



CONTENTS

The Western Contribution to World History by James C. Russell	4
Script and Cognition: The Impact of Orthography on Western and Eastern Patterns of Thought by William C. Hannas	22
Race Mixture in the Roman Empire by Tenney Frank	33
The White Australia Policy in Retrospect: Racism or Realism? by Andrew Fraser	51
The Empire Strikes Back: Reverse Colonization in Europe by Derek Turner	74
Lynchings in Historical Context by Dwight D. Murphey. a review of Philip Dray's <i>At The Hands of Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black America</i>	83
Setting the Isolationist Record Straight by Stephen J. Sniegowski. a review of Ruth Sarles' <i>A Story of America First: The Men and Women Who Opposed US Intervention in World War II</i>	87
Population Transfer, American Style by David Wilson. a review of E. Michael Jones' <i>The Slaughter of Cities: Urban Renewal as Ethnic Cleansing</i>	95
Understanding Hollywood – by Edmund Connelly Part I: Hollywood's Jewish Identity	103
Part II: Deconstructing Christianity	139
Part III: Racial Role-Reversals	149
Black Metal: Conservative Revolution in Modern Popular Culture by Alex Kurtagic	163
Democracy Revisited: The Ancients and the Moderns by Alain de Benoist	179
Social Darwinism: The Development of an Intellectual Mood by Louis Andrews	191

The Case of Victor Davis Hanson: Farmer, Scholar, Warmonger by F. Roger Devlin	207
The Legacy of a European Traditionalist: Julius Evola in Perspective by Guido Stucco	225
Stalin's Willing Executioners: Jews As a Hostile Elite in the USSR by Kevin MacDonald, a review of Yuri Slezkine's <i>The Jewish Century</i>	249
The Role of Jews in South Africa Since 1948 by Sam Davidson	285
The Revolutionary Jew by Edmund Connelly, a review of E. Michael Jones' <i>The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit and Its Impact on World History</i>	323
Solzhenitsyn on the Jews and Tsarist Russia by F. Roger Devlin. a review of <i>Two Hundred Years Together</i> Part II	338 358
The Reality of Red Subversion: The Recent Confirmation of Soviet Espionage in America by Stephen J. Sniegoski	387
Understanding Multiethnic Politics by Louis Andrews, a review of Tatu Vanhanen's <i>Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism</i>	412
Rotating Polyandry – and its Enforcers by F. Roger Devlin, a review of <i>Women's Infidelity</i> and <i>Taken Into Custody</i>	420
Pigmentocracy: Racial Hierarchies in Caribbean and Latin America by Richard Lynn	443
The Revolution in Human Evolution by F. Roger Devlin, a review of Cochran & Harpending's <i>The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution</i>	463
Race, Climate, and Intelligence by Leslie Jones, a review of Richard Lynn's <i>Race Differences in Intelligence: An Evolutionary Analysis</i>	478

THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD HISTORY

JAMES C. RUSSELL

I shall begin by speaking about our ancestors, since it is only right and proper on such an occasion to pay them the honor of recalling what they did." Thus wrote Thucydides in his *History of the Peloponnesian War*¹ and so it is fitting to pay tribute to those whose deeds contributed toward the creation and defense of our Western Civilization. The deeds of our ancestors, which we have chosen to commemorate today, include those of a military, cultural and scientific nature.

In his book entitled *The Birth of Europe*, medieval historian Robert Lopez posed the question: "What enabled Europe to emerge finally on top?" His answer was "the absence of great invasions for a thousand years."² Hence we begin our survey of Western contributions by paying tribute to those who, throughout the history of the West, courageously repulsed alien invading forces.

The first great battle for the survival of the West occurred nearly 2,500 years ago, in 480 B.C. in Greece. Herodotus, the first great Western historian, describes this legendary battle in his *History of the Persian War*. When the Persians invaded Greece, the Greeks realized that they were outnumbered and needed time to reorganize their forces. They sought to delay the approaching Persians at a narrow mountain pass. The following selection describes a scenario not unlike that which confronts us today: the fear and resignation of the many, the outright treason of some, and the sacrifice of the few who fight valiantly against insurmountable odds. Herodotus wrote:

[7.207] The Greek forces at Thermopylae, when the Persian army drew near to the entrance of the pass, were seized with fear; and a council was held to consider a retreat. It was the wish of the Greeks generally that the army should fall back. But Leonidas, the Spartan King, gave his voice for remaining where they were.

[7.210] Four whole days went by, and Xerxes, the Persian king, expected that the Greeks would run away. When, however, he found on the fifth day that they were not gone, thinking that their firm stand was mere impudence and recklessness, he grew angry,

and sent against them the Medes and Cissians, with orders to take them alive and bring them into his presence. Then the Medes rushed forward and charged the Greeks, but fell in vast numbers.

[7.212] During these assaults, it is said that Xerxes, who was watching the battle, thrice leaped from the throne on which he sat, in terror for his army. Next day the combat was renewed, but with no better success on the part of the Persians.

[7.213] Now, as the Persian king was in great distress, and knew not how he should deal with the emergency, Ephialtes, the son of Eurydemus, a Greek, came to him and was admitted to a conference. Hoping to receive a rich reward at the king's hands, he had come to tell him of a pathway which led across the mountain to Thermopylae. By this disclosure he brought destruction on the band of his fellow Greeks who had previously withstood the Persians.

[7.219] The news came that the Persians were marching round by the hills: it was still night when these men arrived. Then the Greeks held a council to consider what they should do, and here opinions were divided: some were strong against quitting their post, while others contended to the contrary. So when the council had broken up, part of the troops departed and went their ways homeward to their several states; part however resolved to remain, and to stand by Leonidas to the last.

[7.223] The Persians under Xerxes began to draw near; and the Greeks under Leonidas, as they now went forth determined to die, advanced much further than on previous days.... Now they took the battle beyond the wall, and carried slaughter among the Persians, who fell in heaps.

[7.224] Leonidas himself fell fighting bravely, together with many other famous Spartans, whose names I have taken care to learn on account of their great worthiness, as indeed I have the names of all the three hundred.

[7.225] Drawing back into the narrowest part of the pass, and retreating even behind the wall, they posted themselves upon a hill, where they stood all drawn up together in one close body.... The hill whereof I speak is at the entrance of the pass, where the stone lion now stands which was set up in honour of Leonidas. Here the Greeks defended themselves to the last, such as still had swords using them, and the others resisting with their hands and teeth; till the Persians, who... now encircled them upon every side, overwhelmed and buried the remnant... beneath showers of arrows.

This inspirational sacrifice of our ancient ancestors at Thermopylae led to a Greek victory over the Persians and permitted Hellenic culture to flourish. The seminal cultural and intellectual contribution of the

Greeks to world history was an objective, logical world-view as embodied in the Aristotelean syllogism. As Revilo Oliver has noted:

The Occidental mind, which appears fully formed in the earliest Greek philosophers and has not since changed, is the mind of conceptual thought—of thought directed from the mind toward an object. The Oriental mind... does not think conceptually; its thought is never directed away from itself. The Oriental mind cannot separate what it is thinking about from itself. The capacity for objective thought is peculiar to the philosophical mind of the West... [T]he unique civilization of the West [is] a unity—a single continuity that runs, with fluctuations but no break, from the ancient Greeks to ourselves.³

The objective Greek world-view was expressed in the cosmological speculation of the pre-Socratic philosophers of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. Thales, who may have been the world's first astronomer, is reported to have predicted an eclipse that occurred in 585 B.C.⁴ His speculation that water is the source of all things was made in such a way that has led him to be considered "the first man in history to suggest that there is an order in nature which the mind can comprehend."⁵ Later, in the fifth century, by abstract reasoning, Democritus anticipated some of the basic concepts of contemporary atomic theory.

The philosophy of this era also contributed the notion of *areté*, which is sometimes translated as *virtue*, but might better be described as a career-specific drive for excellence and its fulfillment. It is from this ancient Greek ideal that the modern exhortations of: "Be the best you can be" and "Reach your highest potential" are derived. In Homeric literature the *areté* of the warrior was bravery coupled with victory. The *areté* of the philosopher was knowledge, and optimally abstract knowledge about the process of obtaining knowledge itself or "contemplation."

Greek philosophy was complemented by literature, sculpture and architecture. The comedic and tragic works of the early Greek dramatists from Euripides to Æschylus served as models for literature throughout the history of the West and the surviving amphitheatres serve as reminders of the active participation of the ancient Greek populace in their local culture.

Greek sculpture followed the general cultural dictum of Protagoras that "Man is the measure of all things." It depicted ideal human forms such as Myron's *Discus Thrower*⁶ and Praxiteles' *Aphrodite* whose ethnic characteristics serve as a reminder of a more homogeneous past. The inspiring architecture of the Acropolis, and particularly the Parthenon, remains a standard for public buildings to this day. The mathematical contributions of the Greeks go beyond the Pythagorean theorem and include Euclidean geometry and the

application of mathematics to physics and military technology by Archimedes.

Unfortunately for the ancient Greeks, Alexander the Great, who died in 323 B.C., despite being an astute tactician, unwittingly became the first apostle of multiculturalism and demonstrated the ethnocultural dangers of empire-building. After conquering Persia, in an apparent effort to consolidate his rule, Alexander married a Persian princess, dressed as a Persian nobleman and encouraged his officers to marry Persian women. Alexander “declared that all men were alike sons of one Father and... he prayed that Macedonians and Persians might be partners in the commonwealth and that the peoples of his world might live in harmony and in unity of heart and mind.”⁷

Predictably, Alexander’s goal of imposing Hellenic civilization upon his newly-conquered subjects was not accomplished. Instead, many immigrants from the conquered Eastern territories made their way to Greece with the result being cultural and genetic dissonance, as well as religious syncretism and a condition of social confusion sometimes referred to as *anomie*. These Eastern immigrants contributed toward the de-Hellenization of Greece by importing their world-rejecting escapist mystery cults which began to appeal to the native Greek population due to the sociocultural stress they were experiencing. The individual anxiety and depression associated with anomie also contributed toward what has been described as a “failure of nerve” which had political and military consequences as well.

Later, in the Hellenistic era, as Greece became immersed in the cultural diversity of its Eastern subject peoples, Greek philosophy reflected the Eastern orientation toward the interior life of the mystical and supernatural. While Plato’s view of a separation between a transcendent and immutable world of ideas and earthly world of corresponding inferior forms may be a reflection of Middle Eastern dualism, in his *Republic*, Plato defends the fundamental unit of Greek life, the *polis* or city-state. In his famous allegory of the cave, Plato conveys his belief that the ruling class should be drawn from those philosophers, who upon attaining knowledge, leave behind the shadowy distortions of the cave but feel compelled to return and risk their lives attempting to enlighten their countrymen who languish in ignorance.

It might be noted that the model of the Greek city-states and the medieval model of a conglomeration of local European ethnostates both correspond closely to the optimal model for human evolution by encouraging the development of a variety of competing population groups within the boundaries of Europe. Ancient efforts at empire-building and contemporary trends toward globalization thwart the operation of this fundamental life process.

Commenting on the impending end of human evolution in the *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Human Evolution*, British geneticist Steve Jones, one of the Encyclopedia's three editors, has noted that a "pattern of small, isolated and partially inbred populations has characterized humanity for most of our evolutionary history." However, "no longer will the human species be made up of a network of small and isolated populations, each evolving more or less independently. Instead future generations of humanity will behave much more like a single genetic unit." Jones concludes:

Many geneticists believe that evolution is particularly rapid in groups of small populations that exchange occasional migrants... The rapidity of human evolution may be partly due to our tribal structure, whose genetic effects were increased by repeated bottlenecks experienced as human populations spread into new parts of the world. Increased mobility means that this phase of history is now at an end, and perhaps, that **human evolution is now almost over.**⁸ [Emphasis added.]

The decrease in reproductive isolation resulting from increased mobility may not be without dire consequences. Although an immediate effect may be a reduction in genetic diseases, Jones aloofly concedes, that apparently "this phase cannot last: sooner or later the harmful genes will again reappear in double dose, so that future generations may have to pay the price...."⁹

After the decline of Greece, Rome followed a similar pattern of initial homogeneous cultural achievement followed by empire-building and consequent alien immigration. In order to increase tax revenues, aliens were granted citizenship with its attendant tax obligations. The heterogenization of the Roman Empire contributed to social, psychological and religious destabilization resulting in the increased appeal of religious cults which offered an artificial, non-biological sense of community in this world and the hope of salvation in the next. In a study entitled, *Enemies of the Roman Order*, historian Ramsay MacMullen has remarked that by the fourth century A.D.:

The civilization called Roman... yields to another, compounded of heterogeneous elements formerly suppressed....[B]eliefs about the supernatural, once illegal or contemptuously relegated to ploughboys and servant girls, after the first century began to infect even the educated, and were ultimately embodied as a principal element in late antique philosophy.... In the end [the fourth century A.D.]... [t]here was little "Roman" left in the Roman empire. Rather, the "un-Roman" elements had come to the fore, and now controlled the world in which they lived.¹⁰

As Rome grew weak, its enemies saw an opportunity to overrun the West. In 452, Attila the Hun and his Asiatic hordes proceeded

Westward as far as Chalons in central Gaul. Fortunately, the Roman general Aetius and the Visigothic leader Theodoric put aside their historic rivalry and united to face Atilla. Unfortunately, then as well as today, there were those of the West who allied themselves with the enemy. At the battle of Chalons it was the Ostrogoths. Nevertheless, the combined Roman and Visigothic forces succeeded in repelling the Huns.¹¹

In the beginning of the eighth century the integrity of the West was once again threatened. The Moors, led by Abd-er-Rahman had crossed the Pyrenees and fought their way north toward the city of Tours. But on October 10, 732 at the Battle of Tours their fortune changed. According to the medieval *Chronicle of St. Denis*:

The Muslims planned to go to Tours to destroy the Church of St. Martin, the city, and the whole country. Then came against them the glorious Prince Charles, at the head of his whole force.... [H]e fought as fiercely as the hungry wolf falls upon the stag. By the grace of Our Lord, he wrought a great slaughter upon the enemies of the Christian faith, so that—as history bears witness—he slew in that battle 300,000 men, including their king by the name Abd-er-Rahman. Then was [Charles] first called “Martel,” for as a hammer of iron, of steel, and of every other metal,... he dashed and smote in the battle all of his enemies. And what was the greatest marvel of all, he lost in that battle only 1500 men.¹²

Early Christianity had found fertile ground for its message of individual salvation among the alienated, heterogeneous, urban inhabitants of the declining Roman Empire. Later, in the Early Middle Ages when Christian missionaries sought to convert the Germanic and Celtic peoples, it became apparent that for Christianity to be accepted by a more cohesive, homogeneous, pastoral-warrior society, it needed to appeal to the different concerns of that society. Hence, Early Medieval Christianity appealed to matters of group survival such as victory in battle, healthy families, and abundant crops and livestock. Germanic Christianity addressed these pre-Christian folk-religious concerns through local patron saints and clergy and their holy relics. In an apparent attempt to convert the Saxons who had been persecuted by Charlemagne, an adaptation of the New Testament known as the *Heliand* was composed in Old Saxon. It portrayed Christ and his apostles as a Germanic warrior-band. Eventually a Middle Eastern salvation religion was transformed into a European folk religion and Christianity became more closely identified with Europe, especially with the emergence of the notion of “Christendom.”

Early Medieval Christianity provided a spiritual impetus and a source of solidarity that are likely to have contributed toward European

victories over invading forces. The bond between religious and temporal spheres increased under Charles Martel's Carolingian descendants. They tended to view Christianity as the religion of a Roman Empire which they admired and sought to reconstruct. The application of religious fervor toward Western military exploits is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in a twelfth-century treatise of St. Bernard of Clairveaux entitled, *In Praise of the New Knighthood*. Written as an exhortation to the Knights Templar and other Crusaders, it distinguishes between fighting for "empty glory" or "earthly possessions" and fighting to assert Euro-Christian dominance in the Holy Land where Euro-Christian pilgrims and shrines had been attacked.

Recalling the existing medieval nexus between European self-identity and Christendom the following words of St. Bernard may be interpreted as a religious rationalization, if not an encouragement to assertively defend Western interests. Bernard writes:

The knights of Christ may safely fight the battles of their Lord, fearing neither sin if they smite the enemy, nor danger at their own death; since to inflict death or to die for Christ is no sin, but rather, an abundant claim to glory.... The knight of Christ, I say, may strike with confidence and die yet more confidently, for he serves Christ when he strikes, and serves himself when he falls.¹³

The religious themes of medieval art and literature appear to have been complemented by the subliminal appeal of the racial features of the subjects portrayed. Persons of European descent, regardless of their religious orientation, are likely to find representations of religious figures appealing. The many excellent Madonnas painted during this period may also indicate a racially healthy celebration of fertility.

The Renaissance artists and sculptors, including Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo and Raphael, resurrected the Classical ideal of the human form and created works of incomparable beauty. The subject matter of art and sculpture began to once again include the Classical deities, royalty, and other members of the secular elite. In the Romantic period, positive portrayals of the common folk, as well as idealized and legendary depictions of the heritages of the European nations became popular in art and literature. The literature of this period likewise drew upon the West's Classical heritage as well as European legends and history, as is evidenced by William Shakespeare's choice of subjects for his plays exemplified by *Julius Caesar*, *Hamlet*, and *Henry IV*.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, southeastern Europe became the target of Muslim aggression. Turks and Tartars plundered the countryside, taking captives and holding them for ransom, or worse, selling them as slaves. In 1682, Poland and Austria

formed an alliance against a possible large-scale Turkish invasion. In March of 1683, a Turkish army of over 140,000 soldiers started marching northward and laid siege to Vienna. As the Turks were about to break through the walls of Vienna, the Polish warrior-king, Jan Sobieski arrived with 30,000 troops. On September 12, 1683 the Battle of Vienna ensued, and according to the following contemporary account:

The battle . . . lasted fourteen or fifteen hours; the slaughter was horrible, and the loss of the Turks inestimable, for they left upon the field of battle, besides the dead and prisoners, all their cannon, equipment, tents and infinite riches that they had been six years gathering together throughout the whole Ottoman Empire. The battle ended by the infantry in the trenches, and on the Isle of the Danube, where the Turks had an artillery battery. The night was spent in slaughter, and the unhappy remnant of the Turkish army saved their lives by flight, having abandoned all to the victors.¹⁴

The Age of Exploration actually began with the heroic expeditions of our Viking ancestors to Iceland, Greenland and North America, or *Vinland*, as they referred to it. The Vikings also contributed to the development of trade routes throughout Europe and to the creation of Russia. The accomplishments of Christopher Columbus have recently come under criticism by contemporary opponents of the West. In 1992, American Indian groups protested a parade in Denver to commemorate the 500th anniversary of his discovery of America, which was promptly canceled as a result. Public recognition of the contribution of Columbus' sponsor, Queen Isabella of Spain, has fared even worse. She was denied even the minimal recognition of a stamp being issued in her honor, apparently due to her expulsion of the Jews from Spain and Portugal in 1492, the same year not only of Columbus' discovery, but also of the Spanish victory over the Moors in Grenada and the subsequent Euro-Christian re-conquest of the entire Iberian Peninsula.

More recent exploratory contributions of the West include the Lewis and Clark Expedition and the exploration of the polar regions by Roald Amundsen, Richard Byrd, Robert Peary and Sir Edward Shackleton. Just before Shackleton's ship, the *Endurance* reached Antarctica in 1915, it became trapped in ice-flows and was eventually destroyed by icebergs. Shackleton and a few off his men began a search for help. After an 850-mile journey in a 20-foot craft through some of the worst weather and seas on record, Shackleton reached a small outpost of civilization from where he called for help. He then returned to the men he had stranded. Remarkably, throughout the entire ordeal, not a single man died.

Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and Kepler developed the mathematical and astronomical foundations of space exploration, which

in this century was accelerated by the work of Robert Goddard, Werner von Braun and Arthur Rudolph. Rudolph's service to the United States space program was rewarded by essentially being hounded out of the country after the government, at the behest of a shrill minority of ingrates, threatened to revoke his pension.

The most sublime contribution of the West has been its music. The works of Handel, Bach, Mozart, Haydn, Beethoven and Brahms are revered the world over. Special respect is due to those composers who incorporated a national consciousness into their compositions, including Richard Wagner, Franz Liszt, Edvard Grieg, Antonin Dvorak, Sergei Rachmaninoff, Jan Sibelius, Giuseppe Verdi and John Philip Sousa. From *Rienzi* and the *Ring* cycle, to *Parsifal*, Wagner captured the Western ethos and developed what he termed *Gesamtkunstwerke* or "total art productions" in which he not only composed the music, but also wrote the lyrics, designed the stage sets and costumes, and eventually built his own opera house. One of the greatest tragedies of our time is the deliberate alienation of our youth from their classical musical heritage.

In the field of medicine, from Hippocrates to Galen and from William Harvey to Louis Pasteur, Marie Curie and Alexander Fleming, who discovered the powerful antibiotic effect of penicillin, and Christian Barnard, who performed the first heart transplant, Western medicine has distinguished itself without parallel. One of the effects of the accomplishments of Western medicine had been a global increase in longevity and consequent population increase in so-called "underdeveloped nations" at the same time that the population of European nations is contracting. Similarly, the Western advances in transportation to which Henry Ford, the Wright Brothers, and Charles Lindbergh contributed, have inadvertently, all but obliterated the West's geographic isolation. As a result we must develop a heightened awareness of alternate social isolating mechanisms, such as physical appearance, if we wish to enhance our prospects for survival.

The authors of the great epic literature of the West, from Homer and Virgil to the authors of *Beowulf*, the Norse sagas, the *Song of Roland* and the *Nibelungenlied* have provided our People with inspiration for future noble deeds. A modern epic that is now being re-enacted in Australia's recent confrontation with a boatload of refugees, is Jean Raspail's *Camp of the Saints*, which should be required reading for all persons of European descent who labor under the pseudo-morality of self-destruction. Friedrich Nietzsche also provides a critique of misdirected altruism which he describes as the "morality of decadence." In his *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche wrote that:

[A] morality in which self-interest wilts away—remains a bad

sign under all circumstances. This is true of individuals; it is particularly true of nations. The best is lacking when self-interest begins to be lacking. Instinctively to choose what is harmful for *oneself*, to feel attracted by “disinterested” motives, that is virtually the formula of decadence.

No discussion of morality, religion and science would be complete without acknowledging Raymond Cattell’s important works, *A New Morality from Science: Beyondism* (Pergamon, 1972), and *Beyondism: Religion from Science* (Praeger, 1987). Cattell’s accomplishments in personality assessment, psychometric testing, and other fields resulted in his being nominated for a life-time achievement award by the American Psychological Foundation. However, two interlopers’ protestations which were graciously amplified by a *New York Times* report, succeeded in postponing the award until an investigation could be made into Cattell’s personal beliefs on race. In the meantime, Cattell withdrew his name from consideration for the award and died.¹⁵

Most advances in communication from Gutenberg’s printing press to the telegraph and television were Western contributions. From Samuel Morse, Nikola Tesla and Guglielmo Marconi to Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell and Philo Farnsworth came great inventions with the potential to enlighten and fortify our People. Yet this potential was never realized. Instead these inventions were hijacked by Mayer, Thalberg, Warner, and Cohn *et al* who sought to utilize our media for their financial gain, or worse, to manipulate our opinions and behavior.

Philo Farnsworth was a fourteen year-old Mormon farm boy in Idaho when he first conceived the design of the television. He later not only invented the cathode-ray tubes used for the first television, but also the first simple electron microscope. During the 1960s he worked on a nuclear fusion process to produce clean energy. At the time of his death in 1971 he held more than 300 U.S. and foreign patents, but to this day Farnsworth’s contributions are virtually unknown.

When Radio Corporation of America’s president, David Sarnoff, learned of Farnsworth’s independent progress, he sent a spy to observe Farnsworth’s research so that RCA could register patents for the new invention before Farnsworth. Even though after a protracted legal battle, Farnsworth won the patent rights, television production was halted during the war years, and by the war’s end the patents began to expire. Depressed, Farnsworth retired to Maine where he began to drink heavily, suffered a nervous breakdown and received shock therapy. Finally, his home burned to the ground. Meanwhile Sarnoff basked in glory, promoting himself and the spy he had sent to steal Farnsworth’s research, as the “father of television.”

Before his death in 1971, Farnsworth noted with dismay the

direction which television had taken. His son Kent recalls that his father "felt he had created kind of a monster, a way for people to waste a lot of their lives." The elder Farnsworth's advice to his son regarding television was: "There's nothing on it worthwhile, and we're not going to watch it in this household, and I don't want it in your intellectual diet."¹⁶

Two other virtually unknown Western inventors whose contributions have shaped the modern world were Jack Kilby and Robert Noyce who developed the microchip. They found a way to mass-produce entire networks of miniature electronic components on a single crystal or "chip." Kilby used chips made of germanium and while Noyce used chips made of silicon, hence the name for that area of California farmland that has become known as "Silicon Valley." Kilby, a former associate of William Shockley, founded Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation in 1957, while Noyce founded INTEL in 1968. Robert Noyce died in 1990, while Jack Kilby was finally awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics last year for "basic work on information and communication technology."

Ten years ago, a new communications medium was introduced in the West. From 1991 to 1995 the number of World Wide Web users jumped from 600,000 to 40 million. Today it stands at over 500 million. The man responsible for creating the World Wide Web from the pre-existing less user-friendly basic Internet structure was Tim Berners-Lee. He created the Hyper-Text Mark-up Language, which is used to post text and graphics to a website, and the protocol language used to communicate between users and websites, as well as a web-browser prototype. Unlike so many others who hopped on the dot-com bandwagon to make a quick fortune, Berners-Lee has been content to work quietly behind the scenes from M.I.T. directing a non-profit consortium that seeks to maintain Internet software compatibility and hence ensure open access to the World Wide Web. Let us be ever vigilant against those who seek to restrict freedom of expression via this new and vital medium.

During the first half of the twentieth century, some Western poets exhibited a concern for the preservation of our cultural and genetic heritage. Ezra Pound was tortured by U.S. troops for his radio broadcasts advocating peace during the West's fratricidal Second World War. Pound was a mentor of T. S. Eliot, and helped Eliot edit *The Wasteland*, a critique of Western decadence. Eliot described some conditions for an optimal society:

The population should be homogeneous.... What is still more important is unity of religious background; and reasons of race and culture combine to make any large number of free-thinking

Jews undesirable. There must be a proper balance between urban and rural, industrial and agricultural development. And a spirit of excessive tolerance is to be deprecated.¹⁷

A major contribution of the West has been its concern for the protection of the global environment. In 1847, George Marsh, a Vermont Congressman became the first public advocate of environmental conservation when he called attention to the destructive impact of deforestation and proposed a land management plan. In 1864, Marsh published an influential analysis of conservation issues entitled *Man and Nature*. The naturalist writings of Henry David Thoreau also contributed toward the public awareness of conservation issues in America. Rachel Carson initiated the modern environmental movement with the publication of *Silent Spring* in 1964. She astutely observed that "Man is a part of nature, and his war against nature is inevitably a war against himself."¹⁸

Garrett Hardin has applied environmental ideals to the problem of human over-population in his 1993 book *Living Within Limits*. Even more perceptive is his 1999 book entitled *The Ostrich Factor: Our Population Myopia*. The recent works of the "father of sociobiology," E. O. Wilson, on *Biodiversity* and *Consilience* are also important in this regard. In *Consilience*, Wilson warns us:

Homo sapiens, the first truly free species, is about to decommission natural selection, the force that made us.... Soon we must look deep within ourselves and decide what we wish to become.¹⁹

Perhaps the greatest contributions of the West to world history have been Charles Darwin's theory of evolution and Gregor Mendel's discovery of the fundamental laws of genetics as well as their eugenic application. Francis Galton, Darwin's cousin made such important eugenic observations in his founding work, *Hereditary Genius*, that Darwin himself included references to them in his *Descent of Man*. The pioneers of the eugenics movement included Harvard geneticist Charles Davenport, who founded the Carnegie Institute's genetics and evolution laboratories at Cold Spring Harbor on Long Island. Davenport convinced the widow of railroad magnate Edward Henry Harriman to endow a Eugenics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor. Harry Laughlin was the Superintendent of the Eugenics Record Office at the Carnegie Institute from its inception in 1910 until 1921 and its Director from 1921 until 1940.

One of the earliest American adherents of eugenics was Henry Fairfield Osborn, the president from 1908 to 1933 of the American Museum of Natural History and a respected paleontologist and geologist who taught at both Princeton and Columbia Universities. He

is credited with significantly expanding the staffing and funding of the scientific department at the Museum. In 1921, Osborn hosted the Second International Congress of Eugenics at the Museum. By that time, eugenics had become a worldwide phenomenon and the exhibition reflected that, with exhibits from twenty-two states and the District of Columbia and 16 foreign countries, including Australia, China, Cuba, India, Norway, and Peru. The Conference was attended by future President Herbert Hoover and Charles Darwin's son, Leonard, who was the Chairman of the International Eugenics Commission. In 1932, the Third International Eugenics Congress was also held in New York at the American Museum of Natural History. Mrs. Harriman was among the sponsors, as was Mrs. DuPont and Dr. John Harvey Kellogg, the homeopathic physician and cereal company executive, who also founded the Race Betterment Foundation.

In 1953, James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the structure of DNA. Commenting on the Human Genome Program, Watson has stated: "We used to think our fate was in the stars. Now we know, in large measure, our fate is in our genes."²⁰ William Shockley not only received the Nobel Prize for his contribution to the development of the transistor, but also led a one-man crusade against dysgenic American policies. Despite threats on his life, Arthur Jensen persevered in studying the relationship between IQ and race. In Canada, neither state-sponsored censorship nor private harassment has deterred J. Philippe Rushton's inquiries into *Race, Evolution and Behavior*. The importance of applying eugenic measures in the West becomes evident from Richard Lynn's recent work on *Dysgenics* and his just-released seminal work *Eugenics: A Reassessment*.

Sociobiology has been applied to religion by Walter Burkert in his interdisciplinary study entitled *Creation of the Sacred: Tracks of Biology in Early Religion* (Harvard, 1996). In an earlier work, Burkert wrote "Religious ritual is advantageous in the process of selection, if not for the individual, then at least for the continuance of group identity."²¹ Burkert's view is echoed in the following paragraph from the *Seattle Times* summary of the paper, "The Neural Basis of Religious Experience" by V. S. Ramachandran, *et al*, at the University of California, San Diego:

"It is not clear why such dedicated neural machinery . . . for religion may have evolved," the team reported yesterday at a meeting of the Society for Neuroscience in New Orleans. One possibility, the scientists said, was to encourage tribe loyalty or reinforce kinship ties or the stability of a closely knit clan.²²

While Judaism has functioned to sustain the Jewish People,

contemporary Western Christianity has, on the contrary, deliberately dissociated itself from its European ethnocultural heritage, and has focused on "universal social justice." There is now afoot a conscious effort to de-Europeanize and to re-Judaize Christianity, through scriptural revision, internal treachery and external pressure. One possible strategy to counter these efforts is to encourage a re-Europeanization of Christianity into a European folk religion. Such a strategy might be bolstered by the argument that Euro-Christians should only accept the folk-affirming form of Christianity accepted by our ancestors and not accept the specious "bait and switch" arguments of liberal Christians who try to indoctrinate us with universalist propaganda. Thought-provoking discussions of past, present, and future religious and ethnocultural encounters may be found in Samuel Huntington's timely *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster, 1996), and Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy's December 1994 *Atlantic Monthly* article "Must it be the Rest Against the West?" The study of the rise and fall of civilizations has captivated many Western minds, from the racial speculations of Arthur de Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and Madison Grant to the organic model of Oswald Spengler and the challenge-response model of Arnold Toynbee. More recent works on this perplexing subject have been written by Francis Parker Yockey, Carroll Quigley, Lawrence Brown, James Burnham, William Gayley Simpson, and Elmer Pendell, who, in his excellent inquiry into *Why Civilizations Self-Destruct* observed that:

In our own civilization we see a lessening of the struggle for survival. Welfare does away with natural selection. Nothing in our present environment can serve as an adequate substitute for the harsh means evolution adopted to prevent the weaker elements of civilizations from playing a major part in the formation of subsequent generations. Compassion, unfortunately, is the enemy of biological progress.²³

Pendell therefore proposed a marriage law that would limit the number of children permitted in a family based upon the intelligence of the parents.

Due to the relaxation of selective pressures as a civilization matures, in most instances the genetic quality of the founders of a civilization is greater than the quality of those who inhabit it during its decline. One may be led to wonder that since the net result of a few hundred years of civilization, without some form of eugenic mechanism, is usually the undoing of millennia of genetic evolution, whether it might be better for a formal civilization never to emerge, hence preserving and perhaps increasing the genetic quality of a more rural, more independent population, within which selective pressures could operate more freely.

In addition to his work on I.Q., Rushton's Genetic Similarity Theory provides a biological basis for understanding the enduring preference of genetically similar individuals for each other. It also provides insights for resolving many of the ethnic conflicts which exist in the world today.²⁴ Kevin MacDonald's work on religion, and particularly Judaism, as a group evolutionary strategy, is essential for a thorough understanding of our current predicament.²⁵

While liberals and universalists constantly yammer about "bringing us all together", and how "diversity is our strength," it may be suggested that the biological function of human language and culture is just the opposite, that is, to keep discrete groups apart. In my own view, culture in humans is analogous to instinct in other species. Species with more complex brains tend to rely less on instinct and more on learned behavior, which in humans, includes culture. For culture in human societies to accomplish that which instinct accomplishes in non-human societies, it must establish a sense of group identity so that the individual knows whom to act altruistically toward and whom to mate with. In short, among humans, culture functions sociobiologically as an isolating mechanism.

The organized anti-Western media of today seem to scour the gutters of the ghetto for the most vile filth imaginable and then serve it up to our children as "their culture." Perhaps Konrad Lorenz's animal behavior research might provide us with some clues as to how MTV has succeeded in contriving the acceptance, if not preference of white adolescents for "rap music" and its attendant so-called "hip-hop culture" of fashion and language. Lorenz gained some popularity for his theories of imprinting when he acted as a substitute for a mother goose soon after her eggs had hatched. Since goslings imprint upon the first moving object they see after they are born as if it were their mother, the little goslings began following Lorenz.

The time during which imprinting occurs is called the "critical period" or "sensitive period."²⁶ This initial form of imprinting shortly after birth is known as "filial imprinting." Among humans, it is believed that there is a period of linguistic imprinting during which a baby imprints upon a particular language. There is another form of imprinting that is believed to take place during sexual maturation. This "sexual imprinting" is a process by which animals identify what traits suitable mates should possess.²⁷ Females are usually more deeply influenced by sexual imprinting. Animals tend to imprint upon the traits of their parents and siblings, since they have the most social contact with them.

It has been demonstrated that finches raised by foster parents of a different species of finch will later exhibit a lifelong sexual attraction toward the alien species. One wonders how a child's sexual imprinting

mechanism is affected by forcible racial integration and near continual exposure to media stimuli promoting interracial contact.

The most serious implication of human sexual imprinting for our genetic future is that it would establish the destructiveness of school integration, especially in the middle and high-school years. One can only wonder to what degree the advocates of school integration, such as former NAACP attorney Jack Greenberg, were conscious of this scientific concept. It also compounds the culpability of media moguls who deliberately popularize miscegenation in films directed toward adolescents and pre-adolescents. In the midst of this onslaught against our youth, parents need to be reminded that they have a natural obligation, as essential as providing food and shelter, to instill in their children an acceptance of appropriate ethnic boundaries for socialization and for marriage.

The sociobiological warfare that our youth is subjected to is likely to be even more diabolical since it appears to deliberately exploit a biological theory of sexual imprinting at the critical period of sexual maturity. Movies like this past year's spate of miscegenationist titles, *Save the Last Dance*, *Crazy/Beautiful* and *O*, a parody of *Othello*, appear deliberately designed to exploit the critical period of sexual imprinting in their target audiences of white pre-adolescent girls and adolescent young women.

The current of misdirected altruism that permeates contemporary Western society is dangerous when it is divorced from biological reality. It would be better to ignorantly adhere to the laws of human evolution, as do most primitive peoples, than to understand these laws and yet deliberately disobey them. It would be most tragic if the people who discovered the theory of evolution were to perish due to a failure of will to apply it to their own destiny.

It is our duty to maintain and advance the Western continuum that originated in ancient Greece and earlier. To falter at this critical juncture is to allow our people to approach extinction. The greatest achievement of the West will be our extrication from our current dilemma. If we succeed in our efforts, the chroniclers of this age will celebrate our valiant struggle in the epic literature of the future – if we fail, there will be no such literature and our beleaguered descendants will mock us in our graves.

*James C. Russell, Ph.D., is the author of **The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity: A Sociohistorical Approach to Religious Transformation** (Oxford University Press, 1994)*

ENDNOTES

1. Rex Warner ii. trans. *Thucydides: the Peloponnesian War* 4, (London: Bodley Head, 1954), p. 116.
2. Robert S. Lopez, *The Birth of Europe* (New York: M. Evans and Co., 1967), pp. 120-21.
3. Revilo P. Oliver, *America's Decline: The Education of a Conservative* (London: Londinium Press, 1987), pp. 216-17.
4. *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle* Reginald E. Allen, ed. & intro. (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 1.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
6. Detailed photographs of this marvelous work are available at: http://www.phil.uni-erlangen.de/~p1altar/photo_html/plastik/maennlich/bewegt/diskobol/diskobol.html.
7. W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* (1948; reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1956), p. 147.
8. Steve Jones, et al, *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Human Evolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
9. *Ibid.*
10. Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. viii-ix.
11. The Gothic historian Jordanes describes the battle in Chapter 38 of his *History of the Goths*, which is translated in William Stearns Davis, ed., *Readings in Ancient History: Illustrative Extracts from the Sources*, 2 Vols. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1912-13), Vol. II: *Rome and the West*, pp. 322-25.
12. William Stearns Davis, ed., *Readings in Ancient History: Illustrative Extracts from the Sources*, 2 vols. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1912-13), vol. II: *Rome and the West*, pp. 362-364.
13. Bernard of Clairveaux, *Liber ad milites Templi: De laude novae militae*, trans. Conrad Greenia in *The Works of Bernard of Clairveaux*, Vol. 7, Cistercian Fathers Series: 19, (Cistercian Publications, Kalamazoo, Mich., 1977).
14. *The Secret History of the Reign of John Sobieski*, The III of that Name, King of Poland, containing a particular account of the siege of Vienna. . . . trans. François-Paulin Dalairac (London: Rhodes, Bennet, Bell, Leigh & Midwinter, 1700), pp. 355-364.
15. An excellent detailed account of this outrage may be found in Glayde Whitney, "Raymond B. Cattell and The Fourth Inquisition" *Mankind Quarterly*, vol. 38, no. 1 & 2, Fall/Winter 1997, pp. 99-124.
16. Neil Postman, "Philo Farnsworth" in *Time: 100 Scientists* <http://www.time.com/time/time100/scientist/profile/farnsworth.html>.
17. T. S. Eliot, *After Strange Gods: A Primer in Modern Heresy* (London: Faber, 1934), p. 20.
18. Rachel Carson, in a CBS television interview in 1963: <http://www.rovers.net/~mjez/newspapercolumns/rachelcarson.htm>
19. E. O. Wilson, *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge* (New York: Knopf, 1998), p. ?.
20. James D. Watson, quoted by Leon Jaroff in *Time* 20 March 1989.
21. Walter Burkert, *Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

22. *Seattle Times*, Oct. 29, 1997.

23. Elmer Pendell, *Why Civilizations Self-Destruct* (Cape Canaveral, Florida: Howard Allen), p. 126.

24. J. Philippe Rushton, "Genetic Similarity Theory and the Roots of Ethnic Conflict" *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 23:4 (Winter 1998): 477-86.

25. Kevin MacDonald, *A People that Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994); *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism* (1998); *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (1998).

26. John Archer, *Ethology and Human Development* (Hemel Hempstead, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).

27. Todd, P.M., and Miller, G.F. "Parental guidance suggested: How parental imprinting evolves through sexual selection as an adaptive learning mechanism" *Adaptive Behavior*, 2(1), 5-47. See also David T Lykken and Auke Tellegen, "Is Human Mating Adventitious or the Result of Lawful Choice? A Twin Study of Mate Selection" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1993: vol. 65. no. 1, 56-68.

SCRIPT AND COGNITION

THE IMPACT OF ORTHOGRAPHY ON WESTERN AND EASTERN PATTERNS OF THOUGHT

WILLIAM C. HANNAS

ABSTRACT

The “Greek” alphabet made literacy widely available and facilitated the growth of ideas that underpin Western society. A more important effect, however, has been the cognitive impact of the mechanism itself. Learning the alphabet entails an early and decisive investment in abstract cognitive practices that define Western theoretic culture. Oral societies, and the societies of East Asia where literacy depends on nonalphabetic scripts, lack this developmental cue and employ patterns of thought that are mirror opposite.

ASIAN AND WESTERN THOUGHT

For many decades Asian and Western scholars working in a variety of disciplines from philosophy, physics, and history to linguistics, psychology, and politics have made similar observations about the unique cognitive styles associated with Chinese-inspired East Asian culture and Greek-inspired Western culture.¹

Not only are these generalizations widely held, they have also withstood an intellectual climate hostile to the idea that deep-seated cognitive differences exist between peoples of different cultures. That these dichotomies—polar opposites—between Eastern and Western thought have been elucidated by scholars on both sides of the world is causing even the most cosmopolitan among us to question the validity of cognitive convergence.

Joseph Needham, a famous admirer of Chinese science, was puzzled by China’s lack of interest in theory and emphasis on concrete, observable phenomena, which he contrasted with the logical, theory-based science of the West. Paul Herbig, who studied Japanese innovation patterns, observed this same penchant for “holistic right brain thinking as opposed to rational left brain analysis” and for seeking “empirical rather than theoretical knowledge” (1995:12). Hajime Nakamura, in his survey of Asian thought, also remarked on

China's concern with particular instances and disinterest in universals and on Japan's preference for "concrete intuitions" over the abstract conceptualization preferred by the West (1964:543).

These historical differences carry into the present. Richard Baum, in studying Chinese scientific practices, noted a marked preference among Chinese scientists for observation over conceptualization, concrete thinking over theoretical speculation, and induction over deduction (1982:1170). Richard Suttmeir, in another contemporary study, remarked on Chinese scientists' neglect of underlying theory in favor of "simple empiricism and inductivism" (1989:379). Robert Logan, author of a book on the cognitive effects of writing, characterized Chinese thought as nonlinear, analogical, inductive, concrete, and intuitive, and Western thought as the exact opposite: linear, logical, deductive, abstract, and rational (1986:49).

More recently, Richard Nisbett et al. (2001:193-4) portrayed the differences between Eastern and Western thought as continuity vs. discreteness, field vs. object, relationships vs. categories, dialectics vs. logic, and experienced-based knowledge vs. abstract analysis. Through a series of psychological experiments, Nisbett validated the existence of these cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners *even today*. He later added interdependence vs. independence and communal vs. individualistic to his catalog of differences, which he ascribed to global preferences between the two groups for holistic vs. analytic thought (2003:56, 88).

ORAL AND LITERATE THOUGHT

Given the consistency with which these dichotomies are cited and the wide-ranging backgrounds of the scholars who cite them, it is surprising that no one has pointed out the parallel between these differences and the differences between oral and literate societies. I suspect this is one of the many instances in science where prior assumptions have ruled out concrete data, inasmuch as East Asians, historically and now, were and are among the world's most literate people. But the parallels are too striking to ignore.

A.R. Luria, the Russian psychologist, was one of the first to marvel at the aggregative, pragmatic tendencies of nonliterate populations in contrast to the analytic and theoretical disposition of literates. In his experiments with nonliterate and literate farmers Luria found differences between the ways the two groups viewed objects – holistically or as a collection of parts – and in their ability to identify abstract relationships. When presented with problems, nonliterates focused on their practical aspects while literates were more interested in their theoretical dimensions (1976).

Walter Ong, who also studied the contrasts between oral and literate societies, argued, "A sound-dominated verbal economy is consonant with aggregative (harmonizing) tendencies rather than with analytic, dissecting

tendencies." It fosters "situational," not abstract thinking, while "abstractly sequential, classificatory, explanatory examination of phenomena" is a function of literate culture (1982:8, 69). Derrick de Kerckhove, the author of several studies on the cognitive effects of writing, wrote similarly that "Oral languages are always, of necessity 'contextualized.' Their usage is both field and context-dependent" (1988:107).

Merlin Donald, a cognitive scientist who believes that consciousness developed in stages, observed that literate or "theoretic" cultures are characterized by "differentiation, quantification, idealization, and formal methods of measurement. Arguments, discovery, proof, and theoretical synthesis are part of the legacy of this kind of thought" (1991:273-4). "Narrative" thought, that is, thought not informed by literacy or supported by a literate culture, contrasts with the "analytic, paradigmatic, or logico-scientific" thought associated with literate peoples.

The same tendencies to view things in a relational, synthetic, and pragmatic context, or to view the world abstractly, analytically, and theoretically that respectively characterize East Asian and Western cognitive styles also describe oral and literate cultures.

LITERACY'S HIDDEN DYNAMICS

How can this fact be explained? As I mentioned above, it is too facile – indeed, simply wrong – to attribute these different cognitive styles to differences in literacy rates per se. Mass literacy is a recent phenomenon in the West and there is substantial evidence that functional, shop-based literacy prevailed through much of East Asia's history (Rawski 1979). Although doubts can be raised about the *quality* of literacy today in Asia (or for that matter in the West), there is no doubt that it is universal, or nearly so, in Japan and Korea and widespread in China.

One clue toward resolving the issue is found in the backgrounds of those who studied the so-called "literacy effect" on cognitive preferences. With one very important exception, all scholars – including those of the "Toronto school"² founded by Marshall McLuhan and the line of Russian psychologists that included Luria and Vygotsky – who argued that writing causes a shift from holistic to analytic thinking, *worked within an alphabetic tradition*. They assumed that what was true of alphabetic literacy was true of literacy in general.

Hence they were unprepared to deal with a study that looked outside that tradition and contradicted their claims of a general link between the acquisition of literacy and a transformation in cognitive preferences. This is the famous study by Scribner and Cole (1981) of the Vai, a West African people literate in a syllabic orthography, who did not show the characteristics claimed by the Toronto school and others for writing in general. Since the

study was designed specifically to test the cognitive facilitation hypothesis, many scholars associated with it were moved to temper their claims about the effects of literacy on thought, instead of drawing a conclusion, which in retrospect seems obvious, that it is not literacy per se that promotes this shift but *alphabetic* literacy.³

According to the earlier theory, which the Vai study contradicts, literacy in any script confers an ability to reflect on language as an abstract entity, apart from the medium with which it is naturally associated, namely speech. The verbal behavior that nonliterate accept as a concrete part of nature is found by literate people to be a *representation* of an underlying set of abstractions. The resulting metalinguistic awareness, by this argument, carries over into one's general cognitive disposition.

There are data to support this line of reasoning,⁴ but the element driving this cognitive facilitation, beyond what can be attributed to the raw literacy effect itself, is the need to *manipulate abstract units* that are obscured in speech but forced on literate users by alphabetic orthography. Syllabic writing makes no such demand, or does so minimally.⁵ Whereas all writing entails recognizing that language is not speech, alphabets go beyond this by requiring one to analyze speech sounds into small (but finite) components – phones – and to express these phones as phonemic abstractions (roughly, letters), which correlate with nothing in nature. Most alphabets also entail the depiction of *words* – abstractions on the macro level that, like phonemes, correspond to nothing in concrete speech.

By contrast, the trouble nonliterate or those literate in nonalphabetic orthography have identifying words and associating phonemes with letters is well documented and caused by the abstract nature of the operation.⁶ Herein also lies the major block to literacy in the West.⁷ Western children not only must learn the concept of representation. They are also making their first foray into the worlds of abstraction and analysis. This decidedly *unnatural* task introduces one to the possibility of abstraction in general and is reinforced whenever a pupil, who is schooled in phonics, spells a word, types it, or even visualizes it.

THE ANATOMY OF ASIAN ORTHOGRAPHY

Although there is some dispute, among nonspecialists at least, over how to classify the dominant character-based orthographies of East Asia, they clearly are not founded on alphabetic principles. As DeFrancis (1984, 1989) and others have shown, there is good reason to believe that Chinese characters are, more than anything else, a large syllabary. In Chinese writing each character is associated with a syllable sound. Due to the way they are formed, parts of a character sometimes give a hint of its pronunciation. But the representation is holistic. There is no discrete, fractional mapping of symbol to sound and nothing resembling the phonemic analysis required of alphabet users.

In Japanese as well, whether reading phonetic *kana* or *kanji* characters, the focus is entirely on syllables. *Kanji*, “Chinese characters” in Japanese, are associated with two types of sounds, depending on whether they represent a borrowed Chinese morpheme or an indigenous Japanese word. In the former case, a character is read as one syllable.⁸ In the latter case, the character functions logographically to represent the uninflected part of a native Japanese word. In neither case is there discrete modeling of sound. The *kana* systems themselves, derived from Chinese characters, are archetypal syllabaries, whose shapes have no relationship to the elements of the composite sounds they individually represent.

Consequently, when Chinese and Japanese learn to read, they do not *analyze* speech sounds much beyond the concrete level that people are equipped from birth to perceive.⁹ Nor is there a corresponding demand to *abstract* sound into phonemes or to relate the two systems of speech and writing on a higher abstract level. Finally, Chinese and Japanese readers are not made to identify *words* – abstract entities not distinguished in speech. The orthographies simply run the symbols together one after another in an unrelieved stream, in a manner characteristic of oral societies the world over.

Instead of fostering analysis and abstraction, Sinitic scripts require only that the user map vague units of meaning (morphemes) and concrete sounds (syllables) onto a large set of mostly opaque signs. Although complex in one sense – the number of symbols stretches into the thousands – the operation rarely gets past concrete, surface facts.

Even Korea’s *hangul* orthography, which is an alphabet by design, subverts the cognitive facilitation associated with Western alphabets by its practice of lumping *hangul* letters together into syllables, which is how they are taught, used, and perceived. The convention is obligatory. Even when all that is wanted is a single letter, the letter appears as a formatted syllable. Beyond *hangul*, Chinese characters still play a prominent role in the educational systems of both Koreas, where they are taught as an aid to understanding all-*hangul* texts.¹⁰ Moreover, mass *hangul* literacy is a recent phenomenon. For most of its five hundred years, *hangul* was used not as an orthography at all but as an aid to learning Chinese characters.

Vietnam, which uses an alphabet mostly of Western letters, may also be diluting the cognitive effects of alphabetic writing by its practice of grouping text into syllable-sized units. Unlike Korean *hangul*, which arranges letters of a written syllable horizontally and vertically within an imaginary square, Vietnamese *quoc ngu* puts its letters in serial order in the manner of Western alphabets. But it does not take the next step, adopted by most other alphabetic systems, of identifying words. Instead the orthography uses blank spaces between each syllable, letting the reader infer what “sounds” group with what others to form words – much as one does in speech.

Despite their move toward alphabetic writing, Korean and Vietnamese still emulate the area's dominant Chinese character-based orthography with its emphasis on concrete syllables and its neglect of language's more abstract components. Although alphabetic notations, which incorporate word division, have been devised for all four of these Asian languages, they play a subsidiary role and have no part in the literary life of East Asians. Thus there have been, until quite recently, few opportunities for the tutorial effects of alphabetic literacy to take root in countries of the "Chinese character cultural sphere."

The one exception has been — of all places — Tibet. Unlike other Asian writing systems, which are based on Chinese characters or to some degree modeled after them, Tibetan writing was adapted from an Indic script and is alphabetic. Its twenty-eight consonant forms have a default value of consonant + the vowel [a] but are treated as simple consonant letters, as evidenced by their use in clusters and in syllable final position, where the default [a] is ignored. Importantly, they are complemented by four separate vowel symbols, which is remarkable when you consider that vowels were not part of the Western alphabet for the first several hundred years of its evolution and are *still* not part of Semitic writing.

Paralleling this orthographic divide between East Asian syllabic writing and Tibetan alphabetic writing is a sharp distinction in the cognitive and philosophical traditions of East Asia and Tibet. Nakamura, in his comprehensive study of Asian thought, found "more points of similarity than points of difference" between Chinese and Japanese thinking, both of which he characterized as holistic, concrete, mystical, and particular (1964:347). Tibet, by contrast, has a tradition of analytic, abstract, logical, and universal thought that seems out of place in East Asia and more becoming the Western tradition.

WESTERN WRITING VERSUS THE SEMI-ORAL SOCIETY

It is argued that "oral society" means more than a lack of writing.¹¹ The term depicts a set of behaviors and mental outlook that differ markedly from the analytic, serial behavior commonly associated with literate society but which, I claim, are actually a product of *alphabetic* literacy. And to the extent that the alphabet is associated with a cognitive shift in the West, the use of nonalphabetic writing should also be seen as a contributor to the so-called "East Asian" style of thinking, which is hard to distinguish from oral societies.

The argument that orthography has a direct and enduring effect on a society's dominant patterns of thought is uncontroversial, and has formed the basis for hundreds of studies that impinge on communication theory, epistemology, anthropology, and even politics.¹² Given the universal acceptance of a dichotomy between oral and literate societies, and widespread agreement on the nature of the mechanism that effects these differences, it is surprising

that studies linking orthographic types to particular cognitive styles have met with little enthusiasm from mainstream intellectuals.¹³

One factor inhibiting acceptance of the view that particular orthographies affect cognitive dispositions in particular ways – beyond the present academic bias to treat all artifacts of Western civilization negatively, or where that is impossible, to ignore them entirely – has been the failure of those making this claim to demonstrate that the alphabet itself, and not orthography in general, facilitated the abstract “theoretic” thinking that is associated with Western civilization. Although support can be adduced from the specific nature of alphabetic literacy, a better case can be made by pointing to the counterexample of East Asia, whose writing lacks the alphabet’s abstract and analytic characteristics, and whose thought is characterized by the concrete, holistic patterns of oral culture.

Accepting this argument entails certain corollaries, beginning with the need to reject the notion of *intrinsic* Eastern and Western cognitive styles and embrace a simpler and more technically satisfying explanation: that East Asia’s dominant orthography fails to provide the developmental cues supportive of an analytic mindset. This may be good news to scholars who admire oral culture and blame the alphabet for its dehumanizing effects – people who, not coincidentally, also find comfort in the “harmonizing” ideal of the East. However, to many East Asians eager to elevate their accomplishments in scientific theory and abstract thinking to the same high level achieved in economic and aesthetic pursuits, such “sentimental egalitarianism” (Goody and Watt, 1968:67) will have little appeal.

Finally, those wishing to preserve the cognitive basis of Western culture must recognize the unique role the alphabet plays in creating and sustaining that foundation. Although there is no danger of the alphabet being replaced as the West’s orthography, its functionality has been eroded by the shift from reading toward graphics and multimedia, and by misguided efforts to replace phonics with “whole word” instruction.

This pedagogical practice, which puts Westerners on the same level as Chinese vis-à-vis their ability to apprehend and interact with orthography, replaces the alphabet’s abstract task of phoneme analysis with holistic word-shape recognition, on the premise that adult readers routinely perceive words and phrases, not letter-phonemes. This is only partly true: mature readers rely on multiple strategies to derive meaning from print, including a “direct access” method that bypasses phonology (initially) and “phonological recoding” that entails converting the symbols to a speech-based code (Hannas, 1997:154–164). The latter style is employed when a reader confronts novelty and depends on prior instruction in phonics.

The limitations of the whole word method and its failure as an instructional tool have led to a grudging return in American primary schools to traditional phonics as a matter of practical necessity. But there is more to the picture.

Learning the alphabet's grapheme-to-sound correspondences constitutes a child's first explicit introduction to analysis and abstraction – an opportunity that is not shared by members of nonalphabetic cultures. It is a wrenching experience that not all children adapt to in equal measure but one with implications that extend beyond literacy to the cognitive foundations of Western society.

*William C. Hannas served in the U.S. Navy (1966–1970) as a communications technician specializing in cryptanalysis of foreign codes and ciphers. He was awarded a B.A. degree in Asian and Russian history at Temple University in 1974, an M.A. degree in Chinese language at the University of Chicago in 1975, and a Ph.D. in East Asian languages and linguistics at the University of Pennsylvania in 1988. Between degrees he studied and taught at Yonsei University in Seoul and National Taiwan Normal University in Taipei. He also served as intelligence analyst with the Joint Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg. In 1989 Hannas was appointed assistant professor of Chinese at Georgetown University, where he taught the Chinese and Korean languages for seven years. That same year he accepted a concurrent appointment at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service monitoring East Asian language publications. He now holds a GS-15 position in FBIS as senior officer for East Asian science and technology. Hannas has written two books on East Asian linguistics: *Asia's Orthographic Dilemma* (University of Hawaii Press, 1997) and *The Writing on the Wall: How Asian Orthography Curbs Creativity* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), and is preparing a third.*

REFERENCES

- Baum, Richard. (1982). "Science and Culture in Contemporary China." *Asian Survey* (December).
- Capra, Fritjof. (1985). *The Tao of Physics*. Boston: New Science Library.
- DeFrancis, John. (1984). *The Chinese Language: Fact and Fantasy*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- (1989). *Visible Speech*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- de Kerckhove, Derrick. (1988). "Inventio." In Scott Findlay and Charles Lumsden, *The Creative Mind*. London: Academic Press.
- de Kerckhove, Derrick, and Charles Lumsden, eds. (1988). *The Alphabet and the Brain: The Lateralization of Writing*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Donald, Merlin. (1991). *Origins of the Modern Mind*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Fung Yu-lan. (1948). *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*. New York: The Free Press.

- Gleitman, Lila R. and Paul Rozin. (1973). "Teaching Reading by Use of a Syllabary." *Reading Research Quarterly* 8 (3):494-500.
- Goody, Jack. (1986). *The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Goody, Jack, and Ian Watt. (1968). "The Consequences of Literacy." In Goody, ed., *Literacy in Traditional Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hannas, William C. (1997). *Asia's Orthographic Dilemma*. Honolulu: University Hawaii Press.
- (2003). *The Writing on the Wall: How Asian Orthography Curbs Creativity*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Havelock, Eric. (1982). *The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Herbig, Paul. (1995). *Innovation Japanese Style*. Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books.
- Innis, H. (1950.) *Empirical Communication*. Cited in Logan (1986).
- Jurdant, Baudouin. (1988). "The Role of Vowels in Alphabetic Writing." In de Kerckhove and Lumsden, eds.
- Ko Yong-kun. (1989). "Pukhan ui on'ŏ chongch'aek" (North Korea's Language Policies). In Ko, ed., *Pukhan ui mal kwa kul* (North Korea's Language and Writing). Seoul: Ulyumunhwasa.
- Logan, Robert K. (1986). *The Alphabet Effect*. New York: William Morrow and Co.
- Luria, A.R. (1976). *Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social Foundations*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Miller, George A. (1972). "Reflections on the Conference." In James Kavanagh and Ignatius Mattingly, eds. *Language by Ear and by Eye: The Relationship between Speech and Reading*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Nakamura, Hajime. (1964). *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*. Honolulu: East- West Center Press.
- Needham, Joseph. (1954). *Science and Civilization in China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1969). *The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Nisbett, Richard. (2003). *The Geography of Thought*. New York: The Free Press.
- Nisbett, R., K. Peng, I. Choi, and A. Norenzayan. (2001). "Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic vs. Analytic Cognition." *Psychological Review* 108 (2).
- Olson, David. (1994). *The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ong, Walter J. (1982). *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*. London: Methuen.
- Pinker, Steven. (1994). *The Language Instinct*. New York: William Morrow.
- Qian Wen-yuan. (1985). *The Great Inertia: Scientific Stagnation in Traditional China*. London, Croom Helm.
- Rawski, Evelyn S. (1979). *Education and Popular Literacy in Ch'ing China*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Read, C., A.Y. Zhang, H. Nie, and B. Ding. (1986). "The Ability to Manipulate Speech Sounds Depends on Knowing Alphabetic Reading." *Cognition* 24:31-44.

- Scribner, Sylvia, and Michael Cole. (1981). *The Psychology of Literacy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Shlain, Leonard. (1999). *The Alphabet versus the Goddess*. New York: Penguin Putnam.
- Sproat, Richard. (2005). Review of Hannas, *The Writing on the Wall: How Asian Orthography Curbs Creativity*. <http://catarina.ai.uiuc.edu/L403C/hannas.pdf>
- Stock, Brian. (1983). *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Suttmeir, Richard P. (1989). "Science, Technology, and China's Political Future—A Framework for Analysis." In Denis Simon and Merle Goldman, eds., *Science and Technology in Post-Mao China*. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University.
- Tannen, Deborah, ed. (1982). *Spoken and Written Language: Exploring Orality and Literacy*. Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Corporation.
- van Wolferen, Karel. (1989). *The Enigma of Japanese Power*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Vygotsky, L.S. (1962). *Thought and Language*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Wrolstad, Merald. (1976). "A Manifesto for Visible Language." *Visible Language* 10 (1):540.
- Yi Yun-p'yo. (1989). "Pukhan ui hanja kyoyuk e taehayo (On North Korea's Chinese Character Education). In Kim Min-su, ed., *Pukhan ui ohak hyongmyong* (North Korea's Revolution in Linguistics). Seoul.

ENDNOTES

1. See Baum (1982), Capra (1985), Fung (1948), Havelock (1982), Herbig (1995), Logan (1986), Nakamura (1964), Needham (1954, 1969), Nisbett (2001, 2003), Qian (1985), Suttmeir (1989), and van Wolferen (1989).
2. This school of thought is represented today by Derrick de Kerckhove and David Olson.
3. Importantly, the Scribner and Cole study showed that Vai literate in an alphabetic script evidence some of the effects claimed for writing in general, in contrast to those literate in the syllabic orthography, whose cognitive preferences tended to mimic those of nonliterate.
4. See H. Innis (1950), L.S. Vygotsky (1962), Jack Goody (1968, 1986), George Miller (1972), Merald Wrolstad (1976), Brian Stock (1983), David Olson (1994), and Leonard Shlain (1999).
5. Users of syllabaries must sometimes map multiple sounds to one symbol to accommodate contextual variation (Sproat 2005), in the same way that Asians aggregate multiple "readings" to individual Chinese characters, whose realization depends on context. It hardly compares to the task performed by alphabet users, who consciously penetrate the syllable barrier—a cognitive leap that Gleitman (1973) suggests was done independently only once in history—sort the allophonic variation into classes, and relate these classes to a few dozen abstract entities.
6. See Gleitman and Rozin (1973), Read et al. (1986).
7. Pinker defines dyslexia as "a difficulty in reading that is often related to a difficulty in mentally snapping syllables into their phonemes" (1994:322).
8. Technically speaking some of these Sinitic readings are two syllables long in Japanese, the second syllable representing an original Chinese syllable-final consonant. Japanese

has only four such syllables and their vocalism is de-emphasized in speech, so that they function practically as single CVC syllables.

9. See Jurdant (1988).

10. Ko (1989), Yi (1989). Koreans call the need for prior knowledge of Chinese characters to read all-*hangul* texts “false *hangul*” to account for the dependence of educated Koreans on the Chinese symbols.

11. See the present writer’s *The Writing on the Wall*, pp. 143–147, for a discussion of the academic treatment of “oral societies.”

12. See, for example, the essays collected in Deborah Tannen, ed., *Spoken and Written Language: Exploring Orality and Literacy*.

13. The hostile reception accorded Logan’s, Havelock’s, and de Kerckhove and Lumsden’s separate efforts to link alphabetic literacy with Western thought contrasts with the popularity of Capra’s and Shlain’s books, which make the same essential claim but interpret the results of alphabetic literacy negatively. Capra blamed the alphabet for inhibiting a proper, holistic “Eastern” understanding of the universe. Shlain claims the alphabet disadvantages females, who are forced to think unnaturally in a linear fashion.

RACE MIXTURE IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE

TENNEY FRANK

*The following article by Tenney Frank originally appeared in the **American Historical Review** (July 1916, vol. 21, no. 4: 689–708). Frank (1876–1939), an American historian, was professor at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, and the author of several books, including **A History of Rome** (1923), **Economic History of Rome** (1920), **Catullus and Horace** (1928), and **Roman Imperialism** (1914).*

There is one surprise that the historian usually experiences upon his first visit to Rome. It may be at the Galleria Lapidaria of the Vatican or at the Lateran Museum, but, if not elsewhere, it can hardly escape him upon his first walk up the Appian Way. As he stops to decipher the names upon the old tombs that line the road, hoping to chance upon one familiar to him from his Cicero or Livy, he finds praenomen and nomen promising enough, but the cognomina all seem awry. L. Lucretius *Pamphilus*, A. Aemilius *Alexa*, M. Clodius *Philostorgus* do not smack of freshman Latin. And he will not readily find in the Roman writers now extant an answer to the questions that these inscriptions invariably raise. Do these names imply that the Roman stock was completely changed after Cicero's day, and was the satirist recording a fact when he wailed that the Tiber had captured the waters of the Syrian Orontes? If so, are these foreigners ordinary immigrants, or did Rome become a nation of ex-slaves and their offspring? Or does the abundance of Greek cognomina mean that, to a certain extent, a foreign nomenclature has gained respect, so that a Roman dignitary might, so to speak, sign a name like C. Julius Abascantus on the hotel register without any misgivings about the accommodations?

Unfortunately, most of the sociological and political data of the empire are provided by satirists. When Tacitus informs us that in Nero's day a great many of Rome's senators and knights were descendants of slaves and the native stock had dwindled to surprisingly small proportions, we are not sure whether we are not to take it as an exaggerated thrust by an indignant Roman of the old stock. At any rate, this, like similar remarks equally indirect, receives totally different evaluation in the discussion of those who have treated of Rome's society, like Friedländer, Dill, Mommsen, Wallon, and Marquardt. To discover some new light upon these fundamental questions of Roman history, I have tried to gather such fragmentary data as the corpus of inscriptions might afford. This evidence is never decisive in its purport, and it is always, by the very nature of the material, partial in its scope, but at any rate it may help us

to interpret our literary sources to some extent. It has at least convinced me that Juvenal and Tacitus were not exaggerating. It is probable that when these men wrote a very small percentage of the free plebeians on the streets of Rome could prove unmixed Italian descent. By far the larger part – perhaps ninety percent – had Oriental blood in their veins.

My first quest was for information about the stock of the ordinary citizen of Rome during the empire. In the *Corpus of Latin Inscriptions*¹ the editors, after publishing the honorary and sepulchral inscriptions of the nobles and military classes, followed by those of the slaves and humble classes which occur in the *columbaria*, gave the rest of the city's sepulchral inscriptions (19,260) in alphabetical order.² Of these I read the 13,900 contained in volume VI., parts 2 and 3, which, despite the occurrence of some slaves as well as of some persons of wealth, represent on the whole the ordinary type of urban plebeians. A mere classification of all these names into lists of natives on the one hand and slaves and foreigners on the other would be of little service, since, obviously, transient foreigners are of little importance in estimating the stock of the permanent population of Rome, and we must face the question at once whether or not the slave and freedman stock permanently merged into the civil population. Furthermore, such lists will be at everyone's hand as soon as the index of the sixth volume of *CIL* is published. In reckoning up the foreign stock, therefore, I have counted only those who, according to the inscriptions, were presumably born at Rome. A somewhat arbitrary definition of limits was necessary since we are seldom given definite information about the place of birth, but as I have used the same classification for the free-born as for the slave-born the results are valid for our purposes. For instance, in getting statistics of birth, I have included all children under ten years of age, assuming that slave children under that age would rarely be brought in from abroad; and if slaves of this class are counted, the free-born of the same class must also be reckoned with. I have also included slave and free-born children who appear to be with father, mother, brother, or sister at Rome, since presumably they would have been sundered from their family if they had been brought in from the foreign market; and again, in order to reach fair results, the corresponding persons of free birth are counted. For reasons which will presently appear I have accepted the Greek cognomen as a true indication of recent foreign extraction, and, since citizens of native stock did not as a rule unite in marriage with *liberti*, a Greek cognomen in a child or one parent is sufficient evidence of status. As is well known, certain Latin cognomina, e.g., *Salvius*, *Hilarus*, *Fortunatus*, were so frequently borne by slaves and freedmen that they were apt to be avoided by the better classes. Nevertheless, since no definite rule is attainable in the matter, I have credited the bearers of all Latin names to the native stock in all cases of doubt.³

Classifying in this way the names of the aforesaid 13,900 inscriptions of volume VI., parts 2 and 3, we find that of the 4,485 persons apparently born

at Rome, 3,723 (eighty-three percent) fall into the list which by our criteria represents foreign extraction. This figure is probably not far from correct, but I think it would be raised somewhat if it were possible to decide what proportion of Latin cognomina conceals slaves and *liberti*. For instance, a name like Q. Manlius Restitutus (VI. 22,015) would usually pass with little suspicion. But the inscription also names his father, mother, wife, and two sons, all of whom have Greek cognomina. Because of his parentage I have classed him as of foreign stock, but there are scores of brief inscriptions in which the necessary facts are not provided. In these the subject had to be classed, however erroneously, as Latin.

In order to reckon if possible the margin of error in cases like this, I have attempted to test the respectability of Latin cognomina, but with rather unsatisfactory results. I counted all the names of slaves and freedmen in the indexes of volumes V., IX., XIV., and over a thousand in volume VI., in order to get a group of five thousand bearing the prevalent slave-names. More than half (2,874) have Greek names, the most popular of these being Eros (58 times), Pamphilus (36), Antiochus (34), Hermes (30), Alexander (28), Philomusus (26), Onesimus (22), Philargyrus (21), names, most of which were also very popular among free Greeks and Asiatics. Two thousand one hundred and twenty-six have Latin names, some of which occur with remarkable frequency, e.g., Felix (97), Hilarus -a (64-53), Faustus -a (58-33), Salvius -a (38-18), Fortunatus -a (29-15), Primus -a (51-47), Secundus -a (25-34), Tertius -a (18-18), Auctus -a (24-25), Vitalis (36), Januarius -a (22-6). Now, if we compare these Latin names with those borne by better-class Roman plebeians, by the pretorian guards, for instance (though many descendants of slaves served even in the pretorian guards), we find, despite a certain overlapping, quite a striking difference. Apparently some names had acquired such sordid associations that they were in general avoided by ordinary plebeians. The favorite names on the pretorian lists are Maximus, Proculus, Severus, Verus, Capito, Justus, Celer, Marcellus, Clemens, Victor, and the like. We may not say that any Latin name was confined wholly to slaves, nor would it be possible to give any usable list of relative percentages, but we may at least say that the Romans recognized such names as Salvius, Hilarus, Fortunatus, Optatus, Auctus, Vitalis, Januarius, as being peculiarly appropriate to slaves; and Felix, Faustus, Primus, Primitivus, and a few others must have cast some suspicion upon the bearer. After reviewing in this light the seventeen percent of possible claimants of Latin origin in the alphabetical list of inscriptions in volume VI., parts 2 and 3, I have little doubt that a third of these would, with fuller evidence, be shifted into the class of non-Latins.

On the other hand, the question has been raised whether a man with Greek cognomen must invariably be of foreign stock. Could it not be that Greek names became so popular that, like Biblical and classical names today, they were accepted by Romans of native stock? In the last days of the empire this

may have been the case;⁴ but the inscriptions prove that the Greek cognomen was not in good repute. I have tested this matter by classifying all the instances in the 13,900 inscriptions (there are 1,347) where the names of both the father and son appear.⁵ From this it appears that fathers with Greek names are very prone to give Latin names to their children, whereas the reverse is not true. The statistics are as follows:

	<u>Greek cognomen</u>		<u>Latin cognomen</u>	
Father	859		488	
Son	<u>Greek</u>	<u>Latin</u>	<u>Greek</u>	<u>Latin</u>
	460	399	53	435

This means that in one generation Greek names diminish from sixty-four percent to thirty-eight percent, or that forty-six percent of the fathers with Greek names give their sons Latin names, while only eleven percent of the Latin fathers give their sons Greek names. And this eleven percent dwindles upon examination into a negligible quantity. For instance, in seventeen of the fifty-three cases the mother's name is Greek, which betrays the true status of the family; and in ten other instances the son's gentile name differs from that of the "father," who is, therefore, probably a stepfather. In almost all of the other twenty-six instances, the inscription is too brief to furnish a fair criterion for judging. Clearly the Greek name was considered as a sign of dubious origin among the Roman plebeians, and the freedman family that rose to any social ambitions made short shrift of it. For these reasons, therefore, I consider that the presence of a Greek name in the immediate family is good evidence that the subject of the inscription is of servile or foreign stock. The conclusion of our pros and cons must be that nearly ninety percent of the Roman-born folk represented in the above-mentioned sepulchral inscriptions of *CIL*, volume VI., parts 2 and 3, are of foreign extraction.

Who are these Romans of the new type and whence do they come? How many are immigrants and how many are of servile extraction? Of what race are they? Seneca happens to make a remark which is often quoted as proof of extensive immigration to Rome. He writes to his mother in derision of Rome:

Of this crowd the greater part have no country; from their own free towns and colonies, in a word, from the whole globe, they are congregated. Some are brought by ambition, some by the call of public duty, or by reason of some mission, others by luxury which seeks a harbor rich and commodious for vices, others by the eager pursuit of liberal studies, others by shows, etc.⁶

Seneca apparently refers in large part to visitors, but also to immigrants. In so far as he has transients in mind we are not concerned with the passage,

for such people did little to affect the permanent racial complexion of Rome's civil population. A passage in Juvenal's third satire is perhaps more to the point, for he seems to imply that the Oriental has come to stay.

While every land...daily pours
Its starving myriads forth. Hither they come
To batten on the genial soil of Rome,
Minions, then lords of every princely dome,
Grammarian, painter, augur, rhetorician,
Rope-dancer, conjurer, fiddler, and physician.

This passage clearly suggests that foreigners of their own free will have drifted to Rome in great numbers to make it their place of livelihood and their permanent abode. I cannot here treat the whole problem, but, while agreeing that the implication of this passage is true to a certain degree, I would question whether the generalities in it are not too sweeping. It may well be that many of the ex-slave rabble who spoke the languages of the East imposed upon the uncritical by passing as free-born immigrants. Even freedmen were not beyond pretending⁷ that they had voluntarily chosen slavery as a means of attaining to Roman citizenship by way of the *vindicta*. At any rate, the Roman inscriptions have very few records of free-born foreigners. Such men, unless they attained to citizenship,⁸ ought to bear names like that in no. 17,171, *Dis man. Epaeneti, Epaeneti F. Ephesio*, but there are not a dozen names of this sort to be found among the inscriptions of volume VI., parts 2 and 3. Nor need we assume that many persons of this kind are concealed among the inscriptions that bear the *tria nomina*, for immigrants of this class did not often perform the services for which the state granted citizenship. There could hardly have been an influx of foreign free-born laborers at Rome, for Rome was not an industrial city and was more than well provided with poor citizens who could not compete with slaves and had to live upon the state's bounty. Indeed, an examination of the laborious article by Kuhn⁹ fails to reveal any free-born foreigners among the skilled laborers of the city. In regard to shop-keepers, merchants, and traders we may refer to a careful discussion by Parvan.¹⁰ He has convincingly shown that the retail trade was carried on at Rome, not by foreigners but by Romans of the lower classes, mostly slaves and freedmen, and that while the provincials of Asia and Egypt continued throughout the empire to carry most of the imports of the East to Rome, the Roman houses had charge of the wholesale trade in the city. The free-born foreigner did not make any inroad upon this field. However, in various arts and crafts, such as those mentioned by Juvenal, the free immigrant could gain a livelihood at Rome. Some of the teachers of rhetoric, philosophy, and mathematics, some of the doctors, sculptors, architects, painters, and the like, were citizens of the provincial cities who went to Rome for greater remuneration. But even most of these professions were in the hands of slaves and freedmen who had been given a specialized education by their masters. In volume VI., part 2, which contains the sepulchral inscrip-

tions classified according to arts and crafts, there is very little trace of the free-born foreigner. Among the fifty inscriptions of *medici*, for instance, only two, 9563, 9597, contain sure instances of such foreigners. Among the *grammatici*, *rhetores*, *argentarii*, *structores*, and *pictores*, where they might well be expected, I find no clear case. It is evident then that the sweeping statements of men like Juvenal and Seneca should not be made the basis for assuming a considerable free-born immigration that permanently altered the citizen-body of Rome. These writers apparently did not attempt to discriminate between the various classes that were speaking foreign jargons on the streets of Rome. As a matter of fact, this foreign-speaking population had, for the most part, it seems, learned the languages they used within the city itself from slaves and freedman parents of foreign birth.

If now this great crowd of the city was not of immigrant stock, but rather of servile extraction, the family life of the slaves must have been far more conducive to the propagation of that stock than is usually assumed, and, furthermore, manumission must have been practiced so liberally that the slave-stock could readily merge into the citizen-body. On the latter question our sources are satisfactory; on the former, they have little to say. From Varro (II. i. 26 and x. 6) and Columella (I. 8, 9) it has been well known that slaves on farms and pasturelands were expected to marry and have offspring. The Romans considered this good economy, both because the stock of slaves increased thereby and because the slaves themselves remained better satisfied with their condition. However, partly because there exists no corresponding statement regarding slaves in the city, partly because of a reckless remark made by Plutarch that Cato restricted the cohabitation of his slaves, partly, too, because service in the city household is supposed to have been very exacting, the prevalent opinion seems to be that the marriage of slaves in the urban *familia* was unusual. Hence the statement is frequently made that slavery died perforce when the *pax Romana* of the empire put an end to capture by warfare.

Fortunately the *columbaria* of several Roman households provide a fairly reliable record regarding the prevalence of marriage among city slaves. In *CIL*, VI. 2, some 4,500 brief inscriptions are given, mainly from the rude funeral urns of slaves and poor freedmen of the first century of the empire. About one-third of these are from the *columbaria* of the Livii, Drusi, Marcelli, Statilii, and Volusii, aristocratic households where, presumably, service would be as exacting as anywhere, discipline as strict, and concern for profits from the birth of *vernae* as inconsiderable as anywhere. Furthermore, these inscriptions date from a time when slaves were plentiful and the dearth of captives generally assumed for a later day cannot be posited. Nevertheless, I believe that anyone who will studiously compare the record of offspring in this group of inscriptions with that in ordinary plebeian inscriptions will reach the conclusion that even in these households the slave doorkeepers and cooks and hairdressers and scullery-maids customarily married and had children. The volume is

full of interesting instances: Livia's *sarcinatrix* married her *mentor* (VI. 3,988), Octavia's *ornatrix* was the wife of her keeper of the plate (5,539), Statilius's courier courted the spinning-maid of the household (6,342). In the lists of husbands and wives one finds a chef (7,458), a *vestiarius* (9,963), a *vestifica* (5,206), an *unctor* (6,381), a slave-maid serving as secretary *a manu* (9,540), the keeper of my lady's mirrors (7,297), of her handbag (7,368), of her wardrobe (4,043), of her jewels (7,296), and what not. Now, these inscriptions are all extremely brief. There are a great many like 4,478, *Domitia Sex, l. Artemisia, Tertius, Viator*, where the word *coniunx* or *contubernalis* is probably, though not necessarily, understood. Furthermore, the record of children is not as complete as it would be in inscriptions of the better classes. A slave-child is, of course, not always honored with a record of its brief existence. Moreover, slave families, not being recognized in formal law, were sometimes broken up, so that some of the names fail to appear with the rest of the family. Nevertheless, the proportion of marriages and of offspring recorded by these very inscriptions, brief and incomplete as they are, is remarkably large. In the thousands of inscriptions of the *columbaria* of the Livii, Drusi, Marcelli, and the first eighty of the Volusii (to make the even 1,000) I find,

- 151 inscriptions recording offspring.
- 99 additional inscriptions recording marriage.
- 152 additional inscriptions (like 4,478 quoted above) probably recording marriage.

402

Now this is not, of course, as large a proportion as is found in the main body of normal inscriptions. For comparison I give the proportions of 14,000 of volume VI., parts 2 and 3, reduced to the ratio of 1,000:

Per 1,000	Total	
280	3,923	inscriptions recording offspring.
184	2,577	additional inscriptions recording marriage.
39	548	additional inscriptions probably recording marriage.

503

Here, as we should expect, the proportion of children is larger, and the long list of inscriptions bearing names of a man and a woman whose relationship is not defined yields in favor of a record of *conjuges*. But, as has been said, the slave inscriptions are far briefer and less complete than the others.

To discover whether the lower proportion in the first list might be due to the brevity of the inscriptions, I compared it with the list of 460 inscriptions of

greater length, edited in volume VI., part 2, 8,639ff., as being *ex familia Augusta*. These inscriptions are longer, to be sure, because the persons designated had reached some degree of prosperity and could afford a few feet of sod with a separate stone. But even these slaves and freedmen were generally required to furnish close and persistent attention to their service. I have again given the numbers in the proportion of 1,000 for the sake of comparison.

Per 1,000	Total	
290	133	inscriptions recording offspring.
220	101	additional inscriptions recording marriage.
78	36	additional inscriptions probably recording marriage.
<hr/>		
588		

From this list, if we may draw any conclusions from such small numbers, it would appear that the imperial slaves and freedmen were more productive than the ordinary citizens of Rome. And I see no reason for doubting that the proportions in the households of the Livii, Drusi, etc., would be nearly as large if the inscriptions were full lapidary ones, instead of the short notices that were painted or cut upon the small space of an urn.

Finally, for the sake of getting a fuller record regarding the poorer classes, I read 3,000 inscriptions of the miscellaneous *columbaria* that follow those of the aristocratic households. These are nos. 4,881–7,881 of volume VI., part 2. A very few of these inscriptions contain names of poor free-born citizens who associated with – in fact were probably related to – slaves and ex-slaves, but the proportion is so small that we may safely use this group for our present purpose. Three thousand inscriptions from miscellaneous *columbaria*:

Per 1,000	Total	
154	462	inscriptions recording offspring.
111	332	additional inscriptions recording marriage.
73	220	additional inscriptions probably recording marriage.
<hr/>		
338		

This group, consisting of the very briefest inscriptions, set up by the poorest of Rome's menial slaves, shows, as we might expect, the smallest birth and marriage rate. But when we compare it with that of the corresponding class engaged in the aristocratic and imperial households, the ratios fall only in proportion to the brevity and inadequacy of the record.

To sum up, then, it would seem that not only were the slaves of the *familia rustica* permitted and encouraged to marry, as Varro and Columella indicate, but – what the literary sources fail to tell – that slaves and freedmen in the *familia urbana* did not differ from country slaves in this respect. And, considering the poverty of those who raised these humble memorials, the brevity of the records, and the ease with which members of such families were separated, the ratio of offspring is strikingly large. We cannot be far from wrong if we infer that the slaves and freedmen¹¹ of the city were nearly as prolific as the free-born population.

But however numerous the offspring of the servile class, unless the Romans had been liberal in the practice of manumission, these people would not have merged with the civil population. Now, literary and legal records present abundant evidence of an unusual liberality in this practice at Rome, and the facts need not be repeated after the full discussions of Wallon, Buckland, Friedländer, Dill, Lemonnier, and Cicotti. If there were any doubt that the laws passed in the early empire for the partial restriction of manumission did not seriously check the practice, the statistics given at the beginning of the paper would allay it. When from eighty to ninety percent of the urban-born population proves to have been of servile extraction, we can only conclude that manumission was not seriously restricted. I may add that a count of all the slaves and freedmen in the *familiae* of the aristocratic households mentioned above showed that almost a half were *liberti*. It is difficult to believe that this proportion represents the usual practice, however, and, in fact, the figures must be used with caution. On the one hand, they may be too high, for many who served as slaves all their lives were manumitted only in old age, and it must also be recognized that slaves were less apt to be recorded than *liberti*. On the other hand, the figures may in some respects be too low, since there can be little doubt that the designation *liberti* was at times omitted on the simple urns, even though the subject had won his freedom. However, as far as the inscriptions furnish definite evidence, they tell the same tale as the writers of Rome, namely, that slaves were at all times emancipated in great numbers.

When we consider whence these slaves came and of what stock they actually were, we may derive some aid from an essay by Bang, *Die Herkunft der Römischen, Sklaven*. Bang has collected all the inscriptions like *Damas, natione Syrus*, and *C. Ducenius C. lib. natus in Syria*, which reveal the provenance of slaves. Of course, the number of inscriptions giving such information is relatively small, a few hundred in all. It should also be noticed that when a slave gives his nationality he shows a certain pride in it, which, in some cases at least, implies that he is not a normal slave of the mart, born in servitude, but rather a man of free birth who may have come into the trade by capture, abduction, or some other special way. However, with this word of caution we may use Bang's statistics for what they are worth.

A very large proportion in his list (seven-eighths of those dating in our era) came from within the boundaries of the empire. From this we may possibly infer that war-captives were comparatively rare during the empire, and that, though abduction and kidnapping supplied some of the trade, the large bulk of the slaves were actually reared from slave-parents. Doubtless slaves were reared with a view to profit in Greece and the Orient, as well as in Italy, and I see no reason for supposing that the situation there differed much from that of our Southern States where – for obvious economic reasons – the birth-rate of slaves was higher between 1800 and 1860 than the birth-rate of their free descendants has been since then. An examination of the names in Bang's list with reference to the provenance of the bearer will do something toward giving a criterion for judging the source of Italian slaves not otherwise specified. In a very few cases a name appears which is not Greek or Latin but Semitic, Celtic, etc., according to the birthplace of the slave, as, for instance, Malchio, Zizas, Belatusa. Such names are rare and never cause any difficulty. Somewhat more numerous, and equally clear of interpretation, are the generic names that explicitly give the race of the bearer, like Syrus, Cappadox, Gallus, etc. In general, however, slaves have Greek or Latin names, and here difficulties arise, for it has by no means been certain whether or not these names had so distinctively servile a connotation that they might be applied indiscriminately to captives from the North and West, as well as to the slaves of Italy and the East. Nevertheless, there seems to be a fairly uniform practice which differentiated between Greek and Latin names during the empire. Slaves from Greece, from Syria, from Asia Minor, including the province of Asia, Phrygia, Caria, Lycia, Pamphylia, Cappadocia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia – that is, from regions where Greek was the language of commerce – regularly bore Greek, rather than Latin, names. Slaves from the North – from Germany to Dacia – as a rule bore Latin names. Presumably their own barbaric names were difficult to pronounce and Greek ones seemed inappropriate. Slaves from Spain and Gaul bore Latin and Greek names in about equal numbers. But here we must apparently discriminate. These provinces were old and commerce had brought into them many Oriental slaves from the market. It may be that the Greek names were applied mostly to slaves of Eastern extraction. This I should judge to be the case at least with the following: Ephesia (Bang, p. 239), Corinthus, Hyginus, Phoebus (his father's name is Greek), Eros (a *Sevir Aug.*), and Philocyrius (p. 240, Hübner reads Philo, Cyprius). In general we may apply these criteria in trying in some measure to decide the provenance of slaves in Italy whose nativity is not specified: bearers of Greek names are in general from the East or descendants of Eastern slaves who have been in the West; bearers of Latin names are partly captives of the North and West, partly, as we have seen from our Roman lists, Easterners and descendants of Easterners who have received Latin names from their masters.

Therefore, when the urban inscriptions show that seventy percent of the city slaves and freedmen bear Greek names and that a large proportion of the

children who have Latin names have parents of Greek names, this at once implies that the East was the source of most of them, and with that inference Bang's conclusions entirely agree. In his list of slaves that specify their origin as being outside of Italy (during the empire), by far the larger portion came from the Orient, especially from Syria and the provinces of Asia Minor, with some from Egypt and Africa (which for racial classification may be taken with the Orient). Some are from Spain and Gaul, but a considerable proportion of these came originally from the East. Very few slaves are recorded from the Alpine and Danube provinces, while Germans rarely appear, except among the imperial bodyguard. Bang remarks that Europeans were of greater service to the empire as soldiers than as servants. This is largely true, but, as Strack has commented,¹² the more robust European war-captives were apt to be chosen for the grueling work in the mines and in industry, and consequently they have largely vanished from the records. Such slaves were probably also the least productive of the class; and this, in turn, helps to explain the strikingly Oriental aspect of the new population.

Up to this point we have dealt mainly with the inscriptions of the city. But they, of course, do not represent the state of affairs in the empire at large. Unfortunately, it is difficult to secure large enough groups of sepulchral inscriptions for other cities and districts to yield reliable average on the points just discussed. However, since the urban inscriptions have presented a general point of view regarding the prolificness of slaves and the significance of the Greek cognomen, it will suffice to record the proportion of servile and Oriental names found in some typical district outside of the city. The proportion of Greek names to Latin among the slaves and *liberti* of the city was, in the inscriptions I recorded, seventy percent versus thirty percent. This is of course very high. In *CIL*, volume XIV. (Latium outside of Rome), the index of cognomina gives 571 to 315, that is, about sixty-four percent to thirty-six percent; volume IX. (Calabria to Picenum), 810 to 714, i.e., fifty-three to forty-seven percent; volume V. (Cisalpine Gaul), 701 to 831, i.e., forty-six to fifty-four percent. This, in fact, is the only part of Italy where the majority of slaves and freedmen recorded did not bear Greek names. As is to be expected, northern slaves, who generally received Latin names, were probably found in larger numbers here; but again it should not be forgotten that a great many of the Latin-named slaves were of Eastern extraction.

In order to get more specific evidence regarding the nature of the population in the West, free as well as servile, we may read the sepulchral inscriptions of some typical towns¹³ and districts. I have listed them in four groups: (1) slaves and freedmen bearing Latin names; (2) slaves and freedmen bearing Greek names; (3) free-born citizens with Latin cognomen; (4) free-born citizens with Greek cognomen. Under 3 and 4, I have, except when explicit evidence proved the contrary, credited the *tria nomina* as indication of free birth; but wish again to call attention to the caution contained in note 3. In cases of

doubt the absence of the *gentile* name has been taken as an indication of servile station if the name given is Greek or Latin and not Barbarian.

	1	2	3	4	Sum
Marsi and Vestini, Italy.....	201	119	234	58	612
Beneventum, Italy.....	141	129	297	57	624
Milan and Patavium, North Italy.	182	135	400	93	810
Narbo, Gaul.....	257	160	332	95	844
Gades, Corduba, Hispalis, Emerita, Spain.....	129	101	305	90	625
	910	644	1,568	393	3,515

When the indexes of *CIL* are nearer completion such details will be more readily available and the tedious work of getting full statistics may be undertaken with the hope of reaching some degree of finality. However, the trend is evident in what we have given, and the figures are, I think, fairly representative of the whole. In these towns, as at Rome, the proportion of non-Latin folk is strikingly large. Slaves, freedmen, and citizens of Greek name make up more than half the population, despite the fact that in the nature of the case these are presumably the people least likely to be adequately represented in inscriptions. Furthermore, if the Latin names of freedmen in half the instances conceal persons of Oriental parentage, as they do in the city, the Easterner would be represented by classes 2 and 4, half of class 1, and a part of class 3. How strikingly un-Latin these places must have appeared to those who saw the great crowd of humble slaves, who were buried without ceremony or record in nameless trenches! Yet here are the Marsi, proverbially the hardiest native stock of the Italian mountains; Beneventum, one of Rome's old frontier colonies; Milan and Padua, that drew Latins and Romanized Celts from the richest agricultural districts of the Po valley; the old colony of Narbo, the home of Caesar's famous Tenth Legion — the city that Cicero called *specula populi Romani*; and four cities at the western end of the empire. If we may, as I think fair, infer for these towns what we found to be true at Rome, namely, that slaves were quite as prolific as the civil population, that they merged into the latter, and that Greek names betokened Oriental stock, it is evident that the whole empire was a melting-pot and that the Oriental was always and everywhere a very large part of the ore.

There are other questions that enter into the problem of change of race at Rome, for the solution of which it is even more difficult to obtain statistics. For instance, one asks, without hope of a sufficient answer, why the native stock did not better hold its own. Yet there are at hand not a few reasons. We know

for instance that when Italy had been devastated by Hannibal and a large part of its population put to the sword, immense bodies of slaves were bought up in the East to fill the void; and that during the second century, when the plantation system with its slave service was coming into vogue, the natives were pushed out of the small farms and many disappeared to the provinces of the ever-expanding empire. Thus, during the thirty years before Tiberius Gracchus, the census statistics show no increase. During the first century B.C., the importation of captives and slaves continued, while the free-born citizens were being wasted in the social, Sullan, and civil wars. Augustus affirms that he had had half a million citizens under arms, one-eighth of Rome's citizens, and that the most vigorous part. During the early empire, twenty to thirty legions, drawn of course from the best free stock, spent their twenty years of vigor in garrison duty, while the slaves, exempt from such services, lived at home and increased in number. In other words, the native stock was supported by less than a normal birth-rate, whereas the stock of foreign extraction had not only a fairly normal birth-rate but a liberal quota of manumissions to its advantage. Various other factors, more difficult to estimate, enter into the problem of the gradual attrition of the native stock. It seems clear, for instance, that the old Indo-Germanic custom of "exposing" children never quite disappeared from Rome. Law early restrained the practice and in the empire it was not permitted to expose normal males, and at least the first female must be reared. It is impossible, however, to form any clear judgment from the literary sources as to the extent of this practice during the empire. I thought that a count of the offspring in a large number of inscriptions might throw light upon the question, and found that of the 5,063 children noted in the 19,000 inscriptions read, 3,155, or about 62.3 percent, were males. Perhaps this reflects the operation of the law in question, and shows that the *expositio* of females was actually practiced to some extent. But here too we must remember that the evidence is, by its very nature, of little worth. Boys naturally had a better chance than girls to gain some little distinction and were therefore more apt to leave a sepulchral record. At any rate, if *expositio* was practiced, the inscriptions show little difference in this respect between the children of slaves and freedmen and the children of the ordinary city populace.¹⁴

But the existence of other forms of "race suicide," so freely gossiped about by writers of the empire, also enters into this question; and here the inscriptions quite fail us. The importance of this consideration must, nevertheless, be kept in mind. Doubtless, as Fustel de Coulanges (*La Cité Antique*) has remarked, it could have been of little importance in the society of the republic so long as the old orthodox faith in ancestral spirits survived, for the happiness of the *manes* depended upon the survival of the family, and this religious incentive probably played the same role in the propagation of the race as the Mosaic injunctions among the Hebrews, which so impressed Tacitus in a more degenerate day of Rome. But religious considerations and customs — which in this

matter emanate from the fundamental instincts that continue the race – were questioned as all else was questioned before Augustus’s day. Then the process of diminution began. The significance of this whole question lies in the fact that “race suicide” then, as now, curtailed the stock of the more sophisticated, that is, of the aristocracy and the rich, who were, to a large extent, the native stock. Juvenal, satirist though he is, may be giving a fact of some social importance when he writes that the poor bore all the burdens of family life, while the rich remained childless:

jacet aurato vix ulla puerpera lecto;
Tantum artes hujus, tantum medicamina possunt,
Quae steriles facit.¹⁵

There may lie here – rare phenomenon – an historic parallel of some meaning. The race of the human animal survives by means of instincts that shaped themselves for that purpose long before rational control came into play. Before our day it has only been at Greece and Rome that these impulses have had to face the obstacle of sophistication. There at least the instinct was beaten, and the race went under. The legislation of Augustus and his successors, while aimed at preserving the native stock, was of the myopic kind so usual in social law-making, and, failing to reckon with the real nature of the problem involved, it utterly missed the mark. By combining epigraphical and literary references, a fairly full history of the noble families can be procured, and this reveals a startling inability of such families to perpetuate themselves. We know, for instance, in Caesar’s day of forty-five patricians, only one of whom is represented by posterity when Hadrian came to power.¹⁶ The Aemilii, Fabii, Claudii, Manlii, Valerii, and all the rest, with the exception of the Cornelii, have disappeared. Augustus and Claudius raised twenty-five families to the patriciate, and all but six of them disappear before Nerva’s reign. Of the families of nearly four hundred senators recorded in 65 A.D. under Nero, all trace of a half is lost by Nerva’s day, a generation later. And the records are so full that these statistics may be assumed to represent with a fair degree of accuracy the disappearance of the male stock of the families in question. Of course members of the aristocracy were the chief sufferers from the tyranny of the century, but this havoc was not all wrought by *delatores* and assassins. The voluntary choice of childlessness accounts largely for the unparalleled condition. This is as far as the records help upon this problem, which, despite the silence, is probably the most important phase of the whole question of the change of race. Be the causes what they may, the rapid decrease of the old aristocracy and the native stock was clearly concomitant with a twofold increase from below: by a more normal birth-rate of the poor, and the constant manumission of slaves.

This Orientalizing of Rome's populace has a more important bearing than is usually accorded it upon the larger question of why the spirit and acts of imperial Rome are totally different from those of the republic, if indeed racial characteristics are not wholly a myth. There is today a healthy activity in the study of the economic factors — unscientific finance, fiscal agriculture, inadequate support of industry and commerce, etc. — that contributed to Rome's decline. But what lay behind and constantly reacted upon all such causes of Rome's disintegration was, after all, to a considerable extent, the fact that the people who built Rome had given way to a different race. The lack of energy and enterprise, the failure of foresight and commonsense, the weakening of moral and political stamina, all were concomitant with the gradual diminution of the stock which, during the earlier days, had displayed these qualities. It would be wholly unfair to pass judgment upon the native qualities of the Orientals without a further study, or to accept the self-complacent slurs of the Romans, who, ignoring certain imaginative and artistic qualities, chose only to see in them unprincipled and servile egoists. We may even admit that had the new races had time to amalgamate and attain a political consciousness, a more brilliant and versatile civilization might have come to birth. That, however, is not the question. It is apparent that at least the political and moral qualities which counted most in the building of the Italian federation, the army organization, the provincial administrative system of the republic, were the qualities most needed in holding the empire together. And however brilliant the endowment of the new citizens, these qualities they lacked. The Trimalchios of the empire were often shrewd and daring businessmen, but their first and obvious task apparently was to climb by the ladder of quick profits to a social position in which their children with Romanized names could comfortably proceed to forget their forebears. The possession of wealth did not, as in the republic, suggest certain duties toward the commonwealth. Narcissus and Pallas might be sagacious politicians, but they were not expected to be statesmen concerned with the continuity of the *mos majorum*. And when, on reading Tacitus, we are amazed at the new servility of Scipios and Messalas, we must recall that these scattered inheritors of the old aristocratic ideals had at their back only an alien rabble of ex-slaves, to whom they would have appealed in vain for a return to ancestral ideas of law and order. They had little choice between servility and suicide, and not a few chose the latter.

It would be illuminating by way of illustration of this change to study the spread of the mystery religions. Cumont seems to think that these cults won many converts among all classes in the West. Toutain, skeptical on this point, assigns not a little of the new religious activity to the rather formal influence of the court at Rome. Dobschütz, a more orthodox churchman, seems to see in the spread of these cults the pervasion of a new and deeper religious spirit, which, in some mystical way, was preparing the old world for Christianity. But is not

the success of the cults in great measure an expression of the religious feelings of the new people themselves? And if it is, may it not be that Occidentals who are actually of Oriental extraction, men of more emotional nature, are simply finding in these cults the satisfaction that, after long deprivation, their temperaments naturally required? When a senator, dignified by the name of M. Aurelius Victor, is found among the votaries of Mithras in the later empire, it may well be that he is the great-grandson of some child kidnapped in Parthia and sold on the block at Rome. Toutain has proved, I think, that in the northern and western provinces the only Oriental cult that took root at all among the real natives was that of Magna Mater, and this goddess, whose cult was directed by the urban priestly board, had had the advantage of centuries of a rather accidental recognition by the Roman state. In the western provinces, the Syrian and Egyptian gods were worshipped chiefly by people who seem not to be native to the soil. The Mithraic worshippers in these provinces were, for the most part, soldiers recruited or formerly stationed in the East, and Orientals who, by way of commerce or the slave-market, had come to live in the West. From the centers where such people lived the cult spread but very slowly.

It would hardly be worth while to attempt any conclusion for the city of Rome, since, as we have seen, the whole stock there had so changed that fair comparisons would be well-nigh unattainable; but the Po valley, that is Cisalpine Gaul, which preserved its Occidental aspect better than any other part of Italy, might yield usable data. For this region nearly one hundred devotees of Oriental gods are recorded in the fifth volume of *CIL*, and, as soldiers and Roman officers are not numerous there, the worshippers may be assumed to represent a normal average for the community. Among them I find only twelve who are actually recorded as slaves or freedmen, but upon examination of the names, more than four-fifths seem, after all, to belong to foreign stock. Nearly half have Greek names. Several are *seviri Augustales*, and, therefore, probably *liberti*; and names like Publicius, Verna, Veronius (at Verona), tell the same tale. Finally, there are several imperial gentile names — Claudius, Flavius, Ulpius, Actius, etc. — which, when found among such people, suggest that the Roman nomenclature is a recent acquisition. There is a residue of only some twelve names the antecedents of which remain undefined. This seems to me to be a fairly typical situation, and not without significance. In short, the mystery cults permeated the city, Italy, and the western provinces only to such an extent as the city and Italy and the provinces were permeated by the stock that had created those religions.

At Rome, Magna Mater was introduced for political reasons during the Punic War, when the city was still Italian. The rites proved to be shocking to the unemotional westerner, who worshipped the staid patrician called Jupiter Optimus Maximus, and were locked in behind a wall. As the urban populace began to change, however, new rites clamored for

admittance, for, as a senator in Nero's days says,¹⁷ "Nationes in familiis habemus, quibus diversi ritus, externa sacra." And as the populace enforced their demands upon the emperor for *panem et circenses*, so they also secured recognition for their *externa sacra*. One after another of the emperors gained popularity with the rabble by erecting a shrine to some foreign Baal, or a statue to Isis in his chapel, in much the same way that our cities are lining their park drives with tributes to Garibaldi, Pulaski, and who knows what -vitch. Finally, in the third and fourth centuries, when even the aristocracy at Rome was almost completely foreign, these Eastern cults, rather than those of old Rome, became the centers of "patrician" opposition to Christianity. In other words, the western invasion of the mystery cults is hardly a miraculous conversion of the even-tempered, practical-minded Indo-European to an orgiastic emotionalism, foreign to his nature. These religions came with their peoples, and in so far as they gained new converts, they attracted for the most part people of Oriental extraction who had temporarily fallen away from native ways in the western world. Christianity, which contained enough Oriental mysticism to appeal to the vast herd of Easterners in the West, and enough Hellenic sanity to captivate the rationalistic Westerner, found, even if one reckons only with social forces, the most congenial soil for growth in the conglomeration of Europeans, Asiatics, and Africans that filled the western Roman Empire in the second century.

This is but one illustration. But it is offered in the hope that a more thorough study of the race question may be made in conjunction with economic and political questions before any attempt is made finally to estimate the factors at work in the change of temper of imperial Rome.

ENDNOTES

1. *CIL*, vol. VI., parts 2, 3, 4.

2. Vol. VI., part 4, published in 1902, contains 2,512 additional inscriptions of this class.

3. In epigraphical discussions one constantly meets with the statement that freedmen were compelled to indicate their status by the designation *lib.* or *l.* and that therefore the occurrence of the *tria nomina* without such designation is proof of free birth. Unfortunately, this rule, if indeed it was one, was so frequently broken, that it must be employed with caution. There are hundreds of obvious exceptions where *tria nomina* of respectable appearance impose upon the reader until at the end of the inscription the dedicant's designation of *patronus* or *contubernalis* or *conlibertus* betrays the real status, e. g., VI. 7,849, 14,550, 16,203, 17,562, 20,675, 20,682, 22,299, 22,606, 23,927, 23,989. Again, numerous bearers of faultless *tria nomina* fall under strong *presumption* of being freedmen because of some official title like *sevir* or because their sons prove to being to one of the city tribes; cf. X. 690, 4,620, 6,677; VI. 12,431, 14,045, 20,079. Finally, there are many instances like 14,018. Here a man gives the name of a large family (all with *tria nomina*) including children and a grandchild, but only the youngest, Caesonia M. F. Prima, a child of seven months, bears the *F* which definitely indicates free birth.

Apparently the other members of the family were not entitled to the designation. Compare also 20,123, 20,339, 23,813. Since in cases of doubt I have been compelled to credit bearers of Latin *tria nomina* to the native stock, it will appear that this group has more than received full credit in the accompanying lists.

4. There are not enough datable inscriptions available to show whether the Greek cognomen gained or lost respectability with time. Obviously it may in general be assumed that most of the freedmen who bore the gentile name of Aelius and Aurelius belong to a later date than the general group of those named Julius and Claudius. If we may use this fact as a criterion we may decide that there was little difference between the first and the second century in this matter, since the proportion of Greek cognomina is about the same in the two groups.

5. It is difficult to secure usable statistics in the case of women, since their cognomina may come from almost any relative or near friend. However, an examination of the indexes of names will show that the Greek cognomen was relatively no more popular among the women than among the men.

6. *Ad Helviam*, 6.

7. Petronius, 57.

8. This criterion fails of course after citizenship was given to the provincials in the third century, but when Rome's population was decreasing there probably was not a heavy immigration.

9. *De Opificum Romanorum Condicione* (1910).

10. *Die Nationalität der Kaufleute im Römischen Kaiserreich* (1909).

11. We cannot suppose that most of the children belong to the period subsequent to the liberation of the parents. Very many of the *liberati* recorded were emancipated in old age, and throughout the empire manumission of slaves under 30 years of age was discouraged (Buckland, *Roman Law of Slavery*, p. 542). In a large number of instances the form and contents of the inscriptions show that slave-fathers after emancipation paid the price for children and wife.

12. *Historische Zeitschrift*, CXII. 9.

13. In this list I have omitted imperial officials and soldiers, since they are not likely to be natives of the place.

14. I have compared the respective ratios of the girls and boys of the Julii and the Claudii with those of the Aelii and the Aurelii (who would in general date about a century later) but found no appreciable difference in the percentage. A chronological test seems to be unattainable.

15. VI. 594-596.

16. Stech, in *Klio*, Beiheft X., *Am. Hist. Rev.*, vol. XXI.: 46.

17. Tacitus, *Annales*, XIV. 44.

THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY IN RETROSPECT RACISM OR REALISM?

ANDREW FRASER

INTRODUCTION

Over the past thirty years, Australia, along with just about every other Western society, has been transformed by a revolution engineered from the top down by the leading echelons of the corporate welfare state.¹ New Class cadres of managers, professionals, politicians, and academics have dismantled the foundations of Australian nationhood laid down at the time of Federation.² The arbitration system, the protective tariff, and the White Australia Policy: All have gone in order to facilitate the free flow of capital, technology, and labor in a globalist economy.

The most revolutionary, by far, of these radical changes has been the decision to open Australia to mass Third World immigration. In taking this step, the managerial regime has, in effect, followed the wry advice tendered by Bertolt Brecht to the East German government on the occasion of the worker's revolt in 1956: Rather than relying on crude repressive measures, Brecht suggested, the Communist regime should simply dissolve the people and elect a new one.³ Indeed, since the end of the Second World War a strange alliance of Communists, Christian churches, ethnic lobbies, and other pressure groups working through the corporate sector and within the centralized apparatus of state power set out deliberately to flood the Anglo-Australian homeland with a polyglot mass of Third World immigrants.

Chief among the ideological weapons deployed in that campaign have been the interwoven myths of equality and universal human rights.⁴ The official ideology of the globalist regime has been enshrined in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.⁵ According to that document, "any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous." There can therefore be "no justification for racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere." Those who subscribed to the doctrine of racial egalitarianism were bound to oppose a color bar on immigration to Australia as being both immoral and pointless: It was axiomatic that "racial differences are not significant differences that need divide mankind."⁶

Racial egalitarianism rather obviously flies in the face of the more realistic premises of the White Australia Policy. The founding fathers of the Australian nation regarded racial differences as a fact of life and racial conflict as the inevitable consequence of a multiracial society. In their view, ethnic homogeneity was one of the great strengths of the Australian nation, one that ought to be preserved and not squandered or thrown away in pursuit of utopian visions of universal harmony in which lions could be reeducated to lie down with lambs.⁷

Forty years after Australian governments began to distance themselves from the White Australia Policy, advances in genetics, paleoanthropology, psychology, and medical science are placing the universalist doctrines of racial egalitarianism under serious pressure. A vast range of studies in a number of disciplines have revealed real and important differences between the races in cognitive and athletic ability, behavior and temperament.⁸ Faced with such intellectual challenges, defenders of the ruling orthodoxy are resorting to social ostracism, legal repression, and even the sort of physical coercion deployed against members of the One Nation Party some years back.⁹ The time is clearly ripe for a courageous and well-informed reappraisal of the White Australia Policy and the decision to dismantle it. Unfortunately, racial realists, concerned to bring common sense to contemporary Australian debates over race and immigration, will be disappointed with two recent books on the White Australia Policy. Both promise much but deliver little because of their authors' determined refusal to take race seriously.

WAS THE WHITE AUSTRALIA POLICY "RACIST"?

The first of these books to appear was written by Keith Windschuttle, a former Marxist academic turned independent neoconservative writer. Hot on the heels of his controversial revision of the "black armband" view of Aboriginal history,¹⁰ Windschuttle has upset yet another academic applecart. In *The White Australia Policy*,¹¹ he sets out to refute the orthodox leftist charge that the immigration legislation enacted shortly after Federation was "racist." On the formal level that is easily done, since the Immigration Restriction Act, 1901 (Cth) did not explicitly prohibit nonwhite immigration. Instead, prospective immigrants were required to pass a dictation test by writing out fifty words in any European language selected by immigration officials.

But because both the intent and the practical effect of the dictation test were to sharply limit colored immigration, Australia was open to attack from progressives around the world and, especially during the Cold War, from newly assertive postcolonial regimes in Asia and Africa. Over the last forty years, a homegrown generation of New Left historians routinely portrayed Australia as a racist pariah nation on a par with South Africa. Ever since the Sixties generation began its long march through the institutions, Australians

have been taught to approach their past in a self-hating mood of enthusiastic shame. To his credit, Windschuttle has been one of the few historians to resist this form of intellectual self-flagellation.

Unfortunately, Windschuttle's rehabilitation of the White Australia Policy is premised on a familiar, if pernicious, tenet of neoconservatism: Like those who claim that the United States is a "creedal nation,"¹² Windschuttle maintains that the operating premise of Australian society is the proposition that all people are equal in principle and in potential. Supposedly, Australia's national identity is "based on a civic patriotism," thereby fostering "loyalty to Australia's liberal democratic political institutions rather than to race or ethnicity." He contends that the White Australia Policy, far from being the reactionary spawn of an irredeemably racist nation, grew out of a long-established, progressive program aiming "to extend both the freedom and the dignity of labour."¹³

Earlier movements to end slavery throughout the British Empire and the transportation of convicts to Australia culminated in a concerted campaign to prevent the importation of cheap coolie labor from Asia and the Pacific islands. Windschuttle claims, therefore, that opposition to Asian immigration was not grounded in fears of "racial contamination." Rather, politicians were concerned both to protect the standard of living of Australian workers and to prevent the emergence of "a racially-based political underclass" that would undermine Australia's egalitarian democracy.¹⁴

This argument rests upon a false dichotomy. Australia's egalitarian democracy was conceived as a new and better Britannia.¹⁵ Who could have doubted that antipodean Britons, too, were white Europeans? By the turn of the twentieth century, references to the "crimson thread of kinship" binding Australians to the mother country had become a staple of political rhetoric.¹⁶ Most Australians hardly needed to be reminded that blood is thicker than water; nevertheless, Windschuttle portrays their leaders as proto-Boasian anthropologists,¹⁷ rejecting any suggestion that racial differences marked a permanent or intractable barrier between different branches of the human brotherhood. Windschuttle maintains that most early twentieth century Australians were confident that Chinese and Indian laborers would become indistinguishable from white Australians of British stock once they were detached from the environments fostering their historic cultures of servility.¹⁸

Windschuttle concedes that the immigration restriction movement did attract support from "unequivocally racist" elements. Indeed, he savors the irony in the fact that in early twentieth-century Australia, the most sympathetic audience for racial nationalism was found among the bohemian writers, artists, and intellectuals of the leftist intelligentsia. That elite minority, then famously associated with the *Bulletin* magazine, bears an "uncanny resemblance" to the "chattering classes" now: "they agree on almost everything, with the conspicuous exception of immigration policy, where their positions are reversed."¹⁹

REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE?

By contrast, Windschuttle insists, mainstream Australians have never subscribed to biological theories of race. Influenced instead by the universalistic principles of both evangelical Christianity and the Scottish Enlightenment, they have refused to treat white Europeans as superior and other races as innately and permanently inferior. This, then, is the crux of Windschuttle's argument: Because the White Australia Policy was never based on racial nationalism, it could be – and was – readily jettisoned once the original political, economic, and cultural justifications for its adoption lost their potency. "The proof that Australia wore the policy lightly was the ease with which it discarded it."²⁰

In other words, if the White Australia Policy really had been steeped in "racist paranoia," it would be difficult to explain the fact that dismantling it in the twenty years from the mid-1950s onward "required no major cultural upheaval and was accomplished with a minimum of fuss by liberal politicians with values similar to those held by the original sceptics and critics when immigration restrictions were introduced in 1901."²¹

Windschuttle is mainly concerned with the rise of the immigration restriction movement. His argument with the academic establishment is pitched as a simple matter of historical fact: Was the White Australia Policy "racist" or not? Another recent book, *The Long, Slow Death of White Australia*, by Gwenda Tavan, deals with its demise. In her first chapter, Tavan differs from Windschuttle on the reasons for the ascendancy of White Australia, insisting that racism and xenophobia were driving forces in the campaign to restrict nonwhite immigration. But, like Windschuttle, she is struck by the ease with which opponents of the White Australia Policy were able to overturn it. Her brief is to rebut the most obvious explanation for the lack of massive popular resistance to such a fundamental change: namely, that the White Australia Policy was dismantled by an elite conspiracy operating in stealth, leaving the Australian people in the dark concerning the nature and magnitude of the mass Third World immigration soon to be inflicted upon them.²²

Tavan is not especially convincing in her effort to demonstrate that the Australian public readily accepted higher non-European immigration as early as the 1970s. Her main evidence is the fact that the Whitlam government was reelected in 1974, even after its Minister for Immigration, Al Grassby, publicly proclaimed his determination to bury the White Australia Policy. Of course Whitlam's Labor government was soundly rejected by the electorate in 1975. The incoming Fraser government certainly had no mandate to promote a massive influx of nonwhite immigrants. Nevertheless, it joined with the Australian Labor Party to forge a bipartisan consensus in favor of Third World immigration.

For decades, there was no effective political opposition to the revolution from above in immigration law and policy. Among the managerial and professional classes, a complacently "cosmopolitan" consensus reigned supreme;

the political equilibrium was not upset until the meteoric rise of the One Nation party in the late 1990s. Then, for a brief, shining moment, the patriotic instincts of the more "parochial," outer suburban, white Australians found a political voice.²³ Much to the relief of the political class, however, that too often tongue-tied voice of populist protest was largely ineffectual and, in any case, was soon silenced.

Concerned to counter suggestions that the new regime lacked popular support from the beginning, Tavan cites opinion polls from the mid-1970s favoring the then-current rate of Asian migration. When weighing such evidence, one wonders how citizens then would have responded to pollsters had they been presented with an accurate picture of how Sydney and Melbourne, in particular, would look after thirty years of colonization by Third World immigrants. Tavan acknowledges that "debate still continues" over how many nonwhites should be allowed to enter while insisting that "a majority of Australians since the 1960s have unequivocally rejected any policy that would completely bar non-Europeans from settling." White Australia, she maintains, is no longer a "dominant worldview"; at most, it persists as a "residual cultural form." Even so, she concedes that "the battle against White Australia is not completely won." From Pauline Hanson to the *Tampa* incident,²⁴ recent events have revealed that "the [white, Anglo-Celtic] racial-cultural ideals" of Australian nationhood have never been completely extinguished. Tavan fears that, like the slow, silent combustion of an underground coal seam, the fiery force of white racial consciousness may burst, without warning, through the surface somnolence secured, so far, by the multiracialist mullahs of the media, the human rights industry, and the educational establishment.²⁵

Tavan clearly shares Windschuttle's conventionally progressive views on the nature and significance of race. As committed racial egalitarians, both writers desperately want to drive a stake through the heart of racial realism, once and for all. Tavan and Windschuttle still worry that, despite having been in a state of suspended animation for several decades, residual forms of racial identity might someday reawaken in the hearts of white Australians, perhaps even with renewed vigor and enhanced vitality. For that reason, Windschuttle happily joins the left in its attack upon race as "an unscientific category," as a thoroughly modern, bad idea "engendered by the new social sciences and brought to maturity by the evolutionary biology of the nineteenth century."²⁶ In the battle between racial realism and racial egalitarianism, former Professor Windschuttle joins his old revolutionary comrades on the barricades, resolutely denying that differences between "races" have a biological or genetic foundation.

In his thoroughly orthodox opinion, nineteenth century anthropology and biology took a wrong turn when they denied "Enlightenment and Evangelical ideas about the unity of humanity." For him, the evident differences between the various races of mankind are the malleable product of their cultures and

the particular stage each may have reached in the long ascent from savagery to civilization. No race is permanently incapable of change and development. Somewhat imprudently, Windschuttle suggests that to take any other view on this question "is to betray one's ignorance of the subject."²⁷ In fact, to anyone familiar with the rapidly expanding literature on the genetic character of racial differences, Windschuttle's dogmatism is a clear case of what American commentator Steve Sailer calls racial flat-earthism.²⁸

BIOLOGY AND CULTURE

There is still room for debate on the precise genetic contribution to any given racial difference in, for example, intelligence, temperament, criminality, and athletic ability. But that such racial differences do exist and that they have a biological basis is not any longer open to serious scientific question. As Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele put it, "the case for race hinges on recognition that genetic variation in traits that affect performance and ultimately survival is the fuel on which the evolutionary process runs." Without that "functional genetic variation, there can be no adaptive evolution." Variation "is the norm...and not...the exception in the case of humans." In fact, Sarich and Miele suggest that the range of genetic variation between different races of *Homo sapiens* is much greater than for any other species, including domesticated dogs. They observe that commonly used genetic tests can determine with great precision not just an individual's race but also "the percentage of racial background in people of mixed ancestry." But until very recently it was impossible to detect the genetic markers distinguishing a cocker spaniel from a wolf.²⁹

Race exists and it matters across a wide range of public policy issues. It is of particular relevance to any analysis of immigration law and policy. Windschuttle, however, is determined to remain uncontaminated by the new sciences of racial difference. He does recognize the seemingly insuperable *cultural* barriers alienating mainstream Australians from other racial groups, particularly the Chinese. Nevertheless he asserts that it is a fundamental error "to slide from the concept of culture to that of race."³⁰ Since cultural differences are not inbred and immutable, there is no insuperable barrier to the assimilation of large numbers of nonwhite migrants into Australian society.

But what if Windschuttle is wrong? What if racial differences are, in large part, biologically or genetically grounded? What if even culture is not simply a social construct but, rather, a phenomenon with a substantial biological component? Windschuttle does document the dominance of Enlightenment and Christian influences in middle Australia, demonstrating that explicitly racist ideologies have had little appeal to opinion leaders in Australia. But that may mean only that Australians, like other ethnic groups tracing their ancestry to Northwestern Europe, are predisposed to individualism, exogamy, and small nuclear families and, as a consequence, display a relative lack of ethnocentrism.

Thus what Windschuttle describes as a creedal commitment to racial egalitarianism may actually be a defining characteristic of a distinctive European racial identity not shared by other peoples. Kevin MacDonald explains Western "cultural" traits as an evolutionary adaptation to the rigors of life in cold, ecologically adverse climates. Natural selection worked there to favor the reproductive success of those individuals capable of sustaining "non-kinship based forms of reciprocity."³¹

Over time, individualistic social structures encouraged the emergence in England of the common law of property and contract and, later still, the emergence of impersonal corporate forms of business enterprise, all requiring cooperation between strangers. The distinctive culture that emerged from the interaction between the genotype of the English people and their environment can be understood as what Richard Dawkins calls an extended phenotype.³² Like the spider's web or the beaver's dam, the extended phenotypes of Western civilization are part of a biocultural feedback loop linking our genes with our environment over countless generations.³³

The extended phenotype produced by the English people finds its greatest political expression in the phenomenon of nationhood. Appearing first of all in England, the idea of the nation could be understood as what Richard Dawkins might call a "meme"³⁴ that has been only imperfectly or not at all replicated in the bioculture of other, particularly non-European, races. Some scholars, however, deny that English nationhood is the product of a primordial English ethnicity. It is often remarked that there are very few nations that seem to be ethnically homogeneous and that England is not one of them. On this view, the English nation "emerged out of populations deposited by successive waves of alien conquest." It was "through the merging or assimilation of peoples who were originally distinct" that a single English nation arose. According to Margaret Canovan, English nationhood "was in no sense a reflection of primordial ties of blood." On the contrary, the English nation was remarkably *inclusive*, taking in not only the scions of Danish, Norman, Saxon, and some Welsh stock, "but also (and, at the time, more significantly) nobles and commoners." Canovan's case would appear to be clinched by the "subsequent expansion of English into *British* identity," carrying "the nation even farther away from anything resembling primordial ethnicity."³⁵

CONSTITUTIONAL PATRIOTISM

It seems, then, that civic rather than ethnic nationalism has been the defining feature of not just Australian and American but British identity as well. Roger Scruton lends support to that suggestion when he remarks that modern citizenship presupposes a society of strangers: "The good citizen recognizes obligations towards people who are not, and cannot be, known to him." Such a society of strangers cannot survive without "the kind of courage, discipline

and self-sacrifice that stem from civic patriotism."³⁶ But neither Canovan nor Scruton embraces the bloodless vision of constitutional patriotism promoted by Keith Windschuttle and the American neo-conservatives. For her part, Canovan acknowledges that nations "are political communities that are experienced as if they were communities of kin." She adds, however, that "the 'as if' is vital."³⁷ In doing so, she seeks to mark out a middle position between ethnic and civic nationalism.

Neither Canovan nor Scruton believes that a nation can be grounded in an abstract loyalty to a particular political regime or constitutional order. Under the label of constitutional patriotism, Windschuttle is marketing a thoroughly artificial nationhood. Inhabiting an ancestral homeland, a real nation binds its citizens together in an inherited community of memory, language, culture, and, indeed, of blood. Citizens are members of a pre-political community that includes the living, their ancestors, and their unborn offspring. Absent generations are among the strangers to whom the good citizen is bound in "a common web of rights and duties."³⁸ Canovan, too, affirms both that, within any particular nation, "many fellow-nationals really will be blood relations" and that "nations depend upon the symbolism of kinship for much of their emotional appeal." But she rejects the claims of ethnic nationalism, pointing out that "much of that kinship is imagined kinship, and a good deal of it is always fictitious."³⁹

The problem with Canovan's argument is that she does not give sufficient weight to the "peculiarities of the English."⁴⁰ As a consequence, like Windschuttle, in relation to the White Australia Policy, she sets up a false dichotomy between ethnic and civic nationalism. In the case of England and the old white dominions settled by people of British stock, including the United States, there is simply no contradiction between the two. That is part of the reason why, for two hundred years after the emergence of the English nation, it was the *only* nation.⁴¹ Even those citizens of a modern nation who are blood relations are expected to treat each other publicly "as if" they were strangers bound together by a willingness to recognize the fundamental constitutional norms associated with the rule of law, representative government, and individual rights.⁴² Only a people such as the English, characterized by the "non-kinship based forms of reciprocity" associated with Protestant Christianity, monogamy and companionate marriage, nuclear families, a marked de-emphasis on extended kinship relations, and a strong tendency towards individualism, could possibly succeed in creating such a "society of strangers."⁴³

It is true, of course, that the English nation was the hybrid product of many preexisting ethnic groups. But the fact is that the ingredients in the ethnic stew that ultimately produced the English people and, later still, British nation, were not all that genetically remote from one another. Indeed, the Danes, the Saxons, and the Normans were closely related Germanic peoples and the

genetic distance between the English, the Scots, and the Irish was not much more significant. Precisely because all of the Germanic peoples were relatively individualistic and comparatively less ethnocentric than Eurasian and African races, they were able to overcome their group differences when they encountered each other in England, merging into a new ethny possessed of its own distinctive language, religion, and way of life.

The relative inclusiveness of English national identity was replicated in the settler dominions. In fact, the English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, and even continental European settlers in colonial America, English Canada, Australia, and New Zealand fused together to become more British than the British in their new homelands. The creation of those colonial British cultures was an important first step on the road to creating new national identities as Americans, Australians, Canadians, and New Zealanders.⁴⁴ Civic nationalism was, therefore, a meme replicated best and most easily through the vehicle provided by the Anglo-Saxon genotype. This exposes a fundamental paradox built into the free and open societies of the West: The only racial groups able to fit seamlessly into the society of strangers constituting a civic nation are those whose members can easily shed the deeply ingrained ethnocentrism and xenophobia characterizing most non-European peoples. Receptivity to civic nationalism, in other words, is found only in a relatively few, mainly northwestern European, ethnic or racial groups.

Unfortunately, over the past two centuries the nationhood meme has undergone a monstrous mutation. Originally, the English nation created the state as a medium for political self-expression. Since then, the transnational corporate welfare state has taken on a life of its own, asserting its power and right to recreate the nation and its people in whatever form it chooses. The result in Australia was the covert decision by political, corporate, and cultural elites to abandon the White Australia Policy.

THE DOWNSIDE OF DIVERSITY

The conventional wisdom holds that “race” is merely an imaginary social construct; all significant group differences are the malleable products of “culture.” Therefore, it is said, social engineering by enlightened policy-makers can overcome racial divisions in polyethnic societies. Now, it is true that biology is not destiny; morality and character also work to shape individual and group behavior. But they, too, are intertwined intimately with the predispositions built into “racial” genotypes. As a consequence, ethnic conflict is an inescapable fact of life. Unfortunately, those who abandoned the White Australia Policy were driven by a dogged determination to deny the reality of racial differences in favor of a sweeping cultural revolution.

According to the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, “culture” denotes “the refinement of mind, tastes and manners.” Clearly there can be no “mind, tastes or manners” without a brain and the body that houses it. And, if the biology

of the brain and the body differs between “races” (or sexes, for that matter), as it does,⁴⁵ it will be reflected in their respective cultures. This would be a thoroughly uncontroversial proposition but for the ideologically driven efforts of Boasian anthropology to treat “culture” as a “super-organic” phenomenon altogether detached from human biology. As Roger Sandall remarks, “the anthropological concept of culture is far too general for its own good, a fact which makes its ‘explanatory importance’ hard to evaluate – because it explains everything, it also tends to explain nothing.”⁴⁶

One need not resort to a crude genetic determinism to recognize the deeply entrenched character of cultural differences between racial groups. The culture of any given racial group is never static; it changes and develops, for better or for worse. Black Africans, for example, have been present in large numbers in America for almost four hundred years. During that time, their culture has been transformed in countless ways. But never have they been successfully integrated into the common culture of white Americans. It remains an open question whether other races can be absorbed into either the American or the Australian nation more easily than the now militantly hyphenated African-Americans.

Experience with the overseas Chinese diaspora throughout the Pacific Rim also gives cause for concern.⁴⁷ As the numerous Chinese colonies in Australia’s largest cities grow in size, wealth, and power, even their Australian-born members may be reluctant to dissolve their ancient collective identity into an individualistic society of strangers owing allegiance to nothing beyond a modern paper constitution, now divorced from its own ancestral roots. Thousands of years ago, the Chinese took an evolutionary path favoring the growth of centralized, authoritarian regimes; not surprisingly, the Chinese today place a premium on clannish behavior and downplay the worth of individual creativity. The result has been a people marked by higher average intelligence – but more conformity, hierarchy, and racial solidarity – than northwestern European societies.

Even when faced with competition from highly cohesive ethnic groups such as the Chinese, a great many individualistic Australians remain utterly oblivious to their own genetic interest in a racially homogeneous society. The demographic threat to that interest grows as immigrants are drawn from racial groups whose genotypes are ever more distant from Australia’s largely European gene pool. Like any other ethno-nation, white Australians constitute a large, partly inbred, extended family.⁴⁸ Since an ethny is “analogous to a population of cousins,” even distant kin “carry genetic interests for each other.” But, because – at any given level of technology – the Australian landmass has a finite carrying capacity, mass immigration must replace future Australian children with those of other, more or less unrelated, ethnic extended families.

The damage caused by Third World immigration to the genetic interests of European peoples can now be quantified with considerable precision.

Frank Salter has calculated that if England, for example, received 12.5 million closely related Danish immigrants, the genetic loss to the remaining English would be relatively low, amounting to the equivalent of 209,000 children (still a large family to lose). But the same number of immigrants from India would cause a corresponding loss of 2.6 million children. Since black, sub-Saharan Africans are even more genetically distant from the English, an influx of 12.5 million Bantus would displace the equivalent of 13 million English children. The genetic losses to the English would be greater still if Indians or Bantus had fertility rates higher than the host population.⁴⁹

Apart from the objective genetic interests at stake, a multiracial society forces white Australians to bear other, more subjectively painful social, economic and political costs. At the high end of Australia's immigrant intake, a growing cognitive elite of East Asians threatens to become similar to "market-dominant minorities" such as the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, Jews in Russia, or Indians in East Africa.⁵⁰ Faced with competition from a growing East Asian population, white Australians now find themselves outgunned: Western-style "old boy" preference networks are only weakly ethnic in character, and, thus, permeable, making them no match for the institutionally directed, in-group solidarity or "ethnic nepotism" practiced by other groups. Endowed with an edge in IQ and a temperament conducive to rigorous regimes of coaching, rote learning, and stricter parental discipline, young East Asians already dominate the competition for places in universities and professional schools. Within two to three decades, it is not unreasonable to expect that Australia will have a heavily Asian managerial-professional ruling class that will not hesitate to promote the interests of coethnics at the expense of white Australians.⁵¹

There is no shortage of Chinese authority for such predictions. A recent book by the Philippine-born Chinese-American Amy Chua provides a striking discussion of the intractable conflicts between the overseas Chinese and the host populations of just about every country in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, for example, the Chinese minority, representing only 1 percent of the population, controls over 60 percent of the economy. Such a lopsided situation generates widespread resentment among Filipinos. This simmering tension boiled over onto Chua's own family when an elderly aunt was murdered by her Filipino chauffeur, a crime all but ignored by Filipino police.⁵² Similar conflicts are an inescapable fact of life almost everywhere in Southeast Asia, most famously in Malaysia, where locals became so incensed over the dominance of the overseas Chinese that governments were forced to protect the ethnic interests of native Malays by adopting official preferential policies.⁵³

WINNERS AND LOSERS

In his online review of Chua's book, Matt Nuenke suggests that the best explanation for the ability of the Chinese to establish and maintain their position

as a “market-dominant minority” throughout the region is the significant IQ gap (in favor of the Chinese) between them and the native populations.⁵⁴ The IQ differential between Chinese and white Australians is not as large, but it does exist, and already it has had a striking effect on the competition for places in higher education and access to professional careers – with white Australians being the big losers.

Prominent Chinese leaders, such as the former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, now boast openly that East Asians share with Jews “a place at the top of the racial pyramid.” In Australia, too, one Chinese writer has described the xenophobic, even downright “racist” attitudes long harbored by his people.⁵⁵ That ingrained racial realism reinforces age-old tendencies toward ethnic nepotism among Asian peoples. If a British-style representative democracy had been grafted onto Singapore’s multiracial society, Lee Kuan Yew is sure that Malays would always vote for Muslims, Indians for Indians, and the Chinese for Chinese, even at the expense of other economic or social interests.⁵⁶

Such ethnocentric attitudes have been powerfully reinforced in recent times by a Communist government that, having lost its Marxist ideological mooring, is fearful of losing control over its vast empire. Immigrants from mainland China have been taught to hate “the foreign devils” and cherish the Motherland, “which never has done, and never could do, any wrong.” Steeped from childhood in an ever more aggressive Chinese nationalism, such immigrants are unlikely to resist powerfully ingrained habits of ethnic nepotism. Indeed, even the British-American writer John Derbyshire, who has a Chinese wife, warns that mass Chinese immigration brings with it the very real danger of an imported Sino-Fascism.⁵⁷

That danger must become ever more pronounced as China itself advances in military and economic might. But even if we leave that geopolitical dimension of the problem aside, there is no denying that individualistic white Australians, taught from infancy that white racial pride is a grave moral failing and that ethnic nepotism is an unlawful form of racial discrimination, will be extraordinarily vulnerable to competition from a much more cohesive cognitive elite of overseas Chinese. Janet Landa points out that in overseas Chinese society, Confucian ethics prescribe “differences in patterns of mutual aid obligations between people with *varying degrees of social distance within a well-defined social structure* – near kinsmen (e.g., family members), distant kinsmen in extended family and lineage, clansmen, fellow villagers, and people speaking the same dialect.”⁵⁸

The strongest ties are within the family, where social distance is at a minimum. Trustworthiness in trade relations is generally measured in terms of concentric circles extending outward from family and near kin. On Landa’s analysis, “Chinese social structure, unlike Western social structure, which is individualistic in nature, consists of a careful ranking of people who are

classified according to distinct categories of social relationships.”⁵⁹ Outside the framework of established relationships, the overseas Chinese are brutal competitors.⁶⁰

Steep hierarchies and inequality are accepted as a normal part of life so that strangers cannot expect to be treated on a par with friends and family. Accordingly, Indonesian Chinese bankers experience no ethical difficulty in forwarding “[a stranger’s] loan application as strategically important information to members of their business networks doing business in the same area and industry as the loan applicant.” Armed with that information, the banker’s associates might not only move into the business but set out as well to implement the business plan submitted along with the stranger’s loan application.⁶¹

The strongest ethical obligation among the overseas Chinese is to preserve social harmony, but strangers falling outside the circle of ethically significant others are fair game; their disappointment and anger cannot disrupt social harmony. Clearly, the greater in-group solidarity of Chinese operating within such a social structure will give them a powerful edge in competition with unorganized, individualistic white Australians. Even the nuclear family has lost much of its former power to bind white Australians together into cohesive units capable of meeting stiff competition from East Asian cognitive elites.

Middle-class Australians face little competitive pressure from the low end of the market for Third World immigrants, but the downside for the nation as a whole is even more obvious. Tensions are already appearing between white Australians and the growing numbers of black, sub-Saharan Africans settled here by the transnational refugee industry.⁶² One can safely predict that, no matter how large this particular Third World colony becomes, black Africans will never become a “market-dominant minority” in Australia. On the contrary, experience “practically everywhere in the world tells us that an expanding black population is a sure-fire recipe for increases in crime, violence and a wide range of other social problems.”⁶³ Unfortunately, experience also demonstrates that any such suggestion will produce nothing short of a hysterical reaction among Australian journalists and academics.⁶⁴

For Australian intellectual and cultural elites, it does not seem to matter that support for such observations can be found in countless academic and official sources. After all, it is hardly news that violent criminals of any race are likely to be people with low IQs who display poor impulse control.⁶⁵ Nor is it difficult to establish that, on average, black sub-Saharan Africans score around 70–75 on IQ tests while white Europeans have a mean score of 100 and East Asians about 105.⁶⁶ It is equally well known that young black men have higher levels of serum testosterone—often associated with impulsive behavior and poor judgement—than whites or East Asians. Now, this does not mean that black Africans carry a “crime gene.” Nor can one say that “blacks are genetically more crime-prone than whites.” But, as Michael Levin points

out, "it does make sense to say that blacks are more prone to behavior that is in fact criminalized in virtually all societies."⁶⁷

Australians will ignore these racial realities at their peril. In *The White Australia Policy*, Keith Windschuttle sees no cause for concern in the ethnic replacement of white, Christian Europeans by Chinese or Muslim newcomers. He has "accepted [mass Third World immigration] with equanimity," perhaps even "with a sense of self-congratulation."⁶⁸ Utterly confident that nonwhite migrants can be assimilated into the individualistic norms of Western culture, Windschuttle looks upon both "racial prejudice" and "religious intolerance" not as essential ingredients in collective identity but as embarrassing social diseases.⁶⁹

MANAGERIAL MULTICULTURALISM

Like the managerial class generally, Windschuttle does not experience his membership in the Australian nation "as if" he belongs to a community of kin. Unlike the bourgeois pioneers of Anglo-American capitalism, managerial-professional elites are no longer rooted in particular communities; they are "at best indifferent and actually hostile to...specific identities...derived from class, ethnicity and race, religion, region and gender."⁷⁰ This requires the repudiation not just of ethnic nationalism but also of any civic nationalism grounded in "pre-political loyalties of a territorial kind – loyalties rooted in a sense of the common home and of the transgenerational society that resides there."⁷¹ The flip side of the universalism and egalitarianism sponsored by the managerial regime is, therefore, the multicultural politics of identity. Doctrines of racial egalitarianism and official multiculturalism may appear to contradict one another but the social and political function of both is to undermine the white, Christian, masculine, and bourgeois values and institutions "that remain the principal constraints on managerial reach and power."⁷²

Under the aegis of the globalist regime, the shared civic culture that is the greatest achievement of Anglo-American constitutionalism is being displaced by a neofeudal system of group representation. Promoting this program, James Tully attacks modern Western constitutionalism because it threatens "the extinction or assimilation of different cultures." Not only did modern constitutionalism authorize "imperial rule of former colonies over Indigenous peoples," it still underwrites "cultural imperialism over the diverse citizens of contemporary societies."⁷³ Tully's ideal of "intercultural negotiation" aims to replace the individualistic society of strangers with the politics of cultural recognition. Significantly, the only culture that cannot be accommodated within what Tully calls the convention of mutual recognition is the common civic culture of Anglo-American constitutionalism. Modernist universalism will be supplanted by postmodernist particularism.

Faced with the reality of cultural diversity, the Anglo-American civic culture has been *expansive* in nature. In other words, it has been "geared toward the

assimilation of difference." Tully's multicultural constitutionalism, by contrast, is *separatist* or *exclusive* in that it is "geared toward the magnification and encouragement of difference." These two very different constitutional cultures cannot coexist; a choice between them must be made. Anglo-American civic cultures developed "a strong momentum towards political connectedness" in order to "overcome the separatist pull of diversity and disagreement." Building on long experience with non-kinship-based forms of reciprocity, the civic cultures of British-derived societies stimulated the "development of imaginative empathy" among citizens. Everyone was required to imagine himself "in the position of a person whose starting point is radically different" from his own.

Multicultural constitutionalism, by contrast, is already causing our shared civic culture to fragment; the momentum towards separatism is growing.⁷⁴ Managerial elites have an obvious interest in dividing subject populations, the better to dominate them. In line with that strategy, multicultural constitutionalism "encourages the citizenry to divide itself into groups in order to win politically controlled benefits." Not surprisingly, once interest groups succeed in "winning special benefits, the separatist pull grows stronger." Group representation spawns new elites with a vested interest in thickening the boundaries between citizens. One corollary of the perennial process of intercultural negotiation is that there can be no possibility of general agreement on public goods. Multicultural constitutionalism assumes "that diversity can be acknowledged and empowered only through constant political battle pitting the races and genders against each other in a never-ending contest for recognition and public benefits."⁷⁵

Tully maintains the pious hope that every group will be able to stand on an equal footing in the contest over recognition and the political rewards that flow from it. However, it has long been an axiom of corporatist interest intermediation that not all groups possess equal procedural status. Groups lacking functional relevance to the globalist system (or which are actually dysfunctional) will be shunted aside unless they possess some other resource that enables them to generate destabilizing conflict.⁷⁶ The basic premise that interest groups are not all created equal is particularly true of racial and ethnic groups. Tully is careful to cite William McNeill to make the point that polyethnicity has been the rule rather than the exception in the life of all advanced civilizations. He does not dwell on McNeill's companion observation that ethnic intermingling has produced a "complex ethnic hierarchy" whenever it has occurred.⁷⁷

Any constitutional order that sets out deliberately to grant special privileges to particular ethnic groups inevitably will produce a still more complex ethnic hierarchy. The relative standing of any given group probably will depend to a significant degree on its performance within the global system of needs. There can be no automatic right to consent or cultural continuity or even recognition of group rights within the context of that dynamic system. A group that is functionally relevant or possesses a significant conflict potential

today may find itself in the dustbin of history tomorrow. While it may be difficult to predict permanent winners in the incessant competition for increasingly scarce resources in a multiracial Australia, we can be sure that the civic culture created and nurtured by generations of white Anglo-Australians will be the sure loser.

As continued Third World immigration provides further impetus to the multiracialist politics of identity, the individualistic society of strangers will be extraordinarily vulnerable to competition from other, tightly knit, racial groups. In retreat from "the rising tide of color,"⁷⁸ white Australians may be forced to reinvent themselves as a people *comme les autres*, shedding their customary civic universalism in favor of a less natural but more powerfully particularistic racial consciousness. Windschuttle would be among the first to deplore any such development, even as his deracinated model of civic patriotism becomes an ever more maladaptive threat to the survival of the historic Australian nation.

Racial realists who read Windschuttle's book will discover ample evidence that, if his tender-minded attitudes prevail, white Australians are destined to be displaced by immigrant groups much less sensitive to charges of racism and xenophobia. One example: Windschuttle informs us that the most violent race riots in Australian history were led, not by murderous white racists, but by Japanese pearl divers determined to eliminate competition from Timorese rivals. There were three such riots in Broome, Western Australia, in 1907, 1914, and 1920. The last continued for a week and involved more than half the town's population of five thousand. Seven people were killed and more than sixty seriously injured, dwarfing the casualty figures for the worst of the anti-Chinese goldfield riots of the mid-nineteenth century.⁷⁹

Almost every immigrant group encountered in Windschuttle's narrative, not to mention the Aboriginal population, displays a strong sense of racial solidarity and an aggressive determination to advance its particular ethnic genetic interests. Much the same can be said for the postwar governments in Japan and the Third World leading the diplomatic offensive against the White Australia Policy. Throughout her book on the deconstruction of the White Australia Policy, Gwenda Tavan is, of course, sympathetic to the relentless attacks by nonwhite nations on Australia's immigration policies; she remains strangely uninterested in their simultaneous determination to retain tight control over their own borders.⁸⁰ Unfortunately this is par for the academic course; "educated" white Australians, leftist "idealists," and right-wing "ratbags" alike remain, at best, resolutely indifferent and, at worst, actively hostile to the survival of their own ethnonation. Indeed, immigration enthusiasts bend every effort to hasten "the long, slow death of white Australia." The brazen "treason of the intellectuals" marching under the banner of managerial multiculturalism has transformed a successful society of sociable strangers into an alphabet soup of self-assertive and mutually indifferent aliens.⁸¹

CONCLUSION

Given the relentless and revolutionary assault on their historic national identity, white Australians now face a life-or-death struggle to preserve their homeland. Whether effective resistance to their displacement and dispossession can be mounted is another question. Unlike other racial, ethnic, or religious groups well equipped to practice the politics of identity, white Australians lack a strong, cohesive sense of ethnic solidarity. As a consequence, ordinary Australians favoring a moratorium on nonwhite immigration cannot count on effective leadership or support from their coethnics among political, intellectual, and corporate elites. On the contrary, our still predominantly Anglo-Australian rulers are indifferent; some profit from, and others actually take pride in, their active collaboration with the Third World colonization of Australia. None of the major parties, indeed, not one member of the Commonwealth Parliament, offers citizens the option of voting to defend and nurture Australia's Anglo-European identity.

The problem, in short, is clear: The Australian nation is bereft of a responsible ruling class. The solution is, in principle, no less obvious: namely, the restoration of a ruling class rooted in the reinvigorated folkways of an authentically Anglo-American civic patriotism, a ruling class reattached to the history and destiny of its own people. Only time will tell whether and how any such constitutional reformation could take place.⁸²

But the problem of an irresponsible ruling class wedded to open borders is not confined to Australia; it threatens the survival of European civilization as a whole. The growing Islamic presence throughout the West is perhaps the most visible sign of our spiritual decline.⁸³ As the secular crisis of European modernity deepens, the soul of our society cries out, unheeded, for salvation. Like the Soviet empire before it, the managerial regime in the West rests upon a shaky foundation of deception and fraud. Charles Murray puts the point bluntly. Western elites, he charges, "are living a lie, basing the future of their societies on the assumption that all groups of people are equal in all respects."⁸⁴ A great many politicians and scholars know or suspect, privately, that there are real differences between racial groups; still they support immigration policies demanding public prevarication about the putative evils of racial discrimination (even though *any* immigration policy — short of completely open or completely closed borders — inevitably favors some groups over others). Such mendacious elites pose a greater threat to Western civilization than the Islamic militants they choose to harbor in the heart of the citadel.

Unfortunately, so long as the postmodernist boundary between fact and fiction remains in the eye of the beholder, the truth about that threat becomes a mere matter of opinion. The directorate of the globalist regime draws its deepest inspiration from Hollywood dream factories, where manufactured images become the new reality. Organized social and political life in the Western

world is largely driven by the psychic power of carefully crafted illusions. One fears, therefore, that it may take a serious systemic breakdown to free us from the self-destructive taboo against discussion of innate group differences.

The orthodox doctrine that race is only skin deep is only one of the official fictions underpinning the transnational system; more fundamental to the regime's legitimacy is the cornucopian myth of endless economic growth. Seen through the eyes of the managerial class, Australia is an *economy*, not a *country*. Nevertheless, a folk memory still survives of a time when Australia was "the lucky country," the homeland of a particular people of British stock with their own particular way of life. Should the globalist economy first falter and finally fail, regime change may yet become possible for this and other Western countries. It may well be that only a miracle can save us now; all the more reason, then, to recall that God helps only those who help themselves. The capacity to act remains the key to our political salvation.⁸⁵

Andrew Fraser was born and raised in small-town Ontario. He studied law and history in Canada and the United States before becoming a law teacher in Sydney, Australia shortly after the White Australia Policy was abandoned.

ENDNOTES

1. On the first stage of the managerial revolution, see James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution: What Is Happening in the World* (New York: John Day & Company, 1941). But the use of mass immigration and multiculturalism as weapons in that revolutionary movement assumed primary importance from the 1960s onward: see Paul Gottfried, *After Liberalism: Mass Democracy in the Managerial State* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999) and idem, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt: Towards a Secular Theocracy* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002); see also Samuel Francis, "Power Trip," *The Occidental Quarterly* 3(2) (Summer 2003): 69; and Andrew Fraser, "A Marx for the Managerial Revolution: Habermas on Law and Democracy," *Journal of Law and Society* 28 (2001): 361.
2. On the New Class, see Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York: Continuum, 1979).
3. Bertolt Brecht, *The Solution*, quoted in Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation: Common Sense about America's Immigration Disaster* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1996), 58.
4. See, generally, Samuel Francis, "Equality As a Political Weapon" in *Beautiful Losers: Essays on the Failure of American Conservatism* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1993).
5. Included as the Schedule to the Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Cth).
6. Immigration Reform Group, *Immigration Control or Colour Bar?* Kenneth Rivett, ed. (Melbourne University Press, 1962), 92-3.
7. Douglas Cole, "The Crimson Thread of Kinship: Ethnic Ideas in Australia, 1870-1914," *Historical Studies* 14 (1971): 511.

8. For an introduction to this literature, see, e.g., Vincent Sarich and Frank Miele, *Race: The Reality of Human Differences* (Boulder: Westview, 2004); Michael Levin, *Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean* (Westport: Praeger, 1997); J. Philippe Rushton, *Race, Evolution and Behavior: A Life History Perspective* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997). The entire June 2005 issue of *Psychology, Public Policy and Law* is devoted to the issue of racial differences in cognitive ability. See, in particular, the lead article by J. Philippe Rushton and Arthur Jensen, "Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive Ability," *Psychology, Public Policy and Law* 11 (2005): 235. See also Charles Murray, "The Inequality Taboo," *Commentary* (September 1, 2005); a fully annotated version is available online at http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.23075,filter.social/pub_detail.asp.
9. See, e.g., Tim Dick, "Uni Suspends Outspoken Academic," *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 30–31, 2005, 9; Bernard Lane, "African Groups Take Aim at Uni Lecturer," *The Weekend Australian*, August 6–7, 2005, 3; Andrew Fraser, "The Trials and Tribulations of Populism in Australia," *Telos* 127 (Spring 2004): 119–148.
10. Keith Windschuttle, *The Fabrication of Aboriginal History* (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2002).
11. Keith Windschuttle, *The White Australia Policy* (Sydney: Macleay Press, 2005).
12. See, e.g., Ben J. Wattenberg, *The First Universal Nation* (New York: Touchstone, 2001).
13. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 5–6. The suggestion that the White Australia Policy was based upon a civic rather than ethnic nationalism was made earlier in Robert Birrell, *A Nation of Our Own: Citizenship and Nation-Building in Federation Australia* (Melbourne: Longman, 1995).
14. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 6, 8.
15. Humphrey McQueen, *A New Britannia: An Argument Concerning Australian Radicalism and Nationalism* (Melbourne: Penguin, 1970).
16. Cole, "The Crimson Thread of Kinship."
17. Franz Boas was a Jewish anthropologist who played a key role in the anti-Darwinian remaking of American social science. According to Carl Degler, "Boas' influence upon American social scientists in matters of race can hardly be exaggerated." He engaged in "a life-long assault on the idea that race was a primary source of the differences to be found in the mental or social capabilities of human groups." It was "through his ceaseless, almost relentless articulation of the concept of culture" that he effectively expunged race from American social science. See Carl Degler, *In Search of Human Nature: The Decline and Revival of Darwinism in American Social Thought* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 61, 71. Boas did not approach his work in the neutral spirit of objective scientific inquiry. On the contrary, his pronounced "out-group sensibility" led him to transform anthropology into a formidable ideological weapon, thereby promoting Jewish ethnic interests in what he conceived as a struggle against anti-Semitism. See Sarich and Miele, 86–91; and Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (Westport: Praeger, 1998).
18. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 174–181.
19. *Ibid.*, 5, 82.
20. *Ibid.*, 67–74, 326.

21. Ibid., 9.

22. Gwenda Tavan, *The Long Slow Death of White Australia* (Melbourne: Scribe, 2005), 227–229.

23. On the conflict between “cosmopolitans” and “parochials” in contemporary Australia, see Katharine Betts, *The Great Divide* (Sydney: Duffy and Snellgrove, 1999).

24. In August, 2001, a Norwegian freighter, the *MV Tampa*, picked up 460 predominantly Afghani “asylum-seekers” from a boat that sank in Indonesian waters before it could reach Australia. Rather than return the passengers to Indonesia, the ship’s captain sought to land them in Australian territory. Prime Minister John Howard refused permission, and the resulting standoff was only resolved when New Zealand and the tiny Pacific island nation of Nauru agreed to take the would-be illegal migrants. His firm stand contributed to the government’s victory in the November 2001 election. Since then, however, many, if not most, of the *Tampa* passengers have wheedled and cajoled their way into Australia.

25. Tavan, *Long Slow Death of White Australia*, 210, 225.

26. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 28–35.

27. Ibid., 34, 27.

28. Steve Sailer, “Race Flat-Earthers Dangerous to Everyone’s Health,” http://www.vdare.com/sailer/medicine_and_race.htm

29. Sarich and Miele, *Race*, 8, 21, 184–7.

30. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 285. Windschuttle’s dogmatic insistence that there is an impassable gulf between the concepts of “race” and “culture” is repeated endlessly not just by orthodox leftists and timid academics but also by nominally “conservative” figures such as former National Party Senator John Stone. Mr. Stone deplores the growth of large Muslim colonies in Australia. He calls for strict limits on further Muslim immigration and other measures requiring immigrants to assimilate into Australian society. On the other hand, he has no objection to large-scale nonwhite immigration so long as it seems good for the economy. Mr. Stone is a former Treasury Secretary known for his “economic rationalist” outlook. Probably for that reason, he makes it clear that his concerns are “not about race, but about *culture*.” To reinforce that point he warns that “some real racists may also seek to inject themselves into the debate, but their advocacy...should be set aside if we are to reach sensible outcomes.” John Stone, “Solutions to the Muslim Problem in Australia,” *National Observer* 66 (Spring 2005): 20. Mr. Stone was as good as his word when I asked him, in his capacity as Honorary Secretary of the Samuel Griffith Society, to include the present paper in the proceedings of the society’s conference in 2006. He flatly refused, saying it was out of place—even though earlier conferences had included several papers dealing with immigration law and policy.

31. Kevin MacDonald, “What Makes Western Culture Unique?,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 2(2) (2002). <http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol2no2/km-unique.html>

32. Richard Dawkins, *The Extended Phenotype* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

33. Louis R Browning, “Bioculture: A New Paradigm for the Evolution of Western Populations,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 4(1) (2004): 31. <http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol4no1/lrb-bioculture.html>

34. Dawkins defines a meme as follows: "A unit of cultural inheritance, hypothesized as analogous to the particulate gene, and as naturally selected by virtue of its 'phenotypic' consequences on its own survival and replication in the cultural environment," Dawkins, *Extended Phenotype*, 290.
35. Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 58, 75-77.
36. Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat* (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2002), 52, 56.
37. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, 87-92, 59.
38. Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, 51-60.
39. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, 59.
40. On which, see Alan Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism: The Family, Property and Social Transition* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978). The phrase itself was coined by E. P. Thompson.
41. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, 63.
42. Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, 51.
43. MacDonald, "Western Culture."
44. Donald Harman Akenson, "The Historiography of English-speaking Canada and the Concept of Diaspora: A Skeptical Appreciation," *Canadian Historical Review* 76 (1995): 377.
45. See, generally, Rushton, *Race, Evolution and Behavior*.
46. Roger Sandall, *The Culture Cult: Designer Tribalism and Other Essays* (Boulder: Westview, 2001), 156.
47. See, generally, Sterling Seagrave, *Lords of the Rim* (London: Corgi, 1996); Joel Kotkin, *Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy* (New York: Random House, 1992); Thomas Sowell, *Migrations and Cultures: A World View* (New York: Basic, 1996).
48. See, e.g., Steve Sailer, "It's All Relative: Putting Race in Its Proper Perspective" at: <http://www.vdare.com/sailer/presentation.htm> Note that Sailer's definition of "race" as an inbred extended family means that some such descent groups are closely related, such as Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, while others, such as the classic continental races (Africans, Europeans, and East Asians), that evolved separately for 40,000 years or so were relatively remote from each other, both genetically and geographically. Race is a fuzzy category precisely because any genetically distinct descent group could be classified as a race. Remember, however, that the concept of a species is no less fuzzy: Are dogs, wolves, and coyotes separate or members of the same species?
49. Frank Salter, *On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethny and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2003), 47, 42, 59-75.
50. On "market-dominant minorities," see Amy Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free-Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred & Global Instability* (London: William Heinemann, 2003). Matt Nuenke's excellent review of Chua's book is available online at: <http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/wof.htm> On Jews as the classic "market-dominant minority:" see Kevin MacDonald, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism As a Group Evolutionary Strategy* (Westport: Praeger, 1994); and Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

51. Frank Salter, ed., *Welfare, Ethnicity and Altruism: New Findings and Evolutionary Theory* (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
52. Chua, *World on Fire*, 1-5.
53. Thomas Sowell, *Preferential Policies: An International Perspective* (New York: William Morrow, 1990), 45-51.
54. Nuenke, <http://home.comcast.net/~neoeugenics/wof.htm>
55. Michael D. Barr, "Lee Kuan Yew: Race, Culture and Genes," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 29(2) (1999): 145-147; Sang Ye, *The Year the Dragon Came* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1996), vii-viii.
56. Lee Kuan Yew in *Der Spiegel* 32/2005 (August 8, 2005).
57. John Derbyshire, "Importing Sino-Fascism?," <http://www.vdare.com/derbyshire/sino-fascism.htm>
58. Janet T. Landa, "Cognitive and Classificatory Foundations of Trust and Informal Institutions: A New and Expanded Theory of Ethnic Trading Networks," in Frank Salter, ed. *Risky Transactions: Trust, Kinship and Ethnicity* (New York: Berghahn, 2002), 134-5.
59. *Ibid.*, 135.
60. George T. Haley, Chin Tiong Tan, and Usha C.V. Haley, *New Asian Emperors: The Overseas Chinese, Their Strategies and Competitive Advantages* (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1998), 68.
61. *Ibid.*, 68, 95.
62. Greg Roberts, "Refugees from Africa Focus of Hate Campaign," *The Weekend Australian*, July 23-24, 2005, 6.
63. Andrew Fraser, "Refugees and Anglo-Australians," *Parramatta Sun*, July 6, 2005, 6.
64. Greg Roberts, "Top Academic Accused of Neo-Nazi Links," *The Australian* July 20, 2005, 6.
65. Levin, *Why Race Matters*, 291-332.
66. Rushton and Jensen, "Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive Ability."
67. Levin, *Why Race Matters*, 148, 105-6; Rushton, *Race, Evolution and Behavior*, 169-170, 267-8. Authorities in many Western countries, including Australia, do not collect or publish comprehensive and reliable statistics showing the relationship between ethnicity and crime. Where statistics on black crime rates, in particular, are available clear patterns emerge. See, e.g., the data sets available online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cvus/rape_sexual_assault700.htm One analysis of U.S. government crime statistics concluded that blacks were responsible for 90 percent of the incidents of violent interracial crime involving blacks and whites. Blacks in the United States "are as much more violent than whites (four to eight times) as men are more violent than women." See New Century Foundation, *The Color of Crime: Race, Crime and Violence in America* (Herndon, VA: New Century Foundation, 1997) available at: <http://www.amren.com/color.pdf>
British experience with black crime can be examined at: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs05/s95race04.pdf>
68. Keith Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 25.
69. Immigration Reform Group, 123.

70. Francis, "Power Trip," 76.
71. Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, 60.
72. Francis, "Power Trip," 76-7.
73. James Tully, *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 70, 96.
74. Cynthia V. Ward, "The Limits of 'Liberal Republicanism': Why Group-Based Remedies and Republican Citizenship Don't Mix," *Columbia Law Review* 91 (1991): 585-6.
75. *Ibid.*, 593, 606.
76. Julian Triado, "Corporatism, Democracy and Modernity," *Thesis Eleven* 9 (1994): 33.
77. William H. McNeill, *Polyethnicity and National Identity in World History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 76.
78. See the prescient work by Lothrop Stoddard, *The Rising Tide of Color* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1920).
79. Windschuttle, *White Australia*, 201.
80. Tavan, *Long Slow Death of White Australia*.
81. Julien Benda, *La Trahison des Clercs* (Paris: J.J. Pauvert, 1965, originally published 1927).
82. For one possible strategy, see Andrew Fraser, *Reinventing Aristocracy: The Constitutional Reformation of Corporate Governance* (Aldershot: Dartmouth/Ashgate, 1998).
83. Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, ; Serge Trifkovic, *The Sword of the Prophet: History, Theology, Impact on the World* (Boston: Regina Orthodox Press, 2002).
84. Murray, "The Inequality Taboo."
85. Andrew Fraser, "Monarchs and Miracles: Australia's Need for a Patriot King," *The Occidental Quarterly* 5(1) (2005): 35.

THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK

REVERSE COLONIZATION IN EUROPE

DEREK TURNER

The drive towards imperium is as old as history. It seems that as soon as a tribe has become self-aware, it automatically becomes self-aggrandizing. All over the world, in all times and often from the most unlikely places, have arisen visionaries and tyrants anxious to expand their people's power and influence over their nearest neighbors.

In the beetling Balkans arose that Alexander of the Macedonians whose handsome features have been immortalized in the frescoes of Pompeii, who sought to bring the entire known world under the sun flag of the Greeks – and whose memory still inspires myths and national struggles today.

From the wolf-haunted slopes of the Appenines arose a hitherto obscure tribe, inspired by admiration of the Greeks and driven by a dream of racial domination and republican virtuousness – a dream that planted its eagle standards from the borders of Scotland to the edges of the Sahara, from Spain to Romania – a dream that shaped modern Europe and became transplanted wherever Europeans went.

From the parched uplands of Anatolia, arose a bearded, scimitar-wielding army, united by belief in a mortal-turned-god for whom all other gods were a blasphemy on the face of his earth – who took their swift horses and droning chants into the very heart of Europe.

From out of the trackless steppes of northeastern Asia irrupted the glittering riders of the Mongols, leaving shattered cities, mounds of skulls, and epicanthic folds all the way from Ulan Bator to Budapest.

From a cold island on the northwesternmost fringes of the civilized world arose a tribe of missionaries, adventurers, and merchants who, almost without realizing what they were doing, expanded their power by sea until they had created a vast dominion on which the sun proverbially never set.

In a highly ordered, highly civilized country at the heart of Europe, previously more famous for its composers and its genteel conformity, arose in the mid-twentieth century a ruthless force that sought to impose order and Germanness on the non-Germanic universe.

The drive to accumulate power and wealth and influence seems to be both perennial and insatiable. Just as non-human organisms always seek to maximize their numbers and living space, so human societies are either expanding or

contracting. To this extent, imperialistic tendencies seem to be an inevitable corollary of attaining a certain stage of advanced civilization.

The Old World is full of ineradicable imprints of empire—fragmentary Roman roads, shattered temples to Apollo, buried mosaic pavements, the “colossal wrecks” of a thousand Ozymandias, noble constitutions and codes of common law, Latin and English phrases and concepts, and iconography that is so pervasive it is now called classical—the cultural legacies of centuries of ceaseless effort to expand and conquer.

These traces are alternately inspiring or dispiriting for today’s Europeans and European-descended peoples. Captain John Smith, who came from a sleepy Lincolnshire village near where I live to found Virginia, took with him to America the family crest earlier awarded to him by the King of Hungary—showing the three Turks’ heads he had personally removed from their owners in a single battle encounter. In the City of Vienna museum, there are still to be seen the captured Turkish banners and splintered lances taken during the Turks’ last attempt to make all of Europe in their own cultural image. In the great mosque—once the great church—of Saint Sophia in Istanbul—once Constantinople—survive glittering sixth century mosaics of Byzantine saints. Yet, whatever rousing thoughts or presentiments of doom may be stirred by such sights, they must always inspire wonder in the thoughtful observer.

There is no doubt that empires are intrinsically romantic.

Yet the reason empires are intrinsically romantic is because they are intrinsically melancholic. Again, just like nonhuman organisms, human societies meet with historical checks that in the end preserve a kind of grand cosmic balance. Even the longest lasting empires, the Roman and the Ottoman, each only lasted around six centuries (excluding the longer lasting Byzantine)—a blink in historical time—during part of which period they were in any case in precipitous decline from past glories.

By contrast, tribes and ethnic groups persist. Those tribes that have been ruled over by larger, more powerful tribes—paradoxically, especially if they have been persecuted by them—can often still be discerned amidst the wreckage, once the smoke from collapsed imperial enterprises has cleared. These groups may be shrunken in numbers and influence, but are nonetheless still recognizably present in their ancestral homelands and acutely self-aware. The empire which ruled them may be “at one with Nineveh and Tyre”—but the tribes often remain, permanent because rooted and united because related. Blood, it seems, is usually thicker than ideology.

Today’s citizens of erstwhile imperial powers often hark back nostalgically to imperial times. Many British Tories wax sentimental about the British Empire—and this is one of the motivations that makes so many British conservatives uncritically supportive of modern America’s empire building. Whatever the cause, they do like to see the British army shooting someone!

But one cannot help feeling that their politically incorrect allegiance is in inverse proportion to Britain's present state – that it is a desperate attempt to defy a less pleasing modernity. Today, the British government's writ does not run quite as far as China or Bengal; it could be argued that it barely reaches Chorley or Brixton! Who could blame today's impoverished Macedonians for getting a little misty-eyed about Alexander – or modern Mongolians for thinking that Genghis Khan wasn't such a bad sort after all?

Yet such nostalgic attitudes overlook one salient point – that imperialism and ethnic well-being are often antithetical. What is good from an imperial point of view is often bad from a national or tribal point of view. Imperialism inevitably means ethnic dilution, socio-political hubris, and cultural overstretch.

Alexander the Great exemplifies the mixture of arrogance, complacency, and blindness to human reality that characterizes the inveterate imperialist. He wished to unite the Macedonians and the Persians in a kind of civic nationalism, himself taking more than one Persian wife and encouraging his soldiers to intermarry with the Persians. He had been so monumentally successful in his undertakings that he seems to have thought that he was above biology – and that he could single-handedly drag mankind onto a new level of consciousness. He thought that Greeks and barbarians really were one and the same, and that Greek ideals were infinitely extendable. And yet when he died, his hard-won empire evaporated almost overnight.

Every erg of energy that is expended abroad is lost to the home country. Every young man who dies of fever, or falls in battle, or suffocates in Black Holes, or is beheaded on video by wild-eyed outlaws, is a young man whose potential has been lost to the home nation – and to what purpose? So that Emperor Nero could have a wider choice of catamites; so that African tribesmen could worship Christ instead of the gods of the trees; so that the East India Company's shareholders could have higher dividends; so that Iraqis could have hip-hop and abortion on demand.

I do not wish to caricature imperialism as merely a selfish desire to maximize power, wealth, and influence. I have already suggested that it is probably an ineradicable part of human nature. It is also clear that sometimes nations can be drawn into empire-building almost against their will, because it has become politically or strategically necessary. A major reason for Britain's expansion in the West Indies was to check the ambitions of Spain and, later, France. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain's expansion into Afghanistan and India was partly to deny an aggressive Russia access to warm-water ports, and partly to rescue British merchant-adventurers and carpetbaggers who had got themselves into hot water and who then had to be rescued. How could Britain avoid having an empire when all her European rivals were busily expanding theirs – threatening Britain's trade routes and military capabilities?

And no doubt some of the imperial visionaries genuinely thought they were doing good for the colonized peoples – just as, probably, some of today's

imperialist neoconservatives probably really think they are helping the people of Iraq. There are clear similarities between the rhetoric of the Victorian British, who justified imperial expansion in terms of bringing civilisation to people whom they were pleased to term “savages,” and the rhetoric of Bushian neoconservatives, who wish to impose global brotherhood and world peace at the point of a smart bomb. One can see why sometimes empires just grow like Topsy.

This probable inevitability of empire clearly undercuts my own argument! It also implies that nations that have once had empires should not feel guilty for their historical errors. If we made mistakes, so did everyone else. Those – like the Australian aborigines, the Amerindians, the Basques, or the Irish – who suffered to some extent under imperial rule – would certainly have behaved similarly had the situations been reversed. In any case, one simply cannot judge historical behavior by modern moral standards. So, to feel historical guilt is inappropriate; on this, sensible anti-imperialists must agree with the most fervent imperialists.

Notwithstanding this, I would like to cite de Tocqueville: “As a general truth, nothing is more opposed to the freedom and well-being of men, than vast empires.” He had discerned the salient fact that empire-building is inherently subversive of limited government and republican ideals. Empires, he could see, necessitated bloated bureaucracies, and meant that problems at home were all too often neglected. Having exploitable territories overseas has always afforded governments the opportunity both of distracting attention from domestic politics and of exporting potential troublemakers – whether criminals or restive younger sons. In the case of Britain, the existence of the empire may have helped to soothe the unhappy relations between Englishman, Scot, Welshman, and Irishman, by diverting energies that might otherwise have been expended in yet more Jacobite or Fenian plots.

Yet empires can also be fundamentally subversive of ethnic interests. Successful empires mean accelerated movement of peoples both in and out of the ancestral domain – to the extent that over time the originating ethnic group becomes weakened and eventually may become outnumbered, or even absorbed. Where now are the Spartans of the time of Thermopylae? There may be a lineal connection between the Romans of the great days and the Romans of today, but it is not immediately apparent.

Rome exerted a centripetal force on the whole world. Over the centuries of her rise and fall, the former city-state absorbed a host of immigrants: Etruscans, Sardis, Scythians, Carpathians, Goths, Germans, Angles, Vandals, Lusitanians, Iberians, Celts, Gauls, Avars, Bulgars, the Belgae, the Iceni, Bretons, Tripolitanians, Berbers, Dacians, Dalmatians, and many more. The Romans had made massive sacrifices to spread their empire, and now wanted to enjoy the fruits of their labors. They wanted people to pick their crops,

build their roads, clean their houses, sell imported luxuries, and even – the ultimate sign of decadence and carelessness – to man their fortifications.

As time went on, the small core of patrician families grew ever smaller, with more and more important jobs passing to newcomers who were not equally imbued with the founding legends and values. The decline was long obvious, yet seemed unavoidable. In any case, attempts to rescue the republic came to nothing, as every year such ideals meant less and less to Romans. Eventually, the ethnic minorities transmuted themselves into ethnic majorities, and this core Roman ethnic group was itself absorbed and passed out of history.

From his perspective and in his historical context, de Tocqueville's suspicion of empires is predictable. Less predictable, perhaps, is the anti-imperialist strain that is to be found in the writings of many great Englishmen. Often, the more patriotic or High Tory the man, the less imperialistic he was likely to be. There is a strain of Tory radicalism that eschews empires in favor of smallness. As that great English patriot and High Tory, Dr. Johnson, put it, "Extended empires, like expanded gold, exchange solid strength for feeble splendour." The Tory radical writer William Cobbett, famous for his evocative *Rural Rides*, wanted just a tiny proportion of the effort spent on maintaining the empire to be expended alleviating the desperate poverty of early nineteenth century England.

Today, the imperial legacies of the various former European imperial powers are still exerting a baneful influence on their originating nation states. As we all may have noticed, the postwar years in Europe have been dominated by the political left. The predictable result of this hegemony is that there now exists all across Europe a rich seam of ethnic angst and racial neurosis for the real or imagined sins of the imperial period when, according to the prevailing demonology, Europeans enslaved non-Europeans out of a combination of greed and sheer blind race hatred. What makes this argument so difficult to counter is that there is a large element of truth in it. And having historically exploited someone else's country *does* make it more difficult to object to someone from that country who comes to exploit "the mother country" in its turn. It is a kind of historical quid pro quo. If we are to assert our own right to govern ourselves, we must respect other peoples' right to govern themselves too.

Yet, even had this manufactured guilt not existed, the historical memory of empires can lead to delusions of commonality. Just as TV viewers sometimes think they know what a particular newsreader is like because they see his face on the television every day, so the awareness of possessing – or having possessed – a diverse empire can lead to those in the originating nation to believe they share a great deal in common with all the peoples of the empire. A well-known British writer of my acquaintance – a clever and cultivated man in most respects – believes he is more closely related to West Indian

Christians than to the French or Germans or Americans, simply because of the shared legacy of empire. Such views are widespread amongst a certain kind of nostalgic British conservative. And certain groups, like the Sikhs and Gurkhas, did indeed provide loyal service to the empire over protracted periods. It is only right that this service should be rewarded in some way – although one might have hoped this could have been done without ceding London's Southall district to the Punjab.

It has been suggested that one of the reasons the Tory administrations of the 1950s and 1960s did so little to limit immigration was for the patronizing reason that seeing Africans and Asians in England reminded them mistily of the days when a third of the world's surface was shaded pink. Britain's last colonial secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, was a good exemplar of this kind of grandly condescending approach. Although a genuine conservative, on the traditional right of his party, his Tory unwillingness to dissolve the already rapidly disappearing bonds of empire in the 1950s and 1960s obscured the realities of immigration, already transforming large areas of Britain's cities. He was so anxious not to offend former national "friends" in Bermuda and Barbados that he refused to do anything to halt or slow immigration from the Caribbean – and joined in the 1968 attacks on Enoch Powell with unbecoming enthusiasm.

The peoples of the empire, it was widely felt, just needed "education" – and perhaps the application of a little soap – to become dusky Englishmen. A famous advertisement of the late nineteenth century, for Pears Soap, showed a white child washing a black child with the magical bar, revealing a gleaming white skin beneath, much to the delight of the little black child. Although this advertisement was arguably saying that "we are all the same under the skin," ironically today this same advertisement is often featured in school text books as a prime example of colonial racist attitudes.

Accordingly, although Britain, France, Holland, Spain, Portugal, and Russia may have relinquished their imperial outposts, that is not the end of their connections with their former possessions. They all, of course, continue to transfer monies to their former colonies, despite those former colonies' proud boasts of "national independence." As they withdrew, the imperial powers took various souvenirs with them. There were innumerable cultural souvenirs, such as Britain's honors system, which is redolent with "Orders of British Empire" (soon to be renamed "Orders of British Excellence" if a recent parliamentary committee's un-poetical recommendations are implemented). The British have the Commonwealth – in which it is only Britain's wealth that is held in common. All former colonial powers preserve such fragrant memories, like elderly men dozing in the sun.

But there were also human souvenirs of empire. Britain took mementoes in the form of millions of Africans, West Indians, and East Indians from the former British colonies. The British Nationality Act of 1948, perhaps the most

foolish legislation ever to pass the Mother of Parliaments, effectively granted British nationality to a quarter of the world's population. Thankfully, not all of them noticed! Today, around 7.9 percent of the UK's population is from ethnic minorities—most, even now, originating directly or indirectly from former colonies.

Upon quitting Algeria, France kept not just the white *pieds-noirs*, but also the loyal Arab *harkis*—both of which decisions were completely understandable, even laudable. To this day, France also possesses a small population from Martinique, Reunion, and the other French overseas territories—many of whom are so integrated into French life as to be active supporters of Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National. But by now, France has also acquired the largest Muslim concentration in Europe—an alienated ethnic power bloc of around 8 percent of the total population (around five million) that is constantly threatening to overthrow France's secular republican state, and that surely cannot be held in check forever. One wonders how much Jacques Chirac's opposition to the war in Iraq is attributable to a belief in the efficacy of international law—and how much is attributable to the brooding presence of this menacing minority.

As she rolled up most of her possessions in the Dutch East Indies and the Caribbean, Holland felt she could not leave behind all of her Moluccans and Dutch Guyanans, so allowed many of them to open restaurants and carry out political assassinations in Amsterdam instead of Aruba. Around 9 percent of the modern Dutch population is considered to be nonwhite, consisting mostly of Antilleans, Surinamese, and Indonesians, plus some Turks and Moroccans.

Portugal held onto her empire until the 1970s, but then, under the baneful influence of the communist revolutionaries who toppled the old *Estado Novo* regime, felt she could not just forget her Cape Verdean, São Toméan, Mozambican, Angolan, Goan, Macanese, or Brazilian "fellow Portuguese," many thousands of whom all came to prefer life in Lisbon to life in Lourenço Marques—although the latest figures for Portugal (2000) show that there are still only 200,000 ethnic minority members in the country, around 1.8 percent of the population. To this number must of course be added the unknown number of *assimilados* and descendants of *assimilados*—as the non-race conscious Portuguese termed colonial subjects who had magically become "Portuguese" by converting to Catholicism and learning the language.

The postcolonial process and effects were not uniform across the former imperial powers. Spain had had an extensive empire in north Africa. She still retains precarious toeholds in Ceuta and Melilla, somewhat to Madrid's embarrassment—the government refused to send a senior representative to Melilla in 1997 to commemorate the five hundredth anniversary of the city's annexation by Don Pedro de Estopiñán y Virués, whose sword-waving bronze statue still waves lonely defiance at the Moorish vastness to the south. Spain of course also owned practically all of South America at one point—yet until recently this had not made Madrid permit mass immigration from the former

dependent territories. Until 1998, only around 1.5 percent of Spain's population was non-Spanish, and the majority of these were other Europeans. But since 1999, immigration into Spain, notably from North Africa and Latin America, has quadrupled. Ironically, Ceuta and Melilla, once thought of as citadels of Christendom on the heathen coast, are now important conduits for illegal Muslim immigrants into Spain. A new nationality law, passed by the supposedly conservative Spanish government in 2003, has effectively given citizenship rights to millions, mostly in Latin America.

Germany used to have its own "places in the sun" in the Cameroons, Namibia, and Tanzania, and a concession in Shanghai. It was a relatively liberal colonial master, to the extent that many Africans living in the German colonies gave active support to the Germans during World War I. Perhaps Germany was not an imperial power for long enough for this to have given rise to guilt after her colonies were stripped from her in 1918. In any case, although Germany has atrocious racial problems today, her largest immigrant group is Turks, of whom there are now some two million in the country – a number certain to be augmented if EU politicians are shortsighted enough to permit Turkey to join the EU. It is pleasing to record that the Conservative Democrat opposition is staunchly opposed to Turkey's entry – and unprecedented election results recently for the nationalist National Party of Germany and the German People's Union will also have sent a clear signal to Angela Merkel that Germans are increasingly concerned about immigration. It would seem that the somewhat neurotic – if understandable – post-1945 settlement is finally breaking asunder.

From 1885 to 1960, Belgium owned the Belgian Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Belgium was a harsh colonial master and was heavily criticized for the suddenness with which she pulled out in 1960; there was a famous *Punch* cartoon showing a departing steamship with white faces looking over the stern at a desperately clutching black arm protruding above the water. Yet Belgium did not feel morally obliged to import many Zaireans (as they became a years after independence) by way of apology. She was too busy battenning on the more remunerative Flemings. Today, thanks partly to the presence in Brussels of the European Union headquarters, 25 percent of the population of Brussels is non-Belgian. Eleven percent of the country's population is classified as "mixed Fleming/Walloon" or "other." Although of course most of these non-Belgians are other Europeans, increased Muslim immigration has led to increasing electoral successes not just for the Flemish nationalist Vlaams Blok, but now also the Francophone Front National in the Walloon region.

Despite calamitous social problems, Russia still clings grimly onto relics of the Soviet empire in the Caucasus and central Asia – as the people of Beslan were reminded horribly a couple of months ago. The 2002 census figures are mired in controversy, but there are an estimated 176 peoples and nationalities

living within Russia. Of the 146 million population, 81.5 percent is regarded as Russian, 3.8 percent Tatar, 3 percent Ukrainian, 1.2 percent Chuvash, 0.9 percent Bashkir, 0.8 percent Belarussian, 0.7 percent Moldavian – with other groups with even smaller percentages making up a further 8.1 percent.

Other European countries, such as Ireland, Switzerland, and many in eastern Europe, never had empires of their own, and are accordingly immune to imperial guilt – some are even considered honorary “victims” – but all are nonetheless now experiencing or starting to experience racial problems. The white man’s burden, it seems, is to be shared equally amongst all of today’s white men – and women. Yet the problems are far more acute in the former imperial nations, and part of the reason for this is undeniably an imperial guilt complex.

Ultimately, the reverse effects of colonization can be catastrophic for former imperial powers. At the height of their power, it can seem to imperial powers as if they have been singled out by the gods, and that their success will continue indefinitely. As complacency spreads, a degree of carelessness creeps into both public and private life. Although there may be occasional minirevivals under charismatic conservative leaders, gradually the old values are forgotten until, eventually, they are wholly extinguished.

George Bush’s contemporary blend of indiscriminate global sabre-rattling and plans to grant amnesties to millions of Hispanics are somewhat reminiscent of late Roman hubris and will, if pursued, ineluctably lead to a similar end to today’s great superpower. It is interesting to note that today’s Roman legions – the unfortunate U.S. troops in Iraq – are using an unprecedentedly high number of so-called “private military contractors” in important security roles. This widespread use of mercenaries, and the difficulty of finding and retaining allies, suggests that American military might is already weakening, and that today’s imperial ideology is losing what compulsion it once had.

The “end of history” is not yet at hand – although in every generation imperial ideologues will try to bring this about. But try as they might, eventually Pax Americana will follow Pax Britannica and Pax Romana into the dim past – to become the stuff of legend and myth. As these world-historical phenomena pass, experience suggests that there will always be left behind the unpretentious nation and tribe – bloodied but unbroken, prevailing and permanent.

*Derek Turner is the editor of **Right Now!** and a frequent contributor to **The Occidental Quarterly**.*

LYNCHINGS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

At the Hands of Persons Unknown:

The Lynching of Black America

Philip Dray

New York: Random House, 2002

\$35.00

528 pp.

Reviewed by Dwight D. Murphey

One of the things most admirable about the film adaptation of Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood* a few years ago was that the film never allowed itself to focus entirely on the criminals and their hanging. Flashbacks showing their robbery and murder of a Kansas farm family constantly reminded the viewer that there was more to the story than the criminals' own personal travail.

The lack of such balance is a serious flaw in any history of lynching in the United States that presents the subject with an overemphasis on the lynching itself. The selection of the subject has built in the bias unless the author is careful. In Philip Dray's narrative, he will mention briefly that "a white woman named Anna Pelly, twenty-four, was found raped and murdered in an alley, strangled to death," or that "a seventeen year old white girl, Eula Ausley, went missing and was found murdered in a forest clearing, her throat slashed from ear to ear." But all of the narrative from that point forward (often for two or three pages) centers on the search for and eventual lynching of the alleged perpetrator.

A book could just as validly be written entitled *At the Hands of Persons Known: A Century of Outrages against White America*, with emphasis on the innocents who were robbed or raped or murdered or kidnapped, followed by a mere sentence or two about what happened to the accused. Of course, the very suggestion of that, under such a title, will seem outlandish; but the fact that it is a mirror image of Dray's own subtitle, *The Lynching of Black America*, shows just how selective and distorted is Dray's approach.

Unfortunately, the bias does not come only from a naive framing of the subject. Dray is committed to the left's view of American history, which has long since become the conventional view. His lengthy narrative account of a century of lynchings, dwelling primarily on those in the South, tells the story in easily readable fashion, and it is apparent that he has done considerable research into those parts of the story that he chooses to emphasize. Most readers, not predisposed to question the conventional account, will find the book yet another demonstration of how cruel, rapacious, and hypocritical white society has been and how much blacks have been the victims of that viciousness. Dray's book will especially help round out the education of young readers who are assigned the book in school.

From the standpoint of intellectual honesty and accuracy, the well-told narrative doesn't make up for its failings, most of them stemming from Dray's leftist myopia. He brings no historical perspective whatever to his eagerness to condemn white society. "Efforts to establish precise numbers...become, at a certain point, meaningless," he says, "... whether their number was 500, 5,000, or 25,000..." We might note that Robert Zangrando, in his book *The NAACP Crusade against Lynching, 1909-1950*, indicates a total of 4,742 between 1882 and 1968. Of these, he says, 1,297 were white and 3,445 black. (*The New York Times* has on at least two occasions reported that all those lynched then were black, but that was the result either of the particular author's dishonesty or sloppiness.)

The number of fewer than 5,000 lynchings over 87 years is hardly "meaningless" when we compare it with the 85 to 100 million victims of Communism estimated by several prominent European scholars in their recent *Black Book of Communism*. Consider, also, the list published in *Insight* magazine of just the more recent genocidal killings:

Sudan, where 1.5 million plus are dead; Rwanda, where estimates range from 500,000 to 800,000; East Timor, at least 100,000; Sri Lanka, 54,000; Tajikistan, 30,000 to 50,000; Algeria, 70,000 to 80,000; Liberia, 200,000; Chechnya, 80,000; Ethiopia/Eritrea, 10,000 in recent weeks; Iraq, 1 million; and Kosovo, 2,000 prior to the NATO bombing attacks.

These are numbers that are beyond effective human comprehension, but each of the victims lived and breathed, laughed and cried, every bit as much as the blacks that Dray tells about. It is ideology, not an objective view of history, that caused Dray and Random House to select their subject.

The hypocrisy of his leftist ideology is especially apparent when at a number of junctures Dray expresses his condonation of communists. This condonation is a part of contemporary intellectual culture even though it has now been seventy years since a good many Western intellectuals began finally to "hear the screams" and turn away from communism. Dray refers to the Communist theoretician Herbert Aptheker as "the scholar Herbert Aptheker." Of Paul Robeson, he says: "A Communist sympathizer, he was also a strong, unbowed

black man....” And to Dray, anti-communism was yet more evidence of America’s depravity, as we see in his references to “the red scare,” “Red baiting,” and “anti-Red paranoia.” He would never write this way if Nazism rather than communism were the form of totalitarianism involved.

Human thought takes so many turns that one is tempted to write a treatise on “the zoology of the human mind.” In that context it is often best just to smile at the results, and it would be unwise to question a speaker’s intellectual honesty. Certainly, I won’t do so here. There is reason, however, to point out some significant “disconnections” in Dray’s thinking.

It seems oddly advantageous for him to cut off his narrative, as he does, in 1965. This leaves the reader with what seems to be a history of struggle for due process and social political equality. If the author had gone just a few months further, he could have told how the “civil rights movement” turned toward “black power” and kicked out its white activists. If he had brought the narrative forward just a short time more, he could have discussed how “equality” transmuted almost immediately into a demand for “compensatory privilege.” More than that, he could have related the American Left’s advance beyond the “black struggle” to use Third World immigration, “multiculturalism,” and an “adversary culture” to swamp the traditional Euro-American society. If Dray had sought a recent subject comparable to his lynching narrative, he could have told the individual stories of the now countless victims of black on black drive by shootings. Instead, he chose to stop in 1965, while the integration movement was still arguably a picture of an underdog seeking justice.

Even though Dray’s book was published in 2002, he strangely fails to add perspective by commenting on contemporary comparisons with much that he discusses. About the Atlanta race riot in 1906, he says that “for blacks, the sense of abandonment during the riot was virtually complete. The police were distinctly unhelpful, and the state militia and federal soldiers stationed at nearby Fort McPherson arrived only after several hours.” It wouldn’t have been out of line for Dray to comment about how similar this was to the Los Angeles riot in May, 1992, when Korean merchants under attack by blacks were left undefended for many hours. Elsewhere, Dray tells how white residents were unwilling to come forward to identify other whites who had taken part in a lynching. It would have helped the reader grasp the universality of much human behavior if Dray had commented upon how little cooperation police receive today from black residents in identifying drive-by shooters. As to the trial of the defendants accused of murdering Emmett Till in 1955, Dray says that the white jury came back with a “not guilty” verdict even though “the known facts that the jury took with them into the deliberation room might, anywhere else in the world, have pointed to a more or less automatic conviction.” Wouldn’t you think Dray would have been moved to comment on how the same thing happened in the O.J. Simpson case with a black jury?

Moreover, Dray's insights are ideologically selective. "American blacks," he says, "were victims of seventeenth and eighteenth century European imperialism." He lets it stand at that, and says nothing about the worldwide British drive to abolish the slave trade or about black African complicity in capturing and selling their fellow blacks into slavery. Of course, there is nothing about slavery having been an institution in a great many societies throughout history.

There is so much lacking in Dray's book that it is difficult to end this review. Before we conclude, however, it is worth noting that at no point is there an effort to understand, with any empathy at all, the concerns of white Americans in those years. They were, it seems, just inexplicably vicious.

*Dwight D. Murphey is the author of a legal studies monograph, **Lynching—History and Analysis**, published by the **Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies**. It is an intellectual scandal reminiscent of the Lysenko case in the Soviet Union that Canada has barred entry to the monograph as "hate literature."*

SETTING THE ISOLATIONIST RECORD STRAIGHT

A Story of America First:

The Men and Women Who Opposed U.S. Intervention in World War II

Ruth Sarles

Edited with an Introduction by Bill Kauffman

Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003

\$65.00

lvi + 238 pp.

Reviewed by Stephen J. Sniegowski

The America First Committee was the major anti-war group during the Roosevelt administration's preparations for American entrance into World War II. There was nothing novel about its stance. The idea of putting American interests paramount and of staying aloof from overseas conflicts had been the traditional foreign policy of the United States from the time of the Founding Fathers, and was most memorably articulated in George Washington's "Farewell Address." Yet the America First Committee was smeared by the Roosevelt administration and the interventionist media as a subversive "Nazi-transmission belt."

That negative image persists today among the liberal and neoconservative punditry. However, this has not been the case in the scholarly literature, especially in the works of the pre-eminent historian of the American "isolationists,"¹ Wayne S. Cole, who evaluates America First as patriotic and principled:

The committee's leaders rejected rioting and violence. They barred Nazis, Fascists, and anti-Semites from membership, and tried to enforce those bans. The committee used orderly democratic methods in desperate efforts to keep the United States out of the wars raging abroad. The committee's positions on foreign affairs were consistent with traditions extending back to the beginnings of

America's independent history and before. When war burst on America with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the committee ceased its noninterventionist activities, pledged support to the war effort, and dismantled its organization. Most of its members loyally supported the war against the Axis, and many, including some of its prominent leaders, served in America's armed forces. The America First Committee was a patriotic and honorable exercise of democracy in action at a critical time in American history.²

The manuscript that provides the basis for the book under review was written during the early years of World War II by Ruth Sarles, who had been a staff member of the America First Committee. The book was commissioned by William H. Regnery, a major financial backer of America First. Sarles finished the manuscript in October 1942; its publication comes over sixty years later. Historian Bill Kauffman, a libertarian sympathetic to non-interventionism, was selected to edit the work. Kauffman significantly shortened the massive 759-page manuscript but retained what he describes as "the pith of the manuscript: Sarles's knowledgeable accounts of the America First Committee's founding, its work with congressional allies, its popularity as measured in public opinion polls, the difficulties of being a loyal opposition as the war clouds descend, and the central role played by Charles A. Lindbergh."³ Kauffman does not present the book as the definitive account of the America First Committee, but rather as a supplement to other works on the subject such as those by Cole and Justus D. Doenecke, with Cole's *America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940-1941* remaining the "standard history."⁴

Despite her close connection to America First, Sarles wrote in an objective manner; her interpretation does not significantly differ from Cole's. Kauffman comments that such "Olympian detachment," which was recommended to her by Charles Lindbergh, "may suit a hero, but it does not always behoove an author. Sarles's book is a valuable compilation of facts and speeches — this is what America First sounded like — but it might have benefited from a dash of partisanship."⁵

The America First Committee originated as a student organization at Yale University Law School in early 1940 under the leadership of Robert Douglas Stuart, Jr., a law student there. The initial intention was to establish a national organization of college students opposed to American intervention in the ongoing European war, which had broken out in September 1939, but this effort soon expanded beyond the college ranks to become a general national anti-war organization headquartered in Chicago. Stuart served as its director, while its permanent "acting" national chairman was General Robert E. Wood, head of Sears and Roebuck. In 1941, it attained a membership of around 850,000. Prominent figures in America First included aviation hero Charles Lindbergh; liberal journalist John T. Flynn; the former head of the New Deal's National Recovery Administration, General Hugh Johnson; and Theodore Roosevelt's feisty daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth. Although its political

and financial support came disproportionately from conservative Midwesterners, Sarles depicts the extensive diversity in the organization. There were numerous liberals, and America First had significant regional support in every region of the country except the South.

America First was devoted to two fundamental principles: keeping the United States out of war and maintaining an "impregnable defense." Ironically, America First's positions here were superficially the same as the official policy of the Roosevelt administration. Given the overwhelming popular opposition to entering the war, it would have been politically suicidal for President Franklin D. Roosevelt to advocate anything else. Consequently, the Roosevelt administration resorted to public claims that aid to Britain was vital for America's defense and that such aid would actually serve to keep the United States out of war. Thus a major effort of America First was to show how such Roosevelt policies as lend-lease and the convoying of British ships would ineluctably embroil the United States in a shooting war. It would seem undeniable that America First was absolutely correct in its assessment of the effect of Roosevelt's policies, which by the fall of 1941 had drawn the United States into an undeclared naval war with Germany in the Atlantic and would ultimately induce Hitler's declaration of war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Roosevelt's more astute interventionist supporters have recognized that his public claims of "aid short of war" were nothing but political cover for his real aim of bringing the country into the war. As Establishment pro-war historian Thomas Bailey would acknowledge after the end of World War II:

Franklin Roosevelt repeatedly deceived the American people during the period before Pearl Harbor . . . He was like the physician who must tell the patient lies for the patient's own good. . . . A president who cannot entrust the people with the truth betrays a certain lack of faith in the basic tenets of democracy. But because the masses are notoriously shortsighted and generally cannot see danger until it is at their throats, our statesmen are forced to deceive them into an awareness of their own long-run interests. This is clearly what Roosevelt had to do, and who shall say that posterity will not thank him for it.⁶

It might be added that members of America First generally supported an Allied victory and were not averse to providing aid to Britain. Sarles notes that America First "favored aid to Britain within the limits of the neutrality law, but it opposed giving or selling or lending materials needed for our defense."⁷

Why did America First want to stay out of war? Obviously, since most sane individuals prefer peace to war, the proper question is why the Roosevelt administration was pushing (surreptitiously) for war. The Roosevelt administration claimed that America itself would ultimately be vanquished if Germany defeated Britain. Moreover, it portrayed the war as a crusade for freedom and democracy—the Four Freedoms, the noble principles of the Atlantic Charter—against Nazi totalitarianism, despotism, and military subjugation.

Members of America First did not see European war as a Manichaeian conflict of good versus evil, but as more a traditional European power struggle. Some feared that war would so enervate Europe as to pave the way for a Communist takeover—a belief also held by Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, incidentally—so that the best alternative would be a negotiated peace. Moreover, adherents of America First believed that if the United States entered the war it would become a fascist military state itself, with the termination of traditional American civil and economic liberties.

While America Firsters were not proved right in all their predictions, on balance they were more correct than their interventionist adversaries. Obviously, the war did not bring about a reign of peace, as the interventionists had claimed.⁸ The war led to the killing of millions of civilians, but victory did not actually improve American security. The Soviet Union, strengthened by its war conquests, quickly became America's implacable foe and developed the offensive capability to destroy the American homeland. And the United States became a permanently militarized state—though perhaps not as dictatorial as America Firsters envisioned.

Of course it is now widely believed that somehow Nazi persecution of the Jews provided the imperative for the United States to join the war. That reason, however, was never expressed in the debate that preceded American entrance into the war, and even as a very belated *ex post facto* justification, it is obvious that American intervention did not prevent it.

Since Establishment opinion has always been, and continues to be, absolutely supportive of the "Good War," it is rather ironic that America First was founded at Yale by scions of the American elite who, as Kauffman points out, "went on to spectacular careers as pillars of the postwar American Establishment."⁹ These included Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, Yale president Kingman Brewster, President Gerald R. Ford, and Peace Corps organizer and vice-presidential candidate R. Sargent Shriver, Jr. R. Douglas Stuart served as ambassador to Norway from 1984 to 1989 and as chairman of the Council of American Ambassadors. In contrast to the anti-American ethos of later antiwar movements, most of the founders of America First, including Stuart, were reserve army officers.

America First lost every major political battle—lend-lease, convoys, entering combat zones—but it was successful in delaying America's entrance into the war. Sarles sees this as a positive achievement, maintaining that the United States would not have been ready for war at an earlier date.¹⁰ Of course, if America First had been successful, the United States would have stayed out of the war altogether.

Although its enemies constantly smeared it as being pro-Nazi, America First explicitly banned Nazis and tried to keep out other disreputable folks, including "anti-Semites." Of course, a question (seldom asked) is what actually constitutes "anti-Semitism." Apparently, to the America First leadership, anti-Semitism included the view that Jews had a hand in pushing the United States

toward war. Sarles writes that the America First Committee "was constantly weeding from active positions in local chapters individuals who spread anti-Semitism by publicly blaming the Jews for the trend toward war."¹¹

Referring to anything that might imply Jewish power and influence is one of the great taboos of modern American life.¹² It is, in fact, so great a taboo that it is taboo to refer to it as a taboo. Charles Lindbergh, of course, violated that taboo in his much noted (or, in the current Establishment's view, notorious) Des Moines speech of September 11, 1941, in which he claimed that "The three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward war are the British, the Jewish, and the Roosevelt administration" (see p. 7 of this issue). This was Lindbergh's only public reference to Jewish war influence, but interventionists and Jewish groups became apoplectic over this alleged evidence of "anti-Semitism." As Wayne Cole writes, "neither Lindbergh nor America First ever recovered from the staggering blows that statement brought upon them. One might have thought that Lindbergh had personally ordered the Holocaust."¹³ Although some leading figures of America First were concerned about the impact of Lindbergh's speech on public relations, many subscribed to the now quaint notion that "No group in a democracy is entitled to immunity from criticism. It was hard to believe that any group in America could be regarded as occupying a position where its attitude on any public question should be unmentionable and that anyone who did mention them should be accused of trying to incite prejudice."¹⁴ If such limits on freedom were "hard to believe" in 1941, it certainly demonstrates the diminution of freedom since that time, to the point where today all public speech must fit the Procrustean bed of political correctness, where not only "hate speech" but "insensitivity" can bring upon the offender serious sanctions. It should be added that left out in the brouhaha over Lindbergh's speech was the issue of its veracity. "Greatly confusing the matter," Kauffman notes, "was the minor detail that Lindbergh was *right*: Jewish groups *were* solidly behind the push for war."¹⁵

It might be added that since World War II is universally portrayed in today's media as the "Good War," American Jews can now acknowledge the Jewish role in intervention, as political scientist Benjamin Ginsberg, director of the Center for Governmental Studies at Johns Hopkins University, does in his revealing *The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State*. Among the efforts to mould public opinion for war, Ginsberg points out that Jewish Hollywood filmmakers concentrated on the production of anti-Nazi propaganda films. In short, although it is regarded as "anti-Semitic" to "blame" Jewish groups for pushing the United States into World War II, it is permissible to praise them for doing the very same thing. Ginsberg even points out that the Anti-Defamation League "employed investigative agents who secretly penetrated isolationist and anti-Semitic organizations and collected potentially damaging or incriminating information," which it turned over to the FBI and other federal agencies.¹⁶

The Anti-Defamation League was not alone in using underhanded tactics to try to destroy the America First Committee. The Roosevelt administration and British intelligence also engaged in such tactics. Significantly, for all the talk by America Firsters of Roosevelt's quest for dictatorship, the organization's leadership seemed to possess an illusory faith in the fundamental fairness of the American government. Sarles portrays America First as such an upstanding organization that it went so far as to voluntarily give its membership lists over to the federal government for investigation.¹⁷ Obviously, such efforts made America First vulnerable to its enemies, but could never really persuade them of its innocence, since those enemies interpreted "truth" to be what advanced their own war agenda, and certainly smearing the opponents of war intervention as pro-Nazi advanced that agenda.

America First essentially suffered the same fate as all popular anti-Establishment groups in America deemed to be too far right of center. The Establishment constantly portrayed it as malicious, and nothing it could do could remove that stigma. The Roosevelt administration's heaping of lavish praise on "Uncle Joe" Stalin and the Soviet Union, support for the incarceration of Japanese Americans, enactment of the genocidal Morgenthau Plan, terror-bombing of civilians, and repatriating prisoners to Stalin's lethal work camps never seemed to tarnish its beneficent image. And the fact of the matter is that both Truman and Roosevelt held negative views of Jews. Truman even went so far as to claim (in his diary) that Jews selfishly put their interest above that of other peoples.¹⁸ All of these negatives were rendered insignificant by support of the "Good War." Most have long ago disappeared down the Orwellian memory hole to all but scholars of a revisionist bent.

Does the history of the America First Committee have relevance today? The very idea of putting America first puts one on the fringes of the political right, in the realm of bone-headed chauvinism, if not malevolent racism. Today America follows a policy of global imperialism through its "war on terrorism," and the stated American goal is to make other societies, especially in the Middle East, "democratic." Like President Roosevelt, the Bush administration lied the country into war—in fact, in one sense, it was evidently a greater lie since the "weapons of mass destruction" invoked as the *casus belli* were non-existent, whereas Pearl Harbor really was attacked. Once again it is "anti-Semitic" to mention that any Jews, in this case the neo-conservatives, have played a role in bringing the country into war. It should be pointed out that the "anti-Semitic" standard has broadened beyond the prohibition of referring to Jews as a collectivity to actually silencing any reference to a particular small group of Jews.

The ongoing global war/imperialist policy is being promoted by self-styled conservatives and a purportedly conservative administration. The major opposition to the war has come from the radical left, which is characterized by support for revolutionary socialism, anti-Americanism, and general hostility to traditional Western culture. While there has been opposition to the war from

right-wing intellectuals – paleoconservatives and paleolibertarians – what has been lacking has been the grass-roots and financial support to develop a patriotic anti-war organization. That nothing like America First could emerge in 2002–2003 shows how far the mainstream American populace has strayed from the republican principles that once served as the nation’s foundation, and which were still largely extant in pre-World War II America.

Stephen J. Sniegoski holds a Ph.D. in American diplomatic history and is the author of several historical articles and a frequent contributor to The Occidental Quarterly.

ENDNOTES

1. The opponents of a war of American military intervention did not like the term “isolationist,” but it has become part of common parlance, demonstrating the power of the interventionist/internationalists to shape the language.
2. Wayne S. Cole, *Determinism and American Foreign Relations during the Franklin D. Roosevelt Era* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America), 1995, p. 40.
3. Sarles, *A Story of America First*, p. xlvii.
4. *Ibid.*, p. xlvii.
5. *Ibid.*, p. xlv.
6. Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 13.
7. Sarles, p. 8.
8. I wrote about interventionist beliefs in my Ph.D. dissertation, “The Intellectual Wellsprings of American World War II Interventionism,” University of Maryland, 1977. A brief summary of some of this information can be found on the Internet. See Stephen J. Sniegoski, “Decline and Renewal: American World War II Interventionists,” *World & I*, February 1987 (<http://www.worldandi.com/public/1987/february/mt6.cfm>).
9. Sarles, p. xxi.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
12. It is, of course, one of those taboos that *The Occidental Quarterly* deals with. For example, see TOQ Editors, “The Question of Jewish Influence,” *The Occidental Quarterly* 3:2 (Summer 2003) (<http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol3no2/toq-editnote3-2.html>), and Kevin MacDonald, “Understanding Jewish Influence I: Background Traits for Jewish Activism,” 3:2 (Summer 2003) (<http://theoccidentalquarterly.com/vol3no2/toq-editnote3-2.html>).
13. Cole, *Determinism*, p. 41.
14. Sarles, p. 57.
15. *Ibid.*, p. xxxiii.
16. Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 110.
17. Sarles, pp. 33–37.

18 President Harry S. Truman wrote in a 1947 diary that was recently discovered on the shelves of the Truman Library:

"The Jews, I find are very, very selfish. They care not how many Estonians, Latvians, Finns, Poles, Yugoslavs or Greeks get murdered or mistreated as D[isplaced] P[ersons] as long as the Jews get special treatment. Yet when they have power, physical, financial or political neither Hitler nor Stalin has anything on them for cruelty or mistreatment to the under dog." "Harry S. Truman 1947 Diary," July 21, Truman Presidential Museum and Library (<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/diary/page21.htm>); "The Truman Diary," *Washington Post*, July 18, 2003, p. A-18 (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A8864-2003Jul17.html>).

POPULATION TRANSFER, AMERICAN STYLE

The Slaughter of Cities: Urban Renewal as Ethnic Cleansing

E. Michael Jones

South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2004

\$40.00 (cloth)

x + 668 pp.

Reviewed by David Wilson

The names Dennis Clark, Louis Wirth, and George Edwards do not come to mind as towering influences on mid-twentieth century America, but drive through the bombed-out urban shells of cities like Philadelphia, Chicago, and Detroit, and you will see their legacy. From the outset of U.S. entry into World War II and continuing until about the 1970s, America's Protestant Establishment sought to break up the Catholic neighborhoods of northern industrial cities by moving in black migrants from the south.

The devices employed ranged from pulling strings on funds for housing to government infiltration of the local parish. More often than not, the goal was accomplished by municipal housing authorities and their decisions about who would live where. The efforts often led to violence, such as the Detroit race riots, one of which left thirty-five dead in 1943. The campaign was designed to ensure, among other goals, U.S. victory in World War II. The Protestants had both a sympathy for England's wartime aims and a deep distrust of the Irish, Polish, and other white ethnic newcomers, who were overwhelmingly Catholic.

As these more recent European immigrants teemed in places like North Philadelphia, they could communicate effectively with each other while screening out the influence of mass media and the broader culture. Their lives were defined by the parish, and as their numbers grew, so did their political clout. With their proximity to one another, a closeness enabled by the row houses in which they lived, it was difficult for the war makers in Washington to keep tabs on them. The possibility that they would either be neutral about American involvement in World War II or, worse, sympathetic to the Axis powers, was deemed a significant domestic threat.

Meanwhile, girding for the war effort meant ramping up industrial production, which accelerated the migration of waves of blacks from the

south (between 1930 and 1970, six and half million made the trek). But rather than house them away from the already occupied urban centers, deliberate efforts were made to inject them into the heart of Catholic neighborhoods, which inevitably drove out the whites. The resulting racial disruption helped to secure cheap black labor for industry, the undercutting of a potential fifth column during the war, and the eventual suburbanization (or Americanization) of white ethnic Catholics. Animating this entire operation was the Anglo-Saxon elite's desire to maintain its dissolving hegemony.

CREATING THE MODERN GHETTO: URBAN POLICY AND WHITE FLIGHT

So goes the thesis of E. Michael Jones, a thoughtful if at times obsessive Catholic writer, in his massive dissertation on the true motivations behind "urban renewal." Jones, editor of *Culture Wars* magazine and proprietor of a website bearing the same name (culturewars.com), offers a brand of cultural criticism that depicts social trends typically deemed "progressive" as not merely ill-advised, but designed to cultivate a morally confused – and thus pliant – populace.

He brings this perspective to bear in *Slaughter of Cities*, making the point that while "urban renewal" and racial integration were endlessly touted as helping to clear the cities of "blight" and the backwardness of racial segregation, they were in fact little more than a game of human chess played by the American elite. The Catholics had to go. And if they couldn't be sent back to Europe, they could be uprooted from their parishes and scattered to the suburban winds, where Rome's grip on their minds would be loosened – and Washington's grip tightened. That these Catholics drew sustenance and comfort from living in their own communities was never considered by the neighborhood demolition engineers. They were instead caricatured as ignorant white racists, pig-headedly opposed to the joys of living with blacks.

Jones opens with an introduction to the brothers Paul and Brand Blanshard, members of the Protestant intelligentsia, whose time in Philadelphia beginning in 1918 convinced them that the Catholics were a looming threat. Like the rest of the characters to follow in Jones's book, they are entirely forgettable people. But the writing and thinking of men like the Blanshard brothers was to shape municipal housing policy for decades to come.

Brother Brand, reflecting on the Catholic parochial schools of Philadelphia's Bridesburg area, observed in 1920 that "It is a world...which is simply not our world, a world in which independent criticism and disinterested science is and must remain unknown, a world which still abounds with the primitive concepts and fancies of the middle ages." Brother Paul agreed, writing in his best-selling book *American Freedom and Catholic Power* in 1949 that "Often the parochial and public schools are on opposite sides

of the same street, dividing the children into competing and even hostile groups, conscious of their own differences and suspicious of each other's way of life."

Of particular concern was Catholic fertility, which, because of sharp differences in church teaching on birth control, was bound to overwhelm Protestant numbers. In big cities, this had obvious consequences for voting power. For the Protestant establishment – in what might be observed as a larger pattern for ethnic and racial conflict – the possibility of specific policy disputes or conflicting interests was subsumed by a more visceral reaction to the "other" (which may only be a more efficient manifestation of the former). For Jones, this reaction is understandable for white Catholics threatened with black criminality, but deplorable for white Protestants threatened with Catholic voting strength. This is not to register a complaint about Jones's explicit advocacy for Catholics, but only to note it, and the way in which it informs his perspective. For Jones, the victims were the Catholics, and the perpetrators were anyone – even if they happened to be Catholic themselves – who participated in the effort to drive them from their homes.

Much of what Jones describes, however, can provide useful insights for those concerned about the loss of power and demographic displacement of white Americans today. Why do so many individual whites work against the interests of whites as a group? Some insight might be gleaned from the story of Dennis Clark, one of Jones's more prominent participants in the anti-Catholic design of urban housing policy. Clark, himself an Irish Catholic from Philadelphia, found that by internalizing the aspirations of Philadelphia's "WASP" elite he rose in stature at such institutions as the Quaker-dominated Philadelphia Housing Authority, the Catholic Interracial Council, and later, the largely Jewish Fels Foundation. Clark never acknowledged to himself that much of his life's work was dedicated to forcing his own kind from the communities that nurtured them. He avoided this reality, Jones says, by taking the cue to view issues in political, rather than ethnic, terms. If Catholics could be divided into "progressives" and "racists," then he needn't have worried himself about operating as an agent against his own people – just those who weren't going along with the program. So convinced of the rightness of racial integration was Clark that he was willing to turn his back on the church over the matter.

Jones summarizes:

Dennis Clark provides us with the classic paradigm of the Catholic intellectual of the time, agitating for social change which he perceived as a moral imperative, and then abandoning the Church when she didn't conform to his paradigm of social justice, without once giving some indication that the program he supported might have been of political benefit to the opponents of Catholic ethnics, even when he sat on the councils of the organizations that plotted the destruction of their neighborhoods.

As all of this was happening, it was plain to see that blacks and whites were not integrating. Rather, once a critical mass of blacks in a given area was achieved, the remaining whites picked up and left. This critical mass need not have been big – sometimes, the move-in of a single black family (the “blockbuster”) was enough to signal to the neighborhood that it was done for. This pattern was so clear and so pervasive that it serves as solid evidence for Jones’s case that “integration” of the urban neighborhoods was not the true goal – displacement was.

A Quaker group called Friends Suburban Housing, for instance, would buy homes in white areas like Levittown, near Philadelphia, with the assistance of special access to the Veterans Administration foreclosure list, and then offer them exclusively to black families. The Quakers themselves, however, did not want racial integration for their own neighborhoods. Jones recounts how one man who planned to sell his Swarthmore home to blacks was presented with a petition signed by thirty-nine members of the Swarthmore Friends Meeting urging him to “consider the neighbors and friends in the community where you have lived for several years.”

In Chicago, similar events were taking place with the help of people like Louis Wirth. An assimilation-minded Jew, Wirth leapt head first into the WASP criticism of Catholics from his power-perch as a sociologist at the University of Chicago, described by Jones as a headquarters for “psychological warfare” in that effort. Wirth once wrote that “the totalitarian nations of Europe have substantial representation of their subjects” in America. Behind this observation was the assumption, in Jones’s words, that “Catholics had a congenital weakness for fascism.”

Ironically, Wirth, himself a member of B’nai B’rith and once elected to the executive board of the Anti-Defamation League, observed that “the relative internal unity...of the Catholic groups in the urban centers increases their capacity to act collectively and to develop an appropriate group consciousness.” Wirth brought his adopted anti-Catholic animus to places like the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council of Chicago at a time when projects like the Frances Cabrini Homes – originally meant for poor Italians, as the name suggests – instead went to black defense workers, touching off a riot in April of 1943.

WASP ELITE, FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, AND BLACK CRIME

While characters like Clark and Wirth busied themselves as agents of the WASP elite, Detroit’s George Edwards was a WASP principal, primed to carry out the ruling elite’s plan at the local level. Edwards, the son of a Dallas lawyer and a graduate of Harvard, found himself appointed to head the Detroit Housing Commission in 1939. It was this commission that, in accordance with the wishes of Washington, passed over the uncontroverial and undeveloped areas of Detroit for the building of housing

for black defense workers. Instead, places like St. Louis the King parish were targeted. Jones writes that the Federal Housing Authority furthered the attack by refusing to insure mortgages in the area near the proposed projects, "indicating it was destined to become an all-black ghetto."

Edwards brought his establishment liberal views and strong support among blacks to his appointment as chief of police, declaring in a 1960 article in *The New Republic* that "no child is born predestined to be a criminal." As if on cue, crime shot skyward. Blacks were 29 percent of Detroit's population but accounted for 65 percent of the arrests, Jones writes. Meanwhile, morale among white police officers was plummeting. On the night of the funeral of a white officer killed by a black man, Edwards also attended an American Jewish Committee award ceremony in which he was lauded for fostering racial harmony. In 1963, while Edwards was on a trip to England with Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, a white officer attempting to arrest a hulking black prostitute was slashed in the hand. The officer shot and killed the prostitute.

Such spiraling multiracial anarchy was too much for the whites of Detroit to bear. Between 1964 and 1966, 22,000 whites left the city each year, and following a race riot in 1967, 47,000 more left, which spiked to 80,000 in 1968. When Edwards died in 1995, Jones notes, Detroit was the most racially homogeneous big city in America.

Throughout these battles in the cities of the north, Jones observes, Catholics had nobody to articulate their position on a national level. The Catholic leadership was busy issuing proclamations on the evils of "racism" and the oneness of humanity while their parishes were being decimated. How Catholics might have articulated their position, however, is unclear, because Jones is keen to stress that the conflict was ethnic (white Protestants versus white Catholics) and not racial (whites versus blacks). Would Catholics have fared better by arguing that the evil force at work was not criminally inclined blacks, but manipulative and controlling Protestants? Or by pointing to the organic virtues of homogeneous white Catholic community?

At the very least, perhaps, understanding the Protestant dynamic might have been helpful, even if Catholics could not have expected to get much traction by publicly criticizing the WASP elite. Jones gives the impression that most Catholics, like most whites today, were either unaware of what was happening to them or misdiagnosed the source of the problem. They were aware that *something* was happening – they just couldn't quite figure out who or what was behind it. "Communists," they suspected, were the ones moving blacks into the neighborhood and supporting Martin Luther King, Jr.

This point, like others in the book, is a good one, but getting to such points can prove a laborious task. *The Slaughter of Cities* is entirely too

long, and oddly organized. Jones jumps from city to city and back again, dropping in names by the dozen that never reappear and are never put into context. He does a fine job of getting into the minds of his primary subjects but does not develop narratives that might make the book more readable. His findings cry out for discussion and analysis, but Jones too often simply dashes off a snide remark and moves on. His efforts to drag in other causes of his, like the use of birth control, are forced, and tend to make him look like an unbalanced conspiracy theorist – even to a reader friendly to a good conspiracy theory.

SLUMS, SUBURBS, AND “URBAN RENEWAL”

One such tendency of Jones along these lines appears in his treatment of suburban housing, cars, and television as “tools of political control.” To hear Jones tell it, it is as if these developments and technologies were specifically designed for purposes of control. Indeed, we do spend our days staring into windshields and television screens, as Jones puts it, and this has consequences on a number of levels. But it is rather doubtful that Henry Ford cackled to himself that his Model T was sure to help control the masses. More probably, he thought it would be a good way to get around without horses. That the ethnic and racial battles of the past century were happening as these technological developments were introduced is doubtless more coincidental than Jones might have us believe.

The same could be said for other historical events Jones tries too hard to grab under the netting he casts. The presence of blacks in America and their migration northward had precious little to do with twentieth century Protestant suspicion of Catholics. It is likely, too, that there were powerful integration champions who did not fully understand the incompatibility of blacks and whites in the same neighborhoods, and might well have considered themselves to be righteous actors. *The Slaughter of Cities* lays out too many historical strands that just can't be tied together, and this is what ultimately prevents Jones's thesis from bearing heavy weight. If Jones meant to show that the housing battles of the World War II era and onward were an isolated effort to destroy the American city and the Catholics who lived there – an effort unconnected to any other historical event – he falls short. I came away from the book suspecting that support for settling blacks in urban ethnic neighborhoods was more a case of Protestant contempt for Catholics than a bloodthirsty desire to see them suffer.

If, on the other hand, Jones's goal was to catalogue this contempt – and the hypocrisy and shortsightedness – of the WASP housing engineers who played a part in turning American cities into uninhabitable slums, he has succeeded. It can hardly be disputed that the effort to “integrate” cities like Philadelphia, Chicago, and Detroit resulted not in harmonious mixtures of the races, but the near-total evacuation of whites. In many instances,

the Protestants themselves were not subjected to these social experiments, and protested more effectively when they were.

Of course, if the “urban renewal” projects were part of a plan to help preserve WASP power, it ultimately failed. Writers Richard Brookhiser and Robert Locke have weighed in on this topic, concluding that the exercise of WASP power was indeed enlightened – perhaps so much so that it proved its own undoing. They might have initially been willing to set quotas on Jews at Yale, but lacked the nerve to more aggressively maintain hegemony.

Rightly or wrongly, WASP-bashing is a popular sport, both among the political mainstream and in some quarters of the racially conscious right. To the former, they represent the starchy and repressed past, in need of livening up by some vigorous salsa dancing. To the latter, they are the effete tea-sippers who once had their hands on the wheel but caved in to multiracialism for fear of offending anyone. On the few occasions when WASPs are praised for their sturdy values, the praise is studiously uncoupled from any mention of race, and the reader is left with the impression that all six billion on the planet could become reserved and industrious WASPs by simply putting their minds to it.

A writer like Jones, however correct his conclusions, is granted maneuvering room in a political climate like ours by blaming the mistreatment of one white group on another white group – in this instance, the white group second only to Germans in their vilification: the British. He compounds this indulgence with a tad too much coyness on race, portraying blacks in many instances as innocents pushed around as much as the white Catholics. The stark behavioral differences between blacks and whites, and their tendency to overwhelm the best of intentions and plans, get little mention.

Today, the animating contest in the United States is hardly white Protestants versus white Catholics. To many observers, there is no longer a ruling class in America, and whatever else might be said about WASP hegemony, it was at least coherent and orderly. WASP power has been supplanted in large swaths of American life by Jewish power, something E. Digby Baltzell, the WASP who popularized the term WASP, thought could be safely brought on board. A plausible explanation for the atrophy of WASP muscle is exhaustion in the face of streams of immigrants, some more able than others, religious appeals to the oneness of mankind, and Coca-Cola commercials about teaching the world to sing. But if the Protestant Establishment meant to hold on to power, it appears to have surrounded itself no better than Caesar.

The more complicated ethnic and racial dynamics aside, Jones' *Slaughter of Cities* has given us a heretofore untold example of how a group, though numerous, can be subjugated in the most elemental of ways: where, and

with whom, they will live. Achieving this subjugation requires, obviously, hands on the levers of judicial and administrative power, but less obviously, the waging of an idea campaign that presents the goal as a universal good, and the opponents as not merely wrong but morally reprehensible. If the targeted group comes to believe this itself, so much the better. Ideally for the group seeking to subjugate, the targeted group will be unable to understand what is really happening to them, or to articulate a defense. The implications for whites today should be plain.

David Wilson is an attorney and freelance writer living in the Northeast.

UNDERSTANDING HOLLYWOOD PART I: HOLLYWOOD'S JEWISH IDENTITY

EDMUND CONNELLY

“Indeed, from the very beginnings of the industry until the present, it is impossible to ignore the influence of Jews on the movie business or to overlook the importance of a Jewish consciousness in American films.”

—Lester D. Friedman¹

“Regardless of a Jewish author’s past or present involvement with organized religion, current religious or cultural practices, and personal sense of group attachment or isolation, the underlying critical assumption is that the work of a Jewish writer must either overtly or covertly reflect a Jewish sensibility.”

—David Desser and Lester D. Friedman²

“The Jewish involvement in motion pictures is more than a success story; it is the basis of the disproportionate influence that Jews have had in shaping American popular culture.”

—Steven Silbiger³

“The way Steven Spielberg sees the world has become the way the world is communicated back to us every day.”

—Stephen Schiff⁴

¹ Lester D. Friedman, *The Jewish Image in American Film* (Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press, 1987), 13.

² David Desser and Lester D. Friedman, *American-Jewish Filmmakers: Traditions and Trends* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 4–5.

³ Steven Silbiger, *The Jewish Phenomenon: Seven Keys to the Enduring Wealth of a People* (Atlanta: Longstreet Press, 2000), 108.

⁴ “Seriously Spielberg,” in *Steven Spielberg: Interviews*, ed. Lester D. Friedman and Brent Notbohm (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2000), 171.

AN EMPIRE OF THEIR OWN

"Jews Run Hollywood." Thus declared the bold headlines of the August 1996 cover story of the Jewish magazine *Moment*. This story was in response to Marlon Brando's controversial claim on a talk show that Jews did, in fact, run Hollywood.⁵ As an intriguing follow-up to the bold assertion, the magazine in the subtitle asked its readers "So What?"

Neal Gabler set the bar for recognition of Jewish power in Hollywood with his 1988 book, *An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood*. There Gabler celebrated the period of Hollywood's founding through the end of the studio and mogul era, an era covering the birth of the industry – from nickelodeons aimed at immigrants in America, to the founding of Hollywood and the studios, to Hollywood's Golden Era – a span of time covering roughly the first half of the twentieth century. *An Empire of Their Own* simplifies the task of demonstrating Jewish prominence in early Hollywood, as the opening epigraphs from his book make clear: "Russian-Jewish immigrants came from the *shtetls* and ghettos out to Hollywood. . . . In this magical place that had no relationship to any reality they had ever seen before in their lives, or that anyone else had ever seen, they decided to create their idea of an eastern aristocracy. . . . The American Dream – is a Jewish invention."⁶ Not only was it a "Jewish invention," it remains a heavily Jewish industry, as writer Steven Silbiger noted in his book *The Jewish Phenomenon*:

In addition to the corporate chieftains, a huge number of Jewish people participate in the entertainment industry. It has not been part of a grand scheme, but when an ethnic group becomes as heavily involved, and as successful, in a particular industry as Jewish people have been in movies, the group's influence, connections and power produce a vast ripple effect, and other Jewish actors, writers, editors, technicians, directors, and producers follow in their footsteps.

⁵ Among other things, Marlon Brando, appearing on *Larry King Live* (April 1996) said: "Hollywood is run by Jews; it is owned by Jews," http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marlon_brando#Accusations_of_Jewish_stereotyping.

⁶ In Neal Gabler, *An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988), 1. The first quote is by Jill Robinson and the second by Hy Kraft.

Silbiger then described the \$5 billion dollar nest egg belonging to Dreamworks owners Steven Spielberg, David Geffen, and Jeffrey Katzenberg; the vast media holdings of Sumner Redstone (including Paramount Pictures); Michael Eisner's stewardship at Disney; the Bronfman family's ownership of Universal Studios; and Bob and Harvey Weinstein's Miramax (*The Crying Game*, *Pulp Fiction*), etc.⁷

Other studies confirm this heavy concentration of Jewish control. Charles Silberman quoted a respected survey which found that "more than three out of five members of the 'movie elite' are Jews."⁸ Rothman et al. have observed that, "Sixty percent of those in the movie elite sample were of Jewish background."⁹ David McClintick, in *Indecent Exposure: A True Story of Hollywood and Wall Street*, wrote, "Contrary to popular notions about bland financiers, most important executive positions in the entertainment business today are occupied by high-spirited, entrepreneurial Jews who emigrated to Hollywood from New York and other points in the East and Midwest. . . . And Yiddish remains the second language of Hollywood."¹⁰

British journalist William Cash drew attention to the Hollywood presence of Spielberg, Geffen, Katzenberg, Mike Ovitz, Lew Wasserman and Sidney Sheinberg, Barry Diller, Gerald Levin, Herbert Allen, et al., writing about the Dreamworks trio that "in one respect at least this particular combination of talents, or 'talent combo' in the local argot, will start out on the right foot. Like the old mogul founders of the early studios—and unlike most other failed build-your-own studio merchants—they are Jewish."¹¹

In *Jewtopia: The Chosen Book for the Chosen People*, based on the hit play by Bryan Fogel and Sam Wolfson, the authors confirm Jewish dominance in Hollywood, noting that of the ten major studios under discussion, nine were created by Jews (Walt Disney was a gentile),

⁷ Silbiger, *The Jewish Phenomenon*, 111. Of course, in the fast-changing world of entertainment, alliances and ownerships are constantly changing, too.

⁸ Charles Silberman, *A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today* (New York: Summit Books, 1985), 147.

⁹ Stephen Powers, David J. Rothman, and Stanley Rothman, *Hollywood's America: Social and Political Themes in Motion Pictures* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 79.

¹⁰ David McClintick, *Indecent Exposure: A True Story of Hollywood and Wall Street* (New York: William Morrow, 1982), 54.

¹¹ William Cash, "Kings of the Deal," *The Spectator*, October 29, 1994, 14.

and as of 2006 all ten studios were run by Jews.¹² David Mamet confirms this: “For those who have not been paying attention, this group [Ashkenazi Jews] constitutes, and has constituted since its earliest days, the bulk of America’s movie directors and studio heads.”¹³

Why does this matter? In essence, it matters because it represents the loss of power of one group – Majority white Christians – to an outside group – Jews. Secondly, Jewish control of Hollywood has itself been a crucial means for dispossessing Majority whites of their place in the country they built, America. As some have argued, the twentieth century was “a Jewish century,” and much of this was because Jews controlled the image factory known as Hollywood. While inroads into ownership of important media had been made earlier, such as Adolph Ochs’s 1896 purchase of the *New York Times*, film was both a near-monopoly for Jewish moguls and a critical means for shaping culture in America.

Further, Jews as a group have not been neutral toward the mass of people they have been displacing. For complex reasons, they have generally had negative attitudes toward white Christians, both in Europe and in America. Because of the deep-seated Jewish hostility toward traditional Western culture, “the Judaization of the West means that the peoples who created the culture and traditions of the West have been made to feel deeply ashamed of their own history – surely the prelude to their demise as a culture and as a people.”¹⁴

The current essay is part of a longer series on Jewish control of Hollywood and the fare they created. I begin by describing the history of their West Coast empire-building and the Jewish themes that arose. I follow this with a survey of four decades of Jewish films, then expand on the theme of Jewish hostility toward the Americans among whom

¹² Studios discussed are: Columbia, Warner Bros., MGM, Universal, Paramount, Disney, Miramax, Dreamworks, New Line, and 20th Century Fox. See Bryan Fogel and Sam Wolfson, *Jewtopia: The Chosen Book for the Chosen People* (New York: Warner Books, 2006). Chapter 8, “Conspiracy Theories: Do Jews Control the World?” contains the information on Hollywood, television, print media, banking, etc. Their figures for television networks and print media are 75 percent and 70 percent, respectively.

¹³ David Mamet, *Bambi v. Godzilla: On the Nature, Purpose, and Practice of the Movie Business* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2007), 19.

¹⁴ Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (Bloomington, Ind.: 1st Books, 2002), lxix.

they lived. Finally, a sample of movies will more concretely acquaint the reader with the common Jewish themes and devices used in popular films. The goal is to equip the white gentile with the ability to see how his real disestablishment over the course of the twentieth century was both mirrored – and partially caused – by the very images of that dispossession.

HISTORY

The story of Hollywood begins with a representative struggle between the white gentile forces that had controlled America from its founding and the immigrant Jews who were aiming to displace them. Near the end of the nineteenth century, famed inventor Thomas Edison, a member of the WASP ruling class, played a key role in inventing the modern film but particularly in creating the larger entity known as the film industry. This included not only technical aspects of filmmaking but also the construction of a cartel that would make, distribute, control, and profit from this new industry. This cartel became known as the Edison Trust.¹⁵

In conscious opposition to Edison and American society more generally was a group of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe. Indeed, the original Hollywood moguls were a homogeneous group. Carl Laemmle was born in a small village in southwestern Germany. Adolph Zukor was born in Hungary, as was William Fox. Louis B. Mayer remembers that he was born somewhere in Russia, while Benjamin Warner, father of the Warner brothers, was from Poland. Lewis J. Selznick was a Ukrainian Jew.¹⁶ These men, "who peered mildly at the camera in photographs from the 1920s, hardly noticeable alongside visiting royalty or one of their stars," were the real power in Hollywood. "No one who feared or contested their power, however, would have been fooled by such diffident poses. Behind those affable masks . . . lurked ruthless calculating minds, vast ambitions and imperial lifestyles; palatial mansions, chauffeured limousines, private tennis courts, million-dollar incomes." With little disagreement, it is said

¹⁵ Robert Sklar, a pioneering scholar of the ethnic and religious aspects of the struggle for control of Hollywood, notes that before 1910 "the movies were as completely in the hands of respectable, established Anglo-Saxon Protestant Americans as they were ever to be" (*Movie-Made America: A Cultural History of American Movies* [New York: Vintage Books, 1975, 1994], 33).

¹⁶ Gabler, 3, 93.

that these men “were the moguls whose daily commands shaped the national consciousness.”¹⁷

Before they were able to effectively “shape the national consciousness,” however, they had to undermine Edison’s iron grip on the Trust. Essentially, the largely Jewish independent filmmakers accomplished this by using Edison’s patented machines surreptitiously. One consequence of this desire to avoid detection was that they moved beyond Edison’s East Coast reach by relocating to Arizona and California. From 1908–1912, Jewish filmmakers defeated vigorous attempts by the Trust to maintain its WASP monopoly, but the “Edison cabal” was ultimately defeated by a more clever, determined, and perhaps well-funded cabal of immigrants.¹⁸

In accounts of this ethnic struggle, there is evidence that Edison and his collaborators were only dimly aware of the scale of the ethnic competition in which they were engaged. These gentiles “never seemed to understand that they were engaged in much more than an economic battle to determine who would control the profits of the nascent film industry; their battle was also generational, cultural, philosophical, even, in some ways, religious.”¹⁹ The Jews involved in the battle, however, were exquisitely aware of their status as ethnic and religious outsiders and properly understood the nature of the competition.

Film scholar Robert Sklar was one of the first to write openly about the importance of Jewish identity in Hollywood. “Now for the first time power to influence the culture had been grasped by a group of men whose origins and whose means were different.” This issue was critical because:

In traditional American society the task of describing the world and communicating that vision to its members had belonged, with different emphasis at different times, to the clergy, political statesmen, educators, businessmen, essayists, poets, and novelists. There had never been a totally uniform cultural expression in the

¹⁷ Sklar, 141.

¹⁸ Gabler is not shy about employing the word “cabal,” using it to describe both Edison’s Trust (p. 59) but also a group of Jews working to build a horse racing track (p. 263).

¹⁹ Gabler, 59. Sklar, however, may be closer to the mark when he wrote: “The American elite classes, once they discovered [their loss of control of the film industry], recognized intuitively that this new medium threatened the liquidation of their heritage” (p. 122).

United States; there had always been schisms and struggles, alternatives and counterviews, but in general the combatants had come from similar ethnic and class backgrounds and had utilized the same means – the written and spoken word.²⁰

Gabler recognized the importance of this Jewish difference as well as the way in which it was embedded in an important struggle. Thus he couched his descriptions of the early contest for control of the film industry in terms of warfare. One of the first major Jewish producers, Carl Laemmle, relied upon ethnic outsiders in America, and "these would be his troops in the war that followed when the Jews would take over the movie industry for good." Laemmle and his cohorts were "put-upon in their economic and cultural warfare against a fat, entrenched establishment."

This sense of being outsiders among a hostile host population stayed with Hollywood Jews for the duration, though it always had to take account of gentile perceptions. From the beginning of Jewish control, many of these perceptions were that films created or backed by the moguls undermined traditional Christian mores, as captured by a Fitzgerald character in *The Last Tycoon*: Hollywood was "a Jewish holiday, a gentiles [sic] tragedy." On February 12 and 19, 1921, Henry Ford's *Dearborn Independent* published articles critical of Jewish filmmaking, though the arguments were surprisingly measured. "It is not that the producers of Semitic origin have deliberately set out to be bad according to their own standards, but they know their taste and temper are different from the prevailing standards of the American people. . . . Many of these producers don't know how filthy their stuff is – it is so natural to them."²¹

²⁰ Sklar, 195.

²¹ "The Jewish Aspect of the 'Movie' Problem," *Dearborn Independent*, Feb. 12, 1921, 118. Prior to World War II, American elites were open to discussion about rising Jewish power. As MacDonald notes:

This was a critical period, in which the modern taboo on discussing Jewish interests and influence was created. It was a period in which Jews had not yet attained the position and influence that they achieved in the postwar years. But they had secured a considerable degree of economic and political power, as well as media influence, and the pall of political correctness had not yet fallen over discussing Jewish issues.

Ten years later the Catholic-led Legion of Decency took the lead and worked with Irish-Catholic newsman Joseph Breen to implement a morality code. With the effects of the Depression to contend with, the moguls did not wish to risk a boycott threatened by up to eleven million Americans who signed a pledge to starve Hollywood of an audience if it did not comply with prevailing moral standards. "One reason why the Legion of Decency campaign proved so quickly effective in mobilizing support was that the general run of movies had never before been so clearly in opposition to traditional middle-class morality."²² In the end, however, mobilization of the gentile masses failed to staunch the oppositional content of so many Hollywood films.

HEGEMONY

Antonio Gramsci, the Marxist theoretician of hegemony, made an important distinction between "rule" and "hegemony," as one scholar explained:

"Rule" is expressed in directly political forms and in times of crisis by direct or effective coercion. But the more normal situation is a complex interlocking of political, social, and cultural forces, and "hegemony" . . . is either this or the active social and cultural forces which are its necessary elements. . . . It is a whole body of practices and expectations, over the whole of living: our senses and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world. . . . It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives. It is, that is to say, in the strongest sense a "culture," but a culture which has also to be seen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes.²³

Regarding the arguments made in *The Dearborn Independent*, MacDonald concludes that, "the great majority of its major claims about Jews are correct and have been corroborated by later scholarship." (Kevin MacDonald, *Cultural Insurrections: Essays on Western Civilization, Jewish Influence, and Anti-Semitism* [Atlanta: The Occidental Press, 2007], 6-7).

²² Sklar, 174.

²³ Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 108-10.

Gramsci was particularly concerned with what came to be known as "cultural hegemony," which is the category applicable to film (and its offshoots such as television). This form of cultural hegemony privileges a group of people who "make movies that tell the stories that an elite group of insiders agree with and want told to the exclusion of almost all other stories and themes."²⁴ In *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media*, political scientist and media critic Michael Parenti described how this power achieves its objectives:

The existence of a common pool of culturally determined (systemic, nonconspiratorial) political values cannot be denied, but where did this common pool come from? Who or what determines the determining element in the culture itself? And can we reduce an entire culture . . . to a set of accumulated habituations and practices that simply build up over time? . . . A closer look reveals that the unconsciously shared "established" view . . . is not shared by everyone and is not in fact all that established. . . . In other words, it may be true that most media elites . . . share common views on these subjects, but much—and sometimes most—of the public does not. What we have then is an "established *establishment* view" which is given the highest media visibility, usually to the exclusion of views held by large dissident sectors of the populace. The "dominant shared values and beliefs" that are supposedly the natural accretions and expressions of our common political culture, are not shared by all or most . . . although they surely are dominant in that they tend to preempt the field of opinion visibility. . . . In sum, media owners—like other social groups—consciously pursue their self-interest and try to influence others in ways that are advantageous to themselves.²⁵

Since Edison and his Trust lost their film franchise in 1912, Parenti's "established *establishment* view" has been determined (at least in film) by the tight-knit group of East European Jews discussed above and remains in the hands of their descendants. Rothman et al. have detailed roles Jewish activists have played in the "revolts against

²⁴ James Jaeger, "Paul Haggis, Bigotry & CRASH," <http://www.mecfilms.com/universe/articles/crash.htm>, 4 March 2006.

²⁵ Michael Parenti, *Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 241–42.

the 'establishment' in their professions," activism so widespread that that it has influenced the entire culture:

Of course, the role of Jews was not confined to academia. Radical and progressive Jews were also prominent among a wider group of intellectuals whose influence was rapidly increasing. Jews figured prominently in the leading liberal and radical journals of opinion, sometimes as editors or publishers, more often among the contributors to magazines like *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, *Ramparts*, and *The Progressive*. Perhaps the most important of these was the *New York Review of Books*, which turned decisively to the left in the mid-1960s. Since that time, the *New York Review of Books* was edited by Robert Silvers and Barbara Epstein, and the bulk of its political contributions (especially articles on American politics) in the mid-1960s was written by Jews. By and large, then, as Tom Wolfe has pointed out, "radical chic" in New York was a heavily Jewish phenomenon, and the influence of such people spread well beyond their own circle.²⁶

In *Hollywood's America: Social and Political Themes in Motion Pictures*, Rothman et al. situate this critique in Hollywood, pointing out that "Hollywood's creative leadership impacts the larger society even as it is influenced by that society." The authors, in noting the fact that "films are made by a relatively small number of people, who . . . tend to share a common outlook," argue that "over time, motion pictures have had an undeniable impact on the beliefs, lifestyles, and action of Americans."²⁷

²⁶ Stanley Rothman and S. Lichter, *Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the Left* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 104-105.

²⁷ Powers et al., *Hollywood's America*, 287. Ben Stein writes about the connection between the identities of those creating film content and their subject matter. While at Yale Law School, this lawyer and game show host took a course in film from Stanley Kauffmann, the well-known critic. In the course, Kauffmann assigned Siegfried Kracauer's *From Caligari to Hitler*, which was a famous study of films in Weimar Germany. "Kracauer talked about the relation of films to real life. He explained, in a convincing and analytical way, how the films of Weimar revealed the social and political thinking of a neurotic nation. The analyses were brilliant and thoroughly impressive. There, I thought, was the meat of film study" (Ben Stein, *The View From Sunset Boulevard: America as Brought to You by the People Who Make Television* [New York: Basic Books, 1979], ix).

This impact results from "the highest media visibility" discussed by Parenti, and it is achieved through repeatedly exhibiting targeted topics. Such repetition is necessary for conditioning an uncritical audience to the message at hand. As Rothman et al. note, "There is little reason to believe that a single film or even group of films significantly influences audiences' views over the long haul." If, however, a constant and unwavering message is broadcast repeatedly, "it is reasonable to believe that such presentations will affect audiences to a significant extent."²⁸

Theologian Margaret Miles, in examining Hollywood's portrayal of religion, agreed, writing that, "No one film has iconic power, but the recurrence of similar images *across* films weaves those images into the fabric of the common life of American society. . . . We get, at a subliminal and hence utterly effective level, not the narrative but the conventions of Hollywood film."²⁹ In essence, as two experts on propaganda conclude, "The media message should be homogeneous, with a consistency of purpose, for the propaganda to be effective."³⁰

CONTROLLING IMAGES OF JEWS

Another important aspect of owning the studios and controlling the filmmaking process was the fact that Jews were in charge of creating the image of their group appeared before the American public, as film expert Lester Friedman makes clear:

Unlike films about other American minorities, movies with Jews were often scrutinized by one segment of that minority group with the power to decide how the entire group would be presented to society as a whole. The resulting images of Jews in films constitute a rich and varied tapestry woven by several generations of moviemakers responding to the world around them. Their works dynamically depict both the Jews' profound impact on American society and that society's perception of the Jews within its midst. Some films are lamps that help extinguish the darkness of ignorance. Others simply mirror long-held preju-

²⁸ Powers et al., *Hollywood's America*, 10.

²⁹ Margaret R. Miles, *Seeing and Believing: Religion and Values in the Movies* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 190-91.

³⁰ Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1999), 375.

dices. But whether they explain or exploit their Jewish characters, all these films either implicitly or explicitly show how Jews affect American life and how American life influences Jews; it is a two-way process inherent in the first Jewish-American movie as well as in the latest.³¹

With respect to Jewish images, Jews in Hollywood have varied the visibility of Jewish themes and characters over time. Prior to World War II, Jewish characters often appeared in the movies. In the first of three Jewish phases of Hollywood identified by one film expert, "ghetto films that characterized the silent era" addressed, among other things, adjustment to life in America and intermarriage. The series that followed the lives of the Cohens and the Kellys, for instance, along with less memorable movies about intermarriage, "epitomized such dreams of assimilation." *The Jazz Singer* (1927), in which Al Jolson courted and married a gentile, was another example. Also, comedies, "many of which lampooned the reputation clinging to Jews for their mercantile cleverness, for their adeptness in cutting corners as well as cloth," filled the silent screen.³²

One may note, however, the irony that the original moguls did not necessarily have to change their names, but those appearing on the screen did because the moguls were sensitive to the fact that gentiles often had a negative view of the Jewish presence in Hollywood. By anglicizing actors' names, the studios avoided "surplus visibility" with respect to their Jewish cast. According to David Zurawik, author of *The Jews of Prime Time*, the sociological concept of surplus visibility describes "the feeling among minority members and others that whatever members of that group say or do, it is too much and, moreover, they are being too conspicuous about it."³³

The result was that, "Bernard Schwartz became Tony Curtis, Issur Danielovich became Kirk Douglas, Julius Garfinkle became John Garfield, Laszlo Lowenstein became Peter Lorre, Jill Oppenheim became Jill St. John, Betty Joan Perske became Lauren Bacall, Muni Weisenfreund became Paul Muni, Theodosia Goodman turned into Theda

³¹ Friedman, *The Jewish Image in American Film*, 9.

³² Stephen J. Whitfield, *American Space, Jewish Time: Essays in Modern Culture and Politics* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 153-54.

³³ David Zurawik, *The Jews of Prime Time* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 2003), 6.

Bara, and Samile Diane Friessen was reborn as Dyan Cannon."³⁴

The middle part of the last century saw a different Hollywood, one in which the sons (and grandsons and granddaughters) of the Jewish moguls' fellow immigrants—as well as a good number of Jewish refugees from Europe—played prominent roles. Paradoxically, it was a period in which most explicit portrayals of the Jew in cinema vanished (important exceptions were *Gentleman's Agreement* and *Crossfire*—both 1947). This middle period was "a dormant period" for open portrayals of Jews. Jews "were disappearing from the screen . . . the endearing comic immigrants depicted in the silent era were replaced by crypto-Jews, or by 'non-Jewish Jews,' or by Jews who thought of themselves only as Americans, or by no Jews at all. . . . This phase, the Hollywood version of the Marrano, lasted until at least the end of the 1950s."³⁵

If explicit Jews appeared at all in films of the fifties, it was usually in minor roles. Studios resisted "problem" pictures that dealt with "racial and religious relations." Even in biographical films about Jewish characters such as *Houdini* or *The Benny Goodman Story*, screenwriters tended to "downplay the Jewish elements or to eliminate them altogether. In cases where dramas, plays, or novels with Jewish themes are adapted for the screen the same holds true. Jewish characters are de-Semitized or de-Judainized (sic)."³⁶ Thus, this was a period in which the Jewish milieu of Hollywood was not considered important.

That Jewish filmmakers felt the need to mask Jewish identity in post-war films is hardly a surprise. Christian/Protestant power was still strong, particularly at the level of the masses, and the movie industry was not yet a secure part of the larger American Establishment, as was seen during the McCarthy era when the House Committee on Un-American Activities spent years shining a bright and uncomfortable light on the ideologies of those who created culture in Hollywood. Jewish reticence here was echoed in other areas into which Jews were tentatively moving, among them the higher reaches of academia, government, and big business. Missteps at this point would not be helpful.³⁷

³⁴ Silberman, 60.

³⁵ Whitfield, *American Space Jewish Time*, 155.

³⁶ Patricia Erens, *The Jew in American Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 198.

³⁷ The anti-Communist spirit of the age—represented by Senator McCarthy and

Following the wild success of the 1960 film adaptation of Leon Uris's novel *Exodus* (which chronicled the birth of modern Israel), however, came a dizzying display of Jews in the spotlight. According to Brandeis University scholar Stephen Whitfield, this period saw

. . . an almost exultant revelation in the fortuitous fact of Jewishness, with sprinklings of minor characters and occasional phrases soon overwhelmed by whole movies devoted to the residual mysteries of modern Jewish identity. The stars, for example, began to preserve their names. In the second phase, Julius Garfinkel had become John Garfield; in the third phase, Art Garfunkel kept his name. In the second phase Emanuel Goldenberg became Edward G. Robinson. In the third phase Jeff Goldblum kept his name; and a gentile, Caryn Johnson, actually changed hers to Whoopi Goldberg. . . . In the third phase the Indians not only bore odd resemblances to Hollywood Jews, but even began speaking Yiddish, as in Elliot Silverstein's *Cat Ballou* (1965). . . .

In the second phase of self-representation in Hollywood, films could be made about Captain Dreyfus that fudged or ignored his Jewish birth. In the current phase, the actor Richard Dreyfuss could tell an interviewer: "In a sense, everything I do has to do with my being Jewish." Dreyfuss could portray a shady, pushy, sleazy entrepreneur in *The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz* (1974); and his co-religionists felt so secure that not even the staff of the Anti-Defamation League was asked to put in overtime. In *The Big Fix* (1978), Dreyfuss could play a Jewish detective named Moses Wine. . . . Even after Gene Wilder played a sort-of Jewish cowboy in *The Frisco Kid* (1980), no one even bothered to give a decent burial to Leslie Fielder's claim, in a discussion of American fiction two decades earlier, that "the notion of the Jewish cowboy is utterly ridiculous, of a Jewish detective . . . nearly as anomalous." For if Marilyn Monroe and Elizabeth Taylor could be Jews (by choice) off the screen, then Jews could be imagined as characters anywhere. When a black cabbie (in *Bye Bye*

the efforts of the HUAC—destroyed Hollywood's "radical, largely Communist backbone," resulting in the collapse of "progressivism" in Hollywood (Erens, 197). See also my discussion of a book about that era, *Red Star Over Hollywood: The Film Colony's Long Romance with the Left* (*The Occidental Quarterly*, 6.1 [Spring 2006], 93–106).

Braverman) and a Japanese career woman (in *Walk, Don't Run*) speak Yiddish, when Jewishness is introduced no matter how irrelevant the context, even moviegoers deprived of seeing Jewish roles for three decades earlier might have echoed the sentiment of the passenger who was standing at the liquor bar of the *Titanic*, just as the liner collided with fate: "I did ask for ice, but this is too much."³⁸

When discussing these openly Jewish movies, it must be kept in mind that most of these Jewish films were "written or scripted by Jewish writers and produced by Jewish businessmen and actors [which] classifies them as a form of self-examination."³⁹ The list of explicitly Jewish participants is long, including "many young actors who rose to stardom playing Jewish characters types (George Segal, Elliott Gould, Barbra Streisand, Woody Allen, Richard Benjamin). In the seventies more would be added to this rooster: Richard Dreyfuss, Dustin Hoffman, Jeannie Berlin, Gene Wilder, and Mel Brooks."⁴⁰

To give a taste of this explosion of films with Jewish themes and/or Jewish casts, consider this list chronologically, beginning in the 1960s: *Exodus*, *Little Shop of Horrors*, *Judgment at Nuremberg*, *King of the Roaring Twenties: The Story of Arnold Rothstein*, *The Pawnbroker*, *Cast a Giant Shadow*, *The Fearless Vampire Killers*, *Bye Bye Braverman*, *The Fixer*, *The Producers*, *Funny Girl*, *Me Natalie*, and *Goodbye Columbus*. Of all genres, comedies were the most overtly Jewish, beginning with *A Majority of One* (1961), *Act One* (1963), and *Come Blow Your Horn* (1963). Later came Carl Reiner's autobiographical *Enter Laughing* (1967), followed by *I Love You*, *Alice B. Toklas!*, *The Night They Raided Minsky's*, and *Take the Money and Run*.⁴¹

One could also note that the British film *Oliver!* (1968) turned Dickens's Fagin into a "likeable, sympathetic character." This favorable, de-Semitized version resulted in the dissolution of the Jewish Film Advisory Committee. As the last director of the committee concluded, "Our job was done."⁴² Indeed, it seemed that Hollywood Jews were now able to address any Jewish theme they liked, as the 1970s showed.

³⁸ Whitfield, *American Space, Jewish Time*, 164-66.

³⁹ Erens, 257.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 256.

⁴¹ Friedman, *The Jewish Image in American Film*, 161.

⁴² Quoted in Erens, 296-300.

THE SEVENTIES

The 1970s saw an explosion of Jewish movies. Some of the major ones were *Where's Poppa?*, *Portnoy's Complaint*, *Fiddler on the Roof*, *The Heartbreak Kid*, *The Way We Were*, *The Long Goodbye*, *Lepke*, *Hester Street*, *The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz*, *Man in the Glass Booth*, *Marathon Man*, *Boys From Brazil*, *Next Stop Greenwich Village*, *Annie Hall*, *The Big Fix*, *Boardwalk*, *The Frisco Kid*, and *Norma Rae*.

The animated film *Fritz the Cat* (1972) portrays a counter-culture hero as a cat. Seeking refuge, Fritz enters a synagogue, where he hears that the US government has pledged its support for Israel in the Six-Day War. A further announcement notes that the Zionists plan to "return the cities of New York and Los Angeles to the United States." Summing up Jewish images of the 1970s, film critic Patricia Erens writes:

And so the 1970s came to a close, bringing the largest number of films with Jewish subjects to appear since the 1920s. The dominant mode of these works is comedy, reflecting the large numbers of Jewish comedic writers, directors, and performers in Hollywood and what Jesse Bier, author of *The Rise and Fall of American Humor*, calls "the Yiddishization of national mirth." The emergence of a new ethnicity in America is evident in many of these, as well as the nostalgic works like *Hester Street* and *Fiddler on the Roof*. . . .

But it is in the area of minor characters that the wealth of the period is evident. Sometimes they are recognizable only to those who know the telltale signs. In other cases their Jewishness is stated and integral to the plot. The arbitrariness of some assignments, wherein any character can be Jewish, has begun to subvert the old stereotypes and thus opens the way for new roles for Jewish characters in the eighties.⁴³

THE EIGHTIES

Kathryn Bernheimer, author of *The 50 Greatest Jewish Movies*, nominated the 1981 film *The Chosen* as the best Jewish film of all time. Two years later, Barbra Streisand starred in her feminist fantasy *Yentl*, and two years after that, the Holocaust was featured in Claude

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 366.

Lanzmann's *Shoah*, an eight-and-a-half-hour examination of the murder of six million Jews. They were far from the only Jewish movies of the 1980s. Sergio Leone chronicled the lower echelons of Jewish life in New York in *Once Upon a Time in America* (1983), while Paul Masursky directed a largely Jewish cast in the quirky *Down and Out in Beverly Hills*, starring Richard Dreyfuss and Bette Midler as an upper-middle class couple living in Hollywood. Patrick Swayze played a none-too-bright gentile dance instructor wooed by a wealthy Jewish idealist in *Dirty Dancing*, while Neil Simon's second of a trilogy, *Biloxi Blues*, starred half-Jewish Matthew Broderick. Finally, the end of the decade saw Jessica Tandy playing a cranky old Jewish woman in *Driving Miss Daisy*.

The 1980s saw further portrayals of Jewish characters in unlikely roles. In *Fort Apache, The Bronx* (1981), for instance, a group of multi-ethnic cops were lectured by an Orthodox sergeant, and in *An American Werewolf in London* (also 1981), a young American Jew traveling in England was bitten by a werewolf. The *Porky's* series (1982, 1984, 1985) featured a Jewish high school student, and, with respect to the *Rocky* franchise, "Rocky Balboa's seemingly Irish trainer and friend, Mickey (Burgess Meredith), turns out to be Jewish in *Rocky III* (1982)."⁴⁴

THE NINETIES

Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* (1993) remains among the most prominent Jewish movies. The decade opened, however, with Barry Levinson's semi-autobiographical *Avalon*, which he followed up with *Bugsy*, the story of Jewish gangster Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel, who built Las Vegas. The Jewish mobster theme was popular during the decade, with two other Bugsy Siegel films popping up in 1991 – *Mobsters* and *The Marrying Man*. Dustin Hoffman did his part by portraying mobster Dutch Schultz (born Arthur Flegenheimer) in *Billy Bathgate*. *Casino* (1995), Martin Scorsese's rendition of the life of gambling czar Lefty Rosenthal, shared with the Bugsy Siegel films a subtheme of the quest for the beautiful gentile woman. At the other end of the legal spectrum came detective Bobby Gold in David Mamet's *Homicide*, in which the theme of a return to Jewish roots and identity coincided with "an increasing number of Jews today who have reconnected with their

⁴⁴ Friedman, *The Jewish Image in American Film*, 86-90.

cultural or religious roots.”⁴⁵

Ron Silver played the “controversial, emotionally engaged, and ethical defense lawyer” Alan Dershowitz (this was before Dershowitz represented O. J. Simpson and boxer Mike Tyson) in *Reversal of Fortune*. This film presented “the very worst side of the WASP world and nothing but the best of Jewish values and character.”⁴⁶ A surprise hit of 1996 was *Shine*, the story of a gifted young Jewish pianist tortured by his Holocaust-survivor father’s own demons. Finally, Woody Allen, despite some well-publicized problems in his private life, continued movies with Jewish themes, including *Husbands and Wives* (1992) and *Deconstructing Harry* (1997). Thus, for over four decades Hollywood has been producing a cornucopia of movies with overt Jewish themes and characters.

JEWISH THEMES: THE HOLOCAUST, ASSIMILATION, AND THE SHIKSA

Beginning in 1982, scholars began to write openly about Jewish issues and images in film. Lester Friedman and Patricia Erens pioneered the field, and Friedman in particular has done much to advance it.⁴⁷ As seen above, Jewish themes include the Holocaust, assimilation, and longing for the *shiksa*, or gentile woman. Other themes could be addressed, such as humor, social justice, or life-style trends, but it is the Holocaust, assimilation, and the *shiksa* that stand out. Historian Peter Novick explains why the Holocaust has become not only a central Jewish theme but a universally American one since the end of the 1960s:

There are many reasons why concern with the Holocaust among the 2 or 3 percent of the American population that is Jewish came to pervade American society. I will mention one important reason here, if only because it is often nervously avoided. We are not just “the people of the book,” but the people of the Hollywood film and the television mini-series, of the magazine article and the newspaper column, of the comic book and the academic

⁴⁵ Kathryn Bernheimer, *The 50 Greatest Jewish Movies: A Critic’s Ranking of the Very Best* (Secaucus, N.J.: Birch Lane Press, 1998), 114.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁴⁷ In addition to the four works mentioned in these notes, Friedman has also written Lester D. Friedman, *Hollywood’s Image of the Jew* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1982) and *Citizen Spielberg* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006).

symposium. When a high level of concern with the Holocaust became widespread in American Jewry, it was, given the important role that Jews play in American media and opinion-making elites, not only natural, but virtually inevitable that it would spread throughout the culture at large.⁴⁸

While Spielberg's *Schindler's List* was to become the most famous example of public portrayals of the Holocaust, it was far from the first or only one. For example, in 1978 Republic Pictures aired the made-for-TV *Holocaust*, which was given immense promotion by Jewish groups (the Anti-Defamation League distributed ten million copies of its sixteen-page tabloid *The Record* to promote the drama, for example). As film critic Bernheimer similarly notes of the miniseries, "The object of the most advance advertising of any television program in history, it sparked international debate in newspapers and magazines, on radio and TV talk shows, in churches and synagogues, on lecture tours, in classrooms, and, perhaps most importantly, in homes around the world."⁴⁹ That the miniseries was seen by perhaps 120 million viewers (including 15 million West Germans) is testimony to the skill with which it was produced and promoted.

In addition to *Holocaust*, there was *Shoah*, *Judgment at Nuremberg*, *Playing for Time*, *Escape From Sobibor*, and *The Murderers Among Us: The Simon Wiesenthal Story*, and *Skokie*, a movie about American neo-Nazis. Such public portrayals of Jewish suffering had real-world effects. *Holocaust*, for instance, "led to the creation of the Carter Commission, which called for a national Holocaust memorial and museum as well as an annual day of remembrance." It also "dramatically increased public support for Israel."⁵⁰ Since *Schindler's List*, the Holocaust has continued to be the theme of a wide variety of films, including Italian writer Roberto Benini's *Life Is Beautiful* and the Robin Williams' film *Jacob the Liar*.

A revealing scene about assimilation comes in Woody Allen's *Zelig* (1983). In the scene, New York Intellectual Irving Howe explains how the character Zelig, who can change himself into any character he so desires, "represents the ultimate assimilated Jew."⁵¹ As the son of a

⁴⁸ Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 12.

⁴⁹ Bernheimer, 156.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 156-57.

⁵¹ Erens, 386.

Yiddish actor, Zelig “metamorphosizes into everything from a black trumpeter, to an opera singer, to a baseball player, to an American Indian, to a Nazi. . . . In terms of its Jewish content, *Zelig* represents the most devastating film about Jewish assimilation ever produced.”⁵² While this may be true, a softer, more representative treatment of Jewish assimilation can be found in *Once Around* (1991), in which Richard Dreyfuss plays the role of the Jew as outsider, hoping to be accepted by insiders.

Dreyfuss is one of those actors who essentially plays the same role in every movie in which he appears because he inevitably plays himself. Since he is so full of *Yiddishkeit*, or Jewish spirit, his movie roles are also full of unadulterated *Yiddishkeit*, whether the character he is playing is specifically Jewish or not.⁵³ As we saw, he played a sleazy entrepreneur in *The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz* (1974), then an Israeli soldier in *Victory at Entebbe* (1976), a Jewish private eye named Moses Wine in *The Big Fix* (1978), and a lawyer named Levinsky in *Nuts* (1987). In 1993 Dreyfuss starred in Neil Simon’s semiautobiographical *Lost in Yonkers*, playing the role of Uncle Louie, a crook on the run, and more recently, the Jewish gangster Meyer Lansky in Home Box Office’s *Lansky* (1999).

In other movies, Dreyfuss’s characters may not be specifically Jewish or they may be veiled to varying degrees. In *Down and Out in Beverly Hills* (1986), for example, he seems to be playing (together with Bette Midler) a Jewish Hollywood type in the Paul Mazursky-directed and produced satire of the neurotic lives of the Hollywood rich and famous.⁵⁴ In his much more famous roles in *Jaws* and *Close Encounters of the Third Kind*, his high-energy persona can easily be seen as an extension of his *Yiddishkeit*. “I am,” Dreyfuss states, “immensely proud of being Jewish, to the point of bigotry. . . . I was raised in Bayside which is ninety percent Jewish. I went every week to Temple Emanuel from the time I was nine until I was sixteen. . . . In a sense,” he claims, “everything I do has to do with my being Jewish.”⁵⁵

Next, the *shiksa* theme deserves attention. Patricia Erens points to

⁵² Friedman, *The Jewish Image in American Film*, 230.

⁵³ As Bernheimer writes, Dreyfuss is an actor “who has consistently applied his distinctly Jewish persona to a wide variety of roles” (Bernheimer, 67).

⁵⁴ Director of *Down and Out in Beverly Hills* Paul Mazursky makes films that “almost always deal with Jewish themes and characters” (Bernheimer, 67).

⁵⁵ Quoted in Friedman, *The Jewish Image in American Film*, 222.

the 1963 *Come Blow Your Horn* as a typical example of Jewish men's yearning for the *shiksa*, or, in Erens's words, "the Jewish male's search for sexual fulfillment, especially among large-breasted flighty gentile women." In this movie, "Alan and Buddy seek a carnal experience which they associate with the *shiksa*. For them this provides a measure of independence, as well as acceptance in non-Jewish society." This culminates, Erens notes, in *Portnoy's Complaint* (1972).⁵⁶

The *shiksa* theme can be viewed from a variety of angles. Within an exclusively Jewish setting, it can be seen as a discourse on the limits Jewish culture sets for its adherents, for it is taboo for males to go outside the group for sex or for mating. It can also be seen in some ways as a negative commentary on the value of Jewish women.⁵⁷

Perhaps more than anyone else, Woody Allen make the *shiksa* theme central in many of his films. For example, in *Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Sex* (*but Were Afraid to Ask)* (1972) one scene features a rabbi "whose secret fantasy is to be whipped by a statuesque *shiksa* while his wife eats pork."⁵⁸ Clearly two distinct boundaries in Jewish culture are being satirized. In *Annie Hall* (1977), the relationship between

neurotic *nebbish* Alvy and all-American *shiksa* Annie provided Allen with the perfect opportunity to mine his favorite themes, chief among them the difference between Jews and gentiles. . . . Alvy is a typical Jewish, intellectual, neurotic New Yorker . . . caustic, cerebral, and cynical, given to exaggeration, often hostile, and usually contemptuous. Annie is open, naive, intuitive, unsophisticated, and unassertive, unsure of her own intellect, and eager for approval.⁵⁹

This ethnic encounter is not exclusively one of Jew meets gentile, however. In one respect, according to sociologist John Murray Cud-

⁵⁶ Erens, 260.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Alina Sivorinovsky, "Images of Modern Jews on Television," *Midstream*, December 1, 1995, 39-40. In an article in *The Forward*, writer and lawyer Susan Kaplan echoes this lament that "there are virtually no female Jewish characters on television. Almost without exception, the wives and significant others of these Sons of Israel are not Jewish" ("From 'Seinfeld' to 'Chicago Hope': Jewish Men Are Everywhere," November 29, 1996).

⁵⁸ Desser and Friedman, *American-Jewish Filmmakers*, 48.

⁵⁹ Bernheimer, 29.

dihy, it represents an internal Jewish drama: the lure of the gentile women is always threatening to tear the Jewish male away from his own tribe:

In Freud, the deepest taboo of Judaism, the taboo against intermarriage, the forbidden lust of the Jew for the gentile *shiksa*, for the *shiksa* as “the promise of fulfillment,” is rationalized, psychologized, and reinterpreted as the desire for the *mother*, which desire is held taboo by everyone, of course, not just by Jews. The particularist, ritual taboo of the *Jewish* subculture—intermarriage, *connubium*—is reconceptualized (and psychologized) as the universalist, “scientific,” anthropological taboo on incest.⁶⁰

In addition to the *shiksa* theme can be found the “light unto the nations” theme, or *tikkun olam*, which carries with it a theme of superior Jewish morality and intellectual abilities. This urge to “heal the world” gives rise to activism, which in practice means political radicalism. Thus, Stephen Whitfield, like Charles Liebman and other social scientists, drew attention to the much higher likelihood that a sixties’ radical in America was Jewish more than anything else.⁶¹

Barbra Streisand starred as an early version of such a radical in *The Way We Were* (1973), playing Katie Morosky, who “serves as president of the Young Communist League, waits tables, and works two nights a week on a linotype machine. . . . In English class she meets Hubbell,” her “gorgeous *goyisher* (gentile) guy.” Hubbell is played by Robert Redford in another version of his all-American WASP character (a year earlier, he had played arch-WASP Bill McKay in *The Candidate*). The differences between a Jewish communist sympathizer and a WASP war veteran who just wants to get along soon show themselves. “At parties Katie insists upon serious political discussions,” while Hubbell tells her, “You push too hard. You expect too much.”⁶²

⁶⁰ John Murray Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 62–63.

⁶¹ Whitfield, *American Space, Jewish Time*, 115–17.

⁶² Erens, 323. Streisand has tended to make what are considered “Jewish” films. A list of such movies would include *Funny Girl* (1968) and *Funny Lady* (1975); *A Star is Born* (1976), the story of a struggling singer named Esther Hoffman; *The Main Event* (1979), about a Beverly Hills business executive; *Yentl* (1983), the story of the passionate yeshiva student; and *The Prince of Tides* (1991), in which Streisand plays a psychoanalyst, Dr. Susan Lowenstein.

The Way We Were "also serves as one of the few Hollywood films to portray Jewish social commitment" (the socialist movement of the thirties and the protests of the 1950s). When, for example, the US Congress steps up its HUAC investigations into Hollywood communists, "Katie is morally outraged and goes to Washington to protest." This represents, Erens argues, "the cultural differences that separate the Jewish community from the larger gentile world. Here we see the Jew's passion for social justice and change."⁶³

This representation of Jewish social commitment is tied in with a sense of Jewish moral superiority. Such a theme can be seen in other films. For example, in Neil Simon's autobiographical *Biloxi Blues*, the explicitly Jewish character Arnold Epstein is played off Eugene Morris Jerome, who "wears his Jewishness lightly." Arnold, in contrast, "has no desire to fit in, and he flaunts his difference." He is "a Jew first and foremost." As one critic observed, Arnold is "the Jew as moral exemplar and crank." This "incorruptible defender of justice" fittingly becomes the district attorney of Brooklyn.⁶⁴

Jewish moral and intellectual superiority has been a staple of modern American film. For example, *Reversal of Fortune* features the "Jewish savior and the gentile he rescues." Such a theme is so common that Bernheimer dubs it the "Jews to the Rescue" genre, one that includes "numerous memorable movies, such as a Jewish lawyer (José Ferrer) who "wins justice and then holds his clients to a higher code of morality" in *The Caine Mutiny*, Judd Hirsch as a Jewish psychiatrist "who comes to the rescue of an uptight WASP family" in *Ordinary People*, Ron Liebman as a Jewish labor organizer among needy Southern gentiles in *Norma Rae*, and "brainy Jew" Jeff Goldblum as a savior of the world in *Independence Day*.⁶⁵

Woody Allen often portrays the gentile as less than a genius. For example, in perhaps his most successful movie, *Annie Hall*, he inserts a scene where the Jewish Alvy, who "may be overly sensitive to suffering, analytical, and self-absorbed," openly scorns a "handsome, happy, and obviously WASP couple to ask the secret of their relationship. 'I'm shallow, empty, with no ideas and nothing interesting to say,' the woman replies. 'And I'm the same way,' her strapping mate

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Bernheimer, 168-69.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 125-26.

adds cheerfully.”⁶⁶

Allen pairs the *shiksa* motif with the inferior gentile theme in *Annie Hall*. Bernheimer notes that “*shiksa* lust as disastrous and self-destructive” is hardly an original Woody Allen theme (it had, for instance, been the theme of the 1972 Jewish comedy *The Heartbreak Kid*, in which the Jewish man, having gotten his *shiksa* prize, is left isolated in the gentile heartland of America). In *Annie Hall*, this destructive behavior features the usual range of negative gentile characters:

The difference between Annie’s background and Alvy’s upbringing is brought into sharp relief in this short but memorable scene juxtaposing a dinner with Annie’s family and a meal *chez* Singer. The split-screen scene illustrates the huge gulf between the two cultures, both of which are ridiculed. Allen’s comic condemnation of both exaggerated extremes pits the stifling, superficial Halls, who quietly speak about swap meets as they pick at their skimpy meal and sip cocktails, against the vulgar, emotional Singers, who gobble a vast dinner as they argue loudly. Although Alvy may be embarrassed by his uncouth family, he shows even greater disdain of the cold, repressed, bigoted Hall clan. Annie’s brother Duane, played by Christopher Walken, is actually psychotic, and a mean-faced Grammy Hall is blithely described by Annie as “a real Jew hater.”⁶⁷

Allen’s air of Jewish superiority did not go unnoticed by critics. Discussing the “insistently moral” protagonist of *Broadway Danny Rose* (1984), magazine critic David Denby complained about Allen’s “high Jewish self-regard,” noting that Allen’s “Jews are more moral than other people sentiments get a little sticky here.”⁶⁸

DEEPER READINGS OF FILMS WITH JEWISH THEMES

While the above critics who focused on Jewish films—Friedman, Erens, Bernheimer, et al.—offer background and insight into hundreds of movies, they all share a serious blind spot: the inability to consider how the image of the *gentile* has been constructed in a Hollywood characterized by Jewish hegemony. The following readings

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Quoted in *ibid.*, 137.

will highlight that theme, along with the more common themes cited above.

Quiz Show (1994)

Quiz Show reproduces the actual 1950s television quiz show scandal in which a prominent young WASP, a Columbia University professor, was unfairly given answers to questions before the show. The previous champion was an intelligent young Jew from New York, and his scripted loss to the WASP enraged him to the extent that he went to Washington to reveal the scandal to a Congressional subcommittee. The narratives in the film and in real life are broadly parallel: Jews, through hard work and intelligence, challenge WASP cultural hegemony in America, but since WASPs still have unfair advantages, they win at the expense of others, including Jews. With Ivy League quotas and other slights still fresh in mind, Jews are ready to finally stand up for their rights.

In *Quiz Show*, "Jews are everywhere . . . as they were in the actual imbroglio that in 1959 was compared to the Black Sox scandal of 1919." For Stephen Whitfield, *Quiz Show* is presented as "a morality tale in which Jews are perpetrators and victims of television fraud . . . Jews are shown wearing black hats and white hats, because they were indeed sucked into the vortex of a scandal that mixed duplicity with unchecked avarice and ambition." Lower middle-class resident of Queens, Herb Stempel (John Turturro), plays the Jewish "*schmuck*" who, for the sake of dramatic interest, "must be the fall guy. He must lose to a fresh face, a more interesting champion—someone who can appear not only smart enough to triumph on *Twenty-One* but suave enough to 'get a table at 21'."⁶⁹

Those behind the scenes who engineer the fall are also Jews—"cunning Jews," no less. They fix the show in order to boost ratings, thereby generating more profits for the show's sponsor. The head of this company, portrayed in *Quiz Show* by impeccably dressed Martin Scorsese, is "probably drawn from Charles Revson, whose cosmetics company sponsored (and fixed) a rival program, *The \$64,000 Question*, on CBS."⁷⁰

While such unflattering public portrayals of Jewish characters

⁶⁹ Stephen Whitfield, "Quiz Show: A Film Review," *American Jewish History*, 1996, 131.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

might “generate concern at the Anti-Defamation League,” it does not in this case because the negative characters are balanced by the appearance of the true hero of the story, a Jewish lawyer who has risen through the educational, political, and social ranks to rival the staid power of WASPs such as Charles Van Doren. Rob Morrow plays Richard Goodwin, the Harvard-educated government lawyer who catches on to the goings-on in the New York television game show world. Making his entrance in the movie’s opening, Goodwin’s ethnicity is hinted at by the car showroom salesman’s slip of the tongue in saying Goodwin’s name; he confuses it with “Goodman,” which is plausibly Jewish enough. (Later, a receptionist makes a more blatant assumption when she tweaks his name—“Goldwyn.”)

As *Quiz Show* progresses and the tension between the Jewish and WASP cheaters rises, Goodwin reveals his ethnic origins to Stempel when he assures Stempel that he knows what a certain Jewish delicacy is. Later, in the rarified air of the Athenaeum club, Goodwin has lunch with the Van Dorens—father and son. Ordering a Reuben sandwich, Goodwin caustically notes that while the sandwich he is eating might be named “Reuben,” there are precious few “Rubins” in attendance at the club. At that time in the 1950s, successful Jews were knocking on the doors of the most prestigious clubs and corporations in America, so the issue was clearly in the air.

While some, such as Whitfield, argue that Goodwin is genuinely torn between the desire to do what is right and the desire to spare Van Doren in order to enter the very social class from which Van Doren hails, his real motives may have been more combative, as testimony from a previous generation of Jews suggests. Literary critic Leslie Fiedler, for instance, described how urban Jewish students “were in some ways like a class in an occupied country, a group of Alsatians or Czechs, say, under a German master.” “We were forbidden Yiddishisms as we were forbidden slang; and though we had our censors outnumbered, our ignorance and shame kept us powerless.” Thus were urban Jews force-fed a language “whose shape was determined by antiquated rules of etiquette (usually called ‘grammar’) . . . a language capable of uttering only the most correctly tepid Protestant banalities no matter what stirred in our alien innards.” Cuddihy argued that Fiedler was part of a *Kulturkampf* being fought between Jews and gentiles; Fiedler’s sentiments toward literature may mirror those in film as well: “I would know, what I wrote against as well as for:

against their taste as well as for our own."⁷¹

Novelist Philip Roth, writing later, shared these sentiments. Playing off the actual *Quiz Show* scandal, he inserted a scene into *Portnoy's Complaint* that portrayed a more naked anti-gentile animus than is shown in the film:

I was on the staff of the House subcommittee investigating the television scandals. . . . and then of course that extra bonus, Charlatan Van Doren. Such character, such brains and breeding, that candor and schoolboyish charm—the ur-WASP, wouldn't you say? And turns out he's a fake. Well, what do you know about that, gentile America? Supergoy, a *gonif!* Steals money. Covets money. Wants money, will do anything for it. Goodness gracious me, almost as bad as Jews—you sanctimonious WASPs!

Yes, I was one happy yiddel down there in Washington, a little Stern gang of my own, busily exploding Charlie's honor and integrity, while simultaneously becoming lover to that aristocratic Yankee beauty whose forebears arrived on these shores in the seventeenth century. Phenomenon known as Hating Your Goy and Eating One Too.⁷²

To emphasize the dual nature of this phenomenon, Portnoy reveals more about his motives not only for skewering quiz show cheat Van Doren, but for bedding his WASP of the moment: "What I'm saying, Doctor, is that I don't seem to stick my dick up these girls, as much as I stick it up their backgrounds—as though through fucking I will discover America. *Conquer America*—maybe that's more like it."⁷³

This parable of Jewish-gentile competition and struggle can be seen as an authentic portrayal of the fall of WASP hegemony in the late fifties or early sixties and the impending "rise of the Jews."⁷⁴ Just as the "ur-WASP" professor had been exposed as a fraud and the Jew vindicated, real-life Jews after WWII broke out of the constraints imposed

⁷¹ Cuddihy, 185.

⁷² Philip Roth, *Portnoy's Complaint* (New York: Random House, 1969), 232–33. Roth mined this incident more thoroughly in his 1981 novel, *Zuckerman Unbound* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux), 33–40.

⁷³ Roth, *Portnoy's Complaint*, 235.

⁷⁴ Albert Lindemann, *Esau's Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 15.

on them by a WASP cultural hegemony and began building their own power base in the intellectual, cultural, political, economic, and—as the Goodwin character shows—moral spheres of modern American life.⁷⁵

DUSTIN HOFFMAN: HIS JEWISH PERSONA

Bernheimer writes that Dustin Hoffman “rarely plays explicitly Jewish characters (his performance as comic Lenny Bruce in Bob Fosse’s *Lenny* was an exception), but many of his roles carry strong Jewish undercurrents.”⁷⁶ Indeed, Hoffman’s roles can be used as a model for the emergence of Jewish themes and identities in modern Hollywood.

Characteristic of many American Jews, Hoffman is only loosely attached to formal Judaism. Whitfield writes that

Dustin Hoffman’s second wife has also encouraged him “to do what I’ve been wanting to do for many years, which is to become more observant and pass that on to my kids. There are a few things that I really want to do before it’s too late,” the actor added. “I want to learn Hebrew. And I would love to be *bar mitzvahed*.”⁷⁷

While these formal symbols of Jewish identity lay in Hoffman’s future, his ethnic concerns are discernible back to the late sixties in *The Graduate*, continue into the seventies with *Marathon Man*, into the eighties with his Broadway performance in *Death of a Salesman*,⁷⁸ and even into the nineties with *Outbreak*.

Marathon Man (1976)

Writing about the Holocaust, Bernheimer notes that the “post-traumatic terror and dread that scarred the culture’s psyche was also vividly manifested in a series of fictional films of the 1970s focusing

⁷⁵ For more on the rise of Jewish influence in the moral sphere, see my review of *Jews and the American Soul* in *The Occidental Quarterly* 7 (Spring 2007).

⁷⁶ Bernheimer, 145.

⁷⁷ Whitfield, 167.

⁷⁸ For insights into the Jewish nature of the play (pro and con), see Stephen J. Whitfield, *In Search of American Jewish Culture* (Hanover, N.H.: Brandeis University Press, 1999), 118–23.

on ongoing Nazi activity."⁷⁹ *Marathon Man* is one such film that represents a standard post-Holocaust theme where Jew confronts Nazi and prevails, giving vicarious victory over those who had killed so many fellow Jews during the war. In this film, Hoffman plays an explicitly Jewish character (Babe Levy) who encounters Nazi dentist Christian Szell, "a character clearly modeled on [Nazi sadist, Doctor Josef] Mengele." Szell "engages in a battle of wits and will" with the Jewish graduate student, Babe. The setting is New York City, home to many American Jews, and the story begins with one of intense concern to the Jewish community: "the harrowing point that the Nazi menace still stalks our world."⁸⁰

In the opening sequence, Szell's brother Klaus removes from a safety deposit box diamonds stolen from Jewish concentration camp prisoners and gives them to an unknown confidant. Returning home, Klaus's German-made Mercedes breaks down, blocking the road, and a fight ensues with a loud-mouthed New York driver who happens to be Jewish. The Jewish driver opens the ethnic hostilities by gratuitously calling Klaus a "kraut meathead." From there, the conflict descends into "Jude-Nazi" name calling, then escalates into inner-city car combat. Ignoring traffic signals and racing through crowded New York City streets, both drivers crash into a fuel oil truck and die in the ensuing inferno, as a congregation of Jews look on in horror.

Jogging through Central Park, Babe briefly pauses to observe the conflagration, but quickly resumes his training. As further establishment of the "Jew vs. Aryan" motif of the film, a tall *goyische* runner passes Babe, taunting him. Incensed, Babe does all in his power to overtake the Aryan, but fails. (In an ironic reversal on a concentration camp scene, a large German Shepard nips at the Aryan jogger's heel.) Babe's weakness and character here are "linked to his background. Babe is nervous, compulsive, and competitive. Anxious and eager, he is also tenacious." Returning home after his run, though, he is powerless to ward off the taunts of a group of Puerto Rican youths outside his apartment.

In addition to being a Columbia University graduate student (in-

⁷⁹ Bernheimer, 143. Erens gives a partial list of movies employing this theme: *The Man in the Glass Booth*, *The Hiding Place*, *Voyage of the Damned*, *Judgment at Nuremberg*, *The Odessa File*, and *The Boys From Brazil* (Ehrens, 345-47).

⁸⁰ Bernheimer, 143. Here Bernheimer also discusses *The Boys From Brazil*, a movie similar to *Marathon Man* in which a character based on Mengele reappears.

dicative of high intelligence), Babe is haunted by the suicide of his famous historian father. His father had been “hounded by McCarthyites,” which is but a thinly-disguised reference to the heavily Jewish group of Communists and “fellow travelers” investigated by HUAC.⁸¹

Searching for his brother’s lost diamonds, former death camp dentist Christian Szell resorts to torturing Babe by drilling sensitive points in his teeth without the use of anesthesia. Here, Szell is resorting to his old Nazi practices, but Babe finds the inner strength to resist and, in the end, prevail. Summing up the meaning of the story, Bernheimer writes

Marathon Man, in which Mengele serves as a symbol of demonic evil, evokes the horrors of the past. It warns of the ongoing threat of anti-Semitic fanaticism while allowing the Jew vicarious revenge and a cathartic victory. Like a number of fantasies of the era, *Marathon Man* seeks to redress the wrongs of history by symbolically restoring power to the Jewish victims of the Holocaust who suffered terribly but, unlike Babe, were not able to defeat their enemy.⁸²

Of note here is the conflation of actual Nazis with gentiles in general, as in Dr. Szell’s first name: Christian. This tendency among Jews to conflate disparate groups of gentiles is common. In academic writing, for example, there is a tendency to group Nazis with all Germans. And blame for the Holocaust is often spread beyond Germans to other Europeans, and even Americans as well.⁸³ More broadly, among post-

⁸¹ For a brief summary (with sources), see Kevin B. MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 52–54. For three personal accounts of how individual Jews and their families were pursued, see *Red Diapers: Growing Up in the Communist Left*, ed. Judy Kaplan and Linn Shapiro (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 54–60, 176–83; and David Horowitz, *Radical Son: A Generational Odyssey* (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 65–72.

⁸² Bernheimer, 145. Here, she also notes that director John Schlesinger is an English Jew.

⁸³ See Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996). Criticism of Goldhagen’s views has been extensive, particularly among professional historians. See, for instance, Lindemann, *Esau’s Tears*, ix–xiv; and Norman G. Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Birn, *A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth* (New York: Henry Holt, 1998). For American guilt, see David S. Wyman *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust* (New York:

war cultural artifacts can be found many instances of conflation of Nazi war criminals (and other blatant anti-Semites) with gentiles in general.

Lenny (1974)

One might say that *Marathon Man* is lightly tinged with hostility toward gentiles. In contrast, *Lenny* proffers a far more virulent dose of hostility. In the beginning of the film, however, an opposite form of emotion is shown: love for the female gentile. Dustin Hoffman's Lenny Bruce meets a stripper, and by way of introduction she asks about his name, prompting Bruce to explain that his original name, Leonard Schneider, was "too Jewish." Soon, physical romance ensues, with Bruce buying a roomful of flowers for his new love interest. When he arrives to meet her, he sees her posed naked on the bed among the flowers. "Oh yeah. Oh yeah. It's a *shiksa* goddess."

Bruce is quite candid about his Jewish background and the relationship between Jews and gentiles. In a nightclub rendition of one of his most well-known routines, he turns his cutting humor toward Christians:

You and I know what a Jew is—*One Who Killed Our Lord*. I don't know if we got much press on that in Illinois—we did this about two thousand years ago. . . .

Alright, I'll clear the air once and for all, and confess. Yes, we did it. I did it, my family. I found a note in my basement. It said: "We killed him . . . signed, Morty." And a lot of people say to me, "Why did you kill Christ?" "I dunno . . . We killed him because he didn't want to become a doctor, that's why we killed him."⁸⁴

While Bruce makes many cracks about the Pope and Christians in general, he says nothing negative about Judaism. In fact, he has a warm relationship with his mother and aunt throughout.

The New Press, 1998). For explicit criticism of Wyman's thesis, see William D. Rubinstein, *The Myth of Rescue: Why the democracies could not have saved more Jews from the Nazis* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

⁸⁴ Whitfield, *American Space, Jewish Time*, 72.

The Graduate (1967)

While Hoffman played Jewish characters in the seventies films discussed above, few observers felt that the existentially pained protagonist in *The Graduate* was Jewish. Erens, for one, fails to include this movie or any of its characters or themes in her exhaustive study *The Jew in American Cinema*. In contrast, Bernheimer takes it for granted that Hoffman plays a "Jewish hero": "Apathetic, ambivalent, and indecisive . . . his character finds that 'Love is the (apparent) answer.'" Bernheimer explicitly compares Hoffman's character to that of Neil Klugman, the Jewish protagonist in the film adaptation of Philip Roth's *Goodbye Columbus*.⁸⁵

Read properly, I believe that Hoffman's character Ben can be seen as playing out one of the most pointed Jewish dramas in modern film. Though the movie uses WASP characters and settings throughout the movie to mask Jewish undercurrents, the final scene reveals the strong sense of estrangement from and hostility toward gentile society in general. It also highlights the Jewish man's longing for the "*shiksa* goddess." By sleeping with both mother and daughter from an arch-WASP family, Ben succeeds in carrying out his fantasy of cuckolding a WASP husband, a theme consonant with the above-noted phrase "Hating Your Goy and Eating One Too."

The Graduate appeared in the same year as Roth's novel *Portnoy's Complaint*, and the parallel sentiments toward the *shiksa* are worth exploring. In this, his most famous book, Roth added his unapologetic account of the *shiksa* theme. A lengthy quotation imparts the deeply held sentiment Roth obviously meant to share:

Shiksies! In winter, when the polio germs are hibernating and I can bank upon surviving outside of an iron lung until the end of the school year, I ice-skate on the lake in Irvington Park. . . . I skate round and round in circles behind the *shiksies* who live in Irvington . . . But the *shiksies*, ah, the *shiksies* are something else again. Between the smell of damp sawdust and wet wool in the overheated boathouse, and the sight of their fresh cold blond hair spilling out of their kerchiefs and caps, I am ecstatic. Amidst these flushed and giggling girls, I lace up my skates with weak, trembling fingers, and then out into the cold and after them I

⁸⁵ Bernheimer, 90.

move, down the wooden gangplank on my toes and off onto the ice behind a fluttering covey of them—a nosegay of *shikses*, a garland of gentile girls. I am so awed that I am in a state of desire *beyond a hard-on*. My circumcised little dong is simply shriveled up with veneration. . . . How do they get so gorgeous, so healthy, so *blond*? My contempt for what they believe in is more than neutralized by my adoration of the way they look, the way they move and laugh and speak—the lives they must lead behind those *goyische* curtains! Maybe a pride of *shikses* is more like it . . .

So: dusk on the frozen lake of a city park, skating behind the puffy red earmuffs and the fluttering yellow ringlet of a strange *shikse* teaches me the meaning of the word *longing*. It is almost more than an angry thirteen-year-old little Jewish Momma's Boy can bear. Forgive the luxuriating, but these are probably the most poignant hours of my life I'm talking about—I learn the meaning of the word *longing*, I learn the meaning of the word *pang*. There go the darling things dashing up the embankment, clattering along the shoveled walk between the evergreens . . . I want Jane Powell too, God damn it! And Corliss and Veronica. I too want to be the boyfriend of Debbie Reynolds—it's the Eddie Fisher in me coming out, that's all, the longing in all us swarthy Jewboys for those bland blond exotics called *shikses* . . .⁸⁶

The early action in *The Graduate* (directed by Jewish Mike Nichols, "an immigrant from Danzig, who had stepped off the *Bremen* right before World War II,"⁸⁷ gives little clue to the film's Jewish significance.

⁸⁶ Roth, *Portnoy's Complaint*, 142-52.

⁸⁷ Whitfield, 60. A more recent account deepens the level of Jewish identification in the film, as director Nichols found that "the deeper he got into the shoot and the more intensely he pushed Hoffman past what the actor thought he could withstand, the more Nichols realized that something painful and personal was at stake, and always had been, in his attraction to the story. 'My unconscious was making this movie,' he says. 'It took me years before I got what I had been doing all along—that I had been turning Benjamin into a Jew. I didn't get it until I saw this hilarious issue of MAD magazine after the movie came out, in which the caricature of Dustin says to the caricature of Elizabeth Wilson, "Mom, how come I'm Jewish and you and Dad aren't?" And I asked myself the same question, and the answer was fairly embarrassing and fairly obvious'" (Mark Harris, "Book Excerpt: Inside the Making of 'The Graduate,'" *Entertainment Weekly*, <http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,20176758,00.html>).

Not until the church scene at the end, where Ben races to the church to break up his true love's marriage to a blond *goy*, does the strong Jewish undercurrent of the movie reveal itself. In a scene powerful for its symbolism, Ben arrives at the church too late; his love has just pronounced her "I do" and is kissing her new husband. Climbing into the second-floor choir loft, Ben screams out her name: "Elaine! Elaine!" Turning to him, Elaine realizes that Ben is the better choice, and she abandons both altar and new husband to be with him.

Before getting away, however, Ben faces a furious group of gentiles, including Mr. and Mrs. Robinson, and stocky young gentile men. First comes Mr. Robinson, whom Ben has cuckolded. Grappling at the foot of the church stairs, Ben delivers a blow to the gut, and Mr. Robinson falls. Next, Ben faces the swarm of blond-haired young men, sparkling white teeth flashing in the crystal light of the church. To defeat them, he grabs a gilded five-foot cross and swings wildly into the seething flock of *goyim*. Thus keeping them momentarily at bay, he takes Elaine outside the church and bars the doors with the cross, completing his escape. This scene starkly combines the Jewish male's yearning for the *shiksa* with revenge against gentile society.

***Outbreak* (1995)**

Reading *Outbreak* as a "Jewish" movie is productive because it provides a chance to explore subtexts and join them together to find the repetition of common Jewish themes, in this case in a film in which no explicit Jewish characters exist. *Outbreak* can be seen as offering Walter Mitty-esque fantasies of the dominant group in Hollywood. In this film, Hoffman plays an eccentric scientist who agrees to save society from a mad military man bent on controlling America through biological warfare. The theme is heroic outsider scientist saves society from corrupt and malevolent insider elite. The interpretation of this text is familiar: Jewish outsider saves society from gentile elite (Bernheimer's "Jews to the Rescue" motif).⁸⁸

For starters, Hoffman plays a brilliant scientist (a "smart Jew"), a plausible role, given the high percentage of American Nobel Prize winners in science and medicine who are Jewish.⁸⁹ In addition, Hoff-

⁸⁸ Bernheimer, xi.

⁸⁹ Raphael Patai explores Jewish intelligence in Part III, "Journey Into the Jewish Mind," of *The Jewish Mind* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996), 287-342. He adds figures on Jewish Nobel Prize winners in his Postscript 1996, 547-50. Mac-

man's character is married to a beautiful blonde (the *shiksa* theme). From Hoffman's elevated vantage point, he can see what is good and bad for society, and the gentile elite—represented by the military (the Cossack or Nazi menace)—are a "them" who must be confronted. Major General McClintock, the evil mastermind behind the plan to blow up a small American town, is chillingly portrayed by Donald Sutherland, who has white hair and piercing blue eyes, a suitable Aryan.

Hoffman appeals to the masses to follow his lead to save themselves from imminent destruction at the hands of the corrupt elite. After some unconvincing heroics, such as jumping from a helicopter onto the fog-enshrouded deck of a ship at sea, Hoffman succeeds. Not only does he succeed in defeating the corrupt general, he finds the cure for the lethal "outbreak," thus saving his dying estranged wife's life and getting her love back in the end. Like other movies discussed here, *Outbreak* successfully pairs the winning of the gentile woman with the defeat of the corrupt gentile elite.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen, the heavy Jewish presence in Hollywood has been a constant for over a century, and it has been a presence that has made a difference, a minority that has, in Stephen Whitfield's words, "left its skid marks," for American Jews have "exerted an extraordinary impact upon the character of the United States."⁹⁰ As Gabler wrote:

[T]he American film industry . . . was founded by Jews who themselves seemed to be anything *but* the quintessence of America. The much-vaunted "studio system" . . . was supervised by a second generation of Jews, many of whom also regarded themselves as marginal men trying to punch into the American mainstream. The storefront theaters of the late teens were transformed into the movie palaces of the twenties by Jewish exhibitors. And

Donald also explores superior Jewish intelligence in *A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 188–91; *Separation and Its Discontents*; and *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998). A strong dissent against the idea of superior Jewish intelligence can be found in Sander L. Gilman, *Smart Jews: The Construction of the Image of Superior Jewish Intelligence* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996).

⁹⁰ Whitfield, *American Space, Jewish Time*, 20.

when sound movies commandeered the industry, Hollywood was invaded by a battalion of Jewish writers, mostly from the East. The most powerful talent agencies were run by Jews. Jewish lawyers transacted most of the industry's business and Jewish doctors ministered to the industry's sick. Above all, Jews produced the movies."⁹¹

Let the reader go away from this essay with the sense—and the confidence to repeat it—that Hollywood is indeed run by Jews. Just as Jacob Heilbrunn insisted when writing about another group of energetic Jews—“It is anything but an anti-Semitic canard to label neoconservatism a largely Jewish phenomenon”⁹²—gentiles should feel free to join select Jews in saying, “It is anything but an anti-Semitic canard to label Hollywood a largely Jewish phenomenon.” And not just a phenomenon but an empire; an “empire of their own.”

*Edmund Connelly is an academic film and television scholar and a frequent contributor to **The Occidental Quarterly** and **The Occidental Observer** (www.theoccidentalobserver.com).*

⁹¹ Gabler, 1-2.

⁹² Jacob Heilbrunn, quoted in Evan R. Goldstein, “Fight Makes Right,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, January 18, 2008.

UNDERSTANDING HOLLYWOOD PART II: DECONSTRUCTING CHRISTIANITY*

EDMUND CONNELLY

IMAGES OF CHRISTIANITY IN EARLY HOLLYWOOD

During the early Hollywood era, films that positively portrayed Christianity and Christian values were common. They were often box-office hits. This can be partly explained by the fact that the vast majority of Americans at the time were practicing Christians. Thus, Hollywood needed movies that resonated with its primary audience. The list of movies from early Hollywood celebrating (or at least respecting) the majority's religion is a long one. Biblical blockbusters like *Samson and Delilah*, *David and Bathsheba*, *Quo Vadis?*, *The Robe*, *The Ten Commandments*, and *Ben Hur* "were specifically designed to appeal to the predilections of the pious, and each of these films became the nation's top box-office hit in the year of its release."¹

Golden Era films usually portrayed Christian clergymen in a sympathetic light. Bing Crosby played clergymen in *Going My Way*, *Bells of St. Mary's*, and *Say One for Me*; so did Pat O'Brien in *Angels with Dirty Faces* and *The Fighting 69th* and Spencer Tracy in *Boys Town* and *Men of Boys Town*. In less memorable films, Clark Gable played a minister in *Polly of the Circus*; Frank Sinatra portrayed a parish priest in *The Miracle of the Bells*; and Mickey Rooney impersonated a feisty frontier preacher in *The Twinkle of God's Eye*. As Michael Medved comments:

In all of these films, and many more, the members of the clergy gave hope to under-privileged kids, or comforted GIs on the battlefield, or helped decent but down-and-out families to survive hard times. If a character appeared on screen wearing a clerical collar it served as a sure sign that the audience was supposed to like him.²

* Cf. Edmund Connelly, "Understanding Hollywood, Part I: Hollywood's Jewish Identity," *The Occidental Quarterly*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 37-72.

¹ Michael Medved, *Hollywood vs. America: Popular Culture and the War on Traditional Values* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 50-51.

² Medved, 51.

The films of Frank Capra, a Sicilian-born Catholic, or Walt Disney, a Kansas Congregationalist, clearly express the Christian values of their creators. In the words of film historian Robert Sklar, "They both knew the rural and small-town heartland of America. Their comic talents veered toward sentimentality and they were imbued with social purpose, a desire to revitalize the nation's old communal myths."³ From 1936 to 1941, Capra deliberately created five social-message films, inspired by a balding man who visited Capra when he was sick and rebuked him for not using his talents for more morally constructive purposes. These films—*Mr. Deeds Goes to Town*, *Lost Horizon*, *You Can't Take It With You*, *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*, and *Meet John Doe*—were all films with clear Christian themes. Indeed, Sklar argues that in *Meet John Doe*, Capra transforms the hero John Willoughby into a "Christ-figure," thereby transforming "the myth of his American hero into a defense of Christian morality."⁴

It is mistaken, however, to suppose that the Golden Era was filled solely with pro-Christian films that satisfied all majority Americans. Many Christian groups felt that Hollywood was not Christian enough for their liking, and they tended to blame this on the Jewishness of Hollywood. Critics ranged from fire-and-brimstone evangelicals in the teens and early twenties who demanded the movies' liberation from "the hands of the devil and 500 un-Christian Jews"⁵ to Red-baiters in the forties for whom Judaism was really a variety of Communism and the movies their chief form of propaganda.

The sum of this anti-Semitic demonology was that the Jews, by design or sheer ignorance, had used the movies to undermine traditional American values. As one antagonist put it, "it is only because they [the Hollywood Jews] are outside the moral sphere of American culture that they blunder so badly that they require periodic campaigns such as that of the Legion of Decency [a Catholic reform group] to set them right."⁶ According to Hollywood historian Neal Gabler, "Ducking from these assaults, the Jews [of Hollywood] became the phantoms of the film history they had created, haunting it but never really able to inhabit it."⁷

³ Robert Sklar, *Movie-Made America: A Cultural History of American Movies* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 205.

⁴ Sklar, 205–12.

⁵ Quoted in Neal Gabler, *An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1988), 2.

⁶ Quoted in Gabler, 2.

⁷ Gabler, 2.

THE RISE OF ANTI-CHRISTIAN FILMS

By the 1960s, however, films far less respectful of traditional Christianity began to appear. This trend must be understood in the context of an important transformation of American society as a whole after the Second World War: the establishment of Jewish cultural and political hegemony, in Kevin MacDonald's words, "a huge increase in Jewish power and influence, and a concomitant decrease in the political and cultural power of European-derived peoples—ethnic warfare by any other name."⁸ In the film industry, Jews and Jewish themes became much more prominent, along with critiques of gentiles and gentile society.⁹ Instead of catering to the convictions and values of the majority, the mainstream media became increasingly focused on criticizing and altering these beliefs and values, and one of the main targets was Christianity. As Medved writes:

In the ongoing war on traditional values, the assault on organized faith represents the front to which the entertainment industry has most clearly committed itself. On no other issue do the perspectives of the show business elites and those of the public at large differ more dramatically. Time and again, the producers have gone out of their way to affront the religious sensibilities of ordinary Americans.¹⁰

Citing a 1992 study which found that "89 percent of Americans claim affiliations with an organized faith," Medved described in detail how Hollywood has produced fare hostile to its audience's beliefs.¹¹

The most striking case is the controversy surrounding Martin Scorsese's *The Last Temptation of Christ*, when 25,000 people protested

⁸ Kevin MacDonald, in Foreword to Tomislav Sunic, *Homo americanus: Child of the Postmodern Age* (Charleston, S.C.: BookSurge Publishing, 2007), xxv.

⁹ Connelly, "Understanding Hollywood, Part I," 50-54.

¹⁰ Medved, 50. Singer Dolly Parton offered one small example: "Do you know why I can't produce a born-again Christian series? Because the Jews control Hollywood, and they don't want to project a Christian in a good light" (in Philip Weiss "Letting Go," *New York Magazine*, January 29, 1996, 33). The controversy surrounding Mel Gibson's 2004 film *The Passion of the Christ* highlighted this claim. Catholic League president William Donahue, speaking on the cable network MSNBC, said about the controversy surrounding Gibson's movie, "Hollywood is controlled by secular Jews who hate Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular. It's not a secret, OK? And I'm not afraid to say it. That's why they hate this movie."

¹¹ Medved, 80.

in front of the MCA/Universal offices to register their unhappiness with a film that profoundly insulted the dignity of the founder of one of the world's great religions. The National Council of Catholic Bishops, the National Catholic Conference, the Southern Baptist Convention, the Eastern Orthodox Church of America, the archbishop of Canterbury, and even Mother Teresa protested the film. But Hollywood executives ignored them.

However, as Medved points out, MCA's willingness to offend Christians was in stark contrast to their sensitivity to other groups. For example, animal rights activists demanded that Disney studios delete a scene they felt was "anti-wolf." Disney assented. In another case, the religious leader of a Hopi village declared that the script of an upcoming Robert Redford film was "sacrilegious." The script was promptly amended.¹²

Medved provides a long list of anti-Christian films, beginning with anti-Catholic fare:

The Runner Stumbles (1979). This notorious turkey . . . features . . . a small-town priest who falls in love with a sensitive young nun, and then stands trial for her murder.

Monsignor (1982). Christopher Reeves . . . played a prince of the Roman Catholic Church. This pernicious prelate engages in every imaginable sin, including the seduction of a glamorous, idealist nun and complicity in her death. His shady dealings with the Mafia to control the Vatican bank eventually bring him to the peak of power under the approving eye of a shriveled, anorexic Pope.

Agnes of God (1985). The movie opens with . . . disturbed young nun Meg Tilly giving birth in a convent, murdering her baby, and then flushing the tiny, bloody corpse down the toilet.

The Penitent (1988). Raul Julia plays a farmer in New Mexico who joins a primitive and brutal Catholic cult after his bored wife gets involved in an affair with his boyhood pal.

¹² Medved, 38–42. Medved also poignantly asks if Hollywood would be as insensitive to a film with a "revisionist view of Holocaust victim Anne Frank that portrayed her as an out-of-control teenage nymphomaniac who risked capture by the Nazis night after night to satisfy her raging hormones?"

Last Rites (1988). Tom Berenger is a moody priest who falls passionately in love with a mysterious Mexican "hot tamale." He abuses his position in the Church in his desperate efforts to protect her, and is ultimately entangled with murder and the mob.

We're No Angels (1989). Robert De Niro and Sean Penn play two lunk-headed petty crooks who escape from prison and pretend to be priests. . . . The movie is supposed to be a remake of a 1955 escaped-cons comedy with Humphrey Bogart, but the earlier film contained none of the anticlerical elements of ecclesiastical masquerade that are central to the plot of the more recent version.

The Pope Must Die (1991). This putrid comedy trots out every hoary anti-Catholic canard of the last two thousand years, including sultry and seductive nuns who provide the Holy Father with his own private harem, and conniving cardinals who control illicit arms deals, organized crime, and sleazy banking around the world.¹³

Regarding this string of anti-Catholic movies, Medved writes, "The most important point to keep in mind about all these movies and their grim and skeptical view of the church of Rome is that their negativity is never answered by simultaneous releases that offer a sympathetic treatment of Catholicism."¹⁴ In the fifteen years prior to publishing *Hollywood vs. America*, Medved could think of precisely one film "that presented a sympathetic view of the Church" (*Romero*, 1989), and even then, it was one that originated outside the Hollywood mainstream.¹⁵ Moreover, the subject of the film, Archbishop Romero of El Salvador, probably received favorable treatment because of his leftist politics, not his Catholicism.

Medved then lists anti-Protestant films:

Crimes of Passion (1984). As a sweaty, Bible-toting Skid Row evangelist, Tony Perkins generates the same warmth and charm he brought to his famous role as Norman Bates in *Psycho*.

Poltergeist II (1986). This sorry sequel to the successful horror film of 1982 featured a hymn-singing preacher from beyond the

¹³ Medved, 52-54.

¹⁴ Medved, 55.

¹⁵ Medved, 55.

grave who leads a band of demonic Bible-belters in trying to drag a hip suburban family down to hell.

The Vision (1987). An impressive cast is utterly wasted on an insipid sci-fi fantasy about conspiring Christians who use hypnotic TV technology in a ruthless plot to take over the world.

Light of Day (1987). This somber stinker, written and directed by *Last Temptation* screenwriter Paul Schrader, portrays a prominent Midwestern minister as a pious, pompous fraud.

The Handmaid's Tale (1990). Some of the industry's most prestigious performers appeared in this pointedly political polemic about what life might be like if Christian fundamentalists came to power in America. As portrayed in the film, these religious zealots are considerably less lovable than the Nazis, who at least had stylish uniforms to recommend them.

The Rapture (1991). Mimi Rogers plays a buxom swinger, addicted to group sex with strangers, who sacrifices these satisfactions when she makes a sudden commitment to Christ. . . . Before the end of the film her "faith" causes her to take her six-year-old daughter out to the desert where . . . the heroine takes a revolver, holds it to her daughter's head, and, while mumbling invocations of the Almighty, blows the child's brains out.¹⁶

In *Misery* director Rob Reiner repeatedly focuses on a tiny gold cross worn by Kathy Bates, the sadistic villain. (In contrast, in the 1999 film *True Crime*, the tormented African American wife of a man unjustly sentenced to death and about to be executed wears a cross around her neck, which is highly visible as she pounds on the windows of the execution chamber. Paired with a non-white character, Christianity is shown as a positive force.)

The remake of *Cape Fear* is also instructive. In the original 1962 version with Robert Mitchum, Mitchum's character played the menacing villain without reference to religious symbols, yet in the 1991 remake with Robert De Niro in the Mitchum role, the villain is a member of a Pentecostal church and carries a Bible under his arm in several scenes.¹⁷

¹⁶ Medved, 55–58.

¹⁷ Medved, 66–67. Medved offers a questionable explanation for the rarity of

Woody Allen's *Hannah and Her Sisters* (1986) took a swipe at Pope John Paul II, presaging the extensive attacks on the Church for pedophilia, real and alleged. Allen's character Mickey is the producer of a television show similar to *Saturday Night Live*. When a network censor complains about a sketch dealing with child abuse, he objects that it cannot be broadcast because it names an individual. Mickey claims this is not the case, because the sketch merely refers to the pope. Then Mickey's assistant, played by Julie Kavner, suggests substituting a presumably less offensive sketch used earlier: "the Cardinal Spellman-Ronald Reagan Homosexual Dance Number."¹⁸

Medved notes that television is equally anti-Christian. For example, in the miniseries *The Thorn Birds*, handsome Richard Chamberlain plays a tormented priest who has broken his vows of celibacy. William Shatner, in his post-Captain Kirk role of T. J. Hooker, tracks down a "ruthless, Scripture-spouting crook who leaves Bibles as calling cards at the scene of his crimes." ABC's *The Women of Brewster Place* shows a preacher luring a woman to his bed, while in one episode of *UNSUB* a certain "Bishop Grace" murders two teenage girls in his congregation. NBC's *In the Heat of the Night* aired an episode in which "Reverend Haskell" expires just after enjoying an affair with one of his parishioners. Two "Bible thumpin' hayseeds" appear as kidnappers on *Shannon's Deal*, paired up with "a devout Christian who murders his wife and then justifies the killing as 'an act of God . . . unstoppable as a flood.'"¹⁹

ANIMATION

To the extent that animated TV shows touch on serious issues at all, Christianity has fared rather poorly in recent decades as well. For

negative portrayals of Jews in film and television: "This has less to do with the high concentration of Jews in the movie industry than with the prevailing perception that Judaism is all but irrelevant as a religious system. . . . Judaism . . . seems so statistically insignificant that it threatens no one, and offers a much less attractive target" (p. 61).

¹⁸ David Desser and Lester D. Friedman, *American-Jewish Filmmakers: Traditions and Trends* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 75. For reports that Jews were directly involved in promoting the story of pedophile priests, see Thomas J. Herron, "The View from Tegucigalpa and the Texas Stampede," *Culture Wars*, December 2004, 6-17; E. Michael Jones, "Perfect Fear Drives out Love" and Herron, "The Priest Bomb Goes off in Philly," both in *Culture Wars*, November 2005, 6-10 and 10-13, respectively.

¹⁹ Medved, 81.

example, Fox Television Network's *The Simpsons* featured a scene in which the family gathered around the table to say grace, and Bart solemnly intones, "Dear God, we paid for all this stuff ourselves, so thanks for nothing." Far more offensive, however, is the *South Park* Christmas special called "Mr. Hankey, the Christmas Poo," a parody of the classic 1965 television special *A Charlie Brown Christmas*. In *South Park*'s Christmas special, the spirit of Christmas is personified by a piece of talking human feces named "Mr. Hankey," the obvious message being that "Christmas is shit."²⁰

At an elementary school in *South Park*, a white, small-town Rocky Mountain community, Mr. Garrison, a racist, anti-Semitic teacher (he wants to get rid of Mexicans and taunts Kyle, the Jewish boy) directs the Nativity play. Kyle's mother, as a Jew, objects to the mixing of church and state, to which Mr. Garrison replies, "Oh, God, you're not gonna lay that Hanukkah crap on me, are you?" To drive home the message that Christmas is a time that Jews suffer (and that Christians are insensitive to that suffering), one of the students says, "Kyle's mother is here to ruin Christmas."

Excluded from a trip to the local mall to ask for presents from Santa, Kyle yells to his departing friends, "Wait! I may not have Santa, but I do have Mr. Hankey the Christmas Poo. . . . He comes out of the toilet every year and gives presents to everybody who has a lot of fiber in their diet." To one of the other boys, Kyle yells, "You're gonna be sorry when you see me riding on Santa's sleigh with Mr. Hankey, Fat Ass!" Alleged Christian intolerance is reinforced by the boy's reply: "You're not gonna ride on Santa's sleigh 'cause you're a Jew, Kyle!" Later, the scene shifts to Kyle's home, decorated in Hanukkah style. While brushing his teeth, Kyle is visited by Mr. Hankey, a turd wearing a Santa hat. Jumping out of the toilet bowl, Mr. Hankey the Christmas Poo sings a song about Santa and Christmas. The starkest comment in the scene comes when this animated piece of feces writes "Noel" in excrement on the mirror.

To finish the *Charlie Brown Christmas* special analogy, in which everyone chimes out "Merry Christmas, Charlie Brown!" only after Charlie has realized the true meaning of Christmas – which has Christ

²⁰ For more on Hollywood's war against Christmas, see my two-part series in *The Occidental Observer*: <http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Connelly-ChristmasI.html> and <http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Connelly-ChristmasII.html>.

at its center—the *South Park* characters wish Kyle a Merry Christmas only after he has taught everyone, with the help of Mr. Hankey, that Christmas and Christianity are shit. To be sure, this show takes mild swipes at individual Jews, but it never attacks Judaism as a religion. Coming as it does during one of the most important Christian holidays, its anti-Christian animus is manifest.

WHAT'S IN A NAME?

In Hollywood's collective imagination, the name "Christian" can be almost as threatening as an actual crucifix. In *Marathon Man* (1976), for example, Dustin Hoffman plays Thomas Levy, a Jewish graduate student tortured by an escaped Nazi dentist. Here, the fictional Nazi dentist's name is instructive: Dr. *Christian* Szell.²¹

An even more egregious association of Christianity with brutal violence is featured in a 1998 Nicolas Cage thriller called *8mm*, directed by Joel Schumacher. Cage plays private detective Tom Welles, who is summoned by a wealthy WASP family to clear up an uncomfortable discovery. The patriarch of the family has passed away. Among his important documents, his widow found an 8mm film depicting the sexual abuse of a nearly naked teenage girl, ending with a bloody scene of the girl being hacked to death with a large knife. The suspense in the film revolves around the question: does this represent a real slaying? As a modern psychological thriller goes, such a premise is not unusual. For the purposes of this essay, however, the choice of a family name for this household is telling: they are the "Christians."

In an attempt to verify the authenticity of this "snuff" film, investigator Welles delves into the underworld of pornographic movie making and finds nightmarish characters, the worst perhaps being "Machine," a giant of a man who wears a black leather mask as he sadistically tortures or kills his victims. Welles tracks him down to a lower-class neighborhood of single-family homes, where Machine still lives with his mother, a God-fearing, church-going woman. As Welles listens in, Machine's mother tells him, "I really wish you were going to church tonight." She then goes outside to the waiting church bus, which has the inscription "Faithful Christian Fellowship" inscribed on its side. This explicit identification of him as a Christian, paired with Welles's confirmation that the snuff film is indeed real and was commissioned

²¹ For a fuller discussion of *Marathon Man*, see Connelly, "Understanding Hollywood, Part I," 64–67.

by the late Mr. Christian – that “Mr. Christian” was directly responsible for the sex slaying of a teenage girl – strongly suggests that this later depiction of the “Faithful Christian Fellowship” is meant as a “booster shot” that reinforces the critique of Christianity and Christian culture.

* * *

There is a clear trend in Hollywood and the mainstream media in general toward an ever-intensifying deconstruction of Christianity and Christian civilization. This trend cannot be explained by market demand, since the vast majority of Americans are Christians to one degree or another. The explanation is that the mainstream media are controlled by what might be called an “anti-Christian coalition.” As I argued in the first installment of this series, the senior partners and directors of this coalition are Jews,²² but the coalition also contains non-Jews who are alienated from and hostile to Christianity for any number of reasons. The coalition wishes to use its power to alter, rather than cater to, the religious convictions of the majority. To borrow an apt description of the motives of Jewish radicals from Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, members of the coalition wish “to estrange the Christian from society, as he [the coalition member] feels estranged from it.”²³

What is the ultimate goal of the coalition? What fate has been scripted for Christianity and Christian civilization? The dénouement of *8mm* is most instructive. After determining that the late “Mr. Christian” had indeed commissioned a snuff film in which a young girl was tortured and murdered for sexual gratification, the detective, played by Nicholas Cage, informs the widow, “Mrs. Christian,” that her husband was a hypocrite, a pervert, and a murderer. Overcome by shame, Mrs. Christian commits suicide. The note she leaves the detective reads simply: “Try to forget us.”

*Edmund Connelly is an academic film and television scholar and a frequent contributor to **The Occidental Quarterly** and **The Occidental Observer** (www.theoccidentalobserver.net).*

²² Connelly, “Understanding Hollywood, Part I.”

²³ Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter, *Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians, and the New Left* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 125.

UNDERSTANDING HOLLYWOOD PART III: RACIAL ROLE-REVERSALS*

EDMUND CONNELLY

“We had no idea that we were about to trade places with the Black man.”

—Edgar Steele¹

Blacks in early American films were portrayed in an overwhelmingly negative light. At best, they were faithful servants and childlike buffoons. At worst, they were irresponsible, impulsive, lustful, and violent. One of the first major motion picture features ever made was D. W. Griffith’s *Birth of a Nation* (1915), based on Thomas W. Dixon’s novel and stage melodrama *The Clansman*, which portrayed recently emancipated slaves rising up against the white order, raping white women, and visiting violence upon white Americans in general. Since *Birth of a Nation*, the celluloid images of both blacks and whites in America have undergone an almost perfect reversal. This installment of the “Understanding Hollywood” series examines examples of such role-reversals and explores the forces that created them.

Negative images of blacks in American films were slow to change. Despite the growth of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 60s, “It was not until the late 1960s that African Americans began to play nonstereotypical roles, and the 1970s finally saw some serious and important films about African American history and life, like the made-for-television-films *The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pittman* (1974) and *Roots* (1975).”² By the late 1980s film portrayals of blacks had changed radically. In addition to the wide variety of serious roles for such black actors as James Earl Jones, Danny Glover, Morgan Freeman, and

* Cf. Edmund Connelly, “Understanding Hollywood,” Part I: “Hollywood’s Jewish Identity,” *The Occidental Quarterly*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 37–72 and “Understanding Hollywood,” Part II: “Deconstructing Christianity,” *The Occidental Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 51–60.

¹ <http://www.conspiracypenpal.com/columns/mlk2.htm>

² Margaret R. Miles, *Seeing and Believing: Religion and Values in the Movies* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 118–19.

Denzel Washington, black directors also began contributing their own views of black life in America. Foremost among these directors is Spike Lee, who burst upon the scene in 1989 with *Do the Right Thing*. Others followed, such as John Singleton, who directed the gritty tale of life in South Central Los Angeles, *Boyz N the Hood* (1991).

Though these more realistic portrayals of a more variegated black experience were long overdue, by about 1990 Hollywood had begun to swing away from such realism and continued on in the direction of ideological exaggeration, in some cases approaching farce. This time it was blacks who were idealized and whites who became the one-dimensional villains or fools. The tendency gathered speed as the decade progressed, so much so that in the first decade of the new millennium, there is a yawning chasm between real life in America and cinematic portrayals of that life.

CRIMINALS AND VICTIMS

Foremost among these misrepresentations is the depiction of which racial group is currently visiting violence, rapine, and murder on whom. While the real-life issue in America of black violence against whites continues to be—for complex historical reasons—a challenge American society has yet to overcome, the filmic portrayal of blacks has improved very much indeed. At the same time, a profound emphasis on the sins of white men against non-whites has become a common theme of Hollywood movies.

Joel Schumacher, son of a Jewish woman and Methodist man, directed the 1996 film, *A Time to Kill*, a story about the legacy of white racism in Mississippi. *A Time to Kill* begins with a chilling though statistically improbable course of events: Southern white “rednecks” menace a black neighborhood and rape, brutally beat, then hang a young black girl.

In fact, while it is very common for black men to rape white women, the rape of black women by white men is exceedingly rare. When leftist writer Andrew Hacker published his indictment of white society, *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal*, even he had to admit that “None of the survey respondents reported a case of rape where the assailant was white and the victim black.”³

³ Andrew Hacker, *Two Nations* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), 190. Statistics show that for cases of interracial crimes involving Blacks and Whites, Blacks commit 90 percent, while Whites commit only 10 percent. Further muddying these waters is

A Time to Kill not only portrays white men as rapists of black women, it justifies extrajudicial murder – i.e., lynching – of such white malefactors by blacks. The father of the victim kills the two white suspects in the courthouse. He is then charged with murder and put on trial. In the climactic courtroom scene in the film, the white lawyer defending the father adopts a clever ploy to save his client. He appeals to the Southern jury's visceral revulsion toward the idea of black-on-white crime. In particular, the lawyer conjures up the image of a little white girl violated by a black predator. Having thus brought to the fore the jury's abhorrence of such a situation, he then asks them what they would do if the races were reversed and the actual predators were white men and the victim a little black girl. In this way, the jury is led to feel that the father of the black victim was justified in seeking revenge on his daughter's white attackers; the father is acquitted, sending a clear message that some forms of lynching are just.

DISPLACING WHITE LEADERSHIP

To say that the United States is a creation of white men is not an expression of racial prejudice, but merely a statement of historical fact. All the authors and signers of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and every president until the present one, were white men. The transformation of America from a white nation to a multiracial one therefore requires that whites cede power to non-whites, and Hollywood has done its part by repeatedly scripting, filming, and promoting stories about the displacement of white leadership. Hollywood has convinced many whites that non-white leaders are not merely conceivable, but even desirable.

Eddie Murphy's 1992 film *The Distinguished Gentleman* epitomizes this sort of film. Murphy plays a con man fortunate enough to share the name of a just-deceased US Congressman, Jeff Johnson. Taking advantage of the value of name recognition, Thomas Jefferson Johnson (Murphy) shortens his name and runs for Congress. (Presciently, his entire campaign consists of a promise for "change" – a pledge we

the fact that "Hispanics are considered a victim category for hate crimes but not a perpetrator category. A Mexican who is attacked because of ethnicity is recorded as Hispanic, but if the same Mexican attacks a black or white for racial reasons he is considered white. This inflates the figure for 'white' hate crime perpetrators . . ." *The Color of Crime: Race, Crime, and Violence in America* (Oakton, Virginia: New Century Foundation, 1998), 1; see also Michael Levin, *Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), 294–95.

would hear repeatedly from a real black politician in 2008.) Interested only in the perks of the job, Johnson is woefully ignorant of the election process and the workings of Washington. Fortunately, he is aided in the campaign by a Jewish retiree from New York and wins the election. (The two even banter in Yiddish at one point.)

Throughout the film, white America is subjected to withering critique. All whites in high-status positions are shown to be deeply flawed or hypocritical. For instance, the film opens with a reception for the original Congressman Johnson, surrounded by throngs of white supporters. Soon, however, the good Congressman is shown *in flagrante delicto* with his white secretary, an act which brings on his death by heart attack.

As the only black man in attendance at the reception, Murphy's character is mistaken for a waiter, a sign of the pervasive racist assumptions of whites. In fact, Murphy is a con man, one who employs a Hispanic and a fellow black to extort money from a philandering white company president. Once in Washington, Johnson quickly realizes that all the white congressmen and lobbyists surrounding him are con men like himself—only the stakes are far higher, so Johnson sets out to enrich himself by playing the game.

The images of the white male legislators and lobbyists are predictable: they are corrupt, immoral, racist fools. Opposite these white frauds is a whole rainbow coalition of aggrieved minorities: blacks, Hispanics, homosexuals, Asians, etc. At every turn, the image of the white is negative. Fat cat gun lovers are shown stupidly hunting ducks with semi-automatic rifles, and a white taxi driver ogling street walkers rear-ends Johnson's car, then shamelessly leaves the scene of the accident.

The moral center of the film is another black man, a theme that was still original in 1992 but is now *de rigueur* (and should be *passé*). The decent black man is a preacher intent on doing what is right. His idealism has rubbed off on his niece, an intelligent, incorruptible lawyer/activist who becomes romantically involved with Johnson. (One of her fellow activists is Ira Schechter, a humble and unassuming Jewish do-gooder.)

Exposure to her and her preacher uncle awakens Johnson's conscience. He momentarily backslides when the stakes get high, but then risks losing his girlfriend. Finally, he decides on one last scam, this time in the service of justice. In a Congressional hearing room, he exposes the white male chairman and greedy white lobbyists, humiliating them

in the process.

In the final scene, Johnson is about to be drummed out of Congress for his antics. Johnson and his girlfriend walk away from the Capitol. The girlfriend asks what he's going to do now that he cannot run again for Congress. Pondering his options, Johnson hits on an idea: "I'm gonna run for President!" Remember, this was 1992.

The Distinguished Gentleman was not the first time Murphy played the role of an underclass black man who exposes the putative immorality of majority culture. In 1983, he did a similar job of humiliating and replacing elite white males in *Trading Places*. In fact, the theme has become so common now that it is a genre unto itself.

DENZEL WASHINGTON

For more than 20 years, when Hollywood sought a youngish black actor for a role exploring white racism and black empowerment, Denzel Washington has topped the list. In 1987's *Cry Freedom*, for example, he played South African anti-apartheid martyr Steve Biko. In 1989's *Glory* he played an escaped slave who joins the Union army in the Civil War. In 1991's *Mississippi Masala*, Washington's character falls in love with an immigrant from India in racist Mississippi. Washington's big breakthrough, however, was his title role in the 1992 Spike Lee film *Malcolm X*. In 1999, Washington played the title role in *The Hurricane*, about boxer Rubin "Hurricane" Carter, imprisoned for the 1966 murders of three New Jersey whites. Other race-charged Washington films include *The Siege* (1998), *Training Day* (2001), *John Q* (2002), *Antwone Fisher* (2002), *Man on Fire* (2004), *Inside Man* (2006), *Déjà Vu* (2006), *American Gangster* (2007), and *The Great Debaters* (2007). Regarding the theme of white displacement, however, two of Washington's films stand out: *Crimson Tide* (1995), directed by Tony Scott and produced by Don Simpson and Jerry Bruckheimer, and *Remember the Titans* (2000), directed by Boaz Yakin and produced by Jerry Bruckheimer.

Power is central in *Crimson Tide*, as emphasized by the opening statement that the commander of a nuclear ballistic missile submarine is one of the three most powerful men in the world, following the leaders of Russia and the United States. The film also harks back to racism in the Deep South because it is set on a submarine named the *Alabama*. The struggle between slave and master is exemplified in the rivalry between the Executive Officer Hunter, played by Washington, and Captain Ramsey, played by Gene Hackman.

The stage for a confrontation is set early in the film when a fire breaks out in the galley, and Hunter leads the effort to extinguish it. The captain, meanwhile, takes this opportunity to run a missile launch drill. Because of the stress of the drill immediately following the fire, a black cook succumbs to a heart attack. Hunter protests the decision to run a drill at such a risky moment, but Captain Ramsey refuses to accept any blame.

This initial black vs. white confrontation quickly escalates into a major showdown. The submarine receives ambiguous transmissions seeming to order the launch of nuclear missiles against targets in the former USSR. Ramsey, who has risen through the ranks of the Navy the hard way, favors an immediate launch. Hunter, an Annapolis Naval Academy graduate, insists upon confirmation of the order before possibly precipitating World War III. Though Ramsey attempts to remove Hunter from his post so that he can unleash the missiles, he fails in his efforts by losing his temper and impulsively straying from standard operating procedure. The cool-headed Hunter then takes advantage of this lapse and has the captain himself relieved of command. Captain Ramsey relinquishes command and walks off stage, old and tired. Metaphorically, this can be interpreted as an attempt to read white males out of the story of a new America, one in which blacks are set to assume their turn at the pinnacles of power.

Perhaps more than any other Hollywood movie, *Remember the Titans* (2000) reveals the template for the planned replacement of the American majority. Ostensibly a heart-warming tale about a group of high school football players working to overcome racism in turbulent times, the barely buried subtext is that whites should gladly—altruistically—hand over everything that they value to blacks. The football team represents American society in microcosm: black, white, and tense. Subtlety is not this film's forte.

The film opens in the present with a mixed group of well-dressed blacks and whites arriving at a cemetery. A voiceover tells us that in 1971 their school in Alexandria, Virginia had been forced by the school board to integrate. The action then fades back to that time. As Hollywood routinely does, it depicts violence coming only from whites, with the narrator telling us that a white store owner has killed a black youth, precipitating violence in town. Bill Yoast, the white coach of the all-white football team, establishes his credentials as a moral person when he prevents his boys, including his star quarterback who hates these "black animals," from heading into town to protect the

white store owner.

Into this tense situation comes a new black coach, Herman Boone (Washington), who moves his family into an all-white neighborhood. At the recently integrated school, the men find out that Boone will replace Yoast as head coach, a proposition that the white coaches find unpalatable. The white players, too, object, threatening to boycott the black coach. Yoast, however, convinces them that the right thing to do is play ball.

Play they do, beginning with a bus trip to summer camp. To no one's surprise, the bus scene is used to highlight segregation. Coach Boone is eager to establish his dominance and does so when Gary, the white quarterback, tries to act as master of the coach. Boone neatly turns this around by humiliating Gary (and all the white parents watching), badgering the boy with taunts of "Who's your daddy?" Meekly, Gary gives in and rides the integrated bus.

Upon arrival at the camp, Boone demands that white and black players share rooms. Clashes erupt over tastes in music as well as responses to a poster of black athletes giving the Black Power salute at the 1968 Mexico City Olympics. An obese white lineman confesses to all in the cafeteria that he is too stupid to go to college. To remedy this, a brilliant black player volunteers to tutor the grateful white, who acknowledges that he is nothing but "white trash."

Injecting historical seriousness into the film, Boone runs his charges through the dense woods, coming upon a fog-shrouded battlefield cemetery. He then speaks of the background of the Civil War and its attempt to erase the wrongs of slavery. Let us not, he intones, forget those goals and sacrifices, nor let those past hatreds persist.

The second white character to become a moral center for this film is Gary, the quarterback. Unlike Coach Yoast, Gary harbors racist feelings toward blacks. He will be one of three examples of whites who come to terms with the new conditions in America, finding it unthinkable at first but slowly coming to see both its inevitability and rightness. After sharing a room with a black teammate, Gary returns to town more open-minded. His girlfriend, however, remains a segregationist and refuses to shake hands with a black player. She, too, will change, though, becoming another white character on screen to lead reluctant whites in the theater audience to make the same transition.

At the Titans' first game, one in which the whites in the stands segregate themselves, the mixed Titans defeat an all-white team. Celebrating after the game, Gary's white friends expect him to join them

for some fun, but Gary sticks with his black and white teammates. Hungry, they look for a restaurant. A newly arrived teammate from California promises to treat them at a local restaurant, but the black players balk. Finally, they all enter, whereupon the simian-looking and unshaven white owner refuses to seat them at any of the open tables. After all, this is the segregated South.

Meanwhile, back in school, the issue of interracial dating is hinted at but is quickly turned into an opportunity to castigate whites for their racism. When a black player moves in close to a group of white girls, teasing them about who's good looking, white students begin a scuffle. Gary, growing ever more certain of the evils of racism—including white solidarity—steps in to threaten his former friends.

Yoast's young daughter is the third major character to revise her feelings toward blacks. At first she sees Coach Boone as a black interloper who is taking her daddy's job. Later, she reluctantly allows that Boone isn't such a bad coach. Later still, after befriending Boone's daughter, she is at the Boone home when racists throw a brick through the front window. Now she too takes sides, going so far as to tell her father that she hates living among "rednecks."

The racial conflict grows in intensity. For instance, a white player deliberately misses a block during a game, resulting in an injury to a black player. Again taking the movie-constructed moral position, Gary ignores white solidarity and has the white player thrown off the team. Next, in the regional championship, the opposing coach and referees are openly racist, making ridiculous penalty calls, but still the Titans prevail. In the line-up after the game to shake hands, though, the other team's white coach refuses to shake hands with Boone.

By this point in the film, the proper position for the audience to espouse has been firmly established. From here on out, characters either get with the program or get relegated to the realm of the hopelessly racist. Gary's girlfriend is one of the first to repent, coming down to the field during a game to shake hands with a black player.

Her boyfriend, Gary, however, takes the symbolism to a new level: that of Christ-like martyr for the sake of his black teammates. Driving his '69 Chevy Camaro through town after another Titans victory, his car is broadsided by an old pickup truck, and he is permanently paralyzed from the waist down. In the hospital, Gary watches on TV as his team fights its way to victory in the Virginia State Championship. Director Boaz Yakin sets up a shot where white light from above shines over the prostrate Gary, who then lifts his arms into a Christ-like

pose. He has given everything so that his black teammates may play.

In the film's climax, the Titans are losing. At halftime, Coach Yoast makes a rousing speech, telling the team that they have taught him that people really are to be judged by their character not race. Fired up, the boys return to the field to do battle. Another white player gives up his starting position to a black teammate voluntarily and without prodding. The decision turns out to be the right one, for the black player recovers a fumble, then later sprints 75 yards downfield for the winning touchdown, while the new white quarterback blocks for him. No opportunity is missed to show that the world is a better place when blacks replace whites. The lesson for American society in general is clear.

MORGAN FREEMAN, THE "NUMINOUS NEGRO"

The concept of the "numinous Negro" was coined by Richard Brookhiser.⁴ Numinous Negroes are not just leaders and heroes. They are paragons of wisdom—moral and spiritual exemplars. Morgan Freeman is Hollywood's favorite actor for Numinous Negro roles. Ever since his breakthrough role as chauffeur Hoke Colburn in *Driving Miss Daisy* (1989), Freeman has consistently been cast as a man of rare intelligence, sensitivity, and moral grounding, usually paired with younger whites who admire him for his superior wisdom and seek his guidance.

In *Driving Miss Daisy*, Jessica Tandy plays Miss Daisy, a wealthy Jewish widow who is burdened by her son with a personal chauffeur. At first, Hoke seems to be the stereotypical step-and-fetchit. Illiterate and seemingly simple, he has no greater goal than to minister to a white woman and her family. As played by Freeman, however, these qualities are transformed into a moving account of a quirky but true friendship, as both Hoke and Miss Daisy grow old together and become increasingly detached from a changing world. The languid pace and soft focus, combined with first-rate performances by Freeman and Tandy, explain why the film won the Academy Award for Best Picture.

Freeman's next film is *Glory* (1989), the story of black soldiers fighting for the North during the Civil War. As Sergeant Major John Rawlins, Freeman acts as advisor to hot-headed former slave Private Trip (Denzel Washington). Rawlins also offers counsel to Colonel Shaw, the white Northern abolitionist who commands the troops.

⁴ Richard Brookhiser, "The Numinous Negro," *National Review*, August 20, 2001.

In the 1990 adaptation of Tom Wolfe's *The Bonfire of the Vanities*, Freeman was cast as the judge "when the studio decided to change the judge's ethnicity from Jewish to African-American in order to moderate criticism of the film's racial politics."⁵ In addition, in keeping with Freeman's appointed role as moral exemplar, dialogue was added which allowed him to preach to the flawed main characters.

In 1991's *Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves*, Freeman played Azeem, a "dignified Saracen warrior with superior judgment," whose achievements include "employing a telescope, delivering a breach baby, and initiating gunpowder into a decisive battle."⁶

In *The Shawshank Redemption* (1994), Freeman played an imprisoned murderer who becomes the friend and mentor of a younger white prisoner played by Tim Robbins – a rather far cry from the usual relationship of black and white men in prison.⁷

In 1995 Freeman appeared in *Outbreak* as Brigadier General Billy Ford, the counterforce to the corrupt Major General McClintock, who plans to blow up a small American town to contain a pestilence. Freeman was next paired with Brad Pitt in *Seven* (1995) to hunt down a white, religious serial killer. On the verge of retirement, Freeman's Lt. Somerset becomes the mentor of a brash, arrogant, and undisciplined young detective, Sergeant Mills (Pitt). The two men are a study in contrasts: Freeman's character wise, thoughtful, and introspective, Pitt's emotional, impulsive, and unreflective.

In *Kiss the Girls* (1997) and *Along Came a Spider* (2001), Freeman returned to hunting white male serial killers. Freeman plays Dr. Alex Cross, a forensic psychologist who has written tomes on the psychology of serial killers and is unusually insightful in decoding ambiguous clues. In *Kiss the Girls* Freeman's character again mentors a younger white, but this time it is a woman, and there are undercurrents of romance. As with *A Time to Kill*, the plot involves the violence of white men against black women. In this case the victim is Cross' niece, who has been kidnapped by two white men. In *Along Came a Spider*, Cross again saves a young white woman. Both films also contain an abundance of black and female characters in roles that were

⁵ [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Bonfire_of_the_Vanities_\(film\)#Main_cast](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Bonfire_of_the_Vanities_(film)#Main_cast)

⁶ Jack G. Shaheen, *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People* (Northampton, Mass.: Interlink Publishing Group, 2001) 399–400.

⁷ Jared Taylor, "Hard Time," a review of Joanne Mariner, *No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons*, <http://www.amren.com/ar/2002/04/index.html#article1>.

once more heavily white and male—detectives, doctors, etc. For instance, there is a black female computer expert. (Dr. Cross is also unusually skilled at using a computer.)

Freeman also combines scientific knowledge and technological inventiveness with his usual role as mentor to younger whites in *Batman Begins* (2005) and its sequel *The Dark Knight* (2008). Freeman's character Lucius Fox provides the young Bruce Wayne with the sophisticated gadgets he needs to become Batman. He also offers Wayne moral guidance and even runs his vast business empire for him.

In *The Sum of All Fears* (2002), Freeman plays the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who mentors a younger white agent, Jack Ryan, played by Ben Affleck.

But the peak of Freeman's political roles was in the 1998 film, *Deep Impact*, in which he played the president of the United States. Here one really begins to suspect that such an image is being deliberately constructed rather than just being "in the air." As a writer for the *Los Angeles Times* wrote, "Black presidents, in fact, have been our awesomest presidents ever: Morgan Freeman in 'Deep Impact' and Dennis Haysbert in '24.' And their approval ratings . . . have been huge."⁸

After playing the US president, the next logical step up for Freeman was to play God himself, which he did in *Bruce Almighty* (2003) opposite Jim Carrey. Freeman played God yet again in *Evan Almighty* (2007) opposite Steve Carell.

RIGHTEOUS WHITES

America is still a majority white nation. Whites still hold most of the nation's wealth and power. Thus the process of white dispossession cannot continue without the cooperation of white Americans. Because of this, Hollywood cannot portray all white Americans as evil racists. That can wait until after we are extinct. In the meantime, Hollywood must also offer images of decent, moral whites: the kind of white people with whom white audiences would like to identify. It should come as no surprise, however, that the measure of these white characters' virtue is their willingness to cooperate in their own people's dispossession. Thus, although the viewer is given an image of the evils of white majority society, he is also allowed to identify with a member of the white majority who steps forward to defend the rights of non-whites. I call this character the "righteous white."

⁸ Joel Stein, "A black president? Seen a few," *Los Angeles Times*, January 11, 2008.

We have already encountered righteous whites in *Remember the Titans*: coach Yoast, who gracefully gives up his position to a black; the quarterback Gary, who breaks ranks with his fellow whites to defend blacks; etc. Righteous whites are a staple in Hollywood race films, whether the non-whites they champion are American Indians in Kevin Costner's *Dances With Wolves* (1990), Japanese Americans in *Come See the Paradise* (1990) and *Snow Falling on Cedars* (1999), or blacks in movies from *To Kill a Mockingbird* (1962) to *Mississippi Burning* (1988), *A Time to Kill* (1996), *Ghosts of Mississippi* (1996), *The Hurricane* (1999), and *The Green Mile* (2000).

Late in his career, Clint Eastwood has invested a great deal in presenting himself as a righteous white, both in *True Crime* (1999), where he comes to the aid of a black, and *Gran Torino* (2008), where he champions a family of Hmong. Eastwood not only starred in both movies, he produced and directed them.

In *True Crime* Eastwood plays reporter Steve Everett, an adulterous recovering alcoholic. Sensing a travesty of justice, he looks into the case of Frank Beechum, a black man condemned to death for murdering a white woman and scheduled to die at midnight that very day.

Though Everett is liberal and non-racist, the rest of the whites in the movie are racist to one degree or another. For example, when the white warden tours the execution chamber, two white guards joke around by imitating a condemned man who finally confesses. This is in contrast to Beechum, who maintains his innocence. Later, a smarmy white pastor attempts to use the black convict for his own ends, hoping to draw publicity to himself. The pastor goes so far as to invent a last-minute confession by the condemned. The camera repeatedly intrudes on the guards' banal conversations and jokes, despite the solemn atmosphere created by an impending execution. True, one guard is black and one Asian, but they appear as props. The focus is on the more numerous white guards and warden.

In addition, the key witness to the murder comes across as a cowardly white who hopes to gain attention by embellishing his story. In any case, he and another white witness are shown to be guilty of racism in that they "naturally" pick the black man they saw at the crime scene out of a police lineup. When Everett visits the home of the black grandmother of a possible witness, she delivers a soliloquy on the pervasiveness of anti-black racism in America.

When it turns out that the woman's now-deceased grandson killed the white victim, the shooting is shown as unintentional; thus, there

are no true black criminals in this movie, only white racists. Everett's new evidence halts the execution seconds after it has begun, and Beechum survives to enjoy freedom with his doting wife and daughter. Steve Everett may look good at the end of the film, but the same can hardly be said of whites in general.

In *Gran Torino*, Eastwood plays Walt Kowalski, a retired auto worker living in a neighborhood that has been taken over by poor Hmong refugees. Walt is an angry, bitter old widower who is alienated from his family. He later learns that he is terminally ill. He also has negative, racist feelings toward the Hmong. Eventually, though, Walt involves himself in the struggle of a young Hmong neighbor, Thao, to resist the pressure to join a gang. He comes to value the family-oriented Hmong culture while remaining alienated from his own family.

When Walt repels a gang assault on Thao, the gang responds by raping Thao's sister and shooting up his house. Thao wants to retaliate immediately, but Walt first stalls him, then locks him in his basement. Once Thao is safe, Walt confronts the gang members outside their house. With a cigarette in his mouth, he asks them for a light. Then he thrusts his hand in his jacket. The gang members think he is pulling a gun and shoot him dead. In fact, he was only reaching for a cigarette lighter. The gang members are arrested for killing Walt in cold blood. By sacrificing his life, Walt has halted the cycle of violence and saved Thao and his family. But Walt does more than merely sacrifice his life for non-whites. He also sacrifices the interests of his children to them. When Walt's will is read, it is revealed that he has disinherited his children, leaving his house to the Catholic Church and his prize Ford Gran Torino to Thao. It is a model of righteousness that can only lead to racial suicide.

* * *

If Hollywood were a predominantly black industry, these racial role reversals would be no mystery. They would merely be examples of a healthy—albeit a bit farcical—form of ethnic self-assertion. But as I have shown in the first article of this series,⁹ Hollywood is a predominantly Jewish milieu. Thus the phenomenon of racial role reversals must be understood in the context of the relationship of blacks and Jews.

⁹ Connelly, "Understanding Hollywood," Part I: "Hollywood's Jewish Identity."

Left to their own devices, black Americans could not have won their freedom from slavery, much less put one of their own in the White House. It was white abolitionists who destroyed slavery. And Jews played a leading role in the struggle for black political, economic, and cultural advancement in the twentieth century.

Kevin MacDonald argues that these efforts need to be viewed as part of a wider agenda of Jewish empowerment through the promotion of multiracialism and multiculturalism.¹⁰ Jews are most visible and vulnerable, and therefore least powerful, in racially and culturally homogeneous societies. They are less visible and vulnerable, and therefore more powerful, in racially and culturally pluralistic societies. Thus Jews have dedicated themselves to promoting multiculturalism. They have overthrown the idea of the United States as an ethnically European nation. They have promoted unrestricted immigration and the integration of racial outgroups like blacks into the mainstream of society. But Jews have supported black empowerment only to the extent that it promotes multiculturalism, while resisting all forms of black nationalism and separatism.

Jews have promoted multiculturalism not merely for ethnic self-defense, but to attain ethnic power. Multiculturalism has not produced a society where no ethnic group is dominant. It has merely replaced white hegemony with Jewish hegemony, for Jews are the arbiters of multiculturalism. For Jews, black empowerment is not an end in itself, but a tool of Jewish empowerment. Black advancement empowers Jews by breaking down white ethnic solidarity and crowding whites out of positions of power and influence. Jews have created an imaginary world of black empowerment and white dispossession because they know that movies shape the real world. As Plato said, "Those who tell the stories rule society." The host of fictional black presidents has finally made possible a real one. But the puppet masters in both worlds are the same.

*Edmund Connelly is an academic film and television scholar and a frequent contributor to **The Occidental Quarterly** and **The Occidental Observer** (www.theoccidentalobserver.net).*

¹⁰ Kevin MacDonald, "Jews, Blacks, and Race," in *Race and the American Prospect*, ed. Samuel Francis (Mt. Airy, Md.: The Occidental Press, 2006).

**BLACK METAL:
CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION IN
MODERN POPULAR CULTURE**

ALEX KURTAGIC

From the viewpoint of racial nationalism, the musical genre known as Black Metal is one of the most significant popular culture phenomena of the last two decades. Yet it has been seldom discussed by politically congenial scholars and commentators. This is surprising, since Black Metal runs counter to the post-World War II trends toward the progressive marginalization, condemnation, and psychopathologization of overt racial consciousness among whites. It is even more surprising when one considers that Black Metal is inspired by and sustains the same cultural and literary traditions that inform modern racial nationalism. Moreover, Black Metal, by means of its highly stylized, frankly European aesthetics, offers an effective weapon operating at the all-important pre-rational level with which to counter the assault on white identity.

I have written before about the need to create a parallel universe outside contemporary mainstream culture, and this involves not only choosing our own topics of scholarship, but anticipating their being defined through appropriation by the establishment's own conformist scholars.¹ I write, therefore, in hopes of introducing Black Metal as a topic of scholarly analysis within the anti-egalitarian tradition.

Black Metal has not been entirely ignored by mainstream scholars. It is discussed, for example, in *Extreme Metal* by Keith Kahn-Harris, founder of the New Centre for Jewish Thought;² in *The Meaning and Purpose of Leisure: Habermas and Leisure and the End of Modernity*, by Karl Spracklen;³ in *Commodified Evil's Wayward Children: Black Metal*

¹ Alex Kurtagic, "Mastery of Style Trumps Superiority of Argument," *TOQ Online*, May 4, 2009, <http://www.toqonline.com/2009/05/mastery-of-style/> and Alex Kurtagic, "I am not racist, but . . .," *The Occidental Observer*, June 7, 2009, <http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Kurtagic-NotRacist.html>.

² Keith Kahn-Harris, *Extreme Metal: Music and Culture on the Edge* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2007).

³ Karl Spracklen, *The Meaning and Purpose of Leisure: Habermas and Leisure and the*

and Death Metal as Purveyors of an Alternative Form of Modern Escapism by Jason Foster;⁴ and in *Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism and the Politics of Identity*, by Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke.⁵ It has also been discussed by a few popular writers, including Michael Moynihan and Didrik Söderlind, whose *Lords of Chaos: The Bloody Rise of the Satanic Metal Underground* is available from mainstream booksellers.⁶

While Moynihan and Söderlind rely on Jungian archetypes for what is otherwise a sensationalist and journalistic analysis of Black Metal, the other texts rely on analytical frameworks derived from the Freudo-Marxist scholastic tradition, which includes Marxist theorists like Louis Pierre Althusser, postmodernists like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, critical theorists like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, and so on. It is not difficult to see that interpretations of culture from these quarters, while containing many astute insights, are necessarily limited and distorted by the theorists' unquestioning belief in equality as a good in itself, by their rejection of evolutionist insights as nefarious and ideological, and by their alienated – when not merely alien – attitudes towards traditional Western culture.

The limitations and distortions built into this body of theory are exacerbated by its status in Western academia as the institutional orthodoxy, a closed universe of theory where alternative – e.g., inegalitarian, evolutionist – perspectives are rejected in advance as discredited, outmoded, prejudiced, or lacking in scholarly rigor. When the subject of study is a cultural phenomenon that explicitly rejects the first principles upon which such a body of theory is predicated, there is always the danger of analysis degenerating into moralizing incomprehension.

DISSIDENCE AS A STYLE

What is Black Metal? Black Metal is a radical outgrowth of Heavy Metal. During the 1980s bands playing commercialized forms of Heavy Metal entered the mainstream, attaining lofty positions in the

End of Modernity (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

⁴ Jason Foster, *Commodified Evil's Wayward Children: Black Metal and Death Metal as Purveyors of an Alternative Form of Modern Escapism* (Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, 2008).

⁵ Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, *Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism and the Politics of Identity* (New York: New York University Press, 2001).

⁶ Michael Moynihan and Didrik Soderlind, *Lords of Chaos: The Bloody Rise of the Satanic Metal Underground* (Los Angeles: Feral House, 2003).

music charts and selling millions of albums. This prompted "fundamentalist" elements within the Heavy Metal scene to reclaim it as an underground praxis by developing extreme variants of the Heavy Metal sound, perceived to be more in tune with the genre's original anti-commercial and countercultural values.⁷ Black Metal was one such variant. It is deemed "Black" Metal because it originally defined itself in terms of Satanic and occult themes and aesthetics.

Black Metal does not sound like Heavy Metal. Both musical forms rely on the same core sonic components (guitar, bass, drums, and vocals); both are characterized by sonic intensity, extreme vocal performances, and the use of heavily amplified, distorted guitars. Heavy Metal musicians, however, tend to favor predictable song structures (verse, chorus, verse, chorus, solo, verse, chorus), as well as sung/screamed, melodic vocals. In addition, Heavy Metal guitarists, although often incorporating influences from classical music in their style, play in a manner that still evinces Heavy Metal's roots in Rhythm and Blues. Heavy Metal lyrics tend to deal with relatively superficial matters associated with youth: love, growing up, sex, rebellion, fun, drinking, etc.

Black metal, on the other hand, is much darker and much more extreme, favoring a rawer, noisier, and much harsher guitar sound; unpredictable song structures; classically-influenced melodies that suggest grimness, mysticism, sorrow, and misanthropic hatred; and inhuman, demonic screeches for vocals, unintelligible and heavily reverberated. In addition, Black Metal lyrics tend to be serious and arcane, dealing with the occult, pre-Christian mythology, pagan pride, war, misanthropy, genocide, and hatred of Christianity.

Black Metal also significantly differs from Heavy Metal aesthetically. Black Metal favors black above any color. Black Metal logos tend to be tortuous and elaborate, almost always unreadable, and laden with occult and/or pagan symbols, such as runes, swastikas, inverted crosses, pentagrams, and mjölnirs. Tortuous "blacklettering" (gothic letters) are nearly ubiquitous. Musicians use esoteric mythological stage names and obscure their faces with corpse-like black and white face paint. They appear on their albums in nocturnal, wooded, mediaeval, and/or wintry settings, clad in studded black leather and laden with bandoliers. It is not uncommon for the most extreme and misanthropic Black

⁷ Deena Weinstein, *Heavy Metal: The Music and its Culture* (New York: Da Capo Press, 2000).

Metal bands to engage in self-mutilation (usually with hunting knives, around the arms and torso) and to have themselves photographed covered in blood after having performed such acts. The object is always to create images likely to inspire fear and horror among observers in the cultural mainstream—although this is merely “preaching to the choir,” of course, an effort to distinguish themselves as radically as possible from the despised “mainstream,” for otherwise Black Metal is nearly invisible outside its subcultural milieu.

ORIGINS OF BLACK METAL

Early Black Metal bands were Bathory, from Sweden, and Venom, from England. Venom are credited with inventing the term “Black Metal,” which first appeared as the title of their 1981 album. Bathory, however, proved far more influential. Although Bathory’s early works were dominated by Satanic themes and aesthetics, these were gradually displaced by the infusion of elements from classical music (particularly the Romantic period) and a growing fascination with pre-Christian Scandinavian mythology and history. Albums like *Blood Fire Death* (1989), *Hammerheart* (1991), and *Twilight of the Gods* (1992) eventually inspired the development of an entire new genre, now known as Viking Metal.

Similarly influential was the Swiss trio, Hellhammer, and its subsequent incarnation, Celtic Frost. Hellhammer was a prototype of such 1980s outgrowths of Heavy Metal as Thrash Metal, Death Metal, and Black Metal, but cannot be categorized as any one of them. Through their highly poetic and esoteric lyrics and increasingly elaborate musical compositions (peaking in 1987’s *Into the Pandemonium*), Hellhammer/Celtic Frost pioneered the transformation of Metal music into a sophisticated popular art form.

At a time when Heavy Metal seemed preoccupied mostly with base, low-brow, hedonistic excess (beer, girls, partying), Celtic Frost’s albums dealt with gods and ancient civilizations, and Bathory’s with Asatru, Vikings, and World War II. The British Thrash Metal band, Skyclad, was also significant, instigating the development of Folk Metal, a genre which incorporates traditional Folk music into a Black Metal framework, and whose musicians have links to the Black Metal and Viking Metal scenes.

Modern Black Metal has long ceased to be characterized purely by Satanism. Indeed, since the late 1980s, some Black Metal musicians have self-consciously refused to be defined by a foreign (i.e., non-

European) monotheistic tradition. There is no Satan, however, without Christianity. By defining itself against Christianity, Satanism merely inverts Christian values instead of rejecting them altogether and embracing an authentically European worldview.

Many Black Metal musicians have, as a result, recognized the superficiality and ultimate futility of continuing "the war against (Judeo-) Christianity" which was central to Black Metal scene during the early and mid 1990s. Moreover, and at least partly in consequence, Black Metal has long since splintered into a variety of vehemently pagan subgenres, such as the abovementioned Viking Metal and Folk Metal, and – the most radical of all – National Socialist Black Metal (NSBM).

VÖLKISCH THOUGHT AND THE CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION

Some of the most fascinating aspects of Black Metal are its parallels with the ideas and sensibilities of the Conservative Revolution and the wider *völkisch* (populist) movement that swept Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These similarities are so striking that Black Metal may well be considered, if not the continuation, then at least the revival of the Conservative Revolution on the plane of modern popular culture.

Black Metal is, moreover, part of a growing subculture of resistance to the anti-white system. This subculture consists of a constellation of interconnected musical genres and subgenres, religious practices, philosophical and political thinkers and schools, websites, booksellers, publications, and cultural activities, such as battle re-enactment. This subculture sustains itself by providing its members with a positive identity that is not dependent on the system of status awards maintained by the present sociocultural and political dispensation. Moreover, if, as Jacques Attali has proposed, the music of the present is the noise of the future, then, in a coded way, Black Metal could well be more symptomatic of things to come than of things as they are.⁸

The Conservative Revolution was entirely different from modern American conservatism, which is merely a form of classical liberalism allied with socially conservative views. American conservatives believe in progress, democracy, equality before the law, and free markets; their ideology derives from the Enlightenment as formulated by John Locke and Adam Smith. They are closely associated with libertarianism. They

⁸ Jacques Attali, *Noise: The Political Economy of Music* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985).

regard man as a rational, sovereign individual, and they tend to have a linear, progressivist conception of history. The German Conservative Revolutionaries, like other *völkisch* movements, were reacting *against* the rationalism of the Enlightenment, and, in American terms, have much in common with the Southern Agrarians. Their common enemies were modernity, urbanism, and industrialism.

Völkisch thought is characterized by a romantic focus on the “organic,” German folklore, local history, blood and soil, and nature mysticism. The term derives from the German word *Volk*, which corresponds to “people,” or “folk,” but with the added connotations of folklore, race, and nation. Among the German romantics, “*Volk*” “signified the union of a group of people with a transcendental essence,” the fusion of man with nature (particularly his native landscape, following Wilhelm Riehl), mythos, or the cosmos, wherein man found “the source of his creativity, his depth of feeling, his individuality, and his unity with other members of the *Volk*.”⁹ A related concept is “*Volkstum*,” a term that combines the notions of folklore and ethnicity.

Völkisch thought arose from the Romantic nationalism of the early nineteenth century, particularly that of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who, along with Ernst Moritz Arndt and Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, “began to conceive of the *Volk* in heroic terms during the wars of liberation against Napoleon.”¹⁰ *Völkisch* thought emerged at a time when Germany existed as a collection of semi-feudal principalities. As political unity eluded them for more than half a century, *völkisch* thinkers were forced to emphasize cultural and spiritual rather than political dimensions of unity. Thus they came to idealize, even mystify, the concept of nationhood. This process attained such momentum that when political unification finally came in 1871, the prosaic nature of Bismarck’s *Realpolitik* led to a tremendous sense of disappointment.

Völkisch thought also coincided with the Industrial Revolution and the attendant destruction of the German landscape, dislocations of the population, obsolescence of traditional crafts and tools, social alienation, political upheavals (e.g., the revolutions of 1848), and economic crises. These led eventually to disenchantment and finally to the wholesale rejection of industrial society and modernity, which came to be seen as materialistic, soulless, rootless, abstract, mechanical,

⁹ George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966).

¹⁰ Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, 14.

alienating, cosmopolitan, and irreconcilable with national self-identification. *Völkisch* thought was a quest for rootedness, for the "inward correspondence between the individual, the native soil, the *Volk*, and the universe."¹¹ Hence the calls for a "'German revolution' to liquidate the dangerous new developments and to guide the nation back to its original purpose." Unsurprisingly, *völkisch* ideologists saw "traditional politics as exemplifying the worst aspect of the world in which they lived," and "rejected political parties as artificial," favoring instead an "elitism that derived from their semi-mystical conceptions of nature and man."¹²

The *völkisch* rejection of modernity was sometimes combined with racist occult and esoteric doctrines exemplified by runologist Guido von List, author of *The Secret of the Runes*. List's racist reading of Helena Blavatsky's Theosophy proved influential in occult circles. The Guido von List Society (*Guido-von-List-Gesellschaft*), which he founded, included among its members the sexo-racist Jorg Lanz von Liebenfels, author of *Theozoologie*, founder of the esoteric order, *Ordo Novi Templi* (Order of the New Templars), and founder and editor of the magazine *Ostara*. Lanz glorified the Aryan race as *Gottmenschen* and advocated the sterilization of the unfit and the inferior races. Lanz's "theozoology" eventually evolved into "ariosophy" – the study of occult wisdom concerning the Aryans. Other List disciples became involved in the *Reichshammerbund* and the *Germanenorden*, organised by Theodor Fritsch, a prominent activist in the German anti-Semitic movement.

When the *Germanenorden* split into two schismatic factions (the *Germanenorden* and the *Germanenorden Walvater* of the Holy Grail), Hermann Pohl, the order's first leader, was joined by Rudolf von Sebottendorff, a Freemason who was also an admirer of List and Liebenfels. Sebottendorff eventually contacted Walter Nauhaus, leader of the *Germanenorden* and head of the Thule Society, a Germanic study group. Sebottendorff adopted the name of this study group as a cover name for his Munich lodge of the *Germanenorden Walvater*, which was run jointly by him and Nauhaus. In time the Thule Society came to organize the *Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (DAP), which was renamed the *Nationalsozialistische deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP) in 1920, months after Adolf Hitler, once a reader of Liebenfels' *Ostara* magazine, joined the party.

¹¹ Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, 6.

¹² Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, 3.

This occult branch of *völkisch* thought, which during the post-World War II years produced writers like Savitri Devi and Miguel Serrano, adopted elements from Eastern mythology: a cyclical view of history (mirrored in Oswald Spengler's metahistory) followed the Hindu model of the four successively degenerative ages, or Yugas; while the swastika, ubiquitous in India and the Far East, was adopted by numerous organizations before the NSDAP, from Blavatsky's Theosophical Society to Lanz's *Ordo Novi Templi* (the first to use the swastika in an Aryan context) to Fritsch's *Germanenorden* to Sebottendorf's Thule Society.

Although dismissed by some *völkisch* thinkers, the Jewish question acquired added importance during this period. As a people of the desert, Jews came to be "viewed as shallow, arid, 'dry' . . . devoid of profundity and totally lacking in creativity." This contrasted with the Germans, "who, living in the dark, mist-shrouded forests [were deemed] deep, mysterious, [and] profound."¹³ Moreover, because the Jews thrived in the liberal, secular, commercial, urban context, they came to be seen as the incarnation of modernity, and hence a corrupting, conspiring outsider, an insidious agent of dissolution.¹⁴ Indeed, Jews had grown closely connected to the liberals on the road to emancipation and, in particular, to the Revolution of 1848.

Because of its links to Judaism, Christianity also came under scrutiny: "in common with most *völkisch* thinkers, [Paul de] Lagarde blamed St. Paul for having enveloped untainted Christianity in sterile Hebrew law" and advocated a Germanic religion through which a "realignment of the spiritual forces [could] effect a true unity of the Volk."¹⁵ Nietzsche's attack on Christianity as a debilitating agent was influenced by the anti-Jewish, but nevertheless still Christian, Lagarde. By the time Savitri Devi wrote *Defiance and Gold in the Furnace*, shortly after World War II, however, radical hostility to Christianity was tightly bound to radical anti-Jewish sentiments.¹⁶

Following World War I, the *völkisch* ideology "acquired a mass po-

¹³ Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, 5.

¹⁴ Fritz R. Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

¹⁵ Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair*, 33.

¹⁶ Savitri Devi, *Gold in the Furnace: Experiences in Post-War Germany*, 3rd ed., ed. R. G. Fowler (Atlanta: The Savitri Devi Archive, 2008) and Savitri Devi, *Defiance*, 2nd ed., ed. R. G. Fowler (Atlanta: The Savitri Devi Archive, 2009).

litical base,"¹⁷ propelled by the anguish of Germany's military defeat in a context where *völkisch* ideas had long been disseminated within German institutions. The Conservative Revolution emerged at this time as a predominantly *völkisch* movement: it thought organically rather than mechanistically, emphasized quality as opposed to quantity, prized folk-community (*Volksgemeinschaft*) as opposed to class conflict, believed in the *Führerprinzip* as opposed to ochlocracy and parliamentarism, glorified war as opposed to unheroic economism, and rejected progressive liberalism, egalitarianism, and the banal commercial culture of urban industrial civilization.

The Conservative Revolutionaries were revolutionaries because they realized that culture was threatened not merely by liberalism and Communism, but by the entire political order, which had to be replaced—using revolutionary means if necessary—by a new order based on conservative principles.¹⁸ Although the term existed prior to the end of World War I, it entered general use only after it was popularized by Hugo von Hoffmannstahl and Edgar Julius Jung during the Weimar Republic. Oswald Spengler, Ernst Jünger, and Carl Schmitt, along with Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (who coined the phrase "Third Reich") were representative of this movement. *Völkisch* ideas enjoyed considerable social prominence and institutional legitimacy long before the National Socialists came to power. They were, however, marginalized and suppressed by the Allied Occupation regime and the new post-war dispensation following Germany's military defeat in 1945.

BLACK METAL AND THE RETURN OF VÖLKISCH THOUGHT

How did *völkisch* ideas resurface in popular culture? By the 1960s Christianity had entered a phase of decline in the West, following a long period of growing skepticism as well as hostility from political ideologies from both Right and Left. As has been the pattern in the West since the fourth century,¹⁹ the decline of the dominant religion coincided with a renewed interest in alternative spiritualities, exotic religions, and the occult.

Much of this interest found expression in modern popular culture,

¹⁷ Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, 5.

¹⁸ Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair*.

¹⁹ Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, *The Occult Roots of Nazism*, 2nd ed. (London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004).

especially modern popular music. Perhaps the most striking example of this confluence is the music of Heavy Metal pioneers Led Zeppelin, whose lyrics blended Aleister Crowley, J. R. R. Tolkien, and pagan Norse and Anglo-Saxon folklore. Artists like Black Sabbath, Black Widow, and Coven also incorporated occult themes and went on to influence subsequent waves of more explicitly Satanic Heavy Metal artists, such as King Diamond and Mercyful Fate.

Influenced by Black Sabbath, Motörhead, and punk rock, Bathory emerged within this milieu. We have already seen how the Satanic themes of Bathory's early albums were replaced by Nordicist and pagan ones. Bathory's Thomas Forsberg articulated the view that Christianity was a foreign religion, a form of Judaic spiritual conquest that sought to crush and eradicate indigenous European paganism. During the 1990s, this view became widely influential in the Black Metal subculture, especially in Scandinavia.

Anti-Christian views within the Black Metal scene usually fall into two categories: Nietzschean (often mediated through Anton Lavey's "Satanism") and neo-pagan. The Nietzscheans denigrate Christianity as an egalitarian religion of weakness, meekness, repentance, confession, and self-denial. The neo-pagans generally agree with the Nietzscheans, but emphasize the foreignness and deracinating influence of Christianity compared to the more authentic European pagan heritage. This outlook is explicitly *völkisch*, evoking the unity of blood and soil, of race and nation, and of spirituality and the *Volk*. The Black Metal scene also tends to be anti-Semitic for the same *völkisch* reasons they are anti-Christian. Some Black Metal musicians were so militantly anti-Christian that during the early-to-mid 1990s, they embarked on a campaign of church arsons.

In the world of Black Metal, genuine spirituality and depth of artistic expression is all about delving fearlessly into the darkness of the human soul. Hence the unremittingly dark songs filled with hate, fear, melancholy, misery, and depression. Black Metal—"true" Black Metal—seeks to put the greatest possible distance between itself and the mainstream of capitalistic mass society, which it perceives as meaningless, banal, materialist, brainless, conformist, uncreative, and hypocritical.

The Black Metal subculture glorifies war and the martial spirit. Scenes of battle are common on Black Metal album covers, and musicians often photograph themselves wielding axes or swords and wearing bandoliers, spiked arm-bands, and, occasionally, coats of mail.

Likewise, lyrics celebrate war and battle, often heroic but always bloody. This militarism is often wrapped in mysticism. Typical titles include "Sunwheel on the Helmet of Steel" in Capricornus' *Alone Against All*, "Nine Steps to Eternity" in Thor's Hammer's *Fidelity Shall Triumph*, and "Fire and Snow" in Graveland's *Will Stronger than Death*.

Black Metal artists also emphasize nature and landscape, but a morbid and mystical sensibility is evident even here. Whether inspired by *völkisch* thought or mere Satanic occultism, nature is always conceived in spiritual, mystical, and Romantic terms. The Black Metal aesthetic dictates that night and winter are eternal. Coniferous forests are preferred to tilled fields and manicured gardens. Where the glorification of war merges with nature mysticism, the emphasis remains on the latter. Viking and Folk Metal bands, in contrast, adopt a more obviously *völkisch* approach to nature, allowing daylight in their landscapes and generally emphasizing the idyllic as opposed to counter-Enlightenment *Sturm und Drang*.

The Black Metal sensibility does not reject culture in favor of nature, but instead valorizes culture and nature, both conceived organically, over civilization, which is conceived in mechanistic and materialistic terms. In the Black Metal universe, cities were never built, the Industrial Revolution never occurred, and modernity never arrived. For all its belligerence, Black Metal is inherently nostalgic, a comprehensive negation of modernity.

This negation is apparent even in the Black Metal sound, which would of course be impossible without the techno-industrial society Black Metal rejects. Thus the technological source of the Black Metal sound—that which links it to modernity—is concealed to the same degree that it is flaunted in Techno music: "raw" Black Metal bands favor a heavily under-produced, "necro" sound that deliberately avoids high-fidelity or otherwise seeks to emulate low-fidelity recording media—in contrast to other genres that favor a primitive, under-produced sound, the desired effect is not "street cred" (as in with Punk) but a sense of quasi-occult obscurity; more instrumentally sophisticated bands use layers of synthesizers to generate a volatilized mystical atmosphere that obscures the act of performance, while bands with a vehemently pagan orientation (e.g., Nokturnal Mortum) add traditional folk instruments into their mix musically to evoke an earthy sense of *Volkstum*.

The desired effect is always for the listener to lose himself in the sound, to go into a semi-trance, raised above the tedium of mundanity;

Black Metal music aspires to hypnosis and, in the case of specifically pagan Black Metal, it seeks to create the spiritual union—with the landscape, with the collective unconsciousness, with the lost pagan soul, with the lost heroic spirit of the distant past—that was longed for by *völkisch* authors a century ago.

The rejection of modernity goes hand in hand with the rejection of progressivism. Like *völkisch* thinkers, Black Metalers, whether pagan, Satanic, or merely suicidal, are cultural pessimists. Their pessimism is often allied with the explicit adoption of the Indo-European Traditional cyclical view of history, in which history begins with a Golden Age then declines through Silver and Bronze ages to the present Iron or Dark Age (Kali Yuga), which is doomed to perish of its own corruptions or through a cataclysmic final battle, whereupon a new Golden Age will dawn.

References to such culture pessimists as Nietzsche and Spengler and to more mystically inclined authors like Julius Evola, Savitri Devi, Miguel Serrano, and H. P. Lovecraft, are common in Black Metal. Hence titles like “Decline of the West (Europe Will Rise)” in Pantheon’s *Aryan Rebirth*, “Eve of the Kali Yuga” in Arkthos’ *Knights of the Eternal Sun*, “The Gathering of the Elite to Destroy both the Modern World and Demiurge” in Beyond the North Winds’ *Aryan Cult of A-Mor*, “Desecration of Our Fatherland” in Darkthule’s *Awakening of the Ancient Past*, “Melancholy of the Inaccomplished Vengeance” in Sons of North’s *Death of the White Race*, “Among the Ruins” in SIG:AR:TYR’s *Beyond the North Winds*, “Son of the Fatherland” in Hordak’s *The Last European Wolves*, “A Golden Age Turns to Rust” in Drowning the Light’s *The Fallen Years*, and “Exiles of the Golden Age” in *Weltenfeind*, a three-way split with Absurd, Grand Belial’s Key, and Sigrblot.

Explicit references to *völkisch* thought are rare, but they occasionally surface: there is a Finnish band called Armanenschaft; Hate Forest’s *Blood and Fire* EP contains the song “Aryosophia”; Vril released a demo entitled “Once and Again Thule”; Werewolf’s track “Vrilmacht” appears in their *Fidelity of Ideology* split EP with Semper Fidelis; there is Apriaxia’s *Blood and Soil* EP; and Adalruna’s *Wer ist der Starke von Oben* shows a photograph of Guido von List standing by the Heltentor with members of the *Guido-von-List-Gesellschaft* in 1911.

References to specifically Nazi mysticism and esotericism are also not infrequent: there is Bilskirnir’s EPs *Ahnenerbe* and *Hyperborea*, and the song “Reconquering the Atlantean Supremacy” in the album *Wotansvolk*, Hakenkreuzzug’s *Centurions of Thule* EP, the song “Jewel of

Atlanteans" in Graveland's *Memory and Destiny*, and the song "Hyperborean Ascention" in Contra Ignem Fatuum's *Detritus*, among others.

The emergence of explicitly National Socialist Black Metal should not surprise, for the original *völkisch* current was the incubator of Conservative Revolutionary tendencies, including National Socialism, and by the mid 1990s Black Metal had re-created the same cultural logic that led to National Socialism 80 years earlier. But the readiness with which Black Metal came to embrace an outlook and sensibility so thoroughly stigmatized following the Allied victory in 1945 still needs to be explained.

The answer lies in the nature of Heavy Metal's genesis following the collapse of the popular music subculture of the 1960s. Deena Weinstein identifies two strands within this genesis, an idealist one and a conservative one, which were fused at the point of Heavy Metal's inception.²⁰

Heavy Metal emerged at a time when its original core demographic—white working-class males—were experiencing a growing social, cultural, economic, political, and demographic displacement, thanks to the rising tide of radical feminism; belligerent black activism; discriminatory legislation in housing, education, and employment favoring minorities; non-white immigration from the Third World; and a serious economic downturn that drove the most marginalized whites to the wall. These developments aided the formation of an implicit white community that was strongly ethnocentric, and which, in a world where whiteness was increasingly de-centered, came to make a badge of honor of its negative marginality: Heavy Metal fans are what Weinstein calls "proud pariahs."

The Heavy Metal culture was defined by its working class roots, and working class culture is by nature conservative, with well-defined male and female roles, a readiness to express strong emotions, and a distrust of government and corporations. It is a culture that is decidedly out of step with modern mainstream liberalism. Not surprisingly, then, Heavy Metal tended to resist radical changes in its form, celebrated heroic masculinity, and was predicated on an ethos of integrity and authenticity that deplored its own commercialization. Indeed, "[f]or fans, perhaps the worst thing that can be said about a heavy metal band is that it has 'gone commercial.'"²¹ Nevertheless, Heavy

²⁰ Weinstein, *Heavy Metal*.

²¹ Weinstein, *Heavy Metal*, 115.

Metal gained many fans from the lower middle class, and subsequent offshoots have followed this pattern. The lower middle class is the same demographic that Mosse identified as formulating the *völkisch* critiques of modernity a century earlier, and indeed the key features of Heavy Metal culture are highly compatible with those critiques.²²

Even in its rawest forms, Black Metal tends to appeal to a more elitist and culturally sophisticated sensibility than its parent genre, but it has not radically changed the basic anti-modern, anti-liberal, anti-commercial, anti-cosmopolitan outlook it inherited from Heavy Metal. It only made it more serious: deepened it ideologically, elaborated it artistically, and radicalized it metapolitically. From the beginning Black Metalers were proud pariahs in the modern world, and, as such, were receptive to anti-establishment ideologies that were compatible with Black Metal's own constitution.

In sum, a good portion of Black Metal's intellectual and aesthetic features are *völkisch*. Crowley, Satanism, and Tolkien also boil in the Black Metal cauldron, to be sure, but these too have been appropriated to the extent that they are consistent with the *völkisch* worldview. Therefore, one can plausibly characterize Black Metal as a revival of the Conservative Revolution, profoundly transformed in the context of a modern musical subculture, but recognizable nonetheless.

LESSONS

My characterization of Black Metal will inevitably lead radical elements within the white nationalist movement to ask, "How do we use Black Metal to start the revolution?" Those asking this question will likely be thinking of how rock music in the 1960s helped to disseminate and popularize among the young the "progressive," liberal, and anti-Western ideas that had been festering in the catacombs of the academia since the 1930s and even earlier.

I am not convinced that Black Metal has an application in that political sense. The music of the 1960s enjoyed broad appeal, whereas Black Metal seeks and revels in its own marginality and obscurity. Student engagement in radical politics during the late 1960s is only mirrored by the modern Left, and enjoyed, as it does today to a much greater degree, media and institutional support. Fans of Black Metal, on the other hand, detest politics even more than the Conservative Revolutionaries: theirs is a strategy of negation and of escape from mundanity.

²² Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*, 7.

The *Anti-Geldof Compilation* that I sponsored and released through my record label remains to date the sole extant example of engagement with current affairs and everyday politics in the Black Metal scene—and even in this case it was largely an emotional response on the part of the participating artists against the pious hypocrisy of self-indulgent rock stars. This is significant when one considers that the *Encyclopedia Metallum* currently lists over 17,000 Black Metal bands.²³ Then, again, most of the participating artists were associated with the NSBM scene, and, as we know, one aspect that distinguished the National Socialists from the Conservative Revolutionaries in Germany was their willingness to engage in mass politics.

At best, we can see Black Metal as proof that it is possible for a cultural space to exist, even today, where anti-egalitarian thought can find honest artistic expression and forge an alternative positive identity among whites through the praxis of style. Our task is to understand the mechanisms that enabled significant parts of the Black Metal scene to exist as an explicit white community in the first place. Our task is also to create other such cultural spaces, to expand the constellation of stylized activities, so that we may eventually build a parallel cultural universe wherefrom they can be afforded institutional support and thus gain momentum and consolidate, once the liberal establishment collapses by the weight of its own corruption and ideological bankruptcy.

This is an important task, because inasmuch as Black Metal artists have developed and inspired an evocative style or aesthetic that (implicitly or explicitly) is uniquely white and European and/or celebrates whiteness in all its diversity of history and heritage, Black Metal is a genuine object of study in the context of a cultural war where the opposing faction seeks to suppress, defame, and eradicate whiteness. Humans are sentimental and emotional animals, more readily persuaded by an appealing style than by a rational argument, so winning the cultural war will require more than hard facts and superior logic. It requires that we successfully appeal to sentiment and emotion by becoming masters of style. Black Metal contains important lessons in this respect.

*Alex Kurtagic is the author of **Mister** (Iron Sky Publishing, 2009), the founder and director of Supernal Music, and a frequent contributor to **TOQ Online** (<http://www.toqonline.com/>).*

²³ <http://www.metal-archives.com/>.

DISCOGRAPHY:

- Adalruna. *Wer ist der Starke von Oben*. 2008.
- Apraxia. *Blood and Soil*. Othal Productions. OLP008. 2001.
- Arkthos. *Knights of the Eternal Sun*. Supernal Music. Ferly048CD. 2006.
- Bathory. *Blood Fire Death*. Black Mark Productions. BMCD666-1. 1989.
- Bathory. *Hammerheart*. Black Mark Productions. BMCD666-1. 1991.
- Bathory. *Twilight of the Gods*. Black Mark Productions. BMCD666-1. 1992.
- Beyond the North Winds' *Aryan Cult of A-Mor*. 2004.
- Bilskirnir. *Ahnenerbe*. Nykta Productions. NYKTA06. 2004.
- Bilskirnir. *Hyperborea*. Solistitium Records. SOL052. 2005.
- Bilskirnir. *Wotansvolk*. Wotanstahl Kangschmiende. WKG006. 2007
- Capricornus. *Alone Against All*. Supernal Music. Ferly011CD. 2004.
- Celtic Frost. *Into the Pandemonium*. Noise Records. N-0067. 1987.
- Contra Ignem Fatuum. *Detritus*. Supernal Music. Ferly036MCD. 2005.
- Darkthule. *Awakening of the Ancient Past*. Battlefield Records. 2004.
- Graveland. *Memory and Destiny*. No Colours Records. NC057. 2002.
- Graveland. *Will Stronger than Death*. No Colours Records. NC0118. 2007.
- Hakenkreuzzug. *Centurions of Thule*. Battlefield Records. 2004
- Hate Forest. *Blood and Fire*. Sombre Records. 2001.
- Hellhammer. *Apocalyptic Raids*. Noise Records. N-0008. 1984.
- Hordak. *The Last European Wolves*. Griffin Music. GRIFFIN008CD. 2006.
- Pantheon. *Aryan Rebirth*. Strong Survive Records. SSR025. 2005.
- Thor's Hammer. *Fidelity Shall Triumph*. Darker Than Black Records. DTB001. 1998.
- Semper Fidelis/Werewolf. *Fidelity of Ideology*. Eastside Records/Hammerbolt. 2008.
- Skyforger. *Semigall's Warchant*. FR034. 2004.
- SIG:AR:TYR. *Beyond the North Winds*. Morbid Winter Records. MWR012. 2008.
- Various Artists. *Anti-Geldof Compilation*. Supernal Music. Ferly035CD. 2007.

DEMOCRACY REVISITED: THE ANCIENTS AND THE MODERNS

ALAIN DE BENOIST

“The defenders of every kind of regime claim that it is a democracy,” wrote George Orwell.¹ This does not seem to be a recent phenomenon. Guizot remarked in 1849: “So powerful is the sway of the word democracy, that no government and no party dares to live, or thinks it can, without inscribing this word on its banner.”² This is truer today than ever before. Not everybody is a democrat, but everybody pretends to be one. There is no dictatorship that does not regard itself as a democracy. The former communist countries of Eastern Europe did not merely represent themselves as democratic, as attested by their constitutions;³ they vaunted themselves as the only real democracies, in contrast to the “formal” democracies of the West.

The near unanimity on democracy as a word, albeit not always a fact, gives the notion of democracy a moral and almost religious content, which, from the very outset, discourages further discussion. Many authors have recognized this problem. Thus, in 1939, T.S. Eliot declared: “When a word acquires a universally sacred character . . . , as has today the word democracy, I begin to wonder, whether, by all it attempts to mean, it still means anything at all.”⁴ Bertrand de Jouvenel was even more explicit: “The discussion on democracy, the arguments in its favor, or against it, point frequently to a degree of intellectual shallowness, because it is not quite clear what this discussion is all about.”⁵ Giovanni Sartori added in 1962: “In a somewhat paradoxical vein, democracy could be defined as a high-flown name for something which does not exist.”⁶ Julien Freund also noted, in a somewhat witty tone:

To claim to be a democrat means little, because one can be a democrat in a contradictory manner either in the manner of the Americans or the English, or like the East European communists, Congolese, or Cubans. It is perfectly natural that under such circumstances I refuse to be a democrat, because my neighbor might be an adherent of dictatorship while invoking the word democracy.⁷

Thus we can see that the universal propagation of the term democracy does not contribute much to clarifying the meaning of democracy. Undoubtedly, we need to go a step further.

The first idea that needs to be dismissed – an idea still cherished by some – is that democracy is a specific product of the modern era, and that democracy corresponds to a “developed stage” in the history of political regimes.⁸ This does not seem to be substantiated by the facts. Democracy is neither more “modern” nor more “evolved” than other forms of governance. Governments with

democratic tendencies have appeared throughout history. We note that the linear perspective used in this type of analysis can be particularly deceiving. The idea of progress, when applied to a political regime, appears devoid of meaning. If one subscribes to this type of linear reasoning, it is easy to advance the argument of the “self-evidence” of democracy, which, according to liberals, arises “spontaneously” in the realm of political affairs just as the market “spontaneously” accords with the logic of demand and supply. Jean Baechler notes:

If we accept the hypothesis that men, as an animal species(*sic*), aspire spontaneously to a democratic regime which promises them security, prosperity, and liberty, we must then also conclude that, the minute these requirements have been met, the democratic experience automatically emerges, without ever needing the framework of ideas.⁹

What exactly are these “requirements” that produce democracy, in the same manner as fire causes heat? They bear closer examination.

In contrast to the Orient, absolute despotism has always been rare in Europe. Whether in ancient Rome, or in Homer’s *Iliad*, Vedantic India, or among the Hittites, one can observe very early the existence of popular assemblies, both military and civilian. In Indo-European societies kings were usually elected; in fact, all ancient monarchies were first elective monarchies. Tacitus relates that among the Germans chieftains were elected on account of their valor, and kings on account of their noble birth (*reges ex nobilitate duces ex virtute sumunt*). In France, for instance, the crown was long both elective and hereditary. It was only with Pippin the Short that the king was chosen from within the same family, and only after Hugh Capet that the principle of primogeniture was adopted. In Scandinavia, the king was elected by a provincial assembly; that election had then to be confirmed by the other national assemblies.

Among the Germanic peoples the practice of “shielding” – or raising the new king on his soldiers’ shields – was widespread.¹⁰ The Holy Roman Emperor was also elected, and the importance of the role of the princely electors in the history of Germany should not be neglected. By and large, it was only with the beginning of the twelfth century in Europe that elective monarchy gradually gave way to hereditary monarchy. Until the French Revolution, kings ruled with the aid of parliaments which possessed considerable executive powers. In almost all European communities it was long the status of freeman that conferred political rights on the citizen. “Citizens” were constituent members of free popular communes, which among other things possessed their own municipal charters, and sovereign rulers were surrounded by councils in the decision-making process. Moreover, the influence of customary law on juridical practice was an index of popular “participation” in defining the laws. In short, it cannot be stated that Europe’s old monarchies were devoid of popular legitimacy.

The oldest parliament in the Western world, the *althing*, the federal assembly of Iceland, whose members gathered yearly in the inspired setting of Thingvellir, emerged as early as 930 A.D. Adam von Bremen wrote in 1076: "They have no king, only the laws." The thing, or local parliament, designated both a location and the assembly where freemen with equal political rights convened at a fixed date in order to legislate and render justice.¹¹ In Iceland the freeman enjoyed two inalienable privileges: he had a right to bear arms and to a seat in the thing. "The Icelanders," writes Frederick Durand

created and experienced what one could call by some uncertain yet suggestive analogy a kind of Nordic Hellas, i.e., a community of freemen who participated actively in the affairs of the community. Those communities were surprisingly well cultivated and intellectually productive, and, in addition, were united by bonds based on esteem and respect.¹²

"Scandinavian democracy is very old and one can trace its origins to the Viking era," observes Maurice Gravier.¹³ In all of northern Europe this "democratic" tradition was anchored in a very strong communitarian sentiment, a propensity to "live together" (*zusammenleben*), which constantly fostered the primacy of the common interest over that of the individual. Such democracy, typically, included a certain hierarchical structure, which explains why one could describe it as "aristo-democracy." This tradition, based also on the concept of mutual assistance and a sense of common responsibility, remains alive in many countries today, for instance, in Switzerland.

The belief that the people were originally the possessor of power was common throughout the Middle Ages. Whereas the clergy limited itself to the proclamation *omnis potestas a Deo*, other theorists argued that power could emanate from God only through the intercession of the people. The belief of the "power of divine right" should therefore be seen in an indirect form, and not excluding the reality of the people. Thus, Marsilius of Padua did not hesitate to proclaim the concept of popular sovereignty; significantly, he did so in order to defend the supremacy of the emperor (at the time, Ludwig of Bavaria) over the Church. The idea of linking the principle of the people to its leaders was further emphasized in the formula *populus et proceres* (the people and the nobles), which appears frequently in old texts.

Here we should recall the democratic tendencies evident in ancient Rome,¹⁴ the republics of medieval Italy, the French and Flemish communes, the Hanseatic municipalities, and the free Swiss cantons. Let us further note the ancient *boerenvrijheid* ("peasants' freedom") that prevailed in medieval Frisian provinces and whose equivalent could be found along the North Sea, in the Low Lands, in Flanders, Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. Finally, it is worth mentioning the existence of important communal movements based on free corporate structures, the function of which was to provide mutual help and to pursue economic and political goals. Sometimes these movements clashed with king and Church, which were supported by the burgeoning

bourgeoisie. At other times, however, communal movements backed the monarchy in its fight against the feudal lords, thus contributing to the rise of the mercantile bourgeoisie.¹⁵

In reality, most political regimes throughout history can be qualified as mixed ones. "All ancient democracies," writes François Perroux, "were governed by a de facto or de jure aristocracy, unless they were governed by a monarchical principle."¹⁶ According to Aristotle, Solon's constitution was oligarchic in terms of its Areopagus, aristocratic in terms of its magistrates, and democratic in terms of the make-up of its tribunals. It combined the advantages of each type of government. Similarly, Polybius argues that Rome was, in view of the power of its consuls, an elective monarchy; in regard to the powers of the Senate, an aristocracy; and regarding the rights of the people, a democracy. Cicero, in his *De Republica*, advances a similar view. Monarchy need not exclude democracy, as is shown by the example of contemporary constitutional and parliamentary monarchies today. After all, it was the French monarchy in 1789 that convoked the Estates-General. "[D]emocracy, taken in the broad sense, admits of various forms," observed Pope Pius XII, "and can be realized in monarchies as well as in republics."¹⁷

Let us add that the experience of modern times demonstrates that neither government nor institutions need play a decisive role in shaping social life. Comparable types of government may disguise different types of societies, whereas different governmental forms may mask identical social realities. (Western societies today have an extremely homogeneous structure even though their institutions and constitutions sometimes offer substantial differences.)

So now the task of defining democracy appears even more difficult. The etymological approach has its limits. According to its original meaning, democracy means "the power of the people." Yet this power can be interpreted in different ways. The most reasonable approach, therefore, seems to be the historical approach—an approach that explains "genuine" democracy as first of all the political system of that ancient people that simultaneously invented the word and the fact.

The notion of democracy did not appear at all in modern political thought until the eighteenth century. Even then its mention was sporadic, frequently with a pejorative connotation. Prior to the French Revolution the most "advanced" philosophers had fantasized about mixed regimes combining the advantages of an "enlightened" monarchy and popular representation. Montesquieu acknowledged that a people could have the right to control, but not the right to rule. Not a single revolutionary constitution claimed to have been inspired by "democratic" principles. Robespierre was, indeed, a rare person for that epoch, who toward the end of his reign, explicitly mentioned democracy (which did not however contribute to the strengthening of his popularity in the years to come), a regime that he defined as a representative

form of government, i.e., “a state in which the sovereign people, guided by laws which are of their own making, do for themselves all that they can do well, and by their delegates do all that they cannot do themselves.”¹⁸

It was in the United States that the word democracy first became widespread, notably when the notion of “republic” was contrasted to the notion of “democracy.” Its usage became current at the beginning of the nineteenth century, especially with the advent of Jacksonian democracy and the subsequent establishment of the Democratic Party. The word, in turn, crossed the Atlantic again and became firmly implanted in Europe—to the profit of the constitutional debates that filled the first half of the nineteenth century. Tocqueville’s book *Democracy in America*, the success of which was considerable, made the term a household word.

Despite numerous citations, inspired by antiquity, that adorned the philosophical and political discourse of the eighteenth century, the genuine legacy drawn from ancient democracy was at that time very weak. The philosophers seemed more enthralled with the example of Sparta than Athens. The debate “Sparta vs. Athens,” frequently distorted by bias or ignorance, pitted the partisans of authoritarian egalitarianism against the tenets of moderate liberalism.¹⁹ Rousseau, for instance, who abominated Athens, expressed sentiments that were rigorously pro-Spartiate. In his eyes, Sparta was first and foremost the city of equals (*hómoioi*). By contrast, when Camille Desmoulins thundered against Sparta, it was to denounce its excessive egalitarianism. He attacked the Girondin Brissot, that pro-Lycurgian, “who has rendered his citizens equal just as a tornado renders equal all those who are about to drown.” All in all, this type of discourse remained rather shallow. The cult of antiquity was primarily maintained as a metaphor for social regeneration, as exemplified by Saint-Just’s words hurled at the Convention: “The world has been empty since the Romans; their memory can replenish it and it can augur liberty.”²⁰

If we wish now to continue our study of “genuine” democracy, we must once again turn to Greek democracy rather than to those regimes that the contemporary world designates by the word.

The comparison between ancient democracies and modern democracies has frequently turned into an academic exercise.²¹ It is generally emphasized that the former were direct democracies, whereas the latter (due to larger areas and populations) are representative democracies. Moreover, we are frequently reminded that slaves were excluded from the Athenian democracy; consequently, the idea emerged that Athens was not so democratic, after all. These two affirmations fall somewhat short of satisfying answers.

Readied by political and social evolution during the sixth century B.C., as well as by reforms made possible by Solon, Athenian democracy entered its founding stage with the reforms of Cleisthenes, who returned from exile in 508 B.C. Firmly established from 460 B.C., it continued to thrive for the next one

hundred and fifty years. Pericles, who succeeded Ephialtes in 461 B.C., gave democracy an extraordinary reputation, which did not at all prevent him from exercising, for more than thirty years, a quasi-royal authority over the city.²²

For the Greeks democracy was primarily defined²³ by its relationship to two other systems: tyranny and aristocracy. Democracy presupposed three conditions: isonomy (equality before laws); isotimy (equal rights to accede to all public offices); and isegory (liberty of expression). This was direct democracy, known also as “face to face” democracy, since all citizens were allowed to take part in the *ekklesia*, or Assembly. Deliberations were prepared by the *boulé* (Council), although in fact it was the popular assembly that made policy. The popular assembly nominated ambassadors; decided over the issue of war and peace, preparing military expeditions or bringing an end to hostilities; investigated the performance of magistrates; issued decrees; ratified laws; bestowed the rights of citizenship; and deliberated on matters of Athenian security. In short, writes Jacqueline de Romilly, “the people ruled, instead of being ruled by elected individuals.” She cites the text of the oath given by the Athenians: “I will kill whoever by word, deed, vote, or hand attempts to destroy democracy.... And should somebody else kill him I will hold him in high esteem before the gods and divine powers, as if he had killed a public enemy.”²⁴

Democracy in Athens meant first and foremost a community of citizens, that is, a community of people gathered in the *ekklesia*. Citizens were classified according to their membership in a deme—a grouping which had a territorial, social, and administrative significance. The term *demos*, which is of Doric origin, designates those who live in a given territory, with the territory constituting a place of origin and determining civic status.²⁵ To some extent *demos* and *ethnos* coincide: democracy could not be conceived in relationship to the individual, but only in the relationship to the polis, that is to say, to the city in its capacity as an organized community. Slaves were excluded from voting not because they were slaves, but because they were not citizens. We seem shocked by this today, yet, after all, which democracy has ever given voting rights to non-citizens?²⁶

The notions of citizenship, liberty, or equality of political rights, as well as of popular sovereignty, were intimately interrelated. The most essential element in the notion of citizenship was someone’s origin and heritage. Pericles was the “son of Xanthippus from the deme of Cholargus.” Beginning in 451 B.C., one had to be born of an Athenian mother and father in order to become a citizen. Defined by his heritage, the citizen (*polites*) is opposed to *idiotes*, the non-citizen—a designation that quickly took on a pejorative meaning (from the notion of the rootless individual one arrived at the notion of “idiot”). Citizenship as function derived thus from the notion of citizenship as status, which was the exclusive prerogative of birth. To be a citizen meant, in the fullest sense of the word, to have a homeland, that is, to have both a homeland and a history. One is born an Athenian—one does not become one (with rare

exceptions). Furthermore, the Athenian tradition discouraged mixed marriages. Political equality, established by law, flowed from common origins that sanctioned it as well. Only birth conferred individual *politeía*.²⁷

Democracy was rooted in the concept of autochthonous citizenship, which intimately linked its exercise to the origins of those who exercised it. The Athenians in the fifth century celebrated themselves as “the autochthonous people of great Athens,” and it was within that founding myth that they placed the pivot of their democracy.²⁸

In Greek, as well as in Latin, liberty proceeds from someone’s origin. Free man **(e)leudheros* (Greek *eleútheros*), is primarily he who belongs to a certain “stock” (cf. in Latin the word *liberi*, “children”). “To be born of a good stock is to be free,” writes Emile Benveniste, “this is one and the same.”²⁹ Similarly, in the German language, the kinship between the words *frei*, “free,” and *Freund*, “friend,” indicates that in the beginning, liberty sanctioned mutual relationship. The Indo-European root **leudh-*, from which derive simultaneously the Latin *liber* and the Greek *eleútheros*, also served to designate “people” in the sense of a national group (cf. Old Slavonic *ljudú*, “people”; German *Leute*, “people,” both of which derive from the root evoking the idea of “growth and development”).

The original meaning of the word “liberty” does not suggest at all “liberation” – in a sense of emancipation from collectivity. Instead, it implies inheritance – which alone confers liberty. Thus when the Greeks spoke of liberty, they did not have in mind the right to break away from the tutelage of the city or the right to rid themselves of the constraints to which each citizen was bound. Rather, what they had in mind was the right, but also the political capability, guaranteed by law, to participate in the life of the city, to vote in the assembly, to elect magistrates, etc. Liberty did not legitimize secession; instead, it sanctioned its very opposite: the bond which tied the person to his city. This was not liberty-autonomy, but a liberty-participation; it was not meant to reach beyond the community, but was practised solely in the framework of the polis. Liberty meant adherence. The “liberty” of an individual without heritage, i.e. of a deracinated individual, was completely devoid of any meaning.

If we therefore assume that liberty was directly linked to the notion of democracy, then it must be added that liberty meant first and foremost the liberty of the people, from which subsequently the liberty of citizens proceeds. In other words, only the liberty of the people (or of the city) can lay the foundations for the *equality* of political and individual rights, i.e., rights enjoyed by individuals in the capacity of citizens. Liberty presupposes independence as its first condition. Man lives in society, and therefore individual liberty cannot exist without collective liberty. Among the Greeks, individuals were free because (and in so far as) their city was free.

When Aristotle defines man as a “political animal,” as a social being, when he asserts that the city precedes the individual and that only within society can the individual achieve his potential (*Politics*, 1253a 19-20), he also suggests that

man should not be detached from his role of citizen, a person living in the framework of an organized community, of a polis, or a *civitas*. Aristotle's views stand in contrast to the concept of modern liberalism, which posits that the individual precedes society, and that man, in the capacity of a self-sufficient individual, is at once something more than just a citizen.³⁰

Hence, in a "community of freemen," individual interests must never prevail over common interests. "All constitutions whose objectives are common interest," writes Aristotle, "are in accordance with absolute justice. By contrast, those whose objective is the personal interest of the governors tend to be defective." (*Politics*, 1279a 17sq). In contrast to what one can see, for instance, in Euripides' works, the city in Aeschylus' tragedies is regularly described as a communal entity. "This sense of community," writes Moses I. Finley, "fortified by the state religion, the myths and traditions, was the essential source of success in Athenian democracy."³¹

In Greece, adds Finley, "liberty meant the rule of law and participation in the decision-making process – and not necessarily the enjoyment of inalienable rights."³² The law is identified with the genius of the city. "To obey the law meant to be devoted with zeal to the will of the community," observes Paul Veyne.³³ As Cicero wrote, only liberty can pave the way for legality: "Legum...servi sumus ut liberi esse possimus" ("We are the servants of the law in order that we can be free," *Oratio pro Cluentio*, 53.)

In his attempt to show that liberty is the fundamental principle of democracy (*Politics*, VII, 1), Aristotle succeeds in de-emphasizing the factor of equality. For the Greeks equality was only one means to democracy, though it could be an important one. Political equality, however, had to emanate from citizenship, i.e., from belonging to a given people. From this it follows that members of the same people (of the same city), irrespective of their differences, shared the desire to be citizens in the same and equal manner. This equality of rights by no means reflects a belief in natural equality. The equal right of all citizens to participate in the assembly does not mean that men are by nature equal (nor that it would be preferable that they were), but rather that they derive from their common heritage a common capacity to exercise the right of suffrage, which is the privilege of citizens. As the appropriate means to this *téchne*, equality remains exterior to man. This process, as much as it represents the logical consequence of common heritage, is also the condition for common participation. In the eyes of the ancient Greeks it was considered natural that all citizens be associated with political life not by virtue of universal and imprescriptible rights of humans as such, but from the fact of common citizenship. In the last analysis, the crucial notion was not equality but citizenship. Greek democracy was that form of government in which each citizen saw his liberty as firmly founded on an equality that conferred on him the right to civic and political liberties.

The study of ancient democracy has elicited divergent views from contemporary authors. For some, Athenian democracy is an admirable example of civic responsibility (Francesco Nitti); for others it evokes the realm of "activist" political parties (Paul Veyne); for yet others, ancient democracy is essentially totalitarian (Giovanni Sartori).³⁴ In general, everybody seems to concur that the difference between ancient democracy and modern democracy is considerable. Curiously, it is modern democracy that is used as a criterion for the democratic consistency of the former. This type of reasoning sounds rather odd. As we have observed, it was only belatedly that those modern national governments today styled "democracies" came to identify themselves with this word. Consequently, after observers began inquiring into ancient democracy, and realized that it was different from modern democracy, they drew the conclusion that ancient democracy was "less democratic" than modern democracy. But, in reality, should we not proceed from the inverse type of reasoning? It must be reiterated that democracy was born in Athens in the fifth century B.C. Therefore, it is Athenian democracy (regardless of one's judgements for or against it) that should be used as an example of a "genuine" type of democracy. Granted that contemporary democratic regimes differ from Athenian democracy, we must then assume that they differ from democracy of any kind. We can see again where this irks most of our contemporaries. Since nowadays everyone boasts of being a perfect democrat, and given the fact that Greek democracy resembles not at all those before our eyes, it is naturally the Greeks who must bear the brunt of being "less democratic"! We thus arrive at the paradox that Greek democracy, in which the people participated daily in the exercise of power, is disqualified on the grounds that it does not fit into the concept of modern democracy, in which the people, at best, participates only indirectly in political life.

There should be no doubt that ancient democracies and modern democracies are systems entirely distinct from each other. Even the parallels that have been sought between them are fallacious. They have only the name in common, since both have resulted from completely different historical processes.

Wherein does this difference lie? It would be wrong to assume that it is related to either the "direct" or "indirect" nature of the decision-making process. Each of them has a different concept of man and a different concept of the world, as well as a different vision of social bonds. The democracy of antiquity was communitarian and "holist"; modern democracy is primarily individualist. Ancient democracy defined citizenship by a man's origins, and provided him with the opportunity to participate in the life of the city. Modern democracy organizes atomized individuals into citizens viewed through the prism of abstract egalitarianism. Ancient democracy was based on the idea of organic community; modern democracy, heir to Christianity and the philosophy of the Enlightenment, on the individual. In both cases the meaning of the words "city," "people," "nation," and "liberty," are totally changed.

To argue, therefore, within this context, that Greek democracy was a direct democracy only because it encompassed a small number of citizens falls short of a satisfying answer. Direct democracy need not be associated with a limited number of citizens. It is primarily associated with the notion of a relatively homogeneous people that is conscious of what makes it a people. The effective functioning of both Greek and Icelandic democracy was the result of cultural cohesion and a clear sense of shared heritage. The closer the members of a community are to each other, the more likely they are to have common sentiments, identical values, and same way of looking at the world, and the easier it is for them to make collective decisions without needing the help of mediators.

In contrast, having ceased to be places of collectively lived meaning, modern societies require a multitude of intermediaries. The aspirations that surface in this type of democracy spring from contradictory value systems that are no longer reconcilable with unified decisions. Ever since Benjamin Constant (*De la liberté des anciens comparée à celle des modernes*, 1819), we have been able to measure to what degree, under the impact of individualist and egalitarian ideologies, the notion of liberty has changed. Therefore, to return to a Greek concept of democracy does not mean nurturing a shallow hope of “face to face” social transparency. Rather, it means reappropriating, as well as adapting to the modern world, the concept of the people and community – concepts that have been eclipsed by two thousand years of egalitarianism, rationalism, and the exaltation of the rootless individual.

*Alain de Benoist is a leading French theoretician of the European New Right, the editor of **Nouvelle École**, and a principal founder of the Group for the Research and Study of European Civilization (GRECE). In 1978 he was awarded the Grand prix de l'essai de l'Académie française.*

*Translated by Tomislav Sunic from the author's book **Démocratie: Le Problème** (Paris: Le Labyrinthe, 1985)*

END NOTES

1. George Orwell, *Selected Essays* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1957), p. 149.
2. François Guizot, *De la démocratie en France* (Paris: Masson, 1849), p. 9.
3. Georges Burdeau observes that judging by appearances, in terms of their federal organization, the institutions of the Soviet Union are similar to those of the United States, and in terms of its governmental system the Soviet Union is similar to England. *La démocratie* (Paris : Seuil, 1966), p. 141.
4. T.S. Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society* (London: Faber & Faber, 1939).

5. Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Du pouvoir* (Geneva : Cheval ailé, 1945), p. 411.
6. Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1962), p. 3.
7. "Les démocrates ombrageux," *Contrepoint* (December 1976), p. 111.
8. Other authors have held exactly the opposite opinion. For Schleiermacher, democracy is a "primitive" political form in contrast to monarchy, which is thought to correspond to the demands of the modern state.
9. "Le pouvoir des idées en démocratie," *Pouvoir* (May 1983), p. 145.
10. Significantly, it was with the beginning of the inquiry into the origins of the French monarchy that the nobility, under Louis XIV, began to challenge the principles of monarchy.
11. The word "thing," which designated the parliament, derives from the Germanic word that connoted originally "everything that is gathered together." The same word gave birth to the English "thing" (German *Ding*: same meaning). It seems that this word designated the assembly in which public matters, then affairs of a general nature, and finally "things" were discussed.
12. "Les fondements de l'État libre d'Icelande: trois siècles de démocratie médiévale," in *Nouvelle Ecole* 25-26 (Winter 1974-75), pp. 68-73.
13. *Les Scandinaves* (Paris: Lidis [Brepols], 1984), p. 613.
14. Cf. P.M. Martin, *L'idée de royauté, ... Rome. De la Rome royale au consensus républicain* (Clermont-Ferrand: Adosa, 1983).
15. Here "democracy," as in the case of peasants' freedoms as well, already included social demands, although not "class struggle" – a concept ignored by ancient democracy. In the Middle Ages the purpose of such demands was to give voice to those who were excluded from power. But it often happened that "democracy" could be used against the people. In medieval Florence, social strife between the "popolo grosso" and the "popolo minuto" was particularly brisk. On this Francesco Nitti writes: "The reason the working classes of Florence proved lukewarm in defense of their liberty and sympathized instead with the Medicis was because they remained opposed to democracy, which they viewed as a concept of the rich bourgeoisie." Francesco Nitti, *La démocratie*, vol. 1 (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1933), p. 57.
16. This opinion is shared by the majority of students of ancient democracies. Thus, Victor Ehrenberg sees in Greek democracy a "form of enlarged aristocracy." Victor Ehrenberg, *L'état grec* (Paris: Maspéro, 1976), p. 94.
17. Pius XII, 1944 Christmas Message: <http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/P12XMAS.HTM>
18. M. Robespierre, "On Political Morality," speech to the Convention, February 5, 1794: <http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/413/>
19. On this debate, see the essay by Luciano Guerci, "Liberta degli antichi e liberta dei moderni," in *Sparta, Atene e i 'philosophes' nella Francia del Setecento* (Naples: Guido, 1979).
20. Camille Desmoulins, speech to the Convention, March 31, 1794. It is significant that contemporary democrats appear to be more inclined to favor Athens. Sparta, in contrast, is denounced for its "war-like spirit." This change in discourse deserves a profound analysis.
21. Cf., for example, the essay by Moses Finley, *Démocratie antique et démocratie moderne* (Paris: Payot, 1976), which is both an erudite study and a pamphlet of great contemporary relevance. The study is prefaced by Pierre Vidal-Naquet, who, among other errors, attributes to Julien Freund (see n. 7, above) positions which are exactly the very opposite of those stated in the preface.

22. To cite Thucydides: "Thanks to his untainted character, the depth of his vision, and boundless disinterestedness, Pericles exerted on Athens an incontestable influence.... Since he owed his prestige only to honest means, he did not have to truckle to popular passions.... In a word, democracy supplied the name; but in reality, it was the government of the first citizen." (*Peloponnesian War II*, 65)

23. One of the best works on this topic is Jacqueline de Romilly's essay *Problèmes de la démocratie grecque* (Paris: Hermann, 1975).

24. Romilly, *Problèmes de la démocratie grecque*.

25. The word "demos" is opposed to the word "laós," a term employed in Greece to designate the people, but with the express meaning of "the community of warriors."

26. In France, the right to vote was implemented only in stages. In 1791 the distinction was still made between "active citizens" and "passive citizens." Subsequently, the electorate was expanded to include all qualified citizens able to pay a specified minimum of taxes. Although universal suffrage was proclaimed in 1848, it was limited to males until 1945.

27. On the evolution of that notion, see Jacqueline Bordes, '*Politeia*' dans la pensée grecque jusqu'à Aristote (Paris : Belles Lettres, 1982).

28. Nicole Loraux interprets the Athenian notion of citizenship as a result of the "imaginary belonging to an autochthonous people" (*Les enfants d'Athéna: Idées athéniennes sur la citoyenneté et la division des sexes* [Paris: Maspéro, 1981]). The myth of Erichthonios (or Erechtheus) explains in fact the autochthonous character and the origins of the masculine democracy, at the same time as it grafts the Athenian ideology of citizenship onto immemorial foundations.

29. Emile Benveniste, *Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, vol. 1 (Paris : Minuit, 1969), p. 321.

30. On the work of Aristotle and his relationship with the Athenian constitution, see James Day and Mortimer Chambers, *Aristotle, History of Athenian Democracy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962).

31. Finley, *Démocratie antique et démocratie moderne*, p. 80.

32. Finley, *Démocratie antique et démocratie moderne*, p. 141.

33. Veyne adds: "Bourgeois liberalism organizes cruising ships in which each passenger must take care of himself as best as he can, the crew being there only to provide for the common goods and services. By contrast, the Greek city was a ship where the passengers made up the crew." Paul Veyne, "Les Grecs ont-ils connu la démocratie?" *Diogène* (October-December 1983, p. 9).

34. For the liberal critique of Greek democracy, see Paul Veyne, "Les Grecs ont-ils connu la démocratie?" and Giovanni Sartori, *Democratic Theory* (see n. 6 above).

SOCIAL DARWINISM

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTELLECTUAL MOOD

LOUIS ANDREWS

During the Edwardian era in England a new intellectual mood was reaching its peak. The new mood manifested itself in many ways: as a new feeling of nationalist exclusiveness, as economic protectionism, as jingoistic imperialism, as social imperialism, and in appeals to “efficiency.” Some have seen it as an intellectual reaction against humanitarianism and sentimentality, and indeed “might” and “necessity” were to some extent replacing the old concept of “right” in public policy.¹

There were several factors behind the new mood, including a general increase in literacy that had resulted in a new, more popular, journalism, the decline in fundamental religious beliefs, and a Hegelian authoritarian trend in philosophy. But perhaps the primary factor was the impact of a new sociobiological school of thought, Social Darwinism.²

Social Darwinism³ can by no means be considered a monolithic system of thought. It began as a liberal and individualistic construct, concerned largely with man’s relationship to his own society in evolutionary terms, but soon developed into a collectivist doctrine, concerned with each society as a unit, and its relationship to other societies in evolutionary terms. Currents of Social Darwinism that focused on the latter can be characterized somewhat by the term “external,” since they considered extranational forces the most important in evolutionary development. The earlier individualistic school can be called “internal” Social Darwinist, since its special interest was in intranational forces.⁴

The various schools of Social Darwinism were the product of the revolution which began in 1859 with the publication of Charles Darwin’s monumental work, *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*. The idea of physical evolution had been prevalent for many years, but it had generally taken a directly environmental form, such as the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and had been largely rejected for various scientific and religious reasons. Darwin’s great contribution was that he combined long and detailed observations with careful and cautious scientific reasoning, producing a theory that, disregarding teleological considerations, tended to explain how life had evolved and to do it much more satisfactorily than any previous theory had done. Nevertheless, this theory did not always win acceptance from the members of the old guard

in biology, and certainly not in religion. In fact, the opposition that orthodox Christianity supplied was in many ways both beneficial to the eventual acceptance of the theory and harmful to the religious structures. The Darwinian theory was developed at a time when Western religion was undergoing a severe crisis, and it was quickly drawn into this crisis. Darwinism emerged triumphant and religion was perhaps irreparably damaged.

As a new theory, evolution had a great appeal to the new guard in biology. In fact, as far as biologists themselves were concerned, it can be argued that basically only the new guard accepted Darwinism; the rest gradually (and literally) died away, thus ending major opposition.

The two major ideas which Darwin expressed were the "struggle for existence," dealing with the eternal validity of competition of all forms, both intraspecific and interspecific, and "natural selection," the by-product of this competition or struggle, by which evolutionary advancement had occurred.⁵ Since the "new biology" considered man a part of nature, not above or apart from it, these ideas and their many subsequent corollaries rapidly became part of contemporary discussions of man and the social, religious, economic, ethical, and political facets of his existence. Thus the intellectual framework was created for the development of Social Darwinism.

HERBERT SPENCER AND THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL DARWINISM

The first major figure considered to be a Social Darwinist was Herbert Spencer.⁶ Spencer was the classic Social Darwinist: individualistic, liberal to the core, and an enthusiastic proponent of *laissez faire* economics. Easily the best known of all Social Darwinists and the founder of its most prominent school, he nevertheless played no direct role in that collectivistic Social Darwinism which chiefly concerns this essay. Still, he exerted a great influence on his contemporaries as well as on those later schools of Social Darwinism that rejected him for his defense of individualism and democracy.

Spencer espoused two major points that entered into the considerations of the later Social Darwinists. The first of these has been touched on previously, that man is physically an animal, and therefore the natural laws of the new biology applied as much to him as to the alligator or songbird. As an animal, man was subject to heredity, so Spencer felt that he could prove that the empiricists were wrong in maintaining that the mind was a *tabula rasa*.⁷ Spencer's second point was that groups, or societies, had also evolved, and thus society itself was an organism.⁸ He took this idea, which had been popular with Edmund Burke and the Romantics, and attempted to reinforce it with the prestige of the new evolutionary science. The physical organism, man, could be related scientifically and biologically to the social organism, society. Spencer felt that the many facets of man's development, e.g., his culture in the broad sense, were the products of evolution. Man's physical, mental, and

sociocultural evolution formed a system, a unified whole, which could be used to provide the proper explanations for all major questions concerning man and his problems. As a result, Spencer was able to make a systematic application of his Social Darwinism to many fields, and he wrote ponderous works on psychology, sociology, and ethics.

First generation Darwinists and Social Darwinists were generally optimistic and dedicated believers in progress as a result of the evolutionary processes, and Spencer was no exception. Of the struggle for existence, he wrote that

inconceivable as have been the horrors caused by the universal antagonism which, beginning with the chronic hostilities of small hordes tens of thousands of years ago, has ended in the occasional vast battles of immense nations, we must nevertheless admit that without it the world would still have been inhabited only by men of feeble types sheltering in caves and living on wild food.⁹

Despite the apparent harshness of this statement, Spencer, perhaps because he was a humanitarian, refused to take the logical step of arguing for the necessity and, to reinforce this pragmatically, the glorification, of war in the present. For some reason, he negated the value of war for the present, thus in a sense rejecting the idea of the continuity of history. This was indeed inconsistent for a thinker who placed such emphasis on terms such as the “persistence of force” and the “indestructibility of matter and energy.”¹⁰

WALTER BAGEHOT

Spencer, as a *laissez-faire* liberal, placed a strong emphasis on rationalism, believing that man’s actions were based largely on reasoned self-interest. He was also somewhat anti-traditional, despite his theory of organic social development. Walter Bagehot,¹¹ the author of *Physics and Politics* (1873) and editor of the still influential journal, *The Economist*, was both a traditionalist and an irrationalist. He can perhaps best be viewed as a transitional figure in the development of Social Darwinism from its individualistic Spencerian form to a largely collectivist body of thought. Bagehot, even though he stood for office as a Liberal, was basically a conservative. He wrote “the first duty of society is the preservation of society.”¹² As an irrationalist, he believed in the value of a “noble myth” and “dreams of glory.”

No orator ever made an impression by appealing to men by their plainest physical wants, except when he could allege that those wants were caused by someone’s tyranny. But thousands have made the greatest impression by appealing to some vague dream of glory or empire or nationality.¹³

The special value of Bagehot to the later theorists was that he went far beyond Spencer in emphasizing the value of the group. He believed that in the struggle for existence the individuals who were able to work together to create and maintain a strong unified group survived. Competition then occurred between groups; those that proved themselves best able to compete, in other words the

best disciplined, most compact, and homogeneous, survived. A major factor in his argument was that the part must submit to the whole, since survival in an evolutionary sense depended on the latter.¹⁴

Concerning moral progress, Bagehot wrote that in a situation in which groups or nations were equal in strength, the noblest would be the victor in conflict. Naturally, where the groups were unequal, the most powerful would be the noblest. Thus, Bagehot wrote, "in every particular state of the world those nations which are strongest tend to prevail over the others and in certain marked peculiarities the strongest tend to be the best."¹⁵

It would perhaps do an injustice to Bagehot to fail to mention that his theory also had a liberal side. He felt that groups or nations would eventually evolve to a point where some system of democracy and personal freedom could be allowed without endangering the existence of the state. Almost humorously, Bagehot called this period in a state's development "The Age of Discussion."¹⁶

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there was a general trend in much of British thought away from liberalism toward a more collectivist and authoritarian nationalism. Neo-Kantians and neo-Hegelians were finding a place in British intellectual life. Attacks on the idea of free trade, a basis of internationalism, were multiplying. This was in part due to the successes of the German Zollverein and the writings of the German economist, Friedrich List, whose book *National Systems of Political Economy* (1841) had become popular in England. These influences all helped foster the development of a new and radical opposition to individualism and free-trade liberalism that had dominated the early Social Darwinist thought of the period.

A new, or partially new, form of Social Darwinism developed out of this radical environment. This "external" Social Darwinism, even though it had developed out of the earlier "internal" type discussed above, soon came to disregard or reject much of the approach of the "internal" school. It was probably Bagehot who began this trend, since he argued that at most stages of its development, a nation had to create a sense of unity to protect itself adequately against all external rivals.

By the 1890s, as England was confronted with greater problems in foreign policy, ideas of organic development became prevalent. Often these connected, interdependently, the nation and the Empire with the world in which nation stood opposed to nation in a supposedly bloody Darwinian struggle for existence. Because of the increasing contact with alien races, British racial pride was growing rapidly. In 1892, Alfred Milner¹⁷ wrote concerning the British in Egypt "by the nature of our interests, by the nature of our power, and by certain special qualities in our national character, we seem marked out for the ...job of stabilizing the economic situation." He added "the qualities of the race have triumphed."¹⁸

BENJAMIN KIDD

In 1894, Benjamin Kidd's¹⁹ *Social Evolution* appeared. Even though poorly argued and written, it quickly went through several printings to sell over 250,000 copies, a huge number for the day.²⁰ Kidd, like Spencer, attempted to build a system that would use evolutionary theory to indicate the direction in which English society should develop. Unlike Spencer, Kidd was most concerned with Britain's ability to meet external challenges and to maintain its place in the world. His book advanced programs designed to reduce the internal struggle so that a more cohesive nation would result, one better able to meet the ever-increasing external competition. Kidd felt that in the future those who had been excluded from internal competition due to poverty and other factors could be brought in on terms of equal political and social opportunity.²¹ He believed that the major opposition to his programs was among the Spencerians and the socialists.²² Both groups had worked for the interests of factions within the social organism, not for the organism itself. Their approaches had led to an increased stratification of society, resulting in a situation where class warfare had become a distinct possibility. Kidd wrote that "the forces which are working out our development are primarily concerned not with these interests of the individual, but with those widely different interests of a social organism subject to quite other conditions and possessed of an indefinitely longer life."²³

For Kidd, the "interests of the social organism and those of the individuals comprising it at any particular time are actually antagonistic; they can never be reconciled...."²⁴ Therefore individual and intragroup interests must be subordinated to those connected with the survival of the social organism as a whole. It was the duty of the state to achieve some sort of social equality so that this might be accomplished. The state to which he referred was of course a racially homogeneous one.

Kidd believed that an innate quality of discipline, which led to social efficiency, had made Britain and the Empire strong.²⁵ He felt that religion would be an important factor in leading to greater national unity and an increase in social efficiency. This religion would be "a form of belief, providing an ultra-rational sanction for that large class of conduct in the individual where his interests and the interests of the social organism are antagonistic, and by which the former are rendered subordinate to the latter in the general interests of the evolution which the race is undergoing...."²⁶

SOCIAL DARWINISM AND BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

In February 1896, an article entitled "Biological View of our Foreign Policy" appeared in the pages of the *Saturday Review*. It was unsigned, but written by a biologist, probably a Professor Mitchell.²⁷ The author described international

relations in a strongly neo-Darwinian tone. "The great nations of the earth are local varieties, species in the making, which are gathering themselves together, emphasizing their national characters, and unconsciously making for specific distinctness."²⁸ He added that foreign policy, as long as it didn't represent only individual ambition or opportunism, was:

anticipation of, and provision for, struggles for existence between incipient species... feeble races are being wiped off the earth and the few great, incipient species are themselves against each other. England as the greatest of these—greatest in race pride—had avoided for centuries the only dangerous kind of war. Now with the whole earth occupied and the movements of expansion continuing, she will have to fight to the death against successive rivals.²⁹

In subsequent years other articles by various authors appeared, associating Social Darwinism with war, military preparations, and the Empire. One such article, by W. F. Wyatt, was entitled "The Ethics of Empire." Wyatt argued that biological law was indeed the foundation of Empire. He believed that humanitarians were the major opponents of this idea and characterized their argument as :

[T]his brutal law of which you speak may prevail and does prevail in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and it has doubtless prevailed among mankind. But now we have reached to the higher code of morality.... The principle of altruism is superceding the principle of competition.³⁰

The author argued that if Britain were to follow a humanitarian policy, embracing altruism and withdrawing from international competition, that another power would simply take her place, grow stronger, and eventually control world affairs. Britain would "wither away and cease to operate as a moving factor in the affairs of men."³¹

All of the great institutions and ideas which England had developed and then spread to many parts of the world would then be lost. To forestall that it was thus her obligation, in a truly humanitarian sense, to disregard the so-called humanitarians.³² Wyatt went on to characterize the maintenance of British military might as more than a matter of vital self-interest, indeed "a high and sacred obligation of morality."³³

Just before the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, Wyatt published an article entitled "War as the Test of National Value," in which he advanced Social Darwinist ideas. He argued that war was not, as some had asserted, an unmixed evil, but that it "has been the absolutely necessary condition of human advance," declaring "if at any given period in the past, war could have been abolished...social evolution must have been stereotyped."³⁴

Wyatt struck an especially strong Social Darwinist note in remarking that contemporary wars were:

only the expression of vast natural forces, having their roots far down in the national character...there is something melancholy and pitiful in the delusion that they can ever be arrested by the breath of [foreign] ministers sitting round a table.³⁵

While he did feel that the trend of history was leading toward a more cosmopolitan world, eventually to be united in peace, he viewed this rather pessimistically. "The attainment of this much desired peace will be the signal for the beginning of universal decay."³⁶ In the absence of diversity between groups, stagnation would occur, and this would be closely followed by corruption.

In May 1899 an article entitled "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Conference" appeared on the Hague Conference. Written by Sidney Lowe, a well-known publicist, this essay vividly described the agony and brutality of war, yet argued that compared to industrial competition, on the surface apparently less brutal, war nonetheless was possibly less cruel. Lowe wrote:

[a] righteous and necessary war is no more brutal than a surgical operation. Better [to] give the patient some pain, and make your own fingers unpleasantly red, than allow the disease to grow upon him until he becomes an offence to himself and the world.³⁷

Around the turn of the century, British Social Darwinist thought again became concerned with the importance of the internal problems of the nation, but largely because it was felt that Britain must gird her internal strength in order to better face the challenges of the external world. The importance of surmounting these external challenges was still the primary concern; internal development was viewed as merely a means to that end.

In "The Breed of Man," H. H. Almond expressed a deep-felt concern about the quality of the British people. He argued that reform was needed, especially in education. Such reform was seen as a necessary preparation for war. Almond also urged universal conscription and a reform of the navy. Concerned about the general poor quality of the military establishment, he even urged that "a 'still strong man' be made absolute dictator over our whole military system."³⁸

KARL PEARSON, SOCIAL DARWINISM, AND EUGENICS

Developing contemporaneously with Darwinism and Social Darwinism was another closely related scientific school, the ideas of which held broad implications for the improvement of man, and was thus of interest to Social Darwinists. This was the science of eugenics,³⁹ founded by Sir Francis Galton,⁴⁰ who published his first work on the subject as early as 1865.⁴¹

The appeal of eugenics to Social Darwinists was especially strong, since it sought to improve the quality of the race. That possibility interested others as well. In October 1906, Sidney Webb, one of the founders of the (socialist) British Fabian Society, wrote two letters to *The Times* on the population problem and the declining birth rate, in which he revealed that a study by the Fabian Society had urged the endowment of motherhood, to improve the quality and quantity of the English race.⁴²

One Social Darwinist in particular, Karl Pearson,⁴³ was especially concerned with eugenics. In 1911 he became the first Galton Professor of Eugenics at the University of London. Pearson allied a thorough knowledge of evolutionary theory and a strong faith in eugenics with a deep social conscience, dating back to his studies of Marxist thought while a student in Germany. The result was perhaps the profoundest expression of Social Darwinism in the period. Pearson's ideas were distant indeed from those of the first Social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer.

Pearson based much of his synthesis on the idea of the organic nature of the state. As early as 1894, he wrote that "[h]uman societies cannot be symbolized as rigid structures of stone and iron, they are organic growths, yielding and accommodating themselves, if sound, to almost every form of internal and external stress."⁴⁴ He felt that, in evolutionary terms, the external struggle was far more important than internal competition. According to Pearson, history has shown only one way "in which a high state of civilization has been produced, namely, the struggle of race with race, and the survival of the physically and mentally fitter race."⁴⁵

Professor Pearson seems to have accepted Marxian economic theory and considered himself a socialist, but he rejected the internationalism of most contemporary socialist thought. His was a national form of socialism.⁴⁶ Pearson's politics were firmly based on the idea of an organic state. He felt that the state must be a "homogeneous whole," and he denounced those socialists who stirred up class antagonisms. Since he viewed the struggle for existence as one between nations and/or races, the unity of the state was paramount. He urged that the state be considered a sacred principle, that "an offense against the state ought to be looked upon as a far graver matter than the offence against the individual." Socialists, he believed, must "inculcate that spirit which would give offenders against the State short shrift and the nearest lamp-post."⁴⁷

Pearson attacked the Social Darwinist theories of both Kidd and Spencer. He argued that they had both rejected socialism by false reasoning and that they based their views on the internal struggle for existence on false biological premises.⁴⁸ He maintained that the social and economic "intra-group struggle plays little, if any, part in natural selection of man."⁴⁹ Pearson argued that social progress actually "depended on an organization of society checking very largely the individual struggle for existence within the group."⁵⁰ The ability to withstand external competition depended to a large extent on the level of social stability. Thus the "victory of the more capable, or the more fortunate, must not involve such a defeat of the less capable that social stability is endangered by the misery produced."⁵¹

Indeed, England could "be crushed" without great difficulty if she allowed too great an amount of internal competition.⁵² But Pearson had a dogmatic faith in the inevitability of the reduction of intragroup competition, and wrote that "the future *will* be socialistic, the intra-group struggle *will* be weakened rather than intensified."⁵³

Pearson argued that true natural selection occurred in man (within society) before it reached the stage of intragroup competition; therefore the industrial and class competitions could safely be reduced.⁵⁴ In the true socialist state “less artificial protection for the weakling will be possible, less chance of their surviving...” The real socialist believed that “the progress of man has depended in the main on the minimizing of [the intra-group struggle] in order to emphasize the action of another factor—extra-group selection.”⁵⁵

Pearson rejected intragroup struggle as a means of bettering the race, but he had other ideas which he felt would improve the quality of the people. Primary among these was his advocacy of eugenics, designed to increase the production of more capable individuals and to lessen the numbers of the “unfit.” To facilitate this, he urged a biological view of the status of women. Concerning female emancipation, he wrote

How can woman follow her sexual and maternal instincts?...how can she do freely what she alone can do for society.... The answer...does not lie in “equality of opportunity,” it lies in special protection, in the socialization of the State.⁵⁶

Thus he urged a “national insurance for motherhood” and the regulation of the labor of women, all toward the end of improving the quality of the individuals within the state.⁵⁷

Pearson’s views on race were related to his eugenic creed, “man varies, and these variations, favorable and unfavorable, are inherited.” Concerning African races, he wrote

How many centuries, how many thousands of years have the Kaffir or the Negro held large tribal districts in Africa undisturbed by the white man? Yet their inter-tribal struggles have not yet produced a civilization in the least comparable with the Aryan. Educate and nurture them as you will, I do not believe that you will succeed in modifying the stock.⁵⁸

Within England, Pearson hoped for the time

when conscious race culture will cope with the ills which arise when we suspend the full purifying force of natural selection.... The higher patriotism and the pride of race must come to our aid in stemming deterioration.⁵⁹

It was “a false view of human solidarity, a weak humanitarianism” that regretted the fact that “a capable and stalwart race of white men should replace a dark-skinned tribe.”⁶⁰

This race-building program would better prepare the nation for war. War was, to Pearson, totally necessary for evolutionary progress:

You may hope for a time when the sword shall be turned into the ploughshare...but, believe me, when that day comes mankind will no longer progress...the relentless law of heredity will be controlled and guided by natural selection.⁶¹

Social Darwinism, in its ultimate form, as has been outlined in the preceding pages, was at the core of much of the thought of the Victorian and Edwardian eras in England. Whether Liberal, Fabian, or Unionist, many of the most important individuals of the latter period reflect, in varying degrees, some consciously and some unconsciously, Social Darwinist ideas and theories.

ALFRED MILNER, IDEALIST

How pervasive was Social Darwinism can perhaps best be understood by looking at a man who, as a product of his age, unconsciously exhibited Social Darwinist tendencies in almost every aspect of his thought. Viscount Alfred Milner never spoke of “evolution,” “natural selection,” or “survival of the fittest” in biological terms, but nevertheless, his ideas and interests paralleled in many respects those of the later Social Darwinists.

Milner was an idealist, despite the fact that he shared many of the ideas of the realists. He was a nationalist to the core and allied this nationalism with outspoken racialist ideas. In most cases, Milner’s nationalism extended to seeing the Empire as a unit. In 1905 he declared: “[w]hen we who call ourselves Imperialists, talk of the British Empire, we think of a group of states, independent of one another in their local affairs, but bound together for the defense of their common interests and the development of a common civilization...in a permanent organic union...”⁶² He felt that not only national but Imperial unity was essential if Britain was to master the challenges of the twentieth century.

Milner regarded race as of overwhelming importance. His biographer, A. M. Gollin, wrote of his views on race that “they were the motive force behind every one of his political and Imperial proposals.” Gollin added that “this race patriotism was not the vulgar racialism that sought to conceal British Imperial self-interest behind those tedious neo-Darwinian slogans which claimed that the strongest were best fitted to survive and to dominate in world affairs....”⁶³ Yet despite the fact that Milner never tried to rationalize his views with an appeal to science, he does seem to fit within the spectrum of later Social Darwinist thought. Many of his ideas align clearly with those of Karl Pearson.

Milner’s Social Darwinism was based, not on science, but on nationalism, patriotism, and anti-cosmopolitanism. He wrote:

[m]y patriotism knows no geographical but only racial limits. I am an Imperialist...because I am a British Race Patriot.⁶⁴

He declared that his first great principle was that

[t]he British State must follow the race, must comprehend it, wherever it settles in appreciable numbers as an independent community.... We cannot afford to part with so much of our best blood.⁶⁵

Elsewhere Milner wrote:

I have emphasized the importance of the racial bond. From my point of view this is fundamental. It is the British race which built the Empire and it is the undivided British race which can alone uphold it...deeper, stronger, more primordial than...material ties is the bond of common blood, a common language, common history and traditions.⁶⁶

Lord Milner believed that the maintenance of the Empire was essential to the prosperity and strength of the nation and he often spoke of their interdependence. He was convinced that Great Britain must maintain a strong military force to protect the Empire, and thus he advocated both conscription and military education. Milner also felt that the time was coming when the home island would no longer be able to supply capable men in the numbers required to run the Empire, and recommended the emigration of good stock to build communities in the colonies. One aim of his imperialism was to maintain those communities as parts of an organic whole, thus providing for a continuity of race, nation, and Empire.⁶⁷

It was Milner's conviction that the British had a national and racial mission; to accomplish it, they must keep racially strong. He hoped, as had Pearson, that Britain would develop a form of socialism, a national type of socialism, to strengthen the nation and to maintain and improve the race. This was to have a form which would not magnify class conflicts, since according to Milner "among civilized peoples of more or less equal size, that one will be, as it will deserve to be, the strongest, which is most successful in removing the causes of class antagonism in its midst."⁶⁸

Milner's socialism was of a moderate form—"Gas and Water Socialism"⁶⁹—which would result in a greater amount of social equality, leading to a more dynamic physical and moral strength for the British people in order that they would be better able to defend the nation and the Empire. His support of tariff reform (i.e., raising tariffs on imports) can be considered part of this program. Milner hoped that, through his influence, tariff reform might be broadened.⁷⁰ He believed that it was designed in the interests of "the nation as a whole, not only one class," and would "let all pay according to their means,"⁷¹ thus helping to decrease class conflict.

Was Milner a true Social Darwinist? Perhaps not, but he was a product of the spirit of his age, albeit an extreme one, and the roots of this spirit lay to a great extent in the Darwinian revolution.

TODAY: SOCIAL DARWINISM AND SOCIOBIOLOGY

Is there a continuity between the Social Darwinism of Edwardian era England and today's sociobiology?⁷² Certainly the egalitarian leftist opponents of sociobiology and its offspring, evolutionary psychology and biosociology, invariably attempt to link them to a totally discredited (in their eyes) Social Darwinism.⁷³ In response, some supporters of these late twentieth century disciplines have tried to distance themselves and their disciplines from the earlier school.⁷⁴ Where does the truth lie?

It is certainly true that various ideas and movements⁷⁵ with connections to Social Darwinism continued to develop to the mid-twentieth century and beyond. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the universal conquest of the Western nations by leftist egalitarians in matters social and political following our second great fratricidal war of the century virtually ended any connection of significant social or scientific movements with Social Darwinism. It had become a pariah in the very world it had helped build. Sociobiology was an independent creation—in fact E.O. Wilson, its creator, knew virtually nothing of the history of Social Darwinism. His primary interest lay in ants. It was only after the publication of his world-shaking classic, *Sociobiology*, that he began a serious study of either human evolution or the background of Social Darwinism. So the leftist critics are surely wrong: sociobiology and its offspring have no linear connection. Both arose independently, based on the scientific information available at the time and the social needs of the era. But are those (generally egalitarian) supporters of sociobiology who reject any possible ties with Social Darwinism correct? Let's look at the evidence.

1. The “new biology” on which Social Darwinism was based considered man a part of nature, not above or apart from it. So does sociobiology.

2. Social Darwinists believed that all life, and especially all human life, could be explained without the invocation of an all-powerful god. Sociobiology agrees.

3. Social Darwinists believed that the concept that drives all egalitarian leftist ideologies, the mind as a *tabula rasa*, was nonsense. Sociobiology rejects this concept just as emphatically.

4. The evolutionary importance of competition and cooperation between individuals and groups was integral to Social Darwinism. While with sociobiology the emphasis is often on the individual gene, recently the importance of group competition has grown in sociobiology.

5. Social Darwinists were generally strong in their support for eugenics and the improvement of the quality of humans being born. While sociobiologists are largely silent on eugenics, it is clear that sociobiological thinking is generally supportive of eugenic ideas and in no case supports anti-eugenic thought, regardless of rhetoric.⁷⁶ Despite the general public posture of most intellectuals, left and right, against the “evils of eugenics,” today support for eugenics is growing rapidly, even if mostly in private.⁷⁷

6. Social Darwinists accepted race differences, not only in the obvious physical characteristics, but also in mental and behavioral characteristics. It is fair to say that most sociobiologists avoid issues involving race as they would the Ebola virus. Nevertheless, private support among them for *The Bell Curve* and even for J. Philippe Rushton's *Race, Evolution and Behavior* is considerable and growing. A huge “fear factor” is involved here, but time and science are clearly on the side of the race-realists (as some of them call themselves).

Where does this leave us? Had our second great fratricidal war been averted, or even if—as that ardent believer in eugenics, Charles Lindbergh, urged—a negotiated peace had been achieved, perhaps the egalitarian leftist conquest of the social and political institutions of the West might not have occurred. In which case it seems likely that the development of contemporary sociobiology might have occurred earlier, influenced by, if not an outgrowth of, Social Darwinism. Since history took a different path, Social Darwinism remains a past and a prologue, but the contemporary sociobiology grew from a different branch on the Darwinian tree.

*Louis Andrews is a businessman and creator of the **Stalking the Wild Taboo** website. He is also web editor/publisher and business manager of **The Occidental Quarterly**. Mr. Andrews has written for **Right Now!** as well as other publications and lives in Augusta, Ga.*

END NOTES

1. L. T. Hobhouse, *Democracy and Reaction* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904), 59-60.
2. *Ibid.*, 75-84.
3. Although Social Darwinism is sometimes defined simply as the equating of business competition with natural selection leading to evolutionary progress, here it is more broadly used as any system or approach to the study of man and society that utilizes evolutionary theory on the biological level.
4. I have borrowed these terms from Bernard Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960.), 30.
5. Although a little dated, Garrett Hardin provides an excellent review of the development of evolutionary theory and its implications for man in *Nature and Man's Fate* (New York: Rinehart, 1959).
6. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Liberal philosopher, published works on almost all major phases of knowledge including philosophy, ethnology, biology, sociology, psychology, political science, history, and mathematics. He was a member of both the 'X' and Athenaeum clubs. *Dictionary of National Biography (1901-1911)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 360-369.
7. For a brief discussion of Spencer's theories and their relation to the development of authoritarian thought, see William M. McGovern, *From Luther to Hitler* (London: George G. Harrap, 1946), 457-463.
8. Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, vol. 1, part II (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1897), 449 ff.
9. Cited in Carlton J. H. Hayes, *A Generation of Materialism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941), 11.
10. *Ibid.*

11. Walter Bagehot (1826-1877). Educated at the University of London. Journalist and economist. Editor of the *Economist*. *Dictionary of National Biography (From the Earliest Times to 1900)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 865-868.
12. Cited in McGovern, 464.
13. Ibid.
14. Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1895), chapters 3 & 4.
15. Ibid., 43.
16. Ibid., 156 ff.
17. Alfred Milner, Viscount (1854-1925). Educated at Tübingen; King's College, London; awarded first scholarship at Balliol College, Oxford. Liberal journalist; Director General of Accounts (Egypt), 1889; Undersecretary to the Khedive, 1890; Board of Internal Revenue (Eng.), 1892; C.B., 1894; K.C.B., 1895; High Commissioner to South Africa, 1897-1905; War Cabinet, 1916; Secretary of the Colonial Office, 1918-1921. *Dictionary of National Biography (1922-1930)*, 588-602.
18. Alfred Milner, *England in Egypt* (London: Edward Arnold, 1904), 356.
19. Benjamin Kidd (1858-1916). Civil servant, sociologist. *Western Civilization*, 1902; *The Science of Power*, 1918. *Dictionary of National Biography (1912-1918)*, 305-306.
20. William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, vol. 1, 87. See also Crane Brinton, *English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 282-292.
21. Benjamin Kidd, *Social Evolution* (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1894), 227.
22. Ibid., Chapters 1 and 7 generally.
23. Ibid., 78.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 277-287.
26. Ibid., 103. For a criticism of Kidd's religious theories, see Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1928), 672 ff.
27. Langer, 87.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. W. F. Wyatt, "The Ethics of Empire," *Nineteenth Century*, April 1897, 524.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 525-529.
33. Ibid., 530.
34. W. F. Wyatt, "War As the Test of National Value," *Nineteenth Century*, February 1899, 218.
35. Ibid., 220.
36. Ibid., 224-225.
37. Sidney Lowe, "The Hypocrisies of the Peace Conference," *Nineteenth Century*, May 1899, 692.
38. H. H. Almond, "The Breed of Man," *Nineteenth Century*, October 1900, 667.

39. Eugenics is concerned with the genetic or hereditary improvement of man. In its beginnings it was largely concerned with the possibility of the improvement of innate intelligence or "talent." Perhaps its major "theorem" is that "Man's political actions have genetic consequences." Hardin, 214.
40. Sir Francis Galton (1822-1911). Founder of the school of Eugenics; creator of fingerprint analysis. Conducted studies in evolution, experimental psychology, and heredity. Numerous awards and honors from scientific societies in England and France. *Dictionary of National Biography (1901-1911)*, 70-73. Hardin, 214 ff.
41. *Macmillan's Magazine* 11 (November 1864-April 1865), 157-166. This as well as his second essay, a continuation of the first, were reprinted in *The Occidental Quarterly*, 2 (3), Fall 2002, 45-68.
42. For a discussion and criticism of these letters, see James W. Barclay, "The Race Suicide Scare," *Nineteenth Century*, December 1906, 895-899.
43. Karl Pearson (1857-1936). Statistician and biologist; educated at University College School; King's College, Cambridge; University of Heidelberg; University of Berlin; from 1884, at University College, London; FRS, 1896; Darwin Medal, 1899; founded journal *Biometrika*, 1901; 1911 first Galton Professor of Eugenics; numerous scientific papers and books. *Dictionary of National Biography (1931-1940)*, 681-684.
44. Karl Pearson, "Women and Labor," *Fortnightly Review*, January-June 1894, 562.
45. Cited in Hobhouse, 114-115.
46. Semmel, 37.
47. *Ibid.*, 39.
48. Karl Pearson, "Socialism and Natural Selection," *Fortnightly Review*, July-December 1894, 2-5.
49. *Ibid.*, 18.
50. *Ibid.*, 5.
51. *Ibid.*, 6.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*, 11.
54. *Ibid.*, 14.
55. *Ibid.*, 16.
56. Pearson, "Women and Labor," 569.
57. *Ibid.*, 576.
58. McGovern, 499.
59. Semmel, 49.
60. *Ibid.*, 50.
61. Hayes, 340.
62. A. M. Gollin, *Proconsul in Politics: A Study of Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power* (London: Anthony Blond, 1964), 123.
63. *Ibid.*, 127.
64. *The Times*, July 27, 1925.
65. *Ibid.*
66. Gollin, 130-131.

60 Vol. 3, No. 1

The Occidental Quarterly

67. Edward Crankshaw, *The Forsaken Idea: A Study of Viscount Milner* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), 162.

68. Cited in Semmel, 181.

69. Gollin, 156.

70. Gollin, 115.

71. Semmel, 181-182.

72. In the balance of this essay, sociobiology refers to both sociobiology and its offspring, evolutionary psychology and biosociology.

73. For example, see William H. Tucker, *The Science and Politics of Racial Research* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994).

74. For example, see Steven Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature* (New York: Viking Press, 2002), reviewed in this issue of *The Occidental Quarterly*.

75. Group evolution, the socialization of the state, and the British Empire and its race-based paternalism.

76. Louis Andrews, "Science for Tomorrow," *The Occidental Quarterly* 2, (1) Spring 2002, 73-79.

77. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1994) and Malcom Brown, "What Is Intelligence, and Who Has It?" *The New York Times*, October 16, 1994.

THE CASE OF VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: FARMER, SCHOLAR, WARMONGER

F. ROGER DEVLIN

Everyone is a reactionary about subjects he understands.

-Robert Conquest

Victor Davis Hanson's name has become known to millions of people since the attacks of September 11. Beginning the very day of those terrible events, he has poured forth a stream of commentary urging a tough response against...well, against somebody. At first it was bin Laden and al-Qaeda, of course. But as soon as the Bush administration announced that Iraq was a proper target for American retaliation, Hanson got on board. Since then he has briefed powerful men at the Pentagon, taught midshipmen in Annapolis, given lectures and interviews, all while maintaining a steady flow of "tough" journalism for National Review Online.

It is all quite a change for him.

Victor Davis Hanson is a fifth-generation California grape farmer. He has often expressed his admiration for the sort of men among whom he grew up: tough, hardworking smallholders, taciturn men with a sense of loyalty to their land and families. He clearly understands the privilege he enjoyed in being reared among this vanishing American breed.

He attended a nondescript state-supported college close to home and went on to graduate study in classics at Stanford. He developed an interest in ancient warfare, and found that his own farming knowledge could illuminate ambiguous and misinterpreted passages in the ancient historians.

All readers of Thucydides and Xenophon know how frequently they refer to armies "ravaging" enemy territory, "destroying" trees or "devastating" crops. The ancients could take for granted that their readers knew what such expressions signified; many had taken part in or suffered from such ravaging themselves. For today's typical urban or suburban reader, however, vines and fruit trees are nearly as unfamiliar as Pindaric odes or red-figure vases. Some classicists have imagined such ravaging to have produced famine and long-term economic depression, or even to have been the decisive cause of Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War.

Hanson, based on his own farming experience, was skeptical. Vines and olive trees have deep roots, and their permanent destruction was too difficult and time-consuming for a marauding army to attempt. Rather than being intended to starve the enemy into submission (as in modern warfare), crop destruction was a kind of slap in the face, a challenge to the enemy to come out and fight. When Pericles succeeded in convincing the Athenians not to fall into this trap and to rely instead on their naval power, it was a sign that the traditional pattern of hoplite (i.e., heavily armed infantryman's) battle was eroding (Thuc. II, 21-22).

In 1980, Hanson submitted a doctoral thesis on this subject to the classics department at Stanford and quietly went back to farming. Three years later the dissertation was published as a book: *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece* (University of California, 1983). I recall seeing it on the "recent arrivals" table at a college bookstore: the back cover featured a photograph of the author in the unkempt dress of a grape farmer.

1983 saw a catastrophic fall in grape prices, and Hanson found himself, in effect, paying consumers to eat his produce. Things were so bad he found he could earn more teaching Greek. He became classics professor at California State University, Fresno – a position he still holds. His reputation as a classroom teacher is high and has won him awards.

By 1987 he had completed work on a second book, *The Western Way of War* (University of California, 1989). Its title may be misleadingly broad. The work is directly concerned only with infantry battle in classical Greece. The polis, Hanson explains, developed a mode of warfare peculiar to itself and with an influence still perceptible in the military practice of the occident.

Other ancient nations such as the Egyptians and Persians fought to a large extent with bow and arrow or sling, on horseback or from chariots. Attacks were often uncoordinated. Battle could be prolonged for days into a series of indecisive skirmishes. Troops were lightly armed, dressed with a view to looking fearsome and masculine, rather than heavily armored to protect themselves from blows. Warriors were as intent upon avoiding the stroke of death as they were on dealing it out to their enemies.

Greeks of the classical period had a strong preference for pitched battle between heavily armed infantry. The favored weapons were sword and hand-held spear, no arrow or throwing-spear. Ambushes and irregular skirmishing – indeed, almost all that we think of as strategy and tactics – were avoided in favor of brief, simple face-offs between identically equipped massed formations. Battle, that is, was a kind of ritualized collective dueling. Armor was designed with single-minded attention to preserving the life of its wearer. On the other hand, once battle commenced, the individual hoplite's supreme duty was to forget about his own preservation, stand his ground and take his chances. "Few types of fighting," writes Hanson, "have required quite the same degree of courage, of nerve in the face of mental and physical anguish, as this...in which armed and armored hoplites advanced in massed formation with no chance of escape" (p. 25).

The terrible ordeal of hoplite battle had, however, two advantages. First, it was economical. Deaths on the winning side averaged about five percent, on the losing side fourteen percent. Armor was affordable for the ordinary farmer. There were no long or distant campaigns; service lasted a few days, with the actual fighting occupying perhaps not more than an hour. Second, no non-Western army could stand up to it. This is what saved Greece during the Persian invasions of 490 and 480 B.C. Reluctant Persian draftees were simply not prepared to face heavily armed men who fought in formation and did not shrink from death. Herodotus relates that the Persians at Marathon believed the Athenians “possessed by some very desperate madness.” The death toll he reports for the battle—6,400 Persians versus 192 Greeks—gives some idea of the superiority of the “western way of war.”

Earlier military historians have tended to concentrate on questions of strategy, tactic, terrain, and logistics. But for these very reasons they also tended to slight hoplite battle of the classical period in favor of later Macedonian and Roman practice—which, incidentally, involved immeasurably greater loss of life.

Hanson also distinguishes himself from most of his predecessors by his attention to the harrowing experience of the individual Greek fighter. His inspiration here appears to have been John Keegan’s study *The Face of Battle* (Dorset Press, 1986); and Keegan returned the favor by writing an admiring preface for *The Western Way of War*. Hanson, indeed, several times cautions readers that the necessarily gruesome descriptions of hoplite battle are not intended as pacifist propaganda—a claim readers of his post-9/11 journalism will have no difficulty believing. Any student of Herodotus will come away from the *Western Way of War* with a greatly increased admiration for the courage and fortitude of the ordinary, unlettered farmers whose sacrifices made the cultural efflorescence of fifth century Greece possible.

Between 1988 and 1993 Hanson wrote what is likely to remain his most important book, *The Other Greeks: the Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization* (Free Press, 1995). It is an extraordinary contribution to our understanding of classical Greece: the achievement of a lifetime, really, though produced by a man still in his thirties. It is the principal grounds for his reputation as a scholar, but has also gained him a large audience for views on other subjects concerning which he is ill informed or mistaken. Before I offer criticism of his writings of the last five years, I want to give readers some understanding of the importance of his scholarly masterpiece.

Human beings have existed for hundreds of thousands of years, and the white race for about the last forty thousand. But what we refer to as Western Civilization cannot plausibly be traced back farther than the first millennium B.C. Furthermore, it was originally the achievement of a single nation, the Greeks, during a relatively brief span of time, the eighth through fourth centuries B.C. Ever since, men have understandably wondered what the

explanation of this could be. What was it about these particular people of this place and time which led them to bring forth self-government under law, free philosophical and scientific investigation, epic and dramatic poetry, and a body of art and architecture which remain the wonder of mankind two and a half millennia later?

It has been called the Greek miracle, but of course there was nothing miraculous about it. Such a grandiose manner of speaking merely reflects—besides admiration for the Greek achievement—our ignorance of its sources. For most of the centuries during which the ideal of classical education remained strong, this ignorance remained total. Consider, for example, the realm of literature. The Western literary tradition begins with a long poem called the *Iliad*, said to have been written by someone named Homer. This Homer is little more than a name to us. We still do not know exactly when or where he lived. But he was obviously a highly accomplished artist. Appearing suddenly as he does in our historical record, he is apt to seem an inexplicable, superhuman genius. And he has often been spoken of as such. But in fact the *Iliad* was the product of a long development. We know, thanks to the work of Milman Parry and other scholars, that Homer was an oral poet, very possibly illiterate, working within a tradition of public recitation for discriminating, aristocratic audiences. He brought that tradition to an unsurpassed level of perfection, so much so that the work of his predecessors ceased to be recited and their very names are now forgotten. Yet their work was by no means insignificant or mere labor lost; it was a necessary precondition for Homer's own achievement. No one—not even a writer of Homer's skill—could have created a work such as the *Iliad* from whole cloth.

Something analogous is true of the Greek polis, an historically unprecedented system of consensual government under law. When it suddenly emerges for us into the light of history in the pages of Herodotus (writing in about the 430s B.C.) we see it already fully formed and defending itself against the encroaching oriental despotism of Persia. Like the *Iliad*, the classical Greek polis is apt to appear to us something marvelous and inexplicable as long as its genesis remains hidden from view. And for most of later history, that genesis was well hidden indeed.

Beginning with the discoveries of Arthur Evans in the nineteenth century and continuing to the present with the recent development of "field survey archeology," this has changed. Enough is now known to allow a plausible reconstruction of the early development of the Greek economy and city-state. Professor Hanson's great contribution is to have synthesized the work of dozens of specialists to provide such a reconstruction; the bibliography of *The Other Greeks* (second edition) is thirty-six pages long. It is impossible to do the work justice in a short space, but perhaps what follows may encourage readers to attempt the five-hundred page original on their own.

In the course of the second millennium B.C. there rose and fell in Greece a notable civilization known as the Mycenaean (after the location of the first impressive archeological finds). Its economic life centered around large palaces, great lords, and a class of bureaucrats or administrators who oversaw agricultural laborers, assigning them their tasks and doling out rations. Most impressive to many are the rich burial finds: jewelry, weapons, pottery, sculpture. And they possessed two seemingly indecipherable scripts, which their discoverer Arthur Evans called simply Linear A and Linear B, both of which looked quite unlike classical Greek.

This Mycenaean palace culture of 1600–1200 B.C. did not, however, mark the dawn of Western civilization. It was a society comparable in achievement perhaps to the early Celtic Hallstatt and La Tène cultures, and considerably less interesting than the already ancient civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia. Like the latter, it was regimented and centralized. Hanson explicitly draws the parallel with Soviet-style collective agriculture.

Toward the end of the second millennium the Mycenaean world collapsed. Most of the palaces were burned. The next four centuries are termed the Greek “Dark Ages.” In fact, they are much less well known to us than Merovingian France or Saxon England. The archeological record is almost a complete blank, and there is no written literature at all. Then, in the eighth century, Homer, the polis, overseas colonization, even the Olympic Games, all appear almost simultaneously. How did it happen?

During the heyday of racial theorizing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there existed a kind of scholarly orthodoxy on this subject. Mycenaean civilization was destroyed by a superior race of invaders from the north: the Dorians. They brought the Greek language and Nordic blood with them, making classical civilization possible.

Even at the time this theory was first put forward there was one fairly obvious problem with it: the Dorians had to come from somewhere. If their superior natural endowments produced a great civilization in Greece, shouldn’t it have done so in their earlier homeland to the north? Why is there no record of any such civilization?

The really decisive blow to the theory, however, came with the decipherment of Linear B in 1951, and the revelation that it was an early form of Greek. The Greek speakers, in other words, were already in their present homeland by the middle of the second millennium B.C. The Dorians did not displace the native population or even impose a foreign tongue; they added only a slight variation to the existing genetic pool.

By the late twentieth century, the racial theory of classical civilization lay mostly in ruins for sound reasons unrelated to “antiracist” demagoguery. But there was no replacement for it. We still had no plausible explanation for the Greek miracle. Thanks in some significant measure to Victor Davis Hanson, we now do. The explanation, in a word, is *agrarianism*.

All preindustrial societies are agricultural, but only a few have been agrarian; of these latter, classical Greece was the first and most important. Agrarian societies are informed by a certain ideal, according to which landed estates should be generally small and inalienable. A plot of land should be large enough to provide a family with a decent sufficiency, but not luxury. It should belong to a family rather than any individual; the head of the family holds it in trust for the benefit of his children and his children's children. It is *his*, in other words, but not his alone. He has no moral right to do with it simply as he pleases.

Agrarianism is an egalitarian ideal, in a sense. A common Greek proverb was *ouk agathoi hoi plousiotatoi*: "the very rich are not good." And, as Hanson easily demonstrates, there was an anti-aristocratic tendency to much Greek literature: especially apparent in Hesiod, Euripides and Aristophanes. But this must not be confused with the envy-driven modern ideology of socialism. In the agrarian polis there was no objection to the accumulation of wealth as such; only to wealth being used to buy out family farms and consolidate large estates. Such *latifundia*, as the Romans called them, inevitably come to be controlled by absentee landlords in their own interests, leading to dependency for those who actually worked the land: free citizen-farmers are replaced by a peasantry. This is inimical not only to efficient land use but to political freedom. The elder Pliny echoed this old agrarian sentiment when he wrote, in an age of Trimalchios and *vomitoria*, "anyone for whom seven acres are not enough is a dangerous citizen."

Solon boasted that the legitimate interests of the wealthy aristocrats were respected in his legal code: a concord of the orders, not class struggle, was the classical ideal. Wealthy men were encouraged to use their wealth for the public benefit, for example, by sponsoring religious festivals and dramatic performances. Aristotle believed a polis had the duty to "teach those that are the respectable by nature that they are not to desire excessive riches," not because he resented aristocrats having more wealth than he did, but from a belief in *noblesse oblige* and a realization that the piling up of riches is not the proper end of human existence. And many aristocrats sincerely accepted the agrarian ideal. Plato—no democrat—suggested in his *Laws* that no farm should be more than five times as large as the smallest holdings.

Hanson sketches for us an account of the rise of Greek agrarianism for which the evidence must necessarily remain meager but which, as far as it goes, is utterly convincing. From comparative studies (for example, of the Western European Dark Ages) certain things can be known about the consequences of the collapse of a complex society. We may infer, for example, that there was a drastic decline in the population, a partial or complete reversion from cultivation of the soil to pastoralism, and an organization of society on the basis of kinship and personal service—feudalism, in a generic sense. Any agriculture that remained would have been extensive rather than intensive; in other words,

land use was extremely inefficient. Probably it consisted of cereal cultivation in the rich but (in Greece) scarce bottomland of river valleys. Gradually, as conditions became more settled, population began to increase and this type of land ran out. Men then began to stake out individual plots of slightly less desirable land on the lower slopes of the surrounding hills. As this too was engrossed, other enterprising farmers worked their way onto rockier ground, ever less suited to cereal cultivation. To compensate for the inferiority of the soil, they began to experiment with other crops, notably olives, figs, and vines – inventing the practice of grafting in the process. These new crops had a longer life-cycle than cereals, and the men who raised them had, correspondingly, a greater tendency to take long views. The new diversified agriculture was labor-intensive, producing not merely more or better food but a new type of person: the family farmer, a hard-working, practical man with a stubborn, individualistic streak, a strong sense of property rights backed by the courage and ability to defend property tenaciously. These agrarians may have been the first considerable body of men in history to develop a “work ethic,” a view of labor as intrinsically important and ennobling rather than mere pain to be endured for the sake of the wealth it produced. Hence arose the idea – so common among ancient moralists, so rarely recalled today – that luxury could be a snare, that the best situation in life was a mean between destitution and riches rather than the maximization of riches.

Besides respect for property, agrarianism favored the rule of law. Aristotle saw this: “when the farmer class and the class having moderate means are in control of the government, they govern according to laws; the reason is because they have a livelihood, and they are not able to be at leisure, so that they put laws in control of the state and hold only the minimum number of assemblies necessary” (*Other Greeks*, p. 114). Aristotle defined a free polis as one in which men rule and are ruled in turn according to generally accepted procedures. Greek civilization thus came to place great emphasis on law-abidingness. Furthermore, educated Greeks were aware that this distinguished them from other nations. Herodotus depicts an envoy warning the king of Persia that Greeks “have law for a master, whom they fear more than your men fear you.”

Eventually the sheer numbers of new agrarians shook the old Dark Age, clan-based structures of authority. The small farmers began to make their influence felt politically. This, in Hanson’s view, was the true significance of Solon’s legislation in sixth-century Athens. He and the other “lawgivers” – shadowy figures such as Philolaus of Corinth and Phaleas the Chalcedonian – were actually agrarian reformers, men who brought law and politics into line with already established agrarian economic and social realities. Failure to understand this has often resulted in these ancient lawgivers being misunderstood as a sort of philosopher-kings, founding states *ex nihilo* on the basis of their own abstract ideals of justice: consult Rousseau’s *Social Contract*, Book II, chapter 7, for an especially extravagant example of this tendency.

The agrarian character of the ancient city-state is concealed to a great extent by the nomenclature of ancient political thought, which centered on moral virtues and the number of enfranchised citizens rather than on economic arrangements. Consider, for example, Aristotle's well-known sixfold classification scheme for regimes. A city may be ruled by one man, a few men, or the mass of the population. And the rulers may govern in their own interests or that of the city as a whole. Hence there are three good regimes: kingship, aristocracy, and polity, or "good" democracy (*politeia*). And, correspondingly, there are three defective regimes: tyranny, oligarchy, and 'bad' democracy (*demokrateia*). Hanson ably demonstrates that this scheme is a Procrustean bed when applied to the economic evolution of the classical city-state. The early agrarian polis might be described as a broad oligarchy, since the landless poor were excluded from government. But in those times there simply was no large urban class of artisans and tradesmen, so the regime might with almost equal propriety be named a democracy. Because, however, agrarianism led to efficient land use and an ever-increasing surplus, such a landless, urban, but not necessarily poor or uneducated class did arise and seek participation in government. In Athens, it won that participation in the fifth century and a new, radical type of democracy came into being, lasting down to Aristotle's own time. Under the new conditions, oligarchy came to be conceived in a new way. For example, occasionally power was seized by an aristocratic cabal, as in the famous episode of the "four hundred" in Athens in 411 B.C.; or a narrow collaborationist government might be installed in formerly democratic cities by Sparta in its own interests. By Aristotle's day it was these despotic regimes which were known as "oligarchies." It would be perverse, however, to class them with the broad agrarian oligarchies of earlier times. But Aristotle's terminology blurs this essential distinction. It can be sharpened using modern economic and sociological concepts, but these disciplines were simply not part of the Greek achievement.

Among the high points of *The Other Greeks* we may mention chapter 9, "The Erosion of the Agrarian Polis." It concerns itself with Athens from the Peloponnesian War until the Battle of Chaeronea (431-338 B.C.), a period for which the historical record is far richer than for agrarianism's rise. Hanson shows that the Athenian farmers benefited economically from radical democratic imperialism even as they lost their political preponderance. Furthermore, they continued to enjoy a high level of social prestige: the urban population emulated rather than resented them. The phenomenon might be compared to that of the British gentleman, an originally sociopolitical category which gradually evolved into a moral ideal, and "set the tone" for the lower orders of society in an increasingly democratic age. It was not any agrarian "reaction" which destroyed Athenian democracy, but the rise of the nonagrarian monarchy of Macedon.

The Other Greeks contains three chapters devoted to military matters, but limited largely to their economic and cultural aspects. In view of Hanson's recent advocacy of widespread American military intervention, his criticisms of ancient militarism are especially noteworthy. By militarism, I mean lack of civilian oversight, state pay for soldiers and armaments, conscription, extended foreign campaigning, and exemption of generals and decision-makers from actual battle service. All had been characteristic of the ancient Near East, and reappeared in the Hellenistic world which arose out of the Macedonian conquests. Within the Western Tradition, they are a sure touchstone of cultural decadence. During the classical period, and especially until the Persian invasions, Greek "armies" were more properly agrarian militias: amateur, private, and formed by farmers themselves in their own interests. Hanson doubts major wars (as opposed to individual battles) were even common before the fifth century.

The Other Greeks first reveals an interest in American agrarianism, an interest more fully developed in *Fields without Dreams*, (Free Press, 1996). That work is based on the author's own experiences as a grape farmer during the agricultural depression of the 1980s. Hanson reminds his fellow countrymen that characteristically agrarian virtues underscored the democratic practices of earlier America as well as of the classical city-state and identifies government subsidies as responsible for the consolidation of family farms into agribusiness monstrosities. Much of the narrative has the ring of black comedy, though for the small farmers involved—Hanson's family and their neighbors—it was closer to tragedy. Independent farmers are taken advantage of by government and government-favored agribusiness concerns, simply because they *are* hardworking, uncomplaining, and have a sense of responsibility. They have gradually been reduced to a kind of helotry or driven out of business by managers and bureaucrats who are often their moral inferiors. Although I have no personal experience with agriculture, Hanson's narrative has for me a compelling quality. He concludes the book by calling for abolition of the Department of Agriculture. He does not seem to be aware, however, of the broader connection between governmental monetary policies and economic downturns such as the one he experienced. Perhaps a classicist-farmer should not be expected to have mastered the theories of Mises and Hayek.

In *Fields without Dreams*, war disappears from view.

At this point in his career Hanson was only forty-two years old and little known outside specialist circles. He had already achieved more than most scholars do in a lifetime. He could have rested on his laurels; perhaps he should have.

In 1999, however, three years after *Fields without Dreams* and two years before the World Trade Center attacks, Professor Hanson published *The Soul of Battle* (Free Press, 1999). It marks a turning point in his career, and deserves our close attention. The cover touts the work as a story of "how three great liberators vanquished tyranny." Only one of the men in question comes from

Prof. Hanson's special field of study: Epaminondas of Thebes. Greatly admired in antiquity, he is nearly forgotten today; I shall, therefore, summarize his career as briefly as possible.

The Peloponnesian War was waged by a Spartan-led coalition supposedly to free Greece from the domination of Athens. What actually happened was that, after destroying the Athenian Empire, Sparta created an even more despotic empire of her own, demanding tribute and obedience wherever her power extended. In 382 B.C. she occupied her former ally Thebes, installing a garrison and a collaborationist oligarchy. Three years later, a democratic cabal successfully conspired to overthrow the oligarchy and expel the Spartan garrison. They also established a new regional federation of democratic townships, led but not dominated by Thebes. In July of 371 a large Spartan-led force was met and defeated near the village of Leuctra by a smaller Theban-led force under the command of Epaminondas. It was considered a shocking upset. Epaminondas wished to follow up his victory with an immediate descent upon Sparta, but it took over a year to obtain the necessary authority and collect an army. What an army, though! Sparta had many enemies, and in December 370 some seventy thousand of them prepared to march south into the Peloponnesus. Their stated purpose was to aid the Arcadians, who had seen in Leuctra a chance to revolt from Spartan overlordship. Upon arriving, they learned that the Spartans had withdrawn to avoid facing them. The Arcadians, however, convinced Epaminondas it would be wrong to waste the opportunity presented by having such a splendid force assembled so close to Sparta. Overstepping his legal authority, Epaminondas led his men into the Eurotas valley, ravaging the land as far as the suburbs of Sparta itself; no army emerged to meet him. Returning to Arcadia in midwinter, he decided quickly on another, greater, and equally unplanned exploit: the liberation of Messenia. This territory, to the west of Sparta, had been reduced to serfdom three centuries previously. It had provided most of the agricultural surplus necessary to free Spartan citizens from labor, allowing them to devote themselves full-time to politics and military training. Within a few weeks, Epaminondas's men freed it and fortified the capital. Sparta had gone from ruler of Greece to minor regional power in less than two years, and it was largely due to the leadership of one man.

When Epaminondas returned to Thebes in the summer of 369 he received the common democratic reward of Greek generals: he was put on trial for treason by envious fellow-citizens. He was too proud even to mount a defense. The assembly, fortunately, had enough sense to drop the matter. For the next seven years, Thebes was the leading power in Greece. Epaminondas mounted three further invasions of the Peloponnesus, though without a force as great or results as spectacular as the first time. In 362 he was killed fighting another victorious battle against the Spartans in Arcadia. Theban hegemony vanished the instant he died and was never recovered. But neither did Sparta recover; Epaminondas's blow against her was essentially fatal.

There are certain figures from antiquity – Alexander the Great is the most notorious example – who are intriguing precisely because only enough evidence concerning them survives to whet our curiosity, but not enough to satisfy it. There is always a danger in modern attempts to reconstruct the thoughts and actions of such men; we are apt to project modern concerns upon them. This has happened, I believe, in Hanson's mostly competent and valuable summary of Epaminondas's career. A cover blurb for *The Soul of Battle* describes the work as "suffused by the author's deep faith in democracy." That, indeed, is just the problem. We find him speaking, for example, of a "naïve idealism" (p. 45) for democracy in Thebes, which is nothing more than his own modern ideological and messianic "faith in democracy." Few ancients actually had much good to say about radical democracy; those who did – such as Pericles and Demosthenes – did so because they were democratic political leaders themselves. They were, in other words, flattering the sovereign demos. Plato had their number; in his *Menexenus* he has Socrates point out that "it is an easy matter to praise Athens to the Athenians." The soberest ancients (such as Aristotle) propounded instead the idea of a constitution "mixed" of democratic and aristocratic elements.

Worse still, in speaking of the bizarre Spartan constitution so admired by Xenophon, Plutarch and – it is said – Socrates, we find Hanson slipping into Marxese. Sparta's "substructure" (as opposed, presumably, to its "superstructure") was "a maze of cultural, political, and economic contradictions" (p. 67; cf. also p. 178). This may reflect the influence of G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, a Marxist classicist elsewhere praised by Hanson.

Or again, consider Epaminondas's study of Pythagorean doctrine, which, as Hanson describes it, would seem to have made him into a regular Jacobin *avant la lettre*: Pythagoras's followers wished to

Overturn conventional prejudice... censor the luxury and decadence of the more wealthy and powerful, and apply a radical equality to fellows both male and female.... The enemies of all Pythagoreans were superstition, blinkered tradition, conventional religion and custom – anything handed down though ignorance that might impede unfettered examination.... Their utopia... was... a commune of the ascetic and educated, a sect of natural and trained elites, whose own exemplary behavior would allow them to bring justice and enlightenment to the ignorant other. (p. 58)

There does exist a kind of leftist *philosophia perennis*, and a number of cancerous modern ideas were well anticipated in antiquity. Some no doubt were to be found among the Pythagoreans. But there is no call for interpreting Epaminondas's struggle against Sparta as the fulfillment of an ideological program, Pythagorean or otherwise. Sparta was hated because she had oppressed and waged war against Thebes – and many other Greek states. Epaminondas did pride himself on liberating the Messenians, and not merely because this was an economic blow to Sparta. But, as with all ancient leaders (even Spartacus) there is no evidence he objected to slavery in principle.

Messenian helotry, “an altogether cruel and bitter condition,” as one ancient called it, is competently described by Hanson, but oddly termed “apartheid.” This anachronistic expression is first encountered well buried in an endnote to *The Other Greeks* (p. 478, note 4) – a cloud no bigger than a man’s hand. The special character of helotry was that its victims were enslaved by the Spartan state: they were not personal chattels, as were the slaves in most Greek city-states or the American South. In this respect there is a certain analogy with the position of blacks under the old South African race laws. Both were political rather than merely natural or economic statuses; both amounted to a kind of socialism. The essential difference, of course, is that the racial divide between Spartan citizens and Messenians was slight. More generally, all racial differences within the ancient Greek world were slight in comparison with those that afflict the modern era.

As explained above, the old racial theory of the rise of classical Greek civilization was indeed mistaken. It would be improper, however, to generalize from this particular case. If the valleys of Dark Age Greece had been inhabited by the present citizens of Equatorial Guinea, whose average IQ is said to be 59, the result would not have been the classical city-state, self-rule under law, tragedy, philosophy, and the Parthenon. Hanson, unfortunately, has milked the “antiracial” aspect of his own thesis for a great deal more than it is worth. He never misses an opportunity to reiterate that Western Civilization is a matter of “culture, not race” – as if informed racialists were unaware of anything besides biology. The truth, of course, is that writers for publications such as this one are interested in race because of their concern for Western culture. And whatever Hanson may think, race is no exception to the rule that one ought to know something about a subject before endeavoring to instruct others. Sadly, Hanson knows less about racial differences than I do about raisin production.

Which brings us to the subject matter of the rest of *The Soul of Battle*. As mentioned above, the work is billed as a story of “how three great liberators vanquished tyranny.” One of the other liberators in question is Patton. The Nazis, of course, give Hanson ample opportunity for pontificating about “racism.” Still, it is surely fair enough to describe Patton as a “liberator from tyranny.” It is the third liberator I wish to focus on here: William Tecumseh Sherman.

I was shocked to see, at the time *The Soul of Battle* was published, that Prof. Hanson had chosen Sherman as one of his military heroes. He had, after all, been at pains in his very first book to distinguish the ancient practice of crop-destruction from the modern version, in which the intent is precisely to wage war on the civilian population, and even reduce it to starvation. Could he really be unaware what historical figure this modern practice is most closely associated with?

Or what of the “western way of war” consisting of short, decisive infantry engagements? Would Gen. Sherman’s March to the Sea represent this tradition?

Or what of Hanson's agrarian concerns? Would he expect Sherman to share his tender concern for the preservation of family farms?

What we find in the Sherman chapters of *The Soul of Battle* is, in fact, a remarkable testament to the ability of even a highly intelligent man to compartmentalize his thoughts. Much of Hanson's treatment of Sherman can be rebutted from the author's own earlier work. The most striking instance regards the relation between property rights and political power. "You must first make a government before you can have property," he quotes Sherman as saying (p. 149); "there is no such thing as property without a government." The disproof is in the pages of *The Other Greeks*. Property rights and their concomitant—freedom under law—evolved from the special, highly unusual circumstances of Dark Age Greece, where government was nearly absent. The polis, as Hanson demonstrated, arose out of this preexisting economic and social arrangement. Sherman's statist view of property, so common in our day, represents a reversion to the non-Western mentality of Persian autocracy in which subjects only have as many rights as the king chooses to allow them.

Agrarianism is another subject on which our author switches sides when moving from classical Greece to America. The South was quite obviously the agrarian section in antebellum America. Hanson, however, chooses to label it "pseudo-agrarian" merely because some larger plantations existed. Like many Americans, he seems to have an exaggerated idea of the number of such Southern *latifundia*. This received notion—which is not new—feeds naturally into a Marxist-style exploitation theory of the Southern economy. Hanson approvingly quotes an Ohio officer who served under Sherman: "a civilization in which a score of lives are impoverished and embittered, are blasted and debased and damned, in order that one life may be made sweeter, is a system of wrong that no language can properly condemn" (p. 149). The sentiment is difficult to dispute, but it does not correctly describe Southern society—nor any other. Wealth is not extracted from unfree men by the free; it is produced by the labor of all men. If the exploitation theory were correct, the slaveholding South ought to have been wealthier than the industrial North; of course, this was not the case.

Hanson's ignorance of the realities of Southern agrarianism is matched by his ignorance of the rich body of thought it has occasioned. John Taylor, John Randolph, the Vanderbilt "Twelve," Richard Weaver, M. E. Bradford—none seem to have come to his attention. Weaver, in particular, might have taught him a lot. Consider only his great essay "Southern Chivalry and Total War":

The majority of the Southern people looked upon [the war] as an elaborate ceremonial, to be conducted strictly according to rules, and with maximum display of color and individual daring—in short, as a gigantic tournament, with the Lord of Hosts as umpire and judge. After First Manassas some Southerners were actually heard to express the opinion that the war must promptly cease because the question of manhood between the two sections had been decided and

there was nothing else at issue. The South went into the first modern war thinking it was a duel, and "affair of honor." (*The Southern Essays of Richard M. Weaver*, pp. 164-165)

This Southern view, indeed, bears some resemblance to Hanson's own description of classical agrarian hoplite battle in *The Western Way of War*. In that book, as above related, Hanson had been at pains to distinguish the limited hoplite duel from the lengthy and distant campaigns of "Hellenistic thugs" and Roman legionaries, financed through plunder and pillage. Is the analogy between this latter kind of warfare and Sherman's brand of "total war" so difficult to see? How did it go from being despicable in antiquity to being admirable in the nineteenth century?

Hanson's answer, I think, is easy enough to infer. Reducing a civilian population to starvation is admirable when it is necessary to end what he variously terms the "odious" or "abhorrent" practice of slavery (adjectives he never applies to the slavery of any other place or time). But slavery was in fact abolished in numerous countries during the nineteenth century without any March to the Sea.

The shortcomings of Hanson's Sherman chapters are indeed so numerous that it is impossible to treat them adequately here. I shall merely list a few more:

He believes the plantation class's worth was "self-assessed in material rather than human terms" (p. 157). Weaver, again, was on the mark in calling the South "the last non-materialist civilization in the Western World." There exist innumerable testimonies to how little status value was conferred by wealth in the antebellum South.

He believes Northern prosperity was due in part to taxation—which of course merely reallocates wealth while eroding it (p.199). His knowledge of economics, in other words, has not improved.

He draws inferences from might to right, believing the South's defeat amounts to a proof of its moral culpability. He explicitly equates the constitutional issue of states' rights with that of slavery (both these confusions on p. 187).

Secessionists were "revolutionaries" who "hated" the union (p. 155) and "forced" it into the war (p. 185, quoting Sherman's own words).

Furthermore, the language of these chapters possesses an extravagance unprecedented in Hanson's writings up to this time (though not unmatched by his political diatribes since September 11). My favorite sentence: "To Sherman, the self-avowed agent of the apocalypse, warfare of the new modern age had only one redeeming feature: the bringing of a brutal, immutable truth to the world of hypocrisy and darkness" (p. 203).

Hanson's knowledge of Sherman's March is extensive (the bibliography for these chapters alone includes sixty-eight items). But it is strictly limited to the military aspect of the March; where consideration of the larger socioeconomic and moral aspect of events should come, we find only vehement rehashing of Yankee propaganda.

Victor Davis Hanson is a fine military historian of *classical Greece*. He knows so little of political theory that he cannot distinguish imperial aggression from its opposite. Sherman marched for the imperial aggrandizement of the Union; Epaminondas marched to destroy the Spartan empire. In that regard, these two figures were polar opposites. Sherman's historical predecessors were rather the Persian commanders who attempted to crush agrarian, democratic, "Western" Athens and incorporate it into their empire.

How did Prof. Hanson come to associate two such figures in his own mind and in his writings? As best as I can reconstruct it, his train of thought went something like this: "The Greeks were agrarians who figured out democracy and Western Civilization. We Americans are the heirs of that civilization; lots of us used to be farmers and a few still are; we call our own form of government democracy. So we are the Greeks of today. The Confederates, however, owned slaves—which we know is wrong, though the Greeks for some reason didn't. The Confederates, then, were the Persian tyrants of the nineteenth century. Since Sherman fought them, he was the heir of the Athenians facing down Persian might at Marathon. Or perhaps of Epaminondas freeing Messenia from Spartan rule: it doesn't so much matter. In any case, since we are Americans and heirs of the Greeks, we are also Unionists, Western, enemies of tyranny, and various good things. When we fight, the other guys are Persians, Spartans, rebels, Asiatics, tyrants, and various bad things."

This "Hanson doctrine," as it might be called, is not only supremely confused—it possesses a self-righteous Manichean quality worthy of Robespierre.

Now, I must remind my readers that *The Soul of Battle* was published in 1999, two years before the events of September 11. A person reading the book upon publication might have come to the same conclusions I have just sketched. But he could never have foreseen that Prof. Hanson's shortcomings would have an effect outside the domain of military history.

Victor Davis Hanson began on the very day of the World Trade Center attacks to publish articles advocating an American war in the Middle East. The earliest have been gathered in a book—*An Autumn of War*—which has sold briskly and been touted by Rush Limbaugh, William Kristol, and other influential figures. Significantly, the longest piece in that collection concerns Sherman, whom the author puts forward as a model to be followed for America's war in Afghanistan.

Indeed, Hanson's cardinal mistake has been to interpret the events of September 11 as a conventional military attack. They were not. War is older than civilization itself, but the first terrorist organization in the modern sense was only formed in the 1870s, in Imperial Russia. It is the direct or indirect inspiration of all such organizations down to the present day. It styled itself "The People's Will," and its executive committee had only about thirty members. These men resorted to planting bombs precisely *because* they knew they were too weak to confront the Imperial Government directly. Their aim

instead was to provoke the authorities into taking harsh countermeasures, and thus (it was hoped) generate public support for the revolutionary cause. For three years they carried out a dramatic campaign of murder against high government officials, culminating in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. This succeeded splendidly in provoking the desired countermeasures; within a few years Russia had a secret police that foreshadowed Lenin's Cheka. But it gained no public support; ordinary Russians were horrified by the assassinations and the revolutionaries' cause suffered. Rather than reconsider their aims and methods, however, later Russian terrorists developed a cult of martyrdom, of self-sacrificial violence as an end in itself. Terror was hallowed by its association with revolutionary aims even in the absence of any political gains.

Contemporary Islamic terrorism still bears a strong family resemblance to its Russian predecessor. The traditional Muslim idea of holy war and religious martyrdom fuses easily with Western political fanaticism. The al-Qaedaists find their inspiration in the writings of Sayyed al-Qutb,

a self-conscious intellectual in the Western sense, who attempted to give Islam a decidedly modernist, even "existentialist" character. The faith of the true Muslim was, for Qutb, an expression of his innermost being against the inauthentic otherness of the surrounding world. Islam was therefore the answer to the rootlessness and comfortlessness of modernity, and Qutb did not stop short of endorsing both suicide and terrorism as instruments in the self-affirmation of the believer. (Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest*, pp. 115-116.)

This mentality is difficult for normal people to comprehend, but we must make the effort if we are to understand what our civilization is now up against.

Hanson, in contrast, conceives the September 11 attacks as a tactical blunder in a conventional war. Bin Laden, he assures us, "thought it more likely that he could gain fame and power than court death and destruction" (*An Autumn of War*, p. xvi). He writes as if al-Qaeda had not intended to provoke a military response from the U.S., and must now be shaking in their boots from bewilderment and surprise.

This very lack of imagination makes Hanson useful to vested interests. The American military, while powerful, is a force designed for conventional fighting. Hanson's misleading historical analogies between Sherman and the Afghan war, therefore, come opportunely to its leaders. He has ignorant bureaucrats at the Pentagon imagining they enjoy the authority of history for picturing themselves as "vanquishers of tyranny." Our country may be no safer, but Hanson's own reputation has soared among men unable to appreciate his standing as a scholar. Should his own understanding of terrorism improve, his usefulness to his new friends will vanish precipitously.

An Autumn of War continues and extends other unfortunate tendencies we saw in *The Soul of Battle*, notably the unconditional praise of modernism. "Medieval" is his great term of condemnation, as when he describes

Islamicists as “wedded to a medieval world of perpetual stasis” (p. 15). We, on the other hand, “inherited our democratic ideals from the European enlightenment” (p. 208). So much for Greek agrarianism. He speaks of America being “created as [an] antithesis” to the Old World (p. 211). And in just the last twenty years we have “evolved beyond the traditional Western paradigm in reaching the theoretical limits of freedom and unbridled capitalism” (p. 204). So much for the destruction of free farming by the Department of Agriculture.

Hanson’s “deep faith in democracy” seems to grow ever deeper. “It is the duty of Americans,” he writes, “to support popular governments and democratic revolutionaries wherever possible” (p. xix), and more specifically to support “the right of all Islamic peoples to self-determination through consensual government” (p. 72). Never mind that divine sanction is the only legitimizing principle familiar to ordinary Muslims. He expects that “what once happened among the enslaved peoples of the Warsaw Pact could occur again in the Middle East—and in a decade or less rather than fifty years” (p. 203). What if Muslims turn out not to care for “freedom and democracy?” No cause for second thoughts: “[i]f they wish...to elect themselves into the slavery of Islamic republics, so be it—but at least we can say that we fought for legitimacy—and they, not us, ruined their countries” (p. 143). He speaks casually of outlawing polygamy, “liberating” women, secularizing education, and putting an end to “tribalism.”

Among the more intriguing pieces in *An Autumn of War* is Hanson’s “interview” with Thucydides. Passages from *The Peloponnesian War* are turned into answers to Hanson’s queries about the War on Terror. He asks about the need for tough measures, even against those not directly connected to the September 11 attacks. “General Thucydides’s” answer advocates punishment of the innocent along with the guilty. The passage, it turns out, is taken from a speech by the demagogue Cleon, whom the real Thucydides called “the most violent man at Athens.” In the speech quoted, Cleon was defending a motion to put the entire adult male population of Mytilene to death and enslave the women and children, because *some* of the citizens had plotted a revolt against Athens.

Hanson further sees fit to apply to Donald Rumsfeld a panegyric Thucydides made upon Pericles the Great. More recently, he has compared George Bush to Demosthenes (though not, fortunately, with any special regard for the president’s speaking ability). Thucydides’ magnificent remarks on the perversion of language brought on by war fever are turned upside down into a defense of Hanson’s own wild rhetoric about “Islamofascism” (pp. 75–78). Such is the “classical wisdom” he offers our age.

In the two years since writing the pieces collected as *An Autumn of War* Prof. Hanson has remained busy producing at least one article per week for National Review Online. He seems oddly out of place among the professional libelers

and callow minds now posing as heirs to that once respectable journal, but it is only knowledge of his past achievements which allows one to say this; the actual material he now grinds out is indistinguishable from theirs. We may skip discussing it; besides being numbingly repetitious, it contains little argument or analysis of any sort. Indeed, most of it is mere cheerleading – intended to stir the reader’s enthusiasm for whatever line the Bush administration is pushing at the moment.

Victor Davis Hanson is among the most talented writers in America today. How sad, then, that precisely his *worst* qualities are now exerting the greatest influence. *The Other Greeks* will never reach the vast audience that has devoured *An Autumn of War*. No revival of free agriculture or classical education is likely to be sparked by his earlier work. Instead, he is now a leading proponent of policies which, it is to be feared, threaten us, our country, and our civilization with catastrophe.

*F. Roger Devlin, Ph.D., is a freelance writer, scholar, and author of **Alexandre Kojève and the Outcome of Modern Philosophy**, forthcoming this year from University Press of America.*

THE LEGACY OF A EUROPEAN TRADITIONALIST JULIUS EVOLA IN PERSPECTIVE

GUIDO STUCCO

This article is a brief introduction to the life and central ideas of the controversial Italian thinker Julius Evola (1898-1974), one of the leading representatives of the European right and of the “Traditionalist movement”¹ in the twentieth century. This movement, together with the Theosophical Society, played a leading role in promoting the study of ancient eastern wisdom, esoteric doctrines, and spirituality. Unlike the Theosophical Society, which championed democratic and egalitarian views,² an optimistic view of progress, and a belief in spiritual evolution, the Traditionalist movement adopted an elitist and antiegalitarian stance, a pessimistic view of ordinary life and of history, and an uncompromising rejection of the modern world. The Traditionalist movement began with René Guénon (1886-1951), a French philosopher and mathematician who converted to Islam and moved to Cairo in 1931, following the death of his first wife. Guénon revived interest in the concept of Tradition, i.e., the teachings and doctrines of ancient civilizations and religions, emphasizing its perennial value over and against the “modern world” and its offshoots: humanistic individualism, relativism, materialism, and scientism. Other important Traditionalists of the past century have included Ananda Coomaraswamy, Frithjof Schuon, and Julius Evola.

This article is addressed, first, to persons who claim to be conservative and of rightist persuasion. It is my contention that Evola’s political views can help the American right to acquire a greater intellectual relevance and to overcome its provincialism and narrow horizons. The criticism most frequently leveled by the European “New Right” against American conservatives is that the ideological poverty of the American Right lies in its circling its wagons around a conservative agenda, in its inability to see the greater scheme of things.³ By disclosing to his readers the value and worth of the world of Tradition, Evola has shown that to be a rightist entails much more than taking a stance on civic and social issues, such as abortion, capital punishment, a strong military, free enterprise, less taxes, less government, fierce patriotism, and the right to bear arms, but rather assessing more crucial matters involving race, ethnicity, eugenics, immigration, and the nature of the nation-state.

Second, readers with an active interest in spiritual and metaphysical matters may find Evola's thought insightful and his exposition of ancient esoteric techniques very helpful. Moreover, his views, though at times very critical and astute, have the potential of becoming a catalyst for personal transformation and spiritual growth.

To date, Evola's work has been subjected to the silent treatment. When Evola is not ignored, he is usually vilified by leftist scholars and intellectuals, who demonize him as a bad teacher, racist, rabid anti-Semite, master mind of right-wing terrorism, fascist guru, or so filthy a racist even to touch him would be repugnant. The writer Martin Lee, whose knowledge of Evola is of the most superficial sort, called him a "Nazi philosopher" and claimed that "Evola helped compose Italy's belated racialist laws toward the end of the Fascist rule."⁴ Others have minimized his contribution altogether. Walter Laqueur, in his *Fascism: Past, Present, Future*, did not hesitate to call him a "learned charlatan, an eclecticist, not an innovator," and suggested "there were elements of pure nonsense also in his later work."⁵ Umberto Eco sarcastically nicknamed Evola "Othelma, the Magician."

The most valuable summaries to date of Evola's life and work in the English language have been written by Thomas Sheehan and Richard Drake.⁶ Until either a biography of Evola or his ... autobiography becomes available to the English-speaking world, these articles remain the best reference sources for his life and work. Both scholars are well versed in Italian culture, politics, and language. Although not sympathetic to Evola's ideas, they were the first to introduce the Italian thinker's views to the American public. Unfortunately, their interpretations of Evola's work are very reductive. Sheehan and Drake succumb to the dominant leftist propaganda according to which Evola is a "bad teacher" because he allegedly supplied ideological justification for a bloody campaign by right wing terrorists in Italy during the 1980s.⁷ Regrettably, both authors have underestimated Evola's *spissitudo spiritualis* as an esotericist and a Traditionalist, and have written about Evola merely as a case study in their fields of competence, i.e., philosophy and history, respectively.⁸

Despite his many detractors, Evola has enjoyed something of a revival in the past twenty years. His works have been translated into French, German,⁹ Spanish, and English, as well as Portuguese, Hungarian, and Russian. Conferences devoted to the study of this or that aspect of Evola's thought are mushrooming everywhere in Europe.¹⁰ Thus, paraphrasing the title of Edward Albee's play, we may want to ask: "Who's afraid of Julius Evola?" And, most important, why?

EVOLA'S LIFE

Julius Evola died of heart failure at his Rome apartment on June 11, 1974, at the age of seventy-six. Before he died he asked to be seated at his desk in order to face the sun's light streaming through the open window. In accordance with his will, his body was cremated and the urn containing his ashes was buried in a crevasse on Monte Rosa, in the Italian Alps.

Evola's writing career spanned more than half a century. It is possible to distinguish three periods in his intellectual development. First came an artistic period (1916-1922), during which he embraced dadaism and futurism, wrote poetry, and painted in the abstract style. The reader may recall that dadaism was an avant-garde movement founded by Tristan Tzara, characterized by a yearning for absolute freedom and by a revolt against all prevalent logical, ethical, and aesthetic canons.

Evola turned next to the study of philosophy (1923-1927), developing an ingenuous perspective that could be characterized as "transidealistic," or as a solipsistic development of mainstream idealism. After learning German in order to be able to read the original texts of the main idealist philosophers (Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel), Evola accepted their chief premise, that being is the product of thought. Yet he also attempted to overcome the passivity of the subject toward "reality" typical of idealist philosophy and of its Italian offshoots, represented by Giovanni Gentile and Benedetto Croce, by outlining the path leading to the "Absolute Individual," to the status enjoyed by one who succeeds in becoming free (ab-solutus) from the conditionings of the empirical world. During this period Evola wrote *Saggi sull'idealismo magico* (Essays on magical idealism), *Teoria dell'individuo assoluto* (Theory of the absolute individual), and *Fenomenologia dell'individuo assoluto* (Phenomenology of the absolute individual), a massive work in which he employs the values of freedom, will, and power to expound his philosophy of action. As the Italian philosopher Marcello Veneziani wrote in his doctoral dissertation: "Evola's absolute I is born out of the ashes of nihilism; with the help of insights derived from magic, theurgy, alchemy and esotericism, it ascends to the highest peaks of knowledge, in the quest for that wisdom that is found on the paths of initiatory doctrines."¹¹

In the third and final phase of his intellectual formation, Evola became involved in the study of esotericism and occultism (1927-1929). During this period he cofounded and directed the so-called Ur group, which published monthly monographs devoted to the presentation of esoteric and initiative disciplines and teachings. "Ur" derives from the archaic root of the word "fire"; in German it also means "primordial" or "original." In 1955 these monographs were collected and published in three volumes under the title *Introduzione alla magia quale scienza dell'Io*.¹² In the over twenty articles Evola wrote for the Ur group, under the pseudonym "EA" (Ea in ancient Akkadian mythology was

the god of water and wisdom) and in the nine articles he wrote for *Bylichnis* (the name signifies a lamp with two wicks), an Italian Baptist periodical, Evola laid out the spiritual foundations of his world view.

During the 1930s and 1940s Evola wrote for a number of journals and published several books. During the Fascist era he was somewhat sympathetic to Mussolini and to fascist ideology, but his fierce sense of independence and detachment from human affairs and institutions prevented him from becoming a card-carrying member of the Fascist party. Because of his belief in the supremacy of ideas over politics and his aristocratic and anti-populist views, which at times conflicted with government policy – as in his opposition to the 1929 Concordat between the Italian state and Vatican and to the “demographic campaign” launched by Mussolini to increase Italy’s population – Evola fell out of favor with influential Fascists, who shut down *La Torre* (The tower), the biweekly periodical he had founded, after only ten issues (February-June 1930).¹³

Evola devoted four books to the subject of race, criticizing National Socialist biological racism and developing a doctrine of race on the basis of the teachings of Tradition: *Il mito del sangue* (The myth of blood); *Sintesi di una dottrina della razza* (Synthesis of a racial doctrine); *Tre aspetti del problema ebraico* (Three aspects of the Jewish question); *Elementi di una educazione razziale* (Elements of a racial education). In these books the author outlined his tripartite anthropology of body, soul, and spirit. The spirit is the principle that determines one’s attitude toward the sacred, destiny, life and death. Thus, according to Evola, the cultivation of the “spiritual race” should take precedence over the selection of the somatic race, which is determined by the laws of genetics and with which the Nazis were obsessed. Evola’s antimaterialistic and non-biological racial views won Mussolini’s enthusiastic endorsement. The Nazis, for their part, were suspicious of and even critical of Evola’s “nebulous” theories, accusing him of watering down the empirical, biological element to promote an abstract, spiritualist, and semi-Catholic view of race.

Before and during World War II, Evola traveled and lectured in several European countries, practicing mountain climbing as a spiritual exercise in his spare time. After Mussolini was freed from his Italian captors in a daring German raid led by SS-Hauptsturmführer Otto Skorzeny, Evola was among a handful of faithful followers who met him at Hitler’s headquarters in Rastenburg, East Prussia, on September 14, 1943. While sympathetic to the newly formed Fascist government in the north of Italy, which continued to fight on the Germans’ side against the Allies, Evola rejected its republican and socialist agenda, its populist style, and its antimonarchical sentiments.

When the Allies entered Rome in June 1944, their secret services attempted to arrest Evola, who was living there at the time. As his elderly mother stalled the MPs, Evola slipped out of the door undetected, and made his way to

northern Italy, and then to Austria. While in Vienna, he began to study ... secret archives confiscated from various European Masonic lodges by the Germans.

One day in 1945, as Evola was walking the deserted streets of the Austrian capital during a Soviet air attack, a bomb exploded a few yards away from him. The blast threw him against a wooden plank. Evola fell on his back, and awoke in the hospital. He had suffered a compression of the bone marrow, paralyzing him from the waist down. Common sense tells one that walking a city's deserted streets during aerial bombardments is madness, if not suicide. But Evola was used to courting danger. Or, as he once put it, to follow "the norm of not avoiding dangers, but on the contrary, to seek them out, [i]s an implicit way of questioning fate."¹⁴ That is not to say that he believed in "blind" fate. As he once wrote:

There is no question that one is born with certain tendencies, vocations and predispositions, which at times are very obvious and specific, though at other times are hidden and likely to emerge only in particular circumstances or trials. We all have a margin of freedom in regard to this innate, differentiated element.¹⁵

Evola was determined to question his fate, especially at a time when an entire era was coming to an end.¹⁶ But what he had anticipated during the air raid was either death or the attainment of a new perspective on life, not paralysis. He struggled for a long time with that particular outcome, trying to make sense of his "karma":

Remembering why I had willed it [i.e., the paralysis] and to understand its deeper meaning was to me the only thing that ultimately mattered, something far more important than to "recover," to which I never really attributed much importance anyway.¹⁷

Evola had ventured outdoors during the air raid in order to test his fate, for he firmly believed in the Traditional, classical doctrine that all the major events that occur in our lives are not purely casual or the outcome of our efforts, but rather the deliberate result of a prenatal choice, something that has been willed by "us" before we were born.

Three years prior to his paralysis, Evola wrote:

Life here on earth cannot be viewed as a coincidence. Moreover, it should not be regarded as something we can either accept or reject at will, nor as a reality that imposes itself on us, before which we can only remain passive, or display an attitude of obtuse resignation. Rather, what arises in some people is the sensation that earthly life is something to which, prior to our becoming terrestrial beings, we have committed ourselves, both as an adventure and as a mission or a chosen task, undertaking a whole set of problematic and tragic elements as well.¹⁸

There followed a five-year period of inactivity. First, Evola spent a year and a half in a Vienna hospital. In 1948, thanks to the intervention of a friend with the International Red Cross, he was sent back to Italy. He stayed in a hospital in Bologna for at least another year, where he underwent an unsuccessful

laminectomy (a surgical procedure in which part of a vertebra is removed in order to relieve pressure on the nerves of the spinal cord). Evola returned to his Roman residence in 1949, where he lived as an invalid for the next twenty-five years.

While in Bologna, Evola was visited by his friend Clemente Rebora, a poet who became a Christian, and then a Catholic priest in the order of the Rosminian Fathers. After reading about their friendship in one of Evola's works, in 1997 I visited the headquarters of the order and asked to talk to the person in charge of Rebora's archives, in hopes of discovering a previously unknown correspondence between them. No correspondence surfaced, but the priest in charge of the archive was kind enough to give me a copy of a couple of letters Rebora wrote to a friend concerning Evola. The following summary of those letters is revealing of Evola's view of religion, and of Christianity in particular.¹⁹

In 1949 a fellow priest, Goffredo Pistoni, solicited Rebora to visit Evola. Rebora asked permission of his provincial superior, and upon receiving it traveled from Rovereto to Evola's hospital in Bologna. Rebora was animated by the desire to see Evola embrace the Christian faith and intended to be a good witness of the gospel. In a letter to Pistoni, Rebora asked for his assistance so that he would not spoil the "most merciful ways of Infinite Love, and, if [my visit was to be] unhelpful, at least not [turn out to be] harmful." On March 20, 1949, Rebora wrote to his friend Pistoni on the letterhead of the Salesian Institute of Bologna:

I have just returned from our Evola: we talked at great length and left each other in a brotherly mood, though I did not detect any visible change on his part which after all I could not expect. I have felt him to be like one yearning to "join the rest of the army," as he said himself, waiting to see what will happen to him . . . I have sensed in him a thirst for the absolute, which nevertheless eludes Him who said: "Let anyone who is thirsty come to me and drink."²⁰

Rebora's frustration with Evola's unwillingness to abandon his views and embrace the Christian faith is evident in the comment with which he closes the first half of his letter:

Let us pray that his previous books, which he is about to reprint, and a few new titles that will be published soon, may not chain him down, considering the success they have, and may not damage people's souls, leading them astray in the direction of a false spirituality, as they "follow false images of the Good." [Probably a quote from Dante's *Divine Comedy*. — G.S.]

Rebora concluded his letter on May 12, 1949, adding:

Having returned to headquarters I am finally concluding this letter by telling you that a supernatural tenderness is growing in my heart for him. He [Evola] told me about an inner event that occurred to him during the bombing of Vienna, which, he added, is still mysterious to him, as he undergoes this present trial. On the contrary, I trust I am able to detect the providential and decisive meaning of this event for his soul.

Rebora wrote again to Evola, asking him if he was willing to travel to Lourdes on a special train on which Rebora served as a spiritual director. Evola politely refused and the contact between the two eventually ended. Evola never converted to Christianity. In a 1935 letter written to a friend of his, Girolamo Comi, another poet who had become a Christian, Evola claimed:

As far as I am concerned, in regard to the "conversion" that really matters, and not that which is based on feelings or on a religious faith, I have been all right since thirteen years ago [i.e., 1922, the transition year between the artistic and philosophical periods].²¹

René Guénon wrote to the convalescent Evola²² suggesting that the latter had been the victim of a curse or magical spell cast by some powerful enemy. Evola replied that he considered that unlikely, for the circumstances to be summoned (e.g., the exact moment of the bomb's landing, the place where Evola happened to be at that moment), would have required too powerful a spell. Mircea Eliade, the renowned historian of religion, who corresponded with Evola throughout his life, once remarked to one of his own students: "Evola was wounded in the third chakra—and don't you find that significant?"²³ Since the corresponding affective forces of the third chakra are anger, violence, and pride, one may wonder whether Eliade meant that the wound sustained by Evola could have had a purifying effect on the Italian thinker, or whether it was the consequence of his hubris. In any event, Evola rejected the idea that his paralysis was a sort of "punishment" for his "promethean" efforts in the spiritual domain. For the rest of his life he endured his condition with admirable stoicism, in rigorous coherence with his beliefs.²⁴

For the next two decades Evola received visitors, friends, and young people who regarded themselves his disciples. According to Gianfranco de Turreis, who met him for the first time in 1967, one could sense that he was a "person of high caliber," though he did not show off or assume snobbish attitudes. Evola would wear a monocle and rest his cheek on a clenched fist, observing his visitor with curiosity. He did not like the idea of having "disciples," and jokingly referred to his admirers as "Evolomani" ("Evola maniacs"). In not seeking to recruit followers, he was probably mindful of Buddha's injunction to proclaim the truth without attempting to persuade or dissuade: "One should know approval and one should know disapproval, and having known approval, having known disapproval, one should neither approve nor disapprove, one should simply teach *dhamma*."²⁵

CENTRAL THEMES IN EVOLA'S THOUGHT

In Evola's literary production it is possible to single out three major themes, which are strictly interwoven and mutually dependent. These themes represent three facets of his philosophy of action. I have designated these themes with terms borrowed from ancient Greek. The first theme is *xeniteia*, a word that refers to the condition of living abroad, or of being absent from one's

homeland. In Evola's works one can easily detect a sense of alienation, of not belonging to what he called the "modern world." According to ancient peoples, *xeniteia* was not an enviable condition. To live surrounded by barbarous people and customs, away from one's polis, when not the result of a personal choice was often the result of a judicial sentence. We may recall that exile was often meted out to undesirable elements of an ancient society, e.g., the short-lived practice of ostracism in ancient Athens; the fate that befell many ancient Romans, including the Stoic philosopher Seneca; the deportation of entire families or populations, etc.

Throughout his life, Evola never really "fit in." Whether during his artistic, philosophical, or esoteric phase, he always felt like a straggler, seeking to link up with "the rest of the 'army.'" The modern world he denounced in his masterpiece, *Revolt against the Modern World*, took its revenge on him: at the end of the war he was surrounded by a world of ruins, isolated, avoided, and reviled. Yet he managed to retain a composed, dignified attitude and to continue in his self-appointed task of night-watchman.

The second theme is *apoliteia*, or abstention from active participation in the construction of the human polis. Evola's recommendation was that while living in exile from the world of Tradition and from the Golden Age, one should avoid the encroaching embrace of the multitudes and refrain from active participation in ordinary human affairs. *Apoliteia*, according to Evola, refers essentially to an inner attitude of indifference and detachment, but it does not necessarily entail a practical abstention from politics, as long as one engages in it with a completely detached attitude: "*Apoliteia* is the inner, irrevocable distance from this society and its 'values': it consists in not accepting being bound to society by any spiritual or moral bond."²⁶ This attitude is to be commended because, according to Evola, in this day and age there are no ideas, causes, and goals worthy of one's commitment.

Finally, the third theme is *autarkeia*, or self-sufficiency. The quest for spiritual independence led Evola far away from the busy crossroads of human interaction, in order to explore and expound paths of perfection and of asceticism. He became a student of ancient esoteric and occult teachings on "liberation," and published his findings in several books and articles.

XENITEIA

The following words, spoken by the Benevolent Spirit to the Destructive Spirit in the *Yasna*, a Zoroastrian collection of hymns and prayers, may serve to characterize Evola's attitude toward the modern world: "Neither our thoughts, nor teachings, nor intentions, neither our preferences nor words, neither our actions nor conceptions nor our souls are in accord."²⁷ Throughout his entire life Evola lived in a consistent and coherent fashion that could be simplistically dismissed as intellectual snobbism or even misanthropy. But the

reasons for Evola's rejection of the socio-political order in which he lived must be sought elsewhere, namely in a well-articulated Weltanschauung, or worldview.

To be sure, Evola's sense of estrangement from the society in which he lived was reciprocated. Anyone who refuses to recognize the legitimacy of "the System," or to participate in the life of a community which he does not recognize as his own, professing instead a higher allegiance to and citizenship in another land, world, or ideology, is bound to live like a metic in ancient Greece, surrounded by suspicion and hostility.²⁸ In order to understand the reasons for Evola's uncompromising attitude, we need first to define the concepts of "Tradition" and "modern world" as employed by Evola in his works.

Generally speaking, the term tradition can be understood in several ways: (1) as an archetypal myth (some members of the political Right in Italy have rejected this view as an "incapacitating myth"); (2) as the way of life of a particular age, e.g., the Middle Ages, feudal Japan, the Roman Empire; (3) as the sum of three principles: "God, Country, Family"; (4) as *anamnesis*, or historical memory in general; and (5) as a body of religious teachings to be preserved and transmitted to future generations. Evola understood tradition mainly as an archetypal myth, that is, as the presence of the Absolute in specific historical and political forms. Evola's Absolute is not a religious principle or a *noumenon*, much less the God of theism, but rather a mysterious domain, or *dunamis*, power. Evola's Tradition is characterized by "Being" and stability, while the modern world is characterized by "Becoming." In the world of tradition stable socio-political institutions were in place. The world of Tradition, according to Evola, was exemplified by the ancient Roman, Greek, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese civilizations. These civilizations upheld a strict caste system; they were ruled by warrior nobilities and waged wars to expand the boundaries of their imperiums. In Evola's words:

The traditional world knew divine kingship. It knew the bridge between the two worlds, namely initiation. It knew the two great ways of approach to the transcendent, namely heroic action and contemplation. It knew the mediation, namely rites and faithfulness. It knew the social foundation, namely the traditional law and the caste system. And it knew the political earthly symbol, namely the empire.²⁹

Evola claims that the traditional world's underlying belief was the "invisible":

It held that mere physical existence, or "living," is meaningless unless it approximates the higher world or that which is "more than life," and unless one's highest ambition consists in participating in hyperkosmia and in obtaining an active and final liberation from the bond represented by the human condition.³⁰

Evola upheld a cyclical view of history, a philosophical and religious view with a rich cultural heritage. Though one may reject it, this view deserves as much respect as the linear view of history upheld by theism, to which I ... subscribe, or as the progressive view championed by Engels' "scientific materialism," or as the hopeful and optimistic view typical of various New Age movements, according to which the universe is undergoing a constant and irreversible spiritual evolution. According to the cyclical view of history espoused by Hinduism, which Evola adopted and modified to fit his views, we are living in the fourth age of a complete cycle, the so-called Kali-yuga, an era characterized by decadence and disruption. According to Evola, the most remarkable phases of this "Yuga" (era) included the emergence of pre-Socratic philosophy (characterized by rejection of myth and by overemphasis on reason); the birth of Christianity; the Renaissance; Humanism; the Protestant Reformation; the Enlightenment; the French Revolution; the European revolutions of 1848; the advent of the Industrial Revolution; and Bolshevism. Thus, the "modern world" for Evola did not begin in the 1600s, but rather in the fourth century B.C.

EVOLA AND ELIADE

Evola's rejection of the modern world can be contrasted with its acceptance, promoted by Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), the renowned historian of religion whom Evola met in person several times, and with whom he corresponded until his death in 1974. The two men met for the first time in 1937. By that time, Eliade had compiled an impressive academic record that included a bachelor's degree in philosophy from the University of Bucharest and an M.A. and a Ph.D. in Sanskrit and Indian philosophy from the University of Calcutta. Evola ... was already an accomplished writer and had published some of his most important works, such as *The Hermetic Tradition* (1931), *Revolt against the Modern World* (1934), and *The Mystery of the Grail* (1937).³¹

Eliade had read Evola's early philosophical works during the 1920s and "admired his intelligence and, even more, the density and clarity of his prose."³² An intellectual friendship developed between the young Romanian scholar and the Italian philosopher, who was nine years Eliade's senior. Their common interest in yoga led Evola to write *L'uomo e la potenza* (Man as power) in 1926 (revised in 1949 with the new title *The Yoga of Power*³³) and Eliade to write the acclaimed scholarly work *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom* (1933). As Eliade ... recalls in his autobiographical journals:

I received letters from him when I was in Calcutta (1928-31) in which he instantly begged me not to speak to him of yoga, or of "magical powers" except to report precise facts to which I had personally been a witness. In India I also received several publications from him, but I only remember a few issues of the journal *Krur*.³⁴

Evola and Eliade's first meeting was in Romania, in conjunction with a luncheon hosted by the philosopher Nae Ionescu. Evola was traveling through Europe at the time, establishing contacts, and giving lectures "in the attempt to coordinate those elements who could represent, to some degree, the [T]raditional thought on the political-cultural plane."³⁵ Eliade recalled the admiration that Evola expressed for Corneliu Codreanu (1899-1938), the founder of the Romanian nationalist and Christian movement known as the "Iron Guard." Evola and Codreanu had met the morning of the luncheon. Codreanu told Evola of the effects that incarceration had had on his soul, and of his discovery of contemplation in the solitude and silence of his prison cell. In his autobiography Evola described Codreanu as "one of the worthiest and most spiritually oriented persons I ever met in the nationalist movements of that period."³⁶ Eliade wrote that at the luncheon "Evola was still dazzled by him [Codreanu]. I vaguely remember the remarks he made then on the disappearance of contemplative disciplines in the political battle of the West."³⁷ But the two scholars' focus was different indeed. As Eliade wrote in his journal:

One day I received a rather bitter letter from him, in which he reproached me for never citing him, no more than did Guénon. I answered him as best as I could, and I must one day give reasons and explanations that that response called for. My argument could not have been simpler. The books I write are intended for today's audience, and not for initiates. Unlike Guénon and his emulators, I believe I have nothing to write that would be intended especially for them.³⁸

I must conclude from Eliade's remarks that he did not like, share, or care for Evola's esoteric views and leanings. I believe there are three reasons for Eliade's aversion. First, Evola, like all traditionalists, presumed the existence of a higher, solar, royal, and esoteric primordial tradition, and devoted his life to describing, studying, and celebrating it in its many forms and varieties. He also set this tradition above and against what he dubbed "telluric" modern popular cultures and civilizations (such as Romania's, to which Eliade belonged). In *Revolt against the Modern World* one can read many instances of this juxtaposition.

Eliade, for his part, rejected any emphasis on esotericism, because he thought it had a reductive effect on the human spirit. Eliade claimed that to limit the value of European spiritual creations exclusively to their "esoteric meanings" repeated in reverse the reductionism of the materialistic approach adopted by Marx and Freud. Nor did he believe in the existence of a primordial tradition: "I was suspicious of its artificial, ahistorical character," he wrote.³⁹ Second, Eliade rejected the negative or pessimistic view of the world and the human condition that characterized Guénon's and Evola's thought. Unlike Evola, who believed in the ongoing "putrefaction" of contemporary Western culture, Eliade claimed:

[T]o the extent that I believe in the creativity of the human spirit, I cannot despair: culture, even in a crepuscular era, is the only means of conveying certain values and of transmitting a certain spiritual message. In a new Noah's Ark, by means of which the spiritual creation of the West could be saved, it is not enough for René Guénon's *L'esotérisme de Dante* to be included; there must be also the poetic, historic, and philosophical understanding of *The Divine Comedy*.⁴⁰

Finally, the socio-cultural milieu that Eliade celebrated was very different from the one favored by Evola. As India regained its independence, Eliade came to believe that Asia was about to re-enter history and world politics and that his own people, the Romanians, "could fulfill a definite role in the coming dialogue between the.... West, Asia and cultures of the archaic folk type."⁴¹ He celebrated the peasant roots of Romanian culture as they promoted universalism and pluralism, rather than nationalism and provincialism. Eliade wrote:

It seemed to me that I was beginning to discern elements of unity in all peasant cultures, from China and South-East Asia to the Mediterranean and Portugal. I was finding everywhere what I later called "cosmic religiosity": that is, the leading role played by symbols and images, the religious respect for earth and life, the belief that the sacred is manifested directly through the mystery of fecundity and cosmic repetition....⁴²

These conclusions could not have been more diametrically opposed to Evola's views, especially as he formulated them in *Revolt against the Modern World*. According to the latter's doctrine, cosmic religiosity is an inferior and corrupt form of spirituality, or, as he called it, a "lunar spirituality" (the moon, unlike the sun, is not a source of light, and merely reflects the latter's light, as "lunar spirituality" is contingent upon God, the All, or upon any other metaphysical version of the Absolute) characterized by mystical abandonment.

In his yet untranslated autobiography, *Il cammino del cinabro* ("The cinnabar's journey"), Evola describes his spiritual and intellectual journey through alien landscapes: religious (Christianity, theism), philosophical (idealism, nihilism, realism), and political (democracy, Fascism, post-war Italy). For readers who are not familiar with Hermeticism, we may recall that cinnabar is a red metal representing rubedo, or redness, which is the third and final stage of one's inner transformation. Evola explains at the beginning of his autobiography: "My natural sense of detachment from what is human in regard to many things that, especially in the affective domain, are usually regarded as 'normal,' was manifested in me at a very tender age."⁴³

AUTARKEIA

Various religions and philosophies regard the human condition as highly problematic, likening it to a disease and setting forth a cure. This disease is characterized by many features, including a certain spiritual "heaviness," or

gravitational pull, drawing us “downwards.” Humans are prisoners of meaningless daily routines; of pernicious habits developed over years, e.g., drinking, smoking, gambling, workaholism, and sexual addictions, in response to external pressures; of an intellectual and spiritual laziness that prevents us from developing our powers and becoming living, vibrant beings; and of inconstancy, as is often painfully obvious from our ever-renewed “New Year’s resolutions.” How often, when we commit ourselves to practice something on a daily basis over a period of time, does the day soon come that we forget, find an excuse to abandon our commitment, or simply quit! This is not merely inconsistency or a lack of perseverance on our part: it is a symptom of our inability to master ourselves and our lives.

Moreover, we are by nature unable to keep our minds focused on any object of meditation. We are easily distracted and bored. We spend our days talking about unimportant, meaningless details. Our conversations, for the most part, are not real dialogues, but rather exchanges of monologues.

We are busy at jobs we do not care about, and earning a living is our utmost concern. We feel bored, empty, and sexually frustrated by our own or our partners’ inability to deliver peak performance. We want more: more money, more leisure, more “toys,” and more fulfillment, of which we get too little, too seldom. We succumb to all sorts of indulgences and petty pleasures to soothe our dull and wounded consciousness. And yet all these things are merely symptoms of the real problem that besets the human condition. Our real problem is not that we are deficient beings, but that we don’t know how to be, and don’t desire to be, different. We embrace everyday life and call it “the real thing,” slowly but inexorably suffocating the yearning for transcendence buried deep within us. In the end this proves to be our real undoing; we are not unlike smokers who, after being diagnosed with emphysema, keep on smoking to the bitter end. The problem is that we deny there is a problem. We are like a psychotic person who denies he is mentally ill, or like a sociopath who after committing a heinous crime insists that he really has a conscience, producing tears and remorse to prove it.

In the past, movements like Pythagoreanism, Gnosticism, Manichaeism, Mandaeism, and medieval Catharism claimed that the problem beleaguering human beings is the body itself, or physical matter, to be precise. These movements held that the soul or spirit is kept prisoner inside the cage of matter, waiting to be freed. (Evola rejected this interpretation as unsophisticated and as the product of a feminine and telluric worldview.) Buddhism declared a “polluted” or “unenlightened mind” to be the real problem, developing in the course of the centuries a real science of the mind in an attempt to cure the disease at the roots. Christian theism identified the root of human suffering and evil in sin. As a remedy, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy propose incorporation into the church through baptism and active

participation in her liturgical life. Many Protestants advocate, instead, a living and personal relationship with Jesus Christ as one's Lord and Savior, to be cultivated through prayer, Bible studies, and church fellowship.

Evola regarded acceptance of the human condition as the real problem, and autarchy, or self-sufficiency, as the cure. According to the ancient Cynics, *autarkeia* is the ability to lead a satisfactory, full life with the least amount of material goods and pleasures. An autarchic being (the ideal man) is a person who is able to grow spiritually even in the absence of what others consider the necessities of life (e.g., health, wealth, and good human relationships). The Stoics equated autarchy with virtue (*arête*, which they regarded as the only thing needed for happiness). Even the Epicureans, led though they were by a quest for pleasure, regarded *autarkeia* as a "great good, not with the aim of always getting by with little, but that if much is lacking, we may be satisfied with little."⁴⁴

Evola endorsed the notion of *autarkeia* out of his rejection of the human condition and of the ordinary life that stems from it. Like Nietzsche before him, Evola claimed that the human condition and everyday life should not be embraced, but overcome: our worth lies in being a "project" (in Latin *projectum*, "to be cast forward"). Thus, what truly matters for human beings is not who we are but what we can and should become. Humans are enlightened or unenlightened according to whether or not they grasp this basic metaphysical truth. It was not snobbism that led Evola to conclude that most human beings are "slaves" trapped in samsara like guinea pigs running on a wheel inside their cage. According to Evola, sharing this state, among those one encounters each day, are not only persons with low paying jobs, but also one's coworkers, family members, and especially persons without a formal education. This is of course difficult to acknowledge. Evola was consumed by a yearning for what the Germans call *mehr als leben* ("more than living"), which is unavoidably frustrated by the contingencies of human existence. We read in a collection of Evola's essays on the subject of mountain climbing:

At certain existential peaks, just as heat is transformed into light, life becomes free of itself; not in the sense of the death of individuality or some kind of mystical shipwreck, but in the sense of a transcendent affirmation of life, in which anxiety, endless craving, yearning and worrying, the quest for religious faith, human supports and goals, all give way to a dominating state of calm. There is something greater than life, within life itself, and not outside of it. This heroic experience is valuable and good in itself, whereas ordinary life is only driven by interests, external things and human conventions.⁴⁵

According to Evola the human condition cannot and should not be embraced, but rather overcome. The cure does not consist in more money, more education, or moral uprightness, but in a radical and consistent commitment to pursue spiritual liberation. The past offers several examples of the distinction between an "ordinary" life and a "differentiated" life. The ancient Greeks

referred to ordinary, material, physical life by the term bios, and used the term zoe to describe spiritual life. Buddhist and Hindu scriptures drew a distinction between samsara, or the life of needs, cravings, passions, and desires, and nirvana, a state, condition or extinction of suffering (dukka). Christian scriptures distinguish between the "life according to the flesh" and the "life according to the Spirit." The Stoics distinguish between a "life according to nature" and a life dominated by passions. Heidegger distinguished between authentic and inauthentic life.

Kierkegaard talked about the aesthetic life and the ethical life. Zoroastrians distinguished between Good and Evil. The Essenes divided mankind into two groups: the followers of the Truth and the followers of the Lie.

The authors who first introduced Evola to the notions of self-sufficiency and of the "absolute individual" (an ideal, unattainable state) were Nietzsche and Carlo Michelstaedter. The latter was a twenty-three year old Jewish-Italian student who committed suicide in 1910, the day after completing his doctoral dissertation, which was first published in 1913 with the title *La persuasione e la retorica* (Persuasion and rhetoric).⁴⁶ In his thesis, Michelstaedter claims that the human condition is dominated by remorse, melancholy, boredom, fear, anger, and suffering. Man's actions reveal that he is a passive being. Because he attributes value to things, man is also distracted by them or by their pursuit. Thus man seeks outside himself a stable reference point, but fails to find it, remaining the unfortunate prisoner of his illusory individuality. The two possible ways to live the human condition, according to Michelstaedter, are the way of Persuasion and the way of Rhetoric. Persuasion is an unachievable goal. It consists in achieving possession of oneself totally and unconditionally, and in no longer needing anything else. This amounts to having life in one's self. In Michelstaedter's words:

The way of Persuasion, unlike a bus route, does not have signs that can be read, studied and communicated to others. However, we all have within ourselves the need to find that; we all must blaze our own trail because each one of us is alone and cannot expect any help from the outside. The way of Persuasion has only this stipulation: do not settle for what has been given you.⁴⁷

On the contrary, the way of Rhetoric designates the palliatives or substitutes that man adopts in lieu of an authentic Persuasion. According to Evola, the path of Rhetoric is followed by "those who spurn an actual self-possession, leaning on other things, seeking other people, trusting in others to deliver them, according to a dark necessity and a ceaseless and indefinite yearning."⁴⁸ As Nietzsche wrote:

You crowd together with your neighbors and have beautiful words for it. But I tell you: Your love of your neighbor is your bad love of yourselves. You flee to your neighbor away from yourselves and would like to make a virtue of it: but I see

through your selflessness. . . . I wish rather that you could not endure to be with any kind of neighbor or with your neighbor's neighbor; then you would have to create your friend and his overflowing heart of yourselves.⁴⁹

The goal of autarchy appears throughout Evola's works. In his quest for this privileged condition, he expounded the paths blazed by various movements in the past, such as Tantrism, Buddhism, Mithraism, and Hermeticism.

In the early 1920s, Decio Calvari, president of the Italian Independent Theosophical League, introduced Evola to the study of Tantrism. Soon Evola began a correspondence with the learned British orientalist and divulger of Tantrism, Sir John Woodroffe (who also wrote with the pseudonym of "Arthur Avalon"), whose works and translations of Tantric texts he amply utilized. While René Guénon celebrated Vedanta as the quintessence of Hindu wisdom in his *L'homme et son devenir selon le Vedanta* (Man and his becoming according to the Vedanta) (1925), upholding the primacy of contemplation or of knowledge over action, Evola adopted a different perspective. Rejecting the view that spiritual authority is worthier than royal power, Evola wrote *L'uomo come potenza* (Man as power) in 1925. In the third revised edition (1949), the title was changed to *Lo yoga della potenza* (The yoga of power).⁵⁰ This book represents a link between his philosophical works and the rest of his literary production, which focuses on Traditional concerns.

The thesis of *The Yoga of Power* is that the spiritual and social conditions that characterize the Kali-yuga greatly decrease the effectiveness of purely intellectual, contemplative, and ritual paths. In this age of decadence, the only way open to those who seek the "great liberation" is one of resolute action.⁵¹ Tantrism defined itself as a system based on practice, in which hatha-yoga and kundalini-yoga constitute the psychological and mental training of the followers of Tantrism in their quest for liberation. While criticizing an old Western prejudice according to which Oriental spiritualities are characterized by an escapist attitude (as opposed to those of the West, which allegedly promote vitalism, activism, and the will to power), Evola reaffirmed his belief in the primacy of action by outlining the path followed in Tantrism. Several decades later, a renowned member of the French Academy, Marguerite Yourcenar, paid homage to *The Yoga of Power*. She wrote of "the immense benefit that a receptive reader may gain from an exposition such as Evola's,"⁵² and concluded that "the study of *The Yoga of Power* is particularly beneficial in a time in which every form of discipline is naively discredited."⁵³

But Evola's interest was not confined to yoga. In 1943 he wrote ... *The Doctrine of the Awakening*, dealing with the teachings of early Buddhism. He regarded Buddha's original message as an Aryan ascetic path meant for spiritual "warriors" seeking liberation from the conditioned world. In this book he emphasized the anti-theistic and anti-monistic insights of Buddha. Buddha taught that devotion to this or that god or goddess, ritualism, and study of the

Vedas were not conducive to enlightenment, nor was experience of the identity of one's soul with the "cosmic All" named Brahman, since, according to Buddha, both "soul" and "Brahman" are figments of our deluded minds.

In *The Doctrine of the Awakening* Evola meticulously outlines the four "jhanas," or meditative stages, that are experienced by a serious practitioner on the path leading to nirvana. Most of the sources Evola drew from are ... Italian and German translations of the *Sutta Pitaka*, that part of the ancient Pali canon of Buddhist scriptures in which Buddha's discourses are recorded. While extolling the purity and faithfulness of early Buddhism to Buddha's message, Evola characterized Mahayana Buddhism as a later deviation and corruption of Buddha's teachings, though he celebrated Zen⁵⁴ and the doctrine of emptiness (sunyata) as Mahayana's greatest achievements. In *The Doctrine of the Awakening* Evola extols the figure of the *ahrat*, one who has attained enlightenment. Such a person is free from the cycle of rebirth, having successfully overcome samsaric existence. The *ahrat's* achievement, according to Evola, can be compared to that of the jivan-mukti of Tantrism, of the Mithraic initiate, of the Gnostic sage, and of the Taoist "immortal."

This text was one of Evola's finest. Partly as a result of reading it, two British members of the OSS became Buddhist monks. The first was H. G. Musson, who also translated Evola's book from Italian into English. The second was Osbert Moore, who became a distinguished scholar of Pali, translating a number of Buddhist texts into English. On a personal note, I would like to add that Evola's *Doctrine of Awakening* sparked my interest in Buddhism, leading me to read the *Sutta Pitaka*, to seek the company of Theravada monks, and to practice meditation.

In *The Metaphysics of Sex* (1958) Evola took issue with three views of human sexuality. The first is naturalism. According to naturalism the erotic life is conceived as an extension of animal instincts, or merely as a means to perpetuate the species. This view has recently been advocated by the anthropologist Desmond Morris, both in his books and in his documentary *The Human Animal*. The second view Evola called "bourgeois love": it is characterized by respectability and sanctified by marriage. The most important features of this type of sexuality are mutual commitment, love, feelings. The third view of sex is hedonism. Following this view, people seek pleasure as an end in itself. This type of sexuality is hopelessly closed to transcendent possibilities intrinsic to sexual intercourse, and thus not worthy of being pursued. Evola then went on to explain how sexual intercourse can become a path leading to spiritual achievements.

APOLITEIA

In 1988 a passionate champion of free speech and democracy, the journalist and author I. F. Stone, wrote a provocative book entitled *The Trial of Socrates*. In his book Stone argued that Socrates, contrary to what Xenophon and Plato claimed in their accounts of the life of their beloved teacher, was not unjustly put to death by a corrupt and evil democratic regime. According to Stone, Socrates was guilty of several questionable attitudes that eventually brought about his own downfall.

First, Socrates personally refrained from, and discouraged others from pursuing, political involvement, in order to cultivate the "perfection of the soul." Stone finds this attitude reprehensible, since in a city all citizens have duties as well as rights. By failing to live up to his civic responsibilities, Socrates was guilty of "civic bankruptcy," especially during the dictatorship of the Thirty. At that time, instead of joining the opposition, Socrates maintained a passive attitude: "The most talkative man in Athens fell silent when his voice was most needed."⁵⁵

Next, Socrates idealized Sparta, had aristocratic and pro-monarchical views, and despised Athenian democracy, spending a great deal of time in denigrating the common man. Finally, Socrates might have been acquitted if only he had not antagonized his jury with his amused condescension and invoked the principle of free speech instead.

Evola resembles Socrates in the attitudes toward politics described by Stone. Evola too professed "*apoliteia*."⁵⁶ He discouraged people from passionate involvement in politics. He was never a member of a political party, refraining even from joining the Fascist party during its years in power. Because of that he was turned down when he tried to enlist in the army at the outbreak of the World War II, although he had volunteered to serve on the front. He also discouraged participation in the "agoric life." The ancient agora, or public square, was the place where free Athenians gathered to discuss politics, strike business deals, and cultivate social relationships. As Buddha said:

Indeed Ananda, it is not possible that a bikkhu [monk] who delights in company, who delights in society will ever enter upon and abide in either the deliverance of the mind that is temporary and delectable or in the deliverance of the mind that is perpetual and unshakeable. But it can be expected that when a bikkhu lives alone, withdrawn from society, he will enter upon and abide in the deliverance of mind that is temporal and delectable or in the deliverance of mind that is perpetual and unshakeable⁵⁷

Like Socrates, Evola celebrated the civic values, the spiritual and political achievements, and the metaphysical worth of ancient monarchies, warrior aristocracies, and traditional, non-democratic civilizations. He had nothing but contempt for the ignorance of ordinary people, for the rebellious masses, for the insignificant common man.

Finally, like Socrates, Evola never appealed to such democratic values as “human rights,” “freedom of speech,” and “equality,” and was “sentenced” to what the Germans call “death by silence.” In other words, he was relegated to academic oblivion.

Evola’s rejection of involvement in the socio-political arena must also be attributed to his philosophy of inequality. Norberto Bobbio, an Italian senator and professor emeritus of the philosophy department of the University of Turin, has written a small book entitled *Right and Left: The Significance of a Political Distinction*.⁵⁸ In it Bobbio, a committed leftist intellectual, attempts to identify the key element that differentiates the political Right from the Left (a dyad rendered in the non-ideological American political arena by the dichotomy “conservatives and liberal,” or “mainstream and extremist”). After discussing several objections to the contemporary relevance of the Right-Left dyad following the decline and fall of the major political ideologies, Bobbio concludes that the juxtaposition of Right and Left is still a legitimate and viable one, though one day it will run its course, like other famous dyads of the past: “patricians and plebeians” in ancient Rome, “Guelphs and Ghibellines” during the Middle Ages, and “Crown and Parliament” in seventeenth century England.

At the end of his book Bobbio suggests that, “the main criterion to distinguish between Right and Left is the different attitude they have toward the ideal of equality.”⁵⁹

Thus, according to Bobbio, the views of Right and Left on “liberty” and “brotherhood” (the other two values in the French revolutionary trio) are not as discordant as their positions on equality. Bobbio explains:

We may properly call “egalitarians” those who, while being aware that human beings are both equal and unequal, give more relevance, when judging them and recognizing their rights and duties, to that which makes them equal rather than to what makes them un-equal; and “inegalitarians,” those who, starting from the same premise, give more importance to what makes them unequal rather than to what makes them equal.⁶⁰

Evola, as a representative of the European Right, may be regarded as one of the leading antiegalitarian philosophers of the twentieth century. Evola’s arguments transcend the age-old debate between those who claim that class, racial, educational, and gender differences between people are due to society’s structural injustices, and those who, on the other hand, believe that these differences are genetic. According to Evola there are spiritual and ontological reasons that account for differences in people’s lot in life. In Evola’s writings the social dichotomy is between initiates and “higher beings” on the one hand, and hoi polloi on the other.

The two works that best express Evola’s *apoliteia* are *Men among Ruins* (1953) and *Riding the Tiger* (1961). In the former he expounds his views on the “organic” State, lamenting the emerging primacy of economics over politics in

post-war Europe and America. Evola wrote this book to supply a point of reference for those who, having survived the war, did not hesitate to regard themselves as “reactionaries” deeply hostile to the emerging subversive intellectual and political forces that were re-shaping Europe:

Again, we can see that the various facets of the contemporary social and political chaos are interrelated and that it is impossible to effectively contrast them other than by returning to the origins. To go back to the origins means, plain and simple, to reject everything that, in every domain, whether social, political and economic, is connected to the “immortal principles” of 1789 in the guise of libertarian, individualistic and egalitarian thought, and to oppose to it a hierarchical view. It is only in the context of such a view that the value and freedom of man as a person are not mere words or pretexts for a work of destruction and subversion.⁶¹

Evola encourages his readers to remain passive spectators in the ongoing process of Europe’s reconstruction, and to seek their citizenship elsewhere:

The Idea, only the Idea must be our true homeland. It is not being born in the same country, speaking the same language or belonging to the same racial stock that matters; rather, sharing the same Idea must be the factor that unites us and differentiates us from everybody else.⁶²

In *Riding the Tiger*, Evola outlines intellectual and existential strategies for coping with the modern world without being affected by it. The title is borrowed from a Chinese saying, and it suggests that a way to prevent a tiger from devouring us is to jump on its back and ride it without being thrown off. Evola argued that lack of involvement in the political and social construction of the human polis on the part of the “differentiated man” can be accompanied by a sense of sympathy toward those who, in various ways, live on the fringe of society, rejecting its dogmas and conventions.

The “differentiated person” feels like an outsider in this society and feels no moral obligation toward society’s request that he joins what he regards as an absurd system. Such a person can understand not only those who live outside society’s parameters, but even those who are set against such (a) society, or better, this society.⁶³

This is why, in his 1968 book *L’arco e la clava* (The bow and the club), Evola expressed some appreciation for the “beat generation” and the hippies, all the while arguing that they lacked a proper sense of transcendence as well as firm points of spiritual reference from which they could launch an effective inner, spiritual “revolt” against society.

Guido Stucco has an M.A. in Systematic Theology at Seaton Hall and a Ph.D. in Historical Theology at St. Louis University. He has translated five of Evola’s books into English.

END NOTES

1. For a good introduction to this movement and its ideas, William Quinn, *The Only Tradition*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
2. The first of the Theosophical Society's three declared objectives was to promote the brotherhood of all men, regardless of race, creed, nationality, and caste.
3. Tomislav Sunic, *Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right*, New York: Peter Lang, 1991; Ian B. Warren's interview with Alain de Benoist, "The European New Right: Defining and Defending Europe's Heritage," *The Journal of Historical Review*, Vol. 13, no. 2, March-April 1994, pp. 28-37; and the special issue "The French New Right," *Telos*, Winter 1993-Spring 1994.
4. Martin Lee, *The Beast Reawakens*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1997.
5. Walter Laqueur, *Fascism: Past, Present, Future*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 97-98. Despite his bad press in the U.S., Evola's works have been favorably reviewed by Joscelyn Godwin, "Evola: Prophet against Modernity," *Gnosis Magazine*, Summer 1996, pp. 64-65; and by Robin Waterfield, "Baron Julius Evola and the Hermetic Tradition," *Gnosis Magazine*, Winter 1990, pp. 12-17.
6. The first to write about Evola in this country was Thomas Sheehan, in "Myth and Violence: The Fascism of Julius Evola and Alain de Benoist," *Social Research*, Vol. 48, Spring 1981, pp. 45-73. See also Richard Drake, "Julius Evola and the Ideological Origins of the Radical Right in Contemporary Italy," in Peter Merkl (ed.), *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, pp. 61-89; "Julius Evola, Radical Fascism, and the Lateran Accords," *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 74, 1988, pp. 403-19; and the chapter "The Children of the Sun," in *The Revolutionary Mystique and Terrorism in Contemporary Italy*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989, pp. 116-134.
7. Philip Rees, in his *Biographical Dictionary of the Extreme Right since 1890*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, devotes a meager page and a half to Evola, and shamelessly concludes, without adducing a shred of evidence, that "... Evolian-inspired violence result[ed] in the Bologna station bombing of 2 August 1980." Gianfranco De Turreis, president of the Julius Evola Foundation in Rome and one of the leading Evola scholars, suggested that, in Evola's case, rather than "bad teacher" one ought to talk about "bad pupils." See his *Elogio e difesa di Julius Evola: il barone e i terroristi*, Rome: Edizioni Mediterranee, 1997, in which he debunks the unfounded charge that Evola was responsible either directly or indirectly for acts of terrorism committed in Italy.
8. See for instance Sheehan's convoluted article "Diventare Dio: Julius Evola and the Metaphysics of Fascism," *Stanford Italian Review*, Vol. 6, 1986, pp. 279-92, in which he tries to demonstrate that Nietzsche and Evola mirror each other. Sheehan should have rather spoken of an overcoming of Nietzsche's philosophy on the part of Evola. The latter rejected Nietzsche's notion of "Eternal Recurrence" as "nothing more than a myth"; his vitalism, because closed to transcendence and hopelessly immanentist; his "Will to Power" because: "Power in itself is amorphous and meaningless if it lacks the foundation of a given being, of an inner direction, of an essential unity" (Julius Evola, *Cavalcare la tigre* [Riding the tiger], Milan: Vanni Scheiwiller, 1971, p. 49); and, finally, Nietzsche's nihilism, which Evola denounced as a project that had been implemented half-way.

9. H.T. Hansen, a pseudonym adopted by T. Hakl, is an Austrian scholar who earned a law degree in 1970. He is a partner in the prestigious Swiss publishing house Ansata Verlag and one of the leading Evola scholars in German-speaking countries. Hakl has translated several works by Evola into German and supplied lengthy scholarly introductions to most of them.

10. See for instance the topics of a conference held in France on the occasion of the centenary of his birth: "Julius Evola 1898-1998: Eveil, destin et expériences de terres spirituelles," on the web site <http://perso.wanadoo.fr/collectif.ea/langues/anglais/acteesf.htm>.

11. Marcello Veneziani, *Julius Evola tra filosofia e tradizione*, Rome: Ciarrapico Editore, 1984, p. 110.

12. This work has been translated into French and German. My translation of the first volume is scheduled to be published in December 2002 by Inner Traditions, with the title *Introduction to Magic: Rituals and Practical Techniques for the Magus*.

13. Marco Rossi, a leading Italian authority on Evola, wrote an article on Evola's alleged antidemocratic anti-Fascism in *Storia contemporanea*, Vol. 20, 1989, pp. 5-42.

14. Julius Evola, *Il cammino del cinabro*, Milan: Vanni Scheiwiller, 1972, p. 162.

15. Julius Evola, *Etica ariana*, Arian ethics, Rome: Europa srl, 1987, p. 28.

16. When Evola and a few friends came to the realization that the war was lost for the Axis, they began to draft plans for the creation of a "Movement for the Rebirth of Italy." This movement was supposed to organize a right-wing political party capable of stemming the post-war influence of the Left. Nothing came of it, though.

17. Julius Evola, *Il Cammino del cinabro*, p. 183.

18. Julius Evola, *Etica ariana*, p. 24.

19. In the beginning of his autobiography Evola claimed that reading Nietzsche fostered his opposition to Christianity, a religion which never appealed to him. He felt theories of sin and redemption, divine love, and grace as "foreign" to his spirit.

20. Rebora was imprecisely quoting from memory a saying by Jesus found in John 7:37. The exact quote is "Let anyone who is thirsty come to me, and let the one who believes in me drink." (Revised Standard Version.)

21. Julius Evola, *Lettere di Julius Evola a Girolamo Comi, 1934-1962*, Rome: Fondazione Julius Evola, 1987, p. 17. In 1922 Evola was on the brink of suicide. He had experimented with hallucinogenic drugs and was consumed by an intense desire for extinction. In a letter dated July 2, 1921, Evola wrote to his friend Tristan Tzara: "I am in such a state of inner exhaustion that even thinking and holding a pen requires an effort which I am not often capable of. I live in a state of atony and of immobile stupor, in which every activity and act of the will freeze.... Every action repulses me. I endure these feelings like a disease. Also, I am terrified at the thought of time ahead of me, which I do not know how to utilize. In all things I perceive a process of decomposition, as things collapse inwardly, turning into wind and sand." *Lettere di Julius Evola a Tristan Tzara, 1919-1923*, Rome: Julius Evola Foundation, 1991, p. 40. Evola was able to overcome this crisis after reading the Italian translation of the Buddhist text Majjhima-Nikayo, the so-called "middle length discourses of the Buddha." In one of his discourses Buddha taught the importance of detachment from one's sensory perceptions and feelings, including one's yearning for personal extinction.

22. For a brief account of their correspondence, see Julius Evola, *René Guénon: A Teacher for Modern Times*, trans. by Guido Stucco, Edmonds, WA: Holmes Publishing Group, 1994.
23. Joscelyn Godwin, *Arktos: The Polar Myth in Science, Symbolism, and Nazi Survival*, Grand Rapids, MI: Phanes Press, 1993, p. 61.
24. In two letters to Comi, Evola wrote: "From a spiritual point of view my situation doesn't mean more to me than a flat tire on my car"; and: "The small matter of my legs' condition has only put some limitations on some profane activities, while on the intellectual and spiritual planes I am still following the same path and upholding the same views," *Lettere a Comi*, pp. 18, 27.
25. *The Middle Length Sayings*, vol. III, trans. by I.B. Horner, London: Pali Text Society, 1959, p. 278.
26. Julius Evola, *Cavalcare la tigre*, p. 175.
27. Yuri Stoyanov, *The Hidden Tradition in Europe*, New York: Penguin, 1994, p. 8.
28. The Latin word *hostis* means both "guest" and "enemy." This is revealing of how ancient Romans regarded foreigners in general.
29. Julius Evola, *Revolt against the Modern World*, Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1995, p. 6. The first part of the book deals with the concepts noted in the extract cited. The second part of the book deals with the modern world.
30. *Ibid.*
31. All of these works have been translated and published in English by Inner Traditions.
32. Mircea Eliade, *Exile's Odyssey*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 152.
33. Julius Evola, *The Yoga of Power*, trans. by Guido Stucco, Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1992.
34. Mircea Eliade, *Journal III, 1970-78*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, p. 161.
35. Julius Evola, *Il cammino del cinabro*, p. 139.
36. *Ibid.*
37. Eliade, *Journal III, 1970-78*, p. 162.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 162-63.
39. Mircea Eliade, *Exile's Odyssey*, pp. 152. See also Alain de Benoist and quote him at length.
40. *Ibid.* This criticism was reiterated by S. Nasr in an interview to the periodical *Gnosis*.
41. Mircea Eliade, *Journey East, Journey West*, San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981-88, p. 204.
42. Eliade, *Journey East, Journey West*, p. 202.
43. Evola, *Il cammino del cinabro*, p. 12.
44. Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus*, p. 47.
45. Julius Evola, *Meditations on the Peaks*, trans. by Guido Stucco, Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1998, p. 5.
46. Carlo Michelstaedter, *La persuasione e la retorica*, Milan: Adelphi Edizioni, 1990.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
48. *Il cammino del cinabro*, p. 46.
49. F. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale, London: Penguin Books, 1969, p. 86.
50. Evola, *The Yoga of Power*, trans. by Guido Stucco, Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1992.

51. Evola would probably have liked Jesus' saying (Luke 16:16): "The law and the prophets lasted until John; but from then on the kingdom of God is proclaimed and everyone who enters does so with violence."
52. Marguerite Yourcenar, *Le temps, ce grand sculpteur*, Paris: Gallimard, 1983, p. 201.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
54. Julius Evola, *The Doctrine of Awakening*, Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1995.
55. I. F. Stone, *The Trial of Socrates*, New York: Doubleday, 1988, p. 146.
56. Julius Evola, *Cavalcare la tigre*, pp. 174-78.
57. Mahajjima Nikayo, p. 122.
58. Norberto Bobbio, *Destra e sinistra: ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica*, Rome: Donzelli Editore, 1994. This book has been published in English as *Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction*, Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1996.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
61. Julius Evola, *Gli uomini e le rovine*, Rome: Edizioni Settimo Sigillo, 1990, p. 64.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
63. Julius Evola, *Cavalcare la tigre*, p. 179.

STALIN'S WILLING EXECUTIONERS JEWS AS A HOSTILE ELITE IN THE USSR

The Jewish Century

Yuri Slezkine

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004

\$29.95 (cloth)

x + 438 pages

Reviewed by Kevin MacDonald

A persistent theme among critics of Jews—particularly those on the pre-World War II right—has been that the Bolshevik revolution was a Jewish revolution and that the Soviet Union was dominated by Jews. This theme appears in a wide range of writings, from Henry Ford's *International Jew*, to published statements by a long list of British, French, and American political figures in the 1920s (Winston Churchill, Woodrow Wilson, and David Lloyd George), and, in its most extreme form, by Adolf Hitler, who wrote:

Now begins the last great revolution. By wresting political power for himself, the Jew casts off the few remaining shreds of disguise he still wears. The democratic plebeian Jew turns into the blood Jew and the tyrant of peoples. In a few years he will try to exterminate the national pillars of intelligence and, by robbing the peoples of their natural spiritual leadership, will make them ripe for the slavish lot of a permanent subjugation. The most terrible example of this is Russia.¹

This long tradition stands in sharp contradiction to the official view, promulgated by Jewish organizations and almost all contemporary historians, that Jews played no special role in Bolshevism and indeed were specifically victimized by it. Yuri Slezkine's book provides a much needed resolution to these opposing perspectives. It is an intellectual tour de force, alternately muddled and brilliant, courageous and apologetic.

APOLLONIANS AND MERCURIANS

One of the muddled elements, apparent at the beginning and present throughout *The Jewish Century*, is Slezkine's claim that the peoples of the world can be classified into two groups. The successful peoples of the modern world,

termed Mercurians, are urban, mobile, literate, articulate, and intellectually sophisticated. Distinguished by their ability to manipulate symbols, they pursue “wealth for the sake of learning, learning for the sake of wealth, and both wealth and learning for their own sake” (p. 1). Since Slezkine sees Jews as the quintessential Mercurians, he regards modernization as essentially a process of everyone becoming Jewish. His second group, which he calls Apollonians, is rooted in the land and in traditional agrarian cultures, and prizes physical strength and warrior values.

Slezkine conceptualizes Mercurianism as a worldview, and therefore a matter of psychological choice, rather than as a set of psychological mechanisms, the most important of which is general intelligence.² As a result of this false premise, he exaggerates the similarity among Mercurians, underestimates the power of ethnocentrism as a unifying factor in Jewish history, and fails to understand the roots of Western social and economic institutions.

Slezkine views Judaism as one of many Mercurian cultures – peoples that dwell alone in Diasporas, living among strangers and often acting as economic middlemen: the Overseas Chinese, Indians, and Lebanese, and the Gypsies and Irish Travelers. Their common denominator, in Slezkine’s view (and mine³), is their status as strangers to the people they live among – sojourners who, above all else, do not intermarry or socialize with the locals. Their interactions with the local Apollonians involve “mutual hostility, suspicion and contempt” (p. 20) and a sense of superiority. Moreover, a “common host stereotype of the Mercurians is that they are devious, acquisitive, greedy, crafty, pushy, and crude” (p. 23). The Mercurians possess greater kin solidarity and internal cohesion than the people they live among; they are characterized by extended families and patriarchal social organization.

So far, so good, although I would stress that the family organization of such groups derives more from the long-term adaptation to the culture areas they originate from than from an adaptation to the nomadic, middleman niche.⁴ But Slezkine maintains that Mercurians are above all smarter than the people they live among: They are said to possess “cunning intelligence,” but it is surely a mistake to consider such disparate groups as Jews (or the Overseas Chinese) and Gypsies (or the Irish Travelers) as having in common a particular set of intellectual traits. After all, the Jews, as Slezkine shows, have repeatedly become an academic, intellectual, cultural, and economic elite in Western societies, while Gypsies have tended toward illiteracy and are at best an economically marginal group.

Slezkine imagines that the Gypsies and literate middleman groups like the Jews or Overseas Chinese differ not in intelligence but only in whether they express their intelligence through literacy or an oral culture: “Businessmen, diplomats, doctors, and psychotherapists are literate peddlers, heralds, healers, and fortune-tellers” (p. 29) – a formulation that will not stand the test of current psychometric data. In fact, the general patterns of Gypsies are the

opposite of Jews: a low-investment, low-IQ reproductive style characterized by higher fertility, earlier onset of sexual behavior and reproduction, more unstable pair bonds, higher rate of single parenting, shorter interval of birth spacing, higher infant mortality rate, and higher rate of survival of low birth weight infants.⁵ Intelligence, for Slezkine, is a lifestyle choice, rather than a set of brain processes underlying information processing and strongly influenced by genetic variation. As we shall see, this formulation is very useful to Slezkine as he constructs his argument later in the book.

In his attempt to paint with a very broad brush, Slezkine also ignores other real differences among the Mercurians, most notably, I would argue, the aggressiveness of the Jews compared to the relative passivity of the Overseas Chinese. Both the Jews and the Overseas Chinese are highly intelligent and entrepreneurial, but the Overseas Chinese have not formed a hostile cultural elite in Southeast Asian countries, where they have chiefly settled, and have not been concentrated in media ownership or in the construction of culture. We do not read of Chinese cultural movements disseminated in the major universities and media outlets that subject the traditional culture of Southeast Asians and anti-Chinese sentiment to radical critique, or of Chinese organizations campaigning for the removal of native cultural and religious symbols from public places.⁶ Slezkine paints Jews as deeply involved in the construction of culture and in the politics of the host societies, but the role of the Chinese was quite different. The following passage describing the political attitudes of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand could never have applied to Jews in Western societies since the Enlightenment:

But few seem to know or indeed to care about the restrictions on citizenship, nationality rights, and political activities in general, nor are these restrictions given much publicity in the Chinese press. This merely points up the fact, recognized by all observers, that the overseas Chinese are primarily concerned with making a living, or amassing a fortune, and thus take only a passive interest in the formal political life of the country in which they live.⁷

Moreover, Slezkine pictures the middlemen as specializing in “certain dangerous, marvelous, and distasteful” (p. 9), but nevertheless indispensable, pursuits (p. 36) – a formulation that carries a grain of truth, as in places where natives were prohibited from loaning money at interest. However, he ignores, or at least fails to spell out, the extent to which Jews have been willing agents of exploitative elites, not only in Western societies, but in the Muslim world as well.⁸ This is the overarching generalization which one can make about Jewish economic behavior over the ages. Their role went far beyond performing tasks deemed inappropriate for the natives for religious reasons; rather they were often tasks at which natives would be relatively less ruthless in exploiting their fellows. This was especially the case in Eastern Europe, where economic

arrangements such as tax farming, estate management, and monopolies on retail liquor distribution lasted far longer than in the West:

In this way, the Jewish arendator became the master of life and death over the population of entire districts, and having nothing but a short-term and purely financial interest in the relationship, was faced with the irresistible temptation to pare his temporary subjects to the bone. On the noble estates he tended to put his relatives and co-religionists in charge of the flour-mill, the brewery, and in particular of the lord's taverns where by custom the peasants were obliged to drink. On the church estates, he became the collector of all ecclesiastical dues, standing by the church door for his payment from tithe-payers, baptized infants, newly-weds, and mourners. On the [royal] estates..., he became in effect the Crown Agent, farming out the tolls, taxes, and courts, and adorning his oppressions with all the dignity of royal authority.⁹

Jewish involvement in the Communist elite of the USSR can be seen as a variation on an ancient theme in Jewish culture rather than a new one sprung from the special circumstances of the Bolshevik Revolution. Rather than being the willing agents of exploitative non-Jewish elites who were clearly separated from both the Jews and the people they ruled, Jews became an entrenched part of an exploitative and oppressive elite in which group boundaries were blurred. This blurring of boundaries was aided by four processes, all covered by Slezkine: shedding overt Jewish identities in favor of a veneer of international socialism in which Jewish identity and ethnic networking were relatively invisible; seeking lower-profile positions in order to de-emphasize Jewish preeminence (e.g., Trotsky); adopting Slavic names; and engaging in a limited amount of intermarriage with non-Jewish elites.¹⁰ Indeed, the "plethora of Jewish wives" among non-Jewish leaders¹¹ doubtless heightened the Jewish atmosphere of the top levels of the Soviet government, given that everyone, especially Stalin, appears to have been quite conscious of ethnicity.¹² For their part, anti-Semites have accused Jews of having "*implanted those of their own category as wives and husbands for influential figures and officials.*"¹³

By emphasizing the necessity and distastefulness of traditional Jewish occupations, Slezkine also ignores the extent to which Jewish competition suppressed the formation of a native middle class in Eastern Europe. (This has also occurred throughout Southeast Asia, because of competition from the Overseas Chinese.) Instead, Slezkine sees Eastern Europeans, through stereotypic lenses, as quintessential Apollonians, some of whom became Mercurian modernists when forced to by circumstances, rather than as containing elements that would have naturally aspired to and competently performed the economic and cultural functions that instead came to be performed by Jews because of their ability to create ethnic monopolies in goods and services. When Jews won the economic competition in early modern Poland, the result was that the great majority of Poles were reduced to the status of agricultural laborers supervised by Jewish estate managers in

an economy in which trade, manufacturing, and artisanry were in large part controlled by Jews.¹⁴ On the other hand, in most of Western Europe Jews had been expelled in the Middle Ages. As a result, when modernization occurred, it was accomplished with an indigenous middle class. If, as in Eastern Europe, Jews had won the economic competition in most of these professions, there would not have been a non-Jewish middle class in England. Whatever one imagines might have been the fortunes and character of England with predominantly Jewish artisans, merchants, and manufacturers, it seems reasonable to suppose that the Christian taxpayers of England made a good investment in their own future when they agreed to pay King Edward I a massive tax of £116,346 in return for expelling two thousand Jews in 1290.¹⁵

While Slezkine's treatment overemphasizes middlemen as a societal necessity rather than as ethnic outsiders competing for scarce resources, he does note that the rise of the Jews in the USSR came at the expense of the Germans as a Mercurian minority in Russia prior to the Revolution. (Jews were excluded from traditional Russia apart from the Pale of Settlement, which included Ukraine, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Crimea, and part of Poland.) Germans manned the imperial bureaucracy, formed a large percentage of professionals, entrepreneurs, and artisans, were more literate than the Russians, and had a sense of cultural superiority and ethnic solidarity:

And so they were, *mutatis mutandis*, head to the Russian heart, mind to the Russian soul, consciousness to Russian spontaneity. They stood for calculation, efficiency, and discipline; cleanliness, fastidiousness, and sobriety; pushiness, tactlessness, and energy; sentimentality, love of family, and unmanliness (or absurdly exaggerated manliness)... Perhaps paradoxically, in light of what would happen in the twentieth century, Germans were, occupationally and conceptually, the Jews of ethnic Russia (as well as much of Eastern Europe). Or rather, the Russian Germans were to Russia what the German Jews were to Germany – only much more so. So fundamental were the German Mercurians to Russia's view of itself that both their existence and their complete and abrupt disappearance have been routinely taken for granted (pp. 113-114).

Although the replacement of Germans by Jews was well under way by the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, a key consequence of the Revolution was the substitution of one Mercurian group, the Germans, by another, the Jews. The difference between the Jews and the Germans was that the Jews had a longstanding visceral antipathy, out of past historical grievances, both real and imagined, toward the people and culture they came to administer. Indeed, Russians on the nationalist right admired the Germans, at least up to World War I. For example, a statute of one nationalist organization, Michael the Archangel Russian People's Union, expressed "particular trust in the German population of the Empire,"¹⁶ while its leader, Vladimir Purishkevich, accused the Jews of "irreconcilable hatred of Russia and everything Russian."¹⁷ Jews disliked the Christian religion of the vast majority of Russians because

of the antagonistic relationship between Judaism and Christianity over the ages; Jews distrusted the peasants, who “fell from grace” (p. 140) with the intelligentsia after the numerous anti-Jewish pogroms, especially after 1880; and Jews blamed the tsar for not doing enough to keep the peasants in check and for imposing the various quotas on Jewish advancement that went into place, also beginning in the 1880s – quotas that slowed down but by no means halted Jewish overrepresentation in the universities and the professions. In this respect, the Germans were far more like the Overseas Chinese, in that they became an elite without having an aggressively hostile attitude toward the people and culture they administered and dominated economically. Thus when Jews achieved power in Russia, it was as a hostile elite with a deep sense of historic grievance. As a result, they became willing executioners of both the people and cultures they came to rule, including the Germans.

After the Revolution, not only were the Germans replaced, but there was active suppression of any remnants of the older order and their descendants. Jews have always shown a tendency to rise because their natural proclivities (e.g., high intelligence) and powerful ethnic networking, but here they also benefited from “antibourgeois” quotas in educational institutions and other forms of discrimination against the middle class and aristocratic elements of the old regime that would have provided more competition with Jews. In a letter intercepted by the secret police, the father of a student wrote that his son and their friends were about to be purged from the university because of their class origins. “It is clear that only the Jerusalem academics and the Communist Party members generally are going to stay” (p. 243). The bourgeois elements from the previous regime, including the ethnic Germans, would have no future. Thus the mass murder of peasants and nationalists was combined with the systematic exclusion of the previously existing non-Jewish middle class. The wife of a Leningrad University professor noted, “in all the institutions, only workers and Israelites are admitted; the life of the intelligentsia is very hard” (p. 243). Even at the end of the 1930s, prior to the Russification that accompanied World War II, “the Russian Federation... was still doing penance for its imperial past while also serving as an example of an ethnicity-free society” (p. 276). While all other nationalities, including Jews, were allowed and encouraged to keep their ethnic identities, the revolution remained an anti-majoritarian movement.

Slezkine is aware of the biological reality of kinship and ethnicity, but he steadfastly pursues a cultural determinist model. He argues that biological models of ethnic nepotism are inappropriate because some nomadic groups are not kin groups but rather “quasi-families” like the Sicilian mafia (p. 35). But this is a distinction without a difference: Why are “natural” kinship groups significantly different from groups composed of families that band together? Each is characterized by internal cohesion and external strangeness, the traits Slezkine deems essential, but there are also kinship connections and a genetic

divide between themselves and surrounding peoples. Cultural badges of group membership and a culturally generated ideology of kin-group membership are age-old ways of cementing kinship groups and setting up barriers that mark real biological differences – the evolved psychology described by modern research in social identity theory.¹⁸ And in any case, the demonstrable genetic differences between Slezkine's prototypical Mercurians – the Jews, Gypsies, and Overseas Chinese – and the surrounding peoples cry out for a biological analysis.

Moreover, Slezkine underestimates the power of ethnocentrism as a unifying factor in Jewish history. This is most apparent in his discussion of Israel, which he describes as a radical departure from the Jewish tradition, because Israel is a quintessentially Apollonian society. Long after Western societies had rejected ethnic nationalism:

Israel continued to live in the European 1930s: only Israel still belonged to the eternally young, worshiped athleticism and inarticulateness, celebrated combat and secret police, promoted hiking and scouting, despised doubt and introspection, embodied the seamless unity of the chosen, and rejected most traits traditionally associated with Jewishness.... After two thousand years of living as Mercurians among Apollonians, Jews turned into the only Apollonians in a world of Mercurians (or rather, the only civilized Apollonians in a world of Mercurians and barbarians)" (pp. 327, 328).

But Israelis certainly did not reject traditional Jewish ethnocentrism and sense of peoplehood. Slezkine portrays Israelis as simply choosing to be ethnocentric nationalists, but ethnocentrism (like intelligence) is a biological system, not a lifestyle choice, and traditional Diaspora Jews were certainly deeply and intensely ethnocentric above all else.¹⁹ There can be little question that Israel and Zionism have been and are promoted and spearheaded by the most ethnocentric elements of the Jewish community.²⁰

For Slezkine, as for so many Jews, the moral debt owed to Jews by Western societies justifies the most extreme expressions of Jewish racialism: "The rhetoric of ethnic homogeneity and ethnic deportations, tabooed elsewhere in the West, is a routine element of Israeli political life.... It is true that no other European nation is in a condition of permanent war; it is also true that no other European state can have as strong a claim on the West's moral imagination" (pp. 364–365). Slezkine sees the moral taboo on European ethnocentrism, the creation of Nazism as the epitome of absolute evil, and the consecration of Jews as "the Chosen people of the postwar Western world" (p. 366) as simply the inevitable results of the events of World War II (pp. 365–366). In fact, however, the creation and maintenance of the culture of the Holocaust and the special moral claims of Jews and Israel are the result of Jewish ethnic activism. These claims have a specific historical trajectory, they are fueled by specific key events, and they are sustained by specific forces.²¹ For example, the Holocaust was not emphasized as a cultural icon until the late 1960s and

early 1970s, when images of the Holocaust were deployed on a large scale in popular culture by Jewish activists specifically to rally support for Israel in the context of its wars of 1967 and 1973.

Similarly, Slezkine sees the United States as a Jewish promised land precisely because it is not defined tribally and “has no state-bearing natives” (p. 369). But the recasting of the United States as a “proposition nation” was importantly influenced by the triumph of several Jewish intellectual and political movements more than it was a natural and inevitable culmination of American history.²² These movements collectively delegitimized cultural currents of the early twentieth century whereby many Americans thought of themselves as members of a very successful ethnic group. For example, the immigration restrictionists of the 1920s unabashedly asserted the right of European-derived peoples to the land they had conquered and settled. Americans of northern European descent in the United States thought of themselves as part of a cultural and ethnic heritage extending backward in time to the founding of the country, and writers like Madison Grant (*The Passing of the Great Race*) and Lothrop Stoddard (*The Rising Tide of Color against White World Supremacy*) had a large public following. At that time both academia and mainstream culture believed in the reality of race; that there were important differences between the races, including in intelligence and moral character; and that races naturally competed for land and other resources.²³

JEWISH SUPERIORITY

The assertion that Israel is the only civilized Apollonian society, despite its acknowledged racialism and open discussion of ethnic deportations, reveals Slezkine’s belief in Jewish moral and intellectual superiority. Indeed, Slezkine regards both European individualism and the European nation-state as imitations of preexisting Jewish accomplishments: “Europeans imitated Jews not only in being modern [by becoming individualists interacting with strangers], but also in being ancient” [i.e., by developing ethnically based nation-states] (p. 44). So we read condescending passages such as “among the most successful [of the European Mercurians] were Max Weber’s Protestants, who discovered a humorless, dignified way to be Jewish” (p. 41). This act of intellectual gymnastics depends on the following analogy: Jews act as an ethnically based tribe within societies, seeing non-Jews as strangers; Europeans establish tribal nation-states while behaving as individualists within their societies (seeing other Europeans as strangers). The sweeping conclusion: Jews are the progenitors therefore of both aspects of modernity: economic individualism and the ethnically based nation-state. The Holocaust then occurred because the European nation-state, although an imitation of Judaism, failed somehow to be sufficiently Jewish: “In the hands of heavily armed, thoroughly bureaucratized, and imperfectly Judaized Apollonians, Mercurian exclusivity and fastidiousness became relentlessly expansive. In the hands of messianically inclined Apollonians,

it turned lethal – especially to the Mercurians. The Holocaust had as much to do with tradition as it did with modernity” (p. 46).

But it is a huge stretch to argue from an analogy – and a loose one at that – to actual imitation and influence. (And one just doesn’t know what to say about his claim that Europeans perpetrated the Holocaust because they had become imperfect Jews.) Slezkine fails to provide any evidence that there is anything but a hazy and forced logical connection between European individualism and the Jewish role as a Diaspora people living among strangers. The reality is that by becoming individualists, Western Europeans returned to distinctive roots buried in their primeval past,²⁴ whereas Judaism, because of its deep-seated tribalism, was widely regarded by Enlightenment intellectuals as an outmoded relic. Indeed, several Jewish commentators have noted that the post-Enlightenment forms of Judaism have essentially been responses to the corrosive effects of European civilization, with its emphasis on individualism and ethnic assimilation, on Judaism as an ethnically based collectivist group – what early Zionist Arthur Ruppin described as “the destructive influence of European civilization” on Judaism because of its tendency to break down group barriers and lead eventually to assimilation and intermarriage.²⁵ Moreover, as Slezkine notes, Jews are not really individualists at all. Even in the modern world, the tribal approach of the Jews in economic enterprises employs ethnic kinship as a central component, whereas the individualistic approach of the Europeans sees this as illegitimate (p. 43). The bottom line is that it is ridiculous to claim that Jews are individualists because they treat outsiders as individuals while acknowledging that they retain a powerful ingroup consciousness and are masters of ethnic networking.

It is no stretch at all, however, to show that Jews have achieved a preeminent position in Europe and America, and Slezkine provides us with statistics of Jewish domination only dimly hinted at in the following examples from Europe in the late nineteenth century to the rise of National Socialism. Austria: All but one bank in fin de siècle Vienna was administered by Jews, and Jews constituted 70% of the stock exchange council; Hungary: between 50 and 90 percent of all industry was controlled by Jewish banking families, and 71% of the most wealthy taxpayers were Jews; Germany: Jews were overrepresented among the economic elite by a factor of 33. Similar massive overrepresentation was also to be found in educational attainment and among professionals (e.g., Jews constituted 62% of the lawyers in Vienna in 1900, 25% in Prussia in 1925, 34% in Poland, and 51% in Hungary). Indeed, “the universities, ‘free’ professions, salons, coffeehouses, concert halls, and art galleries in Berlin, Vienna, and Budapest became so heavily Jewish that liberalism and Jewishness became almost indistinguishable” (p. 63).

Slezkine documents the well-known fact that, as Moritz Goldstein famously noted in 1912, “We Jews administer the spiritual possessions of Germany.” However, he regards Jewish cultural dominance, not only in Germany but throughout Eastern Europe and Austria, as completely benign: “The secular

Jews' love of Goethe, Schiller, and the other Pushkins – as well as the various northern forests they represented – was sincere and tender" (p. 68). Their only sin was that their love of cultural icons transcended national and ethnic boundaries in an age of popular nationalism – for example, their promotion of German culture among the Czechs, Latvians, and Romanians. But this is far from the whole story. Jews were not simply lovers of Pushkin and Goethe. A major theme of anti-Jewish attitudes was that Jews were deeply involved in creating a "culture of critique" – that Jewish cultural influence was entirely negative and shattered the social bonds of the peoples they lived among. Slezkine cites Heinrich Heine as a prime example of a Jewish intellectual with sincere and tender love for German culture, but the Germans, from Wagner to von Treitschke to Chamberlain and Hitler, didn't see it that way. For example, Heinrich von Treitschke, a prominent nineteenth-century German intellectual, complained of Heine's "mocking German humiliation and disgrace following the Napoleonic wars" and Heine's having "no sense of shame, loyalty, truthfulness, or reverence."²⁶ Nor does he mention von Treitschke's comment that "what Jewish journalists write in mockery and satirical remarks against Christianity is downright revolting"; "about the shortcomings of the Germans [or] French, everybody could freely say the worst things; but if somebody dared to speak in just and moderate terms about some undeniable weakness of the Jewish character, he was immediately branded as a barbarian and religious persecutor by nearly all of the newspapers."²⁷ Such attitudes were prominent among anti-Jewish writers and activists, reaching a crescendo with the National Socialists in Germany.

Yet for Slezkine, if Jews did battle against various national cultures – and in the end, he acknowledges that they did – it was only because they realized that their Mercurian worldview was superior: "Did they really want to transform themselves into thick-skulled peasants now that the actual peasants had, for all practical purposes, admitted the error of their ways?" (p. 74). Jews were not recognized as legitimate curators of the national culture, but their lack of acceptance means only that they are truly modern: "Deprived of the comforts of their tribe and not allowed into the new ones created by their Apollonian neighbors, they became the only true moderns" (p. 75) – a statement that accepts at face value the idea that the secular Jews who had become the custodians and main producers of culture had ceased to have a Jewish identification. Slezkine fails to provide any evidence at all for this claim, and in fact there is overwhelming evidence that it is false.²⁸

The main weapons Jews used against national cultures were two quintessentially modern ideologies, Marxism and Freudianism, "both [of which] countered nationalism's quaint tribalism with a modern (scientific) path to wholeness" (p. 80). Slezkine correctly views both of these as Jewish ideologies functioning as organized religions, with sacred texts promising deliverance from earthly travail. While most of his book recounts the emergence of a

Jewish elite under the banner of Marxism in the Soviet Union, his comments on psychoanalysis bear mentioning. Psychoanalysis “moved to the United States to reinforce democratic citizenship with a much-needed new prop. . . . In America, where nationwide tribal metaphors could not rely on theories of biological descent, Freudianism came in very handy indeed” by erecting the “Explicitly Therapeutic State” (pp. 79–80). The establishment of the Explicitly Therapeutic State was much aided by yet another Jewish intellectual movement, the Frankfurt School, which combined psychoanalysis and Marxism. The result was a culture of critique which fundamentally aimed not only at de-legitimizing the older American culture, but even attempted to alter or obliterate human nature itself: “The statistical connection between ‘the Jewish question’ and the hope for a new species of mankind seems fairly strong” (p. 90).

And when people don’t cooperate in becoming a new species, there’s always murder. Slezkine describes Walter Benjamin, an icon of the Frankfurt School and darling of the current crop of postmodern intellectuals, “with glasses on his nose, autumn in his soul and vicarious murder in his heart” (p. 216), a comment that illustrates the fine line between murder and cultural criticism, especially when engaged in by ethnic outsiders. Indeed, on another occasion, Benjamin stated, “Hatred and [the] spirit of sacrifice. . . are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors rather than that of liberated grandchildren.”²⁹ Although Slezkine downplays this aspect of Jewish motivation, Jews’ lachrymose perceptions of their history – their images of enslaved ancestors – were potent motivators of the hatred unleashed by the upheavals of the twentieth century.

Slezkine is entirely correct that Marxism, psychoanalysis, and the Frankfurt School were fundamentally Jewish intellectual movements. However, he fails to provide anything like a detailed account of how these ideologies served specifically Jewish interests, most generally in combating anti-Semitism and subverting ethnic identification among Europeans.³⁰ Indeed, a major premise of his treatment is that Jewish radicals were not Jews at all.

WERE JEWISH RADICALS JEWS?

Slezkine recounts the vast overrepresentation of Jews in the radical left in Europe and America. His attempts to explain this cover some familiar ground: Jewish intellectual opposition to the status quo resulting from their marginal social status (Thorsten Veblen); Jewish leftism as a secular, universalized form of traditional Jewish messianism and rationalism in which Jewish leftists are descendents of the Old Testament prophets calling for social justice (Lev Shternberg, dean of Soviet anthropologists); Jewish Communists as recreating traditional Jewish culture forms – especially scriptural interpretation and intense teacher-student relationships – in a Communist setting (historian Jaff Schatz). Slezkine’s own contribution is to argue that Jewish radicals were in revolt against their families, “rejecting the world of their fathers because it seemed to embody the connection between Judaism and antisocialism

(understood as commercialism, tribalism, and patriarchy)...the real reason for their common revulsion was the feeling that capitalism and Jewishness were one and the same thing" (pp. 96, 98). "Most Jewish rebels did not fight the state in order to become free Jews; they fought the state in order to become free of Jewishness – and thus Free" (p. 152).

This is a very useful theory, of course – useful because it denies that Jewish radicals were Jews at all, that in fact they were anti-Jews (if not anti-Semites – and there's the rub). When Slezkine then goes on to recount the Jewish role as an elite in the most murderous regime in European history, we are led to believe that the only connection of those Jews with Jewishness is genealogical: Russian Jewish radicals, lovers of Pushkin and Tolstoy (as their counterparts in Poland, Hungary, and Germany loved Adam Mickiewicz, Sandór Petőfi, and Goethe), idealistically and selflessly set out to fashion a secular utopia of social justice by overcoming Apollonian backwardness even as they rejected their Jewish origins and all things Jewish.

His evidence for this is rather thin, but even in the examples Slezkine uses to illustrate his point it is clear that these Jewish radicals hated everything about their national cultures except for one or two literary figures. The rest would have to go. As Exhibit A, Slezkine presents Georg Lukács, the son of a prominent Jewish capitalist, who describes his profound discontent with his father's way of life. But Lukács also expresses his hatred for "the whole of official Hungary" – how he extended his unhappiness with his father to "cover the whole of Magyar life, Magyar history, and Magyar literature indiscriminately (save for Petőfi)" (p. 97). Ah, yes. Save for Petőfi. All else – the people and the culture – would have to go, by mass murder if necessary. (Lazar Kaganovich, the most prolific Jewish mass murderer of the Stalinist era, is pictured at the end of his life reading Pushkin, Tolstoy, and Turgenev [pp. 97-98].) But rather than see this as an aspect of traditional Jewish hatred for non-Jews and their culture, souped up and rationalized with a veneer of Marxism, Slezkine explains these radicals as enlightened Mercurians who wished to destroy the old culture except for a few classics of modern literature. We may give thanks to know that Shakespeare would have survived the revolution.

Another of Slezkine's examples is Lev Kopelev, a Soviet writer who witnessed and rationalized the Ukrainian famine as "historical necessity" (p. 230). Slezkine states categorically that Kopelev did not identify as a Jew, but his own material indicates the complexity of the matter. Kopelev identified himself on Soviet documents as "Jewish" but claimed that was only because he did not want to be seen as a "'cowardly apostate,' and – after World War II – because he did not want to renounce those who had been murdered for being Jewish" (p. 241). To the external world, Kopelev is a proud Jew, but to his close associates – in his "heart of hearts" – he is only a Communist and Soviet patriot. But of course many of his close associates were ethnic Jews, and he shed no tears for the Ukrainian and Russian peasants and nationalists who

were murdered in the name of international socialism even as he mourned the loss of Jews murdered because they were Jews. By World War II he had become a “leading ideologue of Russian patriotism” (p. 279), developing “an acute sense of hurt and injustice on behalf of Russia, Russian history, and the Russian word” (p. 280) as he attempted to rally the Russians to do battle with the Germans. Russian patriotism had suddenly become useful – much as, I would argue, harnessing the patriotism and high regard for military service among Americans has been useful for Jewish neoconservatives eager to rearrange the politics of the Middle East in the interests of Israel. Ideology is a wonderfully effective instrument in the service of self-deception (or deception).

Probably more typical of the Jewish identity of the Bolsheviks is the account of Vitaly Rubin, a prominent philosopher and an ethnic Jew, who recounted his career at a top Moscow school in the 1930s where over half the students were Jewish:

Understandably, the Jewish question did not arise there. Not only did it not arise in the form of anti-Semitism, it did not arise at all. All the Jews knew themselves to be Jews but considered everything to do with Jewishness a thing of the past. I remember thinking of my father’s stories about his childhood, *heder* [Jewish elementary school], and traditional Jewish upbringing as something consigned to oblivion. None of that had anything to do with me. There was no active desire to renounce one’s Jewishness. The problem simply did not exist (pp. 253–254).

These Jews clearly have a Jewish identity but they have been removed from traditional Jewish religious cultural forms. In such a predominantly Jewish milieu, there was no need to renounce their Jewish identity and no need to push aggressively for Jewish interests because they had achieved elite status. And yet, just prior to World War II, as Russians started replacing Jews among the political elite and Nazism emerged as an officially anti-Jewish ideology, overt Jewish identity reemerged. Following World War II, Israel began exerting its gravitational pull on Jews, much to the chagrin of a suspicious Stalin. The visit of Golda Meir in 1948 and the outpouring of Jewish support for Zionism that it aroused was a watershed event for Soviet Jewry. Stalin reacted to it by initiating a campaign against public Jews and Yiddish culture.

It is interesting in this regard that the leading Soviet spokesmen on anti-Semitism were both ethnic Jews with non-Jewish sounding names, Emilian Yaroslavsky (Gubelman) and Yuri Larin (Lurie). Both refer to Jews in the third person (p. 245), as if they themselves were not Jews. But when Larin tried to explain the embarrassing fact that Jews were “preeminent, overabundant, dominant, and so on” (p. 251) among the elite in the Soviet Union, he mentioned the “unusually strong sense of solidarity and a predisposition toward mutual help and support” (p. 252) – ethnic networking by any other name.

Obviously, “mutual help and support” require that Jews recognize each other as Jews. Jewish identity may not have been much discussed, but it operated nonetheless, even if subconsciously, in the rarefied circles at the top of Soviet

society. An example not presented by Slezkine is recounted in a report of 1950 to the central committee on Jewish activities at an aircraft production facility:

In a number of extremely important departments of the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic Institute there are workers due to be substituted for political reasons. They gather around themselves people of the same nationality, impose the habit of praising one another (while making others erroneously believe that they are indispensable), and force their protégés through to high posts.³¹

Indeed, there is no other way to explain the extraordinary percentages of Jews throughout elite institutions, which became apparent when the purges began in the late 1940s (see below). High IQ and achievement motivation can only go so far, and cannot explain why, for example, in the late 1940s Jews made up 80% of the Soviet Academy of Science Institute of Literature (Pushkin House) (p. 302), 42% of the directors of Moscow theaters, over half of Soviet circus directors (p. 301), or eight of the top ten directors of the Bolshoi Theater.³² In the case of Pushkin House, the opponents of the dominant clique stated that it had been forged "by long-lasting relationships of families and friends, mutual protection, homogeneous (Jewish) national composition, and anti-patriotic (anti-Russian) tendencies."³³

The reality is that Jewish identity always becomes more salient when Jews feel threatened or feel that their interests as Jews are at stake, but Jewish identity becomes submerged when Jewish interests coincide with other interests and identities.³⁴ (This is a human universal and presumably accounts for the fact that the American Founding Fathers felt no need to carefully define the cultural and ethnic parameters of their creation; they assumed the racial and cultural homogeneity of the Republic³⁵ and perceived no threat to its control by themselves and their descendants.) The relative submergence of Jewish identity within the Jewish milieu in elite circles of the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 1930s is a poor indicator of whether or not these people identified as Jews or would do so when in later years Jewish and Soviet identities began to diverge, when National Socialism reemphasized Jewish identity, or when Israel emerged as a beacon for Jewish identity and loyalty. A similar stance may be observed among present-day Jewish neoconservatives, who argue that the United States has a deep interest in democratizing the Middle East. The confluence of their interests as Jews in promoting the policies of the Israeli right wing and their construction of American interests allows them to submerge or even deny the relevance of their Jewish identity while posing as American patriots.³⁶ But if Israeli and American policy began to diverge significantly, Jewish interests would almost certainly control their attitudes and behavior. Indeed, since neoconservative Zionism of the Likud Party variety is well known for promoting a confrontation between the U.S. and the entire Muslim world, their policy recommendations best fit a pattern of loyalty to their ethnic group, not to America.³⁷

In a previous work I advanced several reasons for supposing that Jews continued to identify as Jews in the USSR, none of which is challenged by Slezkine's treatment: (1) Persons were classified as Jews depending on their ethnic background, at least partly because of residual anti-Jewish attitudes; this would tend to impose a Jewish identity on these individuals and make it difficult to assume an exclusive identity as a member of a larger, more inclusive political group. (2) Many Jewish Bolsheviks, such as those in *Evseksiya* (the Jewish section of the Communist Party) and the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, aggressively sought to establish a secular Jewish subculture; these phenomena are virtually ignored by Slezkine. (3) Very few Jews on the left envisioned a postrevolutionary society without a continuation of Judaism as a group; indeed, the predominant ideology among Jewish leftists was that postrevolutionary society would end anti-Semitism because it would end class conflict and the peculiar Jewish occupational profile. (4) The behavior of American Communists shows that Jewish identity and the primacy of Jewish interests over Communist interests were commonplace among individuals who were ethnically Jewish Communists. (5) The existence of Jewish *crypsis* in other times and places was combined with the possibility that self-deception, identificatory flexibility, and identificatory ambivalence are important components of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy.³⁸

And in the end, despite the rationalizations of many Soviet Jews and Slezkine on Jewish identity, it was blood that mattered. By the time of World War II, most Jews

knew that they were, in some sense, Jews. They may never have been to a synagogue, seen a menorah, heard Yiddish or Hebrew, tasted gefilte fish or indeed met their grandparents. But they knew they were Jews in the Soviet sense, which was also – in essence – the Nazi sense. They were Jews by blood (p. 286).

They reemerged as Jews to fight the Nazis and to solicit the support of American Jews to pressure their government to enter the war and provide aid to the Soviet Union. Jewish spokesmen visited New York proclaiming that "the Jewish people – 'ethnic' or religious, Communist, Zionist, or traditionalist – were one family" (p. 290).

Moreover, Slezkine leaves out an enormous amount of evidence that conflicts with his Jewish radicalism-as-patricide thesis, evidence indicating that in general Jewish radicals did identify as Jews and acted to promote specific Jewish interests. Certainly Jewish radicals often rejected their fathers' religion and their way of life, but all the evidence points to their identifying in different ways as Jews, not losing their Jewish identity to become de-ethnicized moral crusaders against capitalism. Slezkine uses Franz Boas to illustrate his patricide theory, because Boas was a radical Jew who recognized "the shackles of tradition" (p. 98). But he fails to note that Boas was hardly in rebellion against his own family. Boas was reared in a "Jewish-liberal" family in which the revolutionary ideals of

1848 remained influential,³⁹ and there is ample evidence of his strong Jewish identification and concern with anti-Semitism.⁴⁰

Besides a few individual cases like Lukács and Boas, the only general evidence that Slezkine provides for the patricide thesis comes from Jaff Schatz's study of the generation of Jewish Communists who dominated the Communist movement in Poland beginning in the 1930s. But he provides a mangled account of Schatz's work.⁴¹ These Jews did indeed reject their parents' religion, but the result of their Yiddish upbringing was "a deep core of their identity, values, norms, and attitudes with which they entered the rebellious period of their youth and adulthood. This core was to be transformed in the processes of acculturation, secularization, and radicalization sometimes even to the point of explicit denial. However, it was through this deep layer that all later perceptions were filtered."⁴² Most of these individuals spoke Yiddish in their daily lives and had only a poor command of Polish even after joining the party. They socialized entirely with other Jews whom they met in the Jewish world of work, neighborhood, and Jewish social and political organizations. After they became Communists, they dated and married among themselves, and their social gatherings were conducted in Yiddish. Their mentors and principal influences were other ethnic Jews, including especially Luxemburg and Trotsky, and when they recalled personal heroes, they were mostly Jews whose exploits achieved semimythical proportions.

In general, Jews who joined the Communist movement did not first reject their ethnic identity, and there were many who "cherished Jewish culture...[and] dreamed of a society in which Jews would be equal as Jews."⁴³ It was common for individuals to combine a strong Jewish identity with Marxism as well as various combinations of Zionism and Bundism (a movement of Jewish socialists). Moreover, the attraction of Polish Jews to Communism was greatly facilitated by their knowledge that Jews had attained high-level positions of power and influence in the Soviet Union and that the Soviet government had established a system of Jewish education and culture. In both the Soviet Union and Poland, Communism was seen as opposing anti-Semitism. In marked contrast, during the 1930s the Polish government enacted policies which excluded Jews from public-sector employment, established quotas on Jewish representation in universities and the professions, and organized boycotts of Jewish businesses and artisans.⁴⁴ Clearly, Jews perceived Communism as good for Jews, and indeed a major contribution of Slezkine's book is to document that Communism *was* good for Jews: It was a movement that never threatened Jewish group continuity, and it held the promise of Jewish power and influence and the end of state-sponsored anti-Semitism. And when this group achieved power in Poland after World War II, they liquidated the Polish nationalist movement, outlawed anti-Semitism, and established Jewish cultural and economic institutions.

Slezkine also fails to note that in the United States a strong Jewish identification was typical of Jewish radicals and that Jewish support for the left typically waxed and waned depending on specifically Jewish issues, particularly those related to anti-Semitism and support for Israel.⁴⁵ The Jewish Old Left was a recognized part of the Jewish community, and American Jewish leftists during the 1960s were the only leftists who didn't reject their parents—they really were “red diaper babies.”

It is also remarkable that the revolutionary movement in tsarist Russia ceased being anti-Jewish when Jews attained highly visible and prominent positions in the movement, even though workers and peasants participated in anti-Jewish pogroms from 1880 to 1905 and continued to harbor anti-Jewish attitudes. As Slezkine himself notes, Jews were the only group that was not criticized by the revolutionary movement (p. 157), even though most Russians, and especially the lower classes whose cause they were supposedly championing, had very negative attitudes toward Jews.⁴⁶ When, in 1915, Maxim Gorky, a strong philosemite, published a survey of Russian attitudes toward Jews, the most common response was typified by the comment that “the congenital, cruel, and consistent egoism of the Jews is everywhere victorious over the good-natured, uncultured, trusting Russian peasant or merchant” (p. 159). There were concerns that all of Russia would pass into Jewish hands and that Russians would become slaves of the Jews. In the end, as Slezkine shows, as a result of the Revolution this prediction was not far off the mark. But in any case, one would think that if radical Jews had ceased being Jews, they would have been severely critical of the Jewish role in the pre-Soviet economy.

The other huge lacuna in Slezkine's presentation is that he portrays Jewish radicals as typically the offspring of successful Jewish capitalists—like Georg Lukács—who scorn their fathers and wish for nothing more than to destroy Judaism in order to achieve personal freedom and make the world safe for humanity: “Marxism attributed [Jewish patricide] to the proletariat and urged the killing (more or less metaphorical) of the bad fathers, so as to emancipate the world from Judaism and make sure that no sons would have to kill their fathers ever again” (p. 100). Because he wishes to portray Jews as quintessentially modern Mercurians, Slezkine repeatedly shows how Jews dominated the economy, the universities, and the culture of Eastern Europe—indeed, his book is probably the best, most up-to-date account of Jewish economic and cultural preeminence in Europe (and America) that we have. But that is far from the whole story. A prime force resulting in Jewish radicalism was the grinding poverty of most Jews in Eastern Europe. Jews had overshot their economic niche: The economy was unable to support the burgeoning Jewish population in the sorts of positions that Jews had traditionally filled, with the result that a large percentage of the Jewish population became mired in poverty (along with much higher percentages of the non-Jewish population). The result was a cauldron of ethnic hostility, with

governmental restrictions on Jewish economic activity and representation in educational institutions, rampant anti-Jewish attitudes, and increasing Jewish desperation.⁴⁷

The main Jewish response to this situation was an upsurge of fundamentalist extremism that coalesced in the Hasidic movement and, later in the nineteenth century, in political radicalism and Zionism as solutions to Jewish problems. Slezkine devotes one line to the fact that Jewish populations in Eastern Europe had the highest rate of natural increase of any European population in the nineteenth century (p. 115), but this was an extremely important part of Eastern Europe's "Jewish problem." Anti-Semitism and the exploding Jewish population, combined with economic adversity, were of critical importance for producing the great numbers of disaffected Jews who dreamed of deliverance in various messianic movements – the ethnocentric mysticism of the Kabbala and Hasidism, Zionism, or the dream of a Marxist political revolution. Jews emigrated in droves from Eastern Europe but the problems remained. And in the case of the Marxists, the main deliverance was to be achieved not by killing Judaism, as Slezkine suggests, but by the destruction of the traditional societies of Eastern Europe as a panacea for Jewish poverty and for anti-Semitism.

In fact, the vast majority of Jews in Eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were hardly the modern Mercurians that Slezkine portrays them as being. Slezkine does note that well into the twentieth century the vast majority of Eastern European Jews could not speak the languages of the non-Jews living around them, and he does a good job of showing their intense ingroup feeling and their attitudes that non-Jews were less than human.⁴⁸ But he ignores their medieval outlook on life, their obsession with the Kabbala (the writings of Jewish mystics), their superstition and anti-rationalism, and their belief in "magical remedies, amulets, exorcisms, demonic possession (dybbuks), ghosts, devils, and teasing, mischievous genies."⁴⁹ These supposedly modern Mercurians had an attitude of absolute faith in the person of the *tsadik*, their rebbe, who was a charismatic figure seen by his followers literally as the personification of God in the world. (Attraction to charismatic leaders is a fundamental feature of Jewish social organization – apparent as much among religious fundamentalists as among Jewish political radicals or elite Jewish intellectuals.)⁵⁰

BOLSHEVISM AS A JEWISH REVOLUTION

Slezkine's main contribution is to summarize previously available data and to extend our understanding of Jewish dominance of the revolutionary movements before 1917, and of Soviet society thereafter. (Oddly, he makes only a passing reference to Albert Lindemann's important *Esau's Tears*, which makes many of the same points.) Not only were Jews vastly overrepresented among revolutionaries, they "were particularly well represented at the top, among theoreticians, journalists, and leaders" (p. 155). Radical Jews, like other

Jews, were very talented, highly intelligent, hardworking, and in addition dedicated to creating effective ethnic networks.⁵¹ These traits propelled them to the top of radical organizations and made the organizations themselves more effective.

But if Jews dominated radical and revolutionary organizations, they were immeasurably aided by philosemites like Gorky who, in Albert Lindemann's term, were "jewified non-Jews" – "a term, freed of its ugly connotations, [that] might be used to underline an often overlooked point: Even in Russia there were some non-Jews, whether Bolsheviki or not, who respected Jews, praised them abundantly, imitated them, cared about their welfare, and established intimate friendships or romantic liaisons with them."⁵² (As noted above, many of the non-Jewish elite in the USSR had Jewish wives.) What united the Jews and philosemites was their hatred for what Lenin (who had a Jewish grandfather) called "the thick-skulled, boorish, inert, and bearishly savage Russian or Ukrainian peasant" – the same peasant Gorky described as "savage, somnolent, and glued to his pile of manure" (p. 163). It was attitudes like these that created the climate that justified the slaughter of many millions of peasants under the new regime. Philosemites continued to be common among the non-Jewish elite in the USSR, even in the 1950s, when Jews began to be targeted as Jews. One such philosemite was Pavel Sudoplatov, a Slav married to a Jew and with many Jewish friends, who was a high-ranking secret police official with a great deal of blood on his hands. The only murder he unequivocally condemned in his memoirs was that of Paul Mikhoels, a Jewish ethnic activist associated with the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.

Figures like Gorky and Sudoplatov were critical to the success of Jews in the Soviet Union. This is a general principle of Jewish political activity in a Diaspora situation: Because Jews tend to constitute a tiny percentage of a society, they need to make alliances with non-Jews whose perceived interests dovetail with theirs. Non-Jews have a variety of reasons for being associated with Jewish interests, including career advancement, close personal relationships or admiration for individual Jews, and deeply held personal convictions.⁵³

Gorky's love for the Jews – what Slezkine terms "the bitter, ardent, and hopeless love of self-described Apollonians for beautiful Mercurians" (p. 165) – was boundless. Gorky saw Jews as possessors of "heroic" idealism, "all-probing, all-scrutinizing"; "this idealism, which expresses itself in their tireless striving to remake the world according to new principles of equality and justice, is the main, and possibly the only, reason for the hostility toward Jews" (quoted on p. 164).

Despite the important role of Jews among the Bolsheviki, most Jews were not Bolsheviki before the revolution. However, Jews were prominent among the Bolsheviki, and once the revolution was under way, the vast majority of Russian Jews became sympathizers and active participants. Jews were particularly visible in the cities and as leaders in the army and in the revolutionary councils

and committees. For example, there were 23 Jews among the 62 Bolsheviks in the All-Russian Central Executive Committee elected at the Second Congress of Soviets in October, 1917. Jews were the leaders of the movement, and to a great extent they were its public face. Slezkine quotes historian Mikhail Beizer who notes, commenting on the situation in Leningrad, that "Jewish names were constantly popping up in newspapers. Jews spoke relatively more often than others at rallies, conferences, and meetings of all kinds."⁵⁴ In general, Jews were deployed in supervisory positions rather than positions that placed them in physical danger. In a Politburo meeting of April 18, 1919, Trotsky urged that Jews be redeployed because there were relatively few Jews in frontline combat units, while Jews constituted a "vast percentage" of the Cheka at the front and in the Executive Committees at the front and at the rear. This pattern had caused "chauvinist agitation" in the Red Army (p. 187).

Jewish representation at the top levels of the Cheka and OGPU (the acronyms by which the secret police was known in different periods) has often been the focus of those stressing Jewish involvement in the revolution and its aftermath. Slezkine provides statistics on Jewish overrepresentation in these organizations, especially in supervisory roles, and agrees with Leonard Schapiro's comment that "anyone who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the Cheka stood a very good chance of finding himself confronted with and possibly shot by a Jewish investigator" (p. 177). During the 1930s the secret police, then known as the NKVD, "was one of the most Jewish of all Soviet institutions" (p. 254), with 42 of its 111 top officials being Jewish. At this time 12 of the 20 NKVD directorates were headed by ethnic Jews, including those in charge of state security, police, labor camps, and resettlement (i.e., deportation). The Gulag was headed by ethnic Jews from its beginning in 1930 until the end of 1938, a period that encompasses the worst excesses of the Great Terror. They were, in Slezkine's words, "Stalin's willing executioners" (p. 103).

The Bolsheviks continued to apologize for Jewish overrepresentation until the topic became taboo in the 1930s. And it was not until the late 1930s that there was a rise in visibility and assertiveness of "anti-Semites, ethnic nationalists, and advocates of proportional representation" (p. 188). By this time the worst of the slaughters in the Gulag, the purges, and the contrived famines had been completed.

The prominence of Jews in the Revolution and its aftermath was not lost on participants on both sides, including influential figures such as Winston Churchill, who wrote that the role of Jews in the revolution "is certainly a very great one; it probably outweighs all others."⁵⁵ Slezkine highlights similar comments in a book published in 1927 by V. V. Shulgin, a Russian nationalist, who experienced firsthand the murderous acts of the Bolsheviks in his native Kiev in 1919: "We do not like the fact that this whole terrible thing was done *on the Russian back* and that it has cost us unutterable losses. We do not like the fact that you, Jews, a relatively small group within the Russian population,

participated in this vile deed *out of all proportion to your numbers*" (p. 181; italics in original). Slezkine does not disagree with this assessment, but argues that Jews were hardly the only revolutionaries (p. 180). This is certainly true, but does not affect my argument that Jewish involvement was a necessary condition, not merely a sufficient condition, for the success of the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath.⁵⁶ Slezkine's argument clearly supports the Jews-as-necessary-condition claim, especially because of his emphasis on the leadership role of Jews.

However, the claim that Jewish involvement was a necessary condition is itself an understatement because, as Shulgin noted, the effectiveness of Jewish revolutionaries was far out of proportion to the number of Jews. A claim that a group constituting a large proportion of the population was necessary to the success of a movement would be unexceptional. But the critical importance of Jews occurred even though Jews constituted less than 5% of the Russian population around the time of the Revolution, and they were much less represented in the major urban areas of Moscow and Leningrad prior to the Revolution because they were prevented from living there by the Pale of Settlement laws.⁵⁷ Slezkine is correct that Jews were not the only revolutionaries, but his point only underscores the importance of philosemitism and other alliances Jews typically must make in Diaspora situations in order to advance their perceived interests.

In 1923, several Jewish intellectuals published a collection of essays admitting the "bitter sin" of Jewish complicity in the crimes of the Revolution. In the words of a contributor, I. L. Bikerman, "it goes without saying that not all Jews are Bolsheviks and not all Bolsheviks are Jews, but what is equally obvious is that disproportionate and immeasurably fervent Jewish participation in the torment of half-dead Russia by the Bolsheviks" (p. 183). Many of the commentators on Jewish Bolsheviks noted the "transformation" of Jews: In the words of another Jewish commentator, G. A. Landau, "cruelty, sadism, and violence had seemed alien to a nation so far removed from physical activity." And another Jewish commentator, Ia. A Bromberg, noted that:

the formerly oppressed lover of liberty had turned into a tyrant of "unheard-of-despotic arbitrariness".... The convinced and unconditional opponent of the death penalty not just for political crimes but for the most heinous offenses, who could not, as it were, watch a chicken being killed, has been transformed outwardly into a leather-clad person with a revolver and, in fact, lost all human likeness (pp. 183-184).

This psychological "transformation" of Russian Jews was probably not all that surprising to the Russians themselves, given Gorky's finding that Russians prior to the Revolution saw Jews as possessed of "cruel egoism" and that they were concerned about becoming slaves of the Jews. Gorky himself remained a philosemite to the end, despite the prominent Jewish role in the murder of approximately twenty million of his ethnic kin,⁵⁸ but after the Revolution he commented that "*the reason for the current anti-Semitism*

in Russia is the tactlessness of the Jewish Bolsheviks. The Jewish Bolsheviks, not all of them but some irresponsible boys, are taking part in the defiling of the holy sites of the Russian people. They have turned churches into movie theaters and reading rooms without considering the feelings of the Russian people." However, Gorky did not blame the Jews for this: "The fact that the Bolsheviks sent the Jews, the helpless and irresponsible Jewish youths, to do these things, does smack of provocation, of course. But the Jews should have refrained" (p. 186).

Those who carried out the mass murder and dispossession of the Russian peasants saw themselves, at least in their public pronouncements, as doing what was necessary in pursuit of the greater good. This was the official view not only of the Soviet Union, where Jews formed a dominant elite, but also was the "more or less official view" among Jewish intellectuals in the United States (p. 215) and elsewhere. (It is still far more common for leftist intellectuals to bemoan McCarthyism than the horrors of the USSR.⁵⁹)

It is for the sake of creating a perfect human being – Apollonian in body and Mercurian in mind – that Levinson steels himself for doing what is "necessary," including the requisitioning of a weeping farmer's last pig and the killing of a wounded comrade too weak to be evacuated.... [T]he greater the personal responsibility for acts ordinarily considered evil, the more visible the signs of election and the inner strength they bespoke. Demonic as well as Promethean, Bolshevik commissars 'carried within them' the pain of historical necessity" (p. 194).

Levinson, a character in A. Fedeev's *The Rout* (1926), a prominent example of socialist realism in the early Soviet period, is not ideologically Jewish, "but there is little doubt that for reasons of both aesthetic and sociological verisimilitude, canonical Jewishness seemed an appropriate expression of the Bolshevik vision of disembodied consciousness triumphing over [peasant] inertia" (p. 193). So it is not surprising that Gorky's mild rebuke of Jewish anti-Christian zealotry was too much for Esther Frumkina, a leader of the Party's Jewish section. Frumkina accused Gorky of attacking "Jewish Communists for their selfless struggle against darkness and fanaticism" (p. 187). In their self-perceptions, Jews are selflessly altruistic even when acting out ancient hatreds.

THE THREE GREAT JEWISH MIGRATIONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Slezkine's last and longest chapter describes the three great Jewish migrations of the twentieth century – to Israel, to America, and to the urban centers of the Soviet Union. Slezkine perceives all three through the lens of heroic Jewish self-perception. He sees the United States as a Jewish utopia precisely because it had only a "vestigial establishment tribalism" (p. 209) that could not long inhibit Jewish ascendancy: "The United States stood for unabashed Mercurianism, nontribal statehood, and the supreme sovereignty of capitalism and professionalism. It was – rhetorically – a collection of *homines*

rationalistici artificiali, a nation of strangers held together by a common celebration of separateness (individualism) and rootlessness (immigration)" (p. 207). It was the only modern state...in which a Jew could be an equal citizen and a Jew at the same time. 'America' offered full membership without complete assimilation. Indeed, it seemed to require an affiliation with a subnational community as a condition of full membership in the political nation" (p. 207).

Slezkine sees post-World War II America as a Jewish utopia but seems only dimly aware that Jews to a great extent created their own utopia in the U.S. by undermining nativist sentiments that were common at least until after World War II. Slezkine emphasizes the Jewish role in institutionalizing the therapeutic state, but sees it as completely benign, rather than an aspect of the "culture of critique" that undermined the ethnic identities of white Americans: "By bringing Freudianism to America and by adopting it, briefly, as a salvation religion, [Jews] made themselves more American while making America more therapeutic" (p. 319). There is little discussion of the main anti-nativist intellectual movements, all of which were dominated by ethnically conscious Jews: Boasian anthropology, Horace Kallen and the development of the theory of America as a "proposition nation," and the Frankfurt School which combined psychoanalysis and Marxism into a devastating weapon against the ethnic consciousness of white Americans. Nor does he discuss the role of Jewish activist organizations in altering the ethnic balance of the United States by promoting large-scale immigration from around the world.

Slezkine also views the Jewish migration to Israel as heroic: "In both Jewish Palestine (the Yishuv) and Soviet Russia, brotherhood stood for the full identity of all true believers (always the few against the many) and their complete identification with the cause (ardently desired and genuinely felt by most young Jews in both places). Eventually, both revolutions evolved in the direction of greater hierarchy, institutionalized militarism, intense anxiety about aliens, and the cult of generals, boy soldiers, and elite forces, but between 1917 and the mid-1930s they were overflowing with youthful energy and the spirit of fraternal effort, and self-sacrifice" (p. 212).

The passage is remarkable both for its pinpointing the ingroup/outgroup nature of the psychology of traditional Jewish groups, freed now of the Torah and the synagogue, and for its description of the ingroup psychology of mass murder (in the USSR) and ethnic cleansing (in the Middle East) as involving valiant self-sacrifice and pride in accomplishment.

But Slezkine spends most of his energy by far in providing a fascinating chronicle of the Jewish rise to elite status in all areas of Soviet society – culture, the universities, professional occupations, the media, and government. In all cases, Jewish overrepresentation was most apparent at the pinnacles of success and influence. To take just the area of culture, Jews were highly visible as avant-garde artists, formalist theorists, polemicists, moviemakers, and poets.

They were “among the most exuberant crusaders against ‘bourgeois’ habits during the Great Transformation; the most disciplined advocates of socialist realism during the ‘Great Retreat’ (from revolutionary internationalism); and the most passionate prophets of faith, hope, and combat during the Great Patriotic War against the Nazis” (p. 225). And, as their critics noticed, Jews were involved in anti-Christian propaganda. Mikhail Bulgakov, a Russian writer, noticed that the publishers of *Godless* magazine were Jews; he was “stunned” to find that Christ was portrayed as “a scoundrel and a cheat. It is not hard to see whose work it is. This crime is immeasurable” (p. 244).

Some of the juxtapositions are striking and seemingly intentional. On p. 230, Lev Kopelev is quoted on the need for firmness in confiscating the property of the Ukrainian peasants. Kopelev, who witnessed the famine that killed seven to ten million peasants, stated, “You mustn’t give in to debilitating pity. We are the agents of historical necessity. We are fulfilling our revolutionary duty. We are procuring grain for our socialist Fatherland. For the Five-Year Plan.” On the next page, Slezkine describes the life of the largely Jewish elite in Moscow and Leningrad, where they attended the theater, sent their children to the best schools, had peasant women for nannies, spent weekends at pleasant dachas, and vacationed at the Black Sea.

Slezkine describes the NKVD as “one of the most Jewish of all Soviet institutions” and recounts the Jewish leadership of the Great Terror of the 1930s (pp. 254 and 255). On p. 256, he writes that in 1937 the prototypical Jew who moved from the Pale of Settlement to Moscow to man elite positions in the Soviet state “probably would have been living in elite housing in downtown Moscow...with access to special stores, a house in the country (dacha), and a live-in peasant nanny or maid....At least once a year, she would have traveled to a Black Sea sanatorium or a mineral spa in the Caucasus” (p. 256). Slezkine writes long and lovingly detailed sketches of life at the dachas of the elite – the “open verandas overlooking small gardens enclosed by picket fences or wildly overgrown yards” (p. 256), but the reader is left to his own imagination to visualize the horrors of the Ukrainian famine and the liquidation of the Kulaks.

As Slezkine notes, most of the Soviet elite were not Jews, but Jews were far overrepresented among the elite (and Russians far underrepresented as a percentage of the population). Moreover, the Jews formed a far more cohesive core than the rest of the elite because of their common social and cultural background (p. 236). The common understanding that the new elite had a very large Jewish representation resulted in pervasive anti-Jewish attitudes. In 1926, an Agitprop report noted “The sense that the Soviet regime patronizes the Jews, that it is ‘the Jewish government,’ that the Jews cause unemployment, housing shortages, college admissions problems, price rises, and commercial speculation – this sense is instilled in the workers by all the hostile elements.... If it does not encounter resistance, the wave of anti-Semitism threatens to become, in the

very near future, a serious political question" (p. 244). Such widespread public perceptions about the role of Jews in the new government led to aggressive surveillance and repression of anti-Jewish attitudes and behavior, including the execution of Russian nationalists who expressed anti-Jewish attitudes. These public perceptions also motivated Jews to adopt a lower profile in the regime, as with Trotsky, who refused the post of commissar of internal affairs because it might lend further ammunition to the anti-Jewish arguments. From 1927 to 1932 Stalin established an ambitious public campaign to combat anti-Semitism that included fifty-six books published by the government and an onslaught of speeches, mass rallies, newspaper articles, and show trials "aimed at eradicating the evil" (p. 249).

THE DECLINE OF THE JEWS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Jews were able to maintain themselves as an elite until the end of the Soviet regime in 1991 – this despite an official push for affirmative action-style programs to open up opportunities for the children of peasants and workers in the 1930s and to blunt the anti-Jewish feelings simmering at the lower levels of Soviet society. Jewish elite status persisted despite the Great Terror of the late 1930s, which disproportionately affected the political elite. On the whole, Jews were underrepresented as victims of the Great Terror. And although the Jewish percentage of the political elite did decline after the purges of the late 1930s and the promotion of former peasants and working class Russians, this did not affect Jewish predominance as a professional, cultural, and managerial elite. Jews also retained their elite status despite Stalin's campaign in the late 1940s against Jewish ethnic and cultural institutions and their spokesmen.

Jewish elite status remained even after the purge was expanded to all sectors of the Soviet elite, due at least partly to "the widespread sense [among Russians] that the great victory [in World War II] entitled them to a greater role in decision making" (p. 306). Slezkine shows the very high percentages of Jews in various institutions in the late 1940s, including the universities, the media, the foreign service, and the secret police. For example, the deans of philosophers, historians, and legal scholars were ethnic Jews, and, as already noted, Jews constituted 80% of the Soviet Academy of Science Institute of Literature. As for the Jewish role as "vanguard of the working class," Jews still made up 23% of the staff at the Trade Union Council's publication *Trud* even after a purge that cut their numbers in half.

The campaign against the Jews began only after the apogee of mass murder and deportations in the USSR, and was much less lethal than those mounted against a long list of other ethnic groups, whose typical fate was deportation under the most brutal of circumstances (Cossacks, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Moldavians, Kalmyks, Karachai, Balkars, Ingush, Greeks, Bulgars, Crimean Armenians, Meskhetian Turks, Kurds, and Khemshins). The campaign against the Jews was also much less consistent and effective

than the Soviet campaigns against the children of the former elite – the factory owners, the Cossack officers, and the middle classes and intelligentsia – had been (p. 308).

Unlike the purges of the 1930s that sometimes targeted Jews as member of the elite (albeit at far less than their percentage of the elite), the anti-Jewish actions of the late 1940s and early 1950s were targeted at Jews because of their ethnicity. Similar purges were performed throughout Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe (pp. 313–314). “All three regimes [Poland, Romania, Hungary] resembled the Soviet Union of the 1920s insofar as they combined the ruling core of the old Communist underground, which was heavily Jewish, with a large pool of upwardly mobile Jewish professionals, who were, on average, the most trustworthy among the educated and the most educated among the trustworthy” (p. 314). Speaking of the situation in Poland, Khrushchev supported the anti-Jewish purge with his remark that “you have already too many Abramoviches.”⁶⁰

Whereas in the 1920s and 1930s children of the pillars of the old order were discriminated against, now Jews were not only being purged because of their vast overrepresentation among the elite, but were being discriminated against in university admissions. Jews, the formerly loyal members of the elite and willing executioners of the bloodiest regime in history, now “found themselves among the aliens” (p. 310). Rather than rationalize their persecution as resulting from the iron laws of history, some Jews began to feel guilt for their former role. A Jewish woman writes that after her husband was arrested, her maid told her, “You are crying now, but you did not mind when my father was being dekulakized, martyred for no reason at all, and my whole family thrown out in the street” (p. 311).

And so began the exodus of Jews. Stalin died and the anti-Jewish campaign fizzled, but the Jewish trajectory was definitely downhill. Jews retained their elite status and occupational profile until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but “the special relationship between the Jews and the Soviet state had come to an end – or rather, the unique symbiosis in pursuit of world revolution had given way to a unique antagonism over two competing and incommensurate nationalisms” (p. 330). A response of the Russians was “massive affirmative action” (p. 333) aimed at giving greater representation to underrepresented ethnic groups. Jews were targets of suspicion because of their ethnic status, barred from some elite institutions, and limited in their opportunities for advancement.

The Russians were taking back their country, and it wasn't long before Jews became leaders of the dissident movement and began to seek to emigrate in droves to the United States, Western Europe, and Israel. Despite still possessing elite social status and far fewer disabilities than many groups (e.g., the overwhelming majority of the Soviet population was not allowed to live in cities and some Christian sects were banned), Jews perceived their

situation as “unrelieved humiliation” (p. 339). Overt anti-Semitism was encouraged by the more covert official variety apparent in the limits on Jewish advancement. Under these circumstances, Jews became “in many ways, the core of the antiregime intelligentsia” (p. 340). Jewish dissidents whose parents had run the Gulags, the deportations, and the state-sponsored famines, now led the “urgent call for social justice” (p. 342). Jewish academics with “cult followings” (p. 342) – a familiar Jewish pattern⁶¹ – and close ties to Western Jewish intellectuals became the intellectual vanguard and iconoclasts of the new culture of critique in the Soviet Union.

Applications to leave the USSR increased dramatically after Israel’s Six-Day War of 1967, which, as in the United States and Eastern Europe, resulted in an upsurge of Jewish identification and ethnic pride. The floodgates were eventually opened by Gorbachev in the late 1980s, and by 1994, 1.2 million Soviet Jews had emigrated – 43% of the total. By 2002, there were only 230,000 Jews left in the Russian Federation, 0.16% of the population. These remaining Jews nevertheless exhibit the typical Ashkenazi pattern of high achievement and overrepresentation among the elite, including six of the seven oligarchs who emerged in control of the Soviet economy and media in the period of de-nationalization (p. 362).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, this dénouement did not result in any sense of collective guilt among Soviet Jews (p. 345) or among their American apologists. Indeed, American Jewish media figures who were blacklisted because of Communist affiliations in the 1940s are now heroes, honored by the film industry, praised in newspapers, their work exhibited in museums.⁶² At the same time, the cause of Soviet Jews and their ability to emigrate became a critical rallying point for American Jewish activist organizations and a defining feature of neoconservatism as a Jewish intellectual and political movement. (For example, Richard Perle, a key neoconservative, was Senator Henry Jackson’s most important security advisor from 1969 to 1979 and organized Congressional support for the Jackson-Vanik Amendment linking U.S.-Soviet trade to the ability of Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union. The bill was passed over strenuous opposition from the Nixon administration.) Jewish activist organizations and many Jewish historians portray the Soviet Jewish experience as a sojourn in the land of the “Red Pharaohs” (p. 360). The historical legacy is that Jews were the passive, uncomprehending victims of the White armies, the Nazis, the Ukrainian nationalists, and the postwar Soviet state, nothing more.

THE ISSUE OF JEWISH CULPABILITY

Alexander Solzhenitsyn calls on Jews to accept moral responsibility for the Jews who “took part in the iron Bolshevik leadership and, even more so, in the ideological guidance of a huge country down a false path... [and for the Jewish role in the] Cheka executions, the drowning of the barges with the condemned in the White and Caspian Seas, collectivization, the Ukrainian famine – in all the vile acts of the Soviet regime” (quoted on p. 360). But according to Slezkine, there

can be no collective guilt because Soviet violence, unlike the Nazi persecution of the Jews, was not tribal violence. Violence of the Soviet sort has “no legitimate heirs – for either the victims or the perpetrators” (p. 345). Slezkine acknowledges that Jews were “the most enthusiastic ethnically defined supporters of the Soviet state” but he essentially argues that Jews were not really Jews when they were Communists, at least until World War II caused them to be conscious of their Jewish identities. After all, the legacy of Communism “was almost as strongly committed to cosmopolitanism as it was to mass violence” (p. 346).

Again we see the importance of Slezkine’s claims that Jewish Communists lacked a Jewish identity. However, as demonstrated above, there can be little doubt that Soviet Jews thought of themselves as Jews (although they certainly were not religious Jews) and that they worked together on the basis of shared Jewish ethnic identity. Nevertheless, the critical issue for collective guilt is whether the Jewish enthusiasm for the Soviet state and the enthusiastic participation of Jews in the violence against what Slezkine terms “rural backwardness and religion” (p. 346) had something to do with their Jewish identity.

This is a more difficult claim to establish, but the outlines of the argument are quite clear. Even granting the possibility that the revolutionary vanguard composed of Jews like Trotsky that spearheaded the Bolshevik Revolution was far more influenced by a universalist utopian vision than by their upbringing in traditional Judaism, it does not follow that this was the case for the millions of Jews who left the shtetl towns of the Pale of Settlement to migrate to Moscow and the urban centers of the new state. The migration of the Jews to the urban centers of the USSR is a critical aspect of Slezkine’s presentation, but it strains credulity to suppose that these migrants threw off, completely and immediately, all remnants of the Eastern European shtetl culture which, Slezkine acknowledges, had a deep sense of estrangement from non-Jewish culture, and in particular a fear and hatred of peasants resulting from the traditional economic relations between Jews and peasants and exacerbated by the long and recent history of anti-Jewish pogroms carried out by peasants. Traditional Jewish shtetl culture also had a very negative attitude toward Christianity, not only as the central cultural icon of the outgroup but as associated in their minds with a long history of anti-Jewish persecution. The same situation doubtless occurred in Poland, where the efforts of even the most “de-ethnized” Jewish Communists to recruit Poles were inhibited by traditional Jewish attitudes of superiority toward and estrangement from traditional Polish culture.⁶³

In other words, the war against “rural backwardness and religion” was exactly the sort of war that a traditional Jew would have supported wholeheartedly, because it was a war against everything they hated and thought of as oppressing them. Of course traditional shtetl Jews also hated the tsar and his government due to restrictions on Jews and because they did not think that the government did enough to rein in anti-Jewish violence. There can be little doubt that Lenin’s

contempt for “the thick-skulled, boorish, inert, and bearishly savage Russian or Ukrainian peasant” was shared by the vast majority of shtetl Jews prior to the Revolution and after it. Those Jews who defiled the holy places of traditional Russian culture and published anti-Christian periodicals doubtless reveled in their tasks for entirely Jewish reasons, and, as Gorky worried, their activities not unreasonably stoked the anti-Semitism of the period. Given the anti-Christian attitudes of traditional shtetl Jews, it is very difficult to believe that the Jews engaged in campaigns against Christianity did not have a sense of revenge against the old culture that they held in such contempt.

Indeed, Slezkine reviews some of the works of early Soviet Jewish writers that illustrate the revenge theme. The amorous advances of the Jewish protagonist of Eduard Bagritsky’s poem “February” are rebuffed by a Russian girl, but their positions are changed after the Revolution when he becomes a deputy commissar. Seeing the girl in a brothel, he has sex with her without taking off his boots, his gun, or his trench coat – an act of aggression and revenge:

I am taking you because so timid
Have I always been, and to take vengeance
For the shame of my exiled forefathers
And the twitter of an unknown fledgling!
I am taking you to wreak my vengeance
On the world I could not get away from!

Slezkine seems comfortable with revenge as a Jewish motive, but he does not consider traditional Jewish culture itself to be a contributor to Jewish attitudes toward traditional Russia, even though he notes that a very traditional part of Jewish culture was to despise the Russians and their culture. (Even the Jewish literati despised all of traditional Russian culture, apart from Pushkin and a few literary icons.) Indeed, one wonders what would motivate the Jewish commissars to revenge apart from motives related to their Jewish identity. Traditional hostility toward non-Jews and their culture forms a central theme in the writings of Israel Shahak and many mainstream Jewish historians, including Slezkine, and I have presented summaries of this material elsewhere.⁶⁴ An important aspect of Slezkine’s general theoretical approach is that relationships between Mercurians and Apollonians involve mutual hostility, suspicion and contempt, and a sense of superiority (p. 20). These traditional attitudes were exacerbated by the increase in tensions between Jews and non-Jews beginning with the pogroms of 1881 and extending, with fits and starts, into the period of the Bolshevik Revolution.

Slezkine’s argument that Jews were critically involved in destroying traditional Russian institutions, liquidating Russian nationalists, murdering the tsar and his family, dispossessing and murdering the kulaks, and destroying the Orthodox Church has been made by many other writers over the years, including Igor Shafarevich, a mathematician and member of the prestigious U. S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Shafarevich’s review of Jewish

literary works during the Soviet and post-Soviet period agrees with Slezkine in showing Jewish hatred mixed with a powerful desire for revenge toward pre-revolutionary Russia and its culture.⁶⁵ But Shafarevich also suggests that the Jewish “Russophobia” that prompted the mass murder is not a unique phenomenon, but results from traditional Jewish hostility toward the non-Jewish world, considered *tref* (unclean), and toward non-Jews themselves, considered sub-human and as worthy of destruction. Both Shafarevich and Slezkine review the traditional animosity of Jews toward Russia, but Slezkine attempts to get his readers to believe that shtetl Jews were magically transformed in the instant of Revolution; although they did carry out the destruction of traditional Russia and approximately twenty million of its people, they did so only out of the highest humanitarian motives and the dream of utopian socialism, only to return to an overt Jewish identity because of the pressures of World War II, the rise of Israel as a source of Jewish identity and pride, and anti-Jewish policies and attitudes in the USSR. This is simply not plausible.

The situation prompts reflection on what might have happened in the United States had American Communists and their sympathizers assumed power. The “red diaper babies” came from Jewish families which “around the breakfast table, day after day, in Scarsdale, Newton, Great Neck, and Beverly Hills have discussed what an awful, corrupt, immoral, undemocratic, racist society the United States is.”⁶⁶ Indeed, hatred toward the peoples and cultures of non-Jews and the image of enslaved ancestors as victims of anti-Semitism have been the Jewish norm throughout history – much commented on, from Tacitus to the present.⁶⁷

It is easy to imagine which sectors of American society would have been deemed overly backward and religious and therefore worthy of mass murder by the American counterparts of the Jewish elite in the Soviet Union – the ones who journeyed to Ellis Island instead of Moscow. The descendants of these overly backward and religious people now loom large among the “red state” voters who have been so important in recent national elections. Jewish animosity toward the Christian culture that is so deeply ingrained in much of America is legendary. As Joel Kotkin points out, “for generations, [American] Jews have viewed religious conservatives with a combination of fear and disdain.”⁶⁸ And as Elliott Abrams notes, the American Jewish community “clings to what is at bottom a dark vision of America, as a land permeated with anti-Semitism and always on the verge of anti-Semitic outbursts.”⁶⁹ These attitudes are well captured in Steven Steinlight’s charge that the Americans who approved the immigration restriction legislation of the 1920s – the vast majority of the population – were a “thoughtless mob” and that the legislation itself was “evil, xenophobic, anti-Semitic,” “vilely discriminatory,” a “vast moral failure,” a “monstrous policy.”⁷⁰ In the end, the dark view of traditional Slavs and their culture that facilitated the participation of so many Eastern European shtetl Jews in becoming willing executioners in the name of international socialism is not

very different from the views of contemporary American Jews about a majority of their fellow countrymen.

There is a certain enormity in all this. The twentieth century was indeed the Jewish century because Jews and Jewish organizations were intimately and decisively involved in its most important events. Slezkine's greatest accomplishment is to set the historical record straight on the importance of Jews in the Bolshevik Revolution and its aftermath, but he doesn't focus on the huge repercussions of the Revolution, repercussions that continue to shape the world of the twenty-first century. In fact, for long after the Revolution, conservatives throughout Europe and the United States believed that Jews were responsible for Communism and for the Bolshevik Revolution.⁷¹ The Jewish role in leftist political movements was a common source of anti-Jewish attitudes among a great many intellectuals and political figures. In Germany, the identification of Jews and Bolshevism was widespread in the middle classes and was a critical part of the National Socialist view of the world. As historian Ernst Nolte has noted, for middle-class Germans, "the experience of the Bolshevik revolution in Germany was so immediate, so close to home, and so disquieting, and statistics seemed to prove the overwhelming participation of Jewish ringleaders so irrefutably," that even many liberals believed in Jewish responsibility.⁷² Jewish involvement in the horrors of Communism was also an important sentiment in Hitler's desire to destroy the USSR and in the anti-Jewish actions of the German National Socialist government. Jews and Jewish organizations were also important forces in inducing the Western democracies to side with Stalin rather than Hitler in World War II.

The victory over National Socialism set the stage for the tremendous increase in Jewish power in the post-World War II Western world, in the end more than compensating for the decline of Jews in the Soviet Union. As Slezkine shows, the children of Jewish immigrants assumed an elite position in the United States, just as they had in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe and Germany prior to World War II. This new-found power facilitated the establishment of Israel, the transformation of the United States and other Western nations in the direction of multiracial, multicultural societies via large-scale non-white immigration, and the consequent decline in European demographic and cultural preeminence.⁷³ The critical Jewish role in Communism has been sanitized, while Jewish victimization by the Nazis has achieved the status of a moral touchstone and is a prime weapon in the push for massive non-European immigration, multiculturalism, and advancing other Jewish causes.

The Jewish involvement in Bolshevism has therefore had an enormous effect on recent European and American history. It is certainly true that Jews would have attained elite status in the United States with or without their prominence in the Soviet Union. However, without the Soviet Union as a shining beacon of a land freed of official anti-Semitism where Jews had attained elite status in a

stunningly short period, the history of the United States would have been very different. The persistence of Jewish radicalism influenced the general political sensibility of the Jewish community and had a destabilizing effect on American society, ranging from the paranoia of the McCarthy era, to the triumph of the 1960s countercultural revolution, to the conflicts over immigration and multiculturalism that are so much a part of the contemporary political landscape.⁷⁴

It is Slezkine's chief contention that the history of the twentieth century was a history of the rise of the Jews in the West, in the Middle East, and in Russia, and ultimately their decline in Russia. I think he is absolutely right about this. If there is any lesson to be learned, it is that Jews not only became an elite in all these areas, they became a hostile elite – hostile to traditional peoples and cultures of all three areas they came to dominate. Until now, the greatest human tragedies have occurred in the Soviet Union, but Israel's record as an oppressive and expansive occupying power in the Middle East has made it a pariah among the vast majority of the governments of the world. And Jewish hostility toward the European-derived people and culture of the United States has been a consistent feature of Jewish political behavior and attitudes throughout the twentieth century. In the present, this normative Jewish hostility toward the traditional population and culture of the United States remains a potent motivator of Jewish involvement in the transformation of the U.S. into a non-European society.⁷⁵

Given this record of Jews as a hostile but very successful elite, I doubt that the continued demographic and cultural dominance of Western European peoples will be retained either in Europe or the United States and other Western societies without a decline in Jewish influence. (Perhaps more obviously, the same might be said vis-à-vis the Palestinians and other Arab peoples in the Middle East.) The lesson of the Soviet Union (and Spain from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries) is that Jewish influence does wax and wane. Unlike the attitudes of the utopian ideologies of the twentieth century, there is no end to history.

*Kevin MacDonald is Professor of Psychology, California State University - Long Beach, and the author of a trilogy on Judaism as an evolutionary strategy: **A People That Shall Dwell Alone** (1994), **Separation and Its Discontents** (1998), and **The Culture of Critique** (1998), all published by Praeger 1994–1998. A revised edition of **The Culture of Critique** (2002), with an expanded introduction, is available in a quality soft cover edition from www.1stBooks.com or www.amazon.com.*

REFERENCES

- Abrams, E. (1997). *Faith or Fear: How Jews Can Survive in a Christian America*. New York: The Free Press.
- Bendersky, J. (2000). *The "Jewish Threat."* New York: Basic Books.

- Benjamin, W. (1968). *Illuminations*, trans. H. Zohn. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Bereczkei, T. (1993). R-selected reproductive strategies among Hungarian Gypsies: A Preliminary Analysis. *Ethology and Sociobiology* 14:71-88
- Churchill, W. (1920). Zionism versus Bolshevism: A struggle for the soul of the Jewish people. *Illustrated Sunday Herald*, February 8, 5.
- Coughlin, R. J. (1960). *Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern Thailand*. Hong Kong and London: Hong Kong University Press and Oxford University Press.
- Courtois, S. (1999). Introduction: The crimes of Communism. In S. Courtois, N. Werth, J. Panné, A. Paczkowski, K. Bartosek, and J. Margolin, (1999). *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression*, trans. J. Murphy and M. Kramer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Cvorovic, J. (2004). Sexual and Reproductive Strategies among Serbian Gypsies. *Population and Environment* 25: 217-242.
- Davies, N. (1981). *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ediev, D. (2001). Application of the Demographic Potential Concept to Understanding the Russian Population History and Prospects: 1897-2100. *Demographic Research*, 4, 287-333.
- Hagen, W. W. (1996). Before the "final solution": Toward a comparative analysis of political anti-Semitism in interwar Germany and Poland. *Journal of Modern History* 68:351-381.
- Kellogg, M. (2005). *The Russian Roots of Nazism: White Émigrés and the Making of National Socialism, 1917-1945*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Kostyrchenko, G. (1995). *Out of the Red Shadows: Anti-Semitism in Stalin's Russia*. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
- Kotkin, J. (2002). The Christian right, conservatism, and the Jews. *The Jewish Journal of Greater Los Angeles*, June 6. <http://www.joelkotkin.com/Religion/TJJ%20The%20Christian%20Right%20Conservatism%20and%20the%20Jews.htm>
- Lindemann, A. S. (1997). *Esau's Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lipset, S. M. (1988). *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in Social Structures*, rev. ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. (Originally published in 1968 and 1970.)
- MacDonald, K. B. (1994/2002). *A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism As a Group Evolutionary Strategy, with Diaspora Peoples*. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse. Reprint of the 1994 book with a section on other diaspora peoples.
- MacDonald, K. B. (1998/2002). *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements*. Paperback edition of the 1998 Praeger edition, with a new preface. Bloomington, IN: 1stbooks Library.
- MacDonald, K. B. (1998/2004). *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism*. Paperback edition of the 1998 Praeger edition, with a new preface. Bloomington, IN: 1stbooks Library.
- MacDonald, K. B. (2002). What Makes Western Culture Unique? *The Occidental Quarterly* 2(2): 8-38.
- MacDonald, K. B. (2004). *Understanding Jewish Influence: A Study in Ethnic Activism*. Augusta, GA: Washington Summit Press.

- Mahler, R. (1985). *Hasidism and the Jewish Enlightenment: Their Confrontation in Galicia and Poland in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America.
- Mayer, A. J. (1988). *Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? The "Final Solution" in History*. New York: Pantheon.
- Mosse, G. L. (1970). *Germans and Jews: The Right, the Left, and the Search for a "Third Force" in Pre-Nazi Germany*. New York: Howard Fertig.
- Mundill, R. R. (1998). *England's Jewish Solution: Experiment and Expulsion, 1262-1290*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nolte, E. (1965). *Three Faces of Fascism*, trans. L. Vennowitz. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Novick, P. (1999). *The Holocaust in American Life*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Ruppin, A. (1973). *The Jews in the Modern World*. London: Macmillan. (Reprinted by Arno Press, 1973.)
- Schatz, J. (1991). *The Generation: The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Shafarevich, I. (1989). Russophobia. *Nash Sovremennik* (Moscow) (June and November):167-192. Trans. *JPRS-UPA-90-115* (March 22, 1990):2-37.
- Shahak, I. (1994). *Jewish History, Jewish Religion: The Weight of Three Thousand Years*. Boulder, CO: Pluto Press.
- Shahak, I., and Mezvinsky, N. (1999). *Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel*. London: Pluto Press.
- Slezkine, Y. (2004) *The Jewish Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Soloveichik, M. Y. (2003). The virtue of hate. *First Things* 129: 41-46. <http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0302/articles/soloveichik.html>
- Steinlight, S. (2001). *The Jewish Stake in America's Changing Demography: Reconsidering a Misguided Immigration Policy*. Washington, DC: Center for Immigration Studies.
- Stocking, G. W. (1968). *Race, Evolution, and Culture: Essays in the History of Anthropology*. New York: Free Press.
- Stone, R. (1992). Random Samples. *Science* 257: 743.
- Subtelny, O. (1988). *Ukraine: A History*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Szajkowski, K. (1974). *Jews, Wars, and Communism: The Impact of the 1919-1920 Red Scare on American Jewish Life*. New York: KTAV Publishing.
- Vaksberg, A. (1994). *Stalin against the Jews*, trans. A. W. Bouis. New York: Knopf.
- Vital, D. (1975). *The Origins of Zionism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Weyl, N., and W. Marina (1971). *American Statesmen on Slavery and the Negro*. New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House.

ENDNOTES

1. In Nolte 1965, 406. See Kellogg (2005) for an account of the interactions and influence of White Russian émigrés on the National Socialist Movement in Germany.
2. See MacDonald 2004, 9-37, for a review of Jewish psychological traits related to ethnic activism.
3. MacDonald 1994/2002, 1998/2004.

4. See MacDonald 1994/2002, preface to the first paperback edition.
5. Bereczkei 1993; Cvorovic 2004.
6. See discussion in MacDonald 1994/2002, preface to the first paperback edition.
7. Coughlin 1960, 169.
8. MacDonald 1994/2002.
9. Davies 1981, 444; see also Subtelny 1988, 124.
10. This was also noted by Lindemann 1997.
11. Vaksberg 1994, 49.
12. See discussion in MacDonald 1998/2002, ch. 3.
13. In Kostyrchenko 1995, 272; italics in text.
14. MacDonald 1994/2002, Ch. 5; 1998/2004, Introduction to the first paperback edition.
15. Mundill 1998, 249ff.
16. In Kellogg 2005, 41.
17. In Kellogg 2005, 37.
18. MacDonald 1998/2004.
19. MacDonald 1994/2002; 1998/2004.
20. MacDonald 2004, 39–64.
21. Novick 1999; see summary in MacDonald 1998/2002, preface to the first paperback edition.
22. MacDonald 1998/2002.
23. See Bendersky 2000.
24. MacDonald 2002.
25. Ruppin 1973, 339.
26. Mosse 1970, 52–53.
27. In Lindemann 1997, 138–139. Similar complaints were common in Austria (op cit., 193).
28. MacDonald 1998/2002, *passim*.
29. Benjamin 1968, 262.
30. See MacDonald 1998/2002 for discussion of these issues.
31. In Kostyrchenko 1995, 237.
32. The composition of the board of the Bolshoi is given in Kostyrchenko 1995, 15.
33. In Kostyrchenko 1995, 171
34. MacDonald 1998/2004, ch. 9; 1998/2002, ch. 3.
35. Weyl and Marina 1971. For example, “The American Negro was deemed [by a national consensus of opinion from George Washington to the end of World War I] an alien presence in American society who could not be assimilated without destroying or largely impairing the homogeneity and national cohesion of the Republic” (377).
36. See MacDonald 2004, 65–127 for a discussion of the ethnic identity of Jewish neoconservatives.
37. See MacDonald 2004, 65–127.
38. MacDonald 1998/2002, ch. 3.
39. Stocking 1968, 149.
40. MacDonald 1998/2002, ch. 2.
41. See MacDonald 1998/2002, ch. 3.

42. Schatz 1991, 37–38.
43. Schatz 1991, 48.
44. Hagen 1996.
45. MacDonald 1998/2002, ch. 3.
46. See also MacDonald 1998/2004, ch. 2, note 23.
47. MacDonald 2004, ch. 2.
48. See also Vital 1975, 46.
49. Mahler 1985, 16.
50. MacDonald 1998/2002.
51. See MacDonald 2004, 9–37; 1998/2002, chs. 1 and 3.
52. Lindemann 1997, 433.
53. See MacDonald 2004, 65–127.
54. Mikhail Beizer, quoted in Slezkine, 176.
55. Churchill 1920.
56. MacDonald 1998/2002, preface to the first paperback edition and ch. 3.
57. The *Jewish Encyclopedia* (http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/table.jsp?table_id=427&volume=11&title=STATISTICS;) estimates that Jews constituted 3.29% of the population of the Russian Empire circa 1900, and Slezkine (p. 217) provides data on the Jewish population of Soviet cities before and after the Revolution. Ediev (2001, 294) estimates the population of Russia at around 90 million around the time of the Bolshevik Revolution.
58. The estimate of the number of deaths caused by Communism in the USSR is from Cortois (1999, 4).
59. MacDonald 1998/2002, preface to the first paperback edition.
60. In Schatz 1991, 272.
61. MacDonald 1998/2002.
62. See discussion in MacDonald 1998/2002, preface to the first paperback edition.
63. Schatz 1991, 119
64. Mahler 1985; Shahak 1994; Shahak and Mezvinsky 1999.
65. Shafarevich 1989. The NAS asked Shafarevich to resign his position in the academy but he refused (see *Science* 257 [1992]: 743).
66. Lipset 1988, 393.
67. MacDonald 1998/2004, Ch. 2; MacDonald 1998/2002, ch. 1 and preface to the first paperback edition; MacDonald 2004, 9–37; Soloveichik 2003.
68. Kotkin 2002.
69. Abrams 1997, 188.
70. Steinlight 2001.
71. Bendersky 2000; Mayer 1988; Nolte 1965; Szajkowski 1974.
72. Nolte 1965, 331
73. The detailed version of this argument is in MacDonald 1998/2002, preface to the first paperback edition.
74. MacDonald 1998/2002.
75. MacDonald 1998/2002; 2004, 9–37.

THE ROLE OF JEWS IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1948

SAM DAVIDSON

OVERVIEW

The chief aim of this work is to increase our understanding of the downfall of White South Africa and especially the seemingly all-pervasive role of the Jews, particularly in the post-1948 period. The history of modern South Africa can be viewed as a history of group competition. More specifically it is a history that has been dominated by the competition of *ethnic* groups. For that reason this work begins by exploring *apartheid* as a White, and specifically Afrikaner, group strategy. This work then explores the role of the Jews in the anti-apartheid movement and particularly within the opposition parties, the media, the Communist Party, and among the Black African nationalists.

This work challenges a rising cacophony of voices alleging that the West, and Whites in particular, have committed "suicide." Whether it's Paul Gottfried's "decaying Protestantism,"¹ or Eric Kaufmann's "liberal Anglo-Protestant elites, in conjunction with pro-immigration business interests,"² the message seems to be the same: Whites have done this to ourselves with little outside influence. Likewise Ilana Mercer alleged that "White Protestant societies don't just die: they either wither from within."³ Or, like South Africa, they are finished off by other White Protestant societies."

The reality is more complex. This work challenges any "verdict" that White ethnic groups have "committed suicide."

¹ Paul Gottfried, "America's National Question Problem: Decaying Protestantism..." VDARE. Com, February 3, 2001.

http://www.vdare.com/gottfried/decay_Protestantism.htm

² Eric Kaufmann, *The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

³ Ilana Mercer, "Why Do White Protestant Societies Wither? South Africa as a Case Study." VDARE.com, January 26, 2011.

http://www.vdare.com/mercer/110126_south_africa.htm

The problem with such assertions of 'White guilt' is that White ethnic groups have in the past had powerful group identities and created social controls to maintain them. This was especially true in the case of South Africa. Further, how can it be "suicide" if indeed the Jews, who never belonged to a 'White' ethnic group, played a prominent role?

Unsurprisingly, the voices accusing Whites of bearing sole responsibility share one thing in common: they are almost always Jewish. If one recognizes the large role that Jewish groups have played in sabotaging of White society and delegitimizing its very right to exist, it becomes clear that Jewish individuals do indeed have a powerful incentive to downplay their own collective responsibility.

THE AFRIKANERS ASSUME CONTROL.

The National Party's electoral victory of 1948 swept aside the English-speaking elite and initiated a half-century of Afrikaner leadership. The Afrikaner people went from a largely rural and blue-collar population to one that swiftly assumed leadership over all of South Africa. But this ethnic leadership did not go unchallenged.

The stakes for control of South Africa were high. As of 1981, this moderately sized nation possessed 86% of the world's reserves of platinum group metals, 83% of chrome ore reserves, 64% of vanadium reserves, 49% of gold reserves, 48% manganese ore reserves, and 17% of uranium reserves. These percentages, combined with those of the former Soviet Union, formed nearly the entire world's reserves of platinum group metals, vanadium, and manganese ore.⁴

The National Party, as already mentioned, was largely a political vehicle of the Afrikaner people. Its rise to power was preceded by the work of a private society known as the Broederbond which worked towards the expansion of Afrikaner influence. As noted by Alexander Steward,

the National party is unlike democratic parties elsewhere which speak for sections of the electorate or are motivated by particular social or economic goals. The National party is the *volk* in political action. The allegiance of the Afrikaner to his party is thus different from that of the Tory or Socialist or Liberal to his in Brit-

⁴ L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 195.

ain, or of the Republican or Democratic to his in the United States. The party is not the instrument of the government or the parliamentary caucus or the professionals. It belongs to the *volk*: and unity does not come from monolithic regimentation or imperative blueprints, but from individual participation in the common cause of promoting the interests of Afrikanerdom. The party is not judged by its members against success or failure in reaching specific objectives: the touchstone is the well-being of the *volk*: and while that is being served, specific objectives may be revised, altered or abandoned.⁵

The Afrikaners, it will be argued, were pursuing a group strategy. Most simply they did so by engaging in "separation between themselves and other groups."⁶ Further, they developed a "minimalization of conflicts of interest within the group."⁷ In establishing various laws regarding marriage, residency, and political affiliation, they had also established effective group controls on individual behavior.⁸

Despite this legislation, South Africa did not function as a new "Reich," as Jewish critics would later accuse.⁹ Apartheid critic Helen Suzman recalled, "It is perhaps ironic that a government as authoritarian as that of the National Party had a deeply rooted respect for the parliamentary system which provided me with a forum to challenge their policies and elicit information"¹⁰ And regarding Jews, apart from pre-apartheid immigration quotas enacted in the 1930s, "...there was no legislative discrimination against them."¹¹

The Afrikaners enjoyed the privileges of being White that had long been a part of South Africa. However, at the end of the Second World War approximately 73% of Afrikaners were in blue-collar occupations,

⁵ Alexander Steward, *The World, the West, and Pretoria* (New York: David McKay Co., 1977), 73.

⁶ Kevin MacDonald, *A People that Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy*. (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse. Reprint of the 1994 book published by Praeger [Westport, CT, 1994]), 10.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁹ Brian Bunting, *The Rise of the South African Reich* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969).

¹⁰ Helen Suzman, *In No Uncertain Terms* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1993), 2.

¹¹ Joanna Strangwayes-Booth, *A Cricket in the Thorn Tree: Helen Suzman and the Progressive Party of South Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976), 32.

manual labor, or agriculture while only 27% were in white-collar occupations.¹² In 1939, it was estimated that Afrikaner control of commerce, mining, finance, and industry was only 8%, 1%, 5%, and 3%, respectively.¹³

The social and economic standing of Afrikaners would change tremendously under apartheid. Following their political victory, the Afrikaners began a campaign of lifting their people out of blue-collar occupations and rural poverty. By 1977, the percentage of Afrikaners in White-collar occupations had risen to 65.2%.¹⁴ By 1964, Afrikaner control of Commerce, Mining, Finance, and Industry had increased to 28%, 10%, 14%, and 10% respectively.¹⁵ By 1975, 20.8% of private businesses (excluding farms), 18% of mines, and 38% of all posts in the professions were in Afrikaner hands. The Afrikaner insurance group Sanlam was now challenging the Anglo-American Corporation as the most powerful company in South Africa.¹⁶ The civil service, long the exclusive domain of English-speakers, had by the 1970s become 90% Afrikaans.¹⁷

It was during this new period of Afrikaner leadership that the word *apartheid* became well-known. Many of the policies attributed to apartheid had in fact predated the term and were employed long prior to the National Party takeover. For instance, interracial marriages between Europeans and Black Africans had long been illegal in South Africa. During apartheid this would be expanded to apply to any a marriage between White and non-White.¹⁸

Other legislation, such as the Group Areas Act of 1950, could also be seen in the context of appeasing poor Whites. This policy set aside areas of "residence, occupation, and trade" along racial lines. Its immediate purpose was to buy the vote of working-class Whites who often lived in racially mixed areas with coloreds, Blacks, and Asians.¹⁹

¹² Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, *From Apartheid to Nation-building: Contemporary South African Debates* (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1989), 31.

¹³ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 109.

¹⁴ Giliomee and Schlemmer, *From Apartheid to Nation-building*, 120.

¹⁵ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 109.

¹⁶ Brian Lapping, *Apartheid: A History* (London: Grafton, 1986), 164.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 105.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

But apartheid was meant to go further. Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, third Prime Minister of South Africa in the post-1948 period, articulated that apartheid's aim was to establish the total separation of races into their respective "homelands" over a period of decades. This would be complemented by a program of "separate development" within both White and Black areas that would make the system viable. He stated in the senate debates of 1948, "I want to state here unequivocally now...that South Africa is a White man's country and he must remain the master here. In the Reserves we are prepared to allow the natives to be the masters... But within the European areas we, the White people of South Africa, are and shall remain the masters."²⁰ His conception of separate development would enable Whites to retain, and even strengthen, their control within a majority of South Africa's territory.

Taking into account the importance of Black labor to South African industries, Prime Minister Verwoerd outlined three stages. In the first stage of apartheid the movement of Black labor into White areas would be allowed to continue, thereby supplying the demands of industry. The influx of Black labor would stop once these demands had been adequately "saturated." In the third stage, Whites would begin to replace Blacks as the primary source of labor in their respective areas and the Black population would be gradually repatriated into African homelands officially recognized by the South African government.²¹

In response to accusations that the policies of apartheid would be economically unsound, Minister of Labor B. J. Schoeman replied, "What is our first consideration? Is it to maintain the economic laws or is it to ensure the continued existence of the European race in this country?"²² But under Prime Minister Verwoerd, South Africa would achieve what some had called impossible. South Africa more than doubled its GNP and the economy was booming.²³ The manufacturing sector alone increased over six times between 1950 and 1970.²⁴

In 1961 it was argued that the colored South Africans, or mixed race persons, should be represented in parliament by coloreds themselves rather than Whites. On this issue Dr. Verwoerd believed that such

²⁰ Alexander Hepple, *Verwoerd*. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), 120.

²¹ *Ibid.* 224.

²² Suzman, *In No Uncertain Terms*, 37.

²³ James Hentz, *South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005), 25.

²⁴ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 18.

small concessions would pave the way to full racial integration. He argued, "It is easy for this generation to protect itself. It is easy during the course of the next ten or fifteen years by means of gradual concessions, to continue living as always in the past, making money and being prosperous and avoiding unrest. But what then? Are not the children who come after us worth more than ourselves? The question we must ask is, what will happen to South Africa afterwards?"²⁵

However, not all of Africa was experiencing such growth. In 1958 there were only three independent African states. By the end of 1961 there were 26. Some African countries ceased to have any government whatsoever. Entire areas that had formerly been productive European colonies were now sliding into chaos. In 1960 Verwoerd urged White South Africans to support his policies by warning that, "If we do not take this step now, we ourselves may possibly, but our children certainly, will experience all the suffering of the Whites who are being attacked in and driven out of one African territory after the other."²⁶

In the face of rising challenges to White inhabitants of Africa it became necessary for the Afrikaner-dominated National Party to issue appeals to the White population as a whole. In 1970 Whites comprised approximately 18% of the total population of South Africa. Of this, only 60% were Afrikaner.²⁷ At a 1961 party congress Dr. Verwoerd stated, "I see the National Party not as an Afrikaans party, whatever it might have been in the past. I see it as a party which stands for the preservation of the White man, of White government, in South Africa."²⁸ Indeed, the National Party would soon be winning landslide elections among the all-White electorate. In the 1977 general elections the National Party won 134 of the total 165 seats in parliament.²⁹

These "universalist" appeals would also extend somewhat to the non-White inhabitants of South Africa. The official line of the government was that apartheid, and more specifically "separate development", were the best option for all groups within South Africa. According to South African Minister of Information Dr. C. P. Mulder, South Africa had an exemplary record of "peaceful coexistence, stability, economic growth, and high standard of living." He further rea-

²⁵ Hepple, *Verwoerd*, 159.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 178.

²⁷ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 2.

²⁸ Lapping, *Apartheid: A History*, 136.

²⁹ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 111.

Davidson, "The Role of Jews in South Africa since 1948" 57

soned, "that is the reason why we have checkpoints on our borders, not to prevent people from breaking out, but to prevent people from illegally entering... I have never heard of free people voluntarily trying to slip into a police state..."³⁰

It should be noted that these claims were not empty rhetoric. Foreign Minister Eric Louw publicly argued that South African Blacks had been making steady gains under apartheid. Their rate of literacy had increased, larger percentages were enrolled in schools, and the Baragwanath Hospital serving the Black and colored residents of Johannesburg was the largest of its kind in Africa.³¹ All of this was noted in his speech to the U. N. On 11 October 1961. But these facts were too much for the U. N. Delegates to handle, and following his speech the U. N. Assembly voted to censure him. Israel supported the censure, one of only two "Western" states to do so.³²

The United Nations issued a resolution against South Africa in 1961. In October 1961 the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko declared, "Monstrous examples of the mockery of the most elementary human rights are to be found in the Republic of South Africa." South African Foreign Minister Eric Louw denounced the accusers of South Africa as themselves being dictatorships and one-party states.³³ In response to the mounting criticisms from abroad, Dr. Verwoerd stated, "The crux of the problem is whether it is more important to be in the good books of world opinion than it is to make up your own mind as to how best you can ensure your survival as a White race in this country?"³⁴

Despite foreign protests, Louw was correct. The consolidation of apartheid policies continued to benefit Black South Africans for years later. Real earnings for Blacks rose by 51. 3% from 1970 to 1976. In comparison, the real earnings of Whites rose by only 3. 8% during those same years.³⁵ The critics of apartheid were only too eager to ignore, and indeed censor, these inconvenient facts.

³⁰ South African Information Service, *Progress through Separate Development: South Africa in Peaceful Transition* (New York: South African Information Service, 1973), 33.

³¹ Eric H. Louw, *The Case for South Africa* (New York: Macfadden Books, 1963), 85.

³² Gideon Shimoni, *Community and Conscience: The Jews in Apartheid South Africa* (Hanover, N. H.: University Press of New England, 2003), 47.

³³ Louw, *The Case for South Africa*, 97.

³⁴ Hepple, *Verwoerd*, 192.

³⁵ Lapping, *Apartheid: A History*, 166.

This era was by many standards the high point of apartheid. It had been primarily Dr. Verwoerd who had, by the mid-1960s, developed apartheid into a coherent ideological system.³⁶ But the system was strongly challenged from certain sections and it is in this context that the Jewish population of South Africa must be introduced.

THE JEWS OF SOUTH AFRICA

The Jewish population of South Africa was descended largely from Lithuanian Jews, known as Litvaks. As early as 1911 the Jewish community in South Africa was highly urbanized, with approximately 90% of Jews living in urban areas.³⁷ Throughout most of the 20th century, South African Jews hovered between 2% and 4% of the White population. This was well under 1% of the South African population as a whole. In 1948 the Jewish population was estimated at 118,000.³⁸ Even in 1980 the Jewish population remained between 110,000 and 120,000 while the total population of the country grew from approximately 15 million to 25 million.³⁹

Jews arriving in South Africa had one clear advantage: they were White. In the presence of a Black African majority, the differences between Whites appeared marginal. As Helen Suzman's biographer noted, "Jews, by virtue of being White, were ... members of [the] ruling elite."⁴⁰ Indeed, Jews such as Suzman⁴¹ and anti-apartheid journalist Benjamin Pogrand⁴² were raised with Black servants in their childhood homes.

Jews were most prominent in the professional, managerial, and sales sectors of the economy. In 1970 the percentage of the Jewish population in each category was 24%, 23.1%, and 30.5% respectively. This represented 5.5%, 10.6%, and 10.7% of the White population in each sector.⁴³ Some of the nation's most important businesses were

³⁶ Giliomee and Schlemmer, *From Apartheid to Nation-building*, 59.

³⁷ Gideon Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience (1910-1967)* (Cape Town and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 61.

³⁸ Howard Sachar, *A History of the Jews in the Modern World* (New York: Knopf, 2005), 667.

³⁹ Mendel Kaplan, *Jewish Roots in the South African Economy* (Cape Town: C. Struik, 1986), 390.

⁴⁰ Strangways-Booth, *A Cricket in the Thorn Tree*, 32.

⁴¹ Suzman, *In No Uncertain Terms*, 8.

⁴² Benjamin Pogrand, *War of Words: Memoir of a South African Journalist* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2000), 33.

⁴³ Kaplan, *Jewish Roots in the South African Economy*, 391.

either owned or administrated by Jews including the Premier Milling Group, Anglo American Corporation, and the Liberty Life insurance company.⁴⁴

The Jewish community was also extremely Zionist. Its contributions to Keren Hayesod, the central fundraising organization of Israel, were per capita second only to the United States.⁴⁵ Even South African Communist leader Joe Slovo remembered that his community "tended to combine a passionate devotion to the Soviet Union with Zionism and vicious racism towards the majority of the South African population."⁴⁶ The Habonim, a Zionist youth movement, was quite active in South Africa.

For the most part, the Jewish community voted for mainstream liberals. In 1974 Jews voted 51% for the Progressive Party, a left-liberal party that opposed apartheid, 35.7% for the United Party, and only 12.5% for the National Party. As years went by the United Party decreased in power due to challenges from both left and right with multiple party splits.⁴⁷ By the late 1970s the party had disbanded completely.

JEW IN THE OPPOSITION PARTIES

The legal opposition to apartheid came originally from the left wing of the United Party. In 1954 political columnist Neels Natte noted the high proportion of "foreign names" in the left wing of the party such as Woolf, Miller, Bielski, Weiss, Nestadt, Einstein, Emdin, Taurrog, Kowarsky, Meyer, Eppel, Fisher, and Sive.⁴⁸ In 1959 this faction split to form the Progressive Party. Among those who led the split from the United Party was Bernard Friedman, a United Party MP. Friedman campaigned as an independent after resigning his positions in 1955, losing his re-election to another Jewish candidate. Friedman played an active role in the 1959 party split.

For over a decade the sole parliamentary opposition to South Africa's apartheid policies was Progressive Party MP Helen Suzman. She was a graduate of Witwatersrand University where she had studied economics. In her autobiography she mentions influential professors

⁴⁴ Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, 194.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁶ Joe Slovo, *Slovo, the Unfinished Autobiography* (New York: Ocean Press, 1997), 37.

⁴⁷ Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, 126.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 229.

such as Hansi Pollak, Julius Lewin, and Herbert Frankel — all Jews. Frankel provided her with a tutorship at the university upon her graduation. Among her students was the future Communist leader Joe Slovo.⁴⁹

In 1953 Suzman was quite unexpectedly phoned by Dr. Reggie Sidelisky to run for election in an unopposed parliamentary seat on behalf of the United Party.⁵⁰ In office she was informed that Harry Oppenheimer, chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, was “interested in getting the so-called ‘liberal wing’ of the United Party activated.”⁵¹ After winning her seat, Suzman used the position to publicly criticize the South African government and its policies — frequently demanding better treatment of political prisoners and voting against proposed apartheid legislation.

As mentioned by Suzman, Harry Oppenheimer had used his influence to build up the left-wing of the United Party before the split. He would come to play an “important role behind the scenes in the United Party.”⁵² After the death of his father, Harry Oppenheimer became Chairman of Anglo American Corporation in 1957. In 1961 he gave open support to the Progressives by stating, “the best thing you can do is vote progressive.”⁵³

At first glance the splitting of the United Party appeared to be a setback for anti-apartheid groups. Were not the left-liberals weaker having divided themselves from the United Party? Suzman explained herself in 1960, “We have made the break not to split the opposition but indeed to become the only opposition.”⁵⁴ In effect, by identifying themselves as the sole legitimate opposition to the Nationalist Party, the Progressives under Friedman and Suzman could seize a monopoly on the political opposition, shifting it in whatever direction they chose. It would now be Suzman, not the United Party, who would enjoy the support of foreign sympathizers such as Robert Kennedy. In 1966, he wrote a letter of support to Suzman in which he stated, “You are an inspiration to all of us.”⁵⁵

⁴⁹ Suzman, *In No Uncertain Terms*, 12.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁵² Strangwayes-Booth, *A Cricket in the Thorn Tree*, 140.

⁵³ *Ibid.* 197.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 166.

⁵⁵ Suzman, *In No Uncertain Terms*, 120.

Davidson, "The Role of Jews in South Africa since 1948" 61

In 1950 the Group Areas Act was passed. In basic terms it established residential areas for the various racial groups of South Africa.⁵⁶ Years later Helen Suzman received a phone call from a White constituent informing her that an Indian family had moved into their neighborhood. This was completely illegal under the Group Areas Act and the constituent told Suzman take action. Suzman, replied, "And I tell you, sir, that you are a racist. And I must also tell you that I have agreed to support your neighbor's application to remain where she is."⁵⁷

In 1962 Suzman addressed a seminar at Columbia University and recognized one of her former students, Eduardo Mondlane. He informed her that he had been teaching at Syracuse University but was "going back to Mozambique to drive the Portuguese out of there." He then added, "I will go to South Africa to drive the Whites out of there too." Far from denouncing him as a racist, she quite simply replied, "Not so easy."⁵⁸

Politician Harry Schwarz helped create the Mahlabatini Declaration of Faith in 1974 which led to another party split in 1975. Schwarz then left the United Party and founded the Reform Party. It soon merged with Suzman's Progressive Party and became the Progressive Reform Party.⁵⁹ The remainder of the United Party simply disbanded. The 'liberalistic left wing' of the former United Party then became virtually the only legal opposition to apartheid.

As seen earlier, the Jews had played a large role in left-wing circles that formed the early Progressive Party. They also predominated in the Party's later years. In 1986 for instance, sixteen of their representatives on the Johannesburg City Council as well as the mayor were Jewish. As many as nineteen out of thirty-eight Progressive Party candidates in the country's 1977 municipal elections were Jewish.⁶⁰

Despite these limited successes, Jews were never a numerically large population within South Africa, and their possibilities for direct political organization were thus limited. In fact, the percentage of Jews within the total population was relatively shrinking over the years but remained stable in absolute terms. In 1960 Jews comprised 3.7 per

⁵⁶ Bunting, *The Rise of the South African Reich*, 145.

⁵⁷ Suzman, *In No Uncertain Terms*, 241.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* 12.

⁵⁹ Shimoni, *The Case for South Africa*, 125.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 127.

cent of the White population. In 1970 this fell to 3.1 percent and in 1980 fell further to 2.6%.⁶¹ However, other factors would amplify Jewish influence considerably.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN CULTURE OF CRITIQUE

South Africans were confused by the negative reaction to their country in America and Europe." It is strange to find a mass of distortions about South Africa and its racial policy in Europe" wrote Dr. A. B. Du Preez. Why would the West condemn South Africa? It was one of the West's staunchest anti-Communist allies. But, Dr. A. B. Du Preez began to uncover the truth when he found "time and again when the sources are probed, that the information is based on British newspaper reports." He continued, "It transpired also that these false and misleading reports originated from South Africa itself."⁶²

But the negative reports were also coming from a specific part of the South African press: the English-language press. Jan Burger noted, "Whenever the plight of Natives is brought to their notice, the English-language press, true to their tradition of fighting for the underdog, take up the cudgels on their behalf. This does not happen in the Afrikaans Press."⁶³ It cannot be stressed enough how hostile the English-language press was to South Africa. In 1957, South African Prime Minister Strijdom "described the English-language press as South Africa's greatest enemy."⁶⁴ Even supporters of South Africa had to rely upon reports originating in the highly critical English-language press of South Africa.⁶⁵

The role of the English-language press would play a huge role in shaping world opinion of South Africa and its policies. As David Harrison wrote,

For years the English newspapers had chronicled the errors and abuses of Apartheid; for years they had backed the parliamentary opposition, giving them a hearing far beyond their numbers. Since most visitors, tourists, businessmen, politicians and journalists were unable to read Afrikaans, many of the impres-

⁶¹ Kaplan, *Jewish Roots in the South African Economy*, 390.

⁶² A. B. Du Preez, *Inside the South African Crucible* (Kapaapstad, RSA: H. A. U. M., 1959), 15.

⁶³ Jan Burger, *The Gulf Between* (Cape Town: H. Timmins, 1960), 61.

⁶⁴ Poggrund, *War of Words*, 90.

⁶⁵ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 259.

Davidson, "The Role of Jews in South Africa since 1948" 63

sions they carried away with them were those they found in the English press.⁶⁶

By 1973 plans had been made by members of the South African government to establish pro-South African newspapers in English. The covert effort was an attempt to build better relations with foreign countries that had been turned against South Africa. A major scandal erupted when this effort was exposed.⁶⁷ Prime Minister Vorster and others were implicated in the scandal and forced to step down.

But who owned the English-language press of South Africa? Surprisingly, it was largely owned and controlled by Jews. South African journalist Irwin Manoim stated in a 1995 interview,

The interesting thing is that the media in this town was originally Jewish. The Argus Company was started by a Jew called Saul Solomon and the Rand Daily Mail by a Jew called Freeman Cohen. I know all this because I did my Master's degree on the history of journalism in South Africa. A key period during the 1930s was when Isidore Schlesinger started a rival company to take on Argus. Schlesinger ran the media in South Africa – cinema, music; he was our local approximation of those three Jews who have just taken over America – Spielberg, Katzenberg and Geffen."⁶⁸

Indeed, it is difficult to find information on South Africa's anti-apartheid movement without consulting Jewish sources. At one point, the Argus Group controlled 17 of 20 English-language newspapers. It was owned by Anglo American.⁶⁹ Many of these sources are quite congratulatory on the role of the Jewish press in undermining South Africa's security and public image. In Richard Pollak's work on the role of the press in South Africa he accuses the state-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation of being "a one-channel propaganda machine." Meanwhile, he lauds the Jewish newspapers in their effort to "stand almost alone between the Afrikaner government and

⁶⁶ David Harrison, *The White Tribe of Africa: South Africa in Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 230.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 239.

⁶⁸ Immanuel Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain: Interviews with South African Jewish Activists* (New York: Viking, 1997), 151.

⁶⁹ Stefan Kanfer, *The Last Empire* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1993), 294.

totalitarian darkness."⁷⁰ The government-controlled television corporation, says Pollak, was a "cyclops of the state" offering "one part news to three parts propaganda."⁷¹

As early as 1897 South African Olive Schreiner had written a "screed disguised as a novel" titled *Trooper Peter Halket of Mashonaland*. The purpose of the novel was to portray European, especially British, imperialism in Africa under Cecil Rhodes as the rule of blood-thirsty tyrants. This novel was to become the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of the British anti-imperialist movement.⁷² Although Stefan Kanfer identified Schreiner as having Jewish origins, her father was a Lutheran convert from Germany and her precise ethnic background seems unclear. It is clear, however, that Jewish activists later promoted her work. Olive Schreiner's biography would be co-written by Ruth First, the daughter of South African Communist Party treasurer Julius First.

Ms. First was a contributor to *The Guardian*, a South African newspaper. It would become "a central part of the liberation movement" in South Africa.⁷³ Among its contributors were, besides First, Brian Bunting, Michael Harmel, and Lionel Forman.⁷⁴ The four-page editorials were written by Jack Simons.⁷⁵ In contrast to this large Jewish presence at the paper, the first editor-in-chief was journalist Betty Radford. She was the wife of George Sacks who had helped found the paper with Ray Alexander.⁷⁶ Much of the *Guardian's* support came from Jewish traders and shopkeepers who provided the paper's initial funding.⁷⁷ The *Guardian* would appear under various names until it was finally banned in 1963. It was "the sole newspaper allied with the African National Congress."⁷⁸

Nadine Gordimer, who had written the foreword to a later edition of Ruth First's biography of Olive Schreiner, would criticize apartheid in her own novels. Born to Jewish parents, she was awarded the 1991

⁷⁰ Richard Pollak, *Up Against Apartheid: The Role and the Plight of the Press in South Africa* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1981), 2.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁷² Kanfer, *The Last Empire*, 146.

⁷³ James Zug, *The Guardian: The History of South Africa's Extraordinary Anti-apartheid Newspaper* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007), 2.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

Nobel Prize in Literature in part for "taking the question of the justification of the privileges of White people – even benevolent White people – to its extreme."⁷⁹

For years the policies of apartheid were challenged by the *Rand Daily Mail*. Like virtually all of the English-language press in South Africa, it was owned by the Anglo American Corporation, controlled by the Oppenheimer family.⁸⁰ As the years went on the *Rand Daily Mail* suffered from declining White readership due to its highly critical stance on South African apartheid.⁸¹ As anti-apartheid activist Gill Marcus articulated in an interview, "You need to create a societal norm, or community norm, that reinforces the right to take positions that are not necessarily popular."⁸²

Editor Laurence Gandar would be chosen lead the *Mail* in a campaign against apartheid. Surprisingly, Gandar was a soft-spoken man, shy and reserved. Many on the staff of the *Rand Daily Mail* attributed this to a kind of 'coldness' from Mr. Gandar.⁸³ He was not viewed in any way as a "courageous visionary" set upon launching a campaign against South African apartheid. Gandar had been recruited from the public relations department of the Anglo-American Corporation. When *Mail* journalist Benjamin Pogrund told Anglo-American Chairman Harry Oppenheimer about Gandar's plan to launch an anti-apartheid campaign, Oppenheimer commented, "Oh, is Laurie going to show some courage?"⁸⁴ Interestingly, like Betty Radford, Gandar was another non-Jew heading a paper largely owned and staffed by Jews.

Benjamin Pogrund was one of the more notable journalists working for the *Rand Daily Mail*. Highly conscious of his Jewishness, Pogrund had been a member of the Habonim in his youth and maintained a strong Jewish identity.⁸⁵ He remembered his parents' friends had been exclusively Jewish with the exception of a few customers who stopped by their house. After graduating from university he was attracted to

⁷⁹ Nobel Prize press release.

http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1991/press.html. Accessed 10 June 2011.

⁸⁰ Pogrund, *War of Words*, 58.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 93.

⁸² I. Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain*, 259.

⁸³ Pogrund, *War of Words*, 70.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 58.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 32.

the liberal disposition of the *Rand Daily Mail* and convinced his friend, American journalist Hank Margolies, to secure an interview via one of his contacts on the staff. Margolies “delivered an embarrassingly flattering spiel” despite knowing very little about Pogrund.⁸⁶

In 1960 Pogrund highlighted police brutality in his coverage of the so-called Sharpeville Massacre. As thousands of protestors converged on a police station and hurled stones, South African police opened fire and killed dozens. As he approached the area, Pogrund’s own vehicle came under attack from rioters and was forced off the road. Sharpeville proved to be a major embarrassment for South Africa. In Pogrund’s words, “a generation grew up identifying Sharpeville with apartheid repression.”⁸⁷

Pogrund and others at the *Rand Daily Mail* reprinted Helen Suzman’s parliamentary speeches in the paper. Through these efforts Suzman could reach “hundreds of thousands of South Africans.”⁸⁸ In a 1995 interview, Suzman explained her association with the press,

I was fed information by the newspapers, for example, which wasn't allowed to be quoted unless it came from parliament because of the constant States of Emergency, in which the press was stifled.⁸⁹ She also noted that, “of course my effectiveness in opposition was very much due to the support I got from the press. You know, if I had just been attacking these guys in parliament without anyone else knowing about it, it would have had no effect. But it had such wide publicity in the press.”⁹⁰

Another contributor to the *Rand Daily Mail* was Jewish-German émigré Franz Auerbach. In 1967 he wrote a criticism of the South African Prime Minister for the *Rand Daily Mail* titled “Vorster needs lessons in history.” Although he had intended to write under a pseudonym, the editor accidentally identified him by name. Under South African law it was illegal to “express oneself as a government worker on a party-political matter in the public press.” Auerbach was fined R100. Editor Laurence Gandar promptly gave Auerbach the money.⁹¹

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 128.

⁸⁹ I. Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain*, 435.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 437.

⁹¹ Franz Auerbach, *No Single Loyalty* (New York: Waxmann, 2002), 69.

Davidson, "The Role of Jews in South Africa since 1948" 67

In 1960, Auerbach authored a study that "showed how race prejudice was being inculcated by the educational system."⁹² One must wonder if this was inspired by the American study cited a few years earlier in *Brown v. Board of Education*, titled "Effects of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development." That study, unsurprisingly, had been commissioned by the American Jewish Committee.⁹³

In the late 1960s Anthony Jacob's book, *White Man, Think Again*, was published in South Africa. It included such statements as, "The Africans, of course, do not comprehend Anglo-Saxon ideals." Auerbach immediately contacted the Publication Controls Board and filed an application to have the book banned for bringing "all non-White inhabitants of South Africa into ridicule and contempt" – then illegal under the Publications and Entertainment Act of 1963. The Publications Act did not allow any publications 'harmful to the relations between any sections of the inhabitants of the Republic' including anti-Semitic writings.⁹⁴ The PCB complied with South African law and promptly banned the book. Although some of his colleagues had been against using the law to limit freedom of speech, Auerbach stated, "I believe there should be curbs on hate speech."⁹⁵

When the *Rand Daily Mail* was later threatened by a takeover by pro-government interests, Anglo-American Corporation created a protective trust which kept the *Mail* free from outside control. This was necessary due to the paper's declining income – a problem created both by its extremely hostile stance towards the government along with loss of advertising revenue to television. In return for the financial security bestowed by Harry Oppenheimer's economic empire, the *Rand Daily Mail* praised Oppenheimer for his "brilliant talents" and pleaded for him to reenter the South African parliament in "the wider interests of the country."⁹⁶

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The Communist Party of South Africa was a stalwart enemy of the Afrikaner government. The first years of Afrikaner rule in South Africa began with a series of legislation including the Suppression of

⁹² Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, 191.

⁹³ Matthew Berger, "Jews Note Role in Historic School Case." (JewishJournal.com 13 May 2004. Accessed 27 May 2011).

⁹⁴ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 27.

⁹⁵ Auerbach, *No Single Loyalty*, 65.

⁹⁶ Kanfer, 350.

Communism Act in 1950. The Communist Party, riding high on the expansion of Communist parties around the world following the Second World War, was caught by surprise. It promptly disbanded itself and began forming underground cells.⁹⁷

At the time of its dissolution the Communist Party was not a mass organization, nor would it become one in later years. It was estimated that at the time of its banning there were 150 Whites, 250 Indians, and 1,600 Africans within the Party.⁹⁸ The White membership provided a majority of the leadership for the party for a combination of reasons. Many of the Communist “bosses” were often quite wealthy, had professional occupations, and owned large amounts of property, and were most often not Black Africans. It was “from their expensively furnished drawing rooms” where they “worked out a strategy for the African to follow.”⁹⁹ But who were these oddly affluent revolutionaries?

Like many other countries, the South African Communist Party had a predominately Jewish membership. For years the sole Communist MP was Sam Kahn.¹⁰⁰ One of the more popular Communist Party speakers was immigrant factory owner Solomon Buirski.¹⁰¹ During the Party’s underground period in the early 1960s Ben Turok was alleged to be managing the party’s finances.¹⁰² As Taffy Adler stated, “Jewish Communists, although they denied it, were very firmly Jewish.”¹⁰³

It could be argued that the Communist Party, just as the National Party had been, was a vehicle for ethnic interests. Most Jewish Communists married other Jews. The few exceptions such as Lionel Bernstein and Ronald Kasrils, had married White women. The adoption of “universalist” rhetoric and otherwise non-ethnic ideological platforms should not blind us to the fact that such power structures can often

⁹⁷ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 111.

⁹⁸ Martin Meredith, *Nelson Mandela: A Biography* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1997), 87.

⁹⁹ Jordan Ngubane, *An African Explains Apartheid* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 160.

¹⁰⁰ Pogrund, *War of Words*, 41.

¹⁰¹ Slovo, *Slovo*, 38.

¹⁰² U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, *The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa*, Hearing, March 22, 4, 25, 29, and 31, 1982, (Serial No. J-97-101). (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 532.

¹⁰³ I. Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain*, 9.

Davidson, "The Role of Jews in South Africa since 1948" 69

operate in a hegemonic and indirect fashion to serve ethnic interests.¹⁰⁴

In later years Joe Slovo would become the General Secretary of the SACP and Jack Simon would be recognized as the party's leading theorist.¹⁰⁵ Joe Slovo had first heard of communism from Dr. Max Joffe who frequented the boarding house Slovo lived in.¹⁰⁶ Slovo would later marry Ruth First, the daughter of Communist Party treasurer Julius First. Commenting on her parents' Jewishness, Shawn Slovo stated, "For both Ruth and Joe, the food they ate, the friends they had, their cultural interests, intellectual curiosity were all part of their Jewishness. We were brought up as atheists. But it's a cultural inheritance. And that's how Joe became a Communist, through his involvement with Jewish organizations."¹⁰⁷

The Communist Party, while numerically small, possessed several advantages that other groups in South Africa did not. For one, its mostly-Jewish leadership was recognized as White and thus it possessed all the opportunities available to other Whites in South Africa. This would in fact be quite crucial to the temporary success of subversive activities during the early 1960s, as will be later shown.

Secondly, the Communist Party had powerful allies abroad including China, Cuba, East Germany, the Soviet Union, and other Communist-led nations. South African Communist Ronald Kasrils believes that individual members of the South African Communist Party working in London must have handled millions of dollars for the movement.¹⁰⁸ Much of that came from foreign support.

Thirdly, aside from foreign aid, the Communist leadership was quite economically successful. Julius First, one of the Party's treasurers, owned a furniture factory.¹⁰⁹ His daughter Ruth was well educated, having attended the University of Witwatersrand.¹¹⁰ She would later marry Joe Slovo, another Jewish Communist, who was a practicing lawyer. One of Ruth First's fellow students at university was Har-

¹⁰⁴ Kevin MacDonald, *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism*. (Bloomington, IN: 1stbooks Library, 2004; first published by Praeger [Westport, CT, 1998]), Chapter 6.

¹⁰⁵ I. Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain*, 41.

¹⁰⁶ Slovo, *Slovo*, 32.

¹⁰⁷ I. Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain*, 447.

¹⁰⁸ Ronald Kasrils, *Armed and Dangerous* (Johannesburg: J. Ball, 2004), 79.

¹⁰⁹ I. Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain*, 449.

¹¹⁰ Meredith, *Nelson Mandela*, 38.

old Wolpe, a lawyer. Bob Hepple, another lawyer, would help Slovo aid the defense of their fellow conspirators. They would later work closely with Denis Goldberg, an engineer, in setting up an underground headquarters and clandestine munitions factory. The economic affluence and social standing of these individuals gave them huge advantages over the African nationalists they would later support.

JEWES AND AFRICAN NATIONALISTS

As mentioned, the Communist Party had been banned in 1950. By this time it had made the “cornerstone of its strategy” the takeover of African organizations, especially the ANC.¹¹¹ The advantages held by the Communists allowed their expansion of influence into non-communist organizations. But, this influence was not without opposition. Many African nationalists distrusted the Communists and viewed their status as White “bosses” within the movement as an intrusion into Black politics. Nonetheless, the dependency of African movements upon Jewish funding and expertise would increase with time. We must now shift to the African movements themselves and particularly Nelson Mandela.

A young Nelson Mandela traveled to Johannesburg seeking work after being expelled from school and fleeing an arranged marriage. His friend Walter Sisulu recommended him to Lazar Sidelsky, one of the founders of Witkin, Sidelsky, and Eidelman, a Jewish law firm in Johannesburg. Mandela was hired as an articled clerk and Sidelsky generously waived the usual premium.¹¹²

It was here that Mandela met his first White friend – Nat Bregman. A cousin of Sidelsky, Bregman was an eighteen-year-old articled clerk and member of the Communist Party. It was Bregman who first introduced Mandela to Communist-organized social gatherings.¹¹³ It was at these multiracial gatherings that Mandela met such figures as Michael Harmel, a member of the Communist Party’s central committee for nine years until its dissolution in 1950.¹¹⁴ Initially, Mandela was hostile to Communists and especially their influence within groups such as the African National Congress, of which Mandela would become involved.

¹¹¹ Stephen Ellis, *Comrades Against Apartheid: the ANC & the South African Communist Party in Exile* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 10.

¹¹² Meredith, *Nelson Mandela*, 34.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 89.

Mandela pursued a Bachelor of the Arts degree by correspondence while working at Sidelsky's law firm. Following his final examination he enrolled part-time as a law student at the University of Witwatersrand and met fellow students Ruth First, Harry Schwarz, and Harold Wolpe. Schwarz recalled Mandela as being a reserved student and not a frequent participant of discussions.¹¹⁵ All of them would become prominent opponents of apartheid.

After passing a qualifying examination, Mandela began his first employment as a lawyer under another Jew, former Communist Hyman Basner.¹¹⁶ It was in this new capacity that Mandela began to know affluence. He discarded his old patched clothing and bought fashionable suits from a tailor named Alfred Kahn.¹¹⁷ Despite being married, Mandela also began having an open affair with one of the secretaries at his office, much to the shock of his wife.¹¹⁸

Before going into Mandela's political development, it is necessary to take notice of several things. Even at this early stage he was heavily dependent upon Jewish connections to succeed. His contacts with Sidelsky's law firm had given him the opportunity to earn a small wage while studying law and they paved the way for his later rise to prominence. If Mandela's personal development seemed to hinge upon Jewish connections, then his political existence would come to absolutely depend upon them.

Mandela, along with his friend Walter Sisulu, formed the Congress Youth League, a branch of the ANC in the early 1940s. They represented a growing faction within the ANC urging for more aggressive action against apartheid including civil disobedience, boycotts, and mass strikes.¹¹⁹ By 1949 the Congress Youth League was gaining momentum within the ANC. Mandela's group presented a blistering criticism of ANC policies to the president, Dr. Albert Xuma. At the next election they supported Dr. James Moroka, a wealthy and successful Black doctor, to challenge Xuma's leadership. Moroka was elected president of the ANC in 1949 and a new course for the organization was decided upon.¹²⁰ The ANC then adopted the "Programme of Action" to replace earlier ANC policies.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 106.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 107.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 82.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 83.

In 1952 the ANC embarked upon the Defiance Campaign. The ANC then changed from an organization of 7,000 into a mass movement of perhaps as many as 100,000 members.¹²¹ But this new political agitation veered into illegal demonstrations and unruly behavior. In 1956 the ANC adopted the "Freedom Charter" to replace the earlier "Programme of Action." The Charter was a collection of demands that was drafted into a document by Lionel "Rusty" Bernstein. Bernstein was not only a Jew, he was also a member of the underground Communist Party's central committee and its chief propaganda expert. Mandela and the rest of the ANC leadership adopted Bernstein's document with few changes.¹²²

In a June 1956 newspaper article Mandela defended the far-left positions of the Freedom Charter. He declared that the "nationalization of the banks, the gold mines and the land" would strike a "fatal blow" at the "financial and gold-mining monopolies and farming interests that have for centuries plundered the country and condemned its people to servitude." Mandela then argued that the realization of their goals was impossible unless "these monopolies are smashed and the national wealth of the country [was] turned over to the people."¹²³

The influence of "Whites" and Communists within the movement was becoming too much for some within the ANC. During the 1956 ANC conference meant to ratify the Freedom Charter, a group of Africanists "kept up a noisy barrage of attacks ... with shouts of 'Africa for the Africans!'" The Africanists demanded a return to the Programme of Action adopted in 1949 and for a purified all-African movement that defined South Africa as belonging only to Blacks.¹²⁴

Due to the ANC's confrontational tactics and its new program to nationalize South African industries, its leadership was arrested in 1956 and accused of having adopted "a policy to overthrow the state by violence."¹²⁵ The defendants were also accused of belonging to a Communist organization. There were 156 defendants in the trial, including 105 Blacks, 21 Indians, 7 coloreds, and 23 Whites. Of the Whites, more than half were Jewish. They were Yetta Barenblatt, Hy-mie Barsel, Lionel Bernstein, Leon Levy, Norman Levy, Sydney Shall,

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 135.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 138.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 192.

Joe Slovo, Ruth First, Sonia Bunting, Lionel Forman, Isaac Horvitch, Ben Turok, Jacqueline Arenstein, and Ronald Press.¹²⁶

Jews were prominent not only as defendants but also as defense counsels and fundraisers. In the initial stages, the defense included Jews Maurice Franks and Norman Rosenberg. At the most critical stage of the trial the defense was conducted by Jews Israel Maisels and Sydney Kentridge. The idea for a defense fund for the accused was originally conceived in part by Alex Hepple. It was the most successful appeal launched during the 1950s and represented the first major international response to apartheid.¹²⁷ Of the defense fund's twenty-two sponsors; seven were Jews. Two of the four trustees of the defense fund, Dr. Ellen Hellman and Alex Hepple, were also Jews.¹²⁸ The trial would last until 1961.

It was during this time that the strong Jewish presence within the anti-apartheid movement became noticed by the public. Part of a letter to the editor of the *Tansvaler* published in 1956 read,

That the support of the Jews is readily granted to the powers which aim at the downfall of the Boer [Whites] must be deduced from the behaviour of the Jews.... When photographs appear in newspapers of resistance processions, or of joint singing and dancing with the 'Africans', or of the 'Black Sash's' slander tableaux, the Jewish facial type is in the majority. When a book is published on the 'bad conditions' in South Africa, the writer is ten to one a Jew. Under petitions protesting against the Boer's policy there always appear numbers of Jewish names. Jewish professors, lecturers, doctors, rabbis and lawyers fall over one another in order to sign. Behind the tables in the street collecting signatures against the Boer's policy a Jewish lady is usually enthroned."¹²⁹

Important events were unfolding during the trial. In 1959 the Africanist faction split from the ANC and formed the Pan Africanist Con-

¹²⁶ Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, 60.

¹²⁷ Rob Skinner, *The Foundations of Anti-apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 147.

¹²⁸ Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, 61.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 228.

gress.¹³⁰ They had decided that Africa would be liberated by Africans without the influence of Jewish 'Whites' and the Communist Party.¹³¹ Its leadership decided upon a campaign of mass resistance to apartheid policies, especially the system of pass-laws that applied to Blacks. On 21 March 1960, the PAC organized a general protest urging Blacks to burn their passes and present themselves for arrest en masse. Robert Sobukwe and other leaders of the PAC led from the front and were among those arrested.¹³²

The appeal was largely unsuccessful throughout the country but in Sharpeville the organizers successfully organized thousands of Blacks into a violent mob. The police were already nervous after the recent murder of nine policemen outside Durban only two months prior. When the massive crowds at Sharpeville began to mob the police lines and throw stones, the police opened fire. What followed was the death of 69 Blacks, known as the Sharpeville Massacre.¹³³

Mandela, however, accused the PAC of having co-opted the ANC's idea and dismissed the PAC's sacrifices as "a blatant case of opportunism."¹³⁴ The ANC followed the 21 March protests with an anti-pass campaign of their own on 28 March. On 30 March the government declared a state of emergency and on 8 April both organizations were banned.¹³⁵ The PAC, however, was not totally defeated. They would soon begin forming a military wing known as "Poqo," a Xhosa word meaning 'alone' or 'pure.'¹³⁶

On 29 March 1961 the court acquitted Mandela and other defendants. The long treason trial was now over. Mandela, however, immediately went underground.¹³⁷ A call for a general strike was issued but proved disappointing due to the government's preventative measures. It was this failure that directly led to Mandela's advocacy of violent methods.¹³⁸ It proved highly ironic that Mandela would now embrace a violent campaign despite having "just emerged from a

¹³⁰ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 127.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 126.

¹³² Meredith, *Nelson Mandela*, 172.

¹³³ Gann and Duignan, *Why South Africa Will Survive*, 180.

¹³⁴ Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), 206.

¹³⁵ Meredith, *Nelson Mandela*, 176.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 210.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 191.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 200.

marathon trial, the outcome of which had depended on convincing a panel of judges about the ANC's commitment to non-violent methods."¹³⁹

It was in these circumstances that Mandela would now come to fully rely upon his Jewish contacts, especially those in the underground Communist Party. The Jews in his inner circle embraced the new campaign of violence enthusiastically. Joe Slovo became "the key figure in devising the party's military armed struggle" and was chosen as Chief-of-Staff of the new armed wing, known as Umhonto we Sizwe, or MK.¹⁴⁰ The MK's constitution was largely drafted by Mandela, Slovo, and Bernstein.¹⁴¹

A suitable location for the headquarters of the MK was found in the Johannesburg suburb of Lilliesleaf. It had been bought as the headquarters for the underground Communist Party in July 1961. Harold Wolpe, with the cooperation of Michael Harmel, had bought the property by setting up a dummy company and providing Harmel with a false name. The farm was occupied primarily by Arthur Goldreich, his family, and Black farm workers. Goldreich had spent his youth in the Palmach, a branch of the underground Jewish army in Palestine. Except for the farmworkers, all were Jews and members of the Communist Party.¹⁴²

The new campaign was no small undertaking. World War II veteran and Communist Party member Jack Hodgson would become the MK's first instructor in explosives. He and others manufactured bombs for the MK and tested them at a brickworks east of Johannesburg owned by the brother of Wolfie Kodesh, a Jew and fellow member of the Communist party.¹⁴³

But this was only the beginning. At a newly acquired property in Krugersdorp, Denis Goldberg was given responsibility for manufacturing the arms requirements of the new underground organization. Goldberg, a thirty year-old engineer, acquired production materials under a variety of pseudonyms. The planned production was to include 1,500 timing devices for bombs, 48,000 land mines, and 210,000

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 201.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 204.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 208.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 207.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 209. See also Joshua Lazerson, *Against the Tide: Whites in the Struggle against Apartheid* (Bellville, South Africa: Mayibuye Books, 1994), 84.

hand grenades.¹⁴⁴ The funding for all of these activities came, of course, from the underground Communist Party and their sponsors abroad.¹⁴⁵

The early stages of the campaign were more akin to a terrorist plot. It was reasoned that bombing attacks on infrastructure and government targets would drive away foreign capital and bring South Africa to its knees.¹⁴⁶ However, the bombing campaign and public declaration of the MK's existence had to be delayed. The reason was that the ANC's president, Albert Luthuli, was traveling to Oslo to receive the Nobel Peace Prize! The award ceremony was held on 11 December 1961. The terrorist attacks began five days later.¹⁴⁷ By July 1963 the sabotage campaign hit nearly two-hundred targets including "communications and transport facilities, fuel dumps, utilities, and government buildings."¹⁴⁸

Mandela had been in hiding since March 1961. He had been provided with a support committee to arrange for "safe houses, transport, and reading material."¹⁴⁹ Jews such as Wolfie Kodesh and Bob Hepple were a part of this committee. Mandela, in fact, spent two months living in a small bachelor apartment rented by Kodesh under a false name.¹⁵⁰ Mandela also met with his second wife at Arthur Goldreich's house in Parktown. For a while Michael Harmel was also a member of his support committee.¹⁵¹

Mandela traveled abroad shortly after the beginning of the bombing campaign, leaving in January 1962. To his surprise the PAC was actually more popular abroad than the ANC, which was widely seen as a Communist-dominated organization. After returning to South Africa Mandela was caught and arrested on 5 August 1962.¹⁵² His legal advisers were undercover Communists and co-conspirators Joe Slovo

¹⁴⁴ Meredith, *Nelson Mandela*, 239.

¹⁴⁵ U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 539.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 201.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 210.

¹⁴⁸ Stephen Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 17.

¹⁴⁹ Meredith, *Nelson Mandela*, 205.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 206

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 207

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 213.

and Bob Hepple. He was sentenced to three years for inciting the 1961 strike and two for traveling abroad without documents.¹⁵³

The South African government claimed the ANC was a body of "Communists and terrorists." Curiously, in Brian Lapping's history of apartheid he dismisses these claims as "mere propaganda."¹⁵⁴ Yet, while Mandela was incarcerated, the plans for a full-scale guerilla conflict were being drafted. Joe Slovo and Govan Mbeki, a close friend of Slovo's wife, developed a plan known as 'Operation Mayibuye.'¹⁵⁵ Meanwhile, Arthur Goldreich was busy traveling to sympathetic states such as China, East Germany, and the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁶ Goldreich managed to successfully lobby for approximately \$2.8 million in aid from the Soviet Union and its allies.¹⁵⁷

In 1963 the South African authorities raided the Lilliesleaf farm and arrested nineteen leading members of the ANC and MK. Among those arrested were five Whites: Lionel Bernstein, Hilliard Festenstein, Denis Goldberg, Arthur Goldreich, and Bob Hepple. Shortly thereafter, James Kantor and Harold Wolpe were arrested in connection with the Lilliesleaf raid. They were all Jews.¹⁵⁸ The raid and subsequent arrests would prove a devastating setback to the "African" liberation movement.

Shortly after being arrested, Harold Wolpe and Arthur Goldreich were left in the custody of a young guard. He was promised a handsome bribe in return for allowing them to escape, which they did. It was during this escape that they were hidden by Barney Simon, a fellow Jew. Simon, like Benjamin Pogrand, had been a member of the Habonim in his youth and edited *The Classic*, the "first nonracial literary magazine" in South Africa.¹⁵⁹ Two days later Wolpe and Goldreich parted ways with Simon and eventually fled abroad.¹⁶⁰

The MK Regional Command, Natal, was Ronald Kasril's area of responsibility. Another South African Jew, he had been forced to flee the country with his girlfriend Eleanor Anderson after one of his fellow terrorists, Bruno Mtolo, was caught during what his comrades as-

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 229.

¹⁵⁴ Lapping, *Apartheid: A History*, 177.

¹⁵⁵ Meredith, *Nelson Mandela*, 238.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 237.

¹⁵⁷ Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels*, 16.

¹⁵⁸ Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, 64.

¹⁵⁹ I. Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain*, 117.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 127.

sumed was a drinking binge in town. Mtolo had visited the MK headquarters in Rivonia earlier in 1963.¹⁶¹ Mtolo already had an extensive record of petty crimes and agreed to become a state witness within mere hours of his arrest.¹⁶² Kasrils would play a role in coordinating the movement with Joe Slovo while in exile.

Nelson Mandela was ultimately dragged into the new Rivonia trial owing to the seizure of a number of documents in his handwriting obtained from the Lilliesleaf raid.¹⁶³ The seized documents also included the plans for 'Operation Mayibuye.' Two of the three defense lawyers, Arthur Chaskalson and Joel Joffe, were Jewish. The head prosecutor, Percy Yutar, was also Jewish. In a 1988 interview, Yutar claimed that he had deliberately reduced the charges against the defendants from treason to sabotage with the intent to save the accused from the death penalty.¹⁶⁴ However, on 11 June 1964 Mandela, Sisulu, and Mbeki would be sentenced to life imprisonment.¹⁶⁵

The Africanists fared even worse. In 1962 the PAC's second-in-command, Potlako Leballo, was released from prison. At a press conference Leballo declared that in 1963 the PAC would lead a full revolution, in contrast to the ANC's futile efforts. Within days the authorities had raided his offices and seized the PAC's membership lists. It was later announced that 3,246 of the PAC's underground had been arrested.¹⁶⁶ In the 1970s the PAC would largely crumble due to infighting. This, combined with the effectiveness of South African security forces, would leave the ANC as the vanguard of Black politics.¹⁶⁷

JEWES AND THE MOVEMENT IN EXILE

Much of the Black leadership of the ANC was neutralized after the Rivonia trial. The remainder, men such as Oliver Tambo, would rebuild the organization after fleeing abroad. Tambo, one of the founding members of the Congress Youth League, had until 1963 acted as merely the ANC's foreign diplomatic representative. However, during his period abroad he would become the leader of the ANC in exile.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶¹ Meredith, *Nelson Mandela*, 259.

¹⁶² Kasrils, *Armed and Dangerous*, 53.

¹⁶³ Meredith, *Nelson Mandela*, 247.

¹⁶⁴ Shimoni, *The Case for South Africa*, 66.

¹⁶⁵ Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels*, 18.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁶⁸ Davis, *Apartheid's Rebels*, 22.

London became the "ANC's exile capital."¹⁶⁹ Joe Slovo, Jack Hodgson, Yusuf Dadoo, and Ronald Kasrils operated at the London headquarters with others such as Gill Marcus. Marcus remained in exile for 21 years working closely with Slovo. In an interview Marcus stated, "... because of the work that I was doing, which was information for the movement, I always had a lot of contact with him."¹⁷⁰

For a while, Ronald Kasrils and his wife lived in Golders Green, a Jewish Suburb of London. Kasrils, with dark curly hair and white skin, was not what most people expected an "African" guerilla to be. Anti-apartheid activists in London were confused by this very un-Black African rebel.¹⁷¹ Likewise, when he traveled to the Soviet Union for military training he was asked by Russians, "Why aren't you Black?"¹⁷²

Controlling the movement from abroad would prove a challenge, especially for the movement's "White" leadership circles. Not only were the Black Africans distrustful of the influence of Whites and Communists, but they were often completely inept in combat situations. Nonetheless, larger numbers of Black Africans would join the struggle against apartheid as international condemnation against it grew.

The Africans themselves made poor revolutionaries. In the Belgian Congo, Che Guevara had led a small force of Cubans into the newly independent Congo to help fight "Western imperialism." What he found among the Africans was universal superstition, unreliability in combat, and downright incompetence. Guevara noted that the African rebels placed a great deal of importance upon *dawa*, or magical protection, which shielded the rebels from harm. Ronnie Kasrils also noted these superstitions during his training of African rebels in East Germany.¹⁷³

Guevara's experiences in the Congo are mentioned because his reports provide an extremely useful account of what African rebels were like in the 1960s. Guevara goes so far as to say, "the Congolese revolution was doomed to defeat by its own internal weaknesses."¹⁷⁴ For one thing, the African rebels seemed preoccupied with prostitutes and

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁷⁰ I. Suttner, *Cutting through the Mountain*, 251.

¹⁷¹ Kasrils, *Armed and Dangerous*, 91.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 66.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹⁷⁴ Che Guevara, *The African Dream* (New York: Grove Press, 2000), 27.

alcohol. He noted that the leaders of these rebel movements “spent the day drinking until they got in the most incredible state, without even bothering to conceal it from the population because they considered it the natural thing for “men” to do.”¹⁷⁵ In combat, the rebel soldiers would fire their machine guns with eyes closed, or simply run away.¹⁷⁶ In one incident a rebel dropped a lit match and the area caught on fire. The fire reached an ammunition dump and the entire camp erupted into explosions and gunfire.¹⁷⁷

These were by no means the only such incidents in Guevara’s journal. They were in fact quite characteristic of his entire experience in the Congo. By his own words Guevara, the professional revolutionary, is implying that the Africans, or at least the Congolese, were incapable of organizing a revolutionary movement. These events were occurring contemporaneously with the formation of the South African underground movement and strongly suggest that without aid from non-Africans, the movement could not have had impact.

There were still problems even after the ANC leadership regrouped abroad. From late 1985 to mid-1987 Umkhonto we Sizwe rebels laid landmines in the countryside intended to destroy military patrols, but mostly killed farmers, Blacks, and children. It decided to abandon the landmine campaign when these unintended consequences became glaringly apparent.¹⁷⁸

In another incident a member of the ANC’s underground armed faction went to a disco and brought a woman home at gunpoint. Afterward, she led the police back to the spot which was discovered to be the location of a guerilla safe house and a gun battle ensued.¹⁷⁹ Ronald Kasrils recalls reading a different version of the story in a newspaper. In this story, the underground fighter had gone to a notorious disco named Club 702. He began a fight with a young woman’s boyfriend, left the club by taxi, and then argued with the taxi driver about fare in front of his safe house. It was followed by a police raid that led to multiple arrests.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 28.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 48.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ Truth and Reconciliation Reports, Vol. 2, 333.

<http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm>. Accessed 27 May 2011.

¹⁷⁹ Ellis, *Comrades against Apartheid*, 139.

¹⁸⁰ Kasrils, *Armed and Dangerous*, 168.

In addition to the general ineptitude of Africans, there was again a growing tension between the Communists and the Black Africans. In 1975 the ANC exiles were hosting a funeral for one of their own in London. The Africanist-leaning faction took this as an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction at the lack of free speech within the ANC. They also accused the Communists as having hijacked the movement itself. These men, called the 'Gang of Eight,' would be expelled from the ANC for their actions.¹⁸¹

After the 1976 disturbances in Soweto, a new generation of Black youths had joined the ranks of the ANC to fight apartheid. Many of them were sent north to train in Angolan guerilla camps. By 1981 these fighters had been waiting five years for a full campaign against South Africa but were instead diverted into fighting fellow Blacks of the Angolan anti-communist UNITA forces. In 1981 a spy-scare swept over the guerilla camps in Angola. The campaign was launched against "dagga smokers" but was often a pretext for eliminating critics of the ANC leadership. By April 1981, security commissions had been established in every camp headed by a security officer.¹⁸²

The dissatisfaction among African guerillas was widespread in Angola. In 1977 at a camp in Quibaxe, Ronald Kasrils oversaw the arrival of fourteen recruits. They had joined the struggle following the Soweto Uprising against the forced imposition of the White man's language; now they would be digging trenches for a White man in Angola. They felt tricked. It wanted to take the fight to the enemy or be sent home. Because the former was not happening, the spokesman of the new recruits angrily pointed his finger in the direction of Kasrils and shouted, "We want to go home now, now, now!" A fight ensued. Tensions were defused and the would-be mutineers were detained. Allegations would later be made that the group had been tortured, but Kasrils denies it.¹⁸³

In August 1983 the ANC leadership launched an offensive against the anti-Communist UNITA forces in Angola. By January 1984 there were reports of ANC troops fighting for days without food. They were tired, hungry, and had no desire to kill other Blacks. They demanded an immediate offensive against South Africa. Hundreds of troops then broke into open mutiny. They elected a "Committee of

¹⁸¹ Ellis, *Comrades Against Apartheid*, 64.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 119.

¹⁸³ Kasrils, *Armed and Dangerous*, 126.

Ten” and established a list of demands. One demand was for the election of new leadership within the movement. Another demand was immediate investigations into the security department and the “re-education” center called Quatro – where beatings, starvation, and torture were commonplace.¹⁸⁴ The incident proved an embarrassment to the ANC, but it soon outmaneuvered the dissenters and broke the rebellion.

The true extent of Communist influence within the ANC was exposed by Bartholomew Hlapane in his testimony to a U. S. Congressional panel in March 1982. Mr. Hlapane had joined the ANC in 1948 with the aim to “achieve democratic rights for the African people through peaceful means.”¹⁸⁵ In 1955 Hlapane was recruited into the underground SACP by Joe Slovo. The Communist Party expanded its influence while underground by conspiratorial means. Their method was to become involved with mass organizations, even simple community organizations, and to identify “people who are influential, who are clever, and who could be recruited as members of the party.”¹⁸⁶

This information is corroborated well by the activities of others such as Billy Nair. Following the suppression of the South African Communist Party, Billy Nair, an ethnic Indian, used the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) to recruit for the SACP. During large meetings and discussions Nair would identify individuals who might be receptive to Marxist ideas and siphoned them into the underground SACP organization.¹⁸⁷ By these covert means the SACP could retain a presence within the South African anti-apartheid movement.

But how much influence had the Communists achieved? Among the twenty-two members of the ANC National Executive Committee, Hlapane identified no less than seven Communists by name. They were Dan Tloome, Josiah Jele, Joe Slovo, Reginald September, Thabo Mbeki, Stephen Dlamini, and John Nkadimeng.¹⁸⁸ This was nearly a third of the top leadership of the ANC.

¹⁸⁴ Ellis, *Comrades Against Apartheid*, 134.

¹⁸⁵ U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 530.

¹⁸⁶ U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 531.

¹⁸⁷ Raymond Suttner, *The ANC Underground in South Africa, 1950–1976* (Boulder, CO: First Forum Press, 2009), 51.

¹⁸⁸ U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, 537.

Upon being asked why he had turned against his former comrades, Hlapane responded that he found the Communists to be dishonest. They promised, he alleged, to take care of Hlapane's family and others after they had been arrested by the state. He claimed this never happened. Instead, women and children starved. The Communist leadership then fled abroad while the remnants of the ANC suffered imprisonment. Finally, Hlapane added, "I decided to pull out and openly cooperate with the police, because innocent people were being arrested and did not know that the Communist Party had, in fact, captured the leadership of the African National Congress."¹⁸⁹ Within months of his 1982 testimony, Hlapane would be assassinated by Umkhonto we Sizwe.¹⁹⁰

Two years later another purge of the movement would begin. By 1984 the South African government had decided to create a three-chamber legislative body composed of Whites, Coloreds, and Indians. Blacks would also be allowed to vote in local elections outside of their homelands. The election turnout for coloreds and Indians was low, but the new body met for the first time in September 1984. Within days a wave of violence was launched against these "Uncle Toms." On 3 September the newly elected deputy-mayor of Sharpeville was hacked to death on his front doorstep. Two Blacks were burned to death while trapped in their cars, a few more were strangled behind a plundered garage, a man burned to death in a liquor store, and many buildings and cars were set on fire.¹⁹¹

Between September 1984 and February 1985 the South African government reported that five Black councilors and four Black policemen had been killed, over one hundred Black councilors had been attacked, over fifty Black police officers had been injured, and one hundred and forty-seven Black councilors had been forced to resign. The "growing army of young Blacks" was spurred into violence against its own people by groups like the ANC who viewed the participants of the new elections as being sell-outs to apartheid. Their violence would now serve the purpose of the ANC and its foreign backers. Much like the American race-riots of the 1960s, these were claimed to be politically motivated but mostly hurt Blacks themselves. In the same period over one thousand buses serving Blacks had been badly damaged or

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 536.

¹⁹⁰ Ellis, *Comrades against Apartheid*, 39.

¹⁹¹ Lapping, *Apartheid: A History*, 173.

burned. Nine clinics for Blacks had been destroyed. One hundred and forty-three Black school buildings had been destroyed.¹⁹²

The violence did not abate. In July 1985 a young girl was stoned, stabbed, and beaten at a funeral in Duduza. She was then covered in sticks and grass which were set on fire. She had been suspected of being a police informer. But by 1986 the most popular form of punishment for informers, real or imagined, was "necklacing." The assailants would fill a rubber tire with gasoline, place it over the victim, and light them on fire.¹⁹³ This violent purging of political competition allowed the ANC to maintain a dominant position within the anti-apartheid movement even as it remained in exile.

THE ANC TAKES POWER

In August 1985 State President P. W. Botha delivered what became known as the "Rubicon Speech." In it he stressed that he "was not prepared to lead White South Africans and other minority groups on a road to abdication and suicide."¹⁹⁴ Botha made a public offer to consider Mandela's release from imprisonment on the condition that he renounce violence. Mandela quite simply replied, "I am not a violent man."¹⁹⁵

State President Botha stated that he and the National Party were pursuing the policies that had been chosen by the majority of White citizens and he did not have the power to go against their will by bowing to foreign pressure. In 1987, only a tiny minority of Whites wanted a racially mixed parliament and "majority rule." The actual amount of support for these policies was 3% among Afrikaners and 11% among English-speaking Whites.¹⁹⁶ Botha then declared, "Destroy White South Africa and our influence, and this country will drift into faction strife, chaos and poverty."¹⁹⁷ His words would prove prophetic.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*, 174.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹⁹⁴ Suzman, *In No Uncertain Terms*, 251.

¹⁹⁵ Lapping, *Apartheid: A History*, 176.

¹⁹⁶ Hermann Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, *From Apartheid to Nation-building*, 5.

¹⁹⁷ P. W. Botha, "Rubicon Speech."

http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/action/media/downloadFile?media_fileid=1065. Accessed 10 June 2011.

But other parties were already making decisions. After the "Rubicon Speech" of P. W. Botha, Harry Oppenheimer sent Anglo-American executives to an informal talk with ANC representatives.¹⁹⁸ Shortly after, Gavin Relly, Oppenheimer's long-time secretary and then chairman of Anglo-American, led a small group of businessmen to meet with Oliver Tambo and Thabo Mbeki in Zambia. The businessmen flew to Lusaka to meet with Oliver Tambo, among other ANC leaders, and discuss the future of the country.¹⁹⁹

Another Jewish businessman, Tony Bloom, the head one of the five largest companies in South Africa – Premier Milling Group, drew up a manifesto signed by 92 of the country's top businessmen calling "for an end to apartheid and for government negotiations with Black leaders." Bloom advocated "gentle affirmative action", the abolition of all statutory discrimination, and the release of Nelson Mandela.²⁰⁰

The decision to release Mandela and unban anti-apartheid political groups was likely the result of growing foreign pressure. The United States Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986. These sanctions were supported in the United States by The National Jewish Community relations Advisory Council despite President Reagan's attempted veto.²⁰¹ The director of the Religious Actions Center, Rabbi David Saperstein, also pressed for sanctions.²⁰² It is difficult to see whose interests were served by such harsh actions. In a South African survey of 1004 Black coal miners conducted by a third party research organization, only 28 percent of union workers supported sanctions. Among non-union workers the support was as low as 13%.²⁰³

While in prison in 1990, Mandela had written, "The nationalization of the mines, banks, and monopoly industries is the policy of the ANC, and the change or modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable. Black economic empowerment is a goal we fully support and encourage, but in our situation state control of certain sectors of the economy is unavoidable."²⁰⁴ Two weeks later, Mandela would be released by F. W. De Klerk, the man who had replaced P. W. Bo-

¹⁹⁸ Kanfer, *The Last Empire*, 353.

¹⁹⁹ Lapping, *Apartheid: A History*, 178.

²⁰⁰ Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, 194.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 152.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 153.

²⁰³ Giliomee and Schlemmer, *From Apartheid to Nation-building*, 178.

²⁰⁴ Naomi Klein, *The Shock Doctrine* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007), 194.

tha.²⁰⁵ Underground political organizations were unbanned. Mandela's supporters such as communists Slovo, Kasrils, and Marcus would be allowed to return to the country.

Mandela had an astounding change of heart upon being released from prison. After Mandela and Mbeki began holding regular meetings with former Anglo American and De Beers chairman Harry Oppenheimer, they reversed the ANC's economic position. In his first post-election interview as president Mandela stated: "In our economic policies ... there is not a single reference to things like nationalization, and this is not accidental..."²⁰⁶ Following the 1994 election, the ANC even submitted its economic program to Oppenheimer "for approval."²⁰⁷

Among other things, between 1997 and 2004 eighteen state-owned firms were sold by the South African government, raising \$4 billion.²⁰⁸ Even stranger, the Minister of Finance elected during the 1994 elections was none other than Gill Marcus, the communist anti-apartheid activist.²⁰⁹ In fact, it was under this new leadership that the central South African Reserve Bank was privatized.²¹⁰ Marcus became Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank in 1999, and its Governor in 2009.

CONCLUSIONS

There are a number of recurring themes that stand out when considering the Jewish role in South Africa. Among the most noticeable are the prominence of ethnic nepotism among Jews, especially in systems of patronage, and also in the tendency of Jewish groups to promote non-Jews into figurehead positions. Both of these fit well into the overall picture of Jewish group behavior that is well documented in histories such as Neal Gabler's *An Empire of Their Own* (on Hollywood and the entertainment industry) and Kevin MacDonald's *The Culture of Critique*.

Remember that the Communist Party, despite claiming to represent broad sections of the population, was largely a Jewish affair. The leadership of the Communist Party had often been members of Communist families. Ruth First, for instance, was the daughter of Com-

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 197.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 211.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 208.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 212.

²⁰⁹ Shimoni, *Community and Conscience*, 253.

²¹⁰ Klein, *The Shock Doctrine*, 202.

munist Party Treasurer Julius First. Her husband, Joe Slovo, had likewise risen into the party from a Jewish social milieu.

Many of the Jewish Communists themselves had come from Eastern European radicals escaping the forces of the Czar or other reactionary powers that had attempted to stamp out revolutionary movements. Wolfie Kodesh had come from such a family. Communist Party member Ray Alexander herself had been a first-generation Jewish South African that had trained with Latvian Communists in the late 1920s.

Recall also that the left-wing of the United Party, later to become the Progressive Party, had a Jewish "vanguard." The rest of the United Party often shared "wide areas of agreement" with the National Party "on the emotional question of social and residential segregation."²¹¹ It was apparent also, as recalled by Suzman, that Harry Oppenheimer had used his influence to build up the left-wing of the United Party before the split. He would come to play an "important role behind the scenes in the United Party."²¹² After the death of his father, Oppenheimer became Chairman of Anglo American Corporation in 1957. In 1961 he gave open support to the Progressives by stating, "the best thing you can do is vote progressive."²¹³

The second trend that stands out from this research — also noted in Kevin MacDonald's work on Jewish radicals²¹⁴ — is a tendency to put non-Jews into figurehead positions within the most radical and critical organizations that nonetheless relied heavily, if not wholly, on Jewish support. In this the most prominent example is Nelson Mandela and the ANC. It would be more than fair to suggest that the ANC was merely a Communist front. Mandela's entire development was guided by Jewish "handlers." From his early legal career to his adoption of terrorist tactics to his eventual imprisonment, Jews provided indispensable support. Even after he was released from prison, the grey eminence of Harry Oppenheimer persuaded him to change his far-left economic viewpoint in favor of privatizations.

²¹¹ Strangways-Booth, *A Cricket in the Thorn Tree*, 50.

²¹² *Ibid.*, 140.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 197.

²¹⁴ Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse, 2002; originally published: Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), Ch. 3.

But Mandela is certainly not the only example of this trend. The Communist-pioneered newspaper *The Guardian* relied primarily upon Jews for funding and writing. The editor-in-chief, however, was Betty Radford. It was exactly the same for the *Rand Daily Mail*. The non-Jewish editor was for many years Laurence Gandar, a man who had formerly worked for Anglo American. He would absorb much of the blame for the *Mail's* critical stance despite the fact that Jewish journalists were submitting the critical accounts.

In retrospect, the group behavior of Jews in apartheid South Africa conforms very closely to patterns that emerged during the United States Civil Rights Movement and continue to emerge in Europe's current drive towards a non-White multicultural entity. Understanding Jewish influence on the decline of the West and responding to it effectively will likely prove decisive factors in whether Whites once again establish the integrity of their nations – or continue to be outmaneuvered and ultimately dispossessed.

THE REVOLUTIONARY JEW

The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit and Its Impact on World History

E. Michael Jones

South Bend, IN: Fidelity Press, 2008

Reviewed by Edmund Connelly

Anyone who has followed the career of Catholic iconoclast E. Michael Jones will likely agree that his writings on Jews over the last decade have been little short of incendiary. Thus the Internet site *Fringe Watch* claims that Jones “represents one of the foremost proponents of ‘religious’ anti-Semitism in Catholic circles.”¹

Jones’ major vehicle for airing his views on Jews is his magazine *Culture Wars*, which in recent years has run cover stories such as “Judaizing: Then and Now,” “The Converso Problem: Then and Now,” “Shylock Comes to Notre Dame,” and “Too Many Yarmulkes: Abortion and the Ethnic Double Standard.” He then packaged these arguments and much more in a monumental 1200 page tome entitled *The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit and Its Impact on World History*.

In essence, Jones’ view is that Jews, having rejected Logos (by rejecting Christ), were inevitably rendered revolutionaries. Thus the story Jones tells runs for two thousand years. Necessarily, some eras receive scant attention, while others—particularly as we near the present—are well documented. Jones does this in thirty-two chapters, plus a long introduction and short epilogue.

Arguing along with Church fathers, Jones notes that “The Christian God acts with Logos,” which of course is linked to Greek philosophy. In turn, “Greek philosophy is part of God’s plan for humanity,” (14) and Europe was among the first regions to flower under this wedding of Biblical faith and Greek thought.

The problem, however, is that the Western world has been under attack, specifically, as Jones claims, “the Jewish attack on Logos.” While Islam may represent the threat of invasion from without—a theme amply and openly documented over the centuries—Jones ar-

¹ See <http://fringewatcher.blogspot.com/search/label/E%20Michael%20Jones>, accessed March 3, 2010.

gues that it is “the threat of subversion from within, otherwise known as revolution,” that is the West’s primary danger. And Jews are that threat (15). Jones’ long narrative supports what the Jesuits claimed in the 1890s: that “any nation that rebelled against God’s order would end up being ruled by Jews” (quoted on 1061).

Early on Jones defines the term “Jew,” which originally meant the Jewish people as a biological group, or “seed of Abraham.” When they rejected Jesus, however, “they reject their father Abraham as well, and show that ‘the devil is [their] father.’” In that sense, the term “Jew,” according to Jones, no longer refers solely to the Jewish people but to those who reject Christ. “Race is no longer the focus” (chapter 1).

Thirty years after the founding of the Church, modern Judaism as we know it was born. Oddly, this new identity became a negative one: Jews are those who reject Christ and Logos. In practice, this indicates that “the rejection of the Higher Logos at the unavoidable core of one’s religion or even as a determining factor of who is to count as a member of one’s community means that a revolutionary spirit is entwined with that community” (20).

Jews, however, are not alone in their revolutionary action. Over the centuries “Christian heretics linked to Jews or heavily influenced by Jews” have played pivotal roles in revolutionary movements as well, as Jones notes:

Jews joined forces with heretics during the Albigensian crisis, the Hussite revolution, the Reformation, and at the birth of modern England. They joined forces with revolutionaries during The Enlightenment, the Russian Revolution, and the Civil Rights movement. We also see the conflict between the Church and Judaism working itself out at the birth of the Spanish Inquisition, the spread of the Polish empire, and the Chmielnicki rebellion that began the break-up of that empire. Finally, we see a Jewish presence in the rise of the American Empire. (21)

One of the most striking things about *The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit* (hereafter *JRS*) is that while differing in identifying the ultimate causes of Jewish behavior, it nonetheless parallels the accounts of Jewish behavior as found in a non-theological, sociological, or even biological account of Jews. Jones’ treatment of various Jewish revolutionary undertakings reads very much like, for instance, evolutionary psychologist Kevin MacDonald’s description of Jewish “intellectual and politi-

cal movements" that are undermining the West, movements such as Freudian psychology, Boasian anthropology, and so on. In effect, Jones is describing many of the subversive Jewish movements that MacDonald has addressed in *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements*, as well as subsequent writings.²

Chapter One, "The Synagogue of Satan," contains a rather reasonable account of traditional Christian interpretations of Judaism, though to modern ears it sounds shocking. Turning to the Gospel of St. John, Jones finds that the term "Jew" appears 71 times. Again, Jesus and most of his followers were still biological Jews, so it is "the Jews" – those Jews who reject Christ – about whom John is talking. He quotes Jesus as saying, "You belong to your father, the devil, and you want to carry out your father's desire. He was a murderer from the beginning, not holding to the truth, for there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks his native language, for he is a liar and the father of lies" (John 8:44).

Historically, we know that the Jews challenged their Roman occupiers and lost. They had hoped to use their new revolutionary ideology to conquer Rome, but it failed. From that point, "it went into dormancy for 1000 years only to re-emerge in Christian empires when the modern era began." This dormancy allows Jones to essentially resume his story in 1095, when Pope Urban II preached a Crusade. This account comes in chapter three, leaving Jones over two dozen more chapters to cover the long Spanish Inquisition, then the modern era.

A powerful thread that runs through the chapters on the Enlightenment, the French and other revolutions, the rise of science, and the growth of new capitalistic structures concerns the upheaval that accompanied these events. Jones' argument, of course, is that upheavals are an inevitable result of subversion born of revolutionary intent and they are destructive because they violate Logos. To other observers – British philo-semite Paul Johnson comes to mind – such upheavals are unpleasant for a time but ultimately necessary and invigorating. "Jews were the yeast, producing decomposition of the existing order, the

² Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998). See also his *Cultural Insurrections: Essays on Western Civilization, Jewish Influence, and Anti-Semitism* (Atlanta: The Occidental Press, 2007).

chemical agent of change in society," Johnson writes.

To Johnson, such ferment must be seen positively as "rationalization" of all manner of fields—science, economics, morals, etc. What saves Johnson's book from being merely an apologia for Jewish behavior, however, is the fact that he consistently and vividly describes how destructive such "rationalizations" were. Spinoza, for instance, was an example of "the sheer destructive power of Jewish rationalism." Ditto for the Jewish role in capitalism: "[Jews] had no share in or emotional commitment to society as a whole and so could watch its old traditions, methods and institutions being demolished without a pang—could, indeed, play a leading role in the process of destruction." The same was true for Marx, Freud, and Einstein.³

Another theme—familiar to us in these post-Madoff, post-Wall St. bailout days—is financial corruption and manipulation. Jones takes us back to the early sixteenth century to relate a story about Johannes Pfefferkorn, a Jewish convert to Christianity who allied with the Dominicans in order to have Jewish books seized and destroyed. Defending the Jews and their books was one of Europe's leading Christian scholars of the day, Johannes Reuchlin. Jones uses their epic battle to illustrate how Jews win by employing three time-tested tactics: prayer, combat, and bribery. Bribery appears to be most effective.

The convert Pfefferkorn

explains how Jews use money to corrupt the morals of Christians. Jews use "their ill-gotten wealth" to "cause Christians to commit great sins." Jews usually prevail in court because of bribery. "The only reason for this is their ill-gotten money, which Christians accept from them in exchange for helping to muddle and cover up their case and make it appear just." Jews use their wealth "to lead astray not only the common people but even educated men." (228)

This was also a period in which modern science was making its first stirrings. Provocatively, Jones roots this naturalistic thinking in

³ Paul Johnson, *A History of the Jews* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 84, 291, 247. Ironically, the March 2010 issue of Jones' magazine *Culture Wars* has a story about a new magazine, *Standpoint*, launched by Johnson's son Daniel. In a familiar story, the major financial backer is identified as Alan Bekhor, a prominent Zionist, and the staff "is largely Jewish."

the Cabala, which is, in Jones' estimation, another word for magic. "Magic was a way of bringing about heaven on earth and was intimately bound up with the rise of the new scientific worldview" (231). This eventually came to encompass Christians such as John Dee, Sir Francis Bacon, and Sir Isaac Newton.

Jones discusses these men in an account of the rise of Freemasonry, which Jones situates in the Jewish corner as well. The Jewish-Freemason conspiracy, he argues, used a version of Cabala to advance their interests. Dee's Christian Cabalism was the predecessor: "The exoteric part of that movement became the Royal Society; the esoteric part became Freemasonry" (493). In fact, the story of revolution(s) in this chapter includes events both in England and on the continent.

In England this attempt at establishing British imperialism thrived in the secret society of the Rosicrucians, who, according to Jones, later became what we know as Freemasons. Further, he writes, Freemasonry from England was "one of the instruments used by the rulers of England to undermine the powers of France. . . . the Whig-inspired Masonic lodges brought down the Bourbon dynasty and ushered in the French Revolution" (478). In other words, these efforts were a "black operation" that led to the Enlightenment (503).

Next Jones links Napoleon with the Jews. Realizing Jews viewed him as a Messiah, "Napoleon began to think of himself as a combination of Messiah and Antichrist who would fulfill the aspirations of the Masonic lodges by restoring the name of Jehovah, emancipating the Jews, and rebuilding the Temple." (551). He succeeded in the second instance but not the third, having been repelled at Acre, ending his attempts at taking Jerusalem.

Napoleon's ultimate defeat in Europe meant reaction and the return of Catholic authority. For a generation stability persisted, but revolution found its way back, helped in part by Jewish converts to Christianity such as Heinrich Heine and Karl Marx. By the time the Revolution of 1848 broke out, many Europeans began to notice that the revolution was disproportionately represented by Jews (religious and racial). "The Jewish hegemony over Christian Europe which coincided with the rise of capitalism was now being threatened by a new form of Jewish hegemony, that of the Jewish revolutionary" (588).

In the end, the revolution failed, leaving Marx to mutter that the only ones to have benefited were the huckster Jews who bought back loot from looters at steeply discounted prices, thereby amassing fortunes (590). It was Moses Hess, however, who drew the more signifi-

cant conclusion. Rather than class, it was race that was to rule the future. As for the Jews, he wrote, "The Jewish type has remained unchanged over the course of the centuries" (595).

"CARRY THE WAR INTO AFRICA": JEWS AND BLACKS

The setback for revolution in Europe in 1848 sent streams of failed revolutionaries elsewhere, including to America. Working with what they found on the ground in America, Jews "would attempt to remake the Negro in their own image and turn him into the avant garde of the revolutionary movement in America" (643). One of the first to succeed was Ottilie Assing, a half-Jew who seduced Frederick Douglass, both sexually and intellectually.

Jones provides by far the most extensive account arguing for Jews as the primary movers in the attempt to emancipate *and revolutionize* the large black minority in America to undermine white, Christian society. This story has generally been hidden, as generations of American college students can attest. Having been assigned to read Swedish Nobel Laureate (Economics) Gunnar Myrdal's 1,480-page book *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, they see nary a reference to the massive assistance Jews had given to blacks prior to the book's 1944 publication.⁴ Nor does John Hope Franklin's highly respected and continually revised 1947 tome *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American Negroes*, address it any better.⁵

Jones devotes eight chapters (160 pages) to telling the story of the Jewish-Black alliance (which is no alliance in Jones' account). His version is compelling given its depth of detail and the consistency of Jewish intentions: revolution. In this case, it was their plan to "carry the war into Africa" by turning American Negroes into revolutionaries.

As Jones notes, "virtually every black leader in the twentieth cen-

⁴ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944). Jones challenges the claims of authorship of *An American Dilemma*, writing that Murray Friedman "claims that Myrdal 'was neither Jewish nor American,' but, even after indicating that Myrdal did not in fact write *Dilemma*, he fails to tell us that people like University of Chicago sociologist Louis Wirth, who wrote large sections of *Dilemma*, was both, and that Myrdal had been brought in to give credibility to what was largely a Jewish project, because, as Friedman himself points out, "the scholarly critique of society that evolved into sociology had, like psychoanalysis, earned the reputation of being a Jewish science" (764-765).

⁵ John Hope Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom: A History of American Negroes* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947).

ture had a Jewish mentor, backer, or controller who introduced him to revolutionary ideas or organizations." Jones sees the process as Jews "luring Blacks away from Christianity into fantasies of heaven on earth, which could only be brought about by the violence which flowed from Messianic politics." Dostoyevsky realized this in 1877:

The Jews . . . have already leaped en mass upon the millions of liberated Negroes and have already taken a grip upon them in their, the Jews' own way, by means of their sempiternal "gold pursuit" and by taking advantage of the inexperience and vices of the exploited tribe. . . . the Negroes have been liberated from the slave owners, but that will not last because Jews, of whom there are so many in the world, will jump at this new little victim. (quoted on 691)

"The [1909] founding of the NAACP," Jones argues, "marked the beginning of Jewish impact on American life. . . . The NAACP was a Jewish organization, run by a board with no black representatives. . . . Harold Cruse [said it was created] 'to fight anti-Semitism by remote control'" (700). Jones then shows how these revolutionary Jews recruited a black face for the movement, and thus W. E. B. Du Bois became the public face for the NAACP. What is interesting is not just the fact that such Jews used blacks as a battering ram against white rule and independence, at the same time they prevented blacks from forming a nationalistic, particularistic society of their own.

To wit, they mercilessly attacked Booker T. Washington, founder of the Tuskegee Institute, and his movement, using Du Bois as the main agent. Washington was destroyed by a manufactured "scandal" in which he was accused of peeping into the apartment of a white woman. "Washington, the leading black figure in America, was now associated with voyeurism and the fatal sin of sexual attraction to white women" (703).

Du Bois next moved on to the destruction of Marcus Garvey, the black nationalist Jamaican who had started a steamship line to repatriate blacks back to Africa. As the Jewish members of the NAACP wanted integration of blacks and whites in America, not segregation or repatriation, they worked behind the scenes to bring Garvey down. Garvey caught on, and his suspicions were strengthened when, after being arrested for mail fraud in 1922, he found that the presiding judge at his trial was Julian Mack, an elite German Jew "who also

served on the board of the NAACP." Garvey appealed to this apparent conflict of interest to have Judge Mack dismissed, but his request was denied. Now "he became even more convinced that he was the victim of an 'international frame-up,' declaring: 'I am being punished for the crime of the Jew Silverstone [an agent for the failed shipping line]. I was prosecuted by Maxwell Mattuck, another Jew, and I am to be sentenced by Judge Julian Mack, the eminent Jewish jurist. Truly I may say 'I was going to Jericho and fell among the thieves'" (781).

The mission of the NAACP and Du Bois was accomplished. Garvey got the maximum sentence of five years, and the push toward black-white integration had cleared another hurdle. This hypocritical strategy of pushing integration for all gentile groups while opposing it for Jews only gained steam as the century unfolded, particularly once modern Israel came into being in 1948.

JEWES AND BOLSHEVISM

Not surprisingly, Jones' view on Jewish participation in the Bolshevik revolution in Russia finds Jews heavily responsible for the fate of the Christians in the lands which became the Soviet Union. In that sense, he is in the same camp as Berkeley professor Yuri Slezkine, author of *The Jewish Century*.⁶ This can be summed up by the quote that "anyone who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the Cheka stood a very good chance of finding himself confronted with and possibly shot by a Jewish investigator." Indeed, it was the norm for observers of the day to proclaim, "Everywhere I looked I saw Latvians, Latvians, and Jews, Jews, Jews. I was never an anti-Semite, but here their numbers were so obvious" (735).

Jones bolsters his case by employing the work of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, whose two-volume *Two Hundred Years Together* has yet to find an English translator and publisher. Jones uses his own knowledge of German to translate from that version, *Zweihundert Jahre Zusammen*.⁷

⁶ Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004). A useful summary of the book can be found in Kevin MacDonald, "Stalin's Willing Executioners," in *Cultural Insurrections*.

⁷ For the sake of comparison, see F. Roger Devlin's two-part review essay of both volumes, working from the French translation: "Solzhenitsyn on the Jews and Tsarist Russia," *The Occidental Quarterly*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 61-80 and "Solzhenitsyn on the Jews and Soviet Russia," *The Occidental Quarterly*, no. 8, no. 4 (Winter 2008-2009): 69-97. In an interview with Tomislav Sunic on *The Sunic Journal* (February 16,

Despite the grim subject matter at hand, Jones is not immune to humor, as his inclusion of the following exchange shows. Two Jews who had arrived in Germany in 1918 to stoke the revolution elsewhere were Karl Radek and Grigory Zinoviev:

Radek was addressing the crowd. "We have had the Revolution in Russia and the Revolution in Hungary, and now the Revolution is erupting in Germany," he roared, "and after that we will have the Revolution in France and the Revolution in England the Revolution in America." As Radek worked up his passion, Zinoviev tapped him on the shoulder and whispered, "Karl, Karl, there won't be enough Jews to go around." (758)

In contrast to the endless demands for German, Catholic, etc. apologies for the Holocaust, however, Jones notes that "no Jew of any stature apologized for Jewish participation in the Communist Holocaust, which took many more lives." In summary, Jones draws the conclusion from this chapter that "it should be obvious that the revolutionary spirit more than religious observance occupied the mainstream of Jewish consciousness throughout the ages" (737).

JEWES AND MUSIC

Perhaps to prove his thesis that Jews as revolutionists are actively subverting American culture, he treats a large swath of popular music and, as with other topics, shows the consistency of Jewish intentions and behavior. In America, Communist Jews during the Depression followed the dictum "Music is propaganda." Of course not all radical singers and musicians were Jews—Pete Seeger and Woody Guthrie were gentiles, although Guthrie married a Jew, Marjorie Greenblatt, and raised his children as Jews—but there was a consistent and important thread of Jewish subversion in popular music from the thirties until the present.⁸

2010), Devlin claimed that he had it on good authority that an English translation of both volumes to be handled by Yale University Press was canceled due to intense pressure from powerful Jewish groups.

⁸ In *The Occidental Observer*, E. R. E. Knutsson and Elizabeth Whitcombe respectively provide excellent accounts of European Jews *qua* Jews creating music:

E. R. E. Knutsson, "The Archeology of Postmodernity, Part I: Viennese Mutations," (December 6, 2009)

<http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Knutsson->

In comparison, an article on the exact same subject, "Where Have All the Lefties Gone?" examines the same musicians, promoters, and music critics as Jones had written about: Pete Seeger, Dave Van Ronk, Bob Dylan et al. Rather than exploring the obvious Jewish nexus throughout this movement, though, the author, who has cited well over a dozen Jewish names, dismisses it all with the breezy comment, "By Van Ronk's casual estimate, half the folk revivalists were Jewish, and they 'adopted the music as part of a process of assimilation into the Anglo-American tradition.'"⁹ Of course that's exactly wrong; in fact, the Anglo-American tradition was becoming far more Jewish than vice versa, as Lenni Brenner once famously remarked: "Modern America's culture is simply unthinkable without the massive and disproportionate contributions of its Jews. It is almost as if the Jews assimilated America rather than the other way around."¹⁰ Readers of *JRS* will immediately see this.

The chief merit of Jones' tome is that he explicitly makes Jewish identity, motives, and behavior the focus of his story. The blurring of any or all three of those categories has been the norm since at least the end of World War II and accounts for the pitiful state of common understanding when it comes to modern Jews and our world today.

JUDAIZING AMERICAN CULTURE

As with music, Jones shows how most psychoanalysis was also Jewish, as was the bulk of the intellectual movement in America from the 1950s onward. "The new Jewish elite," Jones remarks, "was 'ju-

PostmodernismI.html;

E. R. E. Knutsson, *The Archaeology of Postmodernity, Part II: The Emancipation of Dissonance* (December 14, 2010)

<http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Knutsson-PostmodernismII.html>;

E. R. E. Knutsson, *The Archaeology of Postmodernity, Part III: Transvestism in Music* (December 27, 2009);

<http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Knutsson-PostmodernismIII.html>

Elizabeth Whitcombe, "Adorno as Critic: Celebrating the Socially Destructive Force of Music," (August 28, 2009)

<http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Whitcombe-AdornoI.html>; and Elizabeth Whitcombe, "The Mysterious German Professor," (September 3, 2009)

<http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/authors/Whitcombe-AdornoII.html>.

⁹ Lauren Weiner, "Where Have All the Lefties Gone?" *First Things*, January 2010.

¹⁰ Lenni Brenner, *Jews in America Today* (Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart Inc., 1986), 322.

daizing' America by turning it into a nation of alienated strangers" (920-921). "Jews taught Americans to become 'specialists in alienation.' In promoting alienation, Jews projected their image onto American culture and weakened the mores of the Christian majority." Now the Jewish "genius" "became the guide to how everyone should live in the 'modern' world." This claim that by the fifties Jews had hijacked American culture is a common one, particularly among Jewish thinkers.¹¹

Hollywood, of course, was a main outpost of this Jewish takeover. This "Empire of Their Own," according to Jones, put on film the positions of the majority of Jews. That was sexual deviance, pornography, homosexual rights, feminism, and New Age goddess worship. A good example of this was porn star Richard Pacheco, who auditioned for yet another X-rated film one day, then "interviewed at Hebrew Union Seminary to do rabbinical study" (1031-1032).

JUDAIZING THE CHURCH

Not only had Jews "judaized" America, they were doing the same in Europe, right down to the Vatican itself. Jones shows in detail how Jews insinuated their agenda into The Second Vatican Council. For instance, "In terms of its practical effects, *Nostra Aetate* became a weapon against the Church." One of the worst failures made by the Church at this time, according to Jones, was the fact that it had condemned anti-Semitism "without defining what it meant by that term" (934).

The Church also lost the abortion battle to Jews. Jones makes it absolutely clear that the adoption of liberal laws and mores on abortion in America was a Jewish operation from start to finish. Catholics lost the battle "by not identifying their ethnic opponents" (945). California was a leader in the battle for on-demand abortion. When hearings were held there, Jewish feminist lawyer Gloria Allred ended up throwing a sexual bondage device at the Catholic head of the hear-

¹¹ For instance, David Biale wrote that "The ideal of Zangwill's drama [*The Melting Pot*] is also assimilationist, but . . . the end product is to turn all true Americans into Jews." "The Melting Pot and Beyond: Jews and the Politics of American Identity," in *Insider/Outsider: American Jews and Multiculturalism*, ed. David Biale, Michael Galchinsky, and Susan Heschel (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 21. Walter Kerr, for another, argued that "what has happened since World War II is that the American sensibility has become part Jewish, perhaps as much Jewish as it is anything else" (quoted in MacDonald *The Culture of Critique*, 4).

ings. He later issued a press release that described what the pro-abortion side looked like: "the front rows of the state's auditorium were filled with a sea of hard, Jewish, and (arguably) female faces" (1022). Further, when a story was written about the discovery of a large dumpster with 17,000 aborted fetuses at the pathology lab of a Jewish resident, the report listed those responsible as "almost exclusively Jewish" (1024).

MASTERS OF DISCOURSE

Collectively, Jones sees the Jews who took over American culture as "Masters of Discourse." In other words, they frame the terms of debate in favor of their interests, so typically they prevail. Take, for instance, the long battle between Jews and Catholics over culture. Jones claims that by 1976 the Jewish side had announced victory. "The terms of the Carthaginian peace imposed on the defeated American Catholics included abortion, pornography, the loss of Catholic academe, the redefinition of deviance, and the transformation of discourse." That meant "war on Logos."

In subsequent years, "rabbis" like Professor Stanley Fish changed academic discourse from Protestant to Talmudic. Derrida furthered the attack on "texts." "There was a deeper grammar to this discussion, which eventuated in the campus political correctness speech codes of the 1990s. The heart of that code wasn't racial; it wasn't feminist; it wasn't homosexual; it was Jewish and expressing Jewish culture at its worst." Jewish revolutionaries took the university, too. And anyone who had the temerity to disagree "was expelled from the synagogue" (1000-1003).

NEOCONS

In keeping with his chronology of the Jewish takeover of America, Jones writes that neoconservatism, "like the Popular Front in the '40s, folk music in the '50s, sex and dope in the '60s, and feminism in the '70s, had become the locus of revolutionary Jewish activity in the world at the beginning of the third millennium" (1031). Though Irving Kristol had written about this Jewish movement in the early '80s, most Americans remained unaware of it until the Bush Administration beginning in 2000.

The actors, however, laid the foundation early. Murray Friedman admits as much in his book *The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intel-*

lectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy.¹² A central puppet in this show was none other than William F. Buckley, enforcer for the Jews. Early on he attacked the John Birch Society, since some of its members were a bit too interested in things Jewish. Later he ejected Israel critic Joseph Sobran from *National Review* and wrote a hit piece on Patrick Buchanan when the latter was running for President.

Throughout the '80s, Jews co-opted the conservative movement, in part by appointing their agents as the heads of foundations. In 1985, for example, the Bradley Foundation had assets of \$751 million; it went to the neocon side. Neocons also funded Richard John Neuhaus and his new magazine *First Things* (1028-9). In a move to bring Evangelical Christians into the neocon tent, funds were spent lavishly to allow Jerry Falwell to expand The Moral Majority.

Jones' account of Ralph Reed, however, is more representative of how Jews manipulated Gentile front men. Reed, who led the Christian Coalition during the early '90s, grew up in what he described as "a Jewish atmosphere." While superficially he appeared as a protégé of Pat Robertson, in fact he was under the tutelage of lobbyist Jack Abramoff, for whom he interned in Washington in 1981.

As Jones notes, Abramoff found Reed "incredibly philo-Semitic." Like Buckley before him, Reed's job was to weed out "extreme" elements that might counter Jewish interests. Jones retells the story of how during Pat Buchanan's 1996 Presidential bid, Reed did his neocon duty by throwing Christian Coalition support behind Bob Dole in the South Carolina Republican primary, derailing Buchanan's bid. Since then, Reed has gone on to form with Rabbi Yehiel Eckstein "a sort of Christian AIPAC" (1040-1041).

IS IT ANTI-SEMITIC?

Is the *JRS* anti-Semitic? Certainly it is by the standard definitions of the anti-defamation crowd. Indeed, by those standards it is egregiously anti-Semitic. For instance, it openly talks about Jewish power when the ground rules are that only Jews may do so—unless the gentile writer does so to fawn over said powerful Jews.

To be sure, in current mainstream circles, Jones' book is completely rude and impolitic. But Jones is working according to another standard—the truth as interpreted by the Catholic Church. Jones—and

¹² Murray Friedman, *The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

more and more high members of the Church—are giving up on Catholic-Jewish dialogue because, as Jones notes, “Dialogue has become the vehicle for Jewish control of the Catholic mind. Dialogue has also become a synonym for subversion of Church teaching.”¹³ It is “pointless” and a “one-way street.” If Jews always make demands on Catholics and never accept criticism of Judaism, let alone modify some of their own writings and behavior, why continue such efforts?

PROBLEMS OBTAINING THE *JRS*

In a late 2009 letter to subscribers of *Culture Wars*, Jones indicated that sales of his book were being actively suppressed. He claims that the ADL put him on their “most wanted list,” resulting in one of the highest forms of Jewish censure in America: dynamic silence. Apparently, online seller Amazon.com is complicit in this campaign, as Jones relates a story about Amazon telling a customer the book “was out of print.” Initially, Amazon had undercut the publisher’s price of \$48, then jacked it up to \$320. By Thanksgiving it had reached \$1,000. Meanwhile, Amazon has stopped paying the publisher for copies sold online. (As of this writing in early March 2010, the only copy available on Amazon.com is a used one—for \$999.98. Meanwhile, Fidelity Press has always had copies available for the original \$48.)

The Jewish Revolutionary Spirit is indispensable to those with a serious interest in understanding The Jewish Question. Mankind appears to be at a point where this question overshadows even such weighty topics as nuclear weapons, peak oil, and global warming. And nowhere has such an accessible account of two thousand years of Western history and the Jewish role in that history been available. It belongs on the shelves of everyone who has read John Murray Cuddihy’s *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity*; Albert S. Lindemann’s *Esau’s Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews*; or Kevin MacDonald’s *The Culture of Critique*.¹⁴ Even for those not hitherto interested in The Jewish Question, the *JRS* shows why The Jewish Question is interested in you.

It is pleasing to observe that Jones’ theological account both mirrors

¹³ E. Michael Jones in a letter to readers of *Culture Wars*, late 2009.

¹⁴ John Murray Cuddihy, *The Ordeal of Civility: Freud, Marx, Levi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle with Modernity* (New York: Basic Books, 1974) and Albert S. Lindemann, *Esau’s Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

and supplements evolutionary psychologist Kevin MacDonald's scientific discussion of a Jewish "group evolutionary strategy," as described in *The Culture of Critique*. Both MacDonald's and Jones' books might be re-titled *The Culture of Revolution* or perhaps *The Culture of Subversion*. Whichever version you accept as getting to the root of the matter, both will oblige you to take seriously the effects Jews and their movements have had on the modern world.

*Edmund Connelly is an academic film and television scholar and a frequent contributor to **The Occidental Quarterly** and **The Occidental Observer** (www.theoccidentalobserver.net).*

SOLZHENITSYN ON THE JEWS AND TSARIST RUSSIA

Deux siècles ensemble

Volume 1: *Juifs et Russes avant la révolution*

Paris: Fayard, 2002

Reviewed by F. Roger Devlin

It appears now that the English-speaking world will have to wait some time yet for a translation of *Two Hundred Years Together*, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's two volume study of Russian-Jewish relations. Translations into both French and German have been available for five years, and Italian, Hungarian, Greek, Czech, and Latvian editions are in the works. But no publisher in America or Britain seems to want to bother with a book which has clearly generated an unusual degree of interest. Working from the French version, I will try to give readers of *The Occidental Quarterly* some idea what the book is and isn't, of what it attempts to do and what it accomplishes.

A number of reviewers have criticized Solzhenitsyn's over-reliance on just a few sources, some of them mere encyclopedias, and all in the Russian language. The late American historian John Klier went so far as to list nine historians besides himself whose work Solzhenitsyn might usefully have been consulted were he not largely limited to his native tongue: Hans Rogger, Michael Stanislawski, Michael Aronson, Steven Zipperstein, Jonathan Frankel, Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, Shaul Stampfer, Israel Bartal, and Eli Lederhendler. Klier concluded that "despite its good intentions, the book serves largely as a reminder that he received the Nobel Prize for literature, not for history."¹ Richard Pipes had similar criticisms, describing *Two Hundred Years Together* as "something more than a personal statement yet less than a work of scholarship."²

Indeed, it must be acknowledged that the work is merely an over-

¹ John Klier, "No Prize for History," *History Today*, November 2002, 60-61.

² Richard Pipes, "Solzhenitsyn and the Jews, Revisited," *The New Republic* 25 (November 2002).

view for a general audience of a vast historical panorama, and not the minutely researched life's work of a professional historian. Virtually all the information it contains has been available elsewhere to any reader of Russian determined to find it. It is thus inaccurate to speak, as some have done, of Solzhenitsyn's "revealing" the role of Jews in the Revolution.

Two Hundred Years originated, in fact, as a kind of by-product of *The Red Wheel*, the author's series of historical novels on late Imperial Russia and the Revolution. Solzhenitsyn's wife Natalia Dmitrievna, in an interview for National Public Radio, explained:

He didn't intend to write this book at all. He was writing *The Red Wheel*. But anyone who is studying the history of the Russian Revolution will inevitably get an enormous amount of material about the role of the Jews, because it was great. Aleksandr Isaevich realized that if he put this material into *The Red Wheel* he would create the impression that he was blaming the Jews for the Russian Revolution, which he does not.³

As I have written earlier ("Prophet of the Nation," TOQ, 6:3), Russian nationalists have often triumphantly pointed to the Jewish role in the Revolution as a way of avoiding the more painful course of national self-examination. In publishing his consideration of the Jewish role later and separately from his main work, Solzhenitsyn sought to discourage his Russian readers from indulging in this sort of scapegoating. Similar considerations may be warranted in the West, where certain persons far removed from Solzhenitsyn's Christian moral vision have suddenly become impatient to read this one particular work of his. The concern of Solzhenitsyn and his family that *Two Hundred Years* might be misunderstood by being taken outside the context of the rest of the author's works may be one factor working against the speedy appearance of an English translation.

When an interviewer for the German weekly *Der Spiegel* asked him last year "are we to conclude that the Jews carry more responsibility than others for the failed Soviet experiment?" he responded:

I avoid exactly that which your question implies: I do not call

³ <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1128597>.

for any sort of scorekeeping or comparisons between the moral responsibility of one people or another; moreover, I completely exclude the notion of responsibility of one nation towards another. All I am calling for is self-reflection. Every people must answer morally for all of its past—including that past which is shameful. Answer by what means? By attempting to comprehend: How could such a thing have been allowed? Where in all this is our error? And could it happen again? It is in that spirit, specifically, that it would behoove the Jewish people to answer, both for the revolutionary cutthroats and the ranks willing to serve them. Not to answer before other peoples, but to oneself, to one's conscience, and before God. Just as we Russians must answer . . .⁴

Critics of Solzhenitsyn have even seized upon this unselfconscious use of the expression "we Russians." John Klier, e.g., writes: "Solzhenitsyn envisages a dualistic struggle, fought between us (Russians) and them (Jews)."⁵ But all he is doing, really, is treating the bond of nationhood as natural and normal. It may be a clue to Solzhenitsyn's thought that he never claims for himself an objective observation post outside and above the fray of history, as "tolerant" Western historians such as Klier implicitly do.

* * *

Bearing in mind Solzhenitsyn's fundamental purposes and assumptions, let us see what he has to tell us of the Jews' and Russians' two hundred years together.

The ancestors of Russia's Jews were the Ashkenazim, or German Jews, who began migrating eastward into Poland in the Eleventh Century AD. During the centuries of their Polish sojourn, the Jews developed an institution called the *kahal* (plural *kehalim*). Although the word originally signified "community," it came to be applied to an exclusive administrative council which served as intermediary between the Jewish world and the public authorities.

In Poland, the *kehalim* collected the Crown's taxes (receiving the Crown's patronage in return); collected funds for the social needs of

⁴ <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,496003,00.html>.

⁵ Klier, "No Prize for History," 60.

the Jews; established the rules which governed commerce and industry; exercised judicial authority over the Jewish population; and paid the salaries of Rabbis. The *kehalim* were jealous of their authority, which they frequently abused for personal ends. Accordingly, they were unpopular with ordinary Jews and relied mainly on the support of the Polish Crown to maintain their position. Both the rabbinate and the *kehalim* worked to keep ordinary Jews isolated from the surrounding society, in part by minutely regulating their activity and keeping their minds focused on ritual obligations.

After quoting Jewish writers on the subject, Solzhenitsyn adds:

The two thousand year endurance of the Jewish people in the Diaspora calls for admiration and respect. Yet, looking more closely, at certain times such as the Russo-Polish period from the sixteenth through mid-nineteenth centuries, this solidarity came about through the authoritarian methods of the *kehalim*, and one is uncertain whether respect must be shown for these methods simply because they come from a religious tradition. However that may be, even a small measure of this type of separatism on the part of Russians gets imputed to us as a grave fault. (p. 40)

At the time of their incorporation into the Russian Empire, the Jew's economic condition in Poland was undergoing a long period of decline. Much of the *kahal's* energy was devoted to combating the rise of both the new Hassidic movement and the German-Jewish Enlightenment (the *Haskalah*).

Before the partitions of Poland, Jews were officially prohibited from settling in Russia, although a small number of Jewish merchants were in fact already trading in Ukraine and the Baltic ports. Solzhenitsyn emphasizes throughout his history that the apparent harshness of Russian law must usually be understood within a context of extremely lax enforcement. But the first partition, in 1772, rendered any prohibition a dead letter by suddenly bringing some one hundred thousand Polish Jews into the Russian Empire.

Catherine the Great was personally well-disposed toward the Jews, but Russian doubts about the sincerity of her own conversion from Protestantism made her cautious about displaying liberality toward her non-Orthodox subjects.

The imposition of Russian law threatened the traditional authority of the *kahal*, e.g., by allowing Jews to pay their taxes directly to the government. In 1785, however, a *kahal* delegation successfully petitioned the Crown for a restoration of most of its old prerogatives, tax-collecting included. The Russian government apparently saw the *kahal* as a useful tool of administration and did not dissolve it until 1844.

In 1786, public offices were opened to Jews: there came to be Jewish city-councilmen, mayors, and judges. Catherine eventually sent an order to the Governor General of White Russia (Belarus), signed in her own hand, demanding that "equality of rights for Jews be introduced on the spot without the smallest delay," on pain of penal sanctions against those who infringed upon them. Solzhenitsyn comments:

Let us note that by this act the Jews obtained equal civil rights contrary not only to the situation in Poland, but even before they obtained them in France or Germany. Moreover, the Jews in Russia received straightway the individual freedom which would be denied the Russian peasants for another eighty years. (p. 43)

In 1790, Catherine received a petition from the merchant's guild of Moscow alleging fraudulent business practices on the part of newly arrived Jewish merchants from White Russia and abroad, and requesting their formal expulsion. In December 1791, the Tsarina granted this petition, forbidding Jewish traders from permanent settlement in the central provinces of Russia. At the same time, by way of mitigation, she accorded Jews unlimited rights of residence and trade in "New Russia," a large, thinly populated territory recently won from the Turks (today constituting Moldova and a large part of Ukraine). Solzhenitsyn emphasizes that this decree was not intended to favor Christians in general at the expense of Jews. There was a reciprocal prohibition, e.g., against Christian merchants from Central Russia settling in "New Russia."

But this decision, made on practical grounds and without any long views, became the basis for the Pale of Settlement, the area in Western Russia set aside for unrestricted Jewish residence. Over time, more and more exceptions would be made, allowing Jewish students, professionals, and certain types of businessmen to settle in central Russia. But until its abolition by the Provisional Government in 1917, the vast

majority of Russia's Jews would continue to live within the Pale (e.g., 94 percent in 1897, according to the Imperial Census).

The second and third partitions of Poland took place in 1793 and 1795, and were much more consequential for our story than the first: nearly one million Jews were now incorporated into Russia. Their numbers would increase fivefold over the next century.

In 1800, a serious famine occurred in White Russia, an area of heavy Jewish settlement. Gavril Derzhavin, an Imperial Senator (and, incidentally, the greatest Russian poet before Pushkin), was sent to take emergency measures and submit a report. He found that Polish landowners commonly ignored their estates, preferring to hire the services of Jewish overseers for terms of just one to three years. These overseers had every incentive to squeeze profit out of the estates during their brief tenure, even at the expense of future productivity. They provided the peasants seed and tools for farming at three times the market rate and bought the resulting produce at below market prices, both extortions made possible by a monopoly granted and enforced by the Polish gentry. Many Jews also worked as distillers or tavern keepers on the estates or in rural villages. The drunkenness of the peasants and the rapacity of the Jewish distillers combined to divert grain to vodka production which otherwise would have gone to make bread.

The fundamental problem, as Derzhavin saw it, was that the Jews had outgrown their traditional economic niche. There were too many tradesmen and not enough primary producers in heavily Jewish areas. The Senator also lamented that "[the Jews] have only contempt for those who do not share their faith." He recommended that they be encouraged to colonize less densely populated areas and that the Government sponsor schools to instruct them in Russian and useful trades. And, in what Solzhenitsyn calls "the rather harsh frankness of his time," Derzhavin declared that "if Divine Providence has kept this nation of dangerous *mores* on the earth and not exterminated them, it is proper for governments under whose scepter He has placed them to put up with them as well."

Such observations have made Derzhavin unpopular with Jewish historians. But Solzhenitsyn rejects the accusation that he was a "fanatical Judeophobe," pointing out that he did not blame the Jews for the famine (as some Jewish sources assert). This is a recurring pattern in *Two Hundred Years Together*—Solzhenitsyn seems less concerned to

recount the Jewish share in the tragic fate of Russia than to vindicate the honor of Russians (especially Tsarist officials) who have wrongly gone down in the history books as persecutors.

The government's eventual response to Derzhavin's proposals was the "Jewish Regulation of 1804." Freedom of conscience was guaranteed to all Jews, including the Hassidim (previously persecuted by the *kehalim*). Jews were accorded equal protection of the law, including the right to own land and employ Christian workers. The project of government sponsored Jewish schools was dropped at the insistence of the *kehalim*, but Russian schools and universities were opened to them on a basis of equality.

The most important measure, however, was a total prohibition upon Jewish distilling and tavern keeping. Jews were even ordered to leave the White Russian countryside within a period of three years. As usual, the Tsarist government's powers of enforcement were quite unequal to its ambitions; similar orders continued to be issued with limited effect every few years until 1881.

The government tried to mitigate the new prohibitions with subsidies to set up the affected Jews in new professions, and temporary tax exemptions to let them become established. The Regulation claimed to be, and was in certain ways, the most liberal Jewish policy in Europe. But the Jews felt cruelly the necessity of abandoning a mode of life they had been habituated to for generations under the Polish Crown.

The government devoted strenuous and repeated efforts to encourage Jews to take up agriculture in the virgin lands of New Russia. The result was an epic fiasco of more than fifty years duration. Many of the Jewish colonists "had no idea they would have to perform agricultural labor personally; they apparently thought others would see to the actual cultivation of the ground."

They sowed a negligible part of their allotted fields, sowed too late by waiting for the weather to warm up, sowed five seasons in a row on a field plowed only once; used the wrong seed or lost their seed, did not rotate their crops, broke their farming tools through inexperience, or simply sold them, slaughtered livestock for meat and then complained of not having any, heated their houses with straw meant for feeding the cattle, etc., etc. . . . (Condensed from pp. 83, 85-86)

Animals, tools and seeds were given to them several times over; new loans were constantly extended to them to assure their subsistence. Many simply ran away, setting up as tavern keepers again in nearby towns. There were just enough successful families to excite furious envy in all the rest, who feared the authorities would force everyone to work once a single family had shown it possible for Jews to farm.

During the reign of Alexander II (1855-1881) the government gradually acknowledged failure and abandoned the project. "But what are we to say after the experience of the colonization of Palestine," asks Solzhenitsyn, "where the Jews perfectly mastered the art of working the land under conditions much less favorable than in New Russia?" (p. 173).

Jews took with far greater success to Russian language education and new forms of commerce. Jews were acknowledged to be better merchants than Russians; once, when the Russian merchants of Kiev managed to get their Jewish competition expelled, the cost of living in the city noticeably rose. Industries such as logging, tobacco, sugar, railroad construction, and the grain and lumber trades were developed by Jews.

A new class of Jewish professionals arose in the capitals (university graduates being permitted to settle outside the Pale). Some Jews even gained titles of nobility. The era of Alexander II, the liberator of the serfs, was "without doubt the best period of Russian history for the Jews," according to one of Solzhenitsyn's Jewish sources.

These years also introduce the most controversial and difficult theme in Solzhenitsyn's work. For it was during this time of optimism and confidence, strangely, that the revolutionary movement first took form. It was certainly not Jewish in *origin*: no leader of the early days was Jewish. "Until the beginning of the 1870s," writes Solzhenitsyn, "only a very small number of Jews belonged to the revolutionary movement, and in secondary roles" (p. 236). He gives the names of some of these early Jewish revolutionaries, and biographical details for a few.

But more significant is his evocation of the atmosphere of those days, when enthusiasm for revolution was first ignited among Jewish university students. He quotes from the memoirs of Leo Deutsch, who was one of the pioneers: "Even the most fanatical *yeshiva* student, immersed in the study of the Talmud," could not withstand "two or three minutes' discussion with a nihilist [i.e., radical]. . . . Even a pious

Jew who had only brushed up against 'goy' culture, only made a break with his own traditional world view, was already capable of going very far, even to extremes."

These young men would have been astounded by the claims made in later days that the revolutionary movement they were joining was a "Jewish thing." They were *enfants perdus* who felt nothing but contempt for their benighted ancestors. Their heroes were all "advanced" Russian thinkers such as Dobrolyubov, Chernishevsky, and Pisarev. (Solzhenitsyn notes, however, that Jewish families rarely disowned their radical offspring—something that often happened with ethnically Russian revolutionaries.)

Jewish revolutionaries thought of themselves as working toward the happiness of mankind—or, at the very least, all the peoples of the Russian Empire. Leo Deutsch recalls that "none of the Jewish revolutionaries of the 70s could imagine the idea that one should act only for one's own nation. For us, the Jew had to assimilate completely into the native stock." One symptom of their lack of national aims was that they showed virtually no interest in abolishing the Pale of Settlement. How important could a detail like that appear to young men preparing to usher in a radiant future for the world? On this point Solzhenitsyn is emphatic: "Anti-Russian motivations cannot be imputed to these first Jewish revolutionaries, as certain persons in Russia claim today—*not at all!*" (p. 241).

According to Deutsch, just ten or twelve Jews were involved in the early phase of revolutionary terror. And Solzhenitsyn points out that terrorist groups often favored Russian members for carrying out their attacks: no Jews were directly involved in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, for example. Nevertheless, the unforeseen effect of that assassination was a series of anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine. Apparently, Jewish involvement in the revolutionary movement was notorious enough by 1881 to be taken for granted by many ordinary Russians.

How extensive was it, though, and how accurate the common perception? It is difficult to measure trends like this, but Solzhenitsyn does find some relevant numbers: in the first six months of 1879, 4 percent of the 379 persons charged with crimes against the state were Jews; for the entire year 1880, 6.5 percent of the 1054 persons tried before the Imperial Senate were Jews (p. 263). This would seem to indicate that, on the eve of the pogroms, Jewish participation in the revolutionary movement was already beginning to surpass their share in

the general population (around 4 percent).

The word "pogrom" (literally "devastation") had been used before this time for anti-Jewish riots in Odessa in 1821, 1859, and 1871. These, however, had been isolated occurrences involving mainly the local Greek community, who were commercial rivals of the Jews. But the pogroms the world remembers began on the 15th of April 1881 in the town of Yelisavetgrad (now Kirovohrad), Ukraine. Once begun, peasants from the surrounding villages began arriving to take part. Local troops remained passive at first, not knowing what to do. A cavalry regiment in the vicinity eventually arrived to put a stop to the violence by the 17th. Some sources say there were no fatalities in this first incident; others say there was just one.

For several weeks following, pogroms broke out unpredictably in dozens of towns, including the major cities of Odessa and Kiev. "It was like the unleashing of an elemental force," writes one of Solzhenitsyn's Jewish sources; "the local populace who, for various reasons, wanted to mix it up with the Jews posted proclamations and appeals to recruit forces." Common criminals and thieves followed in their wake. Jewish taverns were a favorite target, but shops and houses were also attacked. The assassination of the Tsar was more occasion than cause of this violence. Those close to the events emphasized economic grievances as the true motivation: Russians felt taken advantage of by Jews. Rioters are said to have believed themselves acting justly and "carrying out the Tsar's will." When police arrived at their houses later to recover stolen property, they protested "it's our own blood you are taking!"

Many radicals were not at all displeased by the pogroms, which they hoped to steer in the direction of a general uprising against autocracy. One tract of August, 1881 even painted the Jews as the local "bourgeoisie," and advocated "revolutionary" attacks upon them.

According to a Jewish contemporary of these events, "they pillaged the Jews, beat them, but did not kill them." Other sources speak of six or seven victims. In the period 1880-1890, no one mentions multiple murders or rapes.

Nikolai Ignatiev, installed as Minister of the Interior in May 1881, decided on a policy of firm repression, although it was made difficult by the unforeseeable character of the outbreaks and his limited forces. Nevertheless, he ordered his men to fire upon rioters. In the towns of Borisov and Nezhin this resulted in fatalities. In Kiev, 1400 arrests

were made. Many in the government felt this was still inadequate. The police chief of Kiev wrote apologetically to the Tsar that the local military tribunals had been too lenient with the rioters; Alexander III wrote in the margin: "This is inexcusable!"

Solzhenitsyn's account, based on documents close to the events, differs dramatically from the common version whereby the pogroms were *instigated by the government itself*. The American Rabbi Max Raisin, e.g., in his widely reprinted *History of the Jews in Modern Times*, writes of ". . . the ravaging of women and the killing or maiming of thousands of men, women, and children"; and adds: "As was subsequently shown, these disturbances were inspired and premeditated by the government, which abetted the rioters in their work and hindered the Jews from defending themselves."

In the autumn of 1881, at Ignatiev's recommendation, a committee was created to draft new Jewish legislation in response to the pogroms. Unlike previous "Jewish committees" – there had been eight of them already – it operated on the assumption that assimilation was an unattainable goal. (This is what many Jews were starting to think as well.) The committee recommended looking to the past for guidance, apparently meaning the customs of pre-emancipation Europe. The new sentiment was that, "Jews had always been considered a foreign element, and must once and for all be considered such."

Ignatiev himself recommended strong measures to prevent further trouble, including the expulsion of Jews from rural villages "so the inhabitants of the countryside may know the government is protecting them from exploitation by the Jews," and also because "governmental power is unable to defend [the Jews] against pogroms which might occur in scattered villages." The Imperial Senate found this proposal overly coercive and refused to ratify it. Instead, on the 3rd of May 1882 a set of "provisional regulations" was issued which merely forbade *new* Jewish settlement in the countryside. A list of villages exempt from the ban was appended, and it grew over time.

Nevertheless, Solzhenitsyn finds an historian asserting that the authorities "threw nearly a million Jews out on the street and out of the villages in order to confine them in the cities of the Pale of Settlement."

Jewish emigration, especially to America, began to increase in the years following the pogroms, and it is widely asserted that this occurred *because* of the pogroms. The emigrants, however, came mostly

from Lithuania, Belarus, and Poland—not from Ukraine, where the violence had actually occurred. In fact, there was even a Jewish internal migration *toward* the more thinly populated Ukraine in these same years. And Jewish emigration to America only became a mass phenomenon in the late 1890s: Solzhenitsyn suggests that the State monopoly on distilling instituted in 1896 was a principal cause. In any case, the evidence indicates that Jews came to America as economic migrants, not as refugees “fleeing the Tsarist pogroms.”

There was, however, a general tendency toward greater restrictions on Jews in the years following the pogroms. The introduction of a *numerus clausus* system in schools was among the most important. It began in individual institutions as early as 1882, and became government policy in 1887. The general rule was to allow a maximum of 10 percent Jewish enrollment within the Pale of Settlement, 5 percent outside, and 3 percent in the two capitals. (Jews were around 4 percent of the population of the Empire.) A few institutions closed themselves entirely to Jewish students. Alexander III’s closest advisor candidly explained to the visiting Moritz von Hirsch that the Jews “rich with their multi-millennial culture, were a spiritually and intellectually more powerful element than the ignorant and coarse Russians,” who therefore required a bit of handicapping.

Solzhenitsyn then lists the various exceptions and mitigations to the system for Jews: (1) schools for girls and women were not affected, (2) neither were private schools, and new ones began springing up in response to the regulations, (3) schools of commerce were excepted, (4) schools in places without enough Jews to fill the *numerus clausus* could accept Jewish students from elsewhere, (5) Jews shut out of professional schools could study at home and still sit for professional qualifying exams. If all else failed, they could simply go abroad: Yiddish speakers acquire German easily, and many “Russian” students in German institutions over the next few decades were Jewish. “In sum,” writes Solzhenitsyn, “the admission quotas did not at all slow the Jewish aspiration to education” (p. 307). Indeed, by the time he finished, I found myself wondering whether complacent white students in the USA might not benefit from some analogous sort of goading.

In these same years there was also a crackdown on Jewish avoidance of military service. This had reached the scandalous rate of 31.6 percent for the period 1876–1883, while the figure for the rest of the population was 0.19 percent. The crackdown may also have contrib-

uted to the rise in Jewish emigration. The authorities were unable, however, to get the Jewish rate below 10 percent for long.

The last decades of the nineteenth century saw the rise of modern racial anti-Semitism in Western Europe. This found an echo in occasional anti-Jewish remarks in the Russian press as early as the 1870s, but "without the strongly theoretical coloration they had in Germany." In the course of the war with Turkey in the Balkans (1878–1879), the panslavist newspaper *Novoe Vremia* reported on acts of plunder committed by Jewish supply masters. Gradually the paper shifted to a frank anti-Semitic line, calling for firm measures against Jewish "control" of Russian science, literature, and art.

The Jews, mindful of the recent pogroms, felt these developments added insult to injury and entirely abandoned the idea of assimilation. Calls for an independent Jewish state were even heard in Russia as early as 1882, fourteen years before Theodor Herzl's *Judenstaat* was published. The rise of Zionism might have been expected to encroach upon Jewish involvement in the revolutionary movement. Individual cases of such "conversion" are certainly known, but the overall trend of these years was toward ever greater Jewish participation in revolutionary politics. All imaginable combinations of socialism and Zionism also found their advocates.

Marxism seemed unpromising as a Jewish revolutionary ideology. Traditionally, Jews put a high priority on the chance to become their own masters, and would only take up trades which held out this prospect. Accepting work in a factory was considered humiliating and dishonorable, almost like an admission of personal failure. Accordingly, there scarcely existed a Jewish "proletariat."

Anyone familiar with the workings of the ideological mind will not be surprised that a way was found around this difficulty. Marx's failure to offer a precise definition of "class" was helpful. Jewish theorists cobbled together a makeshift "revolutionary vanguard" out of artisans (e.g., dentists, tailors, nurses, pharmacists), shop-keepers, apprentices, low-level state employees, and even commercial middlemen—anyone who did not employ wage-workers.

The General Jewish Workers Union of Lithuania, Poland, and Russia, commonly known as the Bund, was the most important Jewish socialist organization in Russia during the last twenty years of Tsarist rule. It was organized as early as 1895 according to Solzhenitsyn, although its first official conference was held in Vilnius only in 1897.

The Bund's leading spirit was Julius Tsederbaum, known to history as Martov and reputed to be the nearest thing Lenin ever had to a personal friend. "Martov's idea," writes Solzhenitsyn, "was that henceforward priority needed to be given to propagating socialism among the masses rather than within small circles, and to this end they needed to make their materials more 'Jewish,' notably by translating them into Yiddish" (p. 269). Up to the very eve of the events of 1905, the Bund was the most powerful Social Democratic organization in Russia.

Officially, the Bund held that there was no single Jewish people, but merely a Jewish bourgeoisie ("the most wretched, most base in the world") and a Jewish proletariat ("the vanguard of the workers' army in Russia"). Yet this socialist party became a unifying factor in Jewish life, and as it grew it increasingly emphasized nationality. Solzhenitsyn notes with approval a Bund member's assertion that "national does not mean nationalist."

The year following the Vilnius conference, the Russian Social Democratic Party opened its own first conference in Minsk. Of the eight delegates, five were Jewish and three were members of the Bund. Although their origins were closely entwined—Lenin was at one point considered for the editorship of the Bund's party organ!—relations between Bundists and Russian Social Democrats were never easy. The Bund consented to enter the Russian Social Democratic Party, but only as a *whole*, preserving full autonomy in regard to Jewish affairs. In 1902, it escalated its demands, preferring a mere federation with the Social Democrats which could allow differences in policy. The leadership even began arguing that "the Jewish proletariat is a part of the Jewish people which occupies a place set apart among the nations."

At this, Lenin saw red. He argued that the Jews were not a nation at all, since they had neither a common language nor a common territory, a view Solzhenitsyn characterized as:

. . . an unimaginatively materialistic judgment: the Jews are one of the most authentic, most tightly-bound nations on earth—bound in spirit. With his superficial and vulgar internationalism, Lenin understood nothing of the depth and historical rootedness of the Jewish question. (p. 275)

When the Social Democratic Party split into Bolshevik and Menshevik

factions in 1903, most Bundists sided with the Martov and the Mensheviks.

There was a long lull in anti-Jewish violence in Russia after the pogroms of the 1880s. But the events in Kishinev on 6-7 April 1903 surpassed in fury all which had gone before. Capital of the province of Bessarabia (now Moldova), Kishinev was a town of 50,000 Jews, 50,000 Romanians, 8,000 Russians (mostly Ukrainians), and several thousand of various other nationalities. Solzhenitsyn bases his account primarily upon the speeches for the prosecution in the ensuing trial, which were in turn based on the results of the official investigation. There were forty-two fatalities in this pogrom, thirty-eight of them Jewish. 1,350 houses were sacked, amounting to nearly one third of the houses in the city. Solzhenitsyn considers that the police were both disorganized to the point of incompetence and culpably negligent. It was the soldiers of a nearby garrison who finally quelled the rioting.

Solzhenitsyn finds no evidence that the pogrom was fomented "from above," a view which still has its advocates.⁶ He traces such speculation to the desire of those times "to exploit the suffering as a means to striking a blow against Tsarist power," and laments that the pogrom has been used "to blacken Russia and mark it forever with a seal of infamy" (p. 361). It certainly was: hysterical exaggerations, including grisly stories of rape and torture, were widely reported in the international press and almost everywhere laid at the doorstep of the Imperial government. A forged letter supposedly written by Interior Minister Plehve made the rounds to give apparent substance to the charge. The Hearst papers called upon the God of Justice to wipe Russia off the face of the earth.

In the months following the Kishinev pogrom, Jews throughout the Pale armed themselves and formed self-defense organizations. In Gomel (White Russia), a town about evenly divided between Christians and Jews, the young were trained in the use of revolvers. Many went out of their way to provoke Christians and express contempt for them in the weeks following the events in Kishinev.

On the 29th of August a fight broke out in a marketplace, and a group of Jews began beating a Christian. When some nearby peasants attempted to come to the man's aid, the Jews whistled, an agreed-

⁶ E.g., Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, "Pogrome in Rußland" (in English), <http://www.sog.uni-hd.de/lehrstuhl/POGROME.html>.

upon signal to summon other Jews in the area. According to government prosecutors at the subsequent trial, what followed amounted to an anti-Russian pogrom carried out by the Jews of Gomel: only Russians were killed during this day. Attacks continued through the afternoon and, as in Kishinev, were only put down when soldiers were called in. Three days later, violence broke out again among the Russian workers at a factory, but troops were on hand. The way into town was blocked, but some 250 Jewish houses in the suburbs were sacked. The Jews behaved violently on this day as well. Five Christians and four Jews were killed. Solzhenitsyn asserts that "no description of these events is found in the work of any Jewish author."

The Jewish movement for equal rights continued during these years, although this was now joined by a demand for Jewish national autonomy which was blandly assumed to be a compatible aim. An eminent Russian-Jewish jurist remarked: "it must be admitted that those who made these demands had no clear idea of their content." Solzhenitsyn points to an ambiguity many readers will be familiar with from other contexts:

The Jewish intelligentsia did not at all renounce its national identity. [Things had changed greatly since the 1870s!] Even the most extreme socialists tried as best they could to reconcile their ideology with the national sentiment. At the same time, however, no voice arose among the Jews to say that the Russian intelligentsia, which wholeheartedly supported its persecuted brothers, did not have to renounce *its own* national sentiment. Equity would have demanded this. But no one perceived the disparity at that time: by the notion of equal rights, the Jews understood *something more*. (p. 523)

In 1904 Russia, in the midst of a new wave of political assassinations and social unrest, ill-advisedly entered into war with Japan. The government suffered from its reputation as a persecutor when it was denied credit by Jewish bankers in the West. Between twenty and thirty thousand Jews fought in this war, and their courage was recognized by all. Many Jewish public figures, however, adopted a defeatist position, as did the entire intelligentsia. The war ended, of course, in a humiliating defeat for Russia.

What we call the Revolution of 1905 was not a single event, but a

series of strikes, uprisings, and mutinies which occurred against the background of military defeat and was egged on by the press and the socialist parties. Jews were especially prominent in the wave of strikes which began in the winter of 1904-1905. One Jewish writer later lamented that "nearly everywhere the strikes were observed only by Jewish workers. . . . In a whole series of towns, Russian workers opposed a stiff resistance to attempts to shut down the factories." There are even cases recorded of Russian factory hands making short work of Jews who attempted political agitation among them.

The Jewish self-defense organizations of the Pale continued to grow after the events in Gomel. In 1905 they acted as a kind of amateur revolutionary army, working closely with the radical parties. Many cities were in a kind of continual revolutionary ferment that year, with policemen assassinated, universities taken over by radicals, and communications shut down. Young Jews took the lead in the disorder, and were especially forward in defacing Imperial flags and images of the Tsar. The Imperial Manifest of October 17th, granting numerous liberties and an elective parliament, met with nothing but scorn from the radical mobs, who viewed it as a mere symptom of weakness.

In the days which followed the Manifest, widespread but disorganized reprisals were directed against Jews. Beatings and destruction of Jewish merchandise were accompanied by shouts such as: "There's your liberation! There's your Revolution! And that's for the portrait of the Tsar!" The violence in Kiev is known as the "Kiev Pogrom of 1905," although only twelve of the forty-seven victims were Jewish. In Odessa some five hundred people died in the riots following the Imperial Manifest, the largest figure for any pre-Revolutionary pogrom. Most of the young revolutionaries escaped the violence while the price for their actions was paid by innocent Jewish shopkeepers. Twenty-four pogroms are also said to have occurred outside the Pale of Settlement, directed not against Jews but any "progressive" elements that could be found.

In November 1905, the Union of the Russian People was formed to combat "the destructive anti-governmental action of the Jewish masses, united in their hatred for everything Russian and indifferent to the means they use." It never amounted to much, but does seem to have had a real existence for a few years. This is more than can be said for the "Black Hundreds," that fearful-sounding epitome of all that is reactionary. No one seems to know exactly who or what the Black

Hundreds were. During the period following the revolution of 1905, the term became a kind of brickbat to use against anyone considered insufficiently “progressive,” rather like the expression “white supremacist” today.

During the winter of 1905–1906, press censorship was abolished, rights of association and assembly guaranteed, and elections held for a Duma, or National Legislature. In April the government promulgated a new Fundamental Law (the word “Constitution” was carefully avoided). The Jewish Bund, like the Bolsheviks, boycotted the election. There were twelve Jews among the 439 deputies elected to the first Duma, all denounced as traitors by Jewish socialists. Most Jews who accepted the “bourgeois” institution of a Duma joined the Constitutional Democratic Party, commonly known after their Russian acronym as the Kadets. Jewish equality was the first plank of the party’s program. Their leader, the Russian Pavel Milyukov, was the object of comically exaggerated admiration and praise by the Jewish men and (especially) women of the party. The first Duma was found both incompetent and intractable, and was dissolved by order of the Tsar after ten weeks. Anyone who reads contemporary descriptions of the deputies and their behavior (“drunken savages”) will understand that this was an entirely practical decision and not a high-handed act of despotism. Russia was quite unprepared for universal suffrage.

Widespread public disorder continued throughout 1906–1907. The revolution may yet have succeeded had it not been for the Tsar’s inspired appointment of Peter Stolypin, first as Minister of the Interior (April 1906), then—following the dissolution of the First Duma—as Prime Minister (July 1906). Stolypin is Solzhenitsyn’s model of prudent statesmanship and the subject of a long, appreciative section of *August 1914*. He put down the revolution with strong measures, including an eight month period of summary justice.

Stolypin drew up a plan for lifting many restrictions upon the Jews in December 1906. The Tsar did not ratify it, but gave permission to have it presented to the Second Duma, which met in February 1907. There were only four Jews this time, but many new leftwing deputies, all of whom proclaimed their devotion to the cause of Jewish equality. Regarding Stolypin’s generous Jewish proposal, however, they did nothing.

Solzhenitsyn explains this strange inaction as part of the political theater of the left:

The goal being to combat Autocracy, their interest lay in forever increasing pressure on the Jewish question, but never solving it: thus one kept one's ammunition in reserve. These knights of liberty reasoned: let's not allow the lifting of restrictions on the Jews dampen their ardor for battle. (p. 465)

Stolypin later carried out most of his plan through administrative decrees, as the Fundamental Law allowed him to do between Duma sessions. He was quickly attacked in *Novoe Vremia* as a pawn of the Jews, while the "progressive" press remained hostile to him.

Disproportionate Jewish influence in the press was as much an issue in late Tsarist Russia as it is in modern America, and one more freely discussed. The author reproduces the following anecdote:

Journalists set up their own press bureau which determined access to Duma sessions. Its members refused to accredit the correspondent from *Kolokol* ("The Bell"), the preferred newspaper of rural priests. [Russian journalist Adriana] Tyrkova intervened, observing that "one must not deprive these readers of the chance to be informed about Duma debates by a newspaper they trusted more than those of the opposition." But [said Tyrkova] "my colleagues, who were mostly Jews, took offense and began shouting angrily that no one reads *Kolokol*, that the newspaper was good for nothing." (p. 468)

A Duma deputy once pointed to the press gallery in the midst of a speech, calling it "this Pale of Jewish Settlement!" It became a standing joke.

The Second Duma was dissolved in June 1907 for similar reasons as the first. Many in the government would have been happy to rescind the Imperial Manifest altogether, but Stolypin insisted on drawing "society" (i.e., the intelligentsia) into some sort of partnership with the government. This would, if successful, have conferred greater legitimacy on the government and taught greater realism and responsibility to the intellectuals. So he restricted the franchise significantly, let a Third Duma be elected, and allowed it to finish out its legally foreseen five-year term. There were just two Jewish members.

The keystone of Stolypin's policy was an agrarian reform which would have broken up rural communes in favor of family farms. This

might have dealt a deathblow to socialism by eliminating its political base in peasant envy. In foreign policy, Stolypin favored cultivating good relations with Germany: a Stolypin government would never have blundered into war with her in 1914 simply to please the governments of France and Britain. The Russian Revolution of 1917 would have been unthinkable.

But after five years in office, on the 14th of September 1911, Solypin was assassinated in Kiev. The assassin, Dmitri Bogrov, was Jewish.

The reader will find a detailed reconstruction of this consequential assassination in *August 1914*. Solzhenitsyn, in common with certain contemporaries of the event, has been called "anti-Semitic" for *not disguising* Bogrov's Jewishness, an accusation he treats with all the respect it deserves.

Everyone present at the event agrees that Bogrov might as easily have shot the Tsar as Stolypin. The twenty-three year old assassin seems to have comprehended something of Stolypin's importance. But his precise motives are not understood. Solzhenitsyn the novelist ascribes to Bogrov in *August 1914* some concern about Stolypin's Jewish policy, but this is speculation. In any event, there were no pogroms against the Jews for the death of a mere Prime Minister.

The most dramatic event in Russian-Jewish history between this assassination and 1917 was the mass expulsion of Jews from the area of the front lines, ordered by General Yanushkevich during the German offensive of 1915. Thousands of Jews fled into the Russian interior, effectively marking the end of the Pale of Settlement. Thanks to this decision, when their long-awaited hour of "liberation" struck in February 1917, an unprecedented number of Jews were living in the capitals and larger cities of European Russia, in a position to take part in the formative struggles of the new regime.

F. Roger Devlin's review of Two Hundred Years Together will conclude in the next issue of The Occidental Quarterly (vol. 8, no. 4) with a consideration of Vol. 2: Russians and Jews during the Soviet Period.

SOLZHENITSYN ON THE JEWS AND SOVIET RUSSIA

Deux siècles ensemble

Volume 2: *Juifs et Russes pendant la période soviétique*

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn

Paris: Fayard, 2003

Reviewed by F. Roger Devlin

This essay is a continuation of the reviewer's account of volume 1 of the same work which appeared in our Fall 2008 issue.

Early in this second volume of *Two Hundred Years Together*, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn explains why the book is a necessary supplement to his principal work on the Revolution, the novel cycle entitled *The Red Wheel*:

I described the revolution literally hour by hour, and never ceased encountering episodes and discussion of the Jewish theme in the sources. Would I have been right to put all of it into the pages of *March 1917*? It would not have been the first time in history that a book and its readers succumbed to the facile and crude temptation to throw all the blame on the Jews, their actions, their ideas, to allow oneself to see in them the principal cause of events and thereby avoid the search for the real causes.

To avoid letting the Russians fall for this optical illusion, I systematically muted the Jewish theme throughout the entire *Red Wheel*, at least in comparison with the way it resonated in the press and hung in the air at the time. (pp. 45-46)

Solzhenitsyn is emphatic that "the February Revolution was not made by the Jews for the Russians; it was certainly carried out by the Russians themselves. . . . We were ourselves the authors of this shipwreck" (pp. 44-45).

Even if not the instigators of the Revolution, the Jews were the subject of its first cascade of "liberating" decrees. The Pale of Settlement,

practically nonexistent since the great Russian retreat of 1915, was formally abolished; *numerus clausus* regulations were dropped; restrictions on the Jewish practice of law and on entry into the officers corps were lifted, etc. Measures were taken against public expressions of anti-Semitism amid widespread false rumors of pogroms in the provinces. All this occurred amid a mood of euphoria soon to dissipate.

The fundamental political fact of the eight-month period between the February Revolution and the Bolshevik *coup d'état* of October was the uneasy coexistence of two political authorities. A Provisional Government was formed by a group of former Duma deputies and won widespread recognition, if no deep loyalty. At the same time, the "workers' councils" (or *soviets*) of the Revolution of 1905 were revived by a small group of socialist intellectuals. They proclaimed themselves the "Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' Deputies" before any actual council was formed. And their so-called Executive Committee remained a more important body than the council it called into being and in whose name it spoke: plenary sessions of the two- to three-thousand member "Petrograd Soviet" were mostly a forum for empty speechifying.

There were no constitutional rules to define the respective spheres of authority of the Provisional Government and the Soviet's Executive Committee. What actually happened was that the Executive Committee assumed a "supervisory" role in relation to the Provisional Government, thwarting its purposes at will but refusing to take upon itself the responsibilities of governing. In Solzhenitsyn's words: "The EC was a shadow government of the worst sort: it deprived the Provisional Government of all real power while criminally avoiding the direct and open assumption of power itself" (p. 46). The result was paralysis at the center and the perfect conditions for an eventual takeover by a determined and ruthless minority.

For several weeks the membership of the Executive Committee was not even divulged:

. . . several of the members hide behind pseudonyms and for two months refused to appear in public: no one knew exactly who was governing Russia. Later it came out that there were ten stupid soldiers in the EC for show, kept at arm's length. Among the rest—the thirty active members—more than half were Jewish socialists. There were Russians, Caucasians, Latvians, and Poles, but the Russians amounted to less than a quarter of the whole. A

moderate socialist, Stankevitch, noted that "the most striking thing about the composition of the EC was the number of foreign elements . . . out of all proportion with their numbers in Petrograd or in the country." (p. 47)

These men were chosen to represent neither their own nationalities nor the people of Russia, but the various socialist parties: Mensheviks, Bolsheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries, and so forth. After June, the EC was replaced by a smaller *Central Executive Committee* of nine persons: five were Jewish, only one Russian (p. 67).

In view of subsequent events, it has largely been forgotten that most politically active Jews in Russia that year were not involved with these socialist parties at all:

In the course of the summer and autumn of 1917, the Zionist movement continued to gather strength in Russia: in September it had 300,000 adherents. Less known is that Orthodox Jewish organizations enjoyed great popularity in 1917, yielding only to the Zionists and surpassing the socialist parties. (p. 54)

Furthermore, most Jews who did belong to socialist parties were not Bolsheviks: "during the year 1917 Jews were proportionally much more numerous in leading positions among the Mensheviks, right Socialist Revolutionaries, left Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists than among the Bolsheviks" (p. 65). Shortly before the Bolshevik *Putsch*, however, the Jewish socialists "Natanson, Kamkov, and Steinberg formed an alliance with Trotsky and Kamenev in the name of the left Socialist Revolutionaries" (p. 81). This brief alliance was useful to Lenin in creating the false appearance that the new "Soviet" government was more than a front for the Bolshevik Party.

Solzhenitsyn writes: "It must be stated clearly that the October *Putsch* was not led by the Jews (except for the glorious Trotsky and the young and dynamic Grigori Chudnovsky)" (p. 80). He remarks that there were also some Jews in the Winter Palace defending the Provisional Government *from* the Bolsheviks, and recalls meeting one of them in a Soviet prison himself.

The new government's first challenge was a mass strike of service personnel in support of the deposed Provisional Government. Ministry buildings barred their doors against the new "Soviet Commissars"; Trotsky got laughed out of the Defense Ministry. Most importantly,

banks refused Bolshevik demands for funds. In 1919, Lenin specifically credited his Jewish followers for keeping him in power at this point: “immediately after October, it was the Jews who saved the revolution by breaking the resistance of the civil servants” (p. 105).

Lenin’s team claimed at first to be a mere caretaker government pending the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. Elections for such an assembly had been scheduled by the Provisional Government for November 12th, and the Bolsheviks reluctantly allowed them to go ahead in the hope of dominating the resulting body. But their rivals the Socialist Revolutionary Party won a large majority. Most Jewish voters supported Zionist parties. The Constituent Assembly was forcibly dispersed the night after it convened, January 6, 1918, and all Bolshevik pretenses to democratic legitimacy were scrapped.

During these critical first months, Lenin had no reliable Russian troops; his only armed force was a Latvian rifle brigade which he assigned to the Jewish commissar Nachimson.

The author discusses some of the arguments used by Jewish apologists to excuse or palliate Jewish involvement in Bolshevik rule. He accepts the common argument that the Jewish Bolsheviks were renegades, i.e., “not Jews *in spirit*.” He points out, however, that the same was true of Russian Bolsheviks and denies that any nation may simply disown its renegades: “for if we release ourselves from all responsibility for the actions of our national kin, the very concept of a *nation* loses any real meaning” (p. 132).

There are many Jewish authors who to this very day either deny the support of Jews for Bolshevism, or even reject it angrily, or else—the most common case—only speak defensively about it. The matter is well-attested, however: these Jewish renegades were for several years leaders at the center of the Bolshevik Party, at the head of the Red Army (Trotsky), of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (Sverdlov), of the two capitals (Zinoviev and Kamenev), of the Comintern (Zinoviev), of the Profintern (Dridzo-Lozovsky), and of the Komsomol (Oskar Ryvkin, then Lazar Shatskin). (p. 91)

Marxists are officially “internationalists,” of course, and Trotsky was especially emphatic in rejecting his ethnic heritage. But does it necessarily follow that he was not influenced by it? “To judge by the appointments he made,” Solzhenitsyn observes, “Jewish renegades were closer

to him than Russian renegades" (p. 92). Particularly striking was his appointment of the incompetent Jewish doctor Sklianski to a high post in the Commissariat of War.

The author goes on to discuss the roles of the Jews Uritsky, Drabkin, and Sverdlov in dispersing the Constituent Assembly, concluding with one of his strongest formulations: "by these sorts of operations the new Jewish form of government was sketched out" (p. 93).

He reproduces the remarks of some contemporary observers:

I. F. Nazhivin records the impressions he received at the very beginning of Soviet power: at the Kremlin in the administration of the Sovnarkom "you see nothing but Latvians upon Latvians, Jews upon Jews. I have never been an anti-Semite, but here there were so many it leapt out at you, and each one younger than the next."

[The writer Vladimir] Korolenko himself, liberal and hyper-tolerant as he was, entered into his Journal in the Spring of 1919: "Among the Bolsheviks there are a great number of Jewish men and women. Their tactlessness, their self-assurance are striking and irritating. . . . In their ranks, and above all in the Cheka [the secret police], you constantly see Jewish physiognomies, and this exacerbates the still virulent traditional feelings of Judeophobia [among the population]." (p. 99)

Another witness quoted by Solzhenitsyn specifies that most of the heads of prisons were Poles and Latvians, while "the section charged with combating black marketers – the least dangerous and most lucrative – was in the hands of Jews" (p. 94). Jews are also said to have been unusually noticeable in the organs charged with provisioning (p. 97). Solzhenitsyn lists the names of ten Jewish bankers who provided important financial services for the Bolsheviks (p. 115).

Some Jews were also implicated in the murder of the Imperial family, notably Sverdlov (who transmitted the order from Moscow) and Urovsky (who led the execution squad), but Solzhenitsyn believes the point has been exaggerated in recent years by certain Russian nationalists "who take a morbid pleasure in this agonizing thought" (p. 100). Most of the executioners were Hungarian prisoners of war; final responsibility for the crime rested, of course, with Lenin.

The Bolshevik *Putsch* led to a split in Jewish parties such as the Bund and the Zionist-Socialists. Those who would not support Lenin either

emigrated or were suppressed. But the left wings of two Zionist-Socialist groupings joined the Communist Party *en masse* in 1919 and 1921. And the left wing of the Bund simply dissolved, with many of its members joining the Communists. According to an internal Party survey of 1926, 2,500 Bundists had become Party members. Many Mensheviks, Jewish and otherwise, did likewise. Most of these persons would face persecution under Stalin (pp. 118–19).

There were Jews who resisted Soviet power. “But,” writes Solzhenitsyn, “they did not have any way of making themselves heard publicly, and the present pages are naturally filled not with their names but with those who guided the course of events” (p. 123). He relates the stories of two Jews who are known to have sacrificed their lives fighting the new regime. Leonid Kannegiesser assassinated Moisei Uritsky, a Jewish Chekist, explaining in a letter to his sister that (among other motives) he was ashamed to see Jews helping to install the Bolsheviks in power. Alexander Abramovich Vilenkin, four-times decorated cavalry officer, was shot in 1918 for belonging to a clandestine anti-Bolshevik Organization.

“These combatants of Bolshevism, whatever may have been their motivation—we honor their memory as Jews. We deplore that there were so few of them, just as the White forces in the Civil War were too few” (p. 125).

In 1918 [writes Solzhenitsyn] Trotsky, with the aid of Sklianski and Yakov Sverdlov, created the Red Army. Jewish soldiers were numerous in its ranks. Several units of the Red Army were composed entirely of Jews, as, e.g., the brigade commanded by Joseph Forman. Among the officers of the Red Army, the share of Jews grew in number and importance for many years after the Civil War. (p. 135)

According to one of the author’s Jewish sources, “the proportion of Jews in the position of Political Adjuncts was especially high at all levels of the Red Army” (p. 136).

Of special interest to students of Communism is the Cheka, the secret political police who carried out the Red Terror and eventually built the Gulag. In their early phase, national minorities composed almost 50 percent of the central apparatus of the Cheka, and nearly 70 percent of the responsible posts. An inventory on 25 September 1918 reveals, besides a great number of Latvians and a not insignificant

number of Poles, a good showing by Jews. And of the judges assigned to the struggle against counter-revolution—by far the most important section in the structure of the Cheka—half were Jews (pp. 142–43).

The Ukrainian Cheka, in what used to be the Pale of Settlement, was composed about 80 percent of Jews (p. 150). In Kiev, which was 21 percent Jewish in 1919 (p. 156), key positions in the Cheka were "almost exclusively" in Jewish hands. Of the twenty members of the commission which decided people's fate, fourteen were Jews (p. 148).

The Kievan Cheka even published a newsletter, *The Red Sword*; it offers an unusual glimpse into the minds of those who carried out the Terror. In an article by its Jewish editor-in-chief Leon Kraini we read: "For us there cannot be any question of encumbering ourselves with old principles of morality and humanitarianism invented by the bourgeoisie." A certain Schwartz echoes his sentiments: "The Red Terror which has been proclaimed must be carried out in a proletarian fashion. . . . If in order to institute the dictatorship of the proletariat in the whole world it is necessary to annihilate all the servants of tsarism and capitalism, we will not hesitate to do so" (p. 141).

Vasily Shulgin, an old political ally of Stolypin, witnessed an enormous exodus from Kiev on October 1st, 1919 as the town was about to be occupied by the Bolsheviks. Some 60,000 Russians, according to his estimate, left on foot with nothing more than they could carry. At the time, there were some 100,000 Jews living in Kiev. "But there were no Jews in this exodus; you could not see any among these thousands of Russians. They did not want to share our destiny." Even the wealthiest "bourgeois" Jews preferred to take their chances with the Bolsheviks (pp. 149–50).

Sergei Maslov, author of *Russia after Four Years of Revolution*, reports: "In the towns of southern Russia, especially the Western half of the Ukraine which changed hands several times, the advent of Soviet power gave rise to ostentatious sympathy and the greatest joy in the Jewish quarters, and often nowhere else" (p. 150).

One of the best promoted legends about the Russian Revolution concerns "the pogroms carried out by the White Armies" during the Civil War. Solzhenitsyn devotes several pages to examining this widely received notion.

In the first place, it is important to understand that Reds and Whites were not the only forces fighting in Southern Russia at this time. There was a powerful Ukrainian separatist movement under the leadership of Symon Petliura. There were also a number of private

armed bands responsible to no one but themselves. These were led by local bosses (Solzhenitsyn names ten), and operated mainly in rural areas. Some described themselves as “Blacks” or “Greens,” and opposed both the White and Red Armies. The entire scene was extremely chaotic, and it can be a difficult chore for the historian to figure out exactly who was where when.

The pogroms which occurred across the whole of Southern Russia during this period were “unprecedented in their cruelty and numbers of victims” (p. 134)—out of all proportion to anything which had been seen in 1881–82, 1903, or 1905–06. Early Soviet sources speak of 180,000–200,000 victims and more than 300,000 orphaned children. The more recent *Jewish Encyclopedia* records that “according to various estimates between 70,000 and 180,000–200,000 perished” (p. 172). Who was responsible for these atrocities?

Collating various Jewish sources, a contemporary historian estimates the number of mass pogroms at 900, among which 40 percent were carried out by the forces of Petliura and the [Ukrainian National] Directory, 25 percent by [irregular] detachments commanded by Ukrainian bosses, 17 percent by Denikin’s [White] Armies, and 8.5 percent by Budienny’s First Cavalry and other Red forces. (pp. 172–73)

In other words, the great majority of pogroms of this period were not connected with the White movement at all. Those carried out by Ukrainian separatist forces were not only the most numerous but also distinguished for their deliberate cruelty and the methodical extermination of women, children, and the elderly. Sometimes they were not even accompanied by pillaging (p. 160).

And, in spite of Lenin’s declared intentions, the Red forces did not remain innocent:

In the Spring of 1918 [before the other forces had gotten started!—FRD], pogroms accompanied by the slogan “down with the Jews and the bourgeois!” were fomented by Red Army detachments returning from Ukraine. Particularly cruel were the pogroms perpetrated by the First Cavalry at the end of August 1920 during their retreat from Poland. But these pogroms fomented by the Red Army have remained nearly hidden from history. (p. 173)

So what about that 17 percent of pogroms due to the White Army?

Solzhenitsyn devotes eleven pages to the story of the Jews and the White movement. This material is difficult to summarize. The author quotes divergent and even contradictory testimonies without always taking sides. At one moment the subject is the "Volunteer Army," a little farther along it the "White Army." The reader is never told that the former was a part of the latter, nor what the other parts were.

A recent scholarly study affirms that "in its first year of existence [1918], the White movement was practically free of any anti-Semitism. . . . But in 1919 [the decisive year of the war] things changed radically" (p. 163). The White Army was hypnotized by Trotsky and Nakhmisk [editor of *Izvestia*], which led it to identify Bolshevism as a whole with the Jews. The divisions fighting in Ukraine were probably also influenced by the local tradition of anti-Semitism (p. 164).

The Jewish doctor Daniel Pasmanik, who served the Whites for a time, recalled:

The Volunteer Army systematically refused to accept into its ranks Jewish ensigns and cadets, including those who had valiantly fought the Bolsheviks in October 1917. This was a severe moral blow to the Jews. I will never forget when eleven Jewish ensigns came to see me in Simferopol to complain that they had been excluded from the armed service and relegated to the rear as cooks. (p. 168)

D. Linski reports that Jews were not allowed to occupy administrative functions, nor accepted in the propaganda department of the Volunteer Army. But he denies that the Army published anti-Semitic propaganda or let attacks against Jews go unpunished (p. 169).

The Volunteer Army was, both militarily and morally, the soundest part of the White forces in Southern Russia. But they were insufficient to stand up to the Red Army by themselves. A number of Cossack divisions were enrolled to fight in the Ukraine, to the West of the Volunteers. These men were motivated by the desire for plunder as much as by opposition to bolshevism. It was in their area that most (perhaps all) of the "White pogroms" occurred.¹

¹ This is essentially the version accepted by Richard Pipes in *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime* (New York: Vintage, 1995), 104-12. Pipes denies that the Volunteer Army perpetrated pogroms – something Solzhenitsyn appears to accept (cf. pp. 164, 167).

General Denikin, overall leader of the White forces in Southern Russia, expressed shame over the pogroms committed by men nominally under his command, and no historian seems to suspect him of having ordered them (although some argue that he might have done more to stop them).

It is frequently asserted that the conduct of the White Army virtually forced the Jews of Southern Russia to side with the Bolsheviks. Solzhenitsyn remarks: "We cannot say that nothing drove them to make this choice; we also cannot say there was no other solution" (p. 149). In any case, it is difficult to see how the Whites could have *forced* anyone to take an active role in the Cheka.

Strengthening the public perception of Bolshevism as a Jewish movement were the brief Communist takeovers of Bavaria and Hungary in 1919. The proportion of Jews in the Bolshevik movement in Hungary was said to be about 95 percent; in the German Communist Party it was also greatly out of proportion. "That the directors of the communist revolts were Jews—this was one of the main reasons for the revival of political anti-Semitism in post-revolutionary Germany" (p. 153). In the 1920s, "the assimilation of Bolshevism to Judaism became a fashion followed by everyone," i.e., it was not peculiar to traditionally anti-Semitic milieus (p. 188).

About two million persons fled Bolshevik Russia during the years 1918–22, with most settling in Western Europe. As Russia fell eerily silent—apart from the monotonous drone of the regime itself—all aspects of the revolution continued to be enthusiastically debated among the exiles, both Jewish and Gentile. Jews numbered some 200,000 among the refugees (i.e., 10 percent), and about half of them went to Germany. They were particularly active in the field of publishing: "In 1922, these publishers brought out more Russian books and publications [in Berlin] than German language editors did in all of Germany" (pp. 182–83). A surprising number of the Jewish exiles continued to cherish an idealized image of Soviet Russia as a promised land of equality and social justice. Among the Jewish refugees who settled in the United States, notes the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, "pro-Bolshevik ideas had no difficulty proliferating" (p. 196). "One cannot say that the Jewish emigration [as a whole] was pro-Bolshevik," concludes Solzhenitsyn, "but for it the Bolshevik regime was not the principal enemy, and many were those who maintained a benevolent attitude towards it" (p. 196).

I. M. Biekerman relates a characteristic anecdote:

When a well-known Jewish public figure proposed to a Jewish religious dignitary, in one of the European capitals, to organize a meeting to protest the execution of Orthodox priests in Russia, the latter, upon reflection, answered that this amounted to combating the Bolsheviks, which he considered it impossible to do since the fall of Bolshevism would lead to the return of pogroms. (p. 198)

This Biekerman, along with Pasmanik and Linski, helped to found an extraordinary group called "The Patriotic Alliance of Russian Jews." In 1923 they issued a manifesto stating that "for the Jews as for all the nations which inhabit Russia, Bolshevism is the worst of all possible evils" (p. 200).

Jews must fight those who are perverting Russia, shoulder-to-shoulder with all anti-Bolsheviks. A fraternal combat against a common enemy will clear the air and considerably weaken the wave of anti-Semitism which has been unleashed. (p. 203)

Later that year this group had published in Berlin a six-author volume entitled *Russia and the Jews*. Says Solzhenitsyn:

In the entire history of relations between Jews and Russians, I know of nothing comparable to this collection. For the Jews in the emigration, it had the effect of a bomb. Just imagine how painful it was to hear these words from Jewish mouths, from within the Jewish world.

As for us Russians, we should not take this collection lightly. On the contrary, it should serve as an example for us: of how, even while loving one's own people, one may speak of one's own errors and, where necessary, do so without indulgence. And without placing oneself apart, without dissociating oneself from one's people. (p. 204)

Solzhenitsyn makes extensive use of this group of writers as sources throughout the first half of his second volume. Admirable as they may have been, they were isolated voices within the Jewish emigration. The author fills a page and a half with the dismissive or vituperative comments they elicited from other Jews (pp. 209-10).

The decade of the 1920s also witnessed a mass migration of Jews

from the former Pale toward the cities of Central Russia: ordinary Russians spoke (or perhaps whispered) of a Jewish “conquest” of the cities. For example, in 1920 there were 28,000 Jews in Moscow; in 1923 there were 86,000; in 1926, 131,000; in 1933, 226,500. City residence allowed them better access to consumer goods and to professional advancement (pp. 218, 224).

Jewish representation in the Communist Party was about proportional to their share of the *urban* population. But with 83 percent of Jews living in towns, they were one of the most urbanized nationalities in the Soviet Union. So overall they were overrepresented in Party ranks by a factor of about 6.5 (p. 219).

The four largest nationalities represented in the Party in 1922 were Russians (72 percent), Ukrainians (5.9 percent), Jews (5.2 percent), and Latvians (2.5 percent). This means that for one thousand Russians there were 3.8 Communists, while for one thousand Jews there were 8.1. The disproportion was greater at higher levels in the Party. Jews made up 18.3 percent of the voting delegates at the XIth Party Congress that year, and 26 percent of the new Central Committee elected by this Congress (pp. 225–26).

During these years, the role of national minorities in the secret police declined overall: from 50 percent at the time of the Red Terror to 30–35 percent by the mid-1920s. Even so, the number of Jews continued to increase (pp. 227–28).

New class origin criteria for admission to universities were established. The sons of even “petty bourgeois” Russians—shopkeepers and such—were barred from advancement. On the other hand

. . . these discriminatory measures were not extended to Jews because they belonged to a “nation persecuted by the tsarist regime.” The Jewish youth, even of *bourgeois origin*, were greeted with open arms in the universities. Jews were forgiven for not being *proletarian*. (p. 221)

Thus, 15.4 percent of students enrolled in institutions of higher learning in 1926–27 were Jewish, while Jews constituted just 1.82 percent of the population. The situation was even more lopsided than these numbers reveal, because the Russians who did get admitted were “proletarians,” i.e., not the cognitive elite of the Russian nation.

Such circumstances were both noticed and resented by the rest of the population. The “new anti-Semitism” was not a continuation of

the pre-Revolutionary variety, but affected demographic groups that had been entirely free of anti-Semitism in earlier days. The matter went undiscussed in the official Soviet press for several years.

Exposés first appeared in Paris by 1922. The revelations of socialists Yekaterina Kuskova and Sergei Maslov profoundly shocked the exiled intelligentsia, for whom it had always been an article of faith that anti-Semitism was caused by "autocracy."

Even among the children of radical families, wrote Kuskova, all the talk is of the Jewish invasion: "*they* have shown their true face, *they* have made us suffer!" She maintained that an actual majority of the population had become anti-Semitic, and the younger generation more than their elders.

Maslov stated that "the power of the Yids" was a common expression. "Among the reasons for this universal Judeophobia," he explained, "is the Jews' strong national solidarity" which "appears especially in the recruitment of administrative agents." In a Jewish functionary: "Soviet power reveals its bad side most ostentatiously. The intoxication of power acts more strongly on Jews" (pp. 241-44).

The New Economic Policy (NEP), launched by Lenin in the spring of 1921, was a tactical retreat on the economic front which allowed limited private enterprise while the Communists strengthened their political grip on the country. This reversal of policy created, as an unintended effect, new occasions for Judeophobia. Solzhenitsyn remarks:

One often saw Jews among those who first enriched themselves under NEP. The hatred directed against them was also due to their operating within the field of Soviet institutions, not only those of the market: many of their undertakings were made easier by the relations they enjoyed with those in the Soviet apparatus. (p. 255)

Beginning around 1926, the regime openly admitted the existence of the "new anti-Semitism" and sought to combat it. A leader in this counter-attack was Yuri Larin, previously best known as the man behind "War Communism," the policies which wrecked the Russian economy between 1918 and 1921. In 1929, he published a book on *The Jews and Anti-Semitism in the USSR*. He reports hearing questions such as these in communist meetings: "Why don't you see Jews in waiting lines? Why are the Jews rich? Why do they have their own bakeries? Why do the Jews seek out easy work? Why do they avoid physical

work? Why do the Jews help each other out, while Russians do not?" (p. 246). A current saying in Moscow ran: "Siberia for the Russians, Crimea for the Jews" (p. 245).

With typical Bolshevik paranoia, Larin thought he could glimpse behind these suggestions "the hand of a clandestine counter-revolutionary organization . . . systematic propaganda orchestrated by secret organizations emanating from the White Army" (which, of course, had been driven out of Russia nine years before [pp. 246, 251]). Larin recommended applying "Lenin's Law," meaning a decree of 1918 authorizing the shooting of anti-Semites without trial.

In fact, the Soviet Penal Code of 1926 contained provisions against "incitement to national hatred and divisiveness" [have the EU bureaucrats been studying Soviet law?], expanded in 1927 to include "diffusion, authorship or *possession* of written documents" (p. 252, italics added). Solzhenitsyn remarks: "The most rabid anti-Semite could not have discovered a better means of getting the people to identify Soviet power with that of the Jews" (p. 253).

There were also, of course, plenty of ordinary Jews who had been left behind and forgotten by the revolution: older people attached to the old places and ways, or families with numerous children. They sank into utter destitution, completely dependent on charity from abroad (which was still operating in the 1920s). G. Simon, an older émigré who returned as an American businessman in the late 1920s, published a book about these forgotten Jews under the sarcastic title *The Jews Reign in Russia*: "The only refuge for Jews," he wrote, "is the graveyard" (pp. 253–54, 257).

The idea of making farmers out of the Jews was once again in fashion during the 1920s. It did not originate with the Jews themselves but was based upon ideological considerations. Ignoring the decades-long efforts of the previous century, the Party claimed that Jews had been prevented from taking up agriculture, and so forced to become "exploiters." Extensive lands were set aside for them in the Crimea, and money poured in from abroad. The regime sought by this means to steal the Zionists' thunder and tie the fate of the Jews even more firmly to that of Soviet rule. These Crimean lands were taken back just a few years later at the time of collectivization (pp. 262–68).

A more serious effort concerned the establishment of the Jewish Autonomous Region of Birobidjan on the Chinese border in Eastern Siberia. This territory was once described by Khrushchev as a fertile land with a southern climate, well-watered and sunny, with immense

forests and rivers brimming with fish. A more objective source calls it a "partly marshy stretch of taiga." Great efforts were made in the 20s and 30s to encourage Jews to settle there, but the majority either returned home or moved on to larger cities such as Vladivostok (pp. 268-70). This Jewish Autonomous Region still nominally exists, with a Jewish population of just over 1 percent.

In the first years of the new regime there existed a "Jewish Section" within the Party, "more fanatical than the Soviet authorities themselves, and sometimes ahead of them in their projects." But there seemed to be contradictory tendencies to the Jewish Sections' activity:

On the one hand, an intense activity of communist propaganda in Yiddish, a pitiless war against Judaism, traditional Jewish education, independent Jewish organizations, political parties and movements, Zionism and Hebrew ["a reactionary and counter-revolutionary language"]. On the other hand, a refusal of assimilation, support for the Yiddish language and culture, the organization of a Soviet Jewish system of education, Jewish scientific research, and action to improve the economic condition of Soviet Jews. (p. 271)

Many members of the Jewish Section were former Bund members. One Jewish author remarks approvingly that "under the proletarian sauce, [the action of the Jewish section] carried the clear mark of Jewish national identity" (p. 272). For a time, important works on pre-Revolutionary Jewish history were supported by the Jewish Section; Solzhenitsyn makes use of some of this material himself in his first volume. There was also a very active Yiddish Theater scene, which lasted into the 1930s, and heavy Jewish involvement in early Soviet Cinema that went far beyond the well-known works of Eisenstein.

The Jewish Section took a special interest in combating its ideological rival, Zionism. They lobbied the regime to take a hard line with an ideology so incompatible with Marxist internationalism, but for several years the upper echelons of the Party showed unwonted leniency in the matter. Zionists maintained a Central Bureau in Moscow until 1924. One Zionist party, Poalei-Zion, was officially permitted to exist until 1928. Harsh punishments for Zionist activity were relatively rare, in part because the Zionists had so many friends abroad.

The Jewish religion was not (as is sometimes asserted) spared persecution during these years, but the regime's policies were certainly

milder and less consistent here than in regard to Orthodox Christianity. The fanatics of the Jewish Section called upon the Party to adopt a policy of “equal persecution” for Judaism, but this took a long time to happen. Synagogues are said to have been more numerous at the end of the 20s than in 1917: two new Synagogues were constructed in Moscow. Prayer books and religious calendars continued to be published. The authorities occasionally even permitted unleavened bread to be imported for Passover celebrations.

The central Synagogues of Vitebsk, Minsk, Gomel, Karkhov, Bobruisk, and Kiev, however, were all closed. Others were plundered: although Synagogues typically contained fewer valuables than Christian Churches, menorahs were frequently made of silver. In 1921, the Jewish Section of Kiev organized a bizarre “public trial of Judaism,” culminating in a “death sentence” handed down by Jewish Communists. This “trial” was later repeated in other towns. *Heders* and *yeshivot* were ordered closed, but continued to operate clandestinely for many years. The Jewish Sections arranged things so that Jews’ days off work never fell on the Sabbath. On the high holy days, they sometimes entered Synagogues to disrupt services.

Solzhenitsyn concludes: “in those years, we all wanted to chase out God” (p. 287). He says surprisingly little about the brutal campaign against the Orthodox Church or any Jewish role in it.

In 1926, the Party downgraded the Jewish Section to a Jewish Bureau. In 1930, it was altogether abolished. (Other national “Sections” were suffering the same fate around the same time.)

Despite their unfortunate history as agriculturalists, many Jews obtained high positions in the Commissariat of Agriculture. There are bizarre stories of peasants being ordered by these authorities to shear their sheep at the onset of the Russian Winter or receiving *roasted* Sunflower seeds for planting (p. 243). Eventually, Commissars with Jewish names such as Schlichter, Epstein, and Kritzman were to preside over collectivization, destroying the independence of the peasants who constituted 80 percent of the Russian population (pp. 292–93).

In summarizing the situation of Jews in the Soviet Union of the 20s, Solzhenitsyn writes:

A myth is in course of formation: “the Jews were always second class citizens under the Soviet regime.” And rare indeed are those who are willing to admit not only the participation of Jews in the deeds perpetrated by the barbaric young State, but also

the virulence which certain of them demonstrated.

In the 1990s, a Jewish author [G. Shurmak] declared: "For decades, Jews were proud of their compatriots who made a brilliant career out of the revolution, without much reflecting upon what that career cost the Russian people in real suffering. . . . It is striking with what unanimity my compatriots deny any responsibility in the Russian history of the twentieth century."

Words like these could be salvation for our two peoples if they were not so hopelessly rare. Because it is the truth: in the course of the twenties, numerous were the Jews who rushed to serve the Bolshevik Moloch, without thinking of the unhappy country which would provide the field for their experiments any more than of the consequences which would result for themselves. (pp. 298-99)

By the end of the 1920s, the New Economic Policy had served its purpose. Stalin, now an unrivalled dictator, inaugurated a policy of collectivization and industrialization. This required an influx of technical expertise from abroad, most especially from the United States. Ignoring Marx's inconvenient teaching that capitalism was always the deadly enemy of socialism, the Soviet Union traded enthusiastically with the West, most often getting equipment and technical expertise in exchange for raw materials.

Before the Revolution, American financiers had refused, at considerable cost to themselves, to have dealings with the "barbaric" Russia of pogroms and Jewish Settlement Laws. But the Soviet campaign against Zionism and Judaism met with little indignation in the West. The general impression was that the Soviet regime was not oppressing the Jews—and was maintaining them in positions of power. The regime did what it could to reinforce this impression. In 1931 Stalin issued for the foreign press a special statement condemning anti-Semitism. And in 1936, Molotov delivered the following tirade (as Solzhenitsyn calls it) to the XVIIIth Party Congress:

Our fraternal sentiments with regard to the Jewish people come from their having given birth to the genius who conceived the communist liberation of humanity [Marx], from their having given the world eminent men in the domain of science, technology, the arts, and valiant heroes of the revolutionary struggle and, in our country, they have produced and still produce new

directors and remarkable organizers whose talents are exercised in every branch of the edification and defense of the cause of socialism. (p. 304)

These words may have been intended to mark off the Soviet regime from Hitlerism in the eyes of the West, says Solzhenitsyn, but they also correspond to reality.

Today, the author asserts, it is often stated in Russia that the Jews were chased out of key positions in the 30s and had no further part in the direction of the country. Solzhenitsyn, however, denies that any significant decline in Jewish power occurred before the Great Purge of 1937–38, and provides statistics to back up the claim: e.g., the participation of Jews in the Party's Central Committee held steady at one-sixth from 1930 to 1934. In the Commissariats of Commerce and Provisioning, Jewish participation hovered between one-third and one-half. A contemporary historian, L. Krichevsky, has written that "the first half of the 30s is marked by an increase in the role of Jews within the security organs [the secret police]. On the eve of the most massive repressions [1937–38], 407 high-level Chekists received decorations: among them, 56 (13.8 percent) were Jews" (p. 314).

The author famously included pictures of six Jewish Chekists of the 30s as an illustration in *The Gulag Archipelago*. This is what first gave rise to the legend of "Solzhenitsyn's anti-Semitism." In the present book he tells us the story behind these pictures: he did not collect and assemble them himself, but copied the set of six directly from a self-glorifying album the security organs themselves published in 1936! (pp. 317, 363).

We must not leave out the story of Isaï Davidovich Berg, inventor of the *gas chamber on wheels*. Frustrated at the inability of the execution squad to keep up with the numbers of "counter-revolutionaries" his men kept bringing them, this dedicated Chekist developed a vehicle which could deliver victims ready for burial. It was disguised as a bread-van. In spite of his inventiveness, Berg himself was shot in 1939.

The author reviews more than one attempt to portray the Jewish Communists of the 1930s as victims. Solomon Schwartz asserts that "under Soviet conditions, [the Jews] had no chance to survive except State service," to which Solzhenitsyn responds:

One is ashamed to read this. What sort of situation of oppression and despair is it which leaves you no other chance of survival

than to occupy positions of privilege? What about the rest of the population? They enjoyed full liberty to wear themselves out on collective farms and in prison camps, digging ditches with pick-axes, carrying loads on the sites of the five-year plans . . . (p. 335)

Jews, being so prominent in the Party, were numerous among those killed in the Great Purge of 1937-38. Before it, they had been at the head of 50 percent of the principal services for internal affairs; by January 1, 1939 they occupied only 6 percent of these positions (p. 320). It is remarkable that no one seems to assert a specifically anti-Semitic motive behind the purge, although Stalin certainly had no fondness for Jews.

The Israeli writer Yu. Margolin is another who tries to engage our sympathy for the Jewish Communists, "victims of the Soviet dictatorship, used and then liquidated without pity when they were no longer useful." Solzhenitsyn is not buying it:

A lovely explanation! But were these persons really *used* for twenty years? Did they not pour all their zeal into being the *engine of that same dictatorship*, and before being "no longer useful," did they not take a vigorous part in the destruction of religion and culture, in the annihilation of the intelligentsia and several million peasants? (p. 323)

For the same reasons, he has little pity for purged Jewish Chekists: "one cannot agree—it would not be decent, not honest—to include among the *persecutions* of the Jews the fact that they were chased out of the organs of repression" (p. 322).

The years following the Great Purge saw the continued decline in Jewish Party membership, as well as the closing of many of the remaining synagogues. In 1939, the *numerus clausus* system was reintroduced for Jews in Soviet Universities. Nevertheless, "up to the war, the great majority of Soviet Jews remained sympathetic to Soviet ideology and in agreement with the regime" (p. 348). And the sympathy of European Jews for the Soviet Union experienced a new upsurge in these years, courtesy of Hitler. During the period of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, following the German invasion of Western Poland, some two million Jews fled east into the Soviet Union.

At this point in his narrative, the author includes a chapter on the Jews' situation within the Gulag, the "archipelago" of prison camps

scattered across Soviet Russia. He begins:

If I had never spent time there myself, I would not have been able to write this chapter. Before camp, I thought like everyone else: one *must not notice* nationality; there are no nations, just humanity. But they send you to camp and you learn that if you belong to a *good* nation you are lucky, you can rest easy, you will survive. But if your nation is *that of everyone*—there is no use blaming anybody for the consequences. (p. 357)

In the Soviet camps, the Russians were the “nation of everyone.” More compact or tribally-minded peoples managed to look out for one another in the harsh conditions of camp life, and so stood a better chance of survival.

Readers of *The Gulag Archipelago* will recall the “trusties,” prisoners who collaborated with their keepers in return for favors which to outsiders may seem ridiculously small, but which often meant the difference between life and death. (The young Solzhenitsyn, still a believer in Communism, actually served as a trusty in the early part of his time in the camps—a story he relates at length in *The Gulag Archipelago*.)

Trusties were often chosen on the basis of nationality:

Any old prisoner who has had the full experience of camp life will confirm that certain nationalities were much better represented among the trusties than among the general prison population. Thus, you found almost no Balts, although they were quite numerous among the prisoners. There were always Russians, of course, but in a small proportion compared to their numbers in the camp (and they had often been recruited among the *bien-pensants* of the Party). On the other hand, there were many Jews, Armenians, Georgians; also a lot of Azerbaijanis and Caucasian mountain people. (p. 357)

On this subject Solzhenitsyn writes something which has evoked more outrage among Russian Jews than anything else in his thousand-page work:

If I had wanted to generalize by saying that the Jews in the camps had a particularly harsh life, no one would have stopped me, and I would not have been covered with reproaches for

having generalized unjustly. But in the camps I knew it was different: insofar as one can generalize, the Jews lived there with less hardship than others. (pp. 358–59)

He relates the story of a Latvian with the convenient name Bernstein, one of his informants in writing *The Gulag Archipelago*, who believes he only survived the camp because in the most difficult times he could turn to the Jews for help (p. 360).

Once again, Solzhenitsyn digs up an example of a Jewish author writing of the Jewish collaborators with sympathy rather than shame: a certain unfortunate named Belinkov "got cast out among the most despised category, the 'trusties.'" The author comments: "one must have lost all sense of humor to write [such a thing]. Cast out among the trusties – what an expression! 'Lowered to the masters?'" (p. 359).

Solzhenitsyn also tells us about the Jews Vladimir Efroimson and Yakov Davidovich Grodzensky who refused to become trusties when they could have. Efroimson wished to dissipate the animosity toward Jews in the camp resulting from so many being trusties. The Jewish trusties mocked him and resented him for making them look bad. The rest explained his behavior by saying that he was not a "real" Jew, or was a "degenerate" Jew. Solzhenitsyn comments:

Animated by the highest motives, Efroimson and Grodzensky did the noblest and most just thing any Jews could do – loyally share the common fate . . . and they were not understood by either side! For it is always this way in History: the paths of self-limitation, renunciation of oneself, are arduous – they lend themselves to sarcasm – but they are the only paths which can save humanity.

As for me, I shall never forget these examples, and shall put my hope in them. (p. 365)

Most of Solzhenitsyn's Jewish sources concede that the Soviet authorities did a commendable job of evacuating Jews from the western regions of Russia at the beginning of the German invasion of 1941, given the constraints upon transport and the other urgent demands being made upon it. About 2,226,000 Jews were successfully evacuated. Another 2,739,000 Jews, mostly from borderlands recently reacquired following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, had to be left to face the German occupation (p. 375).

“During 1941–42,” writes Solzhenitsyn, “the Soviet authorities gladly allowed the synagogues of Moscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov to fill up and the Jewish Passover to be celebrated” (p. 379). Yiddish newspapers were published again. A Jewish Antifascist Committee was set up to publicize anti-Jewish atrocities committed by the invaders: “the effect produced in the West surpassed all Moscow’s expectations. . . . In allied countries, Jewish organizations were created to gather funds for the Red Army” (p. 383). The Soviet regime even cooperated with the Zionist movement for several years.

Popular anti-Semitism increased during the war years. It was commonly asserted, e.g., that Jews avoided service at the front. Solzhenitsyn goes through the statistics carefully and concludes that such accusations are unfounded. He presents evidence that some 430,000 Jews fought in the Red Army during the war, with 270 Jewish Generals and Admirals among them (pp. 388–98).

Part of the German plan of occupation was to get the local populations to initiate pogroms. This was intended to create the impression that anti-Jewish actions were undertaken spontaneously by the nations which Germany had “liberated from Jewish Bolshevism.” In their reports to Berlin, however, SS officials reported that this task was “quite difficult” in Lithuania, “much more difficult” in Latvia, and impossible in Byelorussia. Neither did they have success when they reached Great Russia. In Ukraine, the German plan enjoyed some success, especially among the Ukrainian separatists, but the SS had to take matters into their own hands eventually. Only the Crimean Tatars proved zealous in massacring the local Jews. On the whole, the German attempt to hide behind proxies was a failure (pp. 403–408).

There is nothing in Solzhenitsyn’s pages which could serve as grist for the mill of “holocaust revisionism,” nor does he ever suggest that German National Socialism was preferable to Soviet Communism.

As is widely recognized, the postwar years up to the death of Stalin were marked by an official campaign against the Jews. This was the responsibility of the dictator himself, as Solzhenitsyn explains:

[T]he very structure of the totalitarian regime meant that the weakening of the Jewish share in the leadership of the country could only be initiated by Stalin himself.

But neither Stalin’s devious character nor the hardened character of Soviet propaganda allowed an open course of action. The first transformations in the composition of the State apparatus

occurred—almost imperceptibly, it is true—after the rapprochement of Stalin with Hitler in 1939. The Jew Litvinov was replaced by Molotov and "purges" took place in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. And military and diplomatic academies were closed to Jews.

From the end of 1942, actions were taken to remove Jews from artistic institutions such as the Bolshoi, the Moscow Conservatory, [and] the Moscow Philharmonic. Later there were attempts to initiate a prorated repartitioning of [Party] cadres according to national origin, which in practice amounted to removing Jews from decision-making positions. Over the course of the years and according to circumstances, Stalin sometimes encouraged and sometimes hindered these initiatives. (pp. 424–25)

An important turning point was the arrival of Golda Meir in Moscow as Israeli ambassador. She received a triumphal welcome from the entire Jewish community, and petitions for emigration to Israel began pouring in to the authorities. Meanwhile, as Stalin was preparing for a possible war with the United States, the Israeli government was sending out pro-Western signals. Jews arrested around 1950 are said to have been confronted by their interrogators with their alleged unwillingness to fight against Israel's ally America.

Undoubtedly frightened by the effervescence reigning among the Jews, Stalin—beginning at the end of 1948, and for the rest of his life—drastically changed his policies with regard to them. But in his own manner: acting drastically but without announcement, radically but by little steps, and in apparently secondary domains. (p. 430)

In January 1949, *Pravda* published a long article entitled "On an Antipatriotic Group of Theater Critics." These theater critics, it was reported, hid their true identity behind pseudonyms. Thus, the critic Kholodov was really Meierovich; Yasny was Finkelstein; Svetov was Scheidman, and so forth. Shortly thereafter, *Pravda* launched a campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans." At first, no one had any idea who the "rootless cosmopolitans" were. Eventually an official list of them was published, and every name was recognizably Jewish.

At the same time, the regime started making bizarre claims that Russians had been responsible for various advances in civilization.

For example: Soviet textbooks began teaching that Russian scientists had invented the radio and the automobile. Those taken in by published accounts of “Solzhenitsyn’s Great-Russian chauvinism” may wish to note his curt dismissal of this “imbecilic and ludicrous glorification of Russian ‘superiority’ in all domains” (p. 434).

Between 1948 and 1953, Jews were kicked out of the higher circles of production, administration, cultural and ideological activities *en masse*; access to a whole series of higher education establishments was limited or simply refused them. Responsible posts in the KGB, the organs of the Party and of the Army were closed to them. (p. 437)

By the fall of 1952, Stalin was acting against the Jews openly. A show trial of an innocent group of Jewish doctors was inaugurated with great fanfare in January 1953. On February 9th, a bomb exploded outside the Soviet embassy in Tel-Aviv and the Soviet Union broke off relations with Israel.

Then, suddenly, it was all over. Stalin suffered a debilitating stroke at the end of February and died on March 6, 1953.

It has often been asserted that only Stalin’s death at this juncture saved the Jews from mass deportation to Siberia or the Far North the following summer. Solzhenitsyn reports:

In a recent study, the historian G. Kostyrchenko, a great specialist in Stalin’s Jewish policy, refutes this “deportation myth” with very solid arguments, showing that no fact either then or now has come to light confirming it; and that in any case, Stalin did not have the means to put such a deportation into operation. (p. 442)

We simply do not know what further developments there would have been in the anti-Semitic campaign had Stalin lived longer. Following his death, the Jewish doctors, whose trial had been filling the newspapers for weeks, were quietly released. The official anti-Semitic campaign lost steam.

Solzhenitsyn devotes the last five chapters, totaling one hundred twenty pages, to the twenty years which followed Stalin’s death. The principal circumstance of interest during this period is the gradual withering of Jewish support for the government.

At the end of the 1960s [says Solzhenitsyn] one observation which strengthened me in the conviction that the jig was up for the Communist regime was to what an extent the Jews had turned their backs on it. And without them, Bolshevik fanaticism—which was showing its age and ceasing even to be a fanaticism—was seized by a very Russian nonchalance and a peculiarly Brezhnevian inertia. (p. 475)

Solzhenitsyn notes the prominence of Jews among the dissident movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. Four of the seven men who staged an unprecedented (for the USSR) protest on Red Square following the invasion of Czechoslovakia were Jewish. The Jew Semion Gluzman paid with his freedom for his campaign against the political use of psychiatric hospitals (pp. 483–84). Solzhenitsyn writes:

In this wasted country, still subject to repression, the Russian Social Fund to which I turned over all world rights to *The Gulag Archipelago* [after creating it himself!—FRD], began its aid to the persecuted, and Alexander Ginzburg, competent and devoted, was its first administrator. Among its benefactors have been many Jews and half-Jews (which has given occasion in certain Russian circles, blinded by their extremism, to stigmatize the fund as "Jewish"). (p. 513)

But Jewish abandonment of Communism was too frequently accompanied by the belief that the Communist regime was something uniquely and wholly Russian—in other words, that the Jewish people bore no responsibility for it. Solzhenitsyn cites a number of recent Jewish authors who have characterized the early Soviet regime as nothing more than another chapter in the long history of Jewish persecution. According to a certain Yu. Stern, "Soviet history is marked by a consistent will to break and exterminate the Jews." V. Boguslavsky tells his readers that "the Soviet regime ruined the Jews, deported them, destroyed families"—all of which was "just a normal disaster for the majority of the Jewish population." F. Kolker says that "among the numerous nationalities populating the Soviet Union, the Jews have always been considered apart, as the least 'trustworthy' element," to which the author replies in amazement "what sort of amnesia must one have suffered to write such things in 1983?" (pp. 478–79). Even the dissident Jewish songwriter Alexander Galich sings:

Never, Jews, shall you be chamberlains . . .
Never shall you sit in Synod or Senate.
Your seat shall be the Solovetsky Islands,² the Butyrka Prison.

“They have forgotten,” marvels the author, “quite sincerely – they have entirely forgotten. How difficult it is to remember the evil one has done!” (p. 490).

These blind assertions of national innocence are matched by a host of vitriolic remarks about Russia: “a country of slaves, a troop of traitors, informants, and hangmen,” according to Arkadi Belinkov (p. 497). N. Shapiro tells us that “in the labyrinthine depths of the Russian soul there invariably hides a pogromist . . . a slave and a tramp as well” (p. 498). The country is “a human pigsty,” according to G. Kopylov (p. 495). “They were crawling on all fours and bowing down to trees and stones, while we gave them the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,” said Yakov Yakir, safely arrived in Tel Aviv, of his former fellow-countrymen (p. 498). “[Russian] Orthodoxy is a religion of savages,” according to M. Grobman. According to N. Shulgin, the Jewish involvement in early Communism prevented it from becoming much worse than it actually was (p. 494). Solzhenitsyn comments:

Let us note that none of these malevolent judgments upon the “Russian soul” provokes protest. If someone does not like anything Russian, holds it in contempt, or even says “Russia is a garbage dump,” this is not immoral in Russia. Here, no one addresses Presidents, Prime Ministers, Senators, or Congressmen to ask anxiously “what do you think of this incitation to hate a group of human beings because of their nationality?” (pp. 498–99)

Solzhenitsyn also remarks upon the following confusion in the Jewish attitude toward nationhood:

I have noticed that Jews more often than others insist that no attention must be paid to nationality. “What does it matter, one’s nationality?” they repeat; “national ‘traits,’ national ‘character’ – do these even exist?”

But, with my hand on my heart: it is precisely Jews who scrutinize and strain to discern national peculiarities more jealously,

² The location of the first Soviet labor camp for political prisoners, in the far north.

more attentively, more secretly than others: those of their own nation. (p. 502)

A new era was ushered in by the Six Day War, which

. . . shook the entire Jewish world as well as Soviet Jews with a violence of biblical proportions. Jewish national consciousness resurged and erupted like an avalanche. After the Six Day War, a lot of things changed. . . . An impulse to action had been given. Letters and petitions flooded into Soviet and international bodies. National life recommenced: on High Holy Days it became difficult to get into synagogues they were so crowded. Clandestine circles were formed to study Hebrew, Jewish history, and Jewish culture. (p. 476)

The ultimate effect of the Israeli victory upon Russian Jews was to inspire the emigration movement of the 1970s.

For many Jews, despite a material situation clearly more favorable than that of the great mass of the population, the feeling of being oppressed was quite real (p. 518). From the end of 1969, Jews by the dozens and by the hundreds began signing petitions addressed to "foreign public opinion." They demanded that they be allowed to leave for Israel. (p. 523)

They met with widespread sympathy. "To this day," marvels the author, "it is hard to believe how much publicity they enjoyed" (p. 531). The American Senate refused to ratify most favored nation trading status to the Soviet Union without adding the Jackson Amendment, requiring total freedom of Jewish emigration.

And there was no one to say out loud and clear: Gentlemen! Fifty-five years ago it was not tens of thousands but millions of our compatriots who could only dream of escaping from the hated Soviet regime. No one here was given the right to emigrate. And never once did the politicians, the public men of the West protest or propose to punish the Soviet Union even if only by commercial restrictions! Fifteen million peasants were exterminated during "dekulakization," six million were driven to famine in 1932, not to speak of mass executions and the millions

who ended up in camps. During this time you were glad to sign treaties with the Soviet leaders, grant them loans, shake their hands, seek their favor. And it was only when the Jews in particular had their rights infringed that the entire Western world was seized with a burning compassion and began to understand what this regime was made of. (p. 529)

Large scale Jewish emigration began in 1971, mostly not from the Russian center but from Georgia and the Baltic Republics: 13,000 the first year, 32,000 the second, and 35,000 the third. At first nearly all the Jews went to Israel. By March 1973, 700,000 requests to emigrate had been received.

The Yom Kippur War in the fall of 1973 damaged Israel's prestige, following which emigration slowed to 20,000 in 1974. By 1975–76, nearly 50 percent of emigrants went to countries other than Israel, principally the United States. After 1977, between 70 and 98 percent went directly to the United States (pp. 532–33).

"Only the first wave was motivated by an ideal," admits one Jewish author (pp. 534–35).

During the Gorbachev period, by about 1987, all restrictions upon Jewish emigration were lifted.

Henceforth, a radically new epoch in the history of the now free Russian Jews and of their relations with the new Russia has opened. This period has brought rapid and substantial changes, but it is still too short to anticipate the long-term results. . . . The development of this new theme would go beyond the span of life allotted this author. (pp. 567–68)

With these words, the work closes.

* * *

The themes of national repentance and mutual understanding resonate throughout *Two Hundred Years Together*. Solzhenitsyn emphasizes that they presuppose an effort of historical understanding. This outlook, no doubt, is due to memories of the Communist regime under which he grew up. The Bolsheviks sought to make a clean sweep of the past, and systematically falsified history in the pursuit of a "classless" or conflict free society. Such a mindset can still be found

in Russia; many reviewers warned that any study of the Russian-Jewish past would only lead to the revival of old hatreds.

In this context, the reader of *Two Hundred Years Together* may wish to ponder the following exchange from an interview Solzhenitsyn granted *Moskovskiye Novosti* (January 1-7, 2003) in connection with publication of the second volume:

Interviewer: The main premise of your wide-ranging work is this: the truth about the Russians' relationship with the Jews is morally vital. To whom? To history? To both nationalities?"

Solzhenitsyn: Any truth is morally vital to a person. Any truth in principle.

Solzhenitsyn also has some words for the academic critics who have caviled at the sparseness of his archival research. The type of historical understanding our age requires, both in Russia and in America, is at heart an act of the imagination, in which specialized research plays an important but limited role.

Interviewer: You have addressed a subject wherein you yourself often invoke such concepts as "spirit," "consciousness," and "historical fate." Were these nebulous notions not an impediment to your well-researched work, based on solid facts?

Solzhenitsyn: Far from being an impediment, they were, to a very large extent, a part of my underlying concept. My book aims to go deep into Jewish thoughts, feelings, ideas, and mentality – that is to say, the realm of the spiritual. In this sense the objective of my book is not, in fact, scientific, but artistic. It is basically an artistic work. Except that there are not two or three characters, but a great many characters, with various, most diverse feelings and ideas. Facts alone are not enough to understand them. . . . I went to them and felt an affinity with them, as one does with characters in a work of fiction. . . . Generally speaking, I regard the spirit and consciousness as the most substantial elements of history.

*F. Roger Devlin, Ph.D., is an independent scholar and the author of **Alexandre Kojève and the Outcome of Modern Thought** (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2004).*

THE REALITY OF RED SUBVERSION:

THE RECENT CONFIRMATION OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA

STEPHEN J. SNEGOSKI

In an apparent effort to illustrate political simple-mindedness, Carroll Quigley derisively wrote in his noted (at least by the John Birch Society) *Tragedy and Hope*, that the “same groups who were howling about Soviet espionage in 1948-1955 were also claiming that President Roosevelt expected and wanted Pearl Harbor.”¹ In a previous contribution to *The Occidental Quarterly*, I dealt with the latter; here I will do some “howling” about the former. According to what until recently has passed as conventional wisdom for the liberal establishment, America in the late 1940s and early 1950s was gripped by a terrible Red scare, a period of anti-Communist hysteria and witch hunts. Malicious “red-baiters” slandered innocent liberals as Communists in order to destroy the reforms of the New Deal and impede peace with the Soviet Union. At most, some of the more “anti-Communist” liberals would concede that there may have been a few Communist subversives, but nothing to justify the terrible anti-Communist overreaction, above all the antics of the demagogic Joe McCarthy. From the 1960s through the 1980s, one of the strongest taboos in American political discourse was the subject of Soviet influence within the United States.

During the 1990s, the release of the Venona documents (see p. 49) by the U.S. government and the partial opening of the Soviet archives forced establishment minds to a reconsideration. Yes, Virginia, there really were Communist spies in the United States during the so-called “McCarthy era.” In fact, it now appears that even the slandered and smeared “red-baiters” of the period were unaware of just how far Soviet Communist subversion had penetrated. It must be added that even during the period of the so-called “witch hunt” there was more than enough evidence to prove the reality of Soviet Communist spying to any objective person. But, of course, if one is going to pass for an “educated,” “respectable” person, objective thinking must be eschewed—it’s simply not a Darwinian survival trait in modern America.

From Lenin onward Soviet Communist leaders have preached the necessity of underground activities, with foreign governments the key target for infiltration. The evidence for this from many countries is overwhelming. Communists in government engaged in espionage and acted to influence policy in a pro-Soviet

direction. Many of the individuals engaged in these activities were Communist Party members; others were fellow travelers, who despite their lack of party discipline, sought to advance the interests of Soviet Communism.

Franklin Roosevelt's diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933 provided the Soviets with their first opportunity for effective penetration of the U.S. government. With diplomatic recognition, Soviet intelligence could function under legal cover through its embassy and consulates. The liberal New Deal agencies provided a fertile field for the recruitment of Soviet spies. Many of those who staffed these agencies sympathized with the government planning of the Soviet "experiment" and with Soviet opposition to fascism. This sympathy for Communism increased during World War II, when the Soviets could be seen as comrades-in-arms. That the Soviet Union was combating the great evil of Nazism has often been used to explain (and to justify) the disproportionate number of subversives of Jewish ethnicity.

Soviet intelligence benefited immensely from the support of the Communist Party of the United States, many of whose members acted as agents. Thus during the 1930s and 1940s, Communist subversives, under direct Soviet control, came to permeate key agencies of the federal government: the Treasury and State departments, the Office of Strategic Services (forerunner to the CIA), and even the White House itself.

Soviet intelligence consisted of three separate organizations: the KGB (NKVD or NKGB—the leading state security organ),² the GRU (military intelligence), and the U.S. Communist Party (technically, the Communist Party of the United States of America, or CPUSA), which was supervised by the Comintern (the Communist International, run by Stalin). The KGB and GRU ran parallel "legal" and "illegal" intelligence networks in the United States. "Legal" networks were run by intelligence officers working under legal, usually diplomatic, cover in "residencies" located clandestinely in Soviet diplomatic missions and other official organizations. "Illegal" networks, in contrast, were run by Soviet intelligence officers who used false identities and had no apparent connection to Soviet organizations.

President Roosevelt was oblivious to the danger of Soviet subversion. In 1939, Adolf A. Berle, Roosevelt's assistant secretary of state and adviser on internal security, presented the President with a list of leading Soviet agents in the United States, including Alger Hiss and Harry Dexter White, after receiving this information from ex-Communist spy Whittaker Chambers. Roosevelt simply laughed this off as ridiculous.³

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, however, was concerned about Communist infiltration of the government, and the Nazi-Soviet pact provided him with the opportunity to move against suspected Soviet agents. In 1939 FBI special agents raided the facilities of several organizations linked to the U.S. Communist Party and arrested General Secretary Earl Browder on charges of passport fraud. In

April 1941, the FBI arrested the senior KGB officer in the United States, Gaik Ovakimian, for violating the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 caused the U.S. government to halt this early FBI effort to counter Soviet subversion quickly. Ovakimian was allowed to leave the country and President Roosevelt commuted Browder's sentence.⁴

Although the United States had enacted a number of laws and regulations proscribing Communists from the federal government, during World War II these were only loosely enforced. Members of the Roosevelt administration did not distinguish between support for the Soviet effort to defeat the Axis and support for Soviet Communism. They seemed to believe their own war propaganda: Since Stalin was fighting Nazism, Stalin and the Soviet Union must be beneficent. While some of this cooperation with the Soviet Union was open, other aspects took place behind the scenes. For example, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) actually cooperated with the KGB. OSS Director William Donovan made an effort to establish a formal exchange with the KGB, which would have included allowing an official KGB mission in the United States. Donovan was not pro-Communist, but was entranced by wartime and postwar collaboration with the Soviet Union. Donovan's proposal had considerable support in the ranks of the Roosevelt administration. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, however, was adamantly opposed. Roosevelt ultimately rejected the proposal in March 1944 for political reasons, fearing conservative Republican attacks abetted by Hoover. As historian Bradley F. Smith writes, what motivated Roosevelt in rejecting the exchange was "not distrust of the Soviet secret policy but apprehension about what Hoover and his conservative friends might do." The decision represented "less a fear of communists than of anti-communists."⁵ Despite the failure to establish a formal exchange, informal cooperation developed between the OSS and the KGB, which involved the exchange of a broad range of highly classified material. It should be added that that OSS was also infiltrated by a substantial number of Soviet Communist agents.

U.S. cooperation with the Soviet Union demonstrated the intellectual obtuseness of the American leadership. While America was preaching a war for freedom and railing about Nazi barbarities, it was in bed with a government that maintained an absolute tyranny and killed millions of people. And even if morality could be discounted, it was apparent that Soviet Communism never intended to be friendly with the United States, but openly called for a Communist-controlled world—a "World Federation of Socialist Soviet Republics." The Soviets were not fighting the war to protect Western capitalist democracy but rather to protect and expand Soviet Communist interests. In fact, Stalin deliberately sought to bring about war in 1939 because he, like other Communists, expected a prolonged war to facilitate revolution in an exhausted Europe, as had been the case in World War I.⁶

Wartime propaganda in the United States, directed by the Office of War Information (which many in the government actually seemed to believe), presented Stalinist Russia as a beneficent country that was a true friend of the United States. Vice President Henry Wallace even portrayed Stalin's "economic democracy" as superior in important ways to the "political or Bill-of-Rights democracy" of the United States, which brought about "exploitation, impracticable emphasis on states' rights and even...anarchy."⁷ Given the widespread admiration for Soviet Communism, it can be well understood how Soviet spies could freely operate in the federal government and not appear substantially different from those Americans, especially liberals, who simply wanted to help their Soviet allies during the war and extend that cooperation into the postwar era.

As American hostility toward the Soviet Union began to develop at the end of the war in 1945, evidence of Communist influence in the government came to be looked upon in a more negative light. Simultaneously, evidence of Communist penetration mounted rapidly. In February 1945, federal officials found numerous classified government documents, some marked "top secret," in the New York office of the pro-Communist journal *Amerasia* (see p. 61). Later, former Soviet Communist agents Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers told their stories of Communist espionage to the FBI. And in September 1945, a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, Igor Gouzenko, defected to Canadian authorities, bringing documentary proof of the existence of a far-flung Soviet spy apparatus that had penetrated the Manhattan Project and other agencies in the American, British, and Canadian governments. Ottawa quickly conveyed this information to Washington. Significantly, the stories of subversion from the various sources fitted together.

By the latter part of 1945, the White House was aware of accusations against a substantial number of U.S. government employees, including such high officials as the State Department's Alger Hiss, White House aide Lauchlin Currie, OSS executive assistant Duncan Lee, and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White. Although the Truman administration was alarmed by these revelations, it only slowly began to take action. This sluggishness stemmed largely from political concerns. Undoubtedly, the natural reaction of a politician would be to keep such skeletons locked in the closet—and Truman and his closest associates were fearful of public scandals that might discredit the Democratic Party and its policies and thereby bring the Republicans into power. In short, Truman put domestic politics above American security.

Examples of the Truman administration's inaction and cover-up included deliberate efforts within the Justice Department to bury the *Amerasia* case.⁸ And, despite receiving an FBI report on Harry Dexter White's subversive activities, Truman in 1946 nominated White as American representative to the International Monetary Fund.⁹

Republican charges of Communists in government, which helped them win control of Congress in the 1946 election, induced Truman to take action. In an effort to control the subversion issue and prevent congressional investigations that might benefit the Republicans, Truman issued Executive Order 9835 in March 1947, which instituted loyalty and security checks in the government. Truman believed the executive branch alone could effectively prevent Soviet subversion, and he used the executive order to restrict congressional access to security information.¹⁰

Even after initiating the executive order, however, Truman refused to acknowledge the immense scope of Soviet subversion. Thus, in 1948, Truman characterized the House Un-American Activities Committee's investigation of Alger Hiss as a "Red Herring." And Truman would write in his memoirs in 1956, "The country had reason to be proud of and have confidence in our security agencies. They had kept us almost totally free of sabotage and espionage during the war."¹¹

But while Truman publicly downplayed the scope of Soviet infiltration, the U.S. government had an additional secret source of information that showed the vast extent of this Soviet enterprise. This was the Venona Project. "Venona" was the top-secret name given by the U. S. government to an extensive program launched in 1943 to intercept and decipher communications between Moscow and its intelligence stations in the West. Most of the messages were decoded and read between 1947 and 1952, though the effort continued until 1980. While 200,000 messages were intercepted, only a small number were ever deciphered, and the whole effort was kept top secret for years. While Venona's existence became publicly known in the early 1980s,¹² it was not until 1995 that the National Security Agency began releasing the documents to the public, and fewer than 3,000 partially or fully decrypted Venona messages have been declassified. Venona corroborated stories that the U.S. government was heavily infiltrated by Soviet espionage agents. However, because Venona was a totally secret operation, no evidence obtained from its intercepts was ever introduced in any court, since Washington considered Venona's secrecy to be more important than jailing Soviet agents.

The first comprehensive examination of the subject is *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America*, authored by two establishment historians of American Communism, John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr.¹³ Haynes, Twentieth Century Political Historian at the Library of Congress, and Klehr, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Politics and History at Emory University, are coauthors of other works in Yale University's "Annals of Communism" series.¹⁴

Haynes and Klehr maintain that Venona conclusively shows that the U.S. Communist Party "was indeed a fifth column working inside and against the United States in the cold war,"¹⁵ and that most of those individuals accused of aiding the Soviets in the 1940s had actually done so. The authors point out that

Venona not only supplied information through its intercepts of Soviet traffic, but, because of its “inherent reliability,” also provided a “touchstone for judging the credibility of other sources, such as defectors’ testimony and FBI investigative files.”¹⁶

Venona decrypts revealed that Soviet spies had infiltrated every major agency of the U.S. government during the war years, from the State and Treasury departments to the Manhattan Project. Venona confirmed the guilt of the atomic spies Klaus Fuchs, Theodore Hall, and Julius Rosenberg. Among the high government officials identified by Venona as Soviet agents were State Department official Alger Hiss; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Harry Dexter White; the chief of the State Department’s Division of American Republics, Laurence Duggan; the head of the OSS research department, Maurice Halperin; the special assistant to the director of the OSS, Duncan Lee; and White House aide Lauchlin Currie. However, the authors acknowledge that while Venona demonstrated the Soviet penetration of the United States, it was less valuable in showing the actual damage that Soviet spies did to American security. This stems from the fact that very little information of a substantive nature went by cable to Moscow; the bulk of the espionage reports, including stolen documents, traveling by courier.¹⁷

The demise of the Soviet Union also has brought additional information on the Soviet penetration of America. This has come from Soviet intelligence officials themselves and from the partial opening of the Soviet archives in the early 1990s. Former Soviet intelligence officials who have authored books include defector Colonel Oleg Gordievsky,¹⁸ who had a long career in the KGB; KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin,¹⁹ who defected to Britain in 1992 with a treasure trove of handwritten notes based on intelligence documents; and Pavel Sudoplatov,²⁰ who directed the secretive Administration for Special Tasks of the KGB during the Stalin era, which was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination outside of the Soviet Union. All of these individuals described an extensive Soviet penetration of the United States during the World War II era.

In the early 1990s Klehr and Haynes examined Soviet files pertaining to the American Communist Party. From their study of these documents, the authors wrote *The Secret World of American Communism* and *The Soviet World of American Communism*. These works conclusively prove that the American Communist Party was tied in with the Soviet government and engaged in extensive espionage—a fact that was always patently obvious but which liberal apologists for Communism, who naturally loomed large in academia, denied. Klehr and Haynes write: “It is no longer possible to maintain that the Soviet Union did not fund the American party, that the CPUSA did not maintain a covert apparatus, and that key leaders and cadres were innocent of connection with Soviet espionage operations. Nowhere in the massive Comintern archives or in the American party’s own records did the authors find documents

indicating that Soviet or CPUSA officials objected to American Communists cooperating with Soviet intelligence or even had second thoughts about the relationships. Both the Soviet Union and the American Communist leadership regarded these activities as normal and proper. Their only concern was that they not become public."²¹ In short, the anti-Communist belief that "the American Communist movement assisted Soviet intelligence and placed loyalty to the Soviet Union ahead of loyalty to the United States was well-founded."²²

The files of the KGB provided the basis for Allen Weinstein's *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America – The Stalin Era*.²³ The "haunted wood" in the title is taken from a W. H. Auden poem "September 1, 1939," written upon his hearing of the German invasion of Poland. Weinstein had partial access to these archives during the years 1994 to 1996, since which time most Soviet archives have again been closed. Weinstein did not have direct personal access to the archives, but rather the material was copied and translated by a journalist who had once worked for the KGB, Alexander Vassiliev. The material was then submitted for review to the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, which means that the most sensitive material may have been withheld. Nonetheless, the messages that were made available clearly brought out the existence of a high degree of Soviet espionage in the United States. The authors write that

Soviet operatives and their American agents collected during the 1930s and 1940s a remarkable range of material on U.S. industrial and military production culminating in the data provided by its sources within the atomic research program during World War II. Moreover, during the New Deal and war years, the Soviets benefited from a voluminous amount of information coming from its key agents in a range of U.S. government agencies, including the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).²⁴

Now for a brief discussion of some of the key Americans who served as Soviet agents and sources, as confirmed by the recently released documents. The name that perhaps stands out the most is that of Alger Hiss. His case in 1948 brought the issue of Communist subversion into the national spotlight. In part, what made the Hiss case such a national bombshell was the fact that he had all the proper establishment credentials. Hiss attended Johns Hopkins University and Harvard Law School, where he achieved academic and social prominence. At Harvard Law School, he became a protégé of Felix Frankfurter, who was one of Franklin Roosevelt's trusted advisors. Hiss entered government with Roosevelt's New Deal and moved into the State Department in 1936, where he rapidly advanced, eventually becoming the director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, a position that gave him access to secret documents from other departments and bureaus. Hiss engaged in the preparations for the Yalta Conference and served as an adviser to Roosevelt at the Yalta Conference in 1945. He also acted as the secretary general of the founding meeting of the

United Nations in San Francisco and helped to draft the UN Charter. Due to reports concerning his disloyalty, Hiss resigned from the State Department in December 1946 to become the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He had been handpicked for that position by one of the pillars of the establishment, John Foster Dulles.²⁵

In August 1948, Hiss's name burst into the national limelight when Whittaker Chambers testified before the House Un-American Activities Committee that Hiss was working for the Soviet Union. To much of the media Chambers was initially the villain and Hiss an innocent victim. However, as a result of this investigation, Hiss was charged with perjury (the statute of limitations on espionage having expired). His first trial in 1949 ended in a hung jury, but in the following year a second jury found Hiss guilty and sentenced him to five years imprisonment. He was released from prison in 1954.

Many liberals did not accept the fact of Hiss's guilt; in fact, he became a cause célèbre for those who claimed that the whole Communists-in-government idea was illusory. Hiss himself professed his innocence until his death in 1996. However, the truth of Hiss's guilt was firmly bolstered by Allen Weinstein's *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case*, published in 1978.²⁶ Weinstein had begun his investigation in the belief that Hiss was innocent but found a mountain of evidence—including formerly classified FBI, OSS, CIA, State Department, and Justice Department documents, plus testimony from known spies—demonstrating otherwise. The Venona transcripts have provided additional confirmation, referring to a Soviet agent codenamed "Ales," whose description clearly matches that of Alger Hiss, a conclusion that the FBI drew in 1950.²⁷ And Soviet documents examined by Jerrold and Leona Schecter, coauthors of *Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History*, "reveal that he secretly met with a high ranking officer of the GRU . . . during the Yalta Conference and laid out for the Soviets all the strengths and weaknesses of the Western allies' bargaining position." This information greatly aided Stalin's arguments. "By giving away the American and British positions in advance of negotiations," they write, "Hiss abetted the lowering of the Iron Curtain."²⁸

It might be added that Hiss came close to controlling the State Department—a little-known fact that doesn't seem to be noted in recent works. In the first part of 1946, Hiss proposed a radical reorganization of the Department of State. As William F. Buckley and L. Brent Bozell wrote in 1954: "Had his plan been approved, and had Hiss attained the personal power which, under the plan, he staked out for himself, the State Department would have taken a long step forward in the direction of becoming an adjunct to the Soviet Foreign Office."²⁹ Secretary of State Byrnes, however, rejected the proposed reorganization plan.

A dwindling number on the left still maintain Hiss's innocence. Since there would seem to be insurmountable converging evidence against Hiss, they have posited vast right-wing conspiracies involving the FBI, HUAC, Richard Nixon, the CIA, and other supposedly "right-wing" or "anti-Communist"

elements³⁰—to which they now must add that one cannot believe KGB agents, KGB defectors, or KGB documents on the grounds that the KGB, and any one ever affiliated with the KGB, was inherently deceptive.³¹ But these conspiratorial views would seem to be too farfetched to be entertained outside the Alice-in-Wonderland milieu of academia. And it must be noted that the establishment usually ridicules the notion of a conspiracy, no matter how small, when invoked by the anti-establishment right.

Perhaps the most influential Soviet agent to shape United States foreign and economic policy for the benefit of Moscow was Harry Dexter White.³² Some apologists have questioned the possibility of his having been a Soviet agent because of his apparent support for capitalist economics, as illustrated by his instrumental role in the founding of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.³³ It is likely that White was neither a member of the Communist Party nor a formal part of Soviet intelligence, but Venona and other sources show that he was a “friendly source” who provided Soviet intelligence with direct access to high-level thinking in the Roosevelt administration throughout World War II.³⁴

More than just providing the Soviets with information, White was what is known in intelligence circles as an “agent of influence,” guiding American policy in the direction of Soviet interests. Holding a Harvard Ph.D. in economics, White was Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau’s principal adviser, and ultimately served as assistant secretary of the Treasury. White brought to the Treasury a number of economists later identified as Communist agents, who helped him to make policy. And significantly, the Treasury Department would have a major role in shaping American foreign policy because of Morgenthau’s close friendship with President Roosevelt.³⁵

White was intimately involved in a number of key policies that served to benefit the Soviet Union. One of these was “Operation Snow,” which involved American entrance into World War II. In 1941, Soviet policy sought to deflect the Japanese away from attacking the Soviet Union in support of Japan’s German ally by exacerbating relations between the United States and Japan. Some members of the Roosevelt administration were considering in November 1941 a “modus vivendi” that would have provided a temporary truce with Japan until America had built up its military strength in the Far East. White, however, acted to undermine this proposal by writing a memo to Morgenthau that called for the Japanese evacuation of China, which was then incorporated into Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s famous ultimatum to the Japanese on November 26, 1941. That message, many historians believe, was the final straw that goaded the Japanese into striking Pearl Harbor on December 7. Most historians, revisionist and establishment, do not believe that war with Japan could have been avoided. However, this should not be used to downplay White’s effort. “What is certain,” Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel note in their *Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors*, “is that Operation Snow was being carried out with Soviet, not American interests, in mind.”³⁶

White's most notorious undertaking was his development of the Morgenthau Plan, which was adopted by the British and Americans at the Quebec conference in 1944. The stated objective of the Morgenthau Plan was to de-industrialize Germany and reduce its people to a pastoral existence. This would have involved the deportation of up to fifty million Germans to work in the foreign countries damaged by German aggression. Thus weakened, went the rationale, the allegedly inherently aggressive German nation would never rise again to threaten the peace of the world.³⁷ Morgenthau's support for the plan stemmed largely from his desire for revenge against the German people for the killing of his fellow Jews. Although White (originally Weiss) was also Jewish, he was working in the interests of the Soviet Union. Moscow hoped that so ruthless a policy would drive the German people into its hands, for it was promising a comparatively mild treatment to a "socialist" Germany. While the full success of the Soviet scheme did not materialize, word of the Morgenthau Plan, which was trumpeted by Nazi propaganda, did stiffen German military resistance to the Western allies and thus lengthened the war, allowing the Red Army to conquer more territory in Eastern and Central Europe as the fighting continued. Due to resistance in the U.S. government to the inhumanity and apparent harm to American interests that the plan would have caused, it was officially repudiated, but much of it served as the basis for the Army's order JCS 1067 that laid down the pattern of America's occupation policy until 1947, when developing Cold War strategic concerns began to outweigh the desire to punish Germans.³⁸

White also acted to advance the interests of the Communist Chinese, who were at the time supported by the Soviet Union. Most significantly, White, along with two other Communist subversives in the Treasury Department, Frank Coe and Solomon Adler, acted to block delivery of a loan of \$200 million in gold to enable the Chinese Nationalist government to prop up its faltering currency. Without the loan the Chinese suffered hyperinflation, which did immense damage to the Chinese economy and to the standing of the government vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists.³⁹

Conservative Republicans, most prominently Joe McCarthy, would charge in the 1950s that Communist subversion in the U.S. government caused the "loss" of China. Establishment historians ridiculed the idea of a connection between U.S. policy and the Communist victory in China. So Haynes and Klehr diverge from the conventional view even when they acknowledge that "The obstruction of the gold loan made a minor, not a major, contribution to Mao's victory."⁴⁰ However, as historian Anthony Kubek has pointed out, American "China hands" oriented a host of measures to harm the Nationalist Chinese, not simply the gold loan issue.⁴¹ While one cannot know alternate history, once it has been established that such U.S. government officials as White served as Communist agents, the idea that China was "lost" due to U.S. policymakers does not seem so far-fetched.

As a result of ill health, White resigned as U.S. executive director of the IMF in 1947. The next year Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers identified White as part of a Soviet spy network in testimony to the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). White appeared before HUAC to deny all charges. Shortly thereafter he died of a heart attack, and thus never had to face criminal charges.

Although Soviet penetration primarily impacted the executive branch, the Soviets had at least one operative in Congress in the 1930s: Representative Samuel Dickstein of New York. Dickstein never provided any crucial information to the Soviets, and he expected to be well paid for what he did provide, which earned him the code name "Crook" from his Soviet handlers. The most interesting thing about Dickstein is that he was a leading Congressional figure in the creation of what eventually became the House Un-American Activities Committee. Dickstein, however, sought to use such a committee to investigate right-wing groups.⁴²

Intriguing, yet understandable, is the fact that some of those Americans who went the furthest in ridiculing the idea of Soviet spies in the government had been personally involved with Soviet intelligence. For example, Venona shows that leftist journalist I. F. Stone, who was highly regarded by establishment liberals for his alleged honesty, had contacts with Soviet intelligence agents and received money from the Soviet Union.⁴³

One can imagine that Stone's Soviet paymasters must have enjoyed his public arguments that the whole idea of Soviet penetration in American society was simply a partisan lie fabricated by the political Right. Another journalist who later confessed to working for Soviet intelligence was Michael Straight, editor of the liberal journal, *The New Republic*. Although Straight had completely broken with the Soviet intelligence in 1942, his public downplaying of Soviet espionage was certainly disingenuous.⁴⁴

Probably the most valuable information provided to the Soviet Union came from the spies involved with the atomic bomb project. The atomic spies included British citizen Klaus Fuchs and Americans Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Morton Sobell, David and Ethel Rosenberg, and Theodore Hall. Theodore Hall's name only came to public attention with the release of the Venona transcripts. Hall, who had been a teenage physics prodigy working on the Manhattan Project, provided key information to the Soviets, enabling them to construct their first nuclear weapon. The FBI interrogated Hall but he never confessed. Hall was never publicly accused by the government since it did not want to publicly reveal Venona by using its decrypts as evidence in court and it lacked other evidence of his spy activity.⁴⁵

Regarding the long-standing controversy concerning the Rosenbergs, the key to the government's case against them was the confession of David Greenglass, who worked on the A-bomb project at Los Alamos and was Ethel Rosenberg's brother. The Venona transcripts now confirm that Julius was an

atomic spy for the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ Whether the couple should have been executed, or whether Ethel, whose complicity was less, should have been executed, is another matter, especially since the Soviets derived more significant information on the atomic bomb from other sources. It is likely that the government tried to use the death sentences as leverage to obtain confessions from the Rosenbergs and thus catch other members of the spy ring, but the Rosenbergs, as good Communists, would not confess.⁴⁷

Although the Soviet scientists on their own would have eventually developed an atomic bomb, the espionage certainly gave them great advantages. John E. Haynes writes: "Espionage, however, saved the Soviet Union several years and an immense amount of money because it was able to skip much of the expensive development stage of the bomb project. The additional expense and added years and uncertainty of building an atomic bomb without espionage would have been a major burden to the Soviet Union and restrained Stalin's foreign policy objectives. It is unlikely, for example, that he would have approved North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950 had the American atomic monopoly still existed."⁴⁸

A major new revelation regarding the atomic spying is that J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific director of the Manhattan Project, consciously cooperated with Soviet intelligence. There had always been suspicions about Oppenheimer. It was well known that Oppenheimer had Communist sympathies, close relations who were Communists—his wife, mistress, brother, and sister-in-law were all Party members—and associations with people involved in Soviet espionage. Oppenheimer had been questioned about his Communist connections, but while admitting a youthful flirtation with Communist ideology always denied any connection to Soviet Communist intelligence. Finally, in 1954, Oppenheimer lost his security clearance, preventing him from continuing to serve as chairman of the General Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy. As a result of this punishment, the establishment media portrayed Oppenheimer as a martyr of the McCarthy "witch hunt."

In 1994, the Oppenheimer loyalty issue was reignited with the publication of a memoir by the ex-KGB general Pavel Sudoplatov, with the assistance of two Americans, Jerrold and Leona Schecter, which claimed that Oppenheimer had knowingly assisted Soviet intelligence, though it did not specifically label him a Soviet spy.⁴⁹ This revelation triggered a virtual firestorm among Oppenheimer's supporters, who included an influential segment of the American scientific community. They managed to gain the support of the chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Les Aspin, who announced at a press conference that FBI files disproved Sudoplatov's charges.⁵⁰

Jerrold and Leona Schecter, in *Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History*, provide information that Oppenheimer himself was a Communist Party member well into 1942, when he was told by

the KGB to drop his membership so as to stay hidden from American authorities. Soviet documents prove that Oppenheimer met with the KGB's resident in San Francisco, Gregory Kheifitz, whom he provided secret information. At the behest of Soviet agents, Oppenheimer also agreed to hire Communist spies to work on the Manhattan Project, including Klaus Fuchs, the British scientist.⁵¹

To illustrate their findings, the Schecters reproduce in their appendix an actual document from the Soviet Intelligence Archives, dated Oct. 2, 1944, received and signed by KGB head Lavrenti Beria, referring to Oppenheimer as a "member of the 'apparat' of Comrade Browder," who, at the request of Kheifitz, "provided cooperation in access to research for several of our tested sources including a relative of Comrade Browder."⁵²

Like many of the pro-Soviet subversives, Oppenheimer was Jewish, and it appears that loyalty to his ethnic group helped motivate his support for Soviet Communism. The Schecters write: "Kheifetz made sure that Oppenheimer received the news...that Stalin was about to set up a Jewish autonomous republic in the Crimea. Kheifetz later reported that Oppenheimer, the son of German-Jewish immigrants, was deeply moved to know that Stalin had guaranteed a secure place for Jews in the Soviet Union when the war against Germany was won."⁵³ In actuality, Stalin launched anti-Semitic measures after World War II, culminating in his fabricated "Jewish Doctors' Plot." Instead of sending Soviet Jewry to the balmy Crimea, it seems that Stalin planned to deport them to the frigid Siberian wastes of the Jewish Autonomous Republic of Birobidzhan.⁵⁴

The most prominent new individual now identified as a Soviet agent is Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's close wartime adviser, who actually lived in the White House. Hopkins met with Stalin as Roosevelt's representative and accompanied Roosevelt to his meetings with the Soviet dictator. Hopkins's advice to Roosevelt invariably advanced the Soviet position. For example, he fought against providing aid to the anti-Communist Polish underground in its 1944 uprising against the Germans, thus allowing them to be slaughtered, which facilitated the Soviet Communist takeover of Poland. Hopkins consistently pushed for the establishment of East European governments friendly to the Soviet Union, which essentially meant controlled by Communists. Hopkins even went so far as to insist on shipping uranium to Moscow as part of Lend- Lease.⁵⁵

In a book that appeared in 1990, KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky revealed that he had attended a lecture by Iskhak Akhmerov, who had been in charge of illegal undercover agents in the United States during World War II, in which Akhmerov designated Harry Hopkins as the most important Soviet wartime agent in the United States. Akhmerov went on to make reference to his many personal contacts with Hopkins. Gordievsky later discussed the Hopkins case with other KGB experts on America who affirmed what Akhmerov had said.⁵⁶

After discussions with his coauthor, Christopher Andrew, Gordievsky would only say that Hopkins was an “unconscious agent,” who sincerely believed in the beneficence of Stalin’s Russia.⁵⁷ It should be added that Akhmerov’s meetings with Hopkins have been confirmed by the Venona transcripts.⁵⁸

A similar evaluation of Hopkins was provided by KGB defector Vasili Mitrokhyn in his *The Sword and the Shield*, coauthored by Christopher Andrew. According to this work, Hopkins actually warned the Soviet embassy that the FBI had bugged a secret meeting in which a Soviet operative had passed money to Steve Nelson, who was a leading member of the U.S. Communist underground. Coauthor Andrew once again rejected the idea that Hopkins was a Soviet agent, writing that “KGB officers boasted that he had been a Soviet agent. These boasts were far from the truth. Hopkins was an American patriot with little sympathy for the Soviet system.” According to Andrew, Hopkins simply sought to aid the Soviets, including passing confidential information on to them, in order to help the United States, because, in Hopkins’s mind, what aided the Soviet Union also helped the United States.⁵⁹ It is not apparent to this writer why any of this would exclude Hopkins from being referred to as a Soviet agent.

Romerstein and Breindel reject as “unrealistic” the notion of Hopkins being simply an “unconscious” agent. Some commentators have maintained that Hopkins only dealt secretly with Soviet officials with Roosevelt’s permission—that he was Roosevelt’s “back channel” to Stalin. Romerstein and Breindel argue that while this description might be appropriate if Hopkins had dealt only with Soviet diplomats, it would not apply to Hopkins since he met with “illegal” operatives such as Akhmerov, who was working under cover as a businessman, not as a member of the Soviet government. Romerstein and Breindel point out that Akhmerov would not have broken his cover and revealed himself as a Soviet intelligence officer unless Hopkins had been part of the Soviet spy apparatus.⁶⁰

The historians who now reveal the extent of Communist subversion of the United States still shy away from any type of reassessment of the individual who personified the era—Senator Joseph McCarthy. They hold that after a torpid start, which they acknowledge involved cover-ups for politically partisan reasons, the Truman administration removed Communist subversives from the government before McCarthy began his anti-Communist activities in 1950. As Harvey Klehr writes: “This new evidence is forcing the revision of many of the prevailing myths about the internal communist threat to American democracy in the postwar era. None of it exculpates McCarthy. He remains a political bully who hurt a number of people.”⁶¹ The only work to defend McCarthy after the new revelations is Arthur Herman’s *Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator*.⁶² In a critical review of this book, Sam Tanenhaus (who has written a favorable biography of Whittaker Chambers) sticks to the conventional liberal line that McCarthy

failed “to locate any fresh Red scalps for the simple reason that almost none were to be found.”⁶³ Herman, in contrast, points out that the charge of McCarthy’s foes that “he never exposed a single spy or Communist” is a “claim that is manifestly untrue.”⁶⁴ With some new material, Herman essentially affirms the sound defense of McCarthy made by William F. Buckley and L. Brent Bozell in their 1954 classic, *McCarthy and His Enemies: The Record and Its Meaning*.

Truman’s alleged elimination of pro-Communists from government was certainly not apparent in the State Department. Actually, the security problem at the State Department had worsened considerably in 1945, when employees of terminated wartime agencies were transferred to State. Some of these agencies, such as the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of War Information, were riddled with Communists. The State Department official who supervised the merger, J. Anthony Panuch, told a Congressional committee that it had caused extensive Communist infiltration of the State Department. But neither Panuch nor his principal assistants were able to implement their long-range plan to remove security risks. In 1947, the new Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, at the behest of Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, removed Panuch and every key member of his security staff. And from June 1947 until McCarthy’s famous February 9, 1950 speech in which he claimed the State Department had harbored a large number of pro-Communist subversives, the State Department did not fire one person as a loyalty or security risk.⁶⁵

The standard anti-McCarthy mantra that Truman had successfully dealt with the Communists-in-government problem and that McCarthy never found any Communists is at the very best a half-truth. While it is true that in his public statements McCarthy sometimes went beyond the evidence by stating that there were actual Communist Party members in the State Department—a wording that he apparently used in his February 9, 1950, speech in Wheeling, West Virginia—the real issue before the public was whether there were security and loyalty risks employed in the government who might clandestinely aid the interests of America’s Communist enemy, regardless of whether or not they were members of the Communist Party. And McCarthy was more careful in his terminology in his later speech on the subject before the U. S. Senate on February 20. As a result of McCarthy’s charges, the Senate on February 22, 1950, authorized the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to conduct an investigation to determine “whether persons who are disloyal to the United States are, or have been, employed by the Department of State.” Note that there was no need for McCarthy to prove actual Communist Party membership.⁶⁶

While the majority report of the subcommittee headed by Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland unambiguously cleared all of the individuals cited by McCarthy and branded his charges as “a fraud and a hoax” perpetrated on the American people,⁶⁷ it is hard to concur that every one of the vindicated

individuals was innocent. And even the finding of one individual loyalty risk would overturn the conventional view that McCarthy's charges were totally baseless.

Among the leading loyalty risks named by McCarthy was Owen Lattimore, whom McCarthy labeled "the top Russian spy." This was undoubtedly an exaggeration, since there was considerable competition for this position, but Lattimore was undoubtedly an individual of at best questionable loyalty. Even Thomas Reeves, a liberal McCarthy biographer, admitted that "Lattimore himself was no doubt a fellow traveler" and the Institute of Pacific Relations, in which Lattimore was a leading figure, was "infiltrated by Communists and fellow travelers."⁶⁸

The public record demonstrated that Lattimore's positions followed the Soviet line and that he would deliberately present lies to advance the Soviet Communist position. For example, Lattimore defended Stalin's show trials and referred to the Soviet Union as a democracy. During the Nazi-Soviet Pact he supported neutrality, claiming that there was little to choose between Great Britain and Nazi Germany. Institute of Pacific Relations files showed that, in a 1938 letter to IPR's executive director, he advocated backing the Soviet Union's "international policy in general but without using their slogans and above all without giving them or anybody else an impression of subservience." In 1949, he said he wanted "to let South Korea fall—but not to let it look as though we pushed it."⁶⁹ To historian John E. Haynes, however, "None of this proved that Lattimore was a spy or even that he was a concealed Communist."⁷⁰

Unlike establishment thinkers such as Haynes, McCarthy abided by the old adage: "If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and acts like duck, then it must be a duck." Although perhaps Lattimore only acted like a Soviet agent of influence, considering him part of the Soviet espionage apparatus would not be unreasonable. Besides, ex-Communist Louis Budenz had testified at the Tydings Committee hearings that Lattimore was a Communist. In 1952, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, headed by Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, probed much more deeply into Lattimore's background in its Institute of Pacific Relations hearings and unanimously concluded that Lattimore was a "conscious articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy." At the Institute of Pacific Relations hearings, defector Alexander Barmine, who had been an operative of Soviet intelligence, testified that Lattimore was a member of Soviet military intelligence.⁷¹

While the liberal establishment cavalierly throws out such terms of opprobrium as "racist," "fascist," and "anti-Semite," as potentially destructive of individual careers as they are arbitrary in meaning, in contrast, the utmost linguistic precision was demanded of Senator McCarthy. In terms of American security, however, it hardly mattered whether an individual pursued Soviet interests as a result of formal orders from Soviet intelligence or the Communist

Party, or from the voluntary belief that aid to the Soviet Union would serve to foster world peace or some other beneficial goal. As Haynes acknowledges, "Lattimore's views about communism and the Soviet Union were such that most Americans would not want him anywhere near the making of American foreign policy."⁷² This was all that McCarthy needed to prove. In his assessment of the Lattimore record, Herman goes even further, concluding that Lattimore was "something closer to the McCarran Committee's evaluation that he was a 'conscious and articulate' instrument of Stalinism."⁷³

Another significant instance that McCarthy presented to the Tydings Committee was that of John Stewart Service, a career diplomat stationed in China during World War II. Service's prolific diplomatic dispatches had consistently portrayed the Nationalist government as totalitarian, inefficient, and corrupt, while depicting the Chinese Communists as democratic, progressive, and honest. In fact, he denied that the Chinese Communists were really Communists, referring to them as "so-called Communists." Upon returning to the United States, Service was caught transmitting classified documents to the editor of the aforementioned pro-Communist journal, *Amerasia*.⁷⁴

The *Amerasia* case was a complex affair, which the Tydings Committee investigated. The story of the case is as follows: After noticing the appearance of confidential material in the *Amerasia* journal, investigators from the Office of Strategic Services broke into its offices in March 1945 and discovered thousands of highly classified government documents, some labeled "top secret." Keeping the break-in secret, the FBI undertook physical surveillance of those thought to be involved in the theft of the documents. On June 6, 1945, the FBI arrested six people—including Service and the journal's editor, Philip Jaffe—who were charged with having engaged in espionage. The Justice Department never made much of an effort to prosecute the case, holding that the pilfered documents were unimportant. Ultimately only two of the individuals arrested (excluding Service) were convicted for the offense of conspiring to steal government documents, and were assessed minor fines. By November 1945 the *Amerasia* case was officially closed.⁷⁵

Conservative anti-Communists were enraged by the government's soft attitude to what they regarded as a serious case of espionage, and charged a government cover-up. That the documents were innocuous was not apparent to Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew when he ordered the arrests. As historian Anthony Kubek (one of the few early historians who recognized the reality of extensive Soviet espionage in the U.S. government) wrote in a 1970 assessment: "Many of the pilfered documents were of vital diplomatic and military importance in wartime, just as the original classifications indicated."⁷⁶ With new documentary information available, Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, in their *Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism*, show that those in the highest ranks of the Truman administration, including Communist

White House aide Lauchlin Currie and Attorney General Tom Clark, successfully covered up the affair. The authors provide evidence of Jaffe's longstanding Soviet sympathies and show that he was in contact with Soviet intelligence officials and did make use of Service as an espionage source. They do, however, maintain that Service was unaware of Jaffe's Soviet connections and intentions, and simply believed he was involved in a leaking operation that would undermine his pro-Chiang superiors and the Nationalist Chinese government.⁷⁷

Although the evidence might not show Service to be a conscious foreign agent, nonetheless it does reveal him to have been an individual who engaged in illegal activities to advance the interests of Communism. In December 1951, after the conclusion of the Tydings hearings, the Civil Service Loyalty Review Board concluded that there was "reasonable doubt" as to Service's loyalty and ordered his dismissal from the State Department. Service fought in the federal courts for reinstatement, and the Supreme Court in 1957 ruled in his favor on a technicality: that Service's discharge violated State Department regulations that required an adverse ruling from the State Department's own Loyalty-Security Board.⁷⁸ It should be added, however, that the State Department had a security standard that was less lenient toward an employee than the Civil Service loyalty program. It simply called for the dismissal of an employee in the "interest of national security." And there needed to be only a "reasonable doubt" of the employee's reliability. It would seem reasonable that an employee who leaked classified documents to an individual with a Communist background should, under the existing standard, be dismissed.⁷⁹

Even if Lattimore and Service were not actual Communists, McCarthy did in fact name other Communists. One of these individuals was Mary Jane Keeney, who worked in a number of various sensitive overseas State Department jobs during the 1940s before moving on to the United Nations. After McCarthy's disclosures at the Tydings hearings, the State Department had her removed from her post at the United Nations.⁸⁰

McCarthy also identified Gustavo Duran as a Communist. Testimony regarding Duran's Stalinism, including his work for the Spanish Communist secret police during the Spanish Civil War—even a picture of him in a Communist uniform—was dismissed by liberals as Francoist propaganda. Herman, however, points out that Duran was "not only a Communist but a central figure in Stalin's cold-blooded purge of his Trotskyite and anarchist allies during the Spanish Civil War."⁸¹

Although recent books on Communist subversion still bemoan the "McCarthyite purges" of government employees as civil liberties violations, their presentation of the reality of Communist subversion would seem to belie this criticism. What largely accounted for the success of Soviet espionage in the United States during the Roosevelt years was the government's tolerance of employees with pro-Communist or even outright Communist backgrounds: It

was from such persons that the Soviet Union had been able to recruit most of its agents and sources. Such actual or potential supporters of Soviet Communism in the federal government were either weeded out or had to lie low during the McCarthyist anti-Communist backlash of the early 1950s. As Allen Weinstein writes: the Soviet Union could no longer rely on "recruiting dedicated Communists or other radical supporters of the Soviet Union, whose numbers had been reduced dramatically and whose future remained perilous in a time of anti-Communist purges."⁸² After the 1940s Soviet Communist subversion was forced to rely largely on paid spies, and never again approached the successes achieved during the Roosevelt era. Since the recent works point out that Soviet Communist subversion affected American security, there would seem to be backhanded acknowledgement that these "anti-Communist purges," which affected Communists and pro-Communists (including some individuals who were probably not actual or potential subversives), performed a major benefit for the security of the United States. In short, McCarthyist anti-Communism served to dry up the swamp that spawned Soviet Communist agents.

But what about McCarthy's infringement of such civil liberties as freedom of speech and freedom of association? Was American security worth this price? As a result of McCarthy, a few people lost their government jobs, but no one was sentenced to jail for their beliefs. Far greater restrictions on civil liberties were imposed in other eras of American history, often when establishment icons were at the helm. During the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus throughout the country and had individuals incarcerated simply for criticizing the war effort. During World War I, Woodrow Wilson's administration imprisoned a number of people for opposing the war, the most important of whom was Eugene V. Debs. And Franklin Roosevelt's most notorious infringement of civil liberties was the forced relocation of Japanese-Americans.

While liberals posed as champions of absolute freedom of opinion during "the McCarthy era," this has not been the liberals' position in other eras. It should be noted that from the 1930s through the World War II period, there was a strong "anti-fascist" campaign, largely directed by liberals and leftists and subscribed to by the Roosevelt administration. Numerous books and movies portrayed a huge (but non-existent) fifth-column of hate-ridden Nazis that was about to take over America. Federal, state, and local governments enacted various measures to punish right-wing elements and pro-Nazis. For example, in 1940 Congress enacted a law forbidding the employment of Bundists by the federal government, and denied unemployed Bundists relief work from the Works Progress Administration. Roosevelt administration officials smeared anti-interventionists, including members of the America First Committee, as Nazis.⁸³

Historian John E. Haynes sees similarities between the anti-fascist hysteria and the actions of postwar anti-communism.⁸⁴ Obviously, one major difference is that while the alleged postwar anti-Communist hysteria has been a never-ending focus of establishment concern, the earlier anti-fascist hysteria has been almost totally blotted from historical memory. An even greater dissimilarity between the two movements is that while there was substance to the beliefs of Communist subversion, the fascist fifth-column was totally imaginary, and individuals were persecuted solely for their opinions—as unsavory as some of them may have been. Even Haynes must conclude: “For all its sporadic ugliness, excesses and silliness, the anticommunism of the 1940s and 1950s was an understandable and rational response to a real danger to American democracy.”⁸⁵

As is apparent today, the concern for freedom of opinion no longer reigns as supreme in the establishment liberal pantheon of virtues as it (purportedly) did during the McCarthy years. It is liberals who have been at the forefront of restricting so-called “hate speech,” which has been made a crime in much of the “democratic” Western world. (Given the liberals’ soft spot for totalitarian Communism, it is hard to believe that they ever truly regarded freedom of opinion as the highest social goal.)

Returning to the civil liberties violations of the McCarthy era, it should be added that often even erroneous charges by anti-Communists do not merit the harsh condemnation conventionally meted out by the establishment. The errors were quite understandable. Since liberal policies were so similar to those of Soviet Communism, it was hard to determine whether a person was following a pro-Soviet policy because he was a Soviet agent or merely out of sincere, liberal beliefs. Instead of showing a grave flaw in anti-Communism, however, this would seem to show something seriously amiss with liberalism. In short, liberalism propounded views beneficial to Soviet Communism that were completely contrary to reality and harmful to the interests of the United States. Objectively speaking, it did not really matter whether an individual was aiding the Soviet Union because he was a Communist or from a liberal vision of world peace, support for the underdog, destruction of evil, etc. To combat Communism successfully, it was essential to remove liberals from critical posts in the government. As James Burnham pointed out “What communism does is to carry the liberal principles to their logical and practical extreme....The liberal’s arm cannot strike with consistent firmness against communism, either domestically or internationally, because the liberal dimly feels that in doing so he would be somehow wounding himself.”⁸⁶ That Soviet Communism eventually fell came about largely despite the efforts of American liberalism.

One final issue concerns what constitutes historical proof. Why was it necessary to have new evidence from Venona and the Soviet archives to prove extensive Soviet subversion? Why wasn’t this believed before? Why was the extensive, converging evidence of ex-Communist agents, Soviet defectors, FBI

reports, and even public documents insufficient? This very stringent standard of proof for Soviet subversion might be contrasted with the rather lenient standard applied to some Nazi German atrocities, which rely heavily on eyewitness accounts in the absence – for whatever reason – of documents and physical evidence. This says something about the establishment’s version of truth. Evidence that would constitute proof on one topic is dismissed when applied to another. In short, the establishment has drastically different standards of proof. But probably the readers of this journal already understand the meaning of the establishment’s version of truth.

Stephen J. Sniegoski holds a Ph.D. in American diplomatic history and is the author of several historical articles.

ENDNOTES

1. Carroll Quigley, *Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time* (New York: MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 919.
2. This paper will consistently use the term KGB, by which the top Soviet security agency was best known, although this agency had different names throughout its history. During much of WWII, it was officially named the NKGB, while earlier it was the NKVD.
3. Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindel, *The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage and America’s Traitors* (Washington: Regnery Publishing, 2000), pp. 124–25.
4. National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, “Venona: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939–1957,” Preface, 1996. <http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/venona/preface.htm>.
5. Bradley F. Smith, *The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A.* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 345–46.
6. The idea that Stalin pushed for war has been bandied about for some time. See, for example, Ernst Topitsch, *Stalin’s War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987). In recent years this view has been given greater credence by the work of Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), *Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990). Suvorov brings up the more controversial argument that Stalin had intended to attack Hitler in 1941, and that the German attack was preemptive. For a review of this issue, see: R. C. Raack, “Stalin’s Role in the Coming of World War II,” *World Affairs*, 158:4 (Spring 1996) <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/raack.htm> and “Stalin’s Role in the Coming of World War II: The International Debate Goes On,” *World Affairs*, 159:2 (Fall 1996). <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/raack2.htm>.
7. Benjamin Colby, *’Twas a Famous Victory: Deception and Propaganda in the War with Germany* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House Publishers, 1974). An example of some of the effective pro-Soviet propaganda from the private sector includes Joseph E. Davies’s

best-selling *Mission to Moscow*, which became a movie, and Quentin Reynolds, *Only the Stars Are Neutral*. Both of these works went so far as to defend Stalin's purges as a positive good. For a discussion of the pro-Soviet propaganda fest see Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, *Leftism: From de Sade and Marx to Hitler and Marcuse* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House Publishers, 1974), pp. 299-302.

8. Harvey Klehr and Ronald Radosh, *The Amerasia Spy Case: Prelude to McCarthyism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

9. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, pp. 52-53; Jerrold and Leona Schecter, *Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History* (Washington: Brassey's, 2002), pp. 118.

10. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, p. 454.

11. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1956), p. 291.

12. A number of individuals writing on American counterintelligence vaguely alluded to the secret project. For example: Robert J. Lamphere and Tom Shactman, *The FBI-KGB War: A Special Agent's Story* (New York: Random House, 1986) and David Martin, *Wilderness of Mirrors* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1981).

13. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999).

14. Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov, *The Secret World of American Communism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995) and Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and K. M. Anderson, *The Soviet World of American Communism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998).

15. Haynes and Klehr, *Venona*, p. 7.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 332.

18. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990).

19. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

20. Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness: A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995).

21. Klehr, Haynes, and Firsov, *Secret World of American Communism*, pp. 18-19.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 326.

23. Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America: The Stalin Era* (New York: Random House, 1999).

24. Weinstein and Vassiliev, *Haunted Wood*, p. xix.

25. Allen Weinstein, *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978).

26. *Ibid.*, *Perjury*.

27. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona*, pp. 136-37.

28. Jerrold and Leona Schecter, *Sacred Secrets*, pp. 128-31.

29. William F. Buckley, Jr. and L. Brent Bozell, *McCarthy and His Enemies* (Chicago: Regnery, 1954), p. 10.

30. Allen Weinstein analyzes these various and conflicting pro-Hiss conspiracy theories in *Perjury*, pp. 569–89. There have also been claims that Hiss was framed by elements of the Left—Trotskyites, the American Communist Party, the KGB, the Soviet super-secret agency SMERSH—but these have not taken hold among Hiss partisans.
31. Hiss's main supporter, John Lowenthal, contacted Russian Colonel General Dmitry Volkogonov, who had been overseeing the Russian archives, to check material on Hiss. Volkogonov initially said that he could find no material in the KGB files. Lowenthal interpreted this to mean that Hiss was innocent. However, Hiss was an agent not of the KGB but of military intelligence (GRU), the files of which were closed even to Volkogonov. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, p. 139–41.
32. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, pp. 29–30.
33. The connection between international communism and international finance would not seem so incongruous to persons of a non-establishment rightwing persuasion. Anti-establishment historian Antony C. Sutton has made a connection between international finance and communism. See for example, Anthony C. Sutton, *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1974). http://reformed-theology.org/html/books/bolshevik_revolution/
34. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, p. 45; Jerrold and Leona Schecter, *Sacred Secrets*, p. 124.
35. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, pp. 29–30.
36. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, pp. 42–43, The Schecters maintain that White was manipulated by Soviet intelligence to introduce the Soviet goals into his initiatives regarding the Far East without his being aware of the consequences of the demand that the Japanese pull out of China. Jerrold and Leona Schecter, *Sacred Secrets*, pp. 21–41. Romerstein/Breindel and the Schecters rely heavily on a recent Russian work on this subject: Vitaliy Pavlov, *Operatziya "Sneg"* (Moscow: Gaia Herum, 1996).
37. Jerrold and Leona Schecter, *Sacred Secrets*, p. 124.
38. Freda Utley, *The High Cost of Vengeance* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1949), p. 15. <http://www.fredautley.com/>
39. Haynes and Klehr, *Venona*, pp. 142–45.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
41. Anthony Kubek, *How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941–1949* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963).
42. Weinstein and Vassiliev, *Haunted Wood*, pp. 140–50.
43. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, pp. 433–39.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 109; Weinstein and Vassiliev, *Haunted Wood*, pp. 72–83.
45. Venona Intercepts, "The November 12, 1944 cable: Theodore Alvin Hall and Saville Sax," http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/venona/inte_19441112.html; Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, pp. 202–205; Haynes and Klehr, *Venona*, pp. 314–17; Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, *Bombshell: The Secret Story of America's Unknown Atomic Spy Conspiracy*, (New York: Times Books, 1997).
46. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, pp. 234–35.
47. Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton, *The Rosenberg File: A Search for Truth* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1983. 2d ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997) argue that while the Rosenbergs were guilty of spying their trial was conducted in an unsavory manner.

48. John Earl Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace? American Communism and Anticommunism in the Cold War Era* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), p. 63.
49. Pavel and Antoli Sudoplatov with Jerrold L. and Leona P. Schecter, *Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness – A Soviet Spymaster* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), pp. 181–97.
50. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, pp. 275–76.
51. Jerrold and Leona Schecter, *Sacred Secrets*, pp. 49–52.
52. *Ibid.*, pp. 315–17.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
54. Yaakov Eisenstadt, “Stalin’s Planned Genocide,” *Dei’ah veDibur*, March 6, 2002, <http://www.shemayisrael.com/chareidi/archives5762/vaypek/VP62features2.htm>
55. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, p. 211.
56. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), p. 287.
57. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, p. 213.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
59. Andrew and Mitrokhin, *Sword and the Shield*, p. 111.
60. Romerstein and Breindel, *Venona Secrets*, pp. 213–15.
61. Harvey Klehr, “Red Scare Revisited,” CNN Interactive, <http://asia.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/06/then.now/>.
62. Arthur Herman, *Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator* (New York: The Free Press, 2000).
63. Sam Tanenhaus, “Un-American Activities,” Review of *Joseph McCarthy: Reexamining the Life and Legacy of America’s Most Hated Senator*, *New York Review of Books*, November 30, 2000, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/13910>. Tanenhaus is the author of *Whittaker Chambers: A Biography* (New York: Random House, 1997).
64. Herman, *Joseph McCarthy*, p. 4.
65. William J. Gill, *The Ordeal of Otto Otepka* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House Publishers, 1969), p. 38; Buckley and Bozell, *McCarthy and His Enemies*, pp. 9–30.
66. Buckley and Bozell, pp. 65–67.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
68. Thomas C. Reeves, *The Life and Times of Joe McCarthy: A Biography* (New York: Stein and Day, 1982), p. 255.
69. Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace?*, p. 151.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
71. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, *Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Final Report* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 224.
72. Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace?*, p. 151.
73. Herman, *Joseph McCarthy*, p. 127–28.
74. Anthony Kubek, “Introduction,” *The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China*, vol. I, prepared by the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 91st Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 30–34.

75. Ibid., pp. 1-113.
76. Ibid., p. 78.
77. Radosh and Klehr, *Amerasia Spy Case*, pp. 210-18.
78. Kubek, *Amerasia Papers*, pp. 65-67.
79. Buckley and Bozell, *McCarthy and His Enemies*, pp. 18-30.
80. Herman, *Joseph McCarthy*, pp. 109-110.
81. Ibid., p. 109.
82. Weinstein and Vassiliev, *Haunted Wood*, pp. 299.
83. Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace?*, pp. 22-36.
84. Haynes writes: "Virtually every one of the tactics used in the 1930s and early 1940s to harass fascist and suspected far rightists would after World War II be used against Communists and those suspected of left-wing sympathies."
85. Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace?*, p. 27.
86. James Burnham, *Suicide of the West: An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1964), pp. 289-90.

UNDERSTANDING MULTIETHNIC POLITICS

Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism

Tatu Vanhanen

Stamford, Connecticut: JAI Press Inc., 1999

\$82.50

xix + 370 pp.

Reviewed by Louis Andrews

Why are ethnic conflicts so common? Why do conflicts of interest in multiethnic societies almost invariably become ethnic conflicts? Why are such conflicts apparently universal and without regard to socioeconomic development level? Can a theory be developed that can answer these questions? Can this theory provide methods that can reduce or eliminate ethnic conflict?

These questions concerning ethnic conflicts are just some of those that Tatu Vanhanen, emeritus professor of political science at the University of Helsinki, takes up in a detailed study reported in his book, *Ethnic Conflicts Explained by Ethnic Nepotism*.

Vanhanen analyzes ethnic conflict in 148 nations and looks for “regularities,” or patterns, among them using the same set of indices he has adopted in previous studies. These indices are discussed below. When it comes to ethnic conflict, Vanhanen notes that research is extensive, but theory rare. For years scholars have churned out articles and books on race, ethnicity, and ethnic conflict. Yet unlike other areas of sociological research, theory concerning ethnic conflict has been almost entirely neglected. When theory has been proposed in this egalitarian era, it has almost invariably been cultural, and often applied to blame ethnic conflict on social inequities and discrimination, primarily by the majority group. Often such theories don’t pass muster, since the goal of the proponents is to transfer power and wealth from the haves to the have-nots to satisfy personal and group ideological ends.

Vanhanen explains how unlikely it is that cultural theories will prove to be valid, since ethnic conflicts are universal regardless of culture. Given this universal aspect, he derives his political theories from biology. First, he argues that there is a Darwinian struggle for resources that is at the heart of political conflicts everywhere. Since we live in a world of scarcity and at the same time desire offspring, we are biologically programmed to advance our own survival (actually the survival of our distinctive genes) over the genes of others. As a result, conflict exists in all human societies and is both necessary and universal. Second, he adopts Pierre L. van den Berghe's concept of "ethnic nepotism," or the desire to favor kin over nonkin, as the basis for ethnic and racial favoritism. Since members of a specific ethnicity are more closely related than nonmembers, the theory of inclusive fitness, or kin selection,¹ dictates that kin will be favored over nonkin, which supports the idea of ethnic nepotism. Vanhanen does not limit the term "ethnic group" only to what we traditionally consider ethnic or racial groups, but includes all inbreeding groups, even religious and linguistic ones that can become "ethnic" in nature over time.

In addition to Darwin and van den Berghe, Vanhanen also draws on the work of several other scholars, including Jan and Brigitta S. Tullberg, from whom he adopts the idea that reciprocity may be key in reducing ethnic conflict. From J. Philippe Rushton he draws upon genetic similarity theory. Vanhanen writes:

It seems to me that these two theories complement each other. Ethnic nepotism explains why people tend to favor kin over nonkin [cf. his spelling to reviewer's, p. 1]; Rushton's genetic similarity theory tries to explain how they recognize genetic similarity in non-relatives.

He notes:

Our behavioral predisposition to ethnic nepotism evolved in the struggle for existence because it was rational and useful. It is reasonable to assume that ethnic nepotism is equally shared by all human populations. Consequently, all human populations and ethnic groups have an approximately equal tendency to resort to ethnic nepotism in interest conflicts. It explains the otherwise strange fact that ethnic interest conflicts appear in so many countries where people belong to clearly different ethnic groups, and that ethnic interest conflicts have emerged within all cultural regions and at all levels of socioeconomic development. It would be difficult to imagine any cultural explanation of ethnic conflicts that could explain the appearance of these conflicts across all cultural boundaries.

Vanhanen develops three hypotheses that he tests in his worldwide study of 148 countries.

1. In all human societies where significant ethnic divisions exist, they lead to ethnic interest conflicts.
2. The greater the ethnic division, "the more political and other interest conflicts tend to become canalized along ethnic lines."

3. The level of conflict is lower where political institutions are based on reciprocity.

His methodology is to subject the 148 countries to several indices that he developed and used in other studies to test these hypotheses. First is the Index of Ethnic Heterogeneity (EH). Here Vanhanen assumes that race is more important than linguistic, tribal, or national divisions, since “divisions based on race or color are genetically the deepest ones because they are tens of thousands of years old.” The EH index is based upon a scale that ranges from 0 to 200. In Europe, for example, Portugal is rated at 2, while Bosnia-Herzegovina comes in at 112 as the only European country with an EH greater than ninety.

Next is the Index of Ethnic Conflict (EC). This also rests on a scale of 0–200 and takes into consideration both violent and institutional conflicts. The author derives institutional ethnic conflict data from the existence of ethnic organizations since it “is reasonable to assume that the establishment of ethnic organizations indicates the existence of ethnic tension and interest conflicts based on ethnic divisions.” Vanhanen divides the world into four areas, with the following results based on the correlation between EH and EC.

Area	Countries	EH < 11	EC < 11	Diff	EH > 10	EC > 10	Diff
Europe	38	11	10	-1	27	28	1
WHemisphere	24	7	8	1	17	16	-1
Asia/Oceania	42	3	6	3	39	36	-3
Africa	44	3	4	1	41	40	-1
Totals:	148	24	28		124	120	

The Index of Democratization (ID), used in an earlier study by Vanhanen, is based on data from 1993 and is used to test his third hypothesis. Since a number of scholars have argued that democratization is the key to conflict reduction, not only between nations but also within nations, this would form a particularly important part of the study.

Vanhanen predicted that any country with an EH over 10 would experience significant ethnic conflict. His study to a large extent confirmed that. Of the 124 countries with an EH greater than ten, 118 experienced significant ethnic conflict, while only two of those with an EH of ten or less did. He found that his Index of Ethnic Heterogeneity was very strongly correlated (0.726) with the Index of Ethnic Conflict and even more so (0.857) with the institutionalized ethnic conflict component of the Index. The Index of Democratization could explain only about 10% of ethnic conflict. Conflict was created by the mere existence of ethnic diversity, not by governmental style or policies. In extreme instances such as in an authoritarian or totalitarian state, government might suppress conflict, but if controls were weakened it would reappear. Yugoslavia and the countries of the former Soviet Union are good examples.

I have to conclude, on the basis of empirical evidence, that the level of ethnic conflicts seems to be nearly independent for the degree of democratization. Ethnic conflicts have emerged at all levels of democracy.

Further, he notes that "ethnic nepotism leads to ethnic interest conflicts in all societies independently from their level of socioeconomic development or from the degree of democracy because all human populations share the same behavioral predisposition to ethnic nepotism."

Using GNP figures for the year 1994 for the 148 countries, Vanhanen concludes:

Relatively weak negative correlations indicate that the level of modernization or socioeconomic development does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the variation of ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflicts seem to be only slightly less common in rich and socioeconomically developed countries than in less developed countries. This means that it would be unrealistic to expect the disappearance of ethnic conflicts at higher levels of socioeconomic development. Thus the results. . . support, at least indirectly, the assumption that ethnic nepotism belongs to human nature and that it is independent from the level of socioeconomic development (modernization) and also from the degree of democratization.

So where are we headed? Decreased birth rates among the European-derived peoples and wide-scale immigration into their countries of nonwhite, non-European populations means that ethnic conflict for the West will not just persist, but increase in the years to come. How then can a different future be assured? The Tullbergs have proposed partition or separation in a widely discussed paper, "Separation or Unity? A Model for Solving Ethnic conflicts," in the September 1997 issue of *Politics and the Life Sciences*. Vanhanen acknowledges that in some situations this might be the best policy. In other instances he believes intermarriage might be a solution, but a long look at Brazil and similar countries would seem to make that less likely a road toward racial peace. Finally he argues that our evolved disposition toward reciprocity can reduce ethnic conflicts if groups are granted equality, but his is not the typical leftist or egalitarian approach concerning equality. Vanhanen writes:

I think that it is important to take these characteristics of human nature into account when attempts are made to adapt social structures and political institutions to the requirements of ethnic nepotism. Because every ethnic group wants to survive and at least to manage its own affairs, if it is not capable of subjugating other groups, it would be advisable to give them sufficient autonomy, and to leave them room to pursue their interests in national politics on the basis of equality. If ethnic groups occupy separate territories, it might be useful to establish federal structures even in relatively small countries. Federalism is in harmony with our disposition to territorial behavior.

As Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, the founder of human ethology, has put it:

In multi-ethnic states, federalistic structures allow different ethnic groups self-government within certain bounds and in cooperation with the other groups sharing a superordinate interest on the basis of reciprocity. This can work as long as such a social contract implies that differential reproduction at the cost of the other is avoided. . . .

This is a marvelous book and one recommended for the library of every person or institution interested in causes and prevention of ethnic conflict. It might have been improved, however, by including two additional theories of group dynamics, as well as some acknowledgement of inherent group differences on an individualist–collectivist scale.

Kevin MacDonald has written three books and several articles on Jewish-gentile conflict. He relies heavily on social identity theory (SIT), which is explained in detail in chapter one of the second book of his trilogy, *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism*. This theory, as well as the one that follows, is really a cultural one with a basis in evolutionary biology. The eight most pertinent points of the theory in relation to ethnic conflict as discussed here are taken directly from MacDonald.

1. The social characterization process results in discontinuities such that people exaggerate the similarities of individuals within each category.
2. Social identity research indicates that the stereotypic behavior and attitudes of the ingroup are positively valued while outgroup behavior and attitudes are negatively valued.
3. The result of these categorization processes is group behavior that involves discrimination against the outgroup and in favor of the ingroup; beliefs in the superiority of the ingroup and inferiority of the outgroup; and positive affective preference for the ingroup and negative affect directed toward the outgroup.
4. These tendencies towards ingroup cohesiveness and devaluations of the outgroup are exacerbated by real conflicts of interest.
5. Competition between groups is not a necessary condition for the development of ingroup biases.
6. People tend to manipulate their social identity in ways that provide positive self-evaluations.
7. People readily adopt a group mentality and engage in collective behavior of an often irrational, intensely emotional sort.
8. There is no requirement that beliefs regarding either the ingroup or the outgroup may be true.

Although neither Vanhanen nor MacDonald addresses it, I believe that Optimum Distinctiveness Theory (ODT), a subset of SIT developed by Marilynn B. Brewer, past president of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, is also important in understanding ethnic conflict. It not only explains the heightened racial-ethnic awareness of small groups in a mixed environment, but also to some extent the relative lack of racial consciousness we currently see

among whites in the United States and Europe. This current characteristic is described most succinctly by Sam Francis's well-known aphorism that "whites exist objectively, but not subjectively." Brewer notes:

Social identification and group loyalty will be strongest for groups that are optimally distinct, i.e., those that are large enough to satisfy an individual's need for belonging and inclusion and small enough to satisfy the need for distinctiveness and differentiation. Groups that are in the numerical minority are more likely to be optimally distinct because they offer both a sense of being similar to fellow minority group members and a sense of being different from members of the majority group; minority group members are therefore more likely to exhibit strong ingroup identity and loyalty. The greater sense of belonging found among minority group members may explain the benefits derived from participation in racial/ethnic student organizations and minority support programs. Membership in the majority group of whites, on the other hand, is too inclusive an identity to stimulate feelings of belonging.

In other words, groups must be small enough to maintain distinctiveness. If they become too large or too inclusive, they will tend to fractionalize and splinter. In addition, selfish behaviors will predominate and individualism will replace group interests. If a sufficiently distinctive social group can be maintained, then the collective self will dominate the individual self.

There is an old saying that the victor writes the history. But more important is that the victor creates the new mythology that justifies that history. Today the Western World is consumed with two ideas of that new mythology: human racial-ethnic equality and individualism. This mythology has been promoted by Democrats and Republicans; Christians, Jews, and secular humanists; liberals and conservatives; and in the case of individualism especially, by libertarians.

The concept of individualism has been used to counter efforts by minority ethnic groups to promote group interests. That is, for integration to be successful all ethnic group interests must be subordinated to the greater values of individualism. Thus the saying, "by the content of their character, not by the color of their skin." Unfortunately for the individualist position, as Frank Salter has noted:

When competition is limited to individuals and families and does not involve ethnies, individuals can behave in ways that approximate the optimal (individual) utility maximization modeled by econometricians. But in multi-ethnic states individual economic rationality is maladaptive when it leads to loss of relative ethnic fitness and ethnic stratification, as is common in multicultural societies.

Both the promoters of this individualism and those multiculturalists who defend minority ethnic interests insist on equal outcomes as the proof of whether or not minority groups are oppressed. But, of course, this policy of using equal outcomes as a rational guide means that the "character" (i.e. behavior and IQ) of ethnic groups must be the same. Otherwise there is no way

to judge the policy's effectiveness. If otherwise healthy twelve- and twenty-year-olds are given the same test, their failure to perform identically is not indicative of the quality of the education policy.

Despite the claims of individualist ideologues and antiracists, all ethnic and racial groups behave, at least to some extent, *as groups*. Vanhanen points out that ethnic nepotism is natural, normal, and exists in all groups in all societies, even when the individual is unaware of it. So in the typical interethnic conflict in the West, the minority group member blames it on racism, while the majority group member rejects majority membership and says we should consider everyone as individuals.

As the black legal scholar Lani Guinier once noted, "Talking about race for people of color. . . is the natural thing to do. . . for whites, talking about race is uncomfortable." Blacks understand that they share many interests in common with other blacks as well as some with whites. Whites used to understand that they also shared many interests in common with other whites as well as some with blacks. They, like blacks, used to understand that sometimes *group interests differ*. But after fifty years of egalitarian propaganda in which everyone is merely an individual and race doesn't matter, whites have become true believers, whereas blacks know better. Therein lies the problem.

As Vanhanen notes, ethnic conflict resolution in a free multiethnic society requires reciprocity between groups, but in our case whites recognize only one group: blacks. Building a viable community requires that whites think of themselves as a group, just as blacks do. Only then can reciprocity work, and conflicts be resolved.

Cries of racism by blacks are self-serving weapons, just as are cries by whites that we should ignore race. Such noise from both sides is natural, and successful resolution requires that they be ignored.

*Louis Andrews is a businessman and creator of the **Stalking the Wild Taboo** website. He is also web editor/publisher and business manager of **The Occidental Quarterly**. Mr. Andrews has written for **Right Now!** as well as other publications and lives in Augusta, Ga.*

END NOTES

1. Though most people, including Vanhanen, treat inclusive fitness and kin selection as identical, the originator of the theory of inclusive fitness argued that it was a more general term than that of kin selection. See Hamilton (2001).

REFERENCES

- Brewer, Marilynn B. "The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 17, no. 5 (October 1991), pp. 475–482.
- Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus. *Human Ethology*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1984.
- Hamilton, W. D. (ed.) *Narrow Roads of Gene Land. Volume 2. Evolution of Sex*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 108–115.
- MacDonald, Kevin B. *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998.
- Salter, Frank. "Estimating Ethnic Genetic Interests: Is It Adaptive to Resist Replacement Migration?," *Population and Environment*, November 2002.
- Tullberg, Jan and Tullberg, Brigitta S. "Separation or Unity: A Model for Solving Ethnic Conflicts," *Politics and the Life Sciences*, September 1997, pp. 237–248.

ROTATING POLYANDRY — AND ITS ENFORCERS

Women's Infidelity

Living in Limbo

Michelle Langley

St. Louis, MO: McCarlan Publishing, 2005

xii+188 pp.

\$17.95

Taken into Custody

The War against Fatherhood, Marriage and the Family

Stephen Baskerville

Nashville, TN: Cumberland House Publishing, 2007

352 pp.

\$24.95

Reviewed by F. Roger Devlin

Michelle Langley's *Women's Infidelity* is probably the first book ever reviewed in *The Occidental Quarterly* advertised as "shipped in a plain envelope without any mention of the contents on the package." But even if you are not an adulterous wife yourself, there are good reasons for paying attention to Langley's documentation of social dissolution. An advanced civilization requires high-investment parenting to maintain itself. The greatest threat to proper parenting in our time is divorce, overwhelmingly initiated by the wife (70-75 percent of the time, according to Langley).

Her book's central thesis is an unpopular one previously set forth in this journal by the present reviewer: *women are no more "naturally" monogamous than men.*

Biochemical research points to a natural four-year sexual cycle for the human female. This apparently allows enough time after childbirth for the average mother in a state of savagery to regain her ability to survive without male provisioning. In the absence of any system of marriage, a woman's natural tendency is to "liberate" herself from her mate after that point. When her hormones prompt her to reproduce again, she simply takes a new mate.

Langley cites Helen Fisher's *Anatomy of Love* and Burnham and Phelan's *Mean Genes* in support of this account. According to the latter, separation and divorce are most likely to occur in the fourth year of marriage "across more than sixty radically different cultures."

Feral female sexual behavior is governed by a number of chemicals. The euphoria of infatuation is associated with the stimulant pheyethylamine, naturally produced in the body by erotic attraction. As with other drugs, it is addictive, and people gradually build up a tolerance to it, requiring ever-greater levels to achieve the same effect. Over time, it loses its power over us, and infatuation is replaced by a calm feeling of attachment to our mates. There are neurochemical factors at work here as well. But the feeling of attachment or bondedness is akin to the effect of a sedative or narcotic rather than a stimulant.

Next there are hormones to consider. The sex drive, in both men and women, is linked to testosterone levels. These are, of course, always higher in men; but the difference is greatest in early adulthood when people have traditionally taken their mates. As men age, their testosterone levels gradually decrease; women's levels rise. Going into their thirties, women get hairier, their voices deepen, and they behave more assertively. And, in the author's words, "it's also quite common for them to experience a dramatic increase in their desire for other men." (Langley cites Theresa Crenshaw's *The Alchemy of Love and Lust* and Michael Liebowitz's *The Chemistry of Love* on these matters.)

The author is not a professional researcher in any of these fields herself. She relates that, after four years of happy marriage and shortly after her 27th birthday, she began to feel bored and unhappy for no apparent reason. She turned to a number of books and professionals, all of whom agreed that the fault lay with her husband; she adopted this now conventional view for a time herself. Fortunately – and unlike most women – she kept digging for answers. She met women, at first accidentally, who described similar experiences, and questioned them. Later she began seeking women out for lengthy interviews. She eventually interviewed men as well. It is worth noting that she managed to devote several hours a week to this research without any degree in sociology or taxpayer-funded grants. Gradually, consistent patterns began to emerge from the stories she was hearing. "By the time I stopped counting, I had interviewed 123 women and 72 men.... I found it fascinating that something so prevalent could be kept so secret."

What, then, did she learn? First, women are more likely than men to confuse sexual attraction with love. The sexes speak differently of the feelings associated with the early stages of a romantic affair:

Most men I have talked to call it infatuation, but most of the women I have talked to call it being in love.... Women in particular may believe that, if they find the right person, intense feelings can last. They've been taught to believe that they should only want sex with someone they love. So when a woman

desires a man, she thinks she is in love, and when the desire fades she thinks she is out of love.

Women often speak of seeking “commitment” from men, but this would seem to imply a preference for marriage-minded men over others. Langley observed the very opposite tendency in her interviewees:

They often form relationships with men who are emotionally inaccessible. Instead of choosing men who are interested in developing a relationship, these women choose men who make them feel insecure. Insecurity can create motivation and excitement. Women who seek excitement in their marriages (and many do) will often forego the possibility of real relationships for the excitement of fantasy relationships.... It’s not uncommon for women to pine for men who shy away from commitment, while they shun the attention given to them by men who are willing and ready to make a commitment.

Much uninformed and superficial commentary on the sexual revolution assumes that “men want sex while women want marriage.” Langley draws a valid distinction: women want to *get* married, not to *be* married. They often love not so much their husbands as their bridal-fantasy in which the man serves as a necessary prop.

Females want to wear the dress and have the wedding. Many women have looked forward to that day their whole lives, which ultimately sets them up for a huge crash.

Most women are happiest when focused on fulfilling some part of the get-married-and-live-happily-ever-after fantasy. They are content, even in relatively unfulfilling relationships, as long as some part of the fantasy is left to play out....

When a woman wants to get married, she will usually overlook a lot, and at times allow herself to be treated pretty badly. After she gets married, not only is the excitement of pursuit over, after a few years of marriage the attraction buzz has dissipated too. At that point, many women may find that marriage hasn’t even come close to meeting their expectations. Some women feel stupid for having wanted it so badly in the first place.

Men being pressured for “commitment” sometimes attempt to point this out: “Why is it such a big deal? What is going to be different after we’re married?” The men are right, of course: a wedding ceremony has no magical power to produce lifelong happiness. Unfortunately, this seems to be something women only learn from experience.

One thing that usually does change after the wedding is the woman’s willingness to overlook her man’s faults. Many men will tell you: “when my wife and I were dating, I could do no wrong; now that we are married, I can do no right.” Indeed, says our author, women who have tolerated their men’s shortcomings and tried to please them only in pursuit of their own fantasy often enter marriage carrying a great deal of repressed anger, which usually emerges in time. The husband, for his part, feels like the victim of a “bait and switch” sales tactic. One wonders what would become of the human race if

women told their boyfriends flat out: "you must marry me so I can stop pretending to love you as you are, and start complaining about all the ways you disappoint me."

Langley distinguishes, based upon her interviews, four typical stages in marital breakdown.

1) The wives begin to feel vaguely that "something is missing in their lives." Then they experience a loss of interest in sexual relations with their husbands. The author is clear that her interviewees were *not* being "abused" or mistreated in any way. Nevertheless, in some cases "the women claimed that when their husbands touched them, they felt violated; they said their bodies would freeze up and they would feel tightness in their chest and/or a sick feeling in their stomach."

2) After a certain interval, they experience an unexpected reawakening of sexual desire – but not, alas, for their lawful husbands. In many cases, the women did not act upon their new desires quickly. Usually they would go through a period of feeling guilty, and sometimes try to assuage these feelings by increased attentiveness toward their husbands.

Women, says Langley, enter marriage assuming they are naturally monogamous. "*Trying* to be faithful doesn't seem natural to them." They recite the wedding vow in much the same spirit as they wear "something borrowed, something blue" – it is simply what one does at a wedding. Of course, a vow is no very serious undertaking to one who assumes she will never feel any temptation to break it.

Accordingly, over time, most women begin to rationalize their extramarital erotic interests. If women simply want to be married and are not naturally inclined to be attracted to other men, "any unhappiness or infidelity on the part of the women is assumed to be due to the men they married." This seems to me a critically important and easily overlooked finding: the widely propagated notion that women are naturally monogamous is helping to nourish the contemporary "blame the man for everything" mentality. Hence, odd as this sounds, in order to reestablish the actual practice of monogamy, it may be necessary to discredit the notion that women are naturally inclined to it.

Once women start believing their wayward desires can be blamed upon their husbands' failures, they become "negative and sarcastic when speaking about their husbands and their marriages." It is then usually just a matter of time and opportunity before the wives proceed to actual adultery.

3) Women involved in extramarital affairs speak of "feelings unlike anything they'd experienced before. They felt 'alive' again." This euphoria was, however, combined with pain and guilt. Often before a tryst, they would vow that 'this would be the last time,' but were unable to keep their resolutions. The author interprets this as addictive behavior related to the brain chemistry of erotic attachment. She conjectures that the "high" produced by adultery is more intense than that of lawful courtship because of its association with

shame, guilt and secrecy: a plausible hypothesis, and possible topic for future research.

Usually the women did not act decisively to end their marriages, which gave them a sense of security in spite of everything. Divorce produces separation anxiety, which is a sort of chemical withdrawal. Habitual attachments produce a safe, comfortable feeling, like a sedative; and loss of a person to whom we are bonded produces a panicky feeling like that of a child lost in a department store, Langley writes. So these women often lived in a "state of limbo" for years, unable to decide whether to remain married or seek a divorce. Most expected they would eventually achieve clarity about their own desires, but this seldom happened. The author's hypothesis is that "clarity never comes, because what they are really trying to do is avoid pain. They are hoping that one day it won't hurt to leave their spouse, or that one day they'll no longer desire to be with someone else and will want to return to their spouse." (She neglects to mention that it may "hurt" many women to renounce their husbands' financial support as well.)

Sometimes the paramour breaks off relations with the adulterous wife, for any number of reasons. In these cases, the women "experienced extreme grief, became deeply depressed and expressed tremendous anger *toward their husbands*" (my emphasis). In fact, according to Langley's hypothesis, they were experiencing another form of withdrawal – they were stimulant addicts forced to go "cold turkey." These women "placed the utmost importance on finding a relationship that gave them the feeling they experienced in their affairs. In the meantime, "some women resumed sporadic sexual relations with their husbands in an effort to safeguard the marriage." Though no longer attracted to their husbands, "desire was temporarily rekindled when they suspected their husbands were unfaithful [or] showed signs of moving on." In other words, even wives who have been unfaithful for years want to keep their husbands hanging on – they do not want *him* to leave *them*.

4) Finally some women do reach a sort of resolution. This may mean divorce or a decision to remain married and continue their affairs indefinitely. *Langley does not mention a single case in which an adulterous wife returned to her husband unreservedly and sincerely.* Those who divorced and remarried sometimes expressed "regret for having hurt their children and ex-spouses only to find themselves experiencing similar feelings in the new relationship." In other words, they had reached the end of a second feral sexual cycle, and boredom had returned. The "natural" female sex drive results in rotating polyandry. Langley even entitles one chapter "The Commitment Game: Female Version of Pursue and Discard." One can hardly avoid the thought that these women might have saved everyone a lot of trouble by simply keeping their original marriage vow.

Like other observers of the contemporary scene, the author notes the pervasiveness of female anger. "It's impossible...to understand anything about

women in this country today, unless you understand that a) they're angry, and b) their anger is directed at men. Women today aren't seeking equality. They want retribution—revenge."

Much of this is due to feminist indoctrination. An ideological regime (and feminism may now, I think, legitimately be called a regime) paints the past in the darkest colors possible in order to camouflage its own failures. According to official "herstory," women's lives were a virtual hell on earth before the glorious dawn of feminism. They were beaten and brutalized, burned as witches, forcibly prevented from acquiring the education for which they were supposedly thirsting. Theologians allegedly taught that they had no souls. Unfortunately, Langley appears to accept at least some of this balderdash: "When women decide to leave their husbands, all the pain from their past *together with all the pain women have suffered at the hands of men throughout history* is unleashed on their husbands in the form of anger, regardless of whether or not their husbands have treated them badly" (my emphasis).

Langley is on firmer ground when she suggests women actually enjoy being angry because it gives them a kind of power: "Angry people not only spur those around them to walk on eggshells, they motivate them to do exactly what the angry person wants them to do. Some women stay angry long after divorcing their husbands because, as long as they're angry and their ex-husbands feel guilty, they've got power over them."

A third factor is the unrealistic expectations women now have about marriage: "their not getting the expected payoff [of] continued excitement over getting and being married."

It should also be pointed out that the very terms "retribution" and "revenge" imply that husbands have wronged their wives somehow. If this is not the case, and Langley admits that today it mostly is not, the proper terms for the women's behavior would be "wanton cruelty" or "sadism." This supposition is strengthened by some of the author's own observations: "I've noticed that once a woman reaches a certain point, not only does her anger persist, she wants to continually punish and inflict pain on whomever has angered her.... The men that I talked to often used the word *evil* to describe the behavior of their wives."

Let us consider the author's male interviewees and their reactions to these patterns of female behavior. Langley lists three obstacles to male recognition of the reality of female infidelity: 1) a kind of high-minded attitude that "*my* wife simply isn't 'that kind' of woman," which usually amounts to wishful thinking; 2) an invalid inference from the wife's lack of interest in sexual relations with *them* to a lack of sexual interests generally; and 3) a failure to discuss and compare notes on marital problems with other men, as women routinely do with one another.

The author emphasizes the gullibility of the men she interviewed. One man's wife had walked out on him and rented an apartment; three years

later, he still had no suspicions that she might be with another man. Often the wives who took advantage of their husbands' credulousness were highly jealous themselves: "Some of the husbands learned to look down in restaurants and other public places, because they feared their wife would accuse them of looking at another woman. Some claimed that their wife didn't want them to watch certain television programs." Psychologists call this projection: the automatic attribution of one's own thoughts and motivations to others. Thus, dishonorable women tend to be suspicious; faithful husbands are trusting.

In the author's experience, however, men do not get much credit with their wives for placing so much trust in them:

Some of the women resented their husbands' lack of suspicion.... Although females never give males any indication that they are anything less than 100 percent faithful, [they] seem to think men are stupid for believing them. Females just think males should know that when they say "I would never cheat on you," what they really mean is "I would never cheat on you...as long as you make me happy and I don't get bored."

Of course, if men did know this it is unlikely many of them would want to get married.

Women may want men to make them happy, but they do not say, and probably do not know themselves, how this might be accomplished. "Women want men to read their minds – or, more accurately, their emotions – because it's what they do, easily.... Females want males to anticipate their needs and desires." (Obeying their every command is not enough.) Women do in fact have a greater ability to perceive the needs and feelings of others without verbal communication, an evolved adaptation to the requirements of successfully nurturing infants. When they expect their husbands to have this same ability, they are in effect upset that their husbands are not women.

Eventually, women do come out and tell their husbands they are "unhappy." But this does not mean they have any intention of working on improving the marriage; women ordinarily make no overt, specific complaints until they are

100 percent done with the relationship – meaning [they] have lost all feeling.... It's not uncommon for women to eventually feel less for their husbands than they would for a stranger on the street.... When women start being specific to men about their needs, it's usually only to let their husbands know all the many areas in which they have failed. In other words, their husbands have already been fired; their wives are just giving them the reasons for the termination.... She already has another "Mr. Right" picked out or is eager to find one. She is looking for the feeling of excitement again.

Men rarely understand this. The author found that most men blamed themselves and "beat themselves up" for the things they thought they had done wrong in the marriage. Their initial response to their wives' stated unhappiness was to *try to make them happy*. "In most cases, their husbands launched futile attempts to make their wives happy by being more attentive, spending more

time at home and helping out around the house. Regardless of these women's past and present complaints, the last thing they wanted was to spend more time with their husbands." (Langley notes that wives do often complain that "my spouse doesn't pay attention to me," but calls this code for "I want another man.") In fact, wives often became angry precisely over their husbands' efforts to please them, because this increased their own feelings of guilt for infidelity. Some also perceived the similarity between this behavior and their own earlier efforts to get their husbands to "commit;" women know better than anyone that efforts to please can be a form of manipulation.

The women sometimes responded with a kind of countermanipulation: "they thought if they were cold and treated their husbands terribly, the men would leave, or ask them to leave." Sometimes this happens – which, incidentally, explains why divorce initiation statistics can be misleading. A significant portion of the roughly thirty percent of divorces which are formally male-initiated result from the wife deliberately maneuvering her husband into taking the step.

But it is not always easy for women to obtain a divorce in this manner: "Some of the women couldn't believe the things their husbands were willing to put up with." (So much for men not being committed.) The author recounts cases where women deliberately tried to provoke their husbands into striking them because they calculated it would be to their advantage in the looming child-custody dispute. One reason husbands may be so difficult to provoke today is that they realize the only result will be a jail term for "domestic abuse" or a restraining order preventing them from seeing their children.

Most of the men didn't have anyone to talk to other than their wives, which is why I believe they tried so desperately to hold on to them.... Some of the men were so dependent on their wives, they didn't think they could live without them, but one thing all the men shared was a fear of losing their children.

The men I interviewed feared losing their family, but the women didn't seem to have that fear. The women thought of it as losing their husbands, not their family. More often than not, the men were forced to move out of their homes and away from their kids. They lost all of their attachment bonds and felt as though they were losing their whole identity.

Many of the men became suicidal when their wife left and remained so for a long time afterwards. A few of the men said that they felt homicidal.

On the other hand, "the word used by the majority of women I interviewed to describe their husbands [was] 'pathetic.'" When the full extent of their husband's emotional dependence upon them comes out, women are not moved or gratified; they feel contempt for what they see as weakness.

Sometimes another woman entered the abandoned husband's life, but the affairs were usually mired in the man's grief. In a few cases, the man was unable to have sexual relationships with the woman he started seeing.... To say they were in pain would be an understatement.... The men developed these relationships so they could have someone to talk to. Most said that having

an affair was the last thing on their minds at the time, but they didn't know what else to do. They felt lonely and isolated. Many men credited the woman who helped them with saving their lives, which may be a literal truth.

What are we to make of all this?

Men have an inherent reluctance about joining together to defend their interests in the manner of feminists. One reason, I believe, is they fear it would seem *unmanly*. While feminists blather about "uncomfortable environments" like princesses fussing over peas, men learn early to swallow large amounts of pain and disappointment: this is simply part of what it means to be a man. The toughening they receive from their fathers and peer groups usually stands them in good stead. They must, after all, learn to make their own way in an unfair world that does not care about their feelings. But all men have their limits. I do not see how any society can expect men to endure from their women the abhorrent behavior Michelle Langley describes. Reports of suicides and other violent behavior on the part of abandoned husbands denied access to their children are getting onto the internet. Despite the powerful presence of feminist gatekeepers, even the "old" news media will not be able to maintain a complete blackout forever. The "backlash" feminists have long talked about is just beginning.

The reader has probably gathered by now that *Women's Infidelity* is not the sort of book that would inspire a young man to go out and fall in love. Concerned as all of us must be about declining birthrates, I could not in good conscience urge any young man coming of age in America today to marry, or even to date. There is simply no point in continuing to play by the old rules with women who openly despise those rules. Instead, I would recommend working hard, saving money, refusing to socialize with spoiled women, and reading Michelle Langley if you want to learn what kinds of things you are missing out on. If you still cannot rid yourself of the desire to marry, learning an Eastern European language might not be a bad investment.

The reality of marriage in any age is indeed such that it has never been easy to make it a sensible choice for a man from a purely self-interested point of view. The sexual instinct and romantic illusions can only do so much. This is why it has often been necessary to exhort contented bachelors that it would be "immature and irresponsible" of them not to take a wife. Above and beyond this, dowries often used to be offered with brides to sweeten the deal. Our author's description of this ancient custom is delightful: "females are considered a worthless burden so families pay men to marry them." Sounds reasonable to me.

Langley reports that she interviewed just two men who responded effectively to the challenge of their wives' disloyalty.

The first man took the initiative and filed for divorce after his wife expressed on several occasions that she was unhappy and considering a separation. Before the divorce was final, his wife was trying to reconcile, but he chose

not to because of her [lack of interest] in working on the marriage prior to his filing for divorce.

The second case was a man in a second marriage who had made all the usual mistakes the first time around but, unlike most husbands, managed to learn from the experience. As soon as his second wife started talking about a vague “unhappiness,” he inferred that she had met another man. He put down in writing clear conditions for remaining married to her and refused to agree to any separation, knowing it would only be a prelude to divorce. Insisting she break off her extramarital affair at once, he wrote: “I will not allow my spirit to deteriorate because of your indecision.” Rather than attempting to remove all possible grounds for his wife’s discontent, he simply told her: “complaining is no longer acceptable. If you want me to do or not do something, you must tell me what it is. I do not expect you to read my mind and I will no longer try to read yours.” This worked.

A man cannot force his wife to be faithful, but he can force her to make a clear choice; he can refuse to allow her the opportunity of having both a marriage and an affair, of continuing in a “limbo” of indecisiveness. Langley even reports that some unfaithful wives themselves “wanted their husband to give them an ultimatum – a kick in the ass, so to speak.”

Delivering an ultimatum, be it noted, is incompatible with such sacred bromides as “commitment” and “unconditional love.” One lesson to be drawn from *Women’s Infidelity* is that husbands need to be *less* committed to their wives rather than more. Without legal enforcement of the marriage contract, the threat of abandonment seems to be the only thing that sometimes keeps women in line. Rather than fulminating against men who “love ‘em and leave ‘em,” we might do better to hold ticker-tape parades in honor of husbands who say “enough is enough” and walk out; at least wives would have an incentive to keep their men happy. In any case, the women Langley describes hardly seem to deserve undying loyalty.

The conservative commentariat is clueless as usual about these realities. All they have to offer is empty sermonizing about the sacredness of the marriage vow and sanctimonious rubbish about men “preying upon” and abandoning supposedly weak and helpless women. This is of no help to a husband faced with the reality of an unfaithful wife and the prospect of losing his family through no fault of his own. As long as men do nothing more than keep their marriage vows to women who are trampling upon their own and abusing their husbands’ trust, the situation can only continue to deteriorate.

When you destroy a fundamental social institution – and none is more fundamental than marriage – the usual result is a powerful lesson in why the institution was established in the first place. Never before have we actually been able to observe how women behave when unrestrained by honor, shame, religious instruction, or fear of social disgrace and financial ruin. In our author’s words, “We are just starting to see glimpses of women’s natural sexual

behavior." If her stories provide the glimpses, one shudders to imagine what the full-length view will look like.

Langley is better at describing and diagnosing than at prescribing remedies. She actually concludes with the hope that her work might serve to "reduce the use of shame as a sexual deterrent for females." In other words, *women are not yet shameless enough*. In her view, the only justification for shaming women into marital fidelity in the past was to ease husbands' paternity anxiety. She believes the advent of DNA testing has rendered this aspect of traditional sexual morality obsolete. She thereby joins a long line of persons who have imagined that some technical advance — pills, latex devices, new abortion procedures — will allow men and women to dispense with self-control and fidelity. But this will require the cooperation of men. How does she imagine a husband will react when his wife tells him "I am going to sleep with another man, but don't worry: we'll just have the baby DNA tested to determine the financial obligations." My guess is that husbands will be about as happy with this arrangement as wives would be with men who said "I'm going to bed with my secretary, but don't worry: I'll use a condom, so nobody will catch a disease and all my income will still go to support our children." Sexual jealousy is an evolved irrational drive inexplicable in merely prudential or economically rational terms.

Like many contemporary writers, Langley discusses sex at great length without much considering the most obvious thing about it, viz., that *it is where babies come from*. She is childless herself and nowhere considers the possibility that the vague "something missing" from the lives of bored, unhappy matrons is children.

My great-grandmother raised nine children to adulthood in a world without supermarkets, refrigerators or washing machines. She did not have much time to search for "unconditional love" or "commitment," because she was too busy practicing it herself. Most of her life was taken up with the unceasing procurement and preparation of food for her husband and children. Yet she got along fine without romance novels, child custody gamesmanship or psychotherapy; she was, I am told, always cheerful and contented. This is something beyond the imagination of barren, resentful feminists. It is the satisfaction which results from knowing that one is carrying out a worthwhile task to the best of one's abilities, a satisfaction nothing else in life can give. We are here today because this is the way women used to behave; we cannot continue long under the present system of rotating polyandry.

While Michelle Langley focuses on the psychology of "liberated" female sexual behavior, Stephen Baskerville's *Taken into Custody* details for us the brutal police-state machinery which has grown up in the past forty years to encourage, enforce, and profit from it. Here is the reality behind such commonplace euphemisms as "marital breakdown" and "custody disputes":

A man comes home one day to find his house empty. On the table is a note from his wife saying she has taken the children to live with her sister or parents or boyfriend, or to a "battered women's shelter." Soon after comes a knock on the door. He is summoned to appear [at] a family court within a few hours. In a hearing that lasts a few minutes his children are legally removed from his care...and he is ordered to stay away from them most or all of the time. He is also ordered to begin making child support payments, an order is entered to garnish his wages, and his name is placed on a federal government database for monitoring "delinquents." If he tries to see his children outside the authorized time, or fails to make the payments, he can be arrested. Without being permitted to speak, he is told the hearing is over...

The man may be accused of domestic violence or child sexual abuse, in which case there may be no hearing at all...but the police will simply come to the door and order him to leave his home within hours, or minutes, even if no evidence has been presented against him...The man may also be ordered to pay alimony and the fees of lawyers he has not hired and threatened with arrest if he refuses or is unable...If he refuses to hire a lawyer he will be ordered to pay his spouse's lawyer. Either way, he will pay \$50,000-\$150,000 and possibly much more...If he refuses to answer questions or pay he can be jailed without a trial...If he objects, he can be ordered to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.

At his "trial," he will be interrogated about the most intimate details of his family life.

And no answer is correct. If he works long hours, he is a careerist who neglects his children. If he cares for his children, he is failing to earn as much income for them as he might. If he disciplines his children, he is controlling or even abusive. If he does not, he is neglectful. If he does not bathe them, he is neglecting them. If he does, he may be molesting them.

All this costs him "\$400-\$500 an hour, and the ordeal lasts as long as the lawyers and judge wish to drive up the fees."

Whatever the outcome of the trial, for the rest of his children's childhood they and he will live under constant surveillance and control by the court. He will be told when he can see his children, what he can do with them, where he can take them...what religious services he may (or must) attend with them and what subjects he may discuss with them in private...He can be ordered to work certain hours and at certain jobs, the earnings from which will be confiscated...If he loses his job or is hospitalized he will be declared a felon and jailed for failure to pay child support. His home can be entered by officials of the court...His financial records will be demanded and examined by the court and his bank account will be raided...His children can be compelled to act as informers against him. He can be ordered to sell his house and turn the proceeds over to attorneys he has not hired.

Baskerville notes that the very monstrousness of the injustices being committed against fathers prevents some people from accepting that they are taking place. A common initial reaction to the horror stories is "if things are really as bad as that, wouldn't we have heard about it before now?"

There are several reasons. One, of course, is that journalists whose job it is to inform us of corruption in public life prefer to entertain us with features on "gay marriage" and movie stars' romances. But a second is that the family courts directly retaliate against parents who attempt to organize or speak out. It is a crime in many jurisdictions to criticize a family court judge; where it is not, judges can simply issue individual gag orders from the bench. Baskerville reports instances of fathers who were arrested for talking to reporters about their cases. Sheriff's deputies photograph protest demonstrations by fathers' groups. Internet sites have been shut down. Archaic laws against "defamatory libel" and "scandalizing the court" have been resurrected to prosecute critics. Court officials have been deputized to monitor fathers' criticisms of the court in the press and in their private correspondence (which they can be ordered to hand over on pain of incarceration). Meanwhile, officials are free to discuss the private lives of fathers openly in public meetings and post information about their cases on the Internet.

Family court proceedings occur behind closed doors, and most often no records are kept. In cases where they are, they have sometimes been illegally falsified by unknown persons. Judges cite "family privacy" as the rationale for secrecy. But in fact, the Clerk of Courts is required to make plenty of information about "defendants" (fathers) public: Social Security numbers, unlisted telephone numbers, and more. They are prohibited, however, from divulging the name of the judge assigned to the case. Baskerville draws the obvious conclusion: The purpose of all the secrecy and censorship is not to protect family privacy but to allow the courts to invade it with impunity.

A third obstacle to public recognition that innocent men are being railroaded is that fathers themselves believe the propaganda about "deadbeat dads." Even after becoming victims of the system, they assume some mistake must have been made in their particular case, while other men are the "real" deadbeats the government rightly pursues. An important factor contributing to this misapprehension is a sentimental view of motherhood and female innocence left over from an earlier age but now demonstrably at variance with the facts. One writer quoted by Baskerville reports: "All the domestic relations lawyers I spoke with concurred that *in disputes involving child custody* women initiate divorce 'almost all the time.'" Men more often attempt to avoid divorce: "Fifty-eight percent of men delayed their divorce because of its impact on children. Far fewer women [viz., 37 percent] had this worry."

Many conservatives will no doubt agree that strong-arm methods are unwarranted against lawfully wedded and faithful fathers, but protest that they may be necessary against those scoundrels who "prey upon" women without having escorted them to an altar. Baskerville, however, cites evidence that even unwed fathers do not normally abandon their offspring:

An American study of young, low-income, and unmarried fathers presents a picture that, while far from ideal, does not show them abandoning their chil-

dren: 63% had only one child; 82% had children by only one mother...70% saw their children at least once a week...and large percentages reported bathing, feeding, dressing and playing with their children; and 85% provided informal child support in the form of cash or purchased goods such as diapers, clothing and toys.

Another survey, conducted in the north of England, found that "the most common reason given by the fathers for not having more contact with their children was the mothers' reluctance to let them." Here we see one of the reasons for marriage: not to prevent men from absconding, but to prevent women from interfering with the father-child bond.

In other words, fatherhood is natural. If shotgun marriages and child support collection agencies were necessary to force men to provide for their offspring (as so many sanctimonious male commentators imply), civilization could never have arisen in the first place. The human male simply *cannot* be as bad as now routinely portrayed, whether by hate-filled feminists or pharisaical conservatives.

Here are just a few more highlights from Baskerville's relentless catalogue of divorce industry injustices:

A man in the United Kingdom received a sentence of ten months for greeting his child on the street.

Children have been jailed for refusal to testify against their fathers. A seventeen-year-old girl was wrestled to the ground and handcuffed by two male police detectives for refusal to leave her father's apartment.

Fathers have been kept away from the bedsides of their dying children.

Custodial parents are not answerable to anyone for use of child support payments, and need not spend any of it on the children. States use "child support" money to balance their budgets, or for any other purpose they please.

Some states have instituted "expedited judicial processes" in which fathers are summoned to appear not before judges but before "judicial commissioners" or "marital masters," essentially ordinary lawyers dressed up in judge's robes. These persons sometimes double as lobbyists for legislation relating to child support.

In Warren County, Pennsylvania, a man was threatened with prison unless he signed a preprinted confession stating "I have physically and emotionally battered my partner...I am responsible for the violence I used. My behavior was not provoked."

Private companies have been dragooned into performing surveillance functions for the divorce regime. Employers are required by law to inform on all employees, including those who have never been ordered to pay child support. The information goes into a National Directory of New Hires, maintained for use against any persons who might get behind on child support in the future. This practice "annexes the personnel offices of private companies as administrative agents of the government." Efforts are underway to make

similar use of churches and community organizations such as the YMCA and United Way.

Child support is demanded from men who have been proven not to be the fathers of the children in question. Women are sometimes allowed to collect full child support from more than one man.

In the U.K. and Australia, it has been proposed to outlaw home paternity testing kits available from private companies, so that men may be arrested for attempting to prove they are not the fathers of the children they have been ordered to support.

Also in Britain, feminist groups and bureaucrats can bring domestic violence charges against men they target as abusers on the theory that the victim herself "should be spared having to take legal action." These third-party accusers do not have to provide evidence that the alleged victim even exists.

Some mothers in Massachusetts report being pressured and threatened by social service agents with the loss of their children if they refuse to divorce their husbands.

There are now moves afoot to prosecute "deadbeat accomplices," meaning parents or second wives or other relatives of child support extortionees. One second wife was charged with "harboring a fugitive." Such persons' bank accounts may be seized to pay child support for the fathers they are "abetting."

Teenage boys statutorily raped by adult women may be held liable for child support paid to those women.

In one weird case in Iowa, an eleven-year-old boy's savings (from chores such as shoveling snow) were confiscated by the state in order to pay child support for *himself*—possible since, as a minor, his father's name was also on his bank account.

Most disturbingly of all, to my mind: Fathers have been ordered to submit to something called a "plethysmograph," in which an electronic sheath is placed over the penis while they are made to view pornographic movies involving children.

Baskerville lists numerous legal guarantees violated by family courts, including several Amendments to the Constitution, the presumption of innocence, the separation of powers, habeas corpus and the prohibitions against double jeopardy, ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. The courts openly acknowledge that Constitutional guarantees do not apply in their proceedings—justified, it is asserted, because they are courts of "equity" rather than law. Federal courts never review cases involving family law; family courts are accountable only to review boards dominated by bar associations, i.e., by lawyers with a pecuniary interest in maximizing extortions from divorced men. Baskerville rightly notes an odd circumstance: A vast literature exists castigating the judicial branch for usurping legislative power, ignoring original intent, misapplying the Fourteenth Amendment, and various other sins; but

the family court system, which has a greater influence on more people's lives, has almost entirely escaped scrutiny.

Feminist ideology certainly played a role in creating the current situation; but, as usual, more was involved than ideas having consequences. Much of the divorce industry's growth has simply been an instance of the normal tendency of bureaucrats to seek to increase their wealth and power. For most of these persons, feminism has been more pretext than motivation. The judges, indeed, "promiscuously invoke both the traditional stereotypes about motherhood and modern ideas of women's rights." Probably most have no deep convictions at all in the matter.

The same gap between rationalizing rhetoric and the reality of material interest is visible throughout the divorce industry, which consists not only of judges and lawyers, but also a bevy of "experts" – psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, mediators, custody evaluators, visitation monitors, and instructors for mandatory "parenting education" and "anger management" classes. All are paid through forced exactions from fathers.

Psychotherapists are ubiquitous in the industry, in part because they fear insufficient demand for their services on the market. One attorney says "if you put ten psychiatrists in a room you'll get ten different opinions." Baskerville gives just one example: A father was diagnosed by one psychiatrist as having both a "dysthymic disorder" and a "mixed personality disorder," which included "obsessive-compulsive behavior, rigidity, grandiose thinking, and passive-aggressive traits;" a second psychiatrist came up with "schizotypal personality disorder" instead. Such "expert opinions" are rarely presented in open court, so there is no possibility of cross-examination, and the psychiatrists may be covered by judicial immunity, so they cannot be held accountable for their testimony. As one law professor asks: "What made all these people all of a sudden lunatics and unfit to parent?"

Obviously, the job of the expert is to provide a veneer of rationality for court decisions which are either wholly arbitrary or made on other grounds, such as maximizing the amount of money extracted from the father. If a family court does not have access to some arcane art of determining "the best interests of the child," its claim to be engaged in anything more than kidnapping collapses. (Pseudorationality of this sort is a prominent feature of managerial rule in general: Does anyone seriously believe, e.g., that corporate "diversity consultants" are in possession of some profound science the rest of us lack?) It is not altogether surprising that little training is necessary to qualify as such an "expert." Courts may appoint "persons with only undergraduate degrees or less, one or two weekend seminars or workshops, and maybe a four-hour in-service training program."

As always, the wielders of power claim the moral high ground. "Fathers almost universally report being insulted and harangued with the *obiter dicta* of judges as if they were naughty boys or juvenile delinquents," Baskerville

writes. The *New York Daily News* produced a credulous report on the “parent education classes” judges now commonly order divorcing couples to attend; these are said to be necessary in order to “[t]each them how to behave; maybe even shame them into acting their age.”

The author devotes twenty pages to an historical sketch of federal involvement in child support collection. It began not as a response to any widespread problem of parental abandonment but to political pressure from feminist groups and bar associations. President Ford somewhat reluctantly signed legislation creating the Office of Child Support Enforcement in 1975, warning that it was an unwarranted federal intrusion into families and the role of the states. The original rationale was that the government would save on welfare payments to unmarried mothers by getting the fathers to pay more. Critics pointed out at the time that most welfare mothers did not even have child support orders, and most of the fathers were too poor in any case to pay what the mothers received in welfare benefits.

In 1988, Congress passed the Family Support Act, with two key provisions: 1) states were required to implement presumptive (and virtually compulsory) child support guidelines; and 2) the use of criminal enforcement machinery was extended from welfare cases to *all* child support orders.

Non-welfare fathers are both far more numerous and wealthier than the fathers of welfare babies originally targeted. Today, non-welfare fathers account for 83 percent of child support cases (a proportion which continues to grow) and 92 percent of the money collected. *Yet there had never been a serious problem of nonpayment on the part of these men.* Since 1988, increasing revenue has been the real aim of the program, and the supposed need to force “deadbeats” to support their children has never been anything but a hoax intended to confuse the public.

Oddly, the program actually loses money at the federal level; it cost taxpayers \$2.7 billion in 2002, for example, and the deficit continues to increase. This money gets paid out to state officials as an incentive to increase the amount *they* collect: The more they extort from fathers, the more the federal government rewards them, regardless of whether the men are guilty of anything. In 2002, for example, Ohio collected \$228 million, while California got \$640 million.

In order to receive their cut of the swag, states are *required to channel payments through their criminal enforcement machinery.* In other words, they must treat all divorced fathers, even those who pay their child support in full and on time, like criminals. And they do; officials boast of collecting so-and-so many millions of dollars “from deadbeats.” Criminality is simply ascribed by the government to every divorced father.

Current child support guidelines, Baskerville reports, are largely the creation of one man, a Dr. Robert Williams. In 1987, he founded Policy Studies Inc., a “private” consulting and collection agency targeting government contracts in child support enforcement. Simultaneously, in his capacity as consultant for

the Department of Health and Human Services, he drew up a set of model child support guidelines. Obviously, his business interests were best served by making the guidelines as onerous as possible. In Baskerville's words, "only by creating a level of obligation high enough to create hardship for fathers can the guidelines create a large enough pool of defaulters to ensure profits and demand for the services of his private collection agency."

It worked. The following year, as mentioned, the Family Support Act was passed, requiring states to implement their own child support guidelines in order to qualify for federal handouts, and they were given a short time in which to draw them up. Most did the easiest thing and simply adopted Williams' own guidelines endorsed by HHS. As government began whipping up "deadbeat dad" hysteria, his company's earnings soared.

A number of state courts have ruled against the guidelines. A Georgia superior court described them as "contrary to common sense," since they bear no relation to the actual costs of raising children. Furthermore, they create "a windfall to the obligee... The presumptive award leaves the non-custodial parent in poverty while the custodial parent enjoys a notable higher standard of living." A Wisconsin court pointed out that the state guidelines would "result in a figure so far beyond the child's needs as to be irrational." All such rulings were reversed on government appeal.

Divorced fathers have their cars booted and their driver's and professional licenses revoked, which prevents them from getting or keeping employment. They routinely lose their houses, and many end up in homeless shelters, which one philosophically described as "better than being in jail." Baskerville cites one case of a father being hospitalized for malnutrition because he was not left enough money to feed himself adequately.

The U.S. now has a larger percentage of its population behind bars than any other nation in the world. How many of these prisoners are fathers jailed for nonpayment of child support? For some reason, the Bureau of Justice Statistics will not tell us. We do know that proposals are being made for relieving prison overcrowding by constructing special detention camps for fathers.

Public relations campaigns are being devised to put a more acceptable face upon what is happening. A Virginia enforcement director describes the fathers he pursues as "clients" and "customers" who "are entitled to have the benefit of child support services." Robert Williams's company has "customer service units...for fostering cooperation with each customer" and "[s]pecialized customer service centers...for increasing responsiveness to customers." Baskerville dryly comments: "These...entrepreneurs neglect to mention that customers who choose not to patronize their establishments will be arrested."

In January 2000, HHS Secretary Donna Shalala proudly announced that "federal and state child support enforcement program broke new records in nationwide collections in fiscal year 1999, reaching \$15.5 billion, nearly double the amount collected in 1992." At the same time, collections have gone *down*

when measured as a percentage of what the government claims fathers "owe." The reason? Interest and arrearages created by Williams's guidelines are piled up on the heads of fathers faster than actual money can be squeezed out of them. Most of this fictitious debt can never be collected, of course.

The "domestic violence" we hear so much about is essentially just another aspect of the divorce game. When a woman leaves her husband, she is routinely advised to accuse him of "abuse," whether of herself or the children. No evidence is necessary; the husband is hauled off to prison and forbidden most types of contact with his family. Courts themselves sponsor seminars on how to fabricate accusations, and there are no penalties for perjury.

Baskerville notes that the literature on "domestic violence" evinces no concern with prosecuting men directly for violent acts. Indeed, were men beating their wives, there would be no need for a special category of violence labeled "domestic"; they could simply be prosecuted for battery under the same laws that apply to other cases. The complaint of "domestic violence" activists is almost exclusively that "abusers" might retain custody or visitation rights for their children. They speak ominously of the "batterers" making "threats of kidnapping." This simply means that involuntarily divorced fathers want their children back.

It is important to note that terms such as abuse, violence, and battery do not, in the surreal world of feminism and divorce law, have their traditional English meanings. As early as 1979, feminists were writing of men who battered their wives "by ignoring [them] and by working late." Today, women are instructed that abuse includes "name-calling," "giving you negative looks," "ignoring your opinions," and (most revealingly, in my view) "refusing to let you have money." The U.S. Department of Justice has declared that "undermining an individual's sense of self-worth" is domestic violence and hence a federal crime.

The usual fate of a man charged with "abuse" is to receive a restraining order (sometimes called an order of protection). This is a decree issued from the bench without evidence being presented and without the man being summoned to speak in his own defense; it prohibits a wide range of otherwise legal behavior. It declares the man a criminal and subject to arrest should he continue to live peacefully in his own home or associate with his own children. One law professor notes that "[p]art of the reason the order exists is to be violated." Even if no evidence exists to convict him, "the protection order can provide the basis for criminal liability on the more easily proven crime of violating the order."

Restraining orders are said to be doled out "like candy" to all who apply. Fathers who contact their children are prosecuted for "stalking," an offense the government defines as any "nonconsensual communication." (Try accusing the IRS of stalking you.) Even fathers for whom child visitation rights have been established remain under restraining orders which, like tripwires, can

trigger arrest for the most innocent behavior. Acts for which fathers have been charged include opening an apartment door so a five-year-old son could ring the bell for his mother, putting a note in a son's suitcase to inform the mother he had been sick during his visit, and attending music recitals, sports events, or church services at which their children were present.

Judges issue these orders because there are negative consequences for them if they do not. Federally funded feminist groups publish the names of judges who persist in trying to observe due process. A Maine judge was removed from the bench for "lack of sensitivity" to women applying for restraining orders. One retired judge says his colleagues see the harm being done, but "remain quiet due to the political climate."

Cases have gotten into the news of husbands attacking their estranged wives "despite being under a restraining order." Baskerville asks us to consider whether such men might not be attacking their wives *because* of the restraining orders. These tyrannical acts have much the character of a deliberate provocation. One journalist writes: "It's amazing there aren't more rampages." Of course, to feminists, this "male violence" simply proves the need for more restraining orders: An ideology is unfalsifiable.

There are now "supervised visitation centers" where fathers are made to pay up to \$80 an hour to see their children. "People yell at you in front of the children," says one father; "they try to degrade the father in the child's eyes." "Even hugging your own children could end your visit," says another. There are cameras on the walls, and social workers armed with clipboards observe the fathers minutely. The *Boston Globe* reports: "Visitation centers are becoming so popular with family court judges...that certain centers...have waiting lists up to a year long. That has led to visits being cut short to accommodate other families."

Special "integrated domestic violence courts" are now being established to expedite convictions. "There is no presumption of innocence, hearsay evidence is admissible and defendants have no right to face their accusers. One study found there was no possibility that a defendant could be found innocent, since all persons arrested...received some punishment." Prosecutors pile up charges to encourage plea-bargaining; in other words, innocent men plead guilty to lesser charges in an attempt to avoid having their lives entirely ruined.

"Battered women's shelters" are another institution of the divorce industry, no longer bearing any relation to what their name appears to signify. Rather than providing first aid and other physical relief to women brutalized by their husbands, they are "one stop divorce shops." They assist women in fabricating abuse and incest allegations against their husbands and provide "letters of endorsement" for use against fathers in family court. Women report the use of high-pressure tactics to get them to divorce their husbands; one called a shelter "an experience from hell; the message was you believe what we believe, you do what we say, or get out of here." Many shelters are lesbian

covens where heterosexual volunteers are forbidden to discuss their wedding plans with coworkers.

The great irony about the entire abuse industry is that child abuse is much *more* likely to occur in the fatherless homes now being created in unprecedented numbers. Sometimes it is perpetrated by the mother's new boyfriends, but very often by the mother herself. HHS studies report that "children in mother-only households were three times more likely to be fatally abused [murdered] than children in father-only households. Females were 78% of the perpetrators of fatal child abuse [murder] and 81% of natural parents who seriously abuse their children." One writer says "although, as a literary theme, the 'good father' protecting his children from the 'bad mother' is almost unheard of (so idealized has mothering become), in real life fathers have often played the protector role inside families." In other words, the abuse industry is depriving children of their natural protectors and fostering more abuse.

Perhaps we may most appropriately conclude this (very incomplete) survey of divorce industry horrors by noting the effects on the children themselves. One study based on interviews with children of divorce reported that they

expressed the wish for increased contact with their fathers with a startling and moving intensity....The most striking response among six-to-eight-year-old children was their pervasive sadness. The impact of separation appeared so strong that the children's usual defenses and coping strategies did not hold sufficiently under stress. Crying and sobbing were not uncommon...More than half of these children missed their father acutely. Many felt abandoned and rejected by him and expressed their longing in ways reminiscent of grief for a dead parent...In confronting the despair and sadness of these children and their intense, almost physical, longing for the father, it was evident that inner psychological needs of great power and intensity were being expressed.

Inevitably, there has been talk of "reforming" the system — not least by its beneficiaries, who speak of wanting to make it more "efficient." Why we should wish to see children removed from their fathers' care more "efficiently" they do not tell us. The government is fertile with "responsible fatherhood" programs, "healthy marriage" initiatives, "defense of marriage" acts, and suchlike. These should fool no one who has read Dr. Baskerville's book attentively; they are nothing but further occasions for extending governmental power and patronage while deceiving the public. The next time you hear a politician promise to "strengthen" your marriage or family, pay no attention.

What must be done is clear. In the words of columnist Kathleen Parker: "The divorce industry has to be dismantled, burned and buried like the monster it is."

Now we must consider the means for accomplishing this.

One researcher reports being told the same thing in several cities: "Shoot the judges and lawyers!"

A few men do more than talk. "Statistics are scarce [why?], but judges and lawyers nationwide agree from all the stories they hear about fatal shootings, bombings, knifings, and beatings that family law is the most dangerous area in which to practice," reports a law journal. According to the *Boston Globe*, judges now carry guns under their robes to protect themselves from fathers. Baskerville asserts that metal detectors were installed in courthouses specifically from fear of fathers. Previous attacks upon family court judges, he notes, went mostly unreported in the press [why?], but the June 2006 shooting of a Nevada judge received international attention. The full gravity of the situation is finally penetrating the public's consciousness. The author pointedly asks "what judges and lawyers expect when they set about the business of taking away people's children."

Indeed, he is neither exaggerating nor using metaphor when, in the book's subtitle, he describes the regime's campaign against fathers as a war. The male obligation to military service — i.e., to die or kill under certain circumstances if called upon — has traditionally been based upon a man's obligation to protect his family; the duty of *national* defense is derived from this, as the nation is itself derived from the family. In the author's words, "this is precisely what fathers are for: to become violent when someone interferes with their children."

Individual acts of revenge, heartwarming though they may be to read about, will not put an end to the system. The liquidation of the divorce regime can only be accomplished by organized political force. The criminals and parasites who make up the divorce industry have a big head start; they are highly organized, well funded (largely by their victims), determined, and, in the case of feminists, fanatical. They will fight tooth-and-nail to retain their wealth and power. Fathers, in contrast, are only beginning to awaken to the full extent of the situation and to organize resistance. Dr. Baskerville himself is president of one such organization, the American Coalition for Fathers and Children.

His recommendations for reform are all moderate and sensible — that may be their principal failing. They include the enforcement of due process principles as enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, a presumption of joint custody, the reform of "no fault" laws to require faithless women (or men) to take responsibility for ending the marriage contract, and holding divorce industry officials accountable for their decisions.

I am unsure why divorce could not simply be abolished as a legal category. There do have to be laws to deal with cases of spousal infidelity and abandonment, of course. Columnist Lloyd Conway has formulated a simple policy for these, which I am unable to improve upon: "If you want to run off with a chorus girl, go ahead — just leave your wallet with Momma. And if the milkman is making special deliveries, then the lovebirds can fill out your child support checks together." Holding divorce officials responsible for their decisions will be unnecessary when they are made responsible for punching

out license plates instead. Legal custody will have less practical importance in the absence of a divorce enforcement regime.

Men, I fear, will have to demand nothing less than the full reestablishment of what feminists call patriarchy – the male-headed family as the normal social unit. This may be a “radical” idea, given how far our society has gone offtrack, but it is hardly revolutionary. It is really just the radical restoration of the natural and traditional order of the human family. Baskerville doubts whether a return to father custody can “find acceptance beyond the fringe of political debate.” I think he is mistaken about this. There is no such thing as a fixed “fringe” to political debate. One of the most important forms of political activity consists precisely in moving the fringe. It took much more determination on the part of homosexuals to get us to where “gay marriage” is discussed with a straight face than it would for normal men to restore the presumption of father custody. Indeed, I suspect that men, once politically united, could dictate almost any terms they wished to women.

There are interesting times ahead for men. The course we must embark on is dangerous, but it is less dangerous than continuing to do nothing.

*F. Roger Devlin, Ph.D., is an independent scholar and the author of **Alexandre Kojève and the Outcome of Modern Thought** and a frequent contributor **The Occidental Quarterly**.*

**PIGMENTOCRACY:
RACIAL HIERARCHIES IN THE
CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA***

RICHARD LYNN
University of Ulster

The term “pigmentocracy” has recently been adopted by social scientists to describe societies in which wealth and social status are determined by skin color. There are numerous pigmentocracies throughout the world, and they all have the remarkable characteristic that invariably the light-skinned peoples have the highest social status. These are followed by the brown-skinned, who occupy intermediate positions, and finally by the black-skinned who are at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Few people are unaware that the United States is a pigmentocracy in which whites and light-skinned East Asians do best in education, earnings, and socio-economic status; brown-skinned Hispanics do less well; while blacks do the least well. Even within these groups, it is the light-skinned who do best. North East Asians (ethnic Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese) do better than the darker-skinned (the Filipinos, Hmong, and other Southeast Asians). The Hispanics have their own pigmentocratic skin color hierarchy. The light-skinned, mainly from Cuba, are the most successful, while the darker-skinned from Latin America do not do so well. And among blacks too, it is the lighter-skinned who do best—people like Condoleza Rice, Colin Powell, Barack Obama, and Jesse Jackson.

The United States is by no means unique. Canada is also a pigmentocracy, and pigmentocracies have emerged in many European countries following mass immigration of darker-skinned peoples during the last half century. Australia and New Zealand are pigmentocracies in which Europeans and growing Chinese populations have higher socio-economic status, while the Aborigines in Australia and the

* This essay is drawn from research presented in the author’s latest book, *The Global Bell Curve: Race, I.Q., and Inequality Worldwide* (Augusta, Ga.: Washington Summit Publishers, 2008).

Maoris in New Zealand form an impoverished underclass. South East Asia has its own pigmentocracy in which lighter-skinned Chinese do better than darker-skinned Malays, Indonesians, Filipinos, and Thais. Finally, nowhere are pigmentocracies more evident than in the Caribbean and Latin America

THE CARIBBEAN

The Caribbean islands were discovered by Christopher Columbus in the 1490s. In the next century the Spanish began to colonize the islands and establish sugar plantations. They tried to enslave the Native American Indian inhabitants, but many of these died of diseases, and those that survived did not make good slaves, so the Spanish imported slaves from Africa to work in the sugar plantations. In the ensuing centuries most of the islands fell under British and French rule. The European estate owners were prone to take black mistresses, who produced half-breed mulattos. Other immigrants settled in the islands including Portuguese, Jews, Chinese, and Indians from the subcontinent.

By the 1800s a racial socio-economic hierarchy had emerged typically consisting of Europeans and small numbers of Chinese at the top; followed by half-breed mulattos, together, in some islands, with Indians, in the middle; and blacks at the bottom. A black sociologist has recorded that by this time "the brown (mixed race) slaves were positioned in privileged occupations in the hierarchy of the slave plantation economy, usually as slave artisans."¹ This may have been because the Europeans preferred mixed-race mulattos and possibly because they were generally found to be more intelligent than the blacks and more competent in skilled artisan work.

After the abolition of slavery in 1833 the European estate and plantation owners found that many of the former African slaves were unwilling to work for wages as day laborers and were unreliable employees. Thomas Atwood, the chief judge in Dominica, described the problem: "Negroes are in general much addicted to drunkenness, thievery, incontinency, and idleness. . . . idleness is so very predominant in Negroes, and their dislike of labour is so great, that it is difficult to make them work: it is sometimes absolutely necessary to have recourse to measures that appear cruel, in order to oblige them to labour."² These "measures that appear cruel" were floggings, but after

¹ D. Robotham, "Blackening the Jamaican Nation," *Identities* 7 (2000): 1-37.

² P. Fryer, *Staying Power* (London: Pluto Press, 1984).

the abolition of slavery this was no longer permitted. To solve the problem of securing a reliable supply of labor, the plantation owners brought in a number of Indians from the Indian subcontinent and also some Portuguese and Chinese, who were found to be more reliable laborers than the blacks: "In Jamaica, Grenada, Guyana, and Trinidad, many ex-slaves rapidly quit the plantations to establish villages where they could live and cultivate subsistence crops without interference from white management and their allies. To replace this lost labor, the planters in these countries used government revenues to import Chinese, Portuguese, and Indians under onerous indentures."³

The racial hierarchy and the intelligence and personality characteristics of the races in the West Indies were described in the mid-nineteenth century by Anthony Trollope, the British novelist, who visited Trinidad, Barbados, Jamaica, and Guyana in 1859 and subsequently wrote up his impressions in his book *The West Indies and the Spanish Main*.⁴ At the time Trollope visited the West Indies, there were already small numbers of Chinese and Indians from the Indian subcontinent. Trollope explained that these were brought over as indentured workers because once the blacks had been freed from slavery it was difficult or impossible to get them to work reliably for wages: "The negro's idea of emancipation was and is emancipation not from slavery but from work. To lie in the sun and eat breadfruit and yams is his idea of being free."

Trollope noted that the mulattos – "those who are of mixed race, be it in what proportion it may, between white European and black African" – were higher in the socio-economic hierarchy than the blacks: "they are to be met at the Governor's table; they sit in the House of Assembly; they have forced themselves forward and must be recognized as being in the van." He noted that mulattos ran most of the shops:

Let any stranger go through the shops and stores of Kingston, and see how many of them are either owned or worked by men of color; let him go into the House of Assembly, and see how large a proportion of their debates is carried on by men of color; how large a portion of the public service is carried on by them;

³ M. G. Smith, *Culture, Race, and Class in the Commonwealth Caribbean* (Jamaica: University of the West Indies Press, 1984).

⁴ A. Trollope, *The West Indies and the Spanish Main* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1985).

they make money and enjoy it; they practise as statesmen, as lawyers, and as doctors.⁵

He observed that the intelligence of the mulattos was related to their skin color, which itself reflected the amount of white ancestry. Thus, if one wished to assess the amount of white ancestry "the speech and the intelligence would afford the sources of information on which most reliance could be placed."⁶ He also considered that "the Chinese and the Coolies (Indians) greatly excel the Negro in intelligence."⁷ He evidently regarded these as innate racial characteristics, for he wrote that, "God, for his own purposes has created men of inferior and superior race."⁸

The racial socio-economic hierarchy described by Trollope in the 1850s persisted into the twentieth century and right up to the present. Europeans have continued at the top together with some rich Chinese. Mulattos and Indians still occupy intermediate positions, while blacks are largely at the bottom. West Indians have a finely graded sense of racial distinctions. The term *mulattos* is generally used for those who have one white and one black parent. Those who are one quarter black and three quarters white are designated *quadroons*, while those who are one-eighth black and seven-eighths white are termed *octo-rooms*. In the 1950s a sociologist carried out field work on the racial hierarchy and wrote of "the high status whites, mid-status browns, and low status blacks throughout the West Indies."⁹ A few years later, another sociologist wrote that "class distinctions are mainly seen in racial terms; color in the sense of physical appearance carries extraordinary weight. West Indians conceive differences in appearance in terms of social segmentation" and "race and color are shorthand designations of class."¹⁰ Similarly, in Barbados "the economic elite is comprised of local whites"¹¹; "lighter-skinned elites and darker-colored lower income groups in general typify Caribbean societies"¹²; and "in

⁵ Trollope, 62.

⁶ Trollope, 60.

⁷ Trollope, 58.

⁸ Trollope, 47–57.

⁹ M. G. Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

¹⁰ D. Lowenthal, "Race and Color in the West Indies," *Daedalus* 96 (1967): 580–627.

¹¹ D. Robotham, "Blackening the Jamaican Nation," *Identities* 7 (2000): 1–37.

¹² D. Howard, *Coloring the Nation: Race in the Dominican Republic* (Oxford: Signal Books, 2001).

the color-class system, there is a clear hierarchy of social gradings, and for the most part, these divisions are strongly reflected in skin color, with those of high standing being white, and those with black skins generally occupying the lowest levels of the social spectrum."¹³

Throughout the West Indies the Chinese have typically prospered and entered the middle class: "the Chinese in the British and Dutch Caribbean are largely recognized as a successful upper-middle class, their members based not only in the traditional retail grocery trades but in the import, service, manufacturing, and professional sectors"¹⁴; "the economic success of the Chinese in the former British colonies propelled them firmly into the middle class."¹⁵

The Indians also have done better than blacks: "originally, the new migrants from India were regarded by all as merely 'coolies' at the foot of the social ladder, but eventually they, too, would rise into middle class positions."¹⁶

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

The Dominican Republic and Haiti were originally a Spanish colony named Hispaniola that was taken by the French in the seventeenth century. In 1804 the black slaves rebelled against French rule, and Napoleon was too busy fighting wars in Europe to quell the rebellion. The blacks established a republic and massacred most of the whites. In 1844 the island was divided into two, the eastern half becoming the Dominican Republic and the western half Haiti. In the Dominican Republic a number of whites survived, and over the next decades there were some white immigrants. A social anthropologist has written that by the end of the nineteenth century "the racial factor acted as one of the main determinants of social status . . . white somatic norm image was dominant in regard to social prestige, as in all multi-racial societies of the Caribbean."¹⁷

¹³ R. B. Potter, D. Barker, D. Conway, and T. Clark, *Contemporary Caribbean* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education, 2004).

¹⁴ L. Pan, *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

¹⁵ R. B. Kent, "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement," in L. J. C. Ma and C. Cartier, eds., *The Chinese Diaspora* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

¹⁶ I. Oxaal, "The Dependency Economist as Grassroots Politician in the Caribbean," in I. Oxaal, T. Barnett and D. Booth, eds., *Beyond the Sociology of Development* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975).

¹⁷ H. Hoetink, "The Dominican Republic in the Nineteenth Century," in M. Morner, ed., *Race and Class in Latin America* (London: Routledge, 1990).

At the end of the twentieth century 16 percent of the population of the Dominican Republic was white, 73 percent of mixed race, and 11 percent black. A British social anthropologist who carried out field work in the country has written that "Dominican society has been characterized by a light-skinned elite and a mulatto majority since the seventeenth century" while among mulattos "lighter skin color allows a greater chance of social mobility than for dark-skinned Dominicans."¹⁸ In another study a sample of the inhabitants of the capital city, Santo Domingo, was surveyed in 1999, in which they were asked to assess the relationship between color and socio-economic status. The results were that "whites were perceived to have the highest level of social status, with progressively darker racial categories receiving lower social status ratings."¹⁹ They describe the country as a "pigmentocracy" in which skin color is the major determinant of social status.

From the beginning of the twentieth century a number of Chinese arrived in the Dominican Republic, and within a few years "many Chinese immigrants established small businesses and manufacturing enterprises."²⁰

In Haiti far fewer whites survived the 1804 massacres, and today the population consists of 95 percent blacks and 5 percent mulattos. Despite their minority status, mulattos enjoy higher economic and social status. In the 1960s a sociologist wrote of "the colored elite" (i.e., mulattos).²¹ Because Haiti has been an independent republic governed by blacks for two centuries, there is no reason to expect that mulattos would have higher socio-economic status than blacks. There has been no white ruling class whose racism can have held down the blacks and favored the mulattos. Yet at the end of the twentieth century Haiti was the poorest country in the Caribbean with an annual per capita income of \$1,383. Remarkably, its neighbor the Dominican Republic, whose population is 16 percent white, 73 percent mulatto, and 11 percent black, has a per capita income more than three times greater at \$4,598 (real GDP at PPP, 1998). Haiti also has much higher fertility than the Dominican Republic at 6.4 TFR as compared with 3.3, and much higher infant mortality at 105 per 1,000 births as compared with

¹⁸ Howard, *Coloring the Nation*.

¹⁹ J. Sidanius, Y. Pena, and M. Sawyer, "Inclusionary Discrimination: Pigmentation and Patriotism in the Dominican Republic," *Political Psychology* 22 (2001): 827-85.

²⁰ Howard, *Coloring the Nation*.

²¹ D. Lowenthal, "Race and Color in the West Indies."

43 (1998 figures).²² Both of these are indicative of a low IQ population.

Nothing is known of the intelligence of the population of Haiti. However, there is a study of the math abilities of Haitian immigrant school students in Florida, and math ability is highly correlated with intelligence. The study compared the math abilities of second generation Haitian immigrant school students with second generation Cubans and Nicaraguans. The students were tested in 1992 and 1995, and on both occasions the Haitians scored significantly lowest, the Nicaraguans came next, while the Cubans scored highest.²³ Once again we see a pigmentocratic gradient. The predominantly European light-skinned Cubans do best. The differences can be explained by percentages of Europeans in the racial compositions of the populations.

GRENADA AND JAMAICA

There are similar pigmentocracies throughout the Caribbean. In Grenada where the population consists of approximately 73 percent black, 21 percent mulatto, 5 percent East Indian, and 1 percent white, the race differences in social status were studied in 1952–1953 by a sociologist who described the racial hierarchy as consisting of "a white elite, a larger brown upper middle class, next in rank, who dominated Grenadian commerce, official councils and committees, certain clubs, and other organizations," and a "lower or peasant class" of blacks and some Indians.²⁴

In Jamaica also it was observed in the 1930s that "it is the browns, especially the lighter ones, who have the most chance to enter higher professions, and the blacks as a class do the most menial work."²⁵ In the 1960s Philip Vernon, who carried out some intelligence testing in Jamaica and reported that the average IQ was about 75, wrote that the mixed race mulattos "are of the utmost importance as constituting the bulk of the middle classes who provide most of the country's commercial and professional leadership; lightness of color is one of the

²² R. Lynn and T. Vanhanen, *IQ and Global Inequality* (Augusta, Ga: Washington Summit Publishers, 2006).

²³ T. D. Rodriguez, "Oppositional Culture and Academic Performance among Children of Immigrants in the USA," *Race, Ethnicity and Education* 5 (2000): 199–216.

²⁴ Smith, *The Plural Society in the British West Indies*.

²⁵ M. W. Curti, F. B. Marshall, M. Steggerda, and E. M. Henderson, "The Gesell Schedule Applied to One-, Two-, and Three-year-old Negro Children of Jamaica, B.W.I.," *Journal of Comparative Psychology* 20 (1935): 152–56.

major criteria of social class."²⁶ There is a small population of Chinese in Jamaica, whose numbers have been estimated at between 5,000 and 22,500. In the second half of the twentieth century "they controlled the retail grocery trade and were prominent in the civil service and the professions" and were "among the best educated and wealthiest of Jamaicans."²⁷

In the second half of the twentieth century the pigmentocratic hierarchy in Jamaica expressed as percentages of professional and managerial occupations was Europeans 36 percent, followed by Chinese (28 percent), mulattos (15 percent), East Indians (13 percent), and finally blacks (6 percent). These differences are also present in intelligence. In a study of the intelligence of racial hybrids it was found that in relation to an IQ set at 100, the average IQs were 104.5 for the light-skinned, 101.0 for the intermediate, and 98.0 for the dark-skinned.²⁸

Trinidad and Tobago were British colonies until 1962, when they were united and became independent. By the end of the twentieth century the population consisted of 1 percent Europeans, 1 percent Chinese, 14 percent mulattos, 44 percent Indians, and 40 percent blacks. The pigmentocratic hierarchy in the two islands had emerged by the 1800s: "The nineteenth century bequeathed a three-tiered hierarchy . . . whites for the most part occupied the dominant position economically and politically, there was a brown (mixed European and African) middle stratum, and at the bottom was the black descended majority."²⁹ And "the traditional colonial social pyramid consisted of the English and French white elites at the top, generally socially and occupationally aloof from a developing brown-skinned middle class, who were in turn at a social and cultural distance from the masses of black Afro-Trinidadians."³⁰

The Chinese have done well in Trinidad and Tobago, as they have throughout the Caribbean. Already in the mid-nineteenth century they were prospering in market gardening and the retail trade. In the

²⁶ P. E. Vernon, *Intelligence and Cultural Environment* (London: Methuen, 1969).

²⁷ R. B. Kent, "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement."

²⁸ R. E. Grinder, W. S. Spotts, and M. W. Curti, "Relationships between Goode-nough Draw-a-Man Test Performance and Skin Color among Preadolescent Jamaican Children," *Journal of Social Psychology* 62 (1964): 181-88.

²⁹ M. Crichlow, "Reconfiguring the Informal Economy Divide," *Latin American Perspectives* 25 (1998): 62-83.

³⁰ Oxaal, "The Dependency Economist as Grassroots Politician in the Caribbean."

1850s they were described as "the best gardeners in the colony, responsible for supplying the local markets with most of their vegetables,"³¹ while "in the 1970s, when the Chinese represented a scanty 1 percent of the population, they represented about 10 percent of the business elite; they were members of some of the islands' most exclusive social clubs; Black Power advocates viewed the Chinese as members of the nations' ruling elite, along with whites."³² The intelligence of the five racial groups in Trinidad was investigated in the early 1970s in a study of 14–15 year olds. It was found that the Europeans and Chinese scored highest, the mixed race group came next, while the blacks scored lowest.³³

Martinique remained a French colony until 1946 when it was incorporated as part of France and its inhabitants were given French citizenship and permitted to move to France. The population is divided into *blanc* (white), *mulatre* (colored, mulatto), *noir* (black), and *coolies* (Indians), and "Among the *blancs*, the *bekes*, descended from the original French colonists, control the great majority of the economy; the *coolies* are the descendants of Indians (south Asians) who came to Martinique as laborers following the abolition of slavery."³⁴ French estate owners brought Indians to the island for the same reason that the British did into their Caribbean colonies. They found that blacks would not work reliably after slavery had been abolished. The French sociologist E. Kovats-Beaudoux has also documented the racial hierarchy in her book *The White Creoles of Martinique: A Dominant Minority*.³⁵ The title says it all.

PUERTO RICO

Puerto Rico was a Spanish colony until 1898 when it was ceded to the United States. A social hierarchy based on skin color has often been observed. "In Puerto Rico the prosperous classes tend to be

³¹ W. L. Lai, *Indentured Labor, Caribbean Sugar* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003).

³² Kent, "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement."

³³ A. N. B. Nedd and L. W. Gruenfeld, "Field Dependence-Independence and Social Stratification," *International Journal of Psychology* 11 (1976): 23–41.

³⁴ J. M. Fish, "The Myth of Race," in J. M. Fish, ed., *Race and Intelligence* (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000).

³⁵ E. Kovats-Beaudoux, *Les blancs créole de la Martinique: Une minorité dominante* (Paris: L'Harmottan, 2002).

lighter-skinned."³⁶ It has been also been found the light-skinned have a higher IQ than the dark-skinned.³⁷ In another study people were asked to assess the characteristics of those with five skin colors ranging from "very light" through "light," "medium," "dark," and "very dark." Responses were scored 5 for "very light" through 1 for "very dark." One of the questions asked was "The skin color of smart Puerto Ricans is . . ." Of the sample, 81 percent endorsed "very light" and "light." Only 8.5 percent considered that the skin color of smart Puerto Ricans is "darkest" or "dark."³⁸ The study shows that the general population of Puerto Rico is aware that there is an intelligence gradient corresponding to a light–dark skin color gradient.

CUBA

Cuba is instructive because of the efforts by Fidel Castro to eradicate racial inequalities. After seizing power in 1959, Castro introduced socialism and expropriated the assets of many middle-class whites. As a result many of these fled the island and established a colony in Miami. This white exodus and low fertility reduced the numbers of whites, and by 1995 they had declined to 37 percent of the population.

Europeans controlled the island until the abolition of slavery in the late nineteenth century. Since then they continued to hold most of the wealth, have had higher social status, and occupied most of the professional and administrative positions. European racial prejudice and discrimination against blacks and mulattos was strong in the first half of the twentieth century. Whites had exclusive use of their own clubs and beaches and the smarter restaurants and hotels. In 1937 an African-American Congressman Arthur Mitchell was refused admission to one of the best hotels in Havana. Public schools were open to all, but many whites sent their children to private schools that were largely or exclusively white.

From 1959 Fidel Castro dedicated himself to attempting to eliminate racial differences in socio-economic status and improving the status of blacks by outlawing discrimination and by nationalizing private

³⁶ N. Lemann, "The Other Underclass," *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1991, 96–110.

³⁷ H. B. Green, "Temporal Attitudes in Four Negro Subcultures," in J. T. Fraser, F. C. Haber, and G. H. Miller, eds., *The Study of Time* (New York: Springer, 1972).

³⁸ R. E. Hall, "A Descriptive Methodology of Color Bias in Puerto Rico: Manifestations of Discrimination in the New Millennium," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 32 (2002): 1527–37.

schools previously attended almost entirely by whites. But despite these efforts, blacks remained over-represented in the poorest sections of society. In the army in the 1970s, "blacks were concentrated among enlisted troops and under-represented in the officer corps."³⁹ In the 1980s and 1990s there was still "a concentration of blacks in dilapidated housing in poor neighborhoods; blacks remained under-represented in managerial positions but over-represented in menial jobs; blacks were over-represented in the prison population; and black and mulatto women make up a high percentage of prostitutes."⁴⁰ Whites remain "prejudiced" against blacks or, alternatively, realistic in their perception of blacks. A survey carried out in Havana in 1995 by the Cuban Centro de Antropologia found that 58 percent of whites believed that blacks are less intelligent than whites, 69 percent believed that blacks did not have the same "decency," and 68 percent opposed racial intermarriage.⁴¹ Whites regard blacks as "more aggressive" and "prone to criminal behavior," which in fact they are, as blacks "are greatly over-represented among those in prison."⁴²

The Chinese have done well in Cuba. They were initially brought to the island in the second half of the nineteenth century to work as laborers in the sugarcane fields. But

during the twentieth century, Cuba's Chinese had moved into a variety of urban service and retailing businesses, and most were firmly entrenched in the middle and lower middle classes; by the late 1940s, Havana's Chinatown bustled with a wide range of commercial activities run by Chinese; small businesses included laundries, retail shops, three theatres, nine hotels, and three pharmacies; by the 1950s, the Chinese had achieved considerable commercial success and they controlled some 3,500 small retail businesses.⁴³

³⁹ H. C. Adams, "Fighting an Uphill Battle: Race, Politics, Power, and Institutionalization in Cuba," *Latin America Research Review* 39 (2004): 168-82.

⁴⁰ C. Mesa-Lago, *Growing Economic and Social Disparities in Cuba* (Havana, 2002).

⁴¹ A. de la Fuente, *A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

⁴² B. E. Aguirre and E. B. Silva, "Does Race Matter among Cuban Immigrants? An Analysis of the Racial Characteristics of Recent Cuban Immigrants," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 34 (2001): 311-24.

⁴³ Kent, "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement."

After the revolution of 1959 small businesses were expropriated and nationalized, and many of the Chinese emigrated, principally to the United States.

Despite Castro's determined efforts to eradicate discrimination and prejudice against blacks, Europeans have continued to perform better than blacks in the educational and socio-economic hierarchy. In 1994 blacks and mulattos were so dissatisfied that they rioted in Havana to demand more equality and to protest "the indignities blacks encounter daily; racial discrimination is a popular theme in the songs by young, black rap artists."⁴⁴ Since the Communist revolution Cuba has been governed by a Council of Ministers consisting of 39 members. In the year 2000, only one of these was black.

In May 2000, Castro made a televised speech in which he "acknowledged the most visible and enduring deficiency of race relations in socialist Cuba: the under-representation of black Cubans among the leadership of a political process now entering its fifth decade."⁴¹ Forty years after Castro assumed power, two authorities on Cuba wrote that

Whiteness is highly valued and seems to be one of the primary dimensions of status by which the overall evaluation of a person's social position is reached. Even though the prevailing ideology of the state tirelessly declares that skin color and other morphological characteristics do not matter, few blacks are found at the top echelons of the bureaucratic structure, the Communist Party, and industry. . . . research suggests that racial prejudice and discrimination are still rampant in Cuba.⁴⁵

LATIN AMERICA

Latin America resembles the Caribbean in its pigmentocratic socio-economic hierarchies. At the top of the socio-economic hierarchies are light-skinned Europeans, although these are mainly of Spanish and Portuguese descent, while those in the Caribbean are largely of British and French stock. Small numbers of Chinese and Japanese are also found among the socio-economic elites. In the middle of the socio-economic hierarchies are the brown-skinned mestizos of mixed-race European and Native American Indian descent, and the mulattos, of mixed-race European and African descent. At the bottom are the

⁴⁴ Adams, "Fighting an Uphill Battle."

⁴⁵ Aguirre and Silva, "Does Race Matter among Cuban Immigrants?"

darker-skinned Native American Indians and blacks. This color coded social hierarchy has been noted by numerous sociologists, economists, and anthropologists. For instance: "Latin American society is characterized by a social spectrum with taller, lighter-skinned, European-blooded elites at one end; shorter, darker, Indian-blooded masses at the other end . . ." ⁴⁶

The British social anthropologist Peter Wade has reached the same conclusion—"whites are at the top, Indians and blacks at the bottom, and positions in the middle are defined by various criteria of status, among which color and descent are very important." ⁴⁷ "Hispanic culture is dominated, socio-economically and politically, by Blancos. Many aspects of Latin culture—from beauty ideals to stereotypes about intelligence and criminality to the correlation between light skin color and higher social class—serve to legitimize and reinforce the stigmatization of Morenos (non-Europeans)." ⁴⁸

Many Latin American countries have small ethnic Chinese and Japanese populations. Most of these arrived in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to work as laborers. The Chinese and Japanese have typically prospered in Latin America. They have risen in the socio-economic hierarchy, and by the second half of the twentieth century most of them typically were running businesses or had entered the professions. Robert Kent, professor of geography at the University of Akron, explains: "the Chinese filled key niches, especially in small-scale retailing. As subsequent generations assimilated, the descendants of early immigrants moved into professional occupations and government services in appreciable numbers." For instance, in Panama "in the 1940s, when their population numbers are estimated to have been less than 3,000, they are reported to have dominated the retail grocery trade; in Panama city the later decades of the twentieth century found Chinese to some extent abandoning their emphasis on commerce and moving into professional occupations." ⁴⁹

The pigmentocratic socio-economic hierarchy has been observed

⁴⁶ A. Chua, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).

⁴⁷ Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*.

⁴⁸ E. Uhlmann, N. Dasgupta, A. Elgueta, A. G. Greenwald, and J. Swanson, "Subgroup Prejudice Based on Skin Color among Hispanics in the US and Latin America," *Social Cognition* 20 (2002): 198–226.

⁴⁹ Kent, "A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement."

throughout Latin America. In Bolivia “broadly speaking, the whites are landowners and government officials, the mestizos are tradesmen, skilled workers, and minor civil servants, and the Indians are laborers.”⁵⁰

In Chile Europeans have higher socio-economic status and score higher in math than Native American Indians.⁵¹

In Colombia “the men of wealth and position in all sections of society are generally white”⁵² while “blacks and Indians are at the bottom of the ladder” which represents a hierarchy of wealth, education, civilization, and race.”⁵³

In Ecuador the population in the mid-1990s was 5 percent European, 40 percent mestizo, 40 percent Native American Indian, and 5 percent black. In the mid-twentieth century, “whites and mestizos were at the top of the class structure” while “mestizos often looked down on the blacks.”⁵⁴ These race differences were present in education and earnings where Europeans had approximately double the years of education and earnings than the indigenous population groups.⁵⁵

In Guatemala 3 percent of the population is European, 42 percent mestizo, and 55 percent Native American Indians, and

those of predominantly European ancestry clearly remain Guatemala’s ruling class; middle and lower class Ladinos’ (mestizos) class position is intermediate between Guatemala’s elites and Maya Indians; the class position of most Ladinos is that of salaried workers and petty bureaucrats, which puts them in the middle, rather than the lower, rungs of the class system. Lower positions are reserved for Indian peasants and artisans. . . . Lighter and more Europeanized Ladinos are more highly valued by other Ladinos, especially as marriage partners, than darker,

⁵⁰ *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1960), vol. 3, p. 819.

⁵¹ P. J. McEwan, “The Indigenous Test Score Gap in Bolivia and Chile,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 53 (2004): 157–91.

⁵² *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1960), vol. 6, p. 37

⁵³ Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*.

⁵⁴ N. Whitten, *Class, Kinship, and Power in an Ecuadorian Town* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), 202.

⁵⁵ A. Garcia-Aracil and C. Winter, “Gender and Ethnicity Differentials in School Attainment and Labor Market Earnings in Ecuador,” *World Development* 34 (2006): 289–307.

more Mayan individuals.⁵⁶

In 1990 a study reported that Europeans and mestizos are about six times over-represented in professional, administrative, and office occupations, as compared with Native American Indians, and the intelligence of Native American Indian children was estimated at an IQ of 79.⁵⁷

In Guyana following the abolition of slavery, East Indians, Chinese, and Portuguese from Madeira were brought in as indentured laborers. Anthony Trollope visited Guyana in 1859 and described the characteristics of the races:

the Coolies (Indians) and the Chinamen have an aptitude for putting money together; the Negroes as a class do not have this aptitude, consequently they lie in the sun and eat yams. There is another race who have been and now are of the greatest benefit to this colony. These are the Portuguese, and they thrive wonderfully. At almost every corner of two streets in Georgetown there is to be seen a small shop, and these shops are, I think without exception, kept by Portuguese who all reached the colony in absolute poverty.⁵⁸

Little had changed by 1995 when a survey showed that 43 percent of blacks, but only 34 percent of East Indians were in poverty.⁵⁹

In Mexico the racial socio-economic hierarchy has been described by numerous sociologists and social anthropologists. Thus "ethnicity is strongly related to processes of social stratification . . . light skin color, bright eyes, and Caucasian features enjoy higher prestige than Amerindian; even members of the Maya-speaking lower classes prefer persons of lighter skin."⁶⁰ "The higher class people are whiter, lower

⁵⁶ C. A. Smith, "Race, Class, and Gender Ideology in Guatemala," in B. Williams, ed., *Women out of Place: The Gender of Agency and the Race of Nationality* (London: Routledge, 1996).

⁵⁷ M. Steele, "Guatemala," in G. Psacharopoulos and H. A. Patrinos, eds., *Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994).

⁵⁸ Trollope, *The West Indies and the Spanish Main*.

⁵⁹ J. Gafar, "Poverty, Income Growth, and Inequality in Some Caribbean Countries," *Journal of Developing Areas* 32 (1998): 467-90.

⁶⁰ W. Gabbert, "Social Categories, Ethnicity, and the State in Yucatan, Mexico," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33 (2001): 459-84.

class people more Indian-looking.”⁶¹ And “almost without exception the Mexican officials, lawyers, and business executives we dealt with were light skinned and foreign educated, with elegant European names. Meanwhile, the people doing the photocopying and cleaning the floors were all shorter, darker, and plainly more ‘Indian-blooded’ . . . lightness of skin correlates directly and glaringly with increasing wealth and social status.”⁶²

There are also small numbers of Chinese and Japanese in Mexico. These have prospered, and by the beginning of the twenty-first century “most Chinese have taken up residence in middle-class suburbs,”⁶³ while the Japanese, “often desperately poor when they first arrived in Mexico in the early twentieth century, by the late 1960s they were primarily middle to upper class.”⁶⁴ There is a racial gradient for intelligence in Mexico. A study carried out in 2003 reported that Europeans obtained an IQ of 98, almost exactly the same as that of Europeans in Europe and North America, mestizos obtained an IQ of 94, and Native American Indians obtained an IQ of 83, typical of Native American Indians found in other studies throughout the Americas.⁶⁵

In Nicaragua the racial hierarchy has been described by an American anthropologist:

there are a few ruling class whites of primarily European ancestry. Spanish language and Spanish culture have long been ensconced in the commanding heights of society. Things Spanish or white are super-ordinate; things Indian or black are subordinate; color participates in each generation’s construction of social and economic hierarchy . . . the mestizos make a range of assertions about blackness vis-à-vis whiteness; black is primitive, irrational, dirty, and less attractive than white.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*.

⁶² Chua, *World on Fire*.

⁶³ Kent, “A Diaspora of Chinese Settlement.”

⁶⁴ D. M. Masterson and S. Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

⁶⁵ R. Lynn, E. Backhoff, and L. A. Contreras, “Ethnic and Racial Differences on the Standard Progressive Matrices in Mexico,” *Journal of Biosocial Science* 37 (2005): 107–13.

⁶⁶ R. N. Lancaster, “Skin Color, Race, and Racism in Nicaragua,” *Ethnology* 30 (1991): 339–53.

In Peru there is the typical Latin American racial socio-economic hierarchy: "the social pyramid is that Spanish-speaking European descendants are at the top, followed in turn by *mestizos* (who mostly speak only Spanish) and the *cholos* (bilingual Spanish and native language speaking indigenous people; the indigenous languages of Peru are Quechua and Amyara), while the monolingual indigenous speakers are at the bottom."⁶⁷

There are small numbers of ethnic Chinese and Japanese, mostly descended from laborers who migrated to Peru between 1850 and 1880 to work in the guano mines, the sugarcane industry, cotton plantations, and railroad construction. The owners of these enterprises brought in Chinese and Japanese laborers after the abolition of slavery in 1854 because the blacks and Native American Indians proved to be unreliable workers: the plantation owners "were unsuccessful in employing Indian or free African labor on their plantations," and the Chinese "were better than slaves and without the problems."⁶⁸ In the twentieth century, many of the ethnic Chinese and Japanese have risen in the socio-economic hierarchy and entered the middle and professional class. An ethnic Japanese, Alberto Fujimori, was prime minister from 1990 to 2000.

Finally, we come to Brazil which is widely believed to be an exception to the pigmentocracies that are so common elsewhere. This belief is attributable to a Brazilian sociologist, Gilberto Freyre, who published a book in 1945 and in which he wrote that "race relations in Brazil are probably the nearest approach to paradise to be found anywhere in the world."⁶⁹ A number of social scientists believed him, and it came to be widely asserted that Brazil has "a non-racist national culture in which 'racial democracy' flourished."⁷⁰

So impressed were officials at UNESCO by Freyre's claim that Brazil was a racially egalitarian society that in the 1950s they sponsored a number of studies of Brazil in the belief that these would reveal the secret of a racially tolerant, unprejudiced, and egalitarian multiracial nation that would serve as a model for the United States in which

⁶⁷ D. Macissaac, "Peru," in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, eds., *Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America*.

⁶⁸ Masterson and Funada-Classen, *The Japanese in Latin America*.

⁶⁹ G. Freyre, *Brazil: An Interpretation* (New York: Knopf, 1945).

⁷⁰ H. Winant, "Rethinking Race in Brazil," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 (1990): 173-92.

whites were prejudiced against blacks and other non-white racial minorities and discriminated against them. The results of these researches were disappointing. Indeed, they “documented as never before the prevalence of racial discrimination”⁷¹ and found that “Afro-Brazilians remained overwhelmingly concentrated in the lowest economic strata and that negative attitudes to dark skin were widespread.”⁷² These researches found that the racial socio-economic status hierarchy related to skin color is the same in Brazil as everywhere else throughout Latin America, e.g., “light skin carries higher status”;⁷³ “the higher a job rank is, the lighter the skin is likely to be”;⁷⁴ “the Brazilian social structure is largely divided along racial lines.”⁷⁵

Contrary to the hopes of these researchers, the studies have shown that far from being a racially egalitarian society, racial social inequalities in Brazil are much greater than in the United States and Europe. Europeans in Brazil typically have an affluent lifestyle while many blacks and mulattos live in abject poverty in urban slums on the edge of cities known as *favelas*. Thus in Rio de Janeiro:

clustered on the hill and mountain sides that overlook the fashionable beaches and elegant shopping and high rise centers, the *favelas* are slums in which only a small proportion of households have electricity, running water, or sewage facilities. Juramento, for example, like most other *favelas*, is a self-contained realm of the very poor, with 30,000 residences and a dozen or so entry points. There is no glass in the windows of the shacks, no electricity or water, other than what can be tapped from the city supplies. There are no official street names, and no mail service or telephones lines.⁷⁶

⁷¹ Winant, “Rethinking Race in Brazil.”

⁷² P. A. Lovell, “Development and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in Brazil: 1950–1991,” *Journal of Developing Areas* 33 (1999): 395–418.

⁷³ P. G. Foster, M. Hitchcock, and F. F. Lyimo, *Race and Ethnicity in East Africa* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

⁷⁴ L. Sansone, “The Internationalization of Black Culture,” in H. Vermeulen and J. Perlmann, eds., *Immigrants, Schooling, and Social Mobility* (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 2000).

⁷⁵ E. E. Telles, *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

⁷⁶ H. L. Surratt and J. A. Inciardi, “Unravelling the Concept of Race in Brazil,” *Journal of Psychoactive Drugs* 30 (1998): 255–60.

So great has been the disenchantment of blacks, mulattos, and mestizos with their disadvantaged position in Brazil that on May 13, 1988, when celebrations were held to commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of the abolition of slavery, many of the blacks, mulattos, and mestizos considered that there was little to celebrate because they had not achieved economic and social equality with whites. On the day of the celebrations, many mounted *descomemoração* ("discommemorations") with such themes as "One Hundred Years of Lies," "One Hundred Years without Abolition," "March in Protest of the Farce of Abolition," and "Discommemoration of the Centenary of Abolition."

EXPLAINING PIGMENTOCRACIES

Sociologists generally attempt to explain pigmentocracies as resulting from discrimination by Europeans against other races. The light-skinned European and North East Asian peoples have gained political and economic power by historical accident and maintain their dominant position by discrimination against other races to keep them subordinate. For instance, an American anthropologist writes that "there is strong evidence to indicate that the plight of many racial and ethnic groups is the result of structured inequality and racial oppression."⁷⁷ The British social anthropologist Peter Wade asserts that the low socio-economic status of Africans found in many societies is "explained by saying that slavery put them there and class mechanisms maintained their place."⁷⁸ This theory may have some plausibility for the United States but is far less persuasive for the Caribbean where the Europeans and the Chinese are generally a mere one or two percent of the population. It is the blacks who are the majority and have political power, yet the Europeans and the Chinese hold most of the wealth and have the economic power. It is the same throughout most of Latin America, and even in Brazil the Europeans are only about half the population while the Japanese are about 1 percent.

The most straightforward explanation for the pigmentocratic racial hierarchy is that it is sustained by differences in intelligence. Numerous studies have shown that light skin color is related to intelligence.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ T. Li, *Malays in Singapore: Culture, Economy, and Ideology* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1992).

⁷⁸ Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*.

⁷⁹ R. Lynn, *Race Differences in Intelligence: An Evolutionary Analysis* (Augusta, Ga.: Washington Summit Publishers, 2006).

But there is probably also another factor that psychologists call “delay of gratification” and economists call “time preference.” These are differences in the preference for present as compared with future gratification. Several studies have shown that Europeans and North East Asians prefer to sacrifice present satisfactions for those in the future, while Africans prefer to have their satisfactions here and now. For instance, in a classical study in Trinidad black and white children were offered the choice between having a small candy bar now or a larger one in a week’s time. It was found that black children were much more likely to ask for the small candy now.⁸⁰ The same difference has been found in Jamaica.⁸¹ The anthropologist Peter Wade has noted this, writing of “the stereotypes of blacks all over Latin America commonly included ideas about the supposed laziness, happy-go-lucky attitudes, disorganized family life, taste for music and dance, and so on . . .”⁸² The anthropologist calls these stereotypes, but stereotypes often have an element of truth.

The likely explanation for light-skinned Europeans and North East Asians having higher intelligence, a strong capacity for delayed gratification, and a low time preference is that these races evolved during the last ice age that lasted from around 28,000 years ago to around 11,000 years ago. Light skin color proved adaptive because it facilitates the production of vitamin D in cold climates. Higher intelligence proved adaptive to solve the problems of obtaining food and keeping warm during the intense cold. A capacity for delayed gratification proved adaptive for the storage of food for consumption in many months’ time rather than consuming it straight away. These were not necessary in sub-Saharan Africa where the climate was warm, and food was available throughout the year.

*Richard Lynn, Ph.D., is Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of Ulster. He is the author of sixteen books, the latest being **The Global Bell Curve: Race, I.Q., and Inequality Worldwide** (Augusta, Ga.: Washington Summit Publishers, 2008).*

⁸⁰ W. Mischel, “Delay of Gratification, Need for Achievement, and Acquiescence in another Culture,” *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 62 (1961): 543–52; 63 (1962): 116–24.

⁸¹ P. E. Vernon, *Intelligence and Cultural Environment* (London: Methuen, 1969).

⁸² Wade, *Race and Ethnicity in Latin America*.

THE REVOLUTION IN HUMAN EVOLUTION

*The 10,000 Year Explosion:
How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution*
Gregory Cochran and Henry Harpending
New York: Basic Books, 2009

Reviewed by F. Roger Devlin

Greg Cochran was a physicist doing optics research with applications in defense. When the Cold War ended, all the fun went out of it for him, and he quit in order to pursue his own scientific interests. Now that rarest of birds, a scientist without any permanent institutional affiliation, he investigates whatever questions strike his fancy regardless of academic departmental divisions. For example, he has proposed pathogenic explanations for various diseases previously thought to have other causes.

Becoming interested in evolutionary anthropology, he joined Steve Sailer's invitation-only Human Biodiversity Internet discussion group. There he met anthropologist Henry Harpending, a much-published Professor of Anthropology at the University of Utah. Harpending had done fieldwork among the !Kung (Bushmen) and Herero in Botswana and Namibia, concentrating on sexual and economic strategizing and the resulting family patterns. Dissatisfied with the state of his discipline, Harpending sought to combine its traditional methods with the mathematical modeling used by demographers and geneticists. A number of scientific papers have by now resulted from Cochran's and Harpending's collaboration, including a celebrated "Natural History of Ashkenazi Intelligence."¹

The book under review is Cochran's and Harpending's presentation for the intelligent layman of their research and theorizing about genetic change within modern human populations: in other words, it is about the process of human evolution as it can be detected within the cosmic blink-of-an-eye of the past few millennia.

¹ Also co-written by Jason Hardy: *Journal of Biosocial Science* 38 (5) (2006): 659-93.

RECENT HUMAN EVOLUTION

Paleoanthropologists have traditionally spoken of humans “attaining behavioral modernity” around 40,000 years ago. Behavioral modernity denotes a complex of behaviors including new tool-making technologies, art (e.g., cave paintings), personal decoration, and ritualized burials. Human genetic change since this transition point has long been considered negligible, and anthropologists commonly speak of cultural evolution taking over from biological evolution. “Culture freed the human race from the pressures of natural selection: We made clothes rather than growing fur and built better weapons rather than becoming stronger” (p. 2). Stephen Jay Gould thought even 100,000 years too short a time span in which to detect evolutionary differences, and concluded that “everything we call culture and civilization we’ve built with the same body and brain” (pp. 1, 5). Some biologists even claimed that human evolution had stopped completely.

Cochran and Harpending do not dispute the importance of cultural change, nor do they attempt to reduce every cultural innovation to a corresponding genetic change. But they demonstrate that significant human evolution has occurred since the advent of agriculture just 10,000 years—400 human generations—ago. Indeed, they believe human evolution has recently accelerated on the order of one-hundredfold over earlier primate evolution.

Like Darwin in *The Origin of Species*, they begin by directing the reader’s attention to the dramatic effects of artificial selection upon plants and animals. It is hard to believe, for example, that corn (maize) is a close relative of the Mesoamerican wild grass teosinte, but genetic evidence leaves no room for doubt. The wild and cultivated varieties are thought to have separated just 7000 years ago.

Dogs were domesticated from wolves about 15,000 years ago, and now come in more shapes and sizes than any other mammal. The majority of today’s breeds are not more than two centuries old. The most interesting changes brought about by domestication have been behavioral rather than physical.

There are breeds like the Irish setter that point, and breeds like the Border collie that live to herd other animals. Both [are] elaborations of behaviors we see in wolves. Dogs are much more playful than wolves, and this can probably be understood as retention of juvenile behavior. Many of the ways in which dogs

interact with humans can be understood as a new application of behavioral adaptations designed for a pack. [Thus,] if some wolves are genetically inclined to try to become pack leaders, others are probably natural followers, and dogs likely have higher frequencies of such "sidekick" characteristics: the owner takes on the role of leader of the pack. There is no complex behavioral adaptation in dogs without a recognizable precursor in wolves. (pp. 10-13)

An extreme example of rapid change is Russian scientist Dmitri Belyaev's fox-breeding program. Selecting exclusively for tameness over a period of just forty years (ten fox-generations), he succeeded in producing friendly foxes which enjoyed human contact.

These outcomes of breeding upon animals are not, indeed, comparable to what evolutionists call "complex adaptation," viz., the evolution of major morphological features such as wings or eyes. Such structures involve the coordinated operation of many genes. But neither are the results of artificial selection negligible. Differences in even a single gene can sometimes have important consequences, and such a gene can spread rapidly under a human breeder's guidance.

Natural selection can have similar results—not in forty years, of course, but within a few millennia, which is still a brief spell in biological terms. For example, the creosote bush was brought from South America to North America at the end of the last ice age 11,500 years ago (migratory birds probably carried the seeds). Since that time, some insects native to North America have so adapted themselves to it that they cannot feed upon anything else; others have evolved camouflage as creosote sticks and leaves.

Could natural selection have brought about comparably significant adaptations in our own species over the course of thousands rather than millions of years? A thousand years is only about forty human generations, after all.

The answer will depend on how constant our environment has been. Once an organism becomes well-adapted to a particular environment, evolutionary change can slow to a snail's pace. On the other hand, if a favorable mutation helps adapt an organism to a new environment, it can spread almost as rapidly as in a consciously directed breeding program.

Now, humans have clearly not had a static environment in the 40,000 or 50,000 years since we wandered out of Africa. Firstly, we had to

adapt to the colder and otherwise variegated regions of Eurasia. Secondly, we adopted a settled agricultural way of life beginning around 10,000 years ago. More recently, we have even determined our own environments to a great extent.

Plenty of random genetic mutations have occurred among the three billion bases of the human genome during this same period. A few which might not have mattered to hunter-gatherers on the African savannah (and so would have gotten lost during the early phase of *Homo sapiens'* existence) turned out to be useful in the new Eurasian environments; these would have been likely to spread among local populations.

There is good evidence this has occurred. A simple example is lactose tolerance, which is caused by a single gene. Most human beings (in common with our earliest ancestors) lose the ability to digest milk after the age of weaning. But for Eurasians with domesticated cattle, the randomly-occurring lactose tolerance variation was valuable and so was preserved and spread. Once a sizeable number of people carried the gene, "a new kind of pastoralism became possible, one in which people kept cattle primarily for their milk rather than for their flesh. This change is very significant, because dairying is much more efficient than raising cattle for slaughter: it produces about five times as many calories per acre" (p. 181).

Thus, lactose tolerance increases the carrying capacity of the land for the group which has acquired it and gives them an advantage in competition with others. A lactose tolerant tribe is likely either to conquer or gradually to displace its nearby rivals. Cochran and Harpending speculate this might have been the critical advantage which permitted the Indo-European expansion. (Competing theories include higher intelligence and horsemanship.)

Today, the rate of lactose tolerance in parts of Scandinavia has reached 95 percent. And now that other human groups are herding cattle instead of merely hunting them, lactose tolerance is appearing among them as well: sometimes through the same genetic variant Europeans have (the Fulani and Hausa in West Africa), sometimes through different ones (the Tutsi in East Africa and some Arabs).

How do we know lactose tolerance is a recent mutation?

When a new gene gets passed on to the next generation, it does not normally go by itself: a large chunk of the chromosome where it is located goes with it. A chromosome typically gets broken into just two, three, or four pieces in a single human generation, and within each

piece the offspring inherits the same pattern of genetic variants which the parent had: this is called a "shared haplotype."

Over the generations, breaks will randomly occur at other points along the chromosome until all the genes get shuffled. But this takes a very long time, and until then a gene will be linked with whatever other genes happen to be nearest to it. As a rough rule: the longer the shared haplotype, the younger the mutation. The shared haplotype around the European lactose tolerance mutation is over one million bases long.

And lactose tolerance is just one example. Hundreds of such variants with long shared haplotypes have been discovered in recent years. They include a number of the gross morphological differences commonly used to distinguish the races, such as fair skin and eyes among Europeans and the epicanthic eye fold among East Asians. Most of the variants are not so clearly visible. Their average age is 5000–5500 years among Eurasians and 8500 years among Africans.

On this basis it is possible to estimate the current rate of human genetic change and compare it with that of earlier primate evolution:

Since we have sequenced the chimpanzee genome, we know the size of the genetic difference between chimps and humans. Since we also have decent estimates of the length of time since the two species split, we know the long-term rate of genetic change. The rate of change over the past few thousand years is far greater than this long-term rate over the past few million years, on the order of 100 times greater. (p. 23)

With men as with dogs, the most interesting genetic changes to study are those that involve behavior. Since the first appearance of tool making (by *Homo habilis*) on the African savannah more than two million years ago, the most radical change in hominid behavior occurred in the Upper Paleolithic, or last phase of the Old Stone Age, between 40,000 and 30,000 years ago—the "attainment of behavioral modernity" mentioned above. Innovations which date from this period include fortified dwelling places, dramatically improved tools and weapons made from new materials or from materials available only hundreds of miles away (indicating trading networks), painting, sculpture, and jewelry, all with noticeable regional variations in style. These changes have been called the "human revolution," the "cultural explosion," or the "big bang" of anthropology.

It is noteworthy that this transition did *not* coincide with the first development of anatomically modern humans (*Homo sapiens*) in Africa between 200,000 and 100,000 years ago. "In archeological artifacts from as recently as 100,000 years ago, it's hard to see any real difference in the material culture of Neanderthals and the material culture of Africans" (p. 53).

There must have been some genetic change, a "gateway mutation" (p. 23) (or set of mutations) in *Homo sapiens* around 40,000 years ago which made it all suddenly possible. What could this genetic change have been? Where did it come from, and why?

At around this time, modern humans were migrating into Europe, where they encountered the Neanderthals: "There were big differences between *Homo sapiens* and *Homo neanderthalensis* in way of life, with Neanderthals being high-risk, highly cooperative hunters, rather like wolves, while anatomically modern humans in Africa probably had a mixed diet and were more like modern hunter-gatherers" (pp. 54-55).

It is extremely probable that a certain amount of interbreeding occurred. The two lineages were separated by only half a million years, and no primates are known to have established reproductive isolation in so short a time. Bonobos (pygmy chimpanzees) branched off from common chimpanzees 800,000 years ago, but the two subspecies are still able to have fertile offspring with one another. Most mammalian species retain the ability to interbreed far longer.

The simplest hypothesis concerning the "human revolution" seems to be that it happened because modern humans acquiring new genetic variants directly from Neanderthals: "there is no faster way of acquiring new and useful genes" (p. 36).

Modern humans were certainly on balance the better adapted of the two species; after all, we are here and the Neanderthals are not. Late Neanderthal sites have, indeed, turned up where some of the Upper Paleolithic innovations are copied with greater or lesser success. But Neanderthals never developed them independently; they seem to have lacked the "spark" which had made them possible.

On the other hand, *Homo sapiens* had also been around at least 60,000 years already and had never produced such innovations before they encountered Neanderthals. It seems there was some special synergy between a few of the Neanderthal genetic variants and the preexisting *Homo sapiens* genome: "It would take only a very limited amount of interbreeding for modern humans to have picked up almost every Neanderthal allele [genetic variation] with any significant advantage.

The alleles most obviously worth stealing would be those that implemented adaptations to local conditions in Europe" (p. 53).

Some anthropologists also claim to have detected Neanderthal admixture in early modern human skeletons from Europe, but no consensus yet exists on this point.

For the benefit of those concerned about the effects of Neanderthal ancestry upon the nobility of their lineage, incidentally, the authors include a demonstration that we are also descended from viruses! A virus is a loose strand of DNA or RNA which enters living cells and begins copying itself. Occasionally a virus will enter human sperm or egg cells and copy itself into the human genome. Many identifiable traces of such viral DNA have turned up, a few of which even perform valuable functions. How's that for adding polish to your family escutcheon?

THE AGRICULTURAL REVOLUTION

Since the attainment of behavioral modernity, the most important change in the human way of life has been the development of agriculture. Farming produces between ten and one hundred times as many calories per acre as foraging. This resulted in a population explosion. Before agriculture, there may have been about 6 million human beings on the earth; during the last 10,000 years BC, their number is estimated to have grown between 40 and 170 times.

Farming appeared first in the Fertile Crescent of Southwest Asia. By 9500 BC, we see the first signs of domesticated plants: first wheat and barley, then legumes such as peas and lentils. From there farming spread in all directions, showing up in Egypt and western India by 7000 BC and gradually moving into Europe. Around 7000 BC, rice and foxtail millet were domesticated in China. In sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture appeared around 2000 BC. (p. 68)

Mesoamerican Indians domesticated maize around 5000 BC, but North American Indians in the Illinois and Ohio River valleys adopted maize agriculture only 1000 years ago. Australian Aborigines never domesticated plants at all (pp. 7, 79). "The sedentary lifestyle of farming allowed a vast elaboration of material culture. Food, shelter, and artifacts no longer had to be portable. Births could be spaced closer together, since mothers didn't have to continually carry small children. Food was now storable, unlike the typical products of foraging,

and storable food could be stolen. For the first time, humans could begin to accumulate wealth" (p. 70).

Humans had been adapting to foraging for a very long time, so the transition to a settled way of life must have been difficult. The average standard of living did *not* rise because of agriculture; population growth kept up with or even surpassed the vast increase in available nourishment. Early farmers were on the whole less well-nourished than the hunter-gatherers who preceded them:

The carbohydrate fraction of their diet almost tripled, while the amount of protein tanked. Protein quality decreased as well. Hunter-gatherers would rarely have suffered vitamin deficiency diseases such as beri-beri, pellagra, rickets, or scurvy, but farmers sometimes did. There are numerous signs of pathology in the bones of early agriculturalists. Average height dropped by almost five inches. In the Americas, the introduction of maize led to widespread tooth decay and anemia due to iron deficiency.

Many researchers have written about the health problems stemming from the advent of agriculture. Our point is that, over millennia, populations *responded* to these new pressures. People who had genetic variants that helped them deal with the new diet had more surviving children, and those variants spread: farmers began to adapt to an agricultural diet. (pp. 76-77)

The process of adaptation probably began with changes in the frequency of existing genetic variants; but as population soared, new mutations became more common.

Lactose tolerance, discussed above, was one important adaptation; it is thought to have originated about the same time as cattle were first domesticated, around 6000 BC. Fair skin may have originated among Europeans in response to shortages of vitamin D: fresh meat has plenty of vitamin D, so hunters had likely never had this problem (p. 78). Late adoption of agriculture may explain why the Picts of ancient Scotland are described by Roman authors as dark-skinned (p. 92). Other new genetic changes protected farmers against alcoholism: "Booze inevitably accompanies farming" (p. 82).

Most of the more recent adaptations involve just a few specific genetic functions: changes in metabolism and digestion, in defenses against infectious diseases, in reproduction, in DNA repair, or in the central nervous system (pp. 75-76). Hundreds of adaptations seem to

have become common in the past 10,000 years.

Populations that have never farmed or that haven't farmed for long, such as the Australian Aborigines and many Amerindians, have characteristic health problems today when exposed to Western diets. The most severe such problem currently is a high incidence of type 2 diabetes. The prevalence of diabetes among the Navajo is about two and a half times higher than it is in their European-descended neighbors, and about four times more common among Australian Aborigines than in other Australians. (p. 80)

Besides changing our diets, the adoption of agriculture brought about a host of new challenges: crowding, the accumulation of garbage, difficulties with human waste disposal, and increased numbers of rats and mice as well as livestock near places of human habitation. All of these led to infectious diseases, some newly common, others new altogether. These diseases acted as a selective pressure to produce genetic changes. The authors list nine separate mutations, for example, which protect against falciparum malaria (the most common and dangerous form of malaria); different mutations are common in different regions.

The most interesting genetic changes, as the authors say, are those that change minds rather than bodies. Agriculture selects for personality traits that make men successful rather than colorful: traits such as patience, self-control, and the ability to defer gratification: "Food is often shortest just before sowing, and those earlier farmers had to abstain from eating the seed grain when they and their families were hungriest. This is something that classic hunter-gatherers just didn't do. Efforts to teach Bushmen to become herders frequently fail when they eat all their goats" (p. 114).

For similar reasons, "conventional solutions to the problem of slow modernization among peoples with shallow experience of farming are highly problematic." The cause of differences between "developed" and "undeveloped" societies may well be "biological changes that are the product of natural selection acting over millennia" (p. 122).

Agriculture also leads to private property and stinginess. Hunter-gatherers usually shared resources with the tribe, largely because there wasn't much else to do with them: "Try eating a whole giraffe before the meat goes bad" (p. 115). But farmers could increase their

reproductive success by being miserly.

Hunters are often lazy as long as their stomachs are full, and this makes sense since it conserves their energy. But farmers can almost always find things to do to increase their fitness: piling up enduring assets, building barns or irrigation works, trading for more land or livestock. Evolution seems to be selecting for men who enjoy keeping busy.

There is also evidence that humans have recently been selected for endurance rather than short bursts of strength, probably another adaptation to settled agriculture.

Finally, agricultural surpluses allowed for the emergence of non-productive elites. These elites had powerful reasons to want to keep the peace in their domains: it was necessary to secure their own position and revenue. In effect, they began "taming" the farmers living under them:

There are parallels between the process of domestication in animals and the changes that have occurred in humans [in the past 10,000 years]. In both humans and domesticated animals, we see a reduction in brain size, broader skulls, changes in hair color or coat color, and smaller teeth. With reasonable amounts of gene flow between [elite and peasant] classes, populations as a whole [and not just the elites] should have become tamer. If your ancestors were farmers for a long time, you're descended from people who decided it was better to live on their knees than die on their feet. (pp. 112, 110)

EVOLUTION WITHIN THE PERIOD OF RECORDED HISTORY

One of the authors' boldest speculations concerns a possible genetic basis for the explosion of innovation over the past few centuries commonly known as the scientific and industrial revolutions. Certainly genetics will never explain particular scientific or technological achievements: no use digging up Copernicus' bones in search of a gene to "explain" the heliocentric hypothesis. Genes could only be "responsible for" scientific progress in the sense of providing it with a necessary, not a sufficient, condition. But it is entirely likely that the first anatomically modern men lacked some of the native as well as cultural equipment for carrying out scientific research.

"Some argue that gradual genetic changes could not be responsible for such rapid social changes. We believe, however, that these arguments are mistaken" (p. 122). There often exist fairly precise points

along a quantitative continuum where certain qualitative differences or even new processes suddenly emerge. The authors use the example of a "phase transition": the temperature at which a solid melts or a liquid vaporizes. Another well-known example is the "critical mass" of material necessary to sustain a fission reaction.

What would have been the analogous genetic point at which the rapid development of science became possible? "We think there was no direct selection favoring creativity itself, and that creative individuals are accidental by-products of selection for other traits, traits that really did pay off in everyday life, such as low time preference and the ability to make complex mental models" (p. 126).

Slight differences in the average distribution of these or similar traits can result in massive increases in the number of outliers at the upper end of the bell-curve. Such slight differences in average distributions could well have come about over the course of a few centuries.

Let me offer an example of my own. Many students of classical antiquity have wondered why scientific achievement was so limited in the highly civilized Hellenistic and Roman ages in comparison to the modern era. Archimedes (d. 212 BC), e.g., is now widely considered the greatest scientific mind of antiquity, but he was best known to the men of his own day as a designer of siege engines. His mathematical works were collected and commented upon only in the sixth century AD. Another one thousand years later, rather suddenly in the sixteenth century, he was rediscovered by a number of scientific men interested in carrying on and extending his researches. Intellectual historians have speculated on the reason for this lag. Was it something to do with Christianity? Was it a change in the social structure? Cochran and Harpending might suggest that the genetic outliers – scientifically gifted men – had simply become frequent enough after seventeen further centuries of genetic change to form a research community worthy of a singular ancient prodigy.

ASHKENAZI INTELLIGENCE

The 10,000 Year Explosion concludes with an example of significant genetic change that occurred within a single millennium: the evolution of intelligence in Ashkenazi Jews. "A fair amount of classical commentary on the Jews has been preserved," the authors point out, "and there is no sign that anyone then had the impression that Jews were unusually intelligent" (p. 193). But today the Ashkenazim are estimated to have an average IQ of 112, about three-quarters of a standard deviation

above the European mean (p. 191).

They also suffer from an unusual set of serious genetic diseases at frequencies vastly exceeding the gentile populations which surround them. The authors studied 21 of these disorders and believe that some or all of them are genetically linked to high intelligence.

"[E]ver since [torsion dystonia] was first recognized, observers have commented on the unusual intelligence of the patients who suffer from it" (p. 221). Seven studies also indicate high IQ in patients with nonclassic congenital adrenal hyperplasia, a condition with a gene frequency of almost 20 percent among Ashkenazim. The authors themselves discovered that Israelis being treated for Gaucher's disease are eleven times as likely as the average Israeli Ashkenazi to be engineers or scientists.

Most of the genetic mutations at the root of typical Ashkenazi diseases involve just two biological subsystems: DNA repair and sphingolipid storage disorders. "Imagine a fat biochemistry textbook where each page describes a different function: most of the Ashkenazi diseases would be described on just two of those pages" (p. 214).

Sphingolipid mutations in particular seem like the kind that might increase intelligence: "In each there is a buildup of some particular sphingolipid, a class of modified fat molecules that play a role in signal transmission and are especially common in neural tissues. Researchers have determined that elevated levels of those sphingolipids cause the growth of more connections among neurons" (p. 220).

Tay-Sachs and Niemann-Pick diseases, for example, are sphingolipid disorders that cause a marked increase in the growth of dendrites, the fine branches that connect neurons; they are the only known disease alleles that cause increased neural connections.

It is rare for any population to suffer high frequencies of dangerous mutations like these: the more dangerous the mutation, the more strongly natural selection tends to work against it. But there are two cases in which they may become common: genetic drift in a population bottleneck or natural selection in favor of some positive trait with which they happened to be linked.

A population bottleneck is an event that drastically reduces the numbers in a breeding pool. For example, Pingelap is a Pacific island that was devastated by a Typhoon around 1775, leaving about twenty survivors. Today, almost 10 percent of the islanders suffer a form of severe color blindness. Color blindness just happened to be a trait found among the survivors, and spread as the island population

replenished itself.

But the effects of a population bottleneck are random; there is nothing in the bottleneck hypothesis that would account for the concentration of Ashkenazi genetic disorders in just two functional areas. "We looked at twenty-one genetic diseases among the Ashkenazi and calculated the probability of finding four that affected sphingolipid metabolism, assuming randomness, in a given population. That probability was very low, less than 1 in 100,000. That can't be a coincidence" (p. 215).

And several other genetic results which would be expected from a bottleneck, such as a decrease in overall genetic variety, are not found among the Ashkenazim.

This leaves us with the hypothesis of natural selection in favor of some positive trait (such as intelligence) with which the harmful Ashkenazi alleles happened to be linked. Another circumstance favoring this hypothesis is the pattern of "heterozygote advantage" in these diseases. There are certain alleles which are beneficial to carriers of a single copy ("heterozygotes") but harmful to those with two. The sickle-cell mutation among Africans is the best known example: a single sickle-cell gene protects against falciparum malaria, while two produce the dangerous condition known as sickle-cell anemia. There are many examples of heterozygote advantage, not all of them defenses against infection. Such alleles are usually signs of strong, recent selection; over a longer time, mutations with fewer side effects tend to occur and win out (p. 217).

Natural selection for intelligence required an unusual pattern of social organization to endure over many generations: one in which fertility was linked to success at cognitively demanding occupations and marriage outside the group was strongly discouraged. As the authors demonstrate, Ashkenazi history fulfilled these unusual requirements over a period of eight or nine centuries.

Early Ashkenazi history is unclear. The most plausible hypothesis seems to be that the male ancestors of the Ashkenazim were brought to Italy as slaves following either the Great Revolt of AD 66-73 or the Bar Kochba Revolt of AD 132-135. After regaining their freedom, many of these men would have had to take wives from the local gentile population. About 40 percent of Ashkenazi ancestry is European, mostly from the maternal line. Once a Jewish community had been reestablished, however, strong controls were instituted against intermarriage: not less than 50 percent of Ashkenazi ancestry is Middle

Eastern. “Even 2 percent mixing per generation over the past 2,000 years would have caused the Ashkenazim to become 80 percent European.” The evidence indicates a rate of interbreeding less than 1 percent (Kevin MacDonald has estimated it at about 0.5 percent). This is important, because, “selective pressures cannot change a population that freely mixes with its neighbors. Intermarriage quickly dilutes the effect of beneficial alleles within a population, since the introduction of alleles from outside easily swamps the effects of selection within the group” (pp. 194, 219).

These ancient Jewish communities gradually migrated to Northern France and Germany. When they first appear in the historical record in Carolingian times

they are long-distance merchants who trade with the Muslim world. This is the beginning of a unique occupation pattern; there were no other European groups—or other Jewish groups, for that matter—who were noted for this. When the security required for long-distance travel no longer existed, the Ashkenazim increasingly specialized in one occupation, finance. The majority seem to have been moneylenders by 1100. (p. 195–7)

Serious persecution began in 1096, and gradually Jews were expelled from most of Western Europe. But they were welcomed in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth because of their unusual skills.

For 800 to 900 years, from roughly 800 to 1650 or 1700, the great majority of Ashkenazi Jews had managerial and financial jobs, jobs of high complexity. It would have been impossible (back then) for the majority of any territorial ethnic group to have such jobs because agricultural productivity would have been too low. (p. 199)

Genetic selection for success at intellectually demanding tasks such as scholarship, finance, and trade required that an impermeable ethnic group occupy a specialized economic niche over a period of centuries. Ashkenazi Jews uniquely fulfill this unusual requirement. But could natural selection have brought about the results we see? The authors show that it could have:

Assume that parents of each generation averaged a single IQ

point higher than the rest of the Ashkenazi population. In other words, let's suppose there was a modest tendency (mediated through economic success) for intelligent parents to have more surviving children—a tendency that certainly would not have been noticed at the time. If we assume a heritability of 30 percent for IQ, a very conservative assumption, then the average IQ of the Ashkenazi population would have increased by about a third of a point per generation. Over forty generations, roughly 1000 years, Ashkenazi IQ would have increased by 12 points. (p. 223)

STEPPING ON TOES

Although Cochran and Harpending are primarily scientists whose aim is to understand the world better, they also realize their work flies in the face of the egalitarian doctrines which still control public policy. The official experts on "third world development" will not be pleased to learn that the objects of their benevolence have to farm for several thousand years before they can become capable of modernization. Some Jews have evidently not felt flattered by the authors' "odious" theory of superior Ashkenazi intelligence. And they compound their offence by citing Kevin MacDonald.

Let us conclude with the gauntlet they throw down to the ideologues:

It's time to address that old chestnut that biological differences among human populations are "superficial," only skin-deep. It's not true: We're seeing genetically caused differences in all kinds of functions, and every such difference was important enough to cause a significant increase in fitness (number of offspring)—otherwise it wouldn't have reached high frequency in just a few millennia. . . . Evolution has taken a different course in different populations. Over time, we have become more and more unlike one another as differences between populations have accumulated. (pp. 90, 10)

*F. Roger Devlin, Ph.D., is an independent scholar and the author of **Alexandre Kojève and the Outcome of Modern Thought** (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2004).*

RACE, CLIMATE, AND INTELLIGENCE

Race Differences in Intelligence

An Evolutionary Analysis

Richard Lynn

Augusta GA: Washington Summit Publishers, 2006

\$17.95

322 pp.

Reviewed by Leslie Jones

The idea that it was climate that determined the capacity (or incapacity) of the different races to initiate high civilization has deep roots in Western thought. In the nineteenth century, this notion was reinvigorated by Darwinism. The Social Darwinists regarded racial inheritance as the result of past training in a particular environment. They believed that man's intellectual and moral development was strictly regulated by climate. *Race Differences in Intelligence* is a reversion to this mode of thinking.

The germ of Professor Lynn's new book is two seminal articles that appeared in *Mankind Quarterly* in 1991. In the second paper, entitled "The Evolution of Racial Differences in Intelligence," Lynn proposed a striking explanation of the ethnic IQ differences documented in the preceding paper. This theory is reaffirmed in *Race Differences in Intelligence*.

Why are the East Asians (median IQ, 105) and the Europeans (median IQ, 99) more intelligent on average than other races? This finding applies not only to indigenous East Asians and indigenous Europeans but also to their offshoots in many other countries. And why do Korean children adopted by Belgian families still have the distinctive lower verbal, higher visualization pattern of abilities that is typical of East Asians generally?

Lynn's answer to the first question is that in the northern latitudes the ancestors of these peoples were presented with certain unique challenges, in particular the problem of obtaining food and shelter in the winter. The temperate and cold climates thereby exerted a severe selective pressure for intelligence, leading to an increase in brain size in the European and East Asian populations. Lynn infers that the ancestral Europeans, but even more so the East Asians, would have been subjected to extreme cold stress leading to more frequent genetic mutations, including mutations for higher intelligence.

The author agrees with Edward M. Miller that in cold climates in the hunter-gatherer era, females and their children would have been dependent on male (paternal) provisioning since women are poor hunters. In such circumstances, intelligence would have been important in choosing mates, and this also presumably exerted an additional selection pressure for its enhancement.

The East Asians have particularly strong visualization abilities compared to Europeans, in Lynn's view, because these abilities were once useful for hunting and navigation in a featureless, snowbound terrain.

On ranking his ten races according to the severity of winter temperatures in their native regions, Lynn discerns a general correspondence between coldest winter monthly temperatures and average brain size. Although there are populations with high IQ in the tropics, notably in Singapore, Professor Lynn does not accept that this fact contradicts his theory. As he pointed out in *IQ and the Wealth of Nations* (joint author Tatu Vanhanen), the Chinese people of Singapore are relatively recent immigrants.

Concerning the evolutionary significance of challenging environments, the Social Darwinists anticipated Lynn's theory. In *Social Evolution* (published in 1894), the sociologist Benjamin Kidd asserted that in the "stern regions" of the north, men had acquired "energy, courage, integrity" in a strenuous conflict with nature. And in *Civilization and Climate* (published in 1915) the geographer Ellsworth Huntington theorized that hard environments stimulated man to discover fire, build shelters, and domesticate animals. In *Mainsprings of Civilization* (1945), Professor Huntington claimed that all of the tropical civilizations, notably those of the Mayas, Incas, and Khmers, were founded by migrants from higher latitudes.

In *A Study of History*, Arnold Toynbee depicts ease as inimical to civilization and maintains that dynamic peoples inhabit testing environments. He calls the primitive inhabitants of Nyasaland prior to the arrival of the white man the "do-as-you-likes." According to Benjamin Kidd, likewise, "Man, originally a creature of a warm climate... has not attained his highest development where the conditions of existence have been easiest. Witness the contrast between the 'energetic races' of the temperate zone and the 'careless, shiftless, easily satisfied negro...'"

In *Race Differences in Intelligence*, in similar vein, Professor Lynn describes the tropical and subtropical environments inhabited by the Africans during the last 200,000 years as "not strongly cognitively demanding." Because plant foods, eggs, and insects are readily available throughout the year, the Africans did not have to hunt large mammals. They did not therefore need to develop the various skills that hunting large animals requires. Nor did they have to make fire or clothes or store food.

Although Professor Lynn acknowledges the adverse effect on IQ of environmental factors in impoverished Third World countries, especially poor

nutrition, he contends that even allowing for such factors genotypic African IQ is still only approximately 80.

For the Social Darwinists, man's struggle with nature was training for the rivalry of life, in particular for the remorseless struggle between races portrayed by Karl Pearson in "Socialism and Natural Selection" (1894). Richard Lynn contends that in this struggle it is a general principle that "the more intelligent races typically defeat and enslave the less intelligent." In his new book, he cites the example of the enslavement of Pygmies by the Negroid Africans.

From this principle Professor Lynn deduces that the populations with the highest intelligence levels will ultimately achieve world domination. In *Eugenics: A Reassessment* (2001), he envisages a titanic contest for global supremacy between the European and Oriental peoples from which China emerges victorious and establishes a world state; the position of the Europeans will then become comparable to that of the enslaved Pygmies.

In the same work, Lynn emphasized the advantages that China would enjoy in such a contest. First and foremost, China has a highly intelligent population. A nation's IQ, for Lynn, is determined by the racial composition of its population. In his current book Lynn notes that China is one of the six East Asian nations with the highest national IQs. And as he demonstrated in *IQ and the Wealth of Nations*, national IQ is a significant cause of national per capita income and economic growth.

Furthermore, because China is an authoritarian, unitary state, Lynn envisages large scale eugenic programmes to enhance the quality of its population. In the United States, in contrast, it is politically impossible in his view to address the pressing problems of dysgenic reproduction and dysgenic immigration. Finally, China, unlike the United States and certain countries within Europe, has remained a racially homogenous nation which Lynn considers a source of strength in itself.

Richard Lynn is hardly the first commentator to forecast a resurgent China and the decline of the West. Brooks Adams's *The Law of Civilization and Decay*, Charles Henry Pearson's *National Life and Character*, and Oswald Spengler's *Man and Technics* spring to mind.

Is Lynn right? In *Race Differences in Intelligence*, he discusses an anomaly of Chinese history that arguably vitiates his prediction. From around 500 B.C. to the fifteenth century A.D., China was far in advance of Europe in terms of inventiveness in science and technology. But as Charles Murray has demonstrated in *Human Accomplishment*, from 1400 to 1950 high achievement in the arts and sciences was concentrated in Europe. And, superior intelligence notwithstanding, the East Asian peoples generally lagged behind the Europeans as regards economic growth and development until the second half of the twentieth century.

Lynn does not accept that the cultural and economic stagnation of China from the fifteenth century to the middle of the twentieth invalidates his (and

Galton's) theory that nations and races prosper or decline according to their average level of innate ability. He concedes, however, that an intelligent population is necessary but not sufficient for economic and cultural progress. A market economy and political liberty are also essential.

Whereas China in the period in question remained a unitary, authoritarian state, Lynn observes that the rulers of the numerous European states were forced by competition to concede liberties to their peoples, including freedom of thought and economic freedom. As the historian Tzvetan Todorov has recently argued, Europe's *pluralité*, in particular its political fragmentation, was the basis of its intellectual and economic dynamism in modern times (*Le Monde*, March 5-6, 2006).

Lynn also suspects that the underperformance of the Oriental peoples until quite recently had deep psychological roots. Hans Eysenck discerned a connection between creativity and psychoticism. Psychoticism may enable the creative genius to ignore the social disapproval that original ideas can engender. Lynn speculates that the East Asians have evolved a higher degree of social conformity than Europeans. This is expressed in their low level of psychopathic personality, which militated against creative accomplishment and scientific discovery. However, this ingenious argument is hard to square with China's earlier cultural achievement.

As J. Philippe Rushton remarks in a review of this book, Richard Lynn has made some important contributions in the field of intelligence. But he may eventually be remembered as the historian manqué who foresaw an omnipotent China and the ruin of his people.

Leslie Jones, a freelance writer based in London, holds a Ph.D. in history from the London School of Economics, and is a fellow of the Galton Society.
