

Cast Lead Offensive in Numbers

Statistical Report on:

Persons Killed and Property Damaged or Destroyed in the Gaza Strip by the Israeli Occupation Forces during Operation Cast Lead (27 December 2008 – 18 January 2009)

Acknowledgements

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The views expressed in this report do not necessarily represent the views of the above organizations

Introduction

In late December 2008, the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) launched a major offensive, unprecedented in scope and brutality, against the Gaza Strip. The offensive was launched at approximately 11.30am on Saturday 27 December 2008, with a surprise airstrike campaign carried out by 80 warplanes. This attack targeted the majority of police stations and security premises throughout Gaza, in addition to numerous other targets. Lasting just five minutes, this attack was devastating, due to its timing, scale and types of weaponry used. It became clear in the first moments of the attack that the IOF intended to inflict a high level of destruction and killing. From the outset of the offensive, the IOF did not appear to pay any concern to the fate of civilians, such as the hundreds of police officers working inside their stations as the airstrikes were carried out. At the main police headquarters in Gaza City, many of these young men were just graduating from training. The attacks were carried out at the peak time of police activity, with many civilians attending police stations across Gaza to respond to summons or file complaints. Many civilians were therefore killed in these places.

The timing of the attacks also sparked a state of panic among Gaza's children as it coincided with school arrival and departure times when nearly all of Gaza's school students were in the streets or inside school grounds. Several school children were killed in these attacks. The offensive continued with intense air, artillery and naval attacks on the Gaza Strip until 2am on 18 January 2009 after the Israeli Government had declared a unilateral ceasefire. Israeli military attacks concentrated primarily on North Gaza district and Gaza district although less intense attacks were carried-out across the Gaza Strip. This 22-day military offensive was unprecedented in terms of the scale of grave and systematic violations of the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) and especially the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians at Time of War of 1949 (GCIV) and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 Relative to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts.

Al Mezan Centre for Human Rights and other national (Palestinian) and international organizations have collected evidence which demonstrates clearly that many of the IOF attacks qualify as grave breaches of GCIV and were carried out in a systematic and deliberate manner, rendering them war crimes and crimes against humanity according to international law. The IOF systematically targeted civilian objects without apparent military necessity, including residential homes; targeted groups of civilians gathered in one place; willfully killed civilians, even those trying to flee their area of residence after the start of the ground invasion which commenced in the early hours of 3 January 2009; and deliberately targeted internally displaced persons in their shelters. Three UNRWA managed shelters directly targeted are UNRWA schools that had previously notified the IOF of their exact locations, were flying the UN flag and had large UN flags painted on the rooftops. The IOF also targeted prayers in the mosques and at the entrance to the mosques and used civilians as human shields, forcing them to accompany them, and using them in operations in which residential homes were searched. In some incidents, civilians were forced to negotiate with Palestinian resistance fighters, placing their lives in grave danger.

<u>Medical teams</u>, <u>ambulances and civil defense teams</u> became the direct target of IOF attacks along with civilians attempting to rescue the injured and remove the bodies of their killed relatives and neighbors.

Journalists and media outlets were also targeted by the IOF in an attempt to obscure the truth of the crimes they were perpetrating. Several <u>Palestinian journalists</u> were killed. The Israeli authorities also imposed a blockade which prevented the entry into Gaza of foreign media teams. The following civilian objects became a direct target of IOF attacks on a broad scale: civilian infrastructure, water networks, sanitation networks and mosques. The IOF also used internationally prohibited weapons, or legal weapons in an illegal way, such as the widespread use of white phosphorus in residential areas.

¹ The vast majority of schools in Gaza operate a shift system with some children attending in the mornings and others in the afternoons

This report presents documented statistical material on the damage inflicted on civilians and their property by the IOF during Operation Cast Lead. Information in the report is based on an extensive field survey in which interviews with victims and eyewitnesses were conducted and supporting evidence such as medical reports examined.

Field Research Methodology

This report presents information collected by Al Mezan in a large scale survey. The survey commenced on Wednesday 21 January - three days after the Israeli government declared a unilateral ceasefire. The data collection strategy was planned during Operation Cast Lead as Al Mezan's permanent field workers remained in the field during this time and were therefore able to estimate the scale and type of destruction inflicted on each district. Al Mezan recruited an additional team of temporary field workers and trained them on how to use questionnaires to document violations perpetrated and damage caused during Operation Cast Lead. The use of questionnaires is a documentation tool which has been employed and developed by Al Mezan since the outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000. Information in the questionnaires is corroborated with other sources such physical evidence, sworn witness testimonies and medical reports.

Selection of Field Workers

The additional team of temporary field workers was recruited and selected on the basis of the following criteria: academic achievement and previous voluntary work experience with Al Mezan in the field of documentation. Field workers were allocated to conduct research in the areas where they are resident in order to ensure comprehensive knowledge of the locality and the ability to access victims. Al Mezan's five experienced permanent field workers acted as coordinators and supervisors for the work of the temporary field workers.

Survey Questionnaires:

Al Mezan prepared 30,000 copies of different types of questionnaires in order to collect data on violations perpetrated and damage inflicted. Different questionnaires were used to collect information about the following violations:

- The violation of the right to life (killing)
- The destruction of homes
- The bulldozing of agricultural land
- Destruction of farms including chicken and cow farms
- Destruction to trade premises
- Destruction to industrial premises
- Destruction to public premises including governmental, non-government, medical, educational, health etc.
- The destruction of vehicles
- Detentions

Each questionnaire incorporates a large set of questions - 95 percent of which are closed questions in order to facilitate data analysis and the remainder open ended questions in order to capture qualitative information such as descriptions of incidents. The following example of the questionnaire used to document violations of the right to life is an example of the type of questionnaire used by Al Mezan in documentation:

Example: Questionnaire on the Right to Life

The questionnaire on violations of the right to life (killing) was used to document persons killed by the IOF or for reasons related to the presence of the IOF in the Gaza Strip. The questionnaire collected the following information: personal data such as socio-economic status, refugee status, occupation, marital status, number of family members, number of children and number of dependents; the circumstances of the incident including location, time, identity of perpetrator, weapon used, accompanying circumstances, direction of the attack, place of the injury in the body, the reason why the victim was in the location at the time, whether the victim died immediately or in the hours or days after the incident, whether they received immediate medical attention and whether other persons were killed or injured in the same incident.

The questionnaire also records information on the person who provided the information, the person who completed the questionnaire and the date of the conducting of the questionnaire. The questionnaire is conducted via a face-to-face individual interview with the victim or the victim's family.

The Distribution of Field Researchers

Al Mezan distributed the permanent and temporary field workers throughout Gaza as follows:

- North Gaza district: 10 temporary field workers supervised and supported by Al Mezan's permanent field worker for North Gaza district
- Gaza district: 12 temporary field workers supervised and supported by Al Mezan's permanent field workers for Gaza district
- Middle district (Deir al-Balah): 2 temporary field workers supervised and supported by Al Mezan's permanent field worker for Middle district
- Khan Younis district: 2 temporary field workers supervised and supported by Al Mezan's permanent field workers for Khan Younis district
- Rafah district: 3 field workers supervised and supported by Al Mezan's permanent field worker for Rafah district

The permanent field workers allocated the temporary field workers to different regions and coordinated to ensure there was no duplication in the documentation of incidents in nearby areas.

Logistical Support

Al Mezan allocated one office based staff member to provide daily support to the field workers in terms of preparing questionnaires, daily reports of each region and receiving completed questionnaires. The questionnaires were transferred to office staff for a process of verification and review, and for preparation for entry into the database.

Collection and Verification of Questionnaires

The permanent field workers assumed the task of collecting the questionnaires from the additional team of temporary field workers, categorizing them and submitting them to the Field Unit Coordinator. The questionnaires were then categorized by type of violation and region, reviewed to identify missing information, finalized and then transferred to data entry staff for entry into Al Mezan's database.

Data Entry

Al Mezan allocated seven employees to the data entry process: five data entry officers; one employee specialized in verifying information after data entry; and one employee specialized in computer programs who provided guidance on the data entry system and addressed any technical problems arising from the process of data entry. The questionnaires entered into the database were then transferred to another staff member to check for spelling or typing errors which were then corrected and then reentered into the database.

Accuracy Level and Data Verification:

The accuracy level of the documentation of violations, including the violation of the right to life, is extremely high due to the multiple verification stages in the documentation process conducted by different staff members. This applies to other types of violation. In terms of data missing from the questionnaires, the verification process shows that there are some missing pieces of data in only a few dozen of the questionnaires; however, missing data occurs only in minor fields of the questionnaire forms. None of the questionnaires is missing information from any main fields, such as ID information, address and type of damage or violation.

General Note

Al Mezan has completed the process of data entry and data verification of the questionnaires. In the future, Al Mezan intends to computerize the archiving of all supporting evidence such as autopsy reports, birth certificates and land ownership deeds. However, due to technical limitations this is not possible at current and these documents remain in paper archives.

Definitions

<u>Child:</u> Al Mezan employs the Child Rights Convention (1989) definition of a child as all persons who have not yet reached the age of 18 including unborn children.

<u>Females/Women</u>: In this report the term female(s) refers to women and girls regardless of their ages. The term woman/women refers to females who are older than 18 years of age.

<u>Combatant/Non-Combatant:</u> This report categorizes a combatant as any person killed during armed confrontation i.e. during his/her active participation in minor or major hostilities during Operation Cast Lead. In addition, included in this category is persons known for their affiliation to a resistance group and participating in hostilities in a continuous manner, even if not engaged in hostilities at the time in which they were targeted. In this category, Al Mezan includes persons who were killed by the IOF in targeted, extra-legal assassinations carried out by the IOF during Operation Cast Lead. Bystanders and/or passersby who were in the locations of such assassination operations and believed not to be targeted by IOF's assassination were classified as non-combatants.

Further, it is important to note that politically affiliated persons killed in arbitrary attacks were not considered combatants. The IOF did not declare that it directly targeted them, and according to Al Mezan's investigations - they were not taking part in any way in hostilities when they were killed. A good example of this is the victims of the attacks on the police force killed on the first day while inside the police stations. Some of them are known to have used to be affiliated to political groups and/or armed wings of political groups but gave up this role when joining the police force. Thus the vast majority of civil police officers killed by the IOF during Operation Cast Lead were not involved in any hostile activities directly or indirectly when they were attacked. After Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, the Palestinian National Authority's members of the regular police force stopped attending their work, and the Hamas-led government recruited many police officers; including from its members. The vast majority of these individuals then ceased their resistance activities thereby becoming non-combatants. The very small numbers of civil police who remained involved in resistance activities were classified by Al Mezan as 'combatants' and removed from the category 'civil police' as in the below table. The real test that was employed by Al Mezan in this report is strictly the subject's involvement in hostilities at the time of the attack.

Important Note Concerning the Status of Casualties:

There has been much discussion and debate on the numbers of combatants and non-combatants killed by the IOF during Operation Cast Lead. It is important in this regard to highlight the issue of the 'adoption' of killed persons by resistance groups; i.e. declaration by a political or armed group that the person killed was one of their members. Often, when persons, including children, are killed by IOF actions, political and/or armed groups 'adopt' them as 'martyrs' placing their photographs on their websites and commending their contribution to resisting occupation. This does not mean that those persons killed were involved in resistance activities in any way. The families accept this 'adoption' of killed family members for various reasons including the willingness of resistance groups to provide financial support to the families and pay for funeral costs of the persons killed. These cases require in-depth investigation on a case-by-case basis in order to determine every person's status according to his actual affiliation as well as involvement in hostilities, or the lack thereof.

Table 1: Persons Killed by IOF Actions During Operation Cast Lead Distributed by Month in which they Died

Distributed by Month in Willen they bled				
Year	Month	No.		
2008	December	393		
	January	1004		
	February	7		
	March	3		
	April	1		
2009	June	1		
Т	1409			




Table 2: Number Persons Killed by Combatant/Non-Combatant Status

Category	Number Persons Killed
Combatants (resistance fighters)	237
Of which assassinated	18
Of which children	13
Non-combatants	1172
Of which children	342
Of which women	111
Of which civil police	136
·	
Total number of children killed	355
(combatants and non-combatants)	
Total number persons killed	1409




Table 3: Persons Killed Distributed by Gender and District

	District											
	Nor	th Gaza	Gaza Middle Khan Younis Rafah				Total					
Gender	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Male	385	77.00	521	86.83	141	94	95	94.06	56	96.55	1198	85.02
Female	115	23.00	79	13.17	9	6	6	5.94	2	3.45	211	14.98
Total	500	100	600	100	150	100	101	100	58	100	1409	100




Table 4: Persons Killed Distributed by Type of Weapon Used and Age Category

		Age Category								
	()-17	1	8-40	41-60		60+		Total	
Type of Weapon	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Flachettes	1	0.28	2	0.24	0	0.00	1	1.69	4	0.28
Missile or Bomb	244	68.73	703	85.73	134	76.57	35	59.32	1116	79.21
Artillery	55	15.49	59	7.20	19	10.86	7	11.86	140	9.94
Beating	1	0.28	1	0.12	1	0.57	0	0.00	3	0.21
Other	24	6.76	19	2.32	5	2.86	2	3.39	50	3.55
Shooting	27	7.61	36	4.39	16	9.14	13	22.03	92	6.53
Explosive Device	2	0.56	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	0.14
Gas	1	0.28	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	1.69	2	0.14
Total	355	100	820	100	175	100.00	59	100	1409	100




Table 5: Number of Children Killed Distributed by Type of Weapon Used

	Children Killed .No	Percentage
Flachette	1	0.28
Missile or Bomb	244	68.73
Artillery	55	15.49
Beating	1	0.28
Other	24	6.76
Shooting	27	7.61
Explosive Device	2	0.56
Gas	1	0.28
Total	355	100.00




Table 6: Distribution of Persons Killed by Type of Weapon and Part of Body which was injured

	Place in Body													
	Uppe	r Body	ody Lower Body		Different Parts Lower Body of Body				Limbs		Body Dismembered		То	ıtal
Type of Weapon	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%		
Flachette	1	0.3	1	1.3	2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	0.3		
Artillery	34	9.5	6	8.0	68	8.9	2.0	6.7	25.0	13.8	135.0	9.6		
Beating	1	0.3	0	0.0	2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.2		
Missile or Bomb	252	70.4	52	69.3	645	84.3	27.0	90.0	148.0	81.8	1124.0	79.8		
Other	17	4.7	6	8.0	26	3.4	0.0	0.0	4.0	2.2	53.0	3.8		
Shooting	53	14.8	10	13.3	20	2.6	1.0	3.3	3.0	1.7	87.0	6.2		
Explosive Device	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.6	2.0	0.1		
Gas	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.1		
Total	358	100	75	100	765	100	30	100	181	100	1409	100.0		

Table 7: Persons Killed Distributed by Direction from which the Person was Attacked

The direction from which the person was injured	Number	Percentage
Right	39	2.77
Other	5	0.35
Above	888	63.02
Behind	79	5.61
Left	41	2.91
Front	210	14.90
Different Directions	147	10.43
Total	1409	100




Table 8: Persons Killed Distributed by Whether Medical Treatment was Obstructed

Obstruction	Number	Percentage
Medical Treatment was Obstructed	258	18.31
Medical Treatment was not Obstructed	1151	81.69
Total	1409	100




Table 9: Persons Killed Distributed by Place of Death

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Place of Death	Number	Percentage			
Site of Incident (excluding when home was site of incident)	851	60.40			
Other	112	7.95			
In Ambulance	7	0.50			
In Hospital	153	10.86			
At Home (when home was site of incident)	286	20.30			
Total	1409	100			





Table 10: Persons Killed Distributed by School Completion Levels

School Completion Levels	Number	Percentage
Completed high school	388	27.54
Too young to attend school	65	4.61
Not completed high school	489	34.71
In school at time of death	467	33.14
Total	1409	100



Level of Educational Attainment	Number	Percentage
Illiterate/Too young to start school	100	7.10
Literate	96	6.81
Preparatory School	235	16.68
Primary School	373	26.47
Secondary School	392	27.82
Diploma	3	0.21
University	199	14.12
Higher Education (Masters)	11	0.78
Total	1409	100

Table 11: Persons Killed by Level of Educational Attainment




Table 12: Distribution of Persons Killed by Marital Status

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Status Marital	Number	Percentage		
Married more than once	1	0.07		
Single	723	51.31		
Divorced	4	0.28		
Married	666	47.27		
Widowed	15	1.06		
Total	1409	100		



Table 13: Distribution of Persons Killed by District and Whether they had Dependents

		District									
Dependents Status	North Gaza	Gaza	Middle	Khan Younis	Rafah	Total					
Has dependents	165	144	81	44	18	452					
Does not have dependents	278	413	44	45	29	809					
Assists others financially	57	43	25	12	11	148					
Number of Persons Supported	1171	1140	516	257	177	3261					

Table 14: Distribution of Persons Killed by Location of IOF Troops that Launched the Attack

Location of IOF Troops	Persons Killed
Tank	152
Ground Troops	67
Jet Plane	473
Helicopter	92
Military Observation Point	64
Unmanned Aircraft (drone)	519
Unknown	27
Other	8
Warship	7
Total	1409




Table 15: Distribution of Killed Persons by Refugee Status

Status Refugee	Number	Percentage
Refugee	834	59.19
Non-Refugee	575	40.81
Total	1409	100




Table 16: Persons Killed Distributed by Whether the Removal of their Body was Obstructed

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Status	Number	Percentage										
Body Removal Obstructed	166	11.78										
Body Removal Not Obstructed	1243	88.22										
Total	1409	100										





Table 17: Number of Destroyed or Damaged Housing Units Distributed by: Gender head of household, total

number of residents, number of child residents

District	Units Dist Gender o	of Housing ributed by of Head of ehold	Number of permanent		Number of permanent
	Male	Female	residents in housing units	Total number houses	child residents
North Gaza	3111	204	32411	3315	15565
Gaza	5487	409	60583	5896	30634
Middle	422	46	3817	468	1801
Khan Younis	444	45	3584	489	1834
Rafah	924	60	7114	984	3441
Total	10388	764	107509	11152	53275

Chart 15: Number of homes damaged or destroyed distributed by district



Explanatory Notes: Al Mezan was able to document the destruction of, or damage to, 11,154 civilian homes (housing units) by the IOF during Operation Cast Lead. Of these, 2632 were totally destroyed (destroyed beyond repair) and 8522 were partially destroyed (i.e. assessed as repairable by Al Mezan). The latest United Nations figures (available from UNRWA) on the destruction of civilian homes during Operation Cast Lead are as follows: 3600 homes destroyed beyond repair; 2700 homes sustained major damages; 52,000 homes sustained minor damages.

In several of the tables in this section, the total number of housing units destroyed is listed as 11,152 rather than 11,154. This is because two of the housing units that were destroyed were owned by companies and therefore detailed information on the number of residents, gender of residents, refugee status of residents etc was not available.

Al Mezan definitions in this section:

- **Totally destroyed:** housing units that were demolished or housing units that were damaged to the extent that they cannot be repaired.
- Partially destroyed: housing units that moderate to heavy damages but can be repaired (as assessed by Al Mezan)

Table 18: Number of housing units damaged or destroyed distributed by type of housing unit

Type of housing unit	Number	Percentage
Villa	175	1.57
Ground floor	1849	16.58
Rural cottage/residence	372	3.34
Building roof	1	0.01
Multi-story building	4337	38.88
UNRWA house	1487	13.33
Apartment	2933	26.30
Total	11154	100

Chart 16: Number of housing units damaged or destroyed distributed by type of housing units 5000 4337 Number of housing units 4000 2933 3000 1849 2000 1487 1000 372 175 1 0 Villa Ground Building Multi-story UNRWA Rural Appartment floor residence roof building house

Table 19: Number of housing units destroyed distributed by refugee status of the household

Refugee Status	Number	Percentage		
Refugee	6125	54.92		
Non-Refugee	5027	45.08		
Total	11152	100		




Table 20: Number of destroyed or damaged housing units distributed by type of area (refugee camp, rural area, urban area) and district

		District										
	North Gaza		Gaza		Middle		Khan Younis		Rafah		Total	
Type of area	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Refugee Camp	251	7.57	193	3.27	303	64.74	14	2.86	43	4.37	804	7.21
Rural	1635	49.29	728	12.35	155	33.12	386	78.94	279	28.35	3183	28.54
Urban	1431	43.14	4975	84.38	10	2.14	89	18.20	662	67.28	7167	64.25
Total	3317	100	5896	100	468	100	489	100	984	100	11154	100

Chart 18: Number of destroyed or damaged housing units distributed by type of area (refugee camp, rural area, urban area) and district




Table 21: Housing units destroyed or damaged distributed by method of destruction

	District											
Method of	North Gaza Gaza		Middle		Khan Younis		Rafah		Total			
destruction	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Bulldozed	509	14.49	489	8.297	43	9.13	226	46.58	68	6.907	1335	11.8
Occupied by IOF*	224	6.403	71	1.19	1	0.212	2	0.207	0	0	298	2.619
Shelled	2659	76.4	5295	90.01	431	90.45	260	53.21	903	92.78	9548	84.44
Exploded	93	2.707	29	0.508	1	0.212	0	0	3	0.309	126	1.138
Total	3436	100	5713	100	471	100	483	100	970	100	11307**	100

^{*}Note: this refers to homes that were occupied by IOF ground forces and then damaged
**Note: this figure is higher than the total number of homes documented by Al Mezan as several of the homes were damaged or destroyed by multiple methods and thus have been listed in various categories




Table 22: Housing units distributed by district and extent of damage

		District										
Extent of	North G	aza	Gaza	Gaza		Middle		Khan Younis		ah	Total	
Damage	Number	%	Number	%	% Number %		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Totally												
destroyed	890	26.83	904	15.33	174	37.18	246	50.31	418	42.48	2632	23.60
Partially												
destroyed	2427	73.17	4992	84.67	294	62.82	243	49.69	566	57.52	8522	76.40
Total	3317	100	5896	100	468	100	489	100	984	100	11154	100




Table 23: Extent of Damage to Housing Units by: district, extent of destruction, number of residents

	Extent of damage to housing units				Total	
District	Total destruction	Number of residents	Partial destruction	Number of residents	Partial and Total	Total number residents
Gaza North	890	8073	2427	24549	3317	32622
Gaza	904	7982	4992	53764	5896	61746
Middle	174	1277	294	2540	468	3817
Younis Khan	246	1693	243	1891	489	3584
Rafah	418	3028	566	4092	984	7120
Total	2632	22053	8522	86836	11154	108889




Table 24: Factories Damaged or Destroyed Distributed by Type of Industry, Number of Employees before Offensive, Number of Employees after Offensive

	Number of factories sustaining:		Number employees before offensive		Number employees after offensive		Employees who were laid off		Percentage drop in number of employees	
Type of industry	Total damage	Partial damage	Total damage	Partial damage	Total damage	Partial damage	Total damage	Partial damage	Total damage	Partial damage
Plastics	0	3	0	34	0	18	0	16	0	1.58
Wood	9	11	103	159	16	87	87	72	7.29	7.11
Food	19	12	168	320	24	140	144	180	12.06	17.77
Electrical	2	3	90	19	0	5	90	14	7.54	1.38
Chemical	6	7	41	84	0	44	41	40	3.43	3.95
Mineral	27	36	266	401	29	224	237	177	19.85	17.47
Garment	8	15	124	144	0	22	124	122	10.39	12.04
Construction	31	22	490	431	19	39	471	392	39.45	38.70
Total	102	109	1282	1592	88	579	1194	1013	100	100




Table 25: Destruction of industrial premises distributed by method of destruction, extent of damage and district

		District							
Method of	North Gaza	Gaza	Middle	Khan Younis	Rafah	7	Total		
Destruction	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	%		
		Totally	Destroye	d					
Occupied	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Bulldozed	22	29	0	0	2	53	51.96		
Shelled/bombed	16	24	1	3	0	44	43.14		
Exploded	5	0	0	0	0	5	4.90		
Partially Destroyed									
Occupied	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.92		
Bulldozed	3	5	0	0	1	9	8.26		
Shelled/bombed	22	69	3	2	2	98	89.91		
Exploded	0	1	0	0	0	1	0.92		
			Total						
Occupied	1	0	0	0	0	1	0.47		
Bulldozed	25	33	0	0	3	62	29.38		
Shelled/bombed	37	95	3	4	2	142	67.30		
Exploded	5	1	0	0	0	6	2.84		
Total						211	100		




Table 27: Damage to industrial premises distributed by district and extent of damage

		District										
Extent of	North	Gaza	Ga	ıza	Mid	ddle	Khan	Younis	Ra	ıfah	To	otal
Damage	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Totally destroyed	43	62	53	41	1	25	3	60	2	40	102	48
Partially destroyed	26	38	75	59	3	75	2	40	3	60	109	52
Total	69	100	128	100	4	100	5	100	5	100	211	100



Table 28: Number of trade premises (stores) destroyed or damaged distributed by extent of damage, number of workers before offensive and number of workers after offensive

Location (district)	Extent of Damage	No. of Stores	No. of workers before offensive	No. of workers at current
	Total destruction	13	25	4
Rafah	Partial destruction	42	30	19
	Total destruction	0	0	0
Khan Younis	Partial destruction	4	5	4
	Total destruction	4	6	3
Middle	Partial destruction	1	2	0
	Total destruction	81	203	84
Gaza	Partial destruction	390	1171	910
	Total destruction	67	241	38
North Gaza	Partial destruction	101	295	151
Total		703	1978	1213

Table 29: Destroyed and Damaged Trade Premises (stores) distributed by extent of damage and method of destruction

_ , ,	Method of Destruction/Damage											
Extent of	Shellin	g/Bombing	Bu	Ildozed	Occup	ied	Explo	ded	Ot	her	To	otal
Damage	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Totally destroyed	124	19.29	40	88.89	0	0	0	0	1	0	165	23.47
Partially destroyed	527	80.71	6	11.11	1	0	0	0	4	100	538	76.53
Total	648	100	45	100	0	0	0	0	2	100	703	100




Table 30: Destruction of trade premises distributed by method of destruction

Method of Destruction	Number	Percentage
Bulldozed	46	6.5
Shelled/Bombed	651	92.6
Occupied	1	0.1
Other	5	0.7
Exploded	0	0.0
Total	703	100.0

Table 31: Destruction of trade premises (stores) by district and extent of damage

		District										
Extent of	North	Gaza	Ga	ıza	Mic	ddle	Khan	Younis	Ra	fah	То	tal
Damage	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Totally destroyed	67	40	81	17	4	80	0	0	13	24	165	23
Partially destroyed	101	60	390	83	1	20	4	100	42	76	538	77
Total	168	100	471	100	5	100	4	100	55	100	703	100

Table 32: Destruction to vehicles distributed by district and extent of damage

		District										
Extent of	Nor	th Gaza	(Saza	Mic	ldle	Khan '	Younis	Ra	fah	То	tal
damage	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Totally destroyed	114	57.29	144	40.11	0	0	0	0	73	89.02	331	51.56
Partially destroyed	85	42.71	215	59.89	1	100	1	100	9	10.98	311	48.44
Total	199	100	359	100	1	100	1	100	82	100	642	100




Table 33: Destroyed or Damaged Vehicles Distributed by Type of Vehicle

Type of Vehicle	No.	%
Other	116	18.07
Agricultural Vehicle	19	2.96
Jeep	35	5.45
Taxi	35	5.45
Private Car	346	53.89
Truck	91	14.17
Total	642	100

Table 34: Damaged Public Institutions Distributed by Extent of Damage and Method of Damage

Type of damage	Extent of		Total
	Partial	Total	
Occupied	5	2	7
Other	8	0	8
Bulldozing	7	9	16
Destruction	9	3	12
Bombing	426	145	571
Total	455	159	614




Table 35: Destruction of Public and Private Premises Distributed by Type of Premise

Type of Establishment	Percentage	Number
Other	15.15	93
Bank	0.16	1
Place of Worship	22.15	136
Market	0.16	1
Company	2.77	17
Community Based Organisation	7.49	46
Educational institution	25.90	159
Health institution	3.26	20
Police station	7.98	49
Ministry department	11.07	68
Political party office	0.49	3
Political factions premises	2.61	16
Executive Forces premises	0.81	5
Total	100	614




Table 36: Destruction to Public and Private Premises Distributed by Size of Damage and District

District	Size of da	amage	Total
District	Partial Total		IOlai
North Gaza	109	32	141
Gaza	234	55	289
Deir Al Balah	26	23	49
Khan Younis	47	28	75
Rafah	39	21	60
Total	455	159	614

Table 37: Number of Persons who Secured their Livelihoods from Land that was Destroyed

District	Number
North Gaza	5687
Gaza	11040
Deir Al Balah	118
Khan Younis	1117
Rafah	724
Total	18686




Table 38: Destroyed Land Distributed by District

District	% from total destroyed land	Area (in dunams)		
North Gaza	27.46	1721.93		
Gaza	60.03	3765.17		
Deir Al Balah	0.98	61.70		
Khan Younis	4.87	305.50		
Rafah	6.66	417.45		
Total	100	6271.746		

Table 39: Direct Losses in the Agriculture Sector

Type of losses	Total losses in the Gaza Strip	Unit		
Craanhausa	89	Number		
Greenhouse	184.936	Area (in dunam)		
	42	Number		
Ground greenhouses	142.844	Area (in dunam)		
Water-well	862	Number		
Irrigation pool	210	Number		
	34968	Capacity (in cubic meter)		
Water pump	219	Number		
Pesticide sprayer	302	Number of orchards		
	368	Number of sprayers		
Gates	735	Number of orchards		
Gates	1038	Number		
Livestock	178	Number of orchards		
	8721	Number of animals		
Warehouse	205	Number of orchards		
	10405	Number of warehouses		
Dinde	191	Number of orchards		
Birds	305430	Number of birds		
haahiyaa	46	Number of orchards		
beehives	1010	Number of beehives		

Table 40: Damage to Plants, Trees and Vegetables Distributed by District

	District					
Type of plants/trees	North					Total
	Gaza	Gaza	Deir Al Balah	Khan Younis	Rafah	
# of productive trees	186473	195039	1180	7168	6739	396599
# of unproductive trees	45586	6053	0	0	60	51699
Vegetables (area in dunam)	228.33	712.455	23	0	36	999.785
Total	232059	201092	1180	7168	6799	448298

36

Conclusions

The figures presented in this report reveal the unprecedented scale of killing and material damage inflicted on Palestinian civilians and their property, as well as on public premises, by the IOF during Operation Cast Lead. The figures show that large numbers of children, women and medical personnel were killed during the offensive. This confirms AI Mezan's assertion that the IOF deliberately targeted civilians and their property, and disregarded international legal and universal moral standards relevant to the conduct of hostilities, showing indifference to the lives of civilians who were killed deliberately without military necessity.

Al Mezan investigations, along with other national and international investigations, affirm the presence of incontrovertible evidence on grave and systematic violations of IHL tantamount to war crimes and crimes against humanity according to the Statute of the International Criminal Court and the GCIV and its first Protocol. These crimes include: willful killing; shelling of homes while residents were inside; shooting civilians holding white flags; the random use of excessive force in civilian areas; targeting civilians and civilian premises without distinction, proportionality or military necessity; using civilians as human shields; targeting medical personnel; preventing ambulances from reaching the injured to save their lives; and targeting UN buildings and personnel.

Further, the IOF also carried out actions which severely affected the lives of civilians in the Gaza Strip including the destruction of water, electricity and sewage networks, the destruction of roads linking Gaza's districts, and imposing a siege which caused severe shortages of food and medicines.

The IOF also inflicted severe psychological harm on the people of Gaza by randomly warning civilians of imminent attacks and then failing to provide them with a safe place to go. Throughout Operation Cast Lead, the IOF dropped warning leaflets in the center of the cities and then even in the shelters set up by the UN to protect and house the displaced who had tried to flee the fighting.

The vast scale of crimes perpetrated and their systematic nature signifies an official policy adopted at the highest levels in Israel. These crimes are but a continuation of existing Israeli policy implemented in recent years such as, to mention only a few crimes: extra-judicial assassinations; the destruction of Gaza's power plant; the massive destruction of homes without military necessity; the deliberate deprivation of and collective penalties imposed upon the entire population of Gaza; and the obstruction of access to essential goods necessary for life and basic wellbeing.

International human rights organizations and other investigation committees that have worked in Gaza following the end of Operation Cast Lead have confirmed that Israel committed crimes which require serious international investigation. The perpetration of such crimes is shown clearly in the findings of the UN investigation of nine attacks on UN facilities.

On 22 April 2009, Israel announced the findings of an international IDF investigation opened in response to the accusations of war crimes that had been made not only by Palestinian, Israeli and international human rights organizations, but also by intergovernmental organizations. This investigation declared that no such crimes were committed by Israeli troops during Operation Cast Lead. This internal investigation was conducted by the Israeli army itself and was closed by the Israeli Military Attorney General on 30 March 2009, just 11 days after it was opened. The failure of Israel to conduct serious investigations merely entrenches the deep-rooted

culture of impunity to its soldiers and leadership. Israel's refusal to conduct an investigation that meets the relevant international standards, and its willingness to provide protection and impunity to the army and government who committed or ordered the perpetration of these crimes, places the onus on the international community to seek to initiate effective, impartial investigations and to pursue and bring suspected war criminals to justice in accordance with international law relevant to the prosecution of war criminals.

Al Mezan strongly condemns continued IOF crimes in the Gaza Strip, including the ongoing siege, which constitutes collective punishment of the entire Gazan population.. Further, Al Mezan condemns Israel's encouragement of its soldiers to commit further grave breaches of applicable rules of international law by providing them with protection and immunity.

Al Mezan calls on the international community to assume its moral and legal obligation to take action to end the siege imposed on the Gaza Strip to pave the way for reconstruction. Further, Al Mezan calls on the international community to open an investigation into violations of human rights and IHL perpetrated by the IOF in the Gaza Strip and bring the perpetrators to justice.

End