to allocate as much of their efforts to Belloh and his "capital" as to the federal capital and the federal leadership. In the event, they killed both the federal prime minister (Abubakar Tafawa Balewa) and Belloh. But they were overextended, so that Ironsi, the senior officer of the army, acting with the police and bureaucracy, staged a counter-coup and seized power on his own account.

The existence of these regional forces, strong enough to control the supposed center, may make a coup impossible. If the regional or ethnic bloc is organized on tribal lines the structures of *its* leadership will be too firm and intimate for a coup to function from within. One of the few stable countries of the Middle East, Lebanon, is based on such an arrangement: the Christian, Moslem, and Druze blocs are all mutually hostile, but they recognize the fact that no single group can hope to dominate all the others. Thus, the Beirut government functions as a common clear-

ing house for those policies which are accepted by each ethnic bloc. If one carried out a coup in Beirut, it would immediately lead to the collapse of the system, since each group, backed up by their own armed forces, would seize power in their own region. The coup would therefore only capture Beirut and its suburbs; and it will probably be unable to retain its control over even that small area.

Lebanon provides an extreme example of the role of ethnic/regional forces. In each individual instance there will be particular balance of power between the regions, and between the regions and the center. The efforts of the coup would have to be allocated so as to deal with each ethnic or regional bloc on the basis of an estimate of its role in the particular balance of forces. In a few cases a coup may be impossible because the nature and extent of regional power is such as to require resources beyond those likely to be available. Elsewhere it will be just one more obstacle to overcome.

The third precondition of the coup is therefore:

The target state must have a political center. If there are several centers these must be identifiable and they must be politically, rather than ethnically, structured. If the state is controlled by a nonpolitically organized unit, the coup can only be carried out with its consent or neutrality.

“Ethnically structured” is a rather awkward phrase. It is intended to cover social groups whose leadership is evolved by clear-cut and well-established (usually hereditary) procedures. If a particular traditional leadership controls the state we cannot seize power by carrying out a coup in the state’s controlling center, nor can we penetrate the traditional leadership because we would be excluded automatically as usurpers and outsiders. In Burundi, for example, the traditional Watutsi hierarchy controlled the state and

therefore to seize power in Burundi it would have been necessary to penetrate the hierarchy, but this would only be possible if (a) we were Watutsi, (b) we belonged to the aristocracy, and (c) we were next in line for the succession. In Rwanda, power was also controlled by traditional Watutsi chiefs who had subjected the Bahutu majority. Then there was a revolution, and now the leadership is Bahutu-political rather than Watutsi-traditional. A coup is therefore now possible.

If a political entity is actually controlled by a group which is not structured politically, then obviously political methods cannot be used to seize power. This is the case of a country dominated by a business unit. Imagine, for example, that General Motors *did* control the U.S.A., in the sense that the Presidency and the Congress acted as its stooges. If that were the case, power would have to be seized in Detroit, not Washington. In the unlikely event that one could raise enough cash to buy 51 per cent of General Motors' shares, then Washington would be a fringe benefit added to all the other resources controlled. But the coup is a *political weapon*, and its planners have only political resources. Thus, G.M.—U.S.A. would be outside the reach—and the scope—of a coup.

Returning to reality, Katanga in the early 1960's and the Central American "banana" republics of the 1950's were examples of states whose real "centers" were politically impenetrable—unless you could raise \$200,000,000—\$300,000,000.

The Strategy of the Coup d'État

Dean Acheson used to tell a story about Chief Justice Taft relating a conversation he had just had with an eminent man about the "machinery of government."

*"And you know"—Taft said with wonder in his voice—
"he really did believe that it is machinery."*

—To Move a Nation, Roger Hilsman

Under totalitarian conditions knowledge of the labyrinth of transmission belts [of the machinery of government] equals supreme power.

—The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt

OVERTHROWING GOVERNMENTS is not easy. The government will not only be protected by the professional defenses of the state—the armed forces, the police, and the security agencies—but it will also be supported by a whole range of *political* forces. In a sophisticated and democratic society these will include political parties, sectional interests, regional, ethnic, and religious groupings. Their interaction—and mutual opposition—results in a particular balance of forces which the government in some way represents.¹ In less sophisticated societies, there may be a narrower range of such forces but there will almost always be some political groups which support the status quo, and therefore the government.

¹The language of celestial mechanics should not obscure the inevitable distortions which affect the balance of forces.

If those who carry out the coup appear to shatter such a powerful structure merely by seizing a few buildings, arresting some political figures, and "liberating" the radio station, it is because their crucial achievement passes unnoticed. This is the dangerous and elaborate process by which the armed forces and the other means of coercion are neutralized, and the political forces temporarily forced into passivity. If we were revolutionaries, wanting to change the structure of society, our aim would be to destroy the power of some of the political forces, and the long and often bloody process of revolutionary attrition can achieve this. Our purpose is, however, quite different: we want to seize power *within* the present system, and we shall only stay in power if we embody some new status quo supported by those very forces which a revolution may seek to destroy. Should we want to achieve fundamental social change we can do so after we have become *the* government. This is perhaps a more efficient method (and certainly a less painful one) than that of classic revolution.

Though we will try to avoid all conflict with the "political" forces, some of them will almost certainly oppose a coup. But this opposition will largely subside when we have substituted our new status quo for the old one, and can enforce it by our control of the state bureaucracy and security forces. This period of transition, which comes after we have emerged into the open and before we are vested with the authority of the state, is the most critical phase of the coup. We shall then be carrying out the dual task of imposing our control on the machinery of state, while at the same time using it to impose our control on the country at large. Any resistance to the coup in the one will stimulate further resistance in the other and if a chain reaction develops the coup could be defeated.

Our strategy, therefore, must be guided by two principal

considerations: the need for maximum speed in the transitional phase, and the need to neutralize fully the forces which could oppose us both before and immediately after the coup. If, in the operational phase of the coup, we are at any stage delayed, then our essential weakness will emerge: we shall probably acquire a definite political coloration, and this in turn will lead to a concentration of those forces which oppose the tendency we represent (or are thought to represent). As long as the execution of the coup is rapid, and we are cloaked in anonymity, no particular political faction will have either a motive or an opportunity to oppose us. After all, we could be their potential allies. In any case, a delay will lose us our principal advantage: the voluntary neutrality of the "wait and see" elements, and the involuntary neutrality of those forces which need time to concentrate and deploy for action.

The need for maximum speed means that the many separate operations of the coup must be carried out almost simultaneously; this in turn requires a large number of people. Therefore, assuming that we start the planning of the coup with only a small group of political associates, most of the personnel we will need must be recruited. Further, our recruits must have the training and equipment that will enable them to take swift and determined action. There will usually be only one source of such recruits: the armed forces of the state itself.

It is true that in many countries there are ethnic minorities which, being both traditionally antigovernment and warlike, may seem to be ideal recruits for a coup. These are typically hill peoples, like the Druzes of Syria, the Kurds of Iraq, the Shans of Burma, and the Pathans of West Pakistan and Afghanistan. Because of their poverty and traditions they would probably be easy to recruit, but to do so may lead to a nationalist reaction on the part of the majority peoples, and since the centers of govern-

ment are usually located in the majority areas, their opposition would be a further important obstacle to us.

Another possible substitute for the subversion of the forces of the state is the organization of a party militia. When there is a combination of political freedom with an ineffectual maintenance of law and order, such militias are sometimes formed in order to "protect" party activities. In Weimar Germany, for example, apart from the Brown-shirts, there were party militias of the Social Democrats, the Communists, and the right-wing nationalist parties. Similar organizations—Blackshirts, Greenshirts, Redshirts, and, in the Middle East, Silvershirts—spread in many countries in the wake of Fascist and Nazi successes. In spite of their military bearing, their uniforms, and often extensive weaponry, in almost every instance of confrontation between such militias and the forces of the state, the former were defeated.² Thus, when the Nazis tried to use the embryonic Brownshirts in the 1923 Munich episode, they were easily overpowered by the police and Hitler was himself arrested. His subsequent rise to power was achieved by *political* means and not by the efforts of the Brown-shirts.

In any case, in order to organize and equip a party militia two scarce resources are needed: money and the freedom to do so. Recruiting forces from those maintained by the state requires neither. Therefore, while we will have to neutralize a whole range of forces, a distinctive approach will have to be used in the case of the means of coercion of the state. In dealing with the armed forces, the police, and the security services, we will have to subvert some forces while neutralizing the rest; in the case of the political forces the objective will be limited to their neutralization.

² The conflicts between the armed Bolivian tin-miners and army which led to the 1952 revolution are among the very few exceptions.

Because of their capability for direct intervention, the armed forces and the other means of coercion of the state must be fully neutralized *before* the actual coup starts; the "political" forces can usually be dealt with immediately after the coup. In some situations, however, the political forces can also have an immediate impact on the course of events and must, therefore, be treated on the same basis as the means of coercion of the state.

In Russia, during the period of instability which followed the "bourgeois" February³ revolution, the railwaymen's union emerged as a major source of direct power. Vikzhel (the All-Russian Committee of the Union of Railroad Employees) played a decisive role in the defeat of General Kornilov's putsch by simply refusing to work the railways carrying his soldiers on their way to Petrograd. Later, when Kerensky fled the city following Lenin's October coup, and took refuge with Krasnov's army contingent, Vikzhel threatened to call a general strike (i.e. to leave Krasnov's troops stranded) unless Kerensky negotiated peacefully with the Bolsheviks. Since the Bolsheviks had no serious intention of negotiating, this amounted to a request for unconditional surrender.

In the peculiar conditions of Russia in 1917 the railways, and those who controlled them, were of crucial importance from the military point of view. Elsewhere there will be other political forces which can exert similar pressures: in poor countries, where the majority of city-dwellers can only buy food on a day-to-day basis, shopkeepers—if well organized—can bring great pressure to bear on the government by refusing to open their shops. Where there is a strong trade-union movement, strikes can impede the vital process of establishing the authority of the new government immediately after the coup. Religious and ethnic leaders can

³ Old Calendar. Otherwise March and November.

use the structures of their communities to organize mass demonstrations against the new regime. We must therefore identify and evaluate these political forces and, if necessary, their leading personalities and coordinating bodies must be neutralized before the coup.⁴ Other political forces lacking such direct power will also have to be dealt with, but this will be part of the process of conciliation and accommodation which follows the coup.

NEUTRALIZING THE DEFENSES OF THE STATE

One of the outstanding features of modern states is their extensive and diversified security system. This is a consequence of the general breakdown in external security and internal stability which has been experienced in many areas of the world in the last two or three generations. Every state maintains armed forces, a police force, and some form of intelligence organization. Many states find it necessary to have paramilitary "gendarmeries," duplicate security services, and other variations on the theme.

In the pre-1914 world, states were not noticeably less aggressive than in present-day international society, but the lack of off-rail transport and a residual attachment to diplomatic convention resulted in a certain time-span between hostility and "hostilities." The modern pattern of military operations, the surprise attack and undeclared war, has as a natural consequence the "military" peace. Instead of small professional armies, acting as cadres for wartime expansion, many states attempt to maintain permanent armies capable of immediate defense—and therefore offense.

⁴ See Chapter 4, in which the neutralization of political forces is discussed.

The rise of ideology-based, revolutionary parties—on both right and left—has led to a similar expansion of internal security forces. “Political” branches in police forces, paramilitary internal security forces, undercover secret police outfits, have all become common features of many states, including “democratic” ones.

In the 1930's the United States had fewer than 300,000 men in its armed forces; the only significant intelligence operation was a small (and supremely efficient) code-breaking outfit, while internal security forces were limited to a few “T-men” of the presidential bodyguard and a relatively “tame” and low-budget FBI.

Today, the U.S. Marine Corps alone has more than 280,000 men in uniform while the entire military establishment has a “population” which, at 3,400,000, outnumbered the civilian population of many UN member-countries.

The intelligence community has developed into a many-headed bureaucratic monster, composed of the CIA, the equally important NSA, the service intelligence outfits, and many defense “research” institutions. In the internal security field the FBI has tolerated no competitors, except in specialized work, but it has grown into a mini-CIA, with several thousand agents working in the “political,” as opposed to the criminal, function.

No state has been able to emulate such a luxuriant growth, and even the other superpower,⁵ the Soviet Union, has found it impossible to keep up with the U.S.A.—in spite of the fact that it gets some of its facilities on the cheap—à la Kim Philby. Without being able to keep up with the U.S.A., most states have done their very best. Even a medium-sized country like Italy, with no hostile neighbors of military consequence, with no serious in-

⁵ The astute editor of *Le Monde* contradicted De Gaulle's assertion that there was only one superpower—the U.S.—by pointing out that there were still two: the United States and the CIA.

surgency, and with a tame and "parliamentary" Communist Party, has found it necessary to develop an extensive system, comprising two national police forces, several security agencies, a 300,000-man army, a 40,000-man navy, and a large air force.

Other more embattled states enroll practically the whole population in various kinds of defense and security forces. Israel, surrounded by avowed enemies, with weak natural defenses, unprotected by military alliances, is an extreme case: though it only has the population of a medium-sized city it was able to field more than 250,000 men and women in the June 1967 war.

From the point of view of the coup, the size and power of the armed forces, police, and security agencies is both a great obstacle and a great help. On the one hand, as Trotsky pointed out, the improvement in weapons, transport, and communications has widened the gap between organized military forces and civilians equipped with improvised means. Trotsky noted that, while the French mobs of 1789 could "rush" positions defended by infantry soldiers, in 1917 a Russian mob—however large and determined—would be cut down by modern automatic weapons. By "modern" he meant the clumsy and slow-firing Maxim machine gun; today, every single soldier on mob control could be armed with a weapon giving a similar rate of fire.

On the other hand, the increase in the size of uniformed forces and the "technological revolution" have improved the characteristics of the state security systems as a recruitment ground for the coup. The modern army or security force is usually too large to be a coherent social unit bound by traditional loyalties; the need for technically minded personnel has broken the barriers that often limited recruitment to particular social groups within each country. Pathans and bedouins may be picturesque and politically

very reliable, but they are inadequate as pilots, tank crews, or even to staff a modern police force.

The fact that the personnel of the state security system is both numerous and diverse means that we, the planners of the coup, will be able to infiltrate the system. In doing so, we will have the dual task of turning a few of its component units into active participants of the coup, while neutralizing the others. This does not mean that we have to fight them, but merely that we have to prevent their possible intervention against us for the limited time-span of the coup.

Whether the purpose of our infiltration and subversion of the defenses of the state is to turn the unit concerned into an active participant of the coup, or whether it is merely defensive, the methods to be followed will depend on the character of each particular organization. The raw material for our efforts is the whole spectrum of the coercive forces of the state, and as these vary substantially in their equipment, deployment, and psychological outlook, we shall examine them separately.

NEUTRALIZING THE ARMED FORCES

In June 1967 when the Israelis, having defeated the other Arab armies, were turning to deal with Syria's, the head of Syria's National Revolutionary Council, Salah Jadid, kept the two best brigades of the Syrian army in their barracks at Homs and Damascus.⁶ The war minister, Hafiz Assad, begged Jadid to be allowed to send the 5th and 70th Brigades to the front, but Jadid—after physically assaulting him—pointed out that, though the brigades might save a few square miles of territory, their use at the front would jeopardize the survival of the regime. The leftist Ba'ath

⁶ R. Atallah, "Six jours d'irresponsabilité," *Jeune Afrique* No. 343, August 6, 1967, pp. 13-15. Also *Der Spiegel*, October 23, 1967.

government was not popular with any important section of the population,⁷ and the two brigades were the main supports of the regime.

Though hardly patriotic, Jadid was at least realistic. When he had taken power in February 1966, he had done so by means of the two crucial brigades whose officers were politically and ethnically allied to him, and which displaced the previous strong man, Hafez, from power when *his* brigades happened to be away from Damascus—or were infiltrated by Jadid's men.

Everywhere in the world, while the number of doctors, teachers, and engineers is only increasing slowly, the numerical strength of armies is expanding very rapidly. It is interesting to note that while technical improvements in, say, agriculture have allowed a diminishing number of farmers to produce ever larger amounts of food, armies have needed an ever larger "labor force" though their productivity—or rather destructivity—per head has also increased very rapidly. A modern platoon of thirty men has about three times the effective firepower of its 1945 counterpart; it is doubtful whether farming techniques have improved to the same extent.

The effectiveness of modern soldiers, with their rapid transport, reliable communications, and efficient weapons, means that even *one* single formation loyal to the regime could intervene and defeat the coup if, as is likely, our forces are small and the mass of the people and the rest of the state's forces neutral. Our investigation of the armed forces of the proposed target state must, therefore, be a complete one: we cannot leave out any force capable of intervention—however small.

Though most states have naval and air forces, as well as

⁷ Except the small "Chinese" faction of the Ba'ath Party and the Alawite community.

armies, we shall concentrate our attention on the latter because the procedures to be followed are usually the same for all three services, and because—with some exceptions—only land forces will be important from the point of view of the coup. It is, of course, possible to use fighter-bombers to “take out” a presidential palace instead of sending a team to arrest the occupant, and this was done in the 1963 Iraqi coup, but it is a rather extreme way of playing the game. Although the ratio of firepower achieved per man subverted is very high indeed, tactical bombing of one’s future capital city—and prospective post-coup residence—is not calculated to inspire confidence in the new government.

In certain geographical settings, however, the transport element of naval and air forces make them even more important than the army, as for example in the case of Indonesia. With its population centers scattered over several large islands and thousands of small ones, and with the very limited road facilities on the islands, a unit of naval marines—or paratroopers—will be more effective than some much larger army unit located in the wrong place. When the Communist-attempted coup-cum-revolution took place in Indonesia the military commanders were able to use their transport potential to great advantage: though Communist-infiltrated army units were very powerful they were in the wrong place; while they sat in the Borneo jungles⁸ the anti-Communist paratroopers and marines took over Jakarta, and the country.

Armies are divided into certain traditional formations which vary from country to country, such as divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, platoons. Be-

⁸ It is ironic that ex-President-for-life Sukarno sent them there in order to oppose the Malaysian Federation in the “confrontation” which the new government eventually liquidated.

yond this theoretical structure, however, the focus of decision-making and the real organizational framework is usually concentrated at one or two particular levels. It is very important for us to identify which level is the important one, and then concentrate our efforts on it. Table 1 illustrates several possible alternatives which we may face, though in order to achieve infiltration in depth we may in fact have to operate on many levels *below* the real center; operating *above* it would be pointless.

In (a) in the table, the operational echelon is the battalion; if there are persons holding the rank of divisional commanders they will probably be officers who have been eliminated from the real chain of command, and given gaudy uniforms and exalted ranks as a sweetener. If, in this case, we were to subvert a brigade or divisional commander, and he then issued orders on our behalf to the battalion, the latter—used as it is to receiving its orders direct from GHQ—will probably query or report the order. Thus apart from mere ineffectiveness there could also be a further risk in operating at the wrong echelon.

In (b), where almost every echelon is operational, we can subvert the control mechanism at almost any level, and orders given on our behalf will be obeyed at each lower level. In (c) again we can operate at all levels except those of division and battalion.

Though it may seem that the location of the main focus of control and communications is an arbitrary one, in reality it depends on very firm psychological and technical factors. Unless the standard of training and motivation is high enough, men have to be welded into great uniform blocs under the firm control of their superiors, because they have neither the discipline nor the capability to fight as individuals. Even highly motivated soldiers cannot be allowed to operate far from the concentration of troops unless they are linked by an efficient system of communica-

tions which enables them to receive new orders and to report on their situations. In general, the easier the terrain, the lower the degree of discipline and efficiency, the larger

TABLE 1

Formal structures and real chains of command

<i>(a) Centralized</i>	
<i>Formal structure</i>	<i>Real chain of command</i>
GHQ	GHQ
army area HQ	
division	
brigade	
battalion	battalion
company	company
platoon	platoon
<i>(b) Decentralized</i>	
<i>Formal structure</i>	<i>Real chain of command</i>
GHQ	GHQ
army area HQ	army area HQ
division	division
brigade	brigade
battalion	
company	company
platoon	platoon
<i>(c) Modern NATO-style structure</i>	
<i>Formal structure</i>	<i>Real chain of command</i>
GHQ	GHQ
army area HQ	army area HQ
division	
brigade	brigade
battalion	
company	company
platoon	platoon

will be the unit allowed to operate independently. Conversely, the more sophisticated the troops and equipment, and the closer the terrain—as in jungles or swamps—the smaller will be the unit operating on its own.

The two extremes came face to face in the Sinai in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war when the Egyptian army was organized into three large blocs under rigid HQ control and incapable of independent action; the Israelis, on the other hand, operated in many small brigade-size groups which concentrated for mass, and separated to infiltrate in a fluid and flexible manner.

When we have determined which is the true operational echelon in the various formations of the country concerned, we can go on to the next stage: identifying which formations have the capability to intervene—for or against the coup. We shall follow two main criteria: the nature of the unit concerned, and the location of the particular unit. These are explored in a case study of the Portuguese armed forces.

The Portuguese Armed Forces: Situation 1967

The present regime in Portugal can fairly be described as a partnership between the landowning classes, the newly emergent industrial and business interests, and the bureaucratic middle class (this staffs the civil service and the officer level of the armed forces). As in Spain, the air force and navy are staffed by elements which are traditionally less conservative than the army officers; as in Spain, the two services have been kept “thin” in numbers and resources.

Army

The total strength is about 120,000 men, distributed as follows (excluding administrative personnel):

(a) *1 infantry division*, with some medium tanks, which is partially used as a training formation and is at about one half of its theoretical establishment. Of the total number of men in the unit, only about 2,000 have any transport, apart from the small number equipped with armor. At any one time many of the troops will be newly conscripted, with little training or discipline. *Location*: Central Portugal.

(b) *1 infantry division*. This formation is usually much below strength, with perhaps 3,000 men with some degree of training. Transport is sufficient for perhaps half this number. *Location*: Northern Portugal.

(c) *Rest of the army*. The largest number of troops, around 100,000, with the highest degree of training and with the best equipment, is spread over the African territories: Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea.

Navy

Though the Portuguese have a great naval tradition, and though the overseas "provinces" would justify a larger navy (which the U.S. military assistance program could have partially paid for), for the reasons suggested above it has been kept relatively weak: one destroyer, fourteen smaller combat ships, three submarines, and thirty-six other vessels. Of greater interest to us: twelve support ships, four landing craft, and half a battalion of marines. Because of the distance of the African provinces, even if the navy were particularly loyal to the regime, it could not rapidly bring over many troops from there. The marines tend to be in distant waters and, in any case, their number is hardly significant.

Air Force

About 14,000 men. It is equipped with a variety of old American and Italian equipment. Its 3,000 paratroopers are

stationed in the African provinces, while the transport wing would be able to carry back to Portugal only about a thousand men every twenty-four hours.

In the case of Portugal, therefore, though the armed forces number about 150,000 men, only a small fraction of this total would be relevant in the event of a coup. Most of them would be prevented from intervening physically in the Lisbon area because of their location and their lack of suitable transport equipment. Others would only be able to intervene ineffectually, since their training and equipment would be unsuitable. Thus, out of the entire armed forces, only three or four battalions (perhaps 4,000 men) would have an effective intervention capability. The small size of this force reduces the possibility of the coup being defeated, but it also limits our potential area of recruitment.

If the air force or the navy did bring back to Portugal some of the troops stationed in Africa, by the time of their arrival we would be the government, and they would therefore be under our orders. If we should fail to impose our authority by then, the coup would have failed anyway and their arrival would not change matters. Unless, that is, we had subverted the troops in Africa, which would be a rather tortuous way of going about things.

This suggests the principal criteria by which we separate out the forces relevant to the coup, whether military or not:

The forces relevant to a coup are those whose locations and/or equipment enables them to intervene in its locale (usually the capital city) within the 12-24-hour time-span which precedes the establishment of its control over the machinery of government.

Infiltrating the Armed Forces

Our initial survey of the armed forces of the target country will have isolated two items of information which are crucial to the planning of the coup. These are, the nature and composition of the units which have an intervention capability, and the real operational echelon within them. These data are illustrated in the notional table below:

TABLE 2*Country X: potential forces of intervention**(a) Battalion-size force*

1,000 men, organized in 10 companies, with mechanical transport and antitank weapons.

Location: capital city. Operational echelon: battalion HQ.

(b) Division-size force

1,500 men, organized in 20 companies, with armored carriers, 25 tanks.

Location: 30 kilometers from capital city. Operational echelon: brigade HQ; tanks under separate battalion HQ.

(c) Brigade-size force

3,000 men, organized in 3 battalions.

Location: 300 kilometers from capital city; air transport available. Operational echelons: brigade HQ and air-force-squadron HQ.

Hitherto we have been thinking in terms of formal military units, but we must now carry our analysis further in order to identify the "key" individuals within each particular unit. If we were dealing with a primitive military organization we could readily isolate those who effectively lead the unit concerned. In the tribal war-band, for example, there will be a few obvious "leader" types, distinguished by their appearance and less obviously by their descent or personal repute; the other warriors will only be functionally different from each other because of their individual

strength or dexterity. In modern military organizations it is otherwise: the efficiency of the organization depends on the use of many different types of weapons and other facilities, handled by specialized personnel. In each situation there will be an appropriate "mix" of these and the system therefore depends on two kinds of "key" individuals: the "technicians" and those who coordinate them, the "leaders."⁹

Our next problem, therefore, is to determine who are the "key" individuals within those units of the armed forces which could intervene—for or against us—during the coup. As we have already determined which is the "operational" echelon within each particular formation and thus implicitly identified the "leaders," we now turn to the identification of the technicians. Who these are will depend on the nature of the organization and the task to be carried out. If, for example, during the course of the coup the government calls on the help of force (c) in our notional Table 2, its arrival in the capital could be prevented with the cooperation of just one of these groups: (i) the staff operating the communication system between the political leadership and force (c); (ii) the pilots and/or ground staff of the air transport squadron; (iii) the guard force at the airport(s); (iv) the control-tower personnel at either airport, especially in difficult flying conditions.

In general, the more sophisticated the organization, the greater is its efficiency—but also its vulnerability. Either force (a) or force (b) in Table 2 could, for example, operate successfully even if quite a few of its personnel were not cooperating with the leadership. For these forces, losing the cooperation of 10 per cent of their men would mean losing approximately 10 per cent of their effectiveness; in the case of force (c), however, the loss of perhaps 1 per

⁹ The "leaders" will usually be the operational officers of the unit concerned, but this need not always be so.

cent of its men could lead to a *total* loss of effectiveness for some particular tasks (such as intervening in the capital city).

This indicates that insofar as we are trying to neutralize a formation of the armed forces, we should do so through the cooperation of *technicians* rather than *leaders*, because the former are both more effective individually and easier (and safer) to recruit. The second rule is that we should, other things being equal, choose for neutralization those units which have the most complex organization, while choosing the simplest ones for incorporation. This will both reduce *our* vulnerability from a sudden defection and minimize the total number of people that must be ultimately recruited.

Before we go on to approach and persuade the "key" individuals to join us (thus giving us effective control of their units) we must have collected sufficient information on the armed forces to know: (a) which are the military units which could intervene at the time and place of the coup; (b) the real command structure within the relevant units, and who are the leaders; (c) the technical structure of the units and who are the technicians.

To "incorporate" a unit we will need the active cooperation of a number of its leaders, and in the case of a technically simple unit the defection of some technicians will not matter greatly. If, in otherwise well-infiltrated units, some of the leaders should remain loyal to the pre-coup regime, this should not prove to be a major obstacle.¹

Whether we concentrate on leaders or on technicians will depend on the particular structure of the effective

¹ Officers are amazingly expendable. In both France and Russia many officers left their units following the respective revolutions, and yet the armies seemed to experience a sudden increase in their efficiency. Certainly the French military record after 1789 was a great improvement on the preceding thirty years, and so was the Russian after 1917.

forces of intervention and on the particular political climate. If there is a sharp political division between the troops and their officers we may be able to incorporate units without the cooperation of any formal leaders at all. The problem of identifying the unofficial leaders will, however, be a very difficult one, and in any case there is no reason to believe that we are planning the coup at a time when such a division has hardened. The technical structures, however, are more stable, and one of our principal considerations will be to avoid being dependent on too many links of the technical chain. Table 3 shows our optimum strategy in infiltrating a typical set of potential intervention forces.

Of course, in countries prone to coups, those who order these things are aware of their vulnerability to the defection of parts of their armed forces. It is therefore quite likely that the "easy" battalion No. 1 has been carefully chosen for its reliability and its commanders are trusted associates of the ruling group. If this is the case, we may have to work on battalion No. 3. What we must *not* do is to rely on battalion No. 2, because the defection from our cause of even a few of its "technicians" would have dramatic consequences.

Until we actually start to collect information about the individuals and to make the first approaches, we may not know which units are politically "tied" to the regime, and more generally we will not know what are our ultimate recruitment prospects in each unit. Therefore, though we will have a rough classification in mind, dividing the units into potential allies and potential neutrals, we should keep the distinction flexible. As we build up a picture of the recruitment potential in each unit, we will concentrate our efforts on the units to be incorporated; the reliability of a unit "allied" to the coup will be increased if we infiltrate it in depth, but there is little point in overinfiltrating a unit

TABLE 3

Optimum infiltration strategy

<i>Unit:</i>	<i>Battalion No. 1</i>	<i>Battalion No. 2</i>	<i>Battalion No. 3</i>
<i>Command:</i>	10 company commanders and 5 effective "leaders" at the HQ of each battalion. For infiltration in depth 30 platoon commanders may have to be subverted in each battalion.		
<i>Key men:</i>	15-45 "leaders"	15-45 "leaders"	15-45 "leaders"
<i>Technical structure:</i>	Very simple. Relies on ordinary communication and transportation equipment.	Very complex. To bring the force to the scene of the coup, airlift and sophisticated communications are required.	Medium. Relies on land transport, but radio links needed to operate communications.
<i>Key men:</i>	no "technicians"	40 "technicians"	5 "technicians"
<i>Optimum strategy:</i>	Bring a proportion of the "leaders" over to the coup. (unit incorporated)	Secure the passive cooperation of some of the "technicians" (unit neutralized)	If battalion No. 1 proves difficult to infiltrate, this one would be the second choice.

which will eventually be neutralized. Every approach to an individual will involve an element of risk; every increase in the number of those who know that something is up will reduce our overall security level. We must therefore avoid overrecruitment.

If we go up to an army officer and ask him to join in a projected coup, he will be faced—unless he is a total loyal-

ist—with a set of options, offering both dangers and opportunities.

The proposition could be a “plant” of the security authorities to determine his loyalty to the regime. The proposition could be genuine, but part of an insecure and inefficient plot, and, finally, the proposition could come from a team that has every chance of success.

Should the proposal be a “plant,” accepting it could lose him his job and much more, while reporting it would gain him the rewards of loyalty. Should it be a genuine proposal he has the uncertain prospect of benefiting after a coup, as against the certain prospect of benefiting immediately from reporting it. The natural thing for him to do, therefore, is to report it.

The whole technique of the approach is designed to defeat this logic. Apart from the rewards of being part of a successful coup (which can be portrayed as being significantly greater than the rewards of loyalty) there is another factor which operates in our favor. This is that the person to whom an approach is reported may himself be a supporter of the coup. We must therefore emphasize these two points as much as possible, while underplaying the risk element. But, hopefully, our potential recruits will be motivated by some considerations beyond greed and fear, with other interests and affiliations entering their choice: links of friendship with the planners of the coup and a shared political outlook will be important, but usually the crucial considerations will be family, clan, and ethnic links with those planning the coup.

In most economically backward countries the different ethnic groups are only imperfectly fused into one entity and mass education and mass communications have not by any means broken down traditional rivalries and suspicions. In any case, the first steps toward economic progress usually

reinforce these conflicts, and we may often find that ethnic links are far more important than more recent political affiliations.

For example, when no steel mills were being built there could be no regional conflicts on where to build them; when civil-service jobs were all given to citizens of the imperial power there could be little conflict between ethnic groups on the "fair" allocation of jobs. Conflicts over jobs or the location of steel mills are necessarily more intense than the old conflicts over land: while before only the geographical fringes of the tribe were in contact with the rival, now each tribe fights the other on the national stage. While a conflict over land can reach a compromise at some middle line, a steel mill has to be located in either area A or area B. (The alternative, of course, is to put it on the border of the two provinces; although this is usually far from roads and other facilities, it is sometimes done.)²

As old conflicts widen in scope and intensity, the instinctual solidarity of the ethnic groups hardens. African "tribalism" is merely an extreme case of a very general phenomenon—for example, sophisticated and utterly unreligious Jews will "happen" to marry other Jews, though they may regard themselves as thoroughly assimilated. Despite Czech and Slovak protestations of national unity, capital investment has had to be assigned carefully to each area on an exact percentage basis, and conflict over this was one of the factors which brought down the Novotny ("the great survivalist") government in 1968. In fact, all over Eastern Europe the old conflicts are just below the

² The problem is compounded by the fact that development programs are usually focused around one or two big projects, which attract much of the country's attention—and investment funds. The "donor" countries usually resist the fragmentation of industrial projects to appease local feelings and this further complicates the political problem.

surface, and the new "socialist-national" policies are inevitably reviving them.³ In Rumania almost half a million Germans and a million and a half Hungarians feel that they are not getting a fair deal; while in Yugoslavia, Croats, Serbs, Dalmatians and Macedonians are all involved in the ethnic balancing act, not to speak of the smaller Albanian, Vlach, and Slovene groups. In many areas, ethnic divisions are complicated by a superimposed religious conflict. The Ibo nation in Nigeria, for example, has been in endemic conflict with the Muslim northerners for a very long time, but the introduction of Christianity among them has meant that the old Ibo-Hausa conflict has been intensified by a new Muslim-Christian one.

We will therefore make the fullest use of the "ethnic matrix" without, however, aligning our coup with any particular ethnic faction. In terms of petty tactics, we will match each potential recruit with a recruiter who shares his affiliation, and, if necessary, the image of the coup will be presented in a similar vein. But we must also take account of a special factor which is a typical post-colonial phenomenon. Colonial regimes developed the habit of recruiting army personnel among minority ethnic groups, which were reputed to be more warlike and, more important, could be trusted to join in the repression of the majority group with enthusiasm. After independence, these minorities naturally regressed in terms of political power and social position, but they still staffed much of the armed forces. This has led to the strange spectacle of minorities acting as the official protectors of the regime which is putting the pressure on them.

The Druzes and Alawites of Syria have been in this position since the French departed in 1945, and it is hardly

³ The "Zionist plot" in Poland in early 1968 and the perpetual conflict between Hungary and Rumania over the Transylvanian provinces are particular examples of a general problem.

TABLE 4

The role of ethnic minorities in Syrian politics

DRUZES

April 1949:

The first post-colonial regime of President Quwatli tries (and fails) to destroy the power base of a major Druze clan. This was one of the factors which led to the pioneering coup of Husni al-Za'im (the first military dictator in the Arab world).

August 1949:

Husni al-Za'im overthrown by a group of officers, of whom many are Druzes; this followed the attempt to intimidate the Druze *Jabal* area. The crucial armored unit commanders were Druzes whose cooperation had been enlisted by the planners of the coup.

December 1949:

The new regime starts its attempt to unite Syria with Iraq, and a new coup is planned to overthrow it and stop the union. Druze officers of the armored unit carry out the coup, which leads to Shishakli's military dictatorship.

February 1954:

Shishakli's regime overthrown. This was preceded by his military occupation of the *Jabal* Druze area and his arrest of a Druze delegation, which led to disturbances and reprisals. The group which carried out the coup was composed of three factions, of which the Druze was perhaps the most important.

ALAWITES

February 1966:

Coup by the leftist Ba'ath against the rightist Ba'ath regime of Hafez and the party founders, M. Aflak and S. Bitar. The coup was supposedly based on an ideological rift within the Ba'ath movement. In fact, the government of the leftist Ba'ath was a cover for a group of Alawite officers headed by Salah Jadid, himself an Alawite.

February 1967:

The chief of staff, a Sunni Muslim, is replaced by an Alawite; political power retained by the Alawite-controlled National Revolutionary Council, with Sunni and Christian Arab ministers as figureheads.

surprising that disaffected officers of the two groups have played a prominent role in most of the many coups since independence.

In many parts of Africa the majority peoples are the reputedly "soft" coastal tribes,⁴ who have captured the political leadership because of superior numbers and education, while much of the army is made up of members of the smaller hill tribes. This is the result of the superficial ethnographic theory that the British learned in India and the French in Algeria, but which, in African conditions, was little less than absurd. As soon as the officers of the colonial country landed in a new territory, they set about finding the hills and, once there, tried to re-create their semi-homosexualizing relationship with the "wily Pathan" or "*le fier Kabyle*," by recruiting the supposedly "tough" hill men into the army.

Without setting the stage for an intertribal civil war, there is every incentive to make use of this factor but, to the extent that there is an effective political life, the ideological outlook of the potential recruit will also be important. As far as we are concerned, combining all ranges of the political spectrum against a right or left extreme will give the most suitable political "cover" to our coup. The Quassem regime in Iraq, which lasted for five years as a pure balancing act, was finally brought down in 1963 when the moderate nationalist Aref (Abdel Salam) persuaded all political factions, from left-wing Ba'ath to right-wing conservatives, to combine against the supposed Communist penetration in the government.⁵

⁴ Nigeria is the exception, where the coastal nations are much more developed but fewer in numbers than the inland Hausas, and that is the cause of the trouble.

⁵ One of the danger signs was the fact that Quassem started calling his opponents "Fascist Hitlerites." Adolf Hitler is a popular figure with most shades of Arab opinion and only an unthinking transposition of Soviet habits could have led to the use of this epithet.

If there is no extreme faction available, however, we will have to be content with the petty tactics of claiming political kinship with potential recruits. But apart from the virtues of honesty there is a need for consistency, and a systematic presentation of the coup in terms of divergent political "lines" may eventually lead to our undoing.

Finding out the ethnic group to which a particular officer belongs is relatively easy; finding out what is his political outlook is rather more difficult. But the hardest thing of all will be to find out if he is personally alienated from the higher military leadership. Only the family and the closest friends of an officer will know whether he feels that his superiors are treating him unfairly, or running things badly, to the extent that he would welcome a radical change in the whole set-up. Unless we have a direct line to the individual concerned, we will have to use outside information to determine his inner feelings.

A standard intelligence procedure is to follow the career pattern of officers, in order to find out which ones have been passed over for promotion, assuming—other things being equal—that they will make good prospects for recruitment. In many countries, promotions within the armed forces are announced in official gazettes, and starting from a particular class at the military academy, one can follow the career of each officer from their graduation to the present. In some countries, where promotions are not published (for security reasons), one can carry out the exercise by using back copies of the telephone directory where their names will be printed along with their changing ranks. Where, as in the Soviet Union, neither telephone directories nor official gazettes are good sources of information, we could use more desperate expedients: getting an old boy from the relevant years to circulate proposals for a reunion, or building up mini-biographies from personal acquaintances; by whatever means, our aim would be to

trace a reasonably accurate career history for each graduating class from the military academy. The competitive position of each officer will be established *vis-à-vis* others of his year, rather than the other officers of the formation in which he serves, and Table 5 presents the information in the appropriate framework.

TABLE 5

<i>Class of 19— military academy of country X: present career position</i>	
lieutenant	7
captain	55
major	33
colonel	18
brigadier	2
deceased or civilian	15
	130

The seven lieutenants will probably make eager recruits for anything that will disturb—and rearrange—the order, but their low rank may be a correct assessment of their abilities, in which case their “help” may be a liability. More generally, and more usefully, we will know that the captains and majors in our table may well be less enthusiastic about the set-up than the colonels,⁶ while the two brigadiers—if not actually appointed for their political reliability—have probably become staunch supporters of whoever gave them their exalted jobs.

Ethnic affiliation, political outlook, and career patterns will all serve as guides to the likely reaction of the potential

⁶ Of course, colonels have always been prominent in military coups, but these have been coups which they have initiated on their own behalf. Our purpose is to use army officers, and captains are less likely to take the coup out of our hands than more senior officers.

recruit when the approach is made. There are, however, two points that we have to bear in mind, the first organizational, and the second deeply human. While alienated personnel will make good recruits, we must remember that we need people who will not only cooperate personally, as in the case of the technicians, but also bring the units they command over to the coup. Thus, while the leaders we recruit could (and should) be estranged from the superior hierarchy, they must not be "outsider" figures who are not trusted by their fellow officers and men. There will often be a danger of attracting the inefficient, the unpopular, the corrupt, as well as the disaffected. If we allow our coup to be assisted by such men we will be endangering the security of the coup and discouraging the recruitment of the better elements, and—most important of all—we may find that our "leader" recruits will fail to bring their units with them.

The other point to bear in mind is the basic unpredictability of human behavior. We have so far been trying to establish which links could override the loyalty of army personnel to their superiors and, of these affiliations, the strongest may be expected to be a family link. We should not, however, place total reliance on this factor. Although there is an Arab proverb "I and my brother against my cousin; I and my cousin against the world," we should remember the Aref family history in Iraq between 1958 and 1968 (Table 6, p. 76).

The relationship between the brothers illustrates the difficulty of predicting human behavior. Between 1958 and 1962 one brother was in prison under a suspended death sentence, while the other was in charge of a force that could probably have moved on the capital at any time. The Ba'ath leaders, mindful of this precedent, allowed Abd-el-Rahman to remain in charge of the important armored units near Baghdad, and this was their undoing. There was

TABLE 6

The Aref brothers in Iraq, 1958-68: a study in loyalty

President Abd-el-Rahman Aref (who has himself since been overthrown by a coup) was chosen as a compromise candidate by the army after the accidental death of his brother, Abd-el-Salam, the previous dictator of Iraq, in April 1966. The career pattern of the two brothers shows that, while both were prominent army leaders, one did not always cooperate with the other:

	<i>Abd-el-Salam</i>	<i>Abd-el-Rahman</i>
<i>July 1958:</i> Coup overthrows the monarchy	Co-author of the coup with Quassem.	Unaware of the plans and only intervenes at the end—though commander of an important armored unit.
<i>November 1958:</i>	Quassem arrests Abd-el-Salam. Accused of treason and given a (remit- ted) death sentence.	Promoted, and placed in charge of a large army contingent.
<i>1962:</i>		Placed in retire- ment.
<i>February 1963:</i> Ba'ath coup. Quassem deposed and shot.	Released and made president.	Placed in charge of the 5th armored division, promoted to brigadier general.
<i>November 1963:</i> Anti-Ba'ath coup.	Planned by brothers together. Assumes full control.	Promoted.
<i>April 1966:</i>	Dies.	Emerges as com- promise presidential candidate of the army.

a period, immediately after the first coup of 1963, when the position of the presidential brother was weak and the Ba'ath party militia, totally untrained but heavily armed, could have been used to remove the military brother from his command. The Ba'ath leaders, however, assumed that Abd-el-Rahman would not collaborate with his brother and would behave as he did in 1958 and 1959-62. This time he behaved differently, in spite of the fact that he was helping a brother who needed help much less badly than in 1958-62, when he was a captive and under a death sentence (or perhaps because of this).

Despite such instances of human unpredictability, and bearing in mind the individuality of our prospective recruits, we can nevertheless use the information we have collected to rank the leaders in terms of their probable response to our criteria.

Having established the career histories and ethnic and political affiliations of possible recruits, we can proceed to weigh our prospects as illustrated in Table 7. In evaluating the information we must, of course, bear in mind that the importance to be attached to each factor will differ from one environment to another: in Latin America, for example, social background would also have to be added, while in Western Europe and North America political allegiance would be paramount—ethnic affiliation would be of little importance, but social background would carry some weight.

Thus, out of the fifteen potential recruits, we see that No. 3 is the only totally good prospect from the point of view of the factors here taken into consideration; No. 5 is a totally bad one, and probably dangerous to approach at all; the others, however, will be somewhere in the middle.

Once we have repeated the procedure followed in the case of battalion No. 1 and we have covered all the other formations of the armed forces (or at any rate those with

TABLE 7

Battalion No. 1: recruitment prospects (see Table 3, p. 67)

Recruitment prospects of fifteen officers of higher rank. Experience, opinions, and affiliations from the point of view of the coup. (Repeat for thirty platoon commanders.)

x = Favorable n = Unfavorable o = Unknown
 xx = Very favorable nn = Very unfavorable

Officer No.	Political Views	Ethnic affiliations	Career pattern	Approach		Doubtful
				Yes	No	
1	o	x	xx	✓		
2	n	xx	n		✓	
3	xx	xx	xx	✓		
4	nn	x	n		✓	
5	nn	nn	nn		✓	
6	x	x	x	✓		
7	o	xx	nn			✓
8	o	n	xx	✓		
9	n	xx	n		✓	
10	o	nn	xx	✓		
11	x	n	o			✓
12	x	x	x	✓		
13	n	n	n		✓	
14	xx	xx	x	✓		
15	o	n	xx	✓		

an effective intervention capability), we will know the overall recruitment prospects of each unit, and within them, of each individual. We will never be able to achieve a 100 per cent coverage; in some cases, where the armed forces are very large in relation to our resources, or frequently redeployed, our coverage may be very incomplete.

This will not matter greatly if the "unknown" units can be neutralized *technically*. If, however, their intervention

capability does not depend on elaborate and vulnerable facilities, then the coup may be jeopardized. We do not, however, depend on the incorporation and the neutralization procedures alone, and we will also be able physically to isolate those units which appear on the scene unexpectedly and those which we have not been able to infiltrate at all. Before looking at the problems involved in the third, and least desirable, of our methods of dealing with armed opposition, we must turn our attention to the subversion of individuals in the units where we *do* have the requisite information.

As soon as we emerge from the close security of the planning and information stage, the danger factor in our activities will increase very sharply. As we have pointed out earlier, every single individual we approach will be a potential informer who, by telling the authorities about our efforts, could lead to the collapse of the coup. The most dangerous person to approach will be the first in each particular formation, because until we have *his* cooperation we will not have a really intimate source of information about the unit and its members. Our first recruit must, therefore, be a long-standing member of that particular formation and, if at all possible, he must be a senior officer—or even the commander. Once we have chosen our man, the first step will be to arrange a meeting and to “sound” him out in vague and generalized terms about the “possibilities of achieving political reform.” These soundings must be conducted by a man, or men, who fulfills certain exacting qualifications: he or she must be a trusted associate of high caliber without, however, being in the inner group planning the coup. In other words he must be both valuable and expendable. This is an ideal which we can only try to approximate, but it could be fatal to expose a member of the inner group to the possibility of being betrayed to the authorities. In the coup

country *par excellence*, Syria, political leaders have in fact gone around the barracks "canvassing" for (armed) support, but the special conditions of Syrian political life are not likely to be reproduced elsewhere.

Once the potential recruit has been brought to the state when the possibility of a coup has been openly discussed, he should be told three things about the coup: (a) the political aim; (b) that we have already "recruited" other individuals and units; and (c) the nature of the task that he will be asked to perform. Everything we say, or arrange to be said, to the potential recruit will have to be studied carefully, and we will work on the assumption that every recruit may be a "double" working for the security services.

We will not, of course, identify our coup with any particular party (whose policies would be known) nor with any political faction (whose leading personalities will be known). We will, instead, state the aim of the coup in terms of a political attitude rather than in terms of policies or personalities, because the latter are necessarily more specific and therefore liable to specific opposition. The attitude which we will project will have to be calculated carefully: it should reflect the preoccupations of the target country, implying a solution to the problems which are felt to exist, and in *form* it must reflect the general political beliefs of the majority of its people. Thus, in Britain, we could speak of "the need for more business-like government"—one can even imply (whether truthfully or not) that the coup is linked with prominent public figures such as newspaper proprietors, big businessmen, or the chairman of a nationalized industry. In Latin America the attitude presented may, for example, imply that the "sacred trust of the armed forces" requires intervention to "clear the mess made by the politicians" in order to achieve "social/national progress, while respecting property rights/individual rights."

If the pre-coup government is itself the product of a seizure of power, then the aims of the coup can be presented purely in terms of restoring "normal political life," or, if we are *outrés* leftists, we can speak about "the need to restore democracy."

Making up slogans may seem to be an easy game, but in fact our slogans will have to be calculated carefully to satisfy a political optimum. We must, for example, avoid being specific, but if the attitude we present is too general it will stimulate the suspicions of the shrewder of our listeners, while failing to fire the enthusiasm of the more idealistic ones. We must also remember that the armed forces of many countries are often politically, and psychologically, out of tune with civilian society, and that they could have distinct—and perhaps antagonistic—preoccupations and beliefs. As citizens, army officers may share the belief that there ought to be economies in government expenditure, but at the same time feel that the armed forces are being starved of funds. Where the social status of military personnel has suffered a decline because of defeat in battle, or just a long peace, we will always emphasize the need "to restore the defenders of society to their proper place within it."

In presenting the aims of the coup to potential recruits we should exercise a measure of flexibility in order to reach a "good fit" with what we know to be their beliefs: we cannot, however, run the risk of being exposed as being grossly inconsistent. Whether we hold the views that will make up our image does not matter at all as long as the other conditions are satisfied. It is, incidentally, polite to indicate that the coup is only being carried out with extreme reluctance, and that we appreciate that this reluctance is shared by our recruit.

Once the idea of the coup has gained a measure of acceptance in the mind of our potential recruit, we should

define the coup in terms of his role within it. This will not imply that we will reveal any of the operational detail, but we should make it quite clear that: (a) his role will be limited to a few specific actions; (b) almost everybody in his unit is already with us; and (c) therefore his role will be a safe one.

When, and only when, the recruit becomes actual, rather than potential, we can reveal to him the nature of his actual task. This will be described in the greatest possible detail, but not so as to enable the recruit to work out the implications of the task he is asked to perform. If, for example, the recruit in question is destined to use his unit to provide "muscle" for a roadblock team, he will be told what equipment his men should have, how many will be required, and how he will receive the go-signal. He will not be told the date of the coup, the place where the roadblock will be, or what the other teams will be doing.

Information is the greatest asset we have, and much of our advantage in the planning stage will derive from the fact that, while we know a great deal about the defenses of the state, those who control them know very little about us. We must therefore make every effort to avoid giving any information beyond what is actually required. In any case, while a recruit may feel that he ought to know more about the coup before he agrees to participate in it, he will also feel more secure if we show concretely that the operation is being run with great caution, and is therefore secure.

After the first few recruits in each unit have been made, the others in it will be much easier to persuade; there will also be more people to do the persuading, because this is the purpose to which we will put our first recruits, in the interval between their initial recruitment and the actual coup. Also, a "snowball" or, hopefully, an "avalanche"

effect will be generated by the first recruits, who will gradually create a climate in which it will be easy to recruit further.

After the approach and persuasion of the "key" individuals has begun to give its results, we will be able to identify the units which will eventually be used as active participants in the coup. These will be a small part of the armed forces as a whole but, hopefully, the *only* part that will be able to play an active role at the time and place of the coup. We will concentrate our further efforts on them because their infiltration in depth will be of value to us, whereas the "overneutralization" of the other forces will merely involve further risk. Ideally, we will have neutralized *all* those formations which we have not incorporated, but this is not likely to be the case. The methods that we will follow to "isolate" those formations that we have not been able to penetrate will be discussed in Chapter 4.

The degree of success required of our infiltration program before we can proceed to the operational phase will depend on the military, political, and geographical factors involved; the same degree of penetration may ensure success in one country while being inadequate in another. In our Portuguese example, because of the extensive deployment of the active troops in the remote African "provinces," and the lack of training and mechanization of the troops stationed in Portugal, we could go ahead with minimal penetration (Table 8, p. 84).

This is an extreme example of a small and poor country which is trying to retain its African empire to the bitter end, and is therefore only leaving a very small force in its own metropolitan territory. The degree of incorporation achieved here is only about 2 per cent, and yet the coup would not find any *military* opposition in its way, unless it failed to impose its authority within the time-span required to bring into Lisbon the troops stationed in the African

provinces. (The fact that the present regime is far from universally popular would reinforce the favorable "military" factors.)

If, however, we take the case of a developed country, with good transport links and with no overseas commitments for its troops, the same percentages of incorporation and active neutralization which in the Portuguese case would guarantee success would lead to certain failure, as illustrated in Table 9.

TABLE 8*Infiltration of the armed forces in Portugal (notional)*

Total armed forces (army, navy, and air force):	150,000
Incorporated as active participants:	3,000
Neutralized by the subversion of "key" technicians:	12,000
Neutralized by unsuitable training and equipment:	45,000
Neutralized by their location: Angola	45,000
Mozambique	25,000
Portuguese Guinea	20,000
	150,000

TABLE 9*Infiltration of the armed forces in West Germany (notional)*

Total armed forces (army, navy, and air force):	450,000
Incorporated as active participants:	9,000
Neutralized by the subversion of "key" technicians:	40,000 ⁷
Neutralized by unsuitable equipment (mainly air force and navy):	180,000
Balance of forces under the control of the government:	221,000
	450,000

⁷ In a densely populated area, with extensive civilian telecommunication facilities and a highly developed transport system, even this figure could be reached only with very great efforts.

Since there is nothing that we can do to prevent the large forces capable of intervention from doing so, we would almost certainly fail—unless we *were* the higher leadership of the armed forces.

Most situations will be between the two extremes, with a small percentage of the armed forces incorporated, a larger percentage neutralized by our efforts, and a very small percentage to be “isolated” by severing from the outside its communication and transport facilities. Apart from the military forces, the government will also be defended by police forces and their paramilitary extensions, and we now turn to the problem of their neutralization.

NEUTRALIZING THE POLICE

The flags and uniforms of the military forces of different countries are very different but their structure and organization tend to be very similar, since they reflect the universality of modern technology. The tactical implications of weapons and ancillary equipment impose a certain uniformity on military organization and this has enabled us to study their infiltration in terms which are generally applicable.

Police forces, however, are shaped by the social and political conditions of the society they serve and are therefore very diverse. Policemen can be armed very heavily or not at all; they can be concentrated in mobile and hard-hitting units, or dispersed in small groups; they can be controlled by the ministry of defense, and thus have a military training and outlook, or by the local community, and be extremely civilian-minded.

Though their structure is so diverse, police forces resemble each other in the purposes they serve: the prevention and the detection of crime⁸ and the maintenance of

⁸ By crime is meant an infraction of the laws of the land, and this means different things in different countries—e.g. South African residential and Soviet publication laws.

public order. The criminal side of police work involves the country-wide network of police stations supported by special detective units in the larger centers. The maintenance of public order, however, is carried out by separate paramilitary forces or, where there are no such forces, by concentrating and deploying ordinary policemen taken from their other work. Police work also includes an intelligence element. Information is gathered informally by the entire police apparatus (and their informers), but there will usually be a special section of the police whose only function is in this area. The intelligence aspect of police work will be effectively neutralized by our general defensive effort, *vis-à-vis* the security services, which is discussed in the next section.

Paramilitary forces do not exist in Britain, where there are provisions for the army to act in support of the civil power, but they are extensively employed in many other countries. In France, for example, there are two police forces—the *Sûreté Nationale* and the *Préfecture de Police*—but there is also a paramilitary force which normally acts as the rural police, the *Gendarmerie*.⁹

The *Gendarmerie* is controlled by the ministry of defense and its officers are integrated in the ranks of the armed forces, while the men receive a light infantry training as well as their police training. It numbers about 63,000 men and is organized into departmental forces which are scattered in small groups all over the countryside and into “mobile” groups which are concentrated in large units (legions). We can ignore the departmental forces because they would probably be unable to intervene within the short time-span of a coup; but the mobile units, each of which consists of seven squadrons of trucked gendarmes and one armored-car squadron, represent a very

⁹ In the spring of 1968 the *Préfecture de Police* was administratively merged with the *Sûreté*.

formidable force that would have to be neutralized or isolated.

The mobile Gendarmerie live in military-type barracks and are equipped with submachine guns and heavier infantry weapons; their armored cars (13-ton wheeled vehicles with 40mm. armor) can only be stopped with standard antitank weaponry. Officially, the Gendarmerie—unlike the other two police forces—has no intelligence service; but during the Algerian war a security section was set up and, as bureaucratic organizations often do, has survived the demise of its original function.

The Sûreté Nationale, which carries out police work in population centers of more than 10,000 inhabitants (except for Paris and its suburbs), is largely composed of CID men and dispersed policemen, but it also has a paramilitary force. This is the Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité (CRS). It numbers about 13,500 men, and they are trained and equipped in a manner like that of the mobile units of the Gendarmerie—minus the armored cars. The CRS is staffed with personnel which has been carefully screened politically and it is headed by an assistant director of the ministry of the interior. The Sûreté has an intelligence service which largely concentrates on the more sophisticated forms of crime, and a counterintelligence service which also carries out “political” work and the surveillance of aliens. Both intelligence organizations operate all over France, including Paris,¹ unlike the rest of the Sûreté.

All police work in the Département de la Seine (the Paris area) is the exclusive province of the Préfecture de Police, which has been made internationally famous by one of its fictional inspectors, Maigret. The Préfecture has influenced the organization of police forces in many

¹ But, in Paris, the jurisdiction of the Sûreté's intelligence service is officially limited to the railway station.

countries in southern Europe and the Middle East, and we will study it in greater detail than the other French police forces.

Anatomy of a Police Force: The Paris Préfecture

Hopefully, the police of the capital city which is the locale of the coup will be less powerful than this force. It consists of about 24,000 men and is organized in several directorates, of which the following concern us directly:

(a) *The Police Municipale* is the largest directorate and controls the familiar uniformed *flics*, with their largely symbolic pistols and their much-used truncheons. They are dispersed in twenty district stations in the city and twenty-six suburban ones; their standards of training and discipline have been improved under the Fifth Republic, but their capacity for individual brutality does not add up to effective intervention units. In the event of a major disturbance they are deployed in columns of civilian-type buses which could be stopped by suitable roadblocks; their training and mentality will probably make them "neutrals" if we can prevent their concentrated deployment.

(b) *The Police Judiciaire* is the Paris CID and one of the pioneers of scientific detection. Apart from the incidental intelligence aspect of their work, we can ignore this directorate.

(c) *The Intelligence service*, like its counterpart in the Sûreté, is mainly concerned with sophisticated crime: drugs, vice, and high-class gambling. But it also has a political section which carries out surveillance work. As in the case of other security agencies, we will cover the appropriate defensive tactics in the next section.

(d) *Aliens' directorate* is a small group, mainly concerned with the bureaucratic routines of issuing and checking residence permits. It exercises general surveillance over transient foreigners (the *fiches* you fill in at the hotel are collected by this directorate), and over foreign communi-

ties. Its work will only affect us if we have some connection with foreign elements, and particularly with those foreign communities which have a history of political activity in its more violent forms.

(e) *Safety of the President.* This directorate is concerned with the physical protection of the President, but it also carries out a preventive intelligence function. Following the repeated assassination attempts organized by the OAS and its affiliated organizations, this section of the Préfecture was reinforced with carefully screened personnel taken from the entire security apparatus. Their security system at the Elysée Palace would be a serious obstacle to its seizure during a coup.

(f) *Garde Républicaine.* Though controlled by the Préfecture, this is part of the Gendarmerie and is equipped with light infantry weapons and a variety of transport equipment. It provides the horsed, helmeted, and plumed presidential guard on ceremonial occasions, but its two regiments are hard-hitting mobile forces whose neutralization would be an essential requirement in the event of a coup.

The existence of separate police organizations is one of the problems of neutralizing this part of the state security apparatus. In Britain, the division is largely territorial and its purpose is to give the local interest a measure of control over the police force, but there are also specialized forces which reflect functional divisions. Apart from the county-based police (now being amalgamated into larger groups) there are the following independent police forces: admiralty constabulary; air-ministry constabulary; Atomic Energy Authority constabulary; five independent harbor police forces; British Transport Commission police; civil-aviation constabulary; and war-department constabulary.

All these police forces are strictly confined in their operations to the installations they protect, but similar organiza-

tions in other countries, where bureaucratic propensities are subject to weaker controls, have shown a remarkable ability to grow and diversify.

Though the French police system is particularly extensive, its basic features are shared by police forces in most of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The paramilitary element is usually present in the form of a "field force" attached to the regular police, or else in the form of armored-car units. The riot-control element is reproduced in the special squads of Middle Eastern police forces which, like Beirut's Squad 16, can be very effective in spite of their small size. Where, as in most parts of Asia, a serious insurgency situation has been experienced, this common pattern has been distorted by the proliferation of *ad hoc* police forces which carry out combined internal security and administrative functions. South Vietnam is the extreme example of this trend, with no fewer than five different formations.²

If the British police system can be said to be divided into largely territorial units, and the French one into largely functional ones, in the United States the division is largely constitutional. Except for the specialized work of the police agencies attached to various departments of the federal government, only the FBI has a nation-wide jurisdiction, and then only for certain crimes legally defined as "federal." Most ordinary police work is carried out by purely independent local forces maintained at the municipal, county, or state level. The fragmentation³ of the sys-

² Regional Forces (about 100,000 men), Popular Forces (about 30,000 men), Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (about 20,000 men), the regular police, and the supposedly elite Police Field Force.

³ Of course the fragmentation of the police in the United States has largely resulted from the *deliberate intention* of denying the federal government a possible instrument of tyranny. Nowadays, however, the main effect of the system is to impede efficient police work, viz. the case of the Boston Strangler.

tem means that the police as such would have a very limited intervention potential, in spite of its extensive stock of weaponry and communication equipment. There is, of course, the National Guard, but this has not so far been organized in a manner that would give it a real intervention capability, as was shown by the events of the summer of 1967 when the guard failed to perform efficiently, even against untrained civilians.

The strategy of the coup, with respect to the police system of our target country will, therefore, have to be as diversified as its component parts.

The Paramilitary Element

Paramilitary forces are usually able to perform a military as well as a police function. This versatility has resulted in their rapid growth, partly because they may be a genuinely economical way of improving the security system in general, and partly because funds are often easier to secure for them than for the regular police. An opposition party, or public opinion, which may resist an increase in the police budget can often be persuaded to allocate funds for the ministry of defense, and paramilitary forces are usually under its administrative control. In the newly independent countries the paramilitary element of the police can be a very serious obstacle to the coup because, while the army is often a recent postcolonial development, the police—and its paramilitary units—are usually old established organizations. This means that the police can be *larger* than the army, and also sometimes superior in the quality of training and equipment. If this is the case, it will not be possible to control the paramilitary units by using that part of the army which we have “incorporated” against them.

Fortunately, the governments of newly independent countries are making every effort to increase the size of

their armed forces and thus this unfavorable (for us) balance of strength between the army and the paramilitary police is usually reversed a few years after independence. This is perhaps one of the explanations for the sudden spate of coups in Africa in the course of 1966-7, which came after a phase of very rapid expansion in the armed forces. It is interesting to note that while the "ruthless oppression" of the colonial powers was often carried out by means of a village constabulary with few military pretensions, the new era of freedom has often required the creation of heavily armed paramilitary police forces.⁴ In Ghana, for example, the police system was extended after independence in 1957 and armored-car units were added to the already existing mobile police; the communication system of the police was made independent of civilian services, and the "escort police," which used to be a fezzed and barefooted force of amiable illiterates, has been turned into an effective riot-breaking unit.

If the paramilitary police is large, as compared to those units of the armed forces which we can incorporate, it will be necessary to repeat the whole analysis and infiltration procedure on it. We may, indeed, be able to concentrate on the paramilitary police and content ourselves with neutralizing the army by technical means. Normally, however, the balance of forces between the means of coercion of the state will not require this and we will be able to *isolate* the police for the duration of the coup by using the army.

The first step in our neutralization of these forces is to establish the size, deployment, and organization of the paramilitary police. This is usually easier than in the case of the army because, unlike the latter, paramilitary forces are usually stationed in permanent barracks. Next we will

⁴ But see Appendix A.

try to find out their degree of attachment to the present regime. But this will not involve the sort of study in depth we made of the army, and it will only be a matter of finding out about their *corporate*, rather than individual, outlook. The mentality of the paramilitary police may be "bureaucratic," i.e. concerned with jobs and careers—as in the case of the Italian Pubblica Sicurezza and its Celere paramilitary units; if this is the case, a minimal degree of intervention can be expected. On the other hand, their mentality may be parallel to that of the army, i.e. concerned with loyalty and honor⁵ (as well as jobs and careers), or reflect a political association, as in the case of the KGB or Duvalier's Ton Ton Macoutes.

If the equipment, deployment, and mentality of the paramilitary police are such as to make them an effective intervention force we will have to control them in the same manner as the "hard-core" loyalist forces of the army. (The ways and means of this forcible isolation will be discussed in Chapter 5.) Usually, however, we will find that the paramilitary police force is essentially bureaucratic and, therefore, in spite of its impressive military bearing and equipment, it will not intervene against the armed support of a coup. I have been unable to find a *single case* in the last twenty years of a paramilitary police which has actually defended its political masters during a coup—though there are several cases of their intervention *on behalf* of a coup.

The Rural Police and Gendarmerie

In most underdeveloped countries, this element of the police force is numerically the strongest; this is only to be expected since most of the population of such countries

⁵ The corporate mentality will of course be somewhat more complex than is suggested here by way of illustration.

lives in villages and works in agriculture. In spite of its large size, this part of the police will almost never have an intervention potential against a coup. They are often retired NCO's, fully integrated in the rural society they live in, and, even where there are provisions for their mobilization and concentrated use, they are unlikely to be assembled, equipped, and prepared in time to intervene against us. Whether the rural policeman is a *garde champêtre* with an ancient pistol inscribed *La Loi*, or a Middle Eastern *Zaptie* who plays the village boss, he will hardly want to rush to a remote capital city to protect an equally remote government.

The Urban and National Police

Though this part of the police system will be considerably less dispersed than the village-based rural police, its main components will be just as ineffective against a coup. The personnel of the urban police will fall into three broad categories: (a) crime detection and investigation; (b) normal surveillance; and (c) traffic duties. The CID element will be small and very bureaucratic-minded, and, apart from its incidental intelligence aspect,⁶ it can be ignored by us. The uniformed police who carry out all the usual surveillance duties will be more numerous, but though they may be useful as a riot-breaking force when suitably concentrated they are unlikely to act against *armed* opponents in a major political crisis. The municipal police, largely concerned with traffic duties, will usually be staffed by middle-aged men of retiring disposition, with small and rusty pistols. There are, however, exceptions such as the Spanish *Policia Armada y del Trafico* whose personnel are politically screened and which is equipped with adequate transport and telecommunications and thus able

⁶ See next section, p. 97.

(and probably willing) to intervene in a major political disturbance. A detailed analysis of our target country's police system will probably reveal a problem of composition: after dividing the police force into "hard" and "soft" forces we may find sizable "hard" subdivisions within the "soft" elements.

Our brief survey has shown that only a small part of the police force is likely to be able to intervene against us, and of this a yet smaller part is likely to do so with any enthusiasm. The natural inclination of the police will be to "ride" the crisis out and, as individuals, to avoid endangering their positions *vis-à-vis* their possible future employers. The coup may well be planned as a military operation, but it will not—unless partially or totally unsuccessful—involve any actual *fighting*. Thus, the fact that the police are not heavily armed does not fundamentally explain their low intervention capability, as compared to the army. The real difference between the two is in their degree of integration in the civil society. While the army can develop a corporate ideology and mentality which is divergent—or even opposed—to the civilian one, the police are usually too intimately involved in civilian life to do so.

This can be either an advantage or an obstacle from our point of view. On the one hand the eccentricity of the army will mean that a regime can retain its appeal in the closed world of the military barracks after losing it in society at large. This might interfere with our recruiting, but it could work the other way, i.e. we may find that the army is fundamentally opposed to a government which much civilian opinion accepts. Recruiting our forces among the police will almost always be more difficult than in the army. Firstly, the lower level of (automatic) discipline will mean that recruiting an officer may not bring over "his" men as well. Further, the fact that policemen live among the public will mean that the internal dynamics

which can be generated in the closed world of a military unit would be dissipated in this more open environment and the "snowball" effect which would bring entire units over to us after a limited degree of infiltration will not operate. All these factors point the same way: the low degree of intervention capability—for, as well as against, us—and the difficulty of incorporation both indicate that while the army should be penetrated the police forces can be dealt with—defensively—after the coup.

NEUTRALIZING THE SECURITY AGENCIES

The security agencies of our target country will be numerically the smallest of the professional defenses of the state, but often also the most dangerous. Unlike the armed forces and the police, the security agencies will be actively trying to identify and defeat threats posed by groups such as ours; unlike the armed forces and police, their organizations, deployment, and personnel cannot usually be studied from the outside, and even their existence may not be known to us. Almost every state has some sort of "secret service." Many have several such organizations which operate both within and outside the national territory, and which we have so far described with the blanket term "security agencies." Our first task is to try to identify them more precisely.

It is well known that the bureaucratic animal in its natural state has certain characteristic patterns of behavior: it grows in size and extends its sphere of action until checked by some outside force. This role is usually played by the financial bureaucracy, which fulfills its instincts by opposing the growth of all other bureaucratic organizations. Equally important as a limiting factor is the concerted pressure of individual bureaucracies, each of which is fighting to preserve and extend its territory. The cumulative

effect of these pressures is to limit to some extent the growth of the bureaucracy as a whole, and perhaps without them *all* the inhabitants of developed countries would by now be employed by the state bureaucracy.

These pressures operate weakly or not at all in the case of the security services: their budgets are allocated by many different departments and are usually secret so that they cannot easily be known, let alone reduced; other bureaucratic organizations cannot prevent them from poaching in their territories because their activities cannot often be identified and thus declared to be off-limits. Finally, the prestige which undercover men of all kinds often enjoy allows them to break rules which other bureaucrats must obey and to operate in all areas of social activity. The result of this freedom is predictable: in many countries security agencies have grown in a more dynamic and more disorderly fashion than the rest of the bureaucracy and tend to have overlapping spheres of activity.

Before a zoologist studies his animals he classifies them and tries to relate them to the nearest known species. We will follow this procedure both in functional terms (which are generally applicable to all countries) and in organizational terms (which are particular to each one).

The Pure Intelligence Function

This classification covers the collection and analysis of published and unpublished information of all kinds and, because of the high degree of specialized knowledge which is often required, many different bodies can enter this field, which is the most crowded of the whole sector. *Tactical* military intelligence (What is the opposition doing?) may be collected by separate agencies working for the three branches of the armed forces; in traditionally seafaring nations, naval intelligence is often the largest

and most developed service. *Strategic* information (What is the opposition planning?) may be the province of separate and competing agencies run by the general staff, the ministry of defense, and the ministry in charge of foreign affairs. *Scientific* information may be collected by the administrative entity in charge of "science" and also by specialized bodies in charge of particular sectors, such as atomic energy, aeronautics, and telecommunications. *Economic* intelligence is one of the worst areas of duplication, with demographic, energy, and agriculture authorities all operating alongside the entity in charge of economic affairs in general. *Political* intelligence may be handled by the foreign affairs ministry openly, through the diplomatic service, and also covertly by a separate agency.

The Counterintelligence Function

This covers the prevention of the activities listed above and may be carried out by both generalized and specialized bodies. The military may run their own agency, and the police of each branch of the armed forces may do the same. The ministry of the interior will almost always have a "spy-catching" service (like the Security Service of Britain's Home Office) and particular bodies will have a service to protect their installations (but these rarely go beyond the ordinary police stage). From our point of view, this sector will be the most important. We may—if we fail to preserve our security position—come into contact with (a) the police agency, such as Special Branch in Britain or the FBI in the U.S.A., (b) the separate ministerial body, or (c) the military agencies. Much of our planning and infiltration work will be indistinguishable from that which could be carried out by a foreign intelligence service and it will therefore enter into the territory of the counterintelligence agencies.

The Counterespionage Function

This is the most subtle and sophisticated of all the functions. It covers the deliberate contact with opposition intelligence services, in order to feed them with "disinformation" or to disrupt their organization. It is unlikely that more than one agency carries out this work because it requires an extremely precise control over operations. The agency may be a subsection of any of those mentioned above, but in order to function efficiently it must be able to exercise some form of control over all competing agencies—especially over counterintelligence, which relates to counterespionage as a butcher does to a surgeon.

Internal (Political) Security

This is another sensitive area from our point of view. Its specific function is the prevention of exactly what we aim to do: the overthrow of the government. In many countries there is a "political" police, with both uniformed and covert agents, and it may be controlled by the bureaucracy of the ministry of the interior or by the inner political leadership, either directly or, in one-party states, through the party. Elsewhere, in more or less democratic regimes, the police has a political department, as in France, Italy, and West Germany, and its primary function is the surveillance of extremist groups. In military dictatorships, the territory of military intelligence often extends to this area; in some countries the agency in charge of the physical protection of the higher leadership may run an information service as well as providing the bodyguards.

Internal Intelligence

This function is carried out by the information services which are attached to the police and paramilitary forces of the state. Thus, in Italy, apart from the police (*Pubblica*

Sicurezza), which has a "political" squad, the paramilitary Carabinieri has an information service (SIFAR) which, though primarily concerned with military counterintelligence, also operates in the internal political field.

Our behavior in the midst of this bureaucratic jungle will be purely defensive, unless we have a "direct line" to one or another of the security agencies. If that is the case, the security agency concerned would provide an ideal "cover" for all our activities. Failing such a fortunate coincidence, we will not try to create a "direct line" by infiltrating any security service, because if we do so there will be the very great danger that they will use any contact in order to infiltrate *us*. This is a standard procedure for the security services to follow, and the elementary defensive techniques used when infiltrating the armed forces (cut-outs, one-way communication, etc.) will probably fail to work in their case.

In order to run a secure operation we will follow rules which derive from the basic assumption that *all* information about our activities is a source of danger as soon as it exists outside the minds of our inner group. From this all the standard procedures emerge: (a) no information to be communicated except verbally; (b) no information to be communicated except on a "need-to-know" basis; (c) all communication links from inner to affiliated members to be on a one-way basis; (d) no activity to be carried out by an inner member if an outer member can do the job.

These rules are simple and well known; the problem is to keep to them under the pressure of work and the emotions which it generates. The most sensitive of our activities will be the approach and persuasion of new affiliates to the coup, and the nature of the security agencies can add an extra measure of danger: in many countries some of the security services are hidden within totally unexciting

administrative bodies. Where, as in the case of the U.S. Treasury's Secret Service, this reflects an administrative convenience, the fact is well known; elsewhere, however, the department-within-a-department system is deliberate. We may therefore unwittingly try to infiltrate a "safe" department and discover that we are dealing with a security agency. All we can do is to list some of the places where it is "natural" for security services to "grow": census and cartography services; central bank anticounterfeiting agencies; post-office departments; press bureaus; customs and immigration departments; and the taxation authorities.

It must not be thought that our entire operation will automatically collapse if it is penetrated by a security agency.⁷ If we have followed the security procedures the chances are that only a small part of our total effort will be identified, and therefore its ultimate purpose may not be discovered. Even if it is discovered that a coup is being planned, the security agency may wait before taking any action, in order to capture *all* the planners—and this could be too late. As soon as our teams are on the road, actually executing the coup, it will be too late for the security services to oppose us on the "information" side, while their fighting power will usually be unimportant as compared to the army units we have incorporated. Finally, political security agencies are necessarily sensitive to political trends, and they may decide to join the group planning a coup, if they know that it is well organized and ready to seize power.

⁷ The Okhrana, the Czarist secret police, was extremely efficient and it had infiltrated the Bolshevik and other revolutionary parties without, however, impairing their activities. Roman Malinovsky, who was the leader of the Bolshevik organization inside Russia until 1914, was working for the Okhrana, and they edited *Pravda*, whose chief editor was also one of their agents. This, incidentally, later lent some slight plausibility to the accusations made at the Moscow trials that old Bolshevik leaders had been lifelong stooges of the foreign secret service (usually the British).

The Planning of the Coup d'État

. . . Even barricades, apparently a mechanical element of the uprising, are of significance in reality above all as a moral force . . .

—Lev Davidovich Bronstein (Trotsky)

IN THE EARLY MORNING of April 23, 1961, elements of the 1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment seized the key points of the city of Algiers in the name of generals Challe, Zeller, Jouhaud, and Salan. The four generals, because of their personal prestige and their position in the French hierarchy, quickly asserted their control over the local military command and started to extend their authority over all the armed forces in Algeria. At this time De Gaulle's government was in the process of opening negotiations with the Algerian nationalists and the generals were determined to replace him with a leader who would carry the war to a victorious conclusion. The French armed forces in Algeria were much more powerful than those stationed in France and Germany, and the four generals were hopeful that, once their allegiance was assured, they would find it easy to take effective control of the French government. After all, De Gaulle himself had come to power after a similar episode in May 1958, there seemed to be no major obstacle to a successful second edition of the famous *treize mai*.

When the four generals made their declaration over Algiers Radio, the 1st, 14th, and 18th Colonial Parachute regiments rallied to the coup. A few infantry units, some of the marines, and much of the air force remained loyal to De Gaulle (as in May 1958 they had remained loyal to the Fourth Republic), but most of the armed forces in Algeria were *attentiste*. Wait-and-see is the attitude that usually favors a coup, and when General Henri de Pouilly withdrew his headquarters from Oran to Tlemcen, to avoid having to choose between fighting or joining the coup, he was objectively favoring the coup.

The four generals seemed to be on the verge of victory. The determined *pied noir* population of Algeria was 100 per cent behind them. The powerful parachute units gave them a hard-hitting force of intervention, and the bulk of the armed forces were either for them or neutral. Even the forces loyal to De Gaulle's government did nothing actively to oppose the coup.

While the leaders of the coup started to gather support, the French defense minister was on a visit to Morocco; Maurice Papon, the head of the Paris police, was on vacation; Debré, the Prime Minister and chief "fire-fighter" of the regime, was ill; De Gaulle himself was entertaining the visiting President of Senegal, Senghor. Other ministers were on visits to Algiers itself, and were promptly captured and held in confinement, together with other representatives of the President. Everything pointed to an early victory of the coup, and yet a few days later General Challe was being flown to Paris for eventual trial and imprisonment, Salan and the others were fleeing to the interior on their way to exile or capture, and the 1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment drove back to their barracks singing Edith Piaf's "Je ne regrette rien," though their officers were under arrest and their unit was to be disbanded.

Why did the coup fail? Perhaps the main reason was that the four generals had utterly neglected the "political forces" and had allowed the immediate power of the armed forces to obscure the somewhat less immediate, but ultimately decisive, role that they could play. In the Gaullist coup of May 1958, the action of the military and the population of Algiers had been supported by the Gaullist infiltration of the civil service and by the steady corrosion of the will of other political groups to oppose the dissolution of the Fourth Republic. This time the generals had simply ignored the civilians.

De Gaulle went on television and called for popular support: "*Françaises, Français, aidez-moi.*" Debré, who followed him on the screen, was more specific: "Go . . . to the airports . . . convince the soldiers who are misled. . . ." He also started to arm a militia drawn from the Gaullist party. More important, the trade-union organizations, the Communists (CGT), the Christian Democrats (CFTC), and the Force Ouvrière, all rallied round the government while most political parties did the same; the left-wing Catholic movement started to organize sit-down strikes among the national servicemen in Algeria; and, in general, most organized forces of French society intervened and refused to accept the authority of the coup.

The effect of this refusal was decisive; the larger part of the "wait-and-see" element in the armed forces stopped waiting and declared its support for De Gaulle, and this was the end of the coup.

We will be able to avoid a repetition of the crucial error made by the generals only if we can neutralize the political forces as effectively as the military ones.

Immediate political power is always concentrated in the country's government, but in every country and under all political systems there will be groups outside the government—and even outside formal politics—which also have

political power. Their source of strength can be their ability to influence particular groups of voters (as in democratic societies) or their control over certain organizations which are important in the country's political life. Whether these groups, which we have called "the political forces," are pressure groups, political parties, or other associations does not greatly matter. What is of importance is their ability to participate in the formation of governments and, later, to influence their decisions. The nature of the forces which are important in the political life of a particular country will reflect the structure of its society and economy, and it will also depend on the particular context of decision-making.

If, for example, we were asked to determine the most important forces in British political life, we could produce the following (rather conventional) list: the two major political parties; the Trades Union Congress and certain major unions; the Confederation of British Industry; the senior civil service-academic complex; the City and its corporations; and the press. But if we were asked to isolate the groups which would matter in foreign-policy decision about, say, the Middle East, we would come up with a quite different list: the two major British and part-British oil companies; the Foreign Office-academic "Arabist" group; and the central organizations of British Jews.

In a sophisticated society, with its complex industrial and social structure, there are hundreds of organizations which, whatever their primary purpose, also act as pressure groups and attempt to influence political decisions in a manner that serves their members' interests. These organizations will reflect in their divergent attitudes the diversity of a complex society. In economically backward countries, however, the structure of society is simpler and any conflict of interests, though just as strong, is played out in a much smaller arena and with fewer participants. In Africa south

of the Sahara religious groups are generally fragmented and apolitical, and where the local business community is still relatively small and weak, the major political forces are limited to a few groupings: tribal and other ethnic

TABLE 10

The groups which would influence the formation of American policy on Middle Eastern questions: formal and unofficial participants.

Official:

President and the White House staff
 Department of State
 Pentagon
 CIA (as supplier of information)
 Key Congressional committees

Unofficial:

(a) Oil companies with interests in the Middle East (which seek to protect and extend their interests and therefore advocate sympathetic understanding for Arab aspirations and policies)

(b) Oil companies with exclusively domestic interests (which favor a continuation of the existing policy of excluding foreign oil from the U.S. market, and are therefore inimical to any general U.S.-Arab *rapprochement*)

(c) Other energy industries (which also oppose any relaxation of present U.S. import controls on—cheap—foreign oil)

(d) Politicians with significant Jewish populations in their constituencies (who naturally follow a visibly pro-Israel line on Congressional voting and make appropriate speeches)

(e) Pro-Zionist organizations of American Jewry

(f) American Council for Judaism (which is anti-Zionist and opposes the pro-Israel elements in this field)

(g) Academic bodies with a special interest in Arab or Middle Eastern studies (which usually identify with Arab views and seek a sympathetic hearing of Arab claims)

groups; trade unions; students' and graduates' associations; civil-service officials and officers of the armed forces; and the activists of the ruling political party.

In much of West Africa one would have to add the local market traders' association, and in immediate sub-Saharan areas the traditional Muslim leadership structures. In Asia, religious groups and their leaders would have to be added to the list, and in some countries (such as Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea, and Hong Kong) the local business class will be of importance. Missing from all the lists are the foreign business interests which may play an important or even dominant role, but which represent a special problem already dealt with in Chapter 2. But whatever groups dominate the political scene of our target country in normal times, the special circumstances of the coup will mean that only a few elements among them will be important to us.

Political forces can intervene against the coup in two ways: (*a*) they can rally and deploy the masses, or some part of them, against the new government; (*b*) they can manipulate technical facilities under their control in order to oppose the consolidation of our power.

The action of individual political, religious, ethnic, or intellectual leaders, who could use the framework of their party or community against us, is an example of the first kind of intervention; a strike of the staff of the radio-television service is an example of the second. A general strike would, in effect, combine both kinds of intervention.

NEUTRALIZING THE POLITICAL FORCES I: GENERAL

Politics, like economics, has its infrastructure. Just as industry and commerce require a background of facilities

such as roads, ports, and energy sources, direct political action requires certain technical facilities. The mobilization of French public opinion which took place during the attempted coup in Algiers—and which was the principal cause of its failure—could not have taken place without the use of a whole range of technical facilities. The government appealed to public opinion by means of the mass media, chiefly the radio and television services; the trade unions and other organized bodies coordinated the agitation of their members by means of their network of branches, connected to the central headquarters by means of the public telecommunications facilities; finally, the mass demonstrations could not have taken place without the use of public and private transport.

Our *general* neutralization of the “political” forces will be conducted in terms of this infrastructure. We will seize and hold such facilities as we require for our own purposes, while temporarily putting out of action the others. If the means of communication and the transport system are under our control, or at any rate do not function, the potential threat posed by the “political forces” will be largely neutralized; the leaders of the pre-coup government will be arrested since they are part of the infrastructure and they would probably be the major sources of inspiration of any opposition to the coup.¹

We will neutralize some political forces in *particular* by identifying and isolating their leadership, and by disrupting their organizations; this will be necessary only for those forces which are sufficiently resilient and sufficiently militant to intervene against us even though the infrastructure has been neutralized.

¹ In seizing the leaders of the government we will also contribute toward the isolation of those segments of the army and police which we have been unable to infiltrate, though more direct measures will be required as well.

Both forms of neutralization will involve the selection of certain objectives which will be seized or put out of action, by teams² formed out of those forces of the state which we have fully subverted or, in our terminology, incorporated.

Unless our target country is particularly small and its physical and political structures particularly simple, its system of government will be complex, its physical facilities will be extensive, and its political forces will be many in number while their intervention capabilities will be difficult to forecast.

We will, therefore, start by analyzing the governmental leadership in order to determine which personalities will have to be isolated for the duration of the active phase of the coup and which can be safely ignored. Next, we will study the physical facilities and select those which are likely to be relevant during the coup, in order to plan their seizure or neutralization. Finally, we will investigate the likely nature of those political forces which could still retain a degree of intervention capability after our "general" measures, in order to prepare for their individual neutralization.

PERSONALITIES IN THE GOVERNMENT

However bloodless our coup, however progressive and liberal our aims, we will still have to arrest certain individuals during and immediately after its execution. Of these the most important group will be formed by the leading figures of the pre-coup regime, or in other words the leaders of the government and their close associates, whether they are formally politicians or not. The members of a cabinet will form a fairly large group, from ten to fifty people; adding

²The nature and composition of the active teams of the coup are discussed in Appendix B.

their associates and intimate advisers—who could also organize opposition against us—we could easily reach a figure four or five times this number. Apart from being uncomfortably large, this will also be an especially determined and dangerous group. The personal repute, presence, and authority of its members could be such as to enable them to rally against us the disorganized forces of the state, or the unorganized masses; it could also enable them to impose their will on the team sent to capture them, and turn their would-be captors into their allies. General Challe, for example, was regarded as the *patron* by the NCO's of the French Army in Algeria, and even after the total failure of his attempted coup, the Paris government could not entrust him to a military escort on his way to France and arrest and had to use the CRS,³ who had never experienced his personal authority. After all, if a young soldier acting outside his familiar roles is facing a political personality whose whole behavior is calculated to make people obey him, it is difficult to be absolutely certain that he will carry out his orders, and not the counterorders he may be given.

The large number of the separate targets and the possible "radiation" effect indicate that the teams sent to arrest them should be both large and particularly well chosen. Since our resources will be limited, we will have to concentrate our efforts on the most important figures within the group while leaving the others to be picked up later when our means will have been expanded by the allegiance of the "wait-and-see" element. We cannot arrest all those who may constitute eventual danger, but we must make sure that we do arrest the really dangerous figures, that is, the key figures within the leadership, who

³ *Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité*, part of the police and outside the military community.

may or may not be the first in the formal order of precedence.

The formal structure of governments falls into two broad categories (illustrated in Table 11): the "presidential" type, where the head of state is also the main decision-maker (as in the U.S.A., France, and most of the Afro-Asian states), and the "prime-ministerial" type, where the head of state has largely symbolic or ceremonial duties and real decision-making is carried out at a theoretically lower level (as in Britain, India, and most of Europe, as well as the U.S.S.R.).

A third alternative form—which is not a structure at all, but rather a denial of one—is the "strong man" form of government. The "strong man" may not be a top minister, and may hold no official position at all, but actually rules

TABLE 11

Alternative forms of government

Presidential

Real decision-making level:	}	king	(e.g. seventeenth-century England)
		president	(e.g. twentieth-century America)
		emperor	(e.g. twentieth-century Ethiopia)
		ruler	(e.g. twentieth-century Kuwait)

Prime (or chief) minister

Ministerial level

Junior ministers and civil service

Prime-ministerial

Ceremonial head of state:	}	king	(e.g. Belgium)
		president	(e.g. Italy)

Real decision-making level:	}	prime minister	(e.g. United Kingdom)
		president of council of ministers	(e.g. Italy)

Cabinet-level ministers

Junior ministers

Higher civil servants

by using the formal body of politicians as a screen. This type of regime is evolved when the fabric of the state has been weakened to such an extent that only the actual leader of some part of the armed forces or police can control the situation and remain in power. If the person is himself even minimally acceptable as a political leader, he can take over the formal posts as well and make himself the visible head of the government. Abdel Nasser in Egypt and Reza Shah (the father of the present Shah of Iran) both accomplished this after a short period of transition, but there can sometimes be racial or religious reasons that bar the "strong man" from an official position. The man who controls the bayonets may be totally unacceptable as a public figure, but he can still rule indirectly by manipulating the official leaders, whom he keeps under control by the ultimate sanction of force.

When in early 1966 the Syrian government of the moderate wing of the Ba'ath party, headed by Michel Aflak, Salah Bitar, and the army leader Hafez, was overthrown by an extreme left faction of the party, the new leadership found out that though it controlled the army and the country it could not rule openly. The army officers who led this latest coup were too young, too unknown, and, above all, they were Alawites. Salah Jadid, their leader, is a dark, brooding figure who inspired fear and hatred among that small part of the public that knew of him. And of all the communities of Syria, the Alawites are among the least prestigious. In colonial times the French had recruited most of their forces of repression, the "Troupes spéciales du Levant," from the minority communities, chiefly the Alawites, and they had given the Alawite area in northern Syria a form of autonomy in order—so the nationalists claimed—to break up Syrian national unity. After independence the Sunni majority community regarded the Alawites as renegades, and pub-

lic opinion would have accepted an Alawite head of state only with difficulty.


Salah Jadid overcame this problem by appointing a full set of cabinet ministers, carefully chosen so as to balance the various communities, while retaining the real decision-making power within a separate body, the National Revolutionary Council, headed by himself. Thus, though Syria has a president (Nurreidin Atassi), a prime minister (Youssef Zwayeen), and a foreign minister (Ibrahim Makhous), all major political decisions are made by Jadid; the ministers go on state visits, make the public speeches, and appear at all ceremonial occasions, but power is not in their hands.

The government of the "socialist" countries is formally party government, but it tends to break down into one of the two other types. In its original form, real political power is concentrated in the hands of the central committee, or some other higher party council, as illustrated in Fig. 1.

Once the purely ceremonial figures have been excluded,

Fig. 1 ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT

Party government in "socialist" countries and "People's Republics"




the number of people still to be dealt with will be reduced, and by applying our time-span criterion, we can reduce their numbers still further. The minister of economic planning may be a crucial figure in the government, his position as a technocrat may be unassailable, but he may be unable to rally public opinion against us, or to assert his authority over the armed forces. The dramatic nature of the coup will reduce political life to its ultimate rationale, sheer force, and we will concentrate on those figures in the government who could deploy it. The obvious personalities will therefore be: (a) the minister of the interior and his associates (who control the police force); (b) the minister of defense and his associates (who control the armed forces); (c) the party leaders (if there is a party militia); (d) the prime minister or other central figure (who coordinates all these).

We must remember that for various reasons figures in the government may not always be what they appear to be. We may discover that the apparently innocuous minister of education controls an important students' militia, or the minister of labor a powerful workers' militia. More important, the effective power may be held by an inner association of a particular group of ministers who between them control the means of coercion of the state. Thus, the government of Czechoslovakia between the elections of May 1946 and the final Communist takeover in February 1948 was a coalition of all "democratic" parties, but the Communist ministers within it effectively monopolized the real sources of power by means of the control of the means of coercion. The existence of a group of associates, whose alliance transcends the formal order of government, is illustrated in Fig. 2.

In this particular case, out of the eighteen or so members of the government, the prime minister, the ministers

of defense, labor, and education, and the undersecretaries of state for the army and police form a special inner council which actually holds the reins of power.

Fig. 2 THE FORMAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REAL ONE
(Members of inner power group shown in italics)



The process of selection so far discussed should result in the classification of the personalities of the pre-coup regime into three categories:

The Ceremonial Figures

These will not be arrested. If the head of state is generally popular he should be used as a symbol of continuity who will help us to establish our legitimacy, provided he can be safely manipulated and made to play this role. The other, lesser, ceremonial figures can simply be ignored.

**The "Inner Council" and the Controllers
of the Means of Coercion**

This small group must be sequestered and held in isolation until our authority is safely established. Apart from the service ministers, etc., any government leader who is personally particularly popular should be included in this category.

**The Other Ministers and
Top Civil Servants**

This larger group should be subdivided into priority groups and put into the category above, as and when our resources expand, or become available when other more urgent tasks have been carried out.

PERSONALITIES OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT

The political weight of an individual in any large-scale political community will usually only be important within the framework of an organization which he heads or manipulates. It is sometimes possible for an individual to achieve political importance by becoming identified with an ideology or an attitude in which some significant part of the public believes. Kossuth, the leader of the Hungarian nationalist movement in the 1848-9 revolution, was a poet by profession, and had no party machine behind him, but he did have considerable power because the

TABLE 12

*Mass communications in the Middle East and North
Africa, mid-1967*⁴

Estimated circulation of daily newspapers	1,500,000
Estimated number of television sets	1,000,000
Estimated number of radio sets	7,000,000

⁴Data compiled from Orbis Yearbook and National Publications.

masses (in the cities at any rate) identified his person with Hungarian nationalism. Gandhi, who operated largely outside the Congress Party machine, also achieved personal power because to many Indians he was the embodiment of nationalism. The remoteness of the examples indicates that such figures are very rare, and if we do have one within our target area they should be treated as are the ceremonial personalities in government.

PHYSICAL FACILITIES

Mass Media

Control over the flow of information emanating from the political center will be our most important weapon in establishing our authority after the coup. The seizure of the main means of mass communication will thus be a task of crucial importance. One, though only one, of the causes of the failure of the Greek King's counter-coup in late 1967 was this inability to communicate with the masses, literally and otherwise. When Radio Larissa broadcast the King's messages it only reached a fraction of the population: the transmitter was weak and the wavelength unusual; instead of the booming voice of authority the declaration took the form of a weak appeal for help. We must not make a similar mistake.

Because of the short time-span of the coup, and because of the likely social background of our target country, the press need not be a primary target; we will establish our authority over it after the coup, as with other aspects of the nation's life. Inevitably the press can play only a marginal role in countries where illiteracy is widespread; and, in any case, it is the radio-television service which is mainly associated with the voice of the government. The approximate comparative data for the Arab world in Table 12 illustrate the importance of the different media, in one part of the "Third World."

Even those figures understate the importance of radio and television sets, because while the press figures refer to circulation, i.e. estimated number of readers, rather than copies sold, the radios and television sets reach a much wider public even among the poorest groups, since every café has one.

There are two problems associated with radio and television facilities from our point of view: (a) there will often be many different broadcasting services and associated facilities; and (b) they are particularly difficult to seize. In some countries, where the internal-security position is precarious, the governmental radio is heavily guarded, but even where this is not the case, these facilities are difficult to seize because their staffs have a uniquely extensive way of raising the alarm. As for the duplication of broadcasting facilities, even Haiti, a very small and extremely backward country, has eighteen different radio stations, controlled by independent networks. Our objective is not merely to control but also to monopolize the flow of information, and we must therefore deal with every single facility. This would be difficult (and would also lead to a dispersal of our forces) if we tried to seize and hold every single facility. Our strategy will therefore be to seize and hold just one facility, the one most closely associated with the voice of authority, while neutralizing the others. This is best done with the cooperation of some technical member of their staff who would be able to sabotage the facility from the inside. A single cooperative technician will be able temporarily to put out of action a radio station which would otherwise require a full-scale assault team.

If we are unable to recruit an internal saboteur, the next best alternative will be external sabotage. There is no need to cause any extensive damage since it will usually be possible to remove or destroy a small but essential part of the

transmitter(s), thus effectively neutralizing the facility. The one broadcasting facility which we do have to seize and hold will present a special problem: on the one hand, our need for the facility is absolute; on the other, because it is such an obvious target, the governmental forces will certainly try to recapture it. This means that the team assigned to this target will have to be adequately staffed and equipped and, in order to obviate the need for the cooperation of the facility's personnel, should also include a skeleton technical staff. (Appendix B, on the military aspects of the coup, deals *inter alia* with the composition of the various teams.)

Telecommunications

Technical progress has evolved in our favor, since all the communication requirements between our own teams can be carried out by the cheap and reliable two-way transistor radios now universally available. We must, however, deny the opposition the use of their fixed communication systems, because by so doing we will paralyze their reaction and prevent them from deploying against us such forces as they still control. As Fig. 3 (p. 121) shows, the neutralization of the telecommunication facilities will be complicated by their multiplicity, and it will be essential to achieve full coverage. The Left Socialist Revolutionary coup against the Bolsheviks in July 1918 failed partly because it failed to comprehend the need for a monopoly of *all* telecommunications. The Left Socialist Revolutionaries had infiltrated a group of the Cheka, the main instrument of Bolshevik power, and various army detachments; with these they arrested the head of the Cheka, Dzerzhinsky, and seized many public buildings and the Moscow telegraph office. They failed, however, to seize the telephone office as well, and while they were sending cables all over Russia

asking for generalized political support, Lenin used the telephone service to mobilize his fighting forces, and with these the coup was quickly crushed.

Internal-security authorities are aware of the need for efficient communications, and apart from the facilities illustrated in the diagram on p. 121, there may also be independent networks for the exclusive use of the security forces. The French Gendarmerie has a system of regional links which bypasses the public telephone and cable wires, and even in smaller countries, such as Ghana, the police can have a fully independent system (Table 13).

TABLE 13

Police telecommunication facilities in Ghana


- 63 fixed wireless stations, both high-frequency and VHF radio telephones
- 6 dual-purpose mobile radio stations
- Numerous man-portable radio sets

In the U.S.A. there are no national police networks, but the Department of Defense maintains a nation-wide and international system which is the largest single network in the world and which connects every U.S. military installation with every other throughout the world.

We cannot, of course, hope to seize every two-way set in the hands of the police and the military authorities, but we should neutralize, by external or internal sabotage,⁵ those facilities which can be identified and located. There is no need to seize and hold any of these facilities, and it will therefore be a matter of penetrating the central

⁵ The normal way of neutralizing an electrically powered facility is to detonate small plastic charges on the grouped wire links between the facility and the public power supply (and independent generators, if any). These are usually not difficult to reach from the outside.

Fig. 3 TELECOMMUNICATION FACILITIES AVAILABLE TO GOVERNMENT (notional)




organization of each communication system for the brief period required to sabotage its operation, though, again, *internal* sabotage will be easier and safer.

City Entry-Exit Road Links

During the active phase of the coup the unexpected arrival of even a small contingent of loyalist or uninfiltred forces could seriously endanger our whole effort. When a government discovers that troops of its own armed forces are taking part in a coup in the capital city, its logical reaction may be to call on troops stationed elsewhere, in the hope that the infiltration of the armed forces is limited to those in the capital city. As it is not easy to infiltrate forces in the entire national territory, the government's hope may not be unfounded. We will attack the mechanism which could lead to the arrival of the loyalist troops in the capital city at each separate level: we will arrest those who would call them in, we will disrupt the telecommunications needed to reach them, and we will also try to isolate identified loyalist forces by direct (though purely defensive) military means. We must also prevent the intervention of these forces by controlling the last level: the perimeter of the capital city and scene of the coup.

If the loyalist forces are to intervene in time, they will have to move rapidly, and this will require the use of either the major roads or alternatively air transport. If we can set up efficient defensive road blocks at the appropriate places we should be able to deny their entry into the capital city for the short period required, that is, until we have established ourselves as the government and received the allegiance of the bulk of the state bureaucracy and military forces. Thus, by the time the forces of intervention have reached the scene of the action, *they* will be the isolated band of rebels. The most suitable places to block a road with a small number of men and limited equipment, as

Fig. 4 THE PHYSICAL TARGETS OF THE COUP



well as the techniques and implication of such actions, are discussed in Appendix B and also in Chapter 5, where we deal with the direct neutralization of the identified loyalist forces. Fig. 4 illustrates the locations which would be chosen in a particular (synthetic) example. But our control of the physical access to the capital city will also serve other purposes. It will be one of the ways in which we will establish the physical presence of the new regime, and it will also allow us to prevent the escape of governmental leaders and other personalities which we have been un-

able to arrest. One of the dangers which we will face will be the revitalization of counter-coup opposition, which could result if a major governmental figure escapes from the capital city and joins loyalist elements outside it. After all the efforts we have made to neutralize such forces by internal means and by interference with their transport and communications, our whole work could be endangered. The loyalist forces could fail to reach the capital but the political leadership could reach *them*. The means at our disposal will not be sufficient to seal hermetically the entire capital city, though of course much will depend on its location and spatial spread. Brasilia, though open on all sides, would be easy to seal off simply by closing the airport, since the surface links are inadequate to allow rapid movement to the rest of the country. Helsinki, on the other hand, would be spatially convenient because, though not remote from the rest of the country, it is surrounded by sea and lake so that a small number of road blocks would effectively seal it.

Focal Traffic Points

The sight of tanks in the main squares of the capital city has become a symbol of the coup,⁶ but is also an expression of a very real practical requirement: the need to establish a physical presence in the center of political activity. Every capital city has an area which is the local equivalent of Whitehall in the U.K. or Capitol Hill in the U.S.A., in or near which the main political-administrative facilities are concentrated. We will select and defend certain positions around and within this area and by so doing we will achieve a variety of purposes: (a) the positions will form a ring round the main area within which our active

⁶ Tanks in the main squares are a feature of the Middle Eastern and Latin American, but not of the African, military coup. Most African armies do not in fact have tanks.


teams will operate, so as to protect them from any hostile forces which may have penetrated the capital city; (b) they will assist in establishing our authority by giving visual evidence of our power; (c) they will filter movement to and from the area, thus enabling us to capture those whom we have been unable to arrest directly.

In order to achieve these different objectives, our blocking positions must be individually strong, since otherwise they may tempt any extant loyalist forces into a counter-attack. In any case, unless adequately staffed they will be unable to act as efficient filters to individual movements. We must therefore resist the temptation to secure every important location by blocking positions which are individually weak. As only a few of the possible locations will, in fact, be covered, it is essential to select them with special care. Focal traffic points will be easier to select in a coastal or riverine city, where a definite shape has been imposed to the capital city, and to the traffic flows within it. This is illustrated by Fig. 5 (p. 126). In each particular case, the area which is the center of political and bureaucratic activity will be well known to the local inhabitants, and it will therefore be a matter of selecting a perimeter of straight and fairly broad streets at the intersection of which we will establish our blocking positions. (The avenues and boulevards of Paris are ideal from this point of view.)

Airports and Other Transport Facilities

One of the classic moves in the period immediately following the coup is the closure of airports and the cancellation of all flights. This is part of the general tactic which aims at "freezing" the situation by preventing the uncontrolled flow of people and information. There will also be other, more specific objectives: by closing the airport we will prevent the escape of those governmental leaders whom we have been unable to arrest. We will also prevent any

Fig. 5 PHYSICAL TARGETS IN COASTAL CITY



X = Road blocks at focal traffic points and city entry points

P = Densely populated seafront district

B = Mixed residential areas

G = Governmental administrative and other public buildings

R = Governmental leaders' residences

- - - - = Perimeter within which active teams can operate in safety

inflow of loyalist forces into the area of the capital city. Because of the short time-span in which the coup takes place, air transport will be of very great importance: either we or the government could tip the balance of forces by

flying in quite small contingents of our respective supporters. The size of the forces which can be moved by air may well be very small, but in the context of the delicate balance of the active phase of the coup, they could still play a decisive role.

Air transport is, however, very vulnerable insofar as it still relies on long and uninterrupted landing strips; therefore, if at all possible, we should avoid having to rely on it. To the extent that we are independent of support arriving by air, we should *therefore* prevent the use of all airfields in and around the area of the capital city. Some of these airfields will be military ones, but even if they are not they may still be heavily guarded. This could be a serious obstacle if the government still controls significant military forces outside the capital city and if transport planes are available to bring them into it. Seizing a defended airfield will certainly be difficult, but denying the use of one is very easy. A few vehicles parked on the runway, either by covert means or by a little cooperation from the inside, and "covered" by a small fire team to prevent them from being moved, will suffice to neutralize an entire airport. A few warning shots from suitable positions could also prevent any landings taking place.

Other organized forms of transport will only rarely be important in modern conditions. In many undeveloped countries railways play a very marginal role in the transport structure. Even where they are important economically, they will often be removed from the main population centers, having been built to connect mines and plantations with deep seaports, as part of the colonial export economy rather than as links between the main population centers. In Europe and those parts of Latin America where this is not the case railways will still be unimportant from our point of view because of the time element. In any case, railways are extremely easy to neutralize. In the 1926 coup

in Poland staged by Pilsudski, a great deal of the action revolved around the railway system but rail-borne troops never arrived in time to decide the issue, because both sides found it easy to prevent the other's movements, though not to ensure their own. Where, as in Ethiopia, the railways are important—or rather the single Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway line is important⁷—technical neutralization should be used. Railways rely on a technical chain system *par excellence* and if a single section of rail or signals is sabotaged, the whole system will temporarily stop. The gap between two sections of rail is easily crossed, but probably there will be no rolling stock on the other side.

Public Buildings

The need to provide the bureaucracy and the masses with visual evidence of the reality and power of the coup is one of the continuing elements in our analysis. Otherwise, this will be the least defined and coherent of our groups of targets. The buildings which we will have to seize in every case will be the residences of those government leaders whom we have selected for arrest and those buildings which house facilities that we require, such as the radio-television building. In the first case it will be a matter of a brief penetration to achieve capture or arrest; in the second, however, we will have to seize and occupy the building, and perhaps resist attempts made to recapture it. But there will be other official buildings which we will also have to occupy, or at any rate control the access to. Those can be only loosely defined as those buildings whose possession is associated with the possession of political power.

⁷ A significant part of the Ethiopian army which is not fighting the Somali *shiftas* is stationed in garrison towns along the single railway to the sea.

Most countries have some form of elected assembly, a parliament or its local equivalent, but in many of them political power emanates from the palace of the president or other ruler (or the central committee of the party); we should not be deceived by constitutional fictions, and after spending so much effort distinguishing between effective political power and its symbols, we will not make the mistake of using our scarce resources on the latter.

Nevertheless, there will be certain symbolic buildings which could play an important role in the crucial transitional phase of the coup: their possession by one side or the other will act as a signal to the masses and the rank and file of the bureaucracy in the confused period when it is unclear which side is in control. Our possession of those symbols will then give us the allegiance of those who were waiting to choose one side or the other. Thus, though useless in direct material terms, it may well be worthwhile to seize those buildings which have a powerful symbolic value. In the Ghana coup of 1966 which brought down the Nkrumah regime, the very efficient and practical-minded leaders of the coup felt it necessary to fight their way into the presidential residence, Flagstaff House, though it contained neither Nkrumah himself nor any important technical facilities. They realized that though it was an empty symbol *par excellence*, its possession was essential to secure the support of the Accra masses, who naturally associated the control of political power with that particular building. Fortunately, by the very nature of such symbols there will be one or at most two symbolic buildings whose possession will be an essential requirement.

Apart from the purely symbolic buildings, there will be others whose possession is highly desirable. These are the administrative headquarters of the army, police, and security services. Thus in each case this group of targets will include the following:

(a) *The seat of effective political power.* This could be the royal or presidential palace or the building of the elected assembly or of the party presidium or central committee.

(b) *The main administrative buildings.* The ministry of defense, the ministry of the interior, police and military headquarters, if separate.

(c) *Symbolic buildings.* Often the appropriate building will fall into one or other of the classifications above; where, however, there is a "cultural" lag between the development of the country's political life and the traditional attitudes, the masses will still associate political power with an "obsolete" building.

The coup will be practically over (in its "active" phase) by the time the citizenry wakes up and starts to investigate the possession of buildings symbolic or otherwise. We can therefore postpone the occupation of some of these targets to the later stages. Since in direct practical terms other targets will be more important, or at any rate more urgent, the best way of dealing with the symbolic and administrative targets will be to use them as assembly points for those teams which have already completed their primary mission.

NEUTRALIZING THE POLITICAL FORCES II: PARTICULAR GROUPS

Which organized groups will be sufficiently strong to oppose us even if the voice of the government is silent and the capital city visibly in our hands? Not many, but we must remember that even one well-organized demonstration, or a well-timed strike, could pose a serious threat to the coup in the delicate transitional phase. It is therefore essential to identify such groups and, once identified, to neutralize them before the coup. Once it is known that a

coup has taken place, the leaders of the militant organization(s) concerned will immediately prepare for action; they themselves will then be more difficult to arrest and their organizations will be halfway underground.

In countries where political conflict is limited to the verbal dimension, this kind of dramatic and rapid response to political change will be unknown; but elsewhere, where political conflicts can be violent and where all organized forces, whether primarily political or not, can be drawn into them, this type of response is more or less automatic. Political parties in the Middle East and South America, trade-union movements in southern Europe, and religious movements in South Vietnam have little in common except (a) their ability to respond in this way and (b) that even without the weaponry that some of them have, they could be a real threat to the coup. We will conduct our analysis in terms of those three types of "political force" because their features will largely subsume those of other kinds of organized groups, which may be relevant in particular countries. In the United States or Britain, for example, where neither trade unions nor religious groups nor political parties are sufficiently militant to oppose a coup after it has seized its initial targets, the groups which may have this capability (such as paramilitary movements of the paranoid right) will be organized in a manner which includes features of all three.

One of the points which we must bear in mind is that not all the organized groups which are important in normal political life will also be important in the highly restricted and spasmodic politics of the coup. Conversely, groups which in ordinary political life are of very limited importance could emerge as real threats. If, for example, we failed to neutralize the organization of, say, the National Rifle Association in the U.S.A., or the National Union of Students in the U.K., their reaction—however ineffectual

per se—could still endanger the coup by slowing down the process of political stabilization inasmuch as they could provoke conflicts which would reopen the whole issue. Other, more prudent groups would then re-examine the possibility of challenging our position, while the use of violence to stop the agitation of the groups we have overlooked could lead to further opposition since the side-effects of violence would increase the awareness of and hostility to the coup.

Finally, there are certain political forces which must *not* be neutralized (apart from those groups which have agreed to support us). These are those groups which are generally regarded as extremist but whose effective powers are limited. By allowing them a certain freedom of action we will give them an opportunity to oppose us, and their opposition will have two favorable by-products: (a) we will be able to gain the support of those political forces which fear *them* more than us; (b) we will be able to step forward and fight *other* groups after having associated them with the extremists in question. This can, however, be a dangerous game to play; in the confused and dramatic situation of the coup, the extremists could gain in power and political support, and it is therefore possible that the time which we have allowed them to discredit the opposition will work in their favor.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

In many economically developed countries religious organizations no longer have much political power, though they may still be an important social force. The leaders of religious groups can be influential in social and, to a degree, political life, but the allegiance of the believers is rarely expressed by direct and forceful action in the political field. In economically backward countries, and in

those whose development is limited or very recent, it is otherwise. Where the newer technology of man has been only recently applied, or not at all, the older technology of God is still of paramount importance. This can be a source of very considerable political power to the organizations which are identified with the appropriate beliefs and which are able to channel the sentiments of the believers. Leaving aside local cults, which are too fragmented to be important in terms of national politics, and which in any case tend to be apolitical,⁸ we see that even universal religions will differ in their degree of political involvement.

The role of the Catholic Church in Italy since the war illustrates the power which can be accumulated by a well-organized religious group, even when operating in circumstances which are unfavorable from the *religious* point of view. Though most male Italians seldom or never go to church, Italian women are keen and regular churchgoers. Italy being a democratic country where women have the vote, it is obvious that if the organized Church is willing to direct its followers to vote for a particular party, that party will gain the bulk of the women's vote before it even opens its electoral campaigns. The Church has generally been willing to give such specific directions, and one particular party has benefited: the Democrazia Cristiana (DC). Aided by its assured majority of the female vote, the DC has ruled Italy, alone or in various coalitions, since 1946, and it has done so largely because of the support received from the Church. It is hardly surprising therefore that the Church has been able to dominate the DC and that, through the DC, it has influenced every aspect of Italian national life.

⁸ Local cults may be important from the point of view of the local administration, but not in terms of national politics.

This is no vague influence exercised on a plane of generalized authority, but rather a constant supervision of political activity, conducted at the provincial level by the bishops and at the national level by the Pope and his associates. At each level of the state bureaucracy the Church, directly or indirectly, exercises its influence: on civil-service jobs and promotions; on the allocation of investment funds and of the various kinds of government grants; on administrative decisions dealing with "zoning" and building regulations. This influence has brought its rewards. While the facilities of the state bureaucracy have steadily deteriorated as compared with the dynamic private and semi-state sector, the Church's educational and religious facilities have steadily expanded; money to build and the permissions required to do so have never been lacking.

If we failed to neutralize the organization of the Church in Italy, it could inspire and coordinate opposition to us through its capillary network of parish churches. Parishioners are used to hearing political messages from the pulpit;⁹ priests are used to receiving detailed political briefs from their bishop, and the latter receive their instructions from the Vatican. Our neutralization of the telecommunications facilities will not prevent the flow of instructions: the Vatican maintains its own radio station and this could be used to contact directly the organization throughout the country.

The Catholic Church plays a similar role in certain other countries, where it has a 99.9 per cent nominal membership and the status of the national religion, but the

⁹ In a recent and very successful Italian film, the parish priest was shown explaining to his flock that he did not want to give them a pre-election brief, but he merely asked them to vote for a party which was Democratic and which was Christian: ". . . *Democratico e Cristiano, Cristiano e Democratico* . . ."

stronger state structure of Spain and Portugal, let alone France, has denied it the pre-eminent position it has in Italy. The intervention of the Church would, however, be a powerful factor in much of the Catholic world, including South America, especially if the motive force behind the coup was identified as being anticlerical.

Islam, which has the comprehensive nature of a religion, a political system, and a civilization, is still (though much decayed) a major political force and its leaders play a recognized political role. The "doctors" of El Azhar University in Cairo, one of the main theological institutions of the Muslim world, are periodically prompted by the Nasser regime into open political declarations; no single leader in Islam has the authority of a Pope because the system is less centralized, but in each country the local leaders are still very important. Even the spread of "Arab Socialism" has not impaired the position of Islam, and governments which follow an extreme-left "line" in all foreign and some domestic matters are still unwilling (or unable) to challenge the status of Islam as the state religion. When such a course was tentatively suggested by an obscure member of the present Syrian government, the leadership (which follows an almost Peking "line" in all other fields) was forced to denounce him officially. Whether this resilience means that the Islamic leadership of particular countries could act as an *active* political force is another matter. The structures of Islam as an organized religion are fossilized; the fluid and dynamic aspect of the movement in its early days has been replaced by a dogmatic and extremely conservative set of beliefs, whose inflexibility is one of the causes of the present travail of the Arab world.

The political sterility of Islam in recent times has meant that, though it has been used by governments to propagate *their* political initiatives, Islam *per se* has acted only when

a direct attack has been made on religious orthodoxy.¹ Consequently, unless our coup has a definite anti-Islamic coloring, religious leaders in Muslim countries will not initiate any action against us. We must therefore prevent our opponents' imposing such a coloring on our coup.

In the intermittent political warfare between "Arab Socialists" and the monarchies, while the latter are accused of being "tools of the Zionist-imperialist oil monopolies," the former are accused of wanting to eradicate Islam with their godless beliefs. Actually even the *soi-disant* "progressives" would not dream of challenging Islam, which is after all the main factor—through the language of the Koran—which binds the Arab countries, separated as they are by both history and geography.

Thus, with the one qualification made above, we can ignore Islam as an active political force. The same goes for Hinduism, which, though otherwise very different, shares the passive political role of Islam. Though some political forces in India have successfully made use of Hindu sentiments, religious leaders as such have never actually initiated any major political action. (Even the periodic agitation against cow slaughter is instigated by the extreme-right parties.)

An extreme example of the potentialities of a dynamic religious leadership is the "main-line" Buddhist movement in South Vietnam. The almost continual warfare of the last generation and the politically destructive effect of the Diem regime have led to a collapse of the social and political structures of the country, while its economy has been reduced to localized subsistence agriculture, allied with urban dependence on U.S. aid. In this situation the

¹This and subsequent statements about Islam and the Arab world refer to Sunnite Islam: the heretical Shiite sects and their offshoots are a different matter. Their political and religious leadership is often embodied in the same person, and they are often politically very active.

newer economic, political, and social forces have become extremely weak and the groups based on the older religious affiliations have emerged as the only valid civilian forces in Vietnamese society. Apart from the main-line Buddhist movement, led by Tri Thich Quang and other regional leaders, there is the following alignment of forces (early 1968):

(a) *Hoa Hao*. A reformed Buddhist group with a large following in the southern (Delta) part of the country. Their leadership is politically orientated and, except for strictly local alliance, is anti-Viet Cong. They appear to have built up the rudiments of an armed militia.

(b) *Cao Dai*. An important Buddhist sect which has a history of political participation.

(c) *Binh Xuyen*. A small but very active part sect and part secret society. Its main area of strength is in the Saigon region, and before the Diem regime displaced them, the Binh Xuyen used to "own" the city's police force—and its underworld. The sect has been influenced by the Chinese secret societies from across the river in Cholon, and the effect of repression at the hands of Diem has been to drive it underground rather than to destroy it.

(d) *Catholics*. Until Diem's fall, the large Catholic minority was able to dominate the Buddhist majority. Many of the South Vietnamese community are refugees from the North; under the French many Catholics cooperated actively with the colonial power and served in the French armed forces. Now that the South appears to be going the way the North went in 1954, the community has reached a desperate impasse. Their activity against a pro-Viet Cong (or just pro-peace) coup would be immediate and probably very effective.

All these religious groups could intervene against a coup: their meeting places could be used to assemble and shelter our opponents; the priesthood could inspire and coordinate mass agitation against us; finally, their direct influence on

the army and the bureaucratic rank and file could be used to resist the imposition of our authority.

The religious groups which can be important in particular countries will differ doctrinally, but be organizationally sufficiently similar to adopt a general method of neutralization. If they operate private broadcasting facilities, such as the Vatican Radio or the small radio stations of American missionary sects in many parts of the world, we will put them temporarily out of action. Religious meeting places should not be closed by administrative methods, which are liable to foment rather than stifle opposition, but access to them should be barred by "incidental" road-blocks.

The leadership of religious organizations presents a special problem in terms of neutralization: because of their particular psychological role in the minds of public opinion it will usually be extremely unwise to arrest the actual hierarchic leadership. Fortunately, the actual decision-makers within religious organizations will often be younger men who are not in the public eye but who are the key figures from our point of view. If the real decision-makers are not also the hierarchical leaders, we will arrest them; but if the two roles are embodied in the same person or persons, we will not do so. In concrete terms, a Tri Thich Quang, who is an effective decision-maker, but not formally in the higher leadership, can (and should) be arrested; but a Pope who is both the representational and the effective leader cannot however be arrested without stimulating a great deal of opposition, the impact of which will outweigh any advantage to be gained from the arrest.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Unlike the other groups which constitute a potential source of opposition to the coup, political parties are our direct competitors, in the sense that their primary purpose—like

our own—is the accumulation of political power.² This will not necessarily make them the main, or even a significant, potential threat to us, but it will mean that their response to the coup will be particularly prompt. Whether this response will be verbal and purely declaratory, or whether it will be more direct and effective, will depend on a variety of factors, including the nature of their leadership, organization, and membership. Because political parties are as diverse as the countries within which they compete for power, we will classify them in certain categories as a prelude to examining the methods of their individual neutralization.

"Machine" Parties

Where politics is a business like any other, parties take the form of an association whose purpose is the procurement of votes in exchange for specific and material rewards. The local "boss" secures votes for the party at election time in exchange for cash and/or bureaucratic jobs for himself or his nominees. The deputies in the assembly then deliver their votes to the government in exchange for definite favors, some of which are retained and some of which are passed down to those who secured their election. The "machine" party can flourish in societies as different as early twentieth-century America, Egypt between the wars, and present-day South America. It needs two main ingredients: an elective parliamentary democracy and a socially backward electorate. In the United States at the beginning of the century the immigrant communities were largely composed of eastern and southern Europeans, whose mother countries were economically, and often politically, unsophisticated. Thus the newly

² This is their purpose. Their function, however, is to aggregate interests.

arrived immigrant lacked the political awareness required to obtain direct concessions from the government, in the shape of social welfare legislation or labor codes. He soon learned, however, to obtain indirect favors by promising his support to the local ward organization of the party—i.e. if the votes were delivered on election day and the candidate elected, rewards would eventually be received in return. Present-day “machine” parties, such as the Democrazia Cristiana in parts of Italy, Accion Democratica in Venezuela, and MNR in Bolivia, do not distribute their rewards as widely as the old municipal machines in the United States. This is because these parties participate in the *empleocracia*, which dominates political societies in which industry and commerce are undeveloped and agriculture the monopoly of peasant subsistence farmers or aristocratic landlords. In these conditions politics and the associated jobs in the state bureaucracy are the main avenues of middle-class enterprise, and the party is the framework (together with legal training) for the middle-class activity of office-hunting.

Machine parties have their rationale in the contrast between the constitutional structures and the social ones in countries which are both poor and “democratic.” Their whole manner of operation revolves around the exchange of votes for rewards at every level; in other words it requires the functioning of the parliamentary apparatus, with its periodic elections. In the event of a coup this institutional framework would be frozen and the machine made powerless. Even if the machine has a base of mass support, its leadership, being a coalition of local power structures without a national “presence,” will not be able to mobilize it. We will therefore ignore the “machine” parties and will not need to take any particular action in their regard.

"Insurrectional" Parties³

Such parties may or may not participate in open political life (if it exists in our target country) but the primary purpose of insurrectional parties is to destroy the system rather than to work it. Like the Bolshevik Party before 1917, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Communist and extreme right-wing parties in many parts of the world, these parties live a semilegal existence, with a cellular organization, an "underground" mentality, and frequently a paramilitary element. Such parties are characterized by their adherence to a set of definite ideological beliefs, a rigidly centralized organization, and their preoccupation with the use of direct methods to achieve political ends.

In the social and economic conditions of Western Europe and North America, insurrectional parties are numerically weak and their challenge to the system is usually conducted in an atmosphere of unreality, though from time to time they can gather a mass following among certain sectors of the population which are outside the mainstream of national life. The "Black Power" movement in the United States, for example, has all the traits of an insurrectional party, but it only operates among the Negro communities in the ghettos whose social and economic conditions are those of an economically backward society. In the "Third World," however, the constant pressure of economic deprivation can generate a revolutionary mentality among wide sections of the population, which insurrectional parties try to channel and exploit. Their organization, however, is often inadequate to the task and much of the endemic guerrilla activity in Latin America

³ The alternative term, "revolutionary" parties, has left-wing connotations, while insurrection covers both extremes of the spectrum.

and the insurgencies in Southeast Asia are outside their control.

Insurrectional parties can oppose us in three main ways: (a) through the agitation of the masses, to the extent that they have a mass following; (b) by direct means, such as assassination and sabotage; (c) by syndicalist agitation. Insurrectional parties usually have an authoritarian leadership structure, and much of their strength, in the confused circumstances which would follow a coup, would derive from the coherence of a centralized leadership. We should therefore make every effort to identify and "isolate" their key decision-makers. The emphasis on party discipline and the habit of waiting for "directives" from the higher leadership render many insurrectional parties powerless once the leadership has ceased to function. Though the social pressures which are the sources of strength of an insurrectional party may lead to its revival, this will not take place in the short period of time which concerns us. This vulnerability of insurrectional parties was strikingly demonstrated in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*. The *Ikhwan* was a major force in Egyptian political life after the war, and its large mass following, its network of economic and educational activities, and its paramilitary youth groups gave it a great deal of direct power. Its effectiveness, however, derived largely from the coherent leadership of its founder, Shaykh Hasan al-Banna, and the movement rapidly declined after his death (in unexplained circumstances) just after the failed coup of late 1948. Where necessary, therefore, the committee or personal leadership of the insurrectional party should be arrested and held in isolation for the duration of the coup. Because of the emphasis on party discipline, the beheaded movement will probably abstain from action in the short but critical period following our seizure of power.

Para-Bureaucratic Parties

In one-party states, such as those of Communist countries, much of Africa, and Mexico, the party has lost its major role: the competition for the allegiance of the masses. Being in a position of monopoly, the party is also in danger of appearing superfluous. But, like any other bureaucratic organizations, the party can survive the loss of its primary function, either as a system of spoliation or as an ancillary or supervisor of the administrative bureaucracy of the state. African parties, formed during the political struggles which preceded independence, have often legislated for their monopoly of power as soon as they have attained it. Some, like TANU (Tanzanian African National Union), have turned into constructive galvanizers of the communal and state development programs; others, like Nkrumah's old party in Ghana, became adjuncts to the personal leadership and a system of outdoor relief for his "activist" followers. The majority, however (until swept away by the military dictatorships), have acted as the principal agent in the main local industry: politics.

The para-bureaucratic party treats the state bureaucracy as its subordinate. It investigates its activities, reports on its behavior to the higher leadership, and often demands special privileges and concessions. These parties do not have a mass following except within the framework of normal political life, when they can be relied upon to produce demonstrations *for* this or that stand of the leadership. As soon as the hold of the leadership is threatened, as soon as the police apparatus no longer acts as its "muscle," the para-bureaucratic party dissolves. We can therefore ignore it in the active stage of the coup. However, its secondary function, intelligence and security, will be important and will be dealt with as part of our general defensive measures towards such organizations.

Parties in Developed Countries

Whether it is a two-party system, as in much of the Anglo-Saxon world where parties are in effect coalitions of pressure groups, or whether they are the class- or religion-based parties of much of continental Europe, the major political parties in developed and democratic countries will not present a direct threat to the coup. Though such parties have mass support at election time, neither they nor their followers are versed in the techniques of mass agitation. The comparative stability of political life has deprived them of the experience required to employ direct methods, and the whole climate of their operation revolves around the concept of periodic elections. Even where, as in France and Italy, there are large and nominally revolutionary parties, two or more decades of parliamentary life have reduced their affinity with revolutionary methods.

The apparatus of the party, with its branches and local organizers, can, however, allow them to perform a role of information and coordination which could be potentially dangerous. Even though their leadership may not take any action, the apparatus can still serve as the framework for anti-coup agitation. We will therefore close—administratively—the network of branches, and this should be sufficient to neutralize this particular threat.

The only serious threat from this direction will come from the trade-union movements which are affiliated to the mass parties of the left. Their experience of industrial agitation has provided a natural training for mass intervention against a coup, but this will be dealt with separately below.

TRADE UNIONS

Wherever there is a significant degree of industrial development, and in many countries where there is not, trade unions are a major political force. Because of their

experience of industrial agitation, which can be readily applied to political purposes, the response of trade unions to the coup could constitute a serious danger to us. The mass following of trade unions—unlike that of political parties—is in continuous session: polling booths are only open once every few years, but factories work all the year round. The immediacy of the threat presented by trade unions will depend on their size, cohesion, and degree of militancy: the fragmented syndicalism of Britain, with its purely electoral politics, would not, for example, add up to the threat of, say, the Italian movement with its centralization and long history of political strikes.

The experience of Bolivia since the 1952 revolution illustrates how a single trade union and its activities can dominate a country's political life. Bolivia is one of the poorest countries of South America, whose economy is characterized by subsistence farming and the activities of the large tin industry. Before the revolution and the nationalization of the mines owned by the Patino, Aramayo, and Hochschild interests, the miners had worked in physical and economic conditions of extreme harshness. Following their emancipation, they naturally wanted to achieve immediate and substantial improvements in these conditions, and COMIBOL, the state tin-mining organization, started immediate reforms.

It was soon discovered, however, that the geological and economic conditions of the industry required an increase in productivity which could only be achieved by introducing much new machinery and reducing the labor force. As the only source of capital was the United States, the miners' leaders opposed the reforms on the dual plank of no *yanqui* capitalism and no redundancies. Such problems are familiar from nearer home, but the crucial difference was that the miners were also an *army*. They had been armed by the middle-class leaders of the revolutionary

MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) in order to act as a counterweight to the old army dominated by associates of the mine-owners. The revolution disbanded the army so that the miners could not only exert political and economic pressures but could also use more direct, military methods. Until the MNR leadership found a counterweight in the unions organized among the peasant farmers, the Indian *campesinos*, who were also armed, the miners had things pretty much their way. Led by the militant of the Catavi-Siglo Viente mines, the miners imposed their control on COMIBOL, and therefore on the country, which depends on it as the only major source of foreign exchange. Certainly no coup could have held on to power without the miners' consent, and even if the central institutions in La Paz could have been seized, the real power base in the mines would still have been under the control of the union leaders.

Even without the special circumstances which operate in Bolivia, trade unions will often be a major political force, especially in terms of the situation immediately following a coup. But much will depend on the particular organizational structure of the trade unions, and crucially on the degree of effective centralization and the nature of their political affiliations. In Britain, the main focus of decision-making within the trade-union movement as a whole is the executive of individual unions, but in some of them it has shifted to the shop floor. Apart from this fragmentation, which would at least impair the speed of reaction to a coup, the largely mainstream politics of British labor would not be a suitable framework for direct measures.

In France and Italy, the trade-union movement is not divided on craft lines, as in Britain, or on industrial lines, as in the U.S.A. and much of northern Europe, but on political lines. Individual industrial unions are affiliated to

central organizations which are associated with particular parties. In both countries the largest organization is controlled by the local Communist Party, with smaller Social-Democrat and Catholic ones. The Communist organizations, CGL in Italy and CGT in France,⁴ both have a long experience of political activism expressed in "political" and "general" strikes, phenomena of almost purely historical significance in Anglo-Saxon countries.⁵

Unless our coup is directly linked to the Communist Party, the central organizations of French and Italian trade-unionism would react to it, and do so in predictable ways. Immediately after the coup they would: (a) try to establish contact with other "democratic forces" to form a popular-front opposition; (b) contact their national network of branches to coordinate a general strike; (c) put into execution their contingency plans for "underground" activity and illegal survival. The only tactic which would present a threat to us is the general strike, which would be organized with the deliberate intention of "confronting" the forces of the coup. Our general measures would affect the overall performance of this emergency program, but specific action would be needed as well in order to avoid the confrontation which the unions would probably seek. Both the CGT and the CGL have memories of the wartime resistance movements; both are aware of the destabilizing nature of open repression and they would therefore try to provoke us into using violence.

Though some form of confrontation may be inevitable, it is essential to avoid bloodshed, because this may well have crucial negative repercussions among the personnel of the armed forces and the police. The avoidance of

⁴ Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT); Confederazione Generale del Lavoro (CGL).

⁵ Cf. the events of May 1968 in France.

bloodshed in tense crowd situations is a matter of technique, and competent handling of our incorporated armed and uniformed forces will be essential.⁶

The incidents of Reggio Emilia in Italy in the summer of 1964 in which seven people died following a "political" strike illustrated how an incompetent police force can impair the authority of the government it is trying to protect.⁷

If the trade unions of our target country approximate to Franco-Italian levels of political effectiveness it will be necessary—assuming that our coup is not politically linked with them—to identify and arrest their leaders and close their headquarters in order to impede the operation of their secondary leadership. Elsewhere, it will be a matter of orienting our general measures to deal with the particular threats which a trade-union movement could prevent.

⁶ The renewal of political activism in recent years in both Britain and the United States has intensified the search for effective means of controlling mobs. The study of mass psychology and the development of assorted gadgetry should not obscure the fundamental principles of mob control. These are: (a) the need to keep the mob in open spaces so that claustrophobic and physical pressures are avoided; and (b) the need to break down the anonymity of the individual in a mob by making *selective* arrests.

⁷ Cf. the destabilizing effects of the behavior of the police in Paris on the night of Friday, May 4, 1968, which was the detonator of the crisis.

The Execution of the Coup d'État

As soon as the moral power of national representation was destroyed, a legislative body, whatever it might be, meant no more to the military than a crowd of five hundred men, less vigorous and disciplined than a battalion of the same number.

—Madame de Staël, referring to Napoleon's coup d'état

I came in on a tank, and only a tank will evict me.

—Abu Zuhair Tahir Yahya, Iraqi Prime Minister, 1968

THE ACTIVE PHASE OF A COUP is like a military operation—only more so. If the general principle of tactics is the application of force at the right place, the coup achieves this with surgical precision by striking at the organizational heart of the whole state; if speed is often important in military operations, in the coup it is an essential requirement. But the coup differs from most military operations in one crucial respect: while in war it is often advantageous to retain some forces as reserves to be used in later (and possibly more critical) phases of the conflict, in a coup the principle of total commitment applies. The active stage takes place in one short period of time and forces held back today will be useless tomorrow: all our forces must therefore be used in the one decisive engagement.

The fact that the coup has practically no time dimension means that we will rarely be able to correct errors made during its execution; in war, tactics can be changed, weap-

ons can be replaced, plans reshaped and men retrained on the basis of combat experience; but in the coup there will not be sufficient time for any feedback to operate. In this the coup is similar to the most modern form of warfare, the strategic missile strike, and the time factor places the entire burden of decision-making in the planning stage. Every target must be studied in detail before the coup. The team assigned to seize it must match it in terms of size and composition; its every move must be planned in advance and no tactical flexibility can be allowed.

With this degree of detailed planning, there will be no need for any sort of headquarters structure in the active stage of the coup; for if there is no scope for decision-making there is no need for decision-makers and their apparatus. In fact, having a headquarters would be a serious disadvantage: it would constitute a concrete target for the opposition and one which would be both vulnerable and easily identified. As soon as the coup starts, the ruling group will know that something is happening, but unless coups are very frequent in the country, they will not know what that something is; it could be a mutiny, an insurrection, the opening of a guerrilla war, or even the beginning of an invasion by a foreign power. All these forms of conflict represent threats to the regime, but they are all different in terms of their immediate significance and—more important—in terms of the measures which are required to meet them. We should avoid taking any action that will clarify the nature of the threat and thus reduce the confusion that is left in the defensive apparatus of the regime. Our teams will emerge from their bases and proceed to seize their designated targets while operating as independent units; their collective purpose and their coordinations will thus remain unknown until it is too late for any effective opposition. The leaders of the coup will be scattered among the various teams, each joining the team

whose ultimate target requires his presence: thus the spokesman of the coup will be with the team which will seize the radio-television station, and the prospective chief of police will be with the team whose target is the police headquarters. As each team will be both small and highly mobile, and as there is no headquarters throughout the active phase of the coup, the opposition will not have any single target on which it will be able to concentrate its forces. In this way their numerical superiority will be dissipated and the smaller forces of the coup will have local superiority in the area of each particular target. This will be the key of the victory of the coup.

ON THE EVE

In the last two chapters we have surveyed the planning of the coup in terms of the neutralization of the "professional" defenses of the state, and the selection of those targets which will assist the neutralization of the "political" forces. We analyzed the structure of the armed forces and the other means of coercion, and we saw that much of the armed forces, a significant part of the police system, and some of the security services could not intervene—either for or against us—in the event of a coup. This was due to their remote location or dispersed deployment, or because their training and equipment were inadequate—or overspecialized. Then we infiltrated the relatively small part of the apparatus which did have an intervention capability, so that much of it was technically neutralized and some of it totally subverted. This will ensure for us the neutrality of much of the defenses of the state and the active cooperation of some of its parts. The infiltration of the army and police has given us an instrument: the units which we have incorporated and which form the forces of

the coup. We have also prepared for the use of this instrument by selecting the targets on which it will be used: we have identified the physical targets which must be seized and those which will have to be sabotaged or otherwise interdicted; we have selected the leading personalities among the potential opposition, both in and out of the government, and prepared for their arrest.

But one major task has not been covered in the planning stage: the forcible isolation of the "hard-core" loyalist forces. Hopefully, the strength of those forces which we have been unable to infiltrate and which also have an intervention capability will not be very great. But even if they are weak in absolute terms, we dare not ignore them. To do so would be to invalidate all the measures we have taken to insulate the capital city—and ourselves—from the intervention of hostile forces. The extreme instability of the balance of forces during the active phase of the coup means that what in other circumstances would only be a minor threat could then have disastrous consequences, and if the "hard-core" loyalist forces are large in relation to our own, we will indeed have to divert much of our forces to their isolation.

Though we have been unable to penetrate these "hard-core" loyalist forces, two things will probably have been achieved: (a) their number, quality, and location will be known to us; and (b) our general measures of neutralization will have reduced their overall effectiveness. Their fighting capability will not have been eroded but, as Table 14 illustrates, their intervention against us will be delayed and disrupted.

Our purpose is not to destroy the loyalist forces militarily (since we will be able to deal with their cadres administratively after the coup) but merely to immobilize them for a few crucial hours. The tactics which will be used must be exclusively defensive: a ring of blocking positions

TABLE 14


The mechanics of intervention of the loyalist forces

<i>Phase</i>	<i>Effect of our general measures</i>
1. Police/security agency personnel raise initial alarm and seek to contact their HQ.	Telephone exchange has been seized, telex cable links have been sabotaged, radio relays are shut off. They must therefore send a verbal message.
2. Police/security agency HQ verify the reports and realize the seriousness of the threat. HQ tries to communicate with political leadership.	As above for communications. Some messengers fail to arrive as focal traffic points are gradually occupied.
3. Political leadership calls for army and police intervention.	As above for communications. Some units missing from their barracks; others refuse to move; others cannot move because of technical neutralization.
4. Political leaders begin to realize the extent of our infiltration of the armed forces and police. Loyalist troops respond.	As above for communications. Only military radio links can be used to communicate with loyalist forces.
5. Uninfiltrated forces assemble and prepare for intervention. They try to reach political leadership for a confirmation of their orders. Some defect to us, others choose neutrality, but some remain under the control of the government.	Many political leaders no longer available; some arrested and some in hiding.
6. Loyalist forces move on to capital city, or if already within its area move into the city center.	Airports closed and landing strips interdicted. Railways interrupted and trains stopped. City entry points controlled by our roadblocks.

Loyalist forces in capital city area are then isolated by direct means.

around each concentration of loyalist forces or, if this is not possible, a similar ring around the capital city. Thus, though we will be on the strategic offensive (in the sense that we are the ones who want to change the situation in general) we will also be on the tactical defensive, and this will give us important technical and psychological advantages. By using defended roadblocks to isolate the loyalist forces, we will put the onus of initiating any fighting on them: our forces will be content to wait and it will be the loyalist forces which will try to pass through. Should a column of loyalist forces arrive at the roadblock, their leaders will be faced by opposite numbers wearing the same uniform, and belonging to the same corporate entity, perhaps even to the same regiment. Both sides will state that they are "obeying orders," but interestingly enough, the "orders" of the leaders of our forces will probably appear more legitimate than those of the leaders of the loyalist troops. Owing to our arrests and our interdiction of the physical facilities, the "legitimate" orders will probably have taken an unusual form: the source of the orders to the loyalist troops will probably be somebody other than the appropriate superior in the hierarchy; the method used to convey them will probably be an unusual emergency one; *and the actual orders indistinguishable in form from ones which might have been issued by the planners of a coup.*

Thus the officers of the loyalist forces may have received orders stating, "Move into the city center, hold the parliament building and the radio station." The leadership may have added that they would be acting against the forces of a coup but, even so, such orders would have insurrectional undertones. When army officers find themselves doing unusual things, their natural reaction is to try and fit them into familiar patterns; the most familiar pattern of all will be to arrive at the conclusion that the "politicians" are



guilty of yet another "mess." The most probable course of action will be to request clarification from their superior officers. It is to be hoped that these officers will have either decided to remain neutral, or else have been arrested; in either case the "clarification" will never arrive.

If, on the other hand, the loyalist units decide to force

the roadblock, we will benefit from the tactical advantages of the defensive. These include the opportunity of choosing the place (natural obstructions such as bridges and tunnels) and the opportunity of deploying and camouflaging weapons and men. In order to make the fullest use of both the psychological and the tactical advantages, the blocking position should have a dual structure: a (largely symbolic) first line composed of some suitable physical obstacle, such as cross-parked heavy vehicles, with a few men bearing "orders" which forbid all passage; beyond this, there will be a second (military) line, much stronger numerically, with weapons and men deployed to repel an eventual assault (the operational detail involved is discussed in Appendix B). The defenders of the blocking position should inform the incoming loyalist forces that there is such a second line of defense: this should be partly camouflaged and would then serve as a deterrent even if it is numerically weak compared to the opposition, since its real strength will be difficult to ascertain.

The situation at the blocking position will require very delicate handling and it will be necessary that the soldiers on our side understand that their primary function is to avoid a conflict, rather than to engage in it successfully. In concrete terms, their mission will be a delaying operation rather than a decisive one and this will have precise implications in terms of the weapons and tactics to be employed.


TIMING, SEQUENCE, AND SECURITY

Ideally, the timing of the coup will be completely flexible so that we can take advantage of any favorable circumstances which may arise, such as the temporary absence of the leadership from the capital city or the outbreak of some

coincidental civil disorders. This flexibility, which would be highly desirable, is only rarely possible because the infiltration of the army and police will be a dynamically unstable process: the circle of those who have decided to join us will grow and continue growing as a "bandwagon" effect is generated; but unless the coup materializes, there will eventually be a movement into neutrality or even opposition. Meanwhile, the danger of denunciation will also increase as more and more people become aware that a coup is being planned, or at any rate that "something is up." The timing of the coup will therefore be dictated by the progress of our infiltration of the armed forces and police, and as soon as a satisfactory degree of penetration is achieved the coup must be executed. This implies that it will not be possible to designate a date well in advance of the coup which can be communicated to the various teams. This is just as well, since it means that the date cannot be leaked to the security agencies. Actually, it is quite likely that some information about us will have reached the security agencies, but this should not affect the outcome. As the preparations for the coup proceed, more and more information about our actions will be in circulation but it will also be increasingly obscured by "noise."¹

Every move we make will generate information which could eventually reach the security agencies, but the consequences and misinterpretations of our actions will generate an equal or greater amount of "noise." This will make it increasingly difficult for the analysts of the security agencies to identify the nature of the threat, since their capacity for processing information is not unlimited. This process is illustrated by Fig. 7 (p. 158), in which O-Z is the normal level of "noise" which is received at all times, O-A

¹ An expression used in the intelligence community to describe the false or irrelevant information which is reported alongside "hard" data.



is the processing capacity of the analysts at the security agencies, and X is the point beyond which the total flow of data exceeds processing capacity so that each item of real data is accorded a diminishing amount of attention.²

Even if the security agencies could isolate the real data from the "noise," they will not usually take immediate action. Their professional instincts will be to try to explore all the ramifications of the plot so as to be able to arrest

² The specialized nature of the security agencies' work impedes a rapid expansion of their facilities, and even if such an expansion could take place, it would only be carried out if and when the real threat is identified. This is precisely what the "noise" problem prevents them from doing.


all its participants. And, hopefully, the coup will actually take place while the security agencies are still engaged on these explorations. But the latter will be aware of this timing problem and are therefore likely to respond to a possible threat by going ahead and arresting those of the planners of the coup who have been identified. This "nervousness" presents a special problem on the eve of the coup because our final preparations will probably generate a sharp increase in the total flow of information received by the security agencies. Even without separating hard data from "noise," the mere increase in the total flow of information could be interpreted as a danger signal (as it certainly would be by competent analysts) and this might trigger off the arrests.

In practice, it will rarely be possible to achieve total security within the forces of the coup and we should assume as a working hypothesis that they have in fact been infiltrated by the security agency. This leads to the general defensive procedures discussed in Chapter 3, but it will also have precise operational implications: (a) each "team" will be told well in advance what equipment and tactics will be required to seize its particular target, but not the exact designation of the target; (b) each "team" will only be told its designated target when it actually receives the signal to proceed to its seizure; (c) each "team" will be alerted individually, with only as much advance warning as it requires to prepare for its particular task, instead of a general go-signal for all teams.

Since the teams will have different starting points and different targets to go to, the use of any one general signal would either give insufficient warning to some teams or an unnecessarily long one to others. The longer the time-span between the announcement that the coup is "on" and its actual execution, the greater is the likelihood that information will reach the security agencies in time to prevent

the successful execution of the coup, since this will be the moment at which their operative in our ranks could send out a warning.

The problem of warning time and lead time is illustrated in Fig. 8.



If we give all our teams a ten-hour warning period, by sending out a general call at hour -10 , then Team No. 1 will just about reach its target in time, but all the other teams will have received "excess warning," or in other words, information will have been distributed before it was essential to do so. If we give all the teams a two-hour warning period, then "excess warning" will be zero but Team No. 5 will reach its target several hours before Team No. 1 and those defending it will probably be on a full alert. The solution appears to be a simple one: make warning time equal to lead time so that each team is alerted just in time to allow it to reach its target by the zero hour.

But in reality the problem is more complex. It is not a matter of simultaneous arrival at the target but rather of the simultaneous penetration of the "early-warning sys-

tem" maintained by the security agencies of the state. If, for example, Team No. 2 has to cross the entire capital city to reach its target, the security agency will probably be alerted as soon as it enters the city, at, say, hour — 2. Thus by the time that Team No. 4 reached its target, the opposition would have had two hours to prepare for its defense. We will probably have very little information on the functioning of the security apparatus, but we can operate on the assumption that a team (if it is large and/or equipped with armor) will be noticed and reported as soon as it enters the capital city. We must therefore secure: (a) the protection of our security position against an internal threat, which is achieved by minimizing "excess warning time"; and (b) the protection of our security position against external observation, which is achieved by simultaneous penetration of the capital city area.


Both aims will be achieved by sending the teams into action at a time corresponding to their lead times to the capital-city boundary (or other applicable perimeter). This is illustrated in Fig. 9 (p. 162).³

INTO ACTION

The actual execution of the coup will require many different qualities: skillful diplomacy at a blocking position confronted by loyalist forces; instant personnel management at the radio-television station in order to persuade its technical staff to cooperate with us; considerable tactical abilities in the case of targets which are heavily defended. Our resources will probably be too limited to form fully special-

³In the diagram the "early-warning system" is shown as a clearly delineated perimeter, but, of course, in reality it will be a general area with vaguely defined borders. We will adopt as a perimeter whichever approximation suits the circumstances.

Fig. 9 SIMULTANEOUS PENETRATION OF THE DEFENSIVE SYSTEM AND TEAM WARNING TIME



ized teams out of the pool of those units and individuals which we have incorporated, but we should nevertheless match broad categories of targets with appropriate teams. We can distinguish among three such categories of targets and their corresponding teams.

A - TARGETS

These are the more heavily guarded facilities with strict pass control, such as the royal or presidential palace, the central police station, and the army HQ. In times of crisis,

of course, such facilities may be provided with full-fledged military defenses, and in many countries the crisis is permanent. Partly in order to minimize bloodshed, which could have a destabilizing effect on the situation, and partly in order to reduce the total manpower required, these targets will have to be seized by "sophisticated" teams using a blend of infiltration, diversion, and assault.⁴

Though it will usually be necessary to prepare for a fairly extensive military operation (and a complex one as well, unless we have great numerical superiority in the area of the target) this should not result in much actual combat: when those who guard the target in question are confronted by our extensive preparations, they are unlikely to put up much serious resistance. The fact that our general measures of neutralization have cut off or impeded their contacts with the leadership, the fact that the clear patriotic issues of international warfare will be missing in an internal conflict, and the fact that we will make every effort to allow them to give in gracefully will all militate against a prolonged defense.

If we are fortunate enough to have incorporated a very large number of troops, and especially if they are equipped with impressive weapons, such as armor, it will be still less likely that actual combat will take place. These targets will nevertheless indirectly present us with a very serious problem, though it is political rather than military: the formation of the large teams required by these targets will raise the delicate issue of the coup-within-the-coup. During the active phase of the coup the situation will be confused and extremely unstable, and while the other teams will be too small to tempt their leaders into trying to usurp our control, the operational leaders of the A-teams may well succumb to temptation. The man who leads the tanks which have just seized the presidential palace may easily persuade

⁴The operational detail involved is discussed in Appendix B.

himself that he can also seize power on his own behalf, and if the A-team is sufficiently powerful, he may do just that. Our satisfaction at having carried out a coup successfully would be an insufficient reward for all our efforts unless we also retain power afterward. It will therefore be necessary to adopt measures to prevent the leaders of these large teams from challenging our position: this can sometimes be done by forming the A-teams from many small subunits under the overall command of an inner member of our own group. Where this is not possible, the A-teams will have to be dispersed into smaller groups assigned to secondary targets as soon as they have fulfilled their primary mission. Thus the possible threat presented by the A-teams will be deflected by applying the energies of their leaders to other tasks. The operational commanders of the A-teams will probably need a certain amount of time to readjust to the fact that they are no longer isolated individuals engaged on a dangerous endeavor and to start thinking in more ambitious terms. Matters should be so arranged that they are deprived of their large and unified teams before the transition is made in their minds.

B - TARGETS

These are the technical facilities which will not usually be heavily guarded, and which in any case we want to neutralize rather than seize, such as the telephone exchange, the telegraph office, and secondary radio-television stations. Each of these targets will be assigned to a small team whose personnel will include a "technician" whose presence should help to minimize the amount of physical damage resulting from sabotage. If it is possible to interdict these targets by minor and external sabotage, the B-team may consist of just one or two technically competent operators. Even if the actual building has to be entered for a short

time, the B-team will still be a small one, but in this case it should be overt and consist of uniformed soldiers or policemen.

C-TARGETS

These are the individuals we wish to hold in isolation for the duration of the coup. In the case of the main leader(s) of the government, the arrests will be subsumed in the seizure of the presidential palace and similar A-targets, and therefore the other C-targets should not present a penetration problem. But they will present an evasion problem. A radio station or a royal palace can be very difficult targets to seize but at least they cannot escape or conceal their identity. The personalities whom we wish to arrest will try to do both. It will therefore be essential to devote our early attentions to these targets so as to ensure that they are seized before they can evade our teams. This will usually imply that the C-teams will go into operation marginally earlier than the other teams, and they can do so without breaking the rule of simultaneous penetration of the "early-warning system," because they should be sufficiently small and dispersed to act covertly.

Because these targets are human they will be inherently more problematic than some of our other objectives; the individuals concerned, apart from escaping or concealing their identity, could also try to subvert the very teams sent to arrest them. In the case of particularly charismatic figures, our teams will have to be formed from especially selected personnel; in some cases it may even be necessary to include an inner member of our group. These C-teams will be small, since their task will be a matter of entering a private residence and overpowering one or two guards. The exact size of each team will depend on the overall balance

of resources and requirements under which we operate, but will rarely exceed a dozen men or so.

Once the individuals which form this group of targets have been arrested, we will have to ensure that they are kept under a secure form of control. Our purpose in arresting them is to prevent them from using their influence and/or charisma against us and this can only be achieved if we can insulate them from their public for the whole duration of the coup. Such individuals are often the only casualties of otherwise bloodless coups, because it is often easier to eliminate them, rather than to keep them as captives; if we do keep them, an *ad hoc* prison used must be both secret and internally secure. The liberation of a popular public figure could be a powerful focus of counter-coup actions on the part of the opposition and secrecy will be a more reliable defense than any physical barrier.

While the teams are on their way to their respective targets our other allies will also come into action: the individuals we have subverted in various parts of the armed forces and bureaucracy will carry out their limited missions of technical neutralization. And the groups assigned to the blocking positions will be moving to take up their planned locations designed to isolate the loyalist forces. In the case of these dispersed individuals, whose contribution will be extremely important though almost totally invisible, there will be a signaling problem: since they are scattered throughout the sensitive parts of the state apparatus, it will be difficult to reach them individually. Further, they may include informants of the security agencies because, unlike the personnel of the various teams and blocking forces, they have been recruited as isolated individuals and therefore the mutual surveillance exercised on our behalf in the teams will not operate. Thus it would be dangerous to give them advance warning of the coup

and their signal to go into action will have to be our first broadcast on the radio-television station, except in particular cases where the facility to be neutralized requires early attention.

Our operational control over the various groups cooperating with us will aim at achieving two objectives: (*a*) as always, maximum speed in the execution of their tasks; and (*b*) the use of the absolute minimum of force. This will be important not only because of the psychological and political factors previously mentioned, but also for a more direct, technical reason: the external uniformity between the two sides of the conflict. Our teams will, of course, be nationals of the country in which the coup is being staged, and most of them will be soldiers and policemen wearing the same uniforms as those of the opposition. This uniformity will give us a measure of protection since the loyalist forces will not readily know who is loyal and who is not. Usually it would be a mistake to prejudice this protective cover by adopting distinctive armbands or other conventional labels, since we will need all the protection we can get. Thus, as the teams move around the capital city (probably at night) they will probably not be fired upon, unless they open fire first; to do so would be to facilitate the work of the opposition since this will be their only way of distinguishing between their own forces and ourselves. Further, since our teams have always been kept separate, initially to prevent the penetration of the security agencies, and now to protect our own position within the forces of the coup, there will be a danger of conflict between our own teams. The confusion we generate in the minds of the opposition could therefore exact a price in confusion within our own ranks; this may have serious consequences unless our forces respect the rule of a minimal and purely defensive use of force.

THE IMMEDIATE POST-COUP SITUATION

Once our targets have been seized, the loyalist forces isolated, and the rest of the bureaucracy and armed forces neutralized, the active (and more mechanical) phase of the coup will be over. But everything will still be in the balance: the old regime will have been deprived of its control over the critical parts of the mechanism of the state, but we ourselves will not yet be in control of it, except in a purely physical sense and then only in the area of the capital city. If we can retain our control over what we have seized, those political forces whose primary requirement is the preservation of law and order will probably give us their allegiance. Our objective, therefore, is to freeze the situation so that this process can take place. Thus, while until the actual execution of the coup our aim was to destabilize the situation, afterward all our efforts should be directed at stabilizing, or rather restabilizing, it.

We will be doing this at three different levels: (a) among our own forces, where our aim is to prevent our military or police allies from usurping our leadership; (b) within the state bureaucracy, whose allegiance and cooperation we wish to secure; and (c) with the public at large, whose acceptance we want to gain. In each case we will be using our leverage within one level in order to control the next one, but each level will also require separate and particular measures.

STABILIZING OUR OWN FORCES

During the planning stage, our recruits in the armed forces will be fully conscious of the fact that the success of the coup—and their own safety—depends on the work of coordination which we perform. Immediately after the

coup, however, the only manifestation of all our efforts will be the direct force which they themselves control. In these circumstances they may well be tempted into trying a coup of their own, and they could do this by establishing contact with the other military leaders we have recruited, so as to secure their agreement to our exclusion from the leadership. Apart from the dispersal countermeasures discussed above, our only effective defense will be to retain full control over all "horizontal" communications, or in other words to remain the only contact between each military leader we have recruited and his colleagues. This can sometimes be done technically by keeping under our control the actual communication equipment linking the various units, but this would be effective only in unusually extensive capital cities and would, in any case, break down after a relatively short period of time. Usually, we will need somewhat less direct political and psychological methods designed to keep apart the various military leaders we have recruited. This may involve promises of accelerated promotion to selected younger officers who could not otherwise expect very rapid advancement even within the limited context of those who have participated in the coup; it will also be useful to remind our military and police allies that their colleagues outside the conspiracy may try to displace them *en bloc* unless they—and we—form a tight and mutually supporting group. In general, we should ensure that all those who could pose an internal threat are kept occupied on tasks which, whether essential or not, will at least absorb their energies, and that there are divisive factors operating between them. As soon as we begin to receive the allegiance of military and bureaucratic leaders who were previously outside the conspiracy our leverage with our military and police recruits will increase very substantially. The problem of re-

taining control against such internal threats will therefore be largely short-term. As soon as our position has been established our best policy may be to dispose of our dangerous allies by using the usual polite methods available for the purpose: diplomatic posting abroad, nominal and/or remote command positions, and "promotions" to less vital parts of the state apparatus. Since it is possible that an embryonic coup has existed within our forces from the very beginning, the general security measures we designed to protect ourselves against the penetration of the security agencies will also serve a useful supplementary function: they will prevent the lateral spread of the conspiracy. If our internal security procedures are sufficiently good to prevent all contact between the separate "cells," so that any infiltration by the security agencies is contained, they will also prevent the coordination of this inner opposition.

It has been calculated⁵ that in a defensive military situation even if only 20 per cent of the troops of a unit are loyal, the units concerned should operate successfully and perform their assigned function. And though in aggregate terms our forces will be operating offensively, *vis-à-vis* the uninfiltated forces of the state, their outlook will be defensive both psychologically and tactically. Thus, even though it would be unusual to have the complete loyalty of those who (since they joined our coup in the first place) must be to some extent inherently disloyal, our forces should still perform successfully.

STABILIZING THE BUREAUCRACY

Our attitude toward the second level, the armed forces and bureaucracy which were not infiltrated before the

⁵ The calculations are based on the performance of ex-Soviet Ukrainian and Usbek troops used by the Germans in defensive positions during the Normandy landings in the Second World War.

coup, will depend partly on the degree of control which we have over our own "incorporated" forces. Assuming that we have a reasonably firm hold over them, we should not try to extract any early commitment from the majority of soldiers and bureaucrats whose first information of our existence will be the coup itself. Not knowing the extent of the conspiracy, their principal preoccupation will be the possible danger to their positions in the hierarchy: if most of the officers of the armed forces or the officials of a ministry have joined the coup, those who have not are hardly likely to be rewarded subsequently by rapid promotion. If the soldiers and bureaucrats realized that the group participating in the coup was in reality quite small, they would also realize the strength of their own position: the fact that they are collectively indispensable to *any* government, including the one to be formed after the coup. In the period immediately after the coup, however, they will probably see themselves as isolated individuals whose careers, and even lives, could be in danger. This feeling of insecurity may precipitate two alternative reactions, both extreme: they will either step forward to assert their loyalty to the leaders of the coup or else they will try to foment or join in opposition against us. Both reactions are undesirable from our point of view. Assertions of loyalty will usually be worthless since they are made by men who have just abandoned their previous, and possibly more legitimate, masters; opposition will always be dangerous and sometimes disastrous. Our policy toward the military and bureaucratic cadres will be to reduce this sense of insecurity; we should establish direct communication with as many of the more senior officers and officials as possible to convey one principal idea in a forceful and convincing manner: that the coup will not threaten their positions in the hierarchy and the aims of the coup do not include a

reshaping of the existing military or administrative structures.⁶ This requirement will incidentally have technical implications in the planning stage, when the sabotage of the means of communication must be carried out so as to be reversible easily.

The information campaign over the mass media will also reach this narrow but important section of the population, but it would be highly desirable to have more direct and confidential means of communication with them. The general political aims of the coup as expressed in our pronouncements on the radio and television will help to package our tacit deal with the bureaucrats and soldiers, but its real content will be the assurance that their careers are not threatened. In dealing with particular army or police officers who control especially important forces or with important bureaucrats, we may well decide to go further, in the sense that an actual exchange of promises of mutual support may take place. We should, however, remember that our main strength lies in the fact that only we have a precise idea of the extent of our power. It would therefore be unwise to enter into agreements which indicate that we need support urgently; more generally, any information which reveals the limits of our capabilities could threaten our position, which is essentially based on the fact that our inherent weakness is concealed. Again, as in the case of our own incorporated forces, we should make every effort to prevent communication between the cadres of the armed forces and bureaucracy outside our group. Such communication would usually be indispensable

⁶ Even when the coup is a vehicle for a political group which seeks to achieve fundamental social change, the short-term objective is to stabilize the bureaucracy and the armed forces. Later, when alternative sources of direct force and political support have been established, the machinery of state can be reshaped into an instrument suitable for revolutionary change.

to those who may seek to stage a counter-coup; the ignorance of the extent of the conspiracy will discourage such consultations: it is obviously dangerous to ask somebody to participate in the opposition to a group of which he is himself a member. But we should also interfere with such consultations directly, by using our control of the transport and communications infrastructure.

**FROM POWER TO AUTHORITY:
STABILIZING THE MASSES**

The masses have neither the weapons of the military nor the administrative facilities of the bureaucracy, but their attitude to the new government established after the coup will ultimately be decisive. Our immediate aim will be to enforce public order, but our long-term objective is to gain the acceptance of the masses so that physical coercion will no longer be needed in order to secure compliance with our orders. In both phases we shall use our control over the infrastructure and the means of coercion, but as the coup recedes in time, political means will become increasingly important, physical ones less so.

Our first measures, to be taken immediately after the active phase of the coup, will be designed to freeze the situation by imposing physical immobility. A total curfew, the interruption of all forms of public transport, the closing of all public buildings and facilities, and the interruption of the telecommunication services will prevent, or at any rate impede, active resistance to us. Organized resistance will be very difficult since there will be no way of inspiring and coordinating our potential opponents; unorganized resistance on the part of a mob will, on the other hand, be prevented because the people who might form such a mob would have to violate the curfew while acting as individuals, and not many will do this without the protective shelter of anonymity which a crowd provides.

The impact of our physical measures will be reduced outside the capital city, but, to the extent that the capital city is the focus of the national network of transport and communications, both physical movement and the flow of information will be impeded. The physical controls will be purely negative and defensive in character and our reliance on them could be minimal because their concomitant effect is to enhance the importance of the armed forces we have subverted.

Our second and far more flexible instrument will be our control over the means of mass communications; their importance will be particularly great because the flow of all other information will be affected by our physical controls. Moreover, the confused and dramatic events of the coup will mean that the radio and television services will have a particularly attentive and receptive audience. In broadcasting over the radio and television services our purpose is not to provide information about the situation but rather to affect its development by exploiting our monopoly of these media. We will have two principal objectives in the information campaign that will start immediately after the coup: (a) to discourage resistance to us by emphasizing the strength of our position; and (b) to dampen the fears which would otherwise give rise to such resistance.

TABLE 15

The first communiqué: a choice of styles

THE ROMANTIC/LYRICAL

"This is not a communiqué, but an avowal, an undertaking, and an appeal. It is an avowal of the situation in which the Army and the People have been reduced by a handful of evil men . . . it is an undertaking to wash clean the shame and disgrace suffered by the Army . . . it is finally a call to arms and to honor. . . ."

Captain Mustafa Hamdun, Aleppo Radio, 6.30 a.m., February 25, 1954

THE MESSIANIC

"The bourgeoisie is abolished . . . a new era of equality between all citizens is inaugurated . . . all agreements with foreign countries will be respected. . . ."

Colonel Jean Bedel Bokassa, Central African Republic, January 15, 1966

THE UNPREPARED

". . . [This rebellion has been made for] a strong united and prosperous Nigeria free from corruption and internal strife. . . . Looting, arson, *homosexuality* [sic], rape, embezzlement, bribery, corruption, sabotage, and false alarm will be punishable by death. . . ."

Major Nzeogwu, Radio Kaduna, Nigeria, January 15, 1966

THE RATIONAL-ADMINISTRATIVE

"The myth surrounding Kwame Nkrumah has been broken . . . [he] ruled the country as if it were his private property . . . [his] capricious handling of the country's economic affairs . . . brought the country to the point of economic collapse. . . . We hope to announce measures for curing the country's troubles within a few days . . . the future definitely bright. . . ."

Radio communiqué of Ghana's National Liberation Council, February 1966

Our first objective will be achieved by conveying the reality and strength of the coup instead of trying to justify it; this will be done by listing the controls we have imposed, by emphasizing that law and order have been fully restored, and by stating that all resistance has ceased. One of the major obstacles to active resistance will be the fact that we have fragmented the opposition so that each individual opponent would have to operate in isolation, cut off from friends and associates. In these circumstances the news of any resistance against us would act as a powerful stimulant to further resistance by breaking down this feeling of isolation. We must therefore make every effort to withhold such news. If there is in fact some resistance and if its intensity and locale are such as to make it difficult to conceal from particular segments of the public, we should

admit its existence; but we should strongly emphasize that it is *isolated*, the product of the obstinacy of a few misguided or dishonest individuals who are not affiliated to any party or group of significant membership. The constant working of the motif of isolation, the repetition of long and detailed lists of the administrative and physical controls we have imposed, and the emphasis on the fact that law and order have been re-established should have the effect of making resistance appear dangerous and useless.

The second objective of our information campaign will be to reassure the general public by dispelling fears that the coup is inspired by foreign and/or extremist elements, and to persuade particular interest groups that the coup is not a threat to them. The first aim will be achieved by manipulating national symbols and by asserting our belief in the prevailing pieties: in the Arab world the new regime will announce its belief in Arab unity and Islam, or Arab unity and socialism, as the case may be; where, as in Egypt, the revolution has been institutionalized, it will be necessary to assert our belief in *Al-Thawra*. In Africa, the new regime will announce its intention of fighting tribalism at home and racialism abroad; in Latin America the need to secure social justice (or to fight Communism and perhaps *fidelismo*) will be invoked. Everywhere in the "Third World," nationalist rhetoric will be used and references made to the glorious people of X and the glorious land of X which the last regime has degraded; above all, repeated denunciations of neo-, and not so neo-, colonialism are *de rigueur*. Such denunciations will be particularly important where there is a large foreign business enterprise operating in the country in question; the inevitable suspicions that the coup is a product of the machinations of the "Company" can only be dispelled by making violent attacks on it. These, being verbal and not unexpected, will

pacify the public without disturbing the business interests, and the attacks should be all the more violent if these suspicions are in fact justified.

While the religious attitude leads to the praise of the gods for one's successes and self-blame for one's failures, the nationalist attitude is to attribute successes to the nation and to blame foreigners for its failures. Similarly, the chants in praise of the gods have been replaced by ritualized curses variously addressed to different groups of foreigners and their activities. Thus for the phrase "the imperialist-neo-colonialist power bloc" read "the English and the French" if it is spoken by Africans of former colonies of those countries; while the phrase "Zionist oil monopolist plotters" translates into "Jews and Christians" in the subconscious of the Muslim Arabs who make use of it.

There may be a purely ideological element in these denunciations, but even when the American extreme right speaks of "the international conspiracy of godless Communism" it is significant that they stigmatize it as "un-American" rather than as anticapitalist. We shall make use of a suitable selection of these unlovely phrases; though their meaning has been totally obscured by constant and deliberate misuse,⁷ they will be useful as indicators of our impeccable nationalism, and if that is not in reality our position they will serve to obscure our true policy.

The flow of information emanating from all the sources under our control should be coordinated with our other measures: the impositions of physical controls will be announced and explained, and the political moves, to which we now turn, will be suitably presented. Physical coercion will deter or defeat direct opposition, while the

⁷ On June 12, 1967, the East German radio referred to the "Nazi atrocities committed by Jews against the Arabs of Gaza," who were described as "victims of a Zionist-revanchist-imperialist plot."

information campaign will lay the basis of our eventual acquisition of authority, but only political means will secure for us a base of active support. Where the pre-coup regime was exceptionally brutal, corrupt, or retrograde, the leaders of the coup will have little trouble in gaining a generalized form of acceptance, but even then the active support of specific groups can only be gained by political accommodation, i.e. by sponsoring policies which serve the interests of particular groups, thus giving them reasons for becoming committed to (or at least interested in) our survival. In some Latin American countries, for example, we could gain the support of the landless peasants by announcing our intention of carrying out a program of agrarian reform. In West Africa we could announce our intention of increasing the prices paid to peasant producers by the various commodity marketing boards; in Greece and Turkey, where there is a heavy burden of peasant indebtedness, we could announce a general cancellation of agrarian debts. Each of these policy announcements will bind the interests of a large and politically powerful group to our government unless we are overtaken by other, rival announcements, but it will also lead to the hostility of other groups, whose interests are damaged by our intended policies. In Latin America, where the peasants would benefit, the landlords would lose; in Africa the urban population would be the loser; while in Greece the taxpayer would bear the burden of peasant debt relief. Thus the backing of one interest group will generally have as its concomitant the loss of support of—or even actual hostility from—other groups. Clearly, it will be necessary to estimate the *net* political support which a given policy announcement will generate. This will mean taking into account not only the political significance of each group but also the immediacy of its political power. In the context of a Latin American post-coup situation, for example, the good will of

remote and dispersed peasants will not help us much against the immediate and powerful opposition of bureaucratic and military cadres who could for the most part be the children of the landowning aristocracy. If, on the other hand, our short-term position is strong but we are threatened by a longer-term usurpation of power on the part of our military allies, our objective will be to create a counterweight capable eventually of becoming a source of direct strength, such as a peasants' militia. Thus whether we opt for a "left" policy of land reform and longer-term *campesino* support or a "right" policy of peasant repression and immediate landowner support will depend on the balance between the strength of our short- and our long-term positions.

The almost mechanical elements which are important in the special climate of the immediate post-coup period will distort the normal balance between the political forces of the country concerned. If, therefore, our short-term position is not fragile, we should repress the agitation of those forces which have a disproportionate strength in the short term and concentrate instead on cultivating the support of those groups whose longer-term strength is the greater.

One element in our strategy after the coup lies halfway between the information campaign and the political campaign: the problem of "legitimizing" the coup. Clearly the coup is by definition illegal, but whether this illegality matters, and whether it is possible to counteract its effects, will depend on the total political environment of the country in question. We have seen in Chapter 2 that in much of the "Third World" the legitimacy or otherwise of the government will not greatly matter; the government is treated as part of nature, that is, something that one adjusts to rather than questions. Elsewhere, however, the general attitude of the masses could be more legalistic. One way of legitimizing the post-coup government has already been

mentioned in the discussion of the selection of the personalities to be arrested—the retention of the nominal head of state (where such a constitutional role exists) as our own highly nominal head of state. In this way, the appearance of continuity will be maintained and with it the appearance of legitimacy. Where the head of state is not nominal, as in “presidential” regimes, other tactics will have to be used: the announcement of forthcoming elections or a referendum (as a sort of *ex post facto* legitimization) or, alternatively, the coup can be openly admitted as an extraconstitutional intervention, but one made against an unconstitutional regime. One illegality will then be represented as being the cause of the other, but we shall declare that whereas the illegality of the pre-coup regime was *voluntary* and *permanent*, ours is *necessary* and *temporary*.

Such techniques will be of limited value in conducting the political processes required to create a base of active support and to secure our authority, since everything will depend on the particular political environment in which we shall be operating; one particular problem, however, requires further exploration: recognition by foreign powers. This is almost always important, but for many countries of the “Third World,” whose *pays réel* lies outside their own borders, it will be a crucial problem. When much of the available disposable funds come from foreign loans, investments, or grants, and when foreign cadres carry out vital administrative, technical, and sometimes even military functions, the maintenance of good relations with the particular “donor” country or countries concerned may well be a determining factor in our political survival after the coup. Premature recognition by a foreign power, i.e. recognition granted while the old regime still retains some degree of control, is becoming regarded as a form of aggres-

sion in international law. Beyond this, however, recognition is usually granted to illegitimate governments after a polite interval if there are convincing assurances about their continuity in terms of foreign relations. These assurances are conveyed simply and publicly by formal announcements stating that membership in alliances and groupings will be maintained, that foreign agreements and obligations will be respected, and that legitimate foreign interests in the country concerned will not be harmed. Thus the leaders of Ghana's National Liberation Council, which was formed after Nkrumah's overthrow, announced that Ghana would retain her membership of the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity, and the UN, and would respect all obligations undertaken by Nkrumah's regime. Similarly, Arab post-coup regimes announce that they will remain in the Arab League, and Latin American regimes, in the Organization of American States. Far more important than these declarations is the considerable diplomatic activity which will take place after the coup (and sometimes even before it). The purpose of these diplomatic exchanges will be to clarify the political situation and, nowadays, to indicate—or to dissemble—the ideological orientation of the planners of the coup. Most countries of the world follow British diplomatic doctrine in granting recognition to regimes on the basis of the effective control of their territories. But this is a doctrine as flexible as the definition of "control"; so that recognition can sometimes be withheld if the pre-coup regime retains control over some part of the national territory, as in the case of British nonrecognition of the Yemeni Republican regime.

After the necessary exchanges of information and assurances, the new government will usually be recognized; this will be so even if its illegality is an embarrassment, as in the case of the United States and Latin American coups,

or if its ideological orientation is distasteful, as in the case of the Soviet Union and the Ghanaian and Indonesian coups.

Diplomatic recognition is one of the elements in the general process of establishing the authority of the new government; until this is achieved, we will have to rely on the brittle instruments of physical coercion and our position will be vulnerable to many threats—including that of coup d'état.

appendix A

The Economics of Repression

Once we have carried out our coup and established control over the bureaucracy and the armed forces, our long-term political survival will largely depend on our management of the problem of economic development. Economic development is generally regarded as a "good thing" and almost everybody wants more of it, but for us—the newly established government of X-land—the pursuit of economic development will be undesirable, since it militates against our main goal: political stability.

An economy develops by extending and improving its stock of human and physical capital, and this requires investment, whether to train people or to build factories. In order to invest, current income has to be withdrawn from would-be consumers and channeled away to create capital. Clearly, the higher the rate of investment the faster will be the development of the economy, but also the lower the *present* standard of living. The governments of economically backward countries—where the need for development is manifest—are therefore faced with the alternative of either slow economic development or further reduction of the already desperately low standard of living. The more that can be taxed from current incomes, the nearer will be the beautiful dawn of prosperity—even if it is the prosperity of Spain or Greece rather than that of Western Europe or North America. But there are limits to the amount of saving that can be forced out of a popula-

tion whose annual income per head is already very low: there is an economic-survival limit below which the population—or a large part of it—would simply starve (or retreat into the pure subsistence economy), but well before this point is reached, there is a political-survival limit below which *we*, as the government, would be overthrown. The economic-survival limit is more or less rigid: in any particular environment with a given climate, pattern of nutrition, habits, and traditions, there will be a minimum annual income which an inhabitant of average resourcefulness will need to satisfy his and his family's bodily needs. The "political-survival limit" is, however, very flexible and it will depend on psychological, historical, and social factors, but also on the efficiency of the system of state security and of the propaganda machine.

The problem is particularly acute in the newly independent states of the "Third World." The colonial regimes may or may not have tried to achieve economic development, but if they did try it was without the urgency which the new post-colonial regimes try to achieve. Immediately after independence, therefore, instead of the increase in the standard of living which the native population had been led to expect, the opposite takes place. The new "independence" government has to increase taxes and import duties in order to finance the great projects with which economic development often starts: dams, road systems, steel mills, and harbors. Foreign aid, which many in the "donor" countries have been led to believe to be very substantial,¹ only contributes a fraction of the necessary funds. Most of the money has to come out of current incomes, so that instead of "having cars like the whites,"

¹ Foreign aid has been *falling* as a percentage of GNP in the developed countries in the last few years.

the level of consumption actually falls. This impoverishment of those who are already very poor indeed is not easily tolerated—especially when the mechanism of expectations has been built up.

Our basic problem, therefore, is to achieve economic development—in order to satisfy the aspirations of the élite and would-be élite²—without taxing the masses beyond the politically safe limit, which could lead to their revolt. There are two main instruments with which we can persuade the masses to accept the sacrifice of present consumption for the sake of an increased future income: propaganda and repression,³ or, more efficiently, by a mixture of both. Imagine, therefore, that we have inherited a country with a backward economy whose vital statistics are those shown in Table 16 (p. 186).

Thus, in the past, in this poor (but not particularly poor) country the gross national product per head was

² For the élite, economic development subsumes the national goal of modernization with the personal goal of expanded career opportunities. For the new generation of educated citizens (the would-be élite) economic development is a guarantee of employment—and the unemployed intelligentsia is a major threat to many regimes in the “Third World.”

³ By propaganda is meant the whole range of activities whose content is information or entertainment and whose function, in this case, is (a) to distract attention from present hardship; (b) to justify it in terms of assured future happiness. This may or may not involve the presentation of the outside world as even less well off, but it will almost certainly present the past standard of living as much inferior. An equally important aim of propaganda will be to persuade the masses that the present leadership is the most efficient vehicle for modernization; this can be done in rational terms by using statistical images, or by irrational ones which present the leadership as superhuman. By repression is meant the whole range of political police activities which aim at: (a) suppressing individual political activity by surveillance and imprisonment; (b) intimidating the masses by displays of force; and (c) preventing the circulation of rival information by controlling the media and inhibiting public discussion.

TABLE 16

National accounts data, country X (assumed egalitarian distribution)

*Annual GNP
per head*

£100	...	Present actual level of income in pounds per inhabitant
£90	...	Level of taxation accepted in the past (i.e. net income left after tax)
£80		
£70		
£60		
£50		
£45	...	Economic-survival limit
£40		
£30		
£20		
£10		

£100 per year, and of this £10 was paid out in various taxes while £90 was spent on current consumption, or saved. Now we know that only £45 per inhabitant per year is needed for economic survival, and the problem is to get hold of some of the difference in order to finance development—and to do so without being overthrown. If we simply increase taxes the chances are that part of the population will refuse to pay them, and if administrative methods are used in order to enforce payment a violent reaction may ensue. We will therefore divert some of the modest tax payments received now (£10 in the diagram) from other uses, and spend it on propaganda and the police. This may well result in the situation shown in Table 17.

In the new situation, then, our sums work out as in Table 18.

TABLE 17

National accounts data, country X (after propaganda and police)


*Annual GNP
per head*

£100	...	Present actual level of income per inhabitant
£90	...	
£80	...	Level of taxation accepted after, say, £1 per head per year has been spent on propaganda and police
£70		
£60		
£50		
£45	...	Economic-survival limit
£40		
£30		
£20		
£10		

TABLE 18

National accounts data, country X (funds available for development)

<i>Before</i>	(Expenditure on propaganda and repression)	<i>After</i>
£100	←———— GNP per head per year —————→	£100
£55	← Less £45 per year needed for "survival" →	£55
£10	←———— Tax collected —————→	£20
£0	← Less money spent on propaganda and repression →	£1
£10	← Net funds available for development →	£19



Thus, by spending £1 per man per year on propaganda and an efficient police system, we have lowered the political survival limit by £10, and after deducting the amount spent on the system of repression and persuasion we still have £19 left. If we spend another £1 per man per year the chances are that we will be able to “liberate” some more of the possible margin above the survival limit, but as we spend more and more money on repression we are likely to find that it will lower the safety limit by less and less (see Fig. 10). And, of course, as we spend more and more on the police and propaganda we will find that while the first extra £10 of taxes costs us £1 to obtain with safety, the next £10 will cost, say, £2. Eventually a point is reached where (as shown in Fig. 10) further expenditure brings us no increase in taxation at all. At that point we spend an extra £1 per year and get no increase at all in the taxes which can safely be collected. Well before that point is reached, however, there will be an earlier stage when we will spend, say, an extra £1 on repression and persuasion and get exactly the same sum in further taxes. Immediately before *that* point is the *maximum efficiency* level of expenditure on the police and propaganda machine.


**MAXIMUM SAFETY AND ZERO
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

This is the formula which Duvalier has applied in Haiti with increasing thoroughness since his rise to power. Taxation, which is heavy for a country with an annual income per head of about £30, is spent almost entirely on the army, the "police" (the Ton Ton Macoutes), and on propaganda. The only major economic development project is of doubtful value: the building of a new capital, "Duvalierville," which, in any case, has now been suspended.

The Duvalier mix of efficient repression, massive propaganda, and no development investment has paid off; he has been in power continuously since September 1957, and his regime still appears to be more stable than that of most Latin American countries. The Ton Ton Macoutes operate as a semipublic presidential guard which carries

Fig. 11 THE DUVALIER FORMULA

Political security = maximum economic development = zero



out police and security functions, and they supplement their (generous) salaries by private exactions from what is left of the business sector. The propaganda machine, which involves ceremonial parades, laudatory films, and the projection of "Papa Doc" as a Voodoo expert, is almost as expensive to run as the Ton Ton Macoutes, but equally useful. The extreme poverty of the population means that their level of political awareness and even vitality is extremely low; the Ton Ton Macoutes terrorize the thin élite and the army officers—who are constantly watched—and the Ton Ton themselves rely on Duvalier because their position depends on his survival; the Voodoo mythology and the propaganda machine have deified the man whom the Ton Ton defend, and if Duvalier should disappear from the scene the army and/or the masses would quickly liquidate the Ton Ton.

Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and many other African leaders now dead, in prison, or in exile have followed a policy of high taxation and investment associated with clearly insufficient propaganda and repression effort. Nkrumah, in spite of his eccentricities, was largely defeated by his own success: the by-product of the considerable economic development achieved by Ghana was to stimulate and educate the masses and the new élite, their attitude to Nkrumah's regime becoming more and more critical in the light of the education which the regime itself provided. When this happens, more and more repression and propaganda is needed to maintain political stability and, in spite of considerable efforts, Nkrumah was unable to build a sufficiently ruthless police system. The cause of his downfall was not, therefore, the mismanagement of the economy—which was considerable—but rather the success of much of the development effort.

The middle way, efficient repression, extensive propaganda, and enough economic development to create new

élites committed to the regime, has been followed successfully in both the Soviet Union and China; the regimes of both countries have, however, used different blends of repression and propaganda. The two are interchangeable up to a point, but the nature of the most efficient mixture will depend on the particular country, and local conditions will dictate the most appropriate mixture.

appendix B

Tactical Aspects of the Coup d'État

In the decisive (active) phase of the coup the forces which we have acquired by infiltrating and subverting the system of state security will be used to seize certain objectives or to neutralize selected facilities. To do this force will be essential, but since bloodshed could have unfortunate destabilizing effects we should arrange matters so that the threat of force will suffice to achieve our objectives, rather than its actual use. In this appendix we will analyze two main problems: (a) the formation of the active teams and their operational use; and (b) the deployment of the blocking forces. In both cases our two major preoccupations will be to avoid or minimize bloodshed and—more important—to ensure that our position is not threatened after the coup by a usurpation of our power on the part of the soldiers and policemen we have recruited.

THE FORMATION OF THE ACTIVE TEAMS

Our infiltration of the armed forces and police of the state may have been either general and diffuse or concentrated within a few large formations. In the first type of infiltration the forces we have subverted will consist of many small subunits, whose commanders have decided to join us

while their more senior colleagues—who command the unit as a whole—have remained outside the scope of our infiltration; in the second type of infiltration a few large units have come over to us *en bloc* with all, or most, of their entire establishment. The two alternatives are illustrated in Table 19.

TABLE 19

*Eve of the coup: forces of the state fully subverted
(notional)*

<i>Diffuse</i>	— infiltration —	<i>Concentrated</i>
3 companies of brigade X		2 battalions of brigade X
6 companies of brigade Y		1 battalion of brigade Y
7 companies of brigade Z		
1 battalion of brigade V		
4 companies of brigade U		
Total forces = 3,000 men		Total forces = 3,000 men

Both types of infiltration have their advantages and disadvantages: if we have subverted many small subunits we will have some additional protective cover, since the supporters of the pre-coup regime will not readily be able to identify which units have remained loyal and which have joined us; it will also be useful to be able to confront loyalist forces with teams made up from their own cadres. The subversion of a few large units, on the other hand, will minimize the problems of coordination and recognition and, more important, will increase the security level before the coup, since within each large unit there would be a measure of mutual surveillance which would deter defections to the regime or leaks to the security agencies. After the active phase of the coup, however, a composite force


made up of many small subunits will be much more secure since it will reduce the risk of a usurpation of our position on the part of our military allies. This would be so for three main reasons: (a) the rank of the officers concerned will obviously be lower if they are the appointed commanders of small units rather than large ones; (b) it will be easier to disperse our forces after the active phase of the coup if their concentration is not organic but a construct of our own; and (c) the larger the number of independent unit leaders involved in the coup the less likely they are to combine in order to exclude us from power.

Whatever the sources of the forces which we have incorporated, it will often be necessary to restructure them for the purposes of the coup, since the many specialized tasks to be carried out will require widely different teams; only if we have numerical superiority or its equivalent over the loyalist forces will we be able to use the formations we have subverted in their natural state. We will need three types of team, as well as the blocking forces, and these will correspond to the three types of targets discussed in Chapter 5, and we will therefore draw on the pool of subverted units and individuals to form the required number of A-, B-, and C-teams.

The A-teams will be needed in order to seize the major defended objectives, such as the residence of the ruler, the main radio-television station, and the army and police headquarters. These will be both larger in size and more sophisticated in structure than the other two types of team. Each A-team will consist of four elements whose relative size will vary with each particular target:

(a) A "*civilian*" *penetration group*. This will be very small and will consist of a few men in civilian clothes carrying concealed weapons or explosives. Their function will be to enter the target as open and legitimate "visitors" in order to assist in its seizure from the inside. This assistance can

Fig. 12 "SOPHISTICATED" SEIZURE OF MAJOR DEFENDED TARGETS



SEQUENCE

1. Civilian penetration
 2. Diversion designed to attract loyalist troops away from palace
 3. Interdicting fire to prevent their return and the passage of the main loyalist forces
 4. Assault group from street enters into action
- A. Expected approach of main loyalist forces

be a direct internal assault, or it can take the form of an internal diversion; in the case of the broadcasting facility, however, their main function will be to prevent the use of its installations to raise the alarm.

(b) A "*diversion*" group. This group will be important in proportion to the size of the forces deployed to protect the target. Where, as in the case of the royal or presidential palace, there could be an entire infantry formation assigned to protect the target, a diversion, designed to attract part of the loyalist forces, will be essential. The diversion group will carry out its function by creating a disturbance, or by actually carrying out an assault on a nearby secondary target. The diversion should be timed to include the reaction time of the loyalist forces and their route time to the scene of the disturbance, after which the main assault on the primary target will take place.

(c) A *covering "fire"* group. This will be a small group but it will include troops with heavier weapons, especially armored fighting vehicles. Its function will be to deter resistance on the part of the loyalists by giving demonstrations of firepower, and to prevent the intervention of loyalist forces from elsewhere by covering approach routes.

(d) An *assault* group. This will be by far the largest, and its members should be chosen on the usual criteria of combat proficiency, though hopefully their skills will not be needed.

The integrated operation of the different groups of each A-team is illustrated in Fig. 12.


The B- and C-teams, whose function is respectively to arrest political personalities and to sabotage selected facilities, will not face significant tactical problems and their organization will be a matter of forming small teams equipped with suitable transport, of designating the target, and of coordinating the timing. Each team will consist of a couple of jeep-loads of troops or police accompanied by a member of our inner group (in the case of the major

political personalities) or by a technician (in the cases where the sabotage requires a measure of expertise).

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE BLOCKING FORCES

Although it is to be hoped that the pre-coup regime will be unaware of the timing of our particular coup, it will probably be conscious of the danger from coups in general. Regimes in politically unstable countries often go to great lengths to maintain a force of politically reliable troops or armed police on which they can rely against threats to internal security. Its officers and men often share the ethnic and/or religious affiliation of the ruling group and special safeguards are employed to ensure its political reliability. The infiltration of such "palace guards" is very difficult, and we may well have deliberately decided to exclude them from the scope of our infiltration. Elsewhere, even where every major force has been fully subverted or internally neutralized, we will still be vulnerable to unexpected defections or coincidental transfers of uninfiltated troops. For all these reasons, therefore, the blocking forces designed to insulate the capital city from the intervention of loyalist forces will be essential, since, as has been repeatedly emphasized, the intervention of determined loyalist forces—however small in size—could have effects disproportionate to their size.

The operation of a blocking force is the exact opposite of an ambush: while the objective of an ambush is to inflict maximum damage without controlling passage, the objective of the blocking force is to prevent passage while inflicting minimum damage. The general structure of the blocking position is shown in Fig. 13 (p. 198), but two



essentials are missing: (a) correct intelligence about the location and intentions of the loyalist forces; and (b) the efficient use of natural barriers (such as bridges, tunnels, densely built-up areas, etc.) and of subsidiary roadblocks to channel any loyalist force into the blocking position.

The area of constrained passage on the diagram represents the group of roads or streets which an intervention

force must use in order to enter the city from a particular direction; it is not generally meant to represent a single road or street, though in particular settings this may be the case.

The "observation line" (or "screen" in military terminology) attempts to infiltrate around the blocking position which dismounted loyalist troops may make. The "symbolic" roadblocks deployed across the set of roads or streets concerned will dissuade the loyalist forces by appealing to "orders" and comradeship; if dissuasion fails, they will try deterrence by pointing out the main defensive forces and the antitank positions (or the tanks if available). The operational leadership of the main defensive forces, the "teeth" of the blocking position, will have to be chosen carefully to ensure a determined defense if force is in fact used by the loyalist troops; they must also be made aware of the damaging consequences which could ensue if the blocking position degenerates into an ambush.

appendix C

Statistics

TABLE 1

Economic development and the coup d'état, 1945-67

Country	Per capita national income Dollars (UN estimate year in brackets)	Coup d'état?	Date of last success- ful coup
AFRICA			
Algeria	195 (1964)	yes	1965
Angola	56 (1958)	no (colony)	—
Burundi	38 (1958)	yes	1966
Cameroon	104 (1963)	no	—
Central African Republic	123 (1965)	yes	1966
Chad	60 (1963)	no	—
Congo (Brazzaville)	141 (1958)	yes	1965
Congo (Kinshasa)	66 (1964)	yes	1965
Dahomey	55 (1958)	yes	1965
Egypt	96 (1965)	yes	1952
Ethiopia	42 (1965)	no	—
Gabon	333 (?) (1963)	no	—
Gambia	69 (1958)	no	—
Ghana	245 (1965)	yes	1966
Guineas	83 (1958)	no	—
Ivory Coast	188 (1964)	no	—

Kenya	77 (1965)	no	—
Liberia	148 (1963)	no	—
Madagascar	83 (1958)	no	—
Malawi	38 (1965)	no	—
Mali	57 (1958)	no	—
Mauretania	106 (1965)	no	—
Mauritius	215 (1965)	no (colony until 1968)	—
Morocco	174 (1965)	no	—
Mozambique	40 (1958)	no (colony)	—
Niger	78 (1965)	no	—
Nigeria	63 (1965)	yes	1966
Rwanda	38 (1958)	yes	1966
Senegal	149 (1965)	no	—
Sierra Leone	123 (1965)	yes	1966
Somalia	48 (1958)	no	—
South Africa	509 (1965)	no	—
Southern Rhodesia	206 (1965)	no	—
Sudan	90 (1965)	yes	1958
Tanzania	64 (1965)	no	—
Togo	82 (1965)	yes	1963
Tunisia	179 (1965)	no	—
Uganda	77 (1965)	no	—
Upper Volta	35 (1958)	yes	1966
Zambia	174 (1965)	no	—

Total Africa:

Out of forty countries, or, deducting the three colonies and the two white enclaves, out of thirty-five countries, there have been fourteen successful coups, as well as several (failed) military insurrections and mutinies.

ASIA

Afghanistan	47 (1958)	no	—
Bhutan	49 (1958)	no	—
Brunei	1395 (1958)	no	—
Burma	56 (1963)	yes	1962
Cambodia	112 (1965)	no	—
Ceylon	130 (1965)	no	—

Country	Per capita national income Dollars (UN estimate year in brackets)	Coup d'état?	Date of last success- ful coup
<i>ASIA (continued)</i>			
China, Republic	185 (1965)	no	—
Hong Kong	291 (1963)	no (colony)	—
India	86 (1965)	no	—
Indonesia	85 (1965)	yes	1965
Iran	211 (1965)	no	—
Japan	696 (1965)	no	—
Korea, Republic	88 (1965)	yes	1962
Laos	59 (1958)	yes	1964
Malaysia	250 (1965)	yes	1960
Nepal	66 (1965)	yes	1960
Pakistan	89 (1964)	yes	1958
Philippines	219 (1965)	no	—
Singapore	508 (1965)	no	—
Thailand	105 (1965)	yes	1958
Vietnam, Republic	113 (1965)	yes	1963/

Total Asia:

Out of the twenty-one countries listed, or twenty excluding the one colony, there have been successful coups in eight of them, as well as insurgencies and uprisings in most of them.

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina	740 (1965)	yes	1966
Bolivia	144 (1958)	yes	1964
Brazil	217 (1965)	yes	1964
Chile	515 (1965)	no	—
Colombia	237 (1965)	no	—
Costa Rica	353 (1965)	no	—
Cuba		yes	1952
Dominican Republic	212 (1965)	yes	1964
Ecuador	183 (1965)	yes	1963
El Salvador	236 (1965)	yes	1961

Guatemala	281 (1965)	yes	1963
Guiana	248 (1965)	no	—
Haiti	80 (1965)	yes	1950
Honduras	194 (1965)	yes	1963
Jamaica	407 (1965)	no	—
Mexico	412 (1965)	no	—
Nicaragua	298 (1965)	yes	1963
Panama	425 (1965)	yes	1951
Paraguay	186 (1965)	yes	1954
Peru	218 (1965)	yes	1963
Uruguay	537 (1965)	no	—
Venezuela	745 (1965)	no	—

Total Latin America:

Out of the twenty-two countries listed, only eight have not experienced a successful coup since 1946; of these eight countries four have experienced military revolts and two insurgencies.

MIDDLE EAST

Iraq	193 (1964)	yes	1963
Israel	1067 (1965)	no	—
Jordan	179 (1963)	no	—
Kuwait	318 (1965)	no	—
Lebanon	204 (1958)	no	—
Saudi Arabia	...	no	—
Syria	156 (1963)	yes	1966
Yemen	...	no	—

Total Middle East:

Out of the eight countries listed, only two have experienced coups.

EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA, AND OCEANIA

No coups except for:

Czechoslovakia	...	yes	1948
Greece	566 (1965)	yes	1967
Turkey	244 (1965)	yes	1960

TABLE 2

Basic list of coups and attempted coups, 1945-67

R = Coup has acted as a vehicle for state-directed revolutionary change.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Main party</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
LATIN AMERICA		
<i>Argentina</i>		
Sept. 28, 1951	elements from three services	failed
June 16, 1955	navy faction	failed
Sept. 16, 1955	elements from three services	successful
Nov. 13, 1955	army faction	successful
June 13, 1960	army faction	failed
Mar. 28, 1962	elements from three services	successful
Aug. 8, 1962	troop mutiny	failed
Apr. 2, 1963	generals' faction in army	failed
<i>Bolivia</i>		
Apr. 9, 1952	political and army faction	successful R
Nov. 3, 1964	army faction	successful
<i>Brazil</i>		
Oct. 29, 1945	elements from three services	successful
Nov. 11, 1955	army faction	successful
Apr. 1, 1964	elements from three services	successful
<i>Cuba</i>		
Mar. 10, 1952	army faction	successful R
<i>Dominican Republic</i>		
Jan. 16, 1962	army faction	failed
Sept. 25, 1963	army faction	successful
<i>Ecuador</i>		
Aug. 23, 1947	elements from three services	failed
Nov. 3, 1961	" " " "	successful
July 11, 1963	" " " "	successful
<i>El Salvador</i>		
Dec. 14, 1948	army faction	successful
Oct. 26, 1960	mixed army-political faction	successful
Jan. 25, 1961	right-wing faction	successful

Guatemala

July 9, 1949	army faction	failed
Jan. 20, 1955	mixed political faction	failed
Mar. 30, 1963	army faction	successful
Nov. 13, 1960	left-wing elements and army faction	failed

Honduras

Oct. 3, 1963	army faction	successful
--------------	--------------	------------

Haiti

May 10, 1950	army faction	successful
--------------	--------------	------------

Nicaragua

May 25, 1947	army faction	successful
--------------	--------------	------------

Panama

Nov. 20, 1949	police	successful
May 9, 1951	army-political faction	successful

Paraguay

Mar. 7, 1947	army faction	failed
June 3, 1948	political party faction	successful
Dec. 30, 1948	political party faction	successful
Feb. 26, 1949	political party faction	successful
May 5, 1954	army faction	successful

Peru

Oct. 3, 1948	navy faction	failed
Oct. 27, 1948	right-wing army faction	successful
Feb. 16, 1956	right-wing army faction	failed
July 18, 1962	elements from three services	successful
Mar. 3, 1963	elements from three services	successful

Venezuela

Nov. 23, 1948	political and army faction	successful
Nov. 11, 1950	political faction	failed
May 4, 1962	right-wing navy faction	failed
June 3, 1962	left-wing navy faction	failed
June 24, 1960	foreign-financed faction	failed

ASIA

Burma

Mar. 2, 1962	elements from three services	successful
--------------	------------------------------	------------

Ceylon

Jan. 28, 1962	elements from three services	failed
---------------	------------------------------	--------

<i>Date</i>	<i>Main party</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
<i>ASIA (continued)</i>		
<i>Indonesia</i>		
Dec. 3, 1950	navy faction	failed
Nov. 16, 1965	elements from three services	failed
Apr. 26, 1950	elements from two services	failed
<i>Korea, Republic</i>		
Oct. 20, 1948	army faction	failed
1962	elements from three services	successful
<i>Laos</i>		
Aug. 9, 1960	neutralist army faction	successful
Apr. 19, 1964	right-wing army faction	successful
<i>Nepal</i>		
Dec. 15, 1960	king plus army faction	successful
<i>Pakistan</i>		
1958	elements from three services	successful
<i>Thailand</i>		
Nov. 9, 1947	army faction	successful
June 29, 1951	navy faction	failed
Nov. 29, 1951	army faction	successful
Sept. 16, 1957	army faction	successful
Oct. 20, 1958	army faction	successful
<i>Vietnam, Republic</i>		
Nov. 1, 1963	elements from three services	successful
<i>MIDDLE EAST</i>		
<i>Iraq</i>		
July 14, 1958	army faction	successful R
Mar. 7, 1959	left-wing army faction	failed
Feb. 8, 1963	army and air force faction	successful
<i>Lebanon</i>		
Dec. 31, 1961	army-tribal faction	unsuccessful
<i>Syria</i>		
Mar. 30, 1949	army faction	successful
Aug. 14, 1949	army faction	successful
Dec. 17, 1949	army faction	successful
Nov. 28, 1951	army faction	successful
Feb. 25, 1954	army faction	successful
Sept. 28, 1961	army-political faction	successful

Syria (continued)

Apr. 1, 1962	Nasserist army faction	failed
Mar. 8, 1963	left-wing army faction	successful R

AFRICA*Congo (Brazzaville)*

Aug. 12, 1963	army faction	successful
---------------	--------------	------------

Egypt

July 23, 1952	army faction	successful R
---------------	--------------	--------------

Ethiopia

Dec. 14, 1961	palace guard	failed
---------------	--------------	--------

Gabon

Feb. 17, 1964	army faction	failed
---------------	--------------	--------

Sudan

Aug. 18, 1955	army-tribal faction	failed
---------------	---------------------	--------

Nov. 17, 1958	army faction	successful
---------------	--------------	------------

Tanzania

Jan. 20, 1964	troop mutiny	failed
---------------	--------------	--------

Togo

Jan. 13, 1963	army-tribal faction	successful
---------------	---------------------	------------

Uganda

Jan. 23, 1964	troop mutiny	failed
---------------	--------------	--------

EUROPE*Czechoslovakia*

Feb. 21, 1948	Communist Party	successful R
---------------	-----------------	--------------

Turkey

May 21, 1960	elements from three services	successful
--------------	------------------------------	------------

Feb. 22, 1962	army faction	failed
---------------	--------------	--------

May 20, 1963	army and air force faction	failed
--------------	----------------------------	--------

In 1965 there were successful coups in: Algeria; Congo (Brazzaville); Congo (Kinshasa); Dahomey; and Indonesia.

In 1966 there were successful coups in: Burundi; Central African Republic; Ghana; Nigeria; Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Upper Volta; Argentina; and Syria.

In 1967 there were successful coups in: Dahomey and Greece.

TABLE 3

The efficiency of the coup d'état

Outcome as a function of conflict type

<i>Type</i>	<i>Con- flict con- tinu- ing</i>	<i>In- con- clu- sive</i>	<i>Lost</i>	<i>Half and half</i>	<i>Won</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Civil disorder	4	25	47	26	18	3
Coup d'état	0	0	24	2	62	
Military revolt	0	3	17	0	3	
Military/insurrection	0	4	33	8	2	
Guerrilla war	5	2	6	4	8	1
Civil war	1	2	4	4	6	
Border conflict	8	14	3	3	0	
Limited war	0	1	3	1	1	
Covert invasion	2	5	7	1	1	
Blockade, etc.	0	0	2	2	0	
Threat	1	1	0	0	1	
	<hr style="width: 100%; border: 0.5px solid black; margin-bottom: 2px;"/> 21	<hr style="width: 100%; border: 0.5px solid black; margin-bottom: 2px;"/> 57	<hr style="width: 100%; border: 0.5px solid black; margin-bottom: 2px;"/> 146	<hr style="width: 100%; border: 0.5px solid black; margin-bottom: 2px;"/> 51	<hr style="width: 100%; border: 0.5px solid black; margin-bottom: 2px;"/> 102	<hr style="width: 100%; border: 0.5px solid black; margin-bottom: 2px;"/> 4

TABLE 4

The frequency of the coup d'état

Time distribution of type of conflict 1946-64 (based on starting date of conflict)

Time periods: A January 1, 1946-April 30, 1952
 B May 1, 1952-August 31, 1958
 C September 1, 1958-December 31, 1964

<i>Type of conflict</i>	<i>Time period</i>		
	A	B	C
Internal:			
civil disorder	35	32	56
localized internal:			
coup d'état	25	18	44
military revolt/mutiny	8	6	17
insurrection	15	12	12
widespread internal:			
guerrilla war	11	10	5
civil war	4	7	6
International:			
conventional:			
border conflict	7	12	9
limited war	3	2	1
other:			
covert invasion	6	3	7
blockade, etc.	2	1	1
threat	0	2	1
TOTAL:	<u>116</u>	<u>105</u>	<u>159</u>

A Note on the Type

This book is set in Electra, a Linotype face designed by W. A. Dwiggins. This face cannot be classified as either modern or old-style. It is not based on any historical model, nor does it echo any particular period or style. It avoids the extreme contrasts between thick and thin elements that mark most modern faces and attempts to give a feeling of fluidity, power, and speed. The book was composed, printed, and bound by The Colonial Press Inc., Clinton, Massachusetts. Typography and binding design by Janet Papazian.