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A HISTORY OF THE
PEACE CONFERENCE
OF PARIS

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A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS


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PREFACE

THE History of the Peace Conference, of which this is the first volume, owes its origin to the Institute of International Affairs. The purpose and aim of the latter can perhaps best be stated by giving some extracts from the Report of its Committee.

There were certain lessons which those who attended the Congress of Paris could scarcely fail to draw from the experience gained there, and the task of preparing a scheme for applying one of them was entrusted to this Committee.

Preparations for discussing the terms of peace had long been in train when hostilities suddenly closed in November 1918. At Washington and in London, specialists, recruited by the foreign departments from the Universities and elsewhere, were at work digesting facts and stating the questions which would have to be settled. In January 1919, the staffs with these corps of specialists, strengthened by others released for the work from the navy, army, and air force, were assembled in Paris. The American delegation was mainly housed in the Hôtel Crillon, and the British, which was much the largest, in the Majestic. Here were congregated under one roof trained diplomatists, soldiers, sailors, airmen, civil administrators, jurists, financial and economic experts, captains of industry and spokesmen of labour, members of cabinets and parliaments, journalists and publicists of all sorts and kinds. Many of them came from the various Dominions, India, Egypt or the Crown Colonies.

At meals, and when off duty, there was no convention to forbid discussion of the business in hand. A unique opportunity was thus given to every specialist of grasping the relation of his own particular question to all the others involved, and of seeing its place in the vast problem of reconstruction before the Congress. So great a diversity of minds has seldom been associated on a single task under one roof. Men who never

imagined they had anything in common began to discover how much in common they really had. In friendly informal intercourse they came to see how they differed, and also to appreciate the sincerity of views which were not their own. A respect for each other's opinions grew up which could scarcely have developed under other conditions. It affected the relations of the two bodies in Paris, which had the advantage of a common language and political tradition. For besides meeting on the Commissions, where the daily work was done, the British and American specialists were constantly dining with one another in their respective hotels.

In these delegations were included many whose business in life had been to originate thought or influence public opinion on international questions. Now for the first time they were put to the discipline of handling practical problems side by side with men who had only known what it meant to get things done. The mutual benefit of this hourly contact between men of theory and men of practice was great. There were also coming to the delegations from time to time, people fresh from some distant scene of action, from Russia, Prægue, Armenia, Egypt, or the remote frontiers of Central Asia. Whenever this happened there were gatherings in the Hotel Crillon, or the Hotel Majestic, of all those from either delegation whose business it was to deal with these special problems. For hours together such visitors were plied with questions, and the problems they had studied on the spot were discussed before them in all their bearings. Not seldom it happened that practical solutions afterwards embodied in the treaties were worked out in the course of these informal discussions.

'The passions which embroil nations against each other and wreck civilization, all have their roots in the ignorance born of isolation. And this isolation is not merely that of one nation from another, but scarcely less of the schools of thought which develop within each national circle. In Paris were brought together leaders of thought and action from the same country and the same race, who had never before met for intercourse in their own land under one roof. More effective agencies for creating an opinion on international affairs at once charitable, sane, and well-informed have never been devised than these delegations so long as they existed.' . . .

'Such was the position which some members of the British

and American delegations met to consider at a gathering over which General Tasker H. Bliss was elected to preside on the motion of Lord Robert Cecil. This and subsequent meetings resulted in the reports and resolutions set out elsewhere, the opening passages of which were as follows :

‘Until recent years it was usual to assume that in foreign affairs each government must think mainly, if not entirely, of the interests of its own people. In founding the League of Nations, the Allied Powers have now recognized that national policies ought to be framed with an eye to the welfare of society at large. The proceedings at Paris have shown how necessary it is to create some organization for studying the relation of this principle to practical questions as they arise. Resolved Therefore :

(1) That those present undertake to form an Institute, entitled, “The Institute of International Affairs, founded at Paris, 1919,” composed at the outset of two Branches, one in the United Kingdom and one in the United States.

(2) That the purpose of this Institute should be to keep its members in touch with the international situation and enable them to study the relation between national policies and the interests of society as a whole.

It was further decided that the Institute as a whole should produce, amongst other publications, an Annual Register of International Affairs, beginning with a comprehensive account of the Congress of Paris. An Anglo-American Committee was appointed to develop the organization.¹ The British promoters also appointed a committee, under Lord Robert Cecil, to select the original members of their own branch.

It was now clear that matters had reached a point when nothing further could be profitably done for the organization of the British and American Branches until the Congress was over, and the members of the two delegations had returned to

¹ The members of this were :

Professor Coolidge,	} Americans.
Dr. James Brown Scott,	
Professor Shotwell,	
Mr. Hurst,	} British.
Captain Clement Jones,	
Major Temperley.	

In October 1919, the committee appointed to select the members of the British Branch began their work by co-opting Lord Eustace Percy, Major Temperley and Sir John Tilley to take the places of Mr. Hurst and Sir Valentine Chirol, who were both in Egypt. The Committee of Selection was thus consolidated with the British half of the Anglo-American Committee.

their respective countries. With the preparations for the first issue of the Annual Register it was otherwise. Those first volumes would obviously have to deal with the Congress of Paris, and the settlements produced by that Congress, constituting as they must the basis upon which the future policy of the world will develop. To organize the production of this work while those who could treat its various aspects with first-hand knowledge were still assembled in Paris, was essential. The attention of the Committee was at once concentrated on this task. Mr. George L. Beer and Lord Eustace Percy undertook to draw out a plan of the work, and a meeting of the proposed contributors was held at the Hotel Astoria to consider it. At this meeting their scheme was thoroughly discussed, and the different sections allotted to the various experts. . . . The editorship was entrusted to Major Temperley, of Peterhouse, Cambridge, [who had been a contributor to the Cambridge Modern History.] This work, which is to include five volumes with maps and documents, is now in preparation, and will, it is hoped, be produced in the early future.'

In conclusion, it must be explained that these volumes¹ could not have been produced at this juncture, and perhaps not at all, had it not been for the public-spirited action of Mr. T. W. Lamont, of New York, in advancing £2,000 to meet the expenses. This timely assistance, offered while the Conference was still sitting, and most of the contributors were still assembled in Paris, made it possible for the work to be assigned to the various writers, and to be discussed between them before they scattered to their respective homes.

Nor can this preface be closed without reference to the great loss sustained by the Institute in the recent death of one of its most enthusiastic founders, Mr. George Louis Beer of New York, the well-known historian of the American Revolution and of the causes which led to it, and one of the foremost of all students of colonial questions. The vast range of his knowledge, and the titanic labours he accomplished as an adviser of the American Delegation, were a constant source

¹ See note at foot of p. xxvii.

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of wonder and admiration to all his British as well as his American friends. There can be no doubt that the work he did in Paris must have hastened the progress of disease which cost him his life. The world's peace had no better friend. He lived to complete the contribution on Africa which appears in Volume II, and the original editorial scheme was planned by him in conjunction with Lord Eustace Percy.

June 1920.

EDITORIAL FOREWORD

THE circumstances, which produced both the Institute of International Affairs and the project for a History of the Peace Conference, have been described in the Preface. But, as the work of the History progressed, it became more and more evident that the Institute, as such, which has no foreign politics, could not stand sponsor to this work and to the views it contained. The responsibility in such case, therefore, primarily falls on the Editor, but even in his case that responsibility must be a limited one. The editorial aim has been to present a history of the Peace Conference and transactions there which should be as moderate, detached, and impartial as possible. Though this has invariably been the aim, it has not always been possible, nor did the Editor think it right, to preclude expressions of opinion on the part of an individual contributor. The difficulty does not arise from lack of information. We already possess more information about the Conference of Paris than was possessed about the Congress of Vienna half a century after it had completed its labours. Recent revelations, for instance, have made the origin of the League of Nations better known to us than the origin of the war. The *German Observations on the Draft Treaty*¹ and the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers form the complete argumentative and legal basis of the Treaty.

The chief difficulty lies therefore not in lack of information, but in lack of perspective. It would not help matters to delay publication on this ground for two or three years. All histories

¹ No Entente Power has yet published the German Observations as an official paper. They have, however, been printed unofficially in America and imported into this country. They are for the first time extensively drawn upon and analysed in Chap. VI, Vol. II of the History. The Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers has been published in England as an official paper (Misc. No. 4, 1919) Cmd. 258. The fact is mentioned as some little inquiry has shown that a great number of people are unaware of this fact.

of the Conference in this generation will be open to the objection of being too near the events to see them in their true perspective. Nor does the difficulty consist in the fact that the information is not at present available to any one on certain questions, e. g. reparation, or in the fact that certain clauses of the Treaty have not yet been put into execution. Such objections will hold true for many years, though doubtless in a less degree as time goes on. Yet the real defect as to the lack of perspective, engendered or conveyed by a contemporary history, has a countervailing advantage. For articles written at this time by persons present at the Conference, or with an intimate knowledge of the events they describe, must reproduce much of the spirit and atmosphere in which the Conference met. The deciding factor, therefore, in publishing this history at this early date is the belief that its publication will make people realize the fleeting and now fast vanishing atmosphere in which the Conference lived and moved. New opinions are being formed, new sentiments arising in all kinds of subtle ways, which will soon transform the whole atmosphere. That atmosphere may perhaps be preserved in the pages of a contemporary history written by actors or by observers of the drama.

The object of this history is neither to criticize nor to defend the German or any other Treaty, still less to defend or to criticize the policy of any government or nation taking part in the Conference. The aim is to produce a history at once independent and objective, to detail the facts and to sketch the opinions that prevailed at the Conference. Ultimate history cannot be obtained in this generation on this or any other subject, but the purpose of this history will be attained if it preserves or records some of the materials for ultimate history, which might otherwise have been lost or forgotten.

June 1920.

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INTRODUCTION

1. *Origins of the War.*

THE war was a conflict between the principles of freedom and of autocracy, between the principles of moral influence and of material force, of government by consent and of government by compulsion. In one form or another the conflict is as old as mankind, but for our purpose it began in 1688. For it was then that the British system of self-government or constitutionalism¹ was established, and it was about that time that a new and formidable type of government arose, which was eventually to threaten not only Anglo-Saxondom but democracy itself.

‘That which arose in Northern Europe about the time of our Revolution Settlement was a new form of practical absolutism. . . . It is a new type, not to be confounded with that of Henry VIII, Philip II, or Louis XIV, and better adapted to a more rational and economic age. Government so understood is the intellectual guide of the nation, the promoter of wealth, the teacher of knowledge, the guardian of morality, the mainspring of the ascending movement of man. That is the tremendous power, supported by millions of bayonets, which grew up in [those] days at Petersburg, and was developed by much abler minds, chiefly at Berlin; and it is the greatest danger that remains to be encountered by the Anglo-Saxon race.’²

Two centuries ago then, the principles, that met in battle in 1914, already showed their peculiar characteristics in England and Prussia. But the eighteenth century contributed little in the direction of further development until it drew towards

¹ In his speeches President Wilson uses the term ‘democracy’ to cover those States, whether monarchies or republics, which have a ‘government by consent’ as opposed to those under personal or militarist governments. This use, though convenient to-day, is historically misleading, for England and the Dutch Republic in the eighteenth century had ‘governments by consent’, though they were in no sense ‘democracies’. ‘Constitutionalism’ seems the most comprehensive term for the principle on which free States are or have been governed.

² So spoke Lord Acton in 1899 in words that his hearers recognized to have been strangely prophetic in 1914. v. *Lectures on Modern History*, Chapter on Rise of Prussia, *sub-fin* p. 289, edition of 1906.

a close. Then political evolution began and proceeded with a swiftness unparalleled in politics. The United States broke away from the British Empire, but in so doing she served only to increase the sway and the prestige of ideals that were peculiarly Anglo-Saxon. For, while the British Empire had already shown that a monarchy might be free, the United States now proved that a Republic might be law-abiding and stable.

The French Republic and Revolution, which followed close on the heels of the American, taught a very different lesson. Its twin ideals were democracy and nationality.¹ Neither were strange to one or other branch of Anglo-Saxondom, but they came upon Europe with an irresistible force. France taught that a people had the right and the power to resist oppression from within and from without, and that equality before the law was the first privilege of man. Then disillusion set in, as it became apparent that the national spirit used the democratic principle in pursuit of its own ends, and Italians and Dutchmen were not charmed with democracy, when they found that their masters were Frenchmen. Finally, democracy perished even in France and became the instrument of a military and imperial autocrat. The French Revolution had unloosed torrential forces, but its immediate effects had provoked reaction and reorganized despotism. Though Napoleon fell, his rival despots in Russia, Austria, and Prussia, rehabilitated by suffering and by victory, enjoyed a new lease of life, and the triumph of reaction began.

The reaction after 1815 was but momentary. Canning 'called the new world into existence' to prove that autocracy must not meddle there, and Monroe enunciated a parallel doctrine which showed that the Anglo-Saxon powers were at least united against despots, if they were sometimes divided against one another. The future was indeed to prove that the differences between constitutionalism, democracy, and nationalism could be reconciled. The three forces met and blended, and in 1870 their influence seemed at last predominant in Europe. The omens seemed favourable. Constitutionalism had

¹ Nationality or nationalism is the impulse or desire of a people both to realize its individuality and to attain ethnic unity. The French of Napoleon's time, like Magyars, Germans and Russians later, proved that nationalism was not the same thing as democracy.

triumphed in Scandinavia, in Belgium, in Holland, in Greece, in Italy, even in France during the last years of Napoleon III. Nationality had won victories in Belgium, in Greece, in Italy, and in Serbia. Democracy had secured its first successes in the British Isles and seemed to be advancing to assured victory in every Anglo-Saxon community beyond the seas. Then the seemingly irresistible tide was decisively checked and thrown back in the Centre and East of Europe. At Sadowa and at Sedan militarism and autocracy appeared in a new light, as intelligent, attractive, and victorious.

In many countries men now arose who put democracy and nationality to strange and to sinister uses. In Russia the national aspirations were put at the service of a relentless autocracy. In Germany the national spirit, which had been the soul of the insurrection against Napoleon and had ennobled the ideals of 1848, was finally harnessed to the chariot of Prussia. It was Bismarck, the masterful charioteer, who inspired all Germany with the gospel of efficiency, discipline, success, and power, and who enforced these arguments by armaments of a size and power hitherto undreamed of by conquerors. He it was, too, who used the sentiment of nationality itself to crush other national aspirations, who set the pride and strength of a great nation against the rights, interest, or existence of small ones. As national pride crystallized, the doctrine arose that one race was superior to another, and some held the proof of superior culture to lie in the ability to exercise superior force. In the case of races so backward as to be really uncivilized some such doctrine has always been recognized. But the difficulty appeared when the new evangel was preached to Czechs by Austrians, to Poles by Russians, to Alsatians, to Danes, and to Poles by Germans, in every case by force and by the armed hand.

‘The war had its roots in the disregard of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiance and their own forms of political life.’¹ This sentence is the clue to the events which finally led to the war. Even that finished diplomatic artist, Prince Bülow, could not make a statement of the way Germany regarded the smaller nationalities without showing how full of danger it was for the future. ‘Nations

¹ President Wilson, 11th February 1918.

of military ability and economic skill and of superior culture will mostly reach further with the arm of their State power than with the sway of their national culture, and will expend their energy on making the national conquest follow in the wake of the political . . . it is a law of life and development in history, that where two national civilizations meet they fight for ascendancy.¹ The fact is that the very principles on which military autocracies are based constrain them to curtail or abolish the existence of nationalities to whom they deem themselves superior in force or in culture. To these doctrines there could ultimately be but one answer and one end. If Belgium and Serbia blocked the way to Paris and Bagdad such small obstacles could not stand in the way of Germany's greatness. It had been forgotten that small states could stand for large principles, and that the safeguarding of their integrity carried ultimately with it the freedom of the world from autocracy.

The world as it emerged from the war, though bleeding and exhausted, contained within itself the elements of stability and life. Three emperors and half a dozen kings, the chiefs or the servants of the great military autocracies, had fallen. But constitutionalism, whether in the form of limited monarchy or of a republic, had endured the terrific strain. Kaiserism or military despotism was dead if Bolshevism or democratic despotism was still alive. Great new principles had been enunciated which implied far-reaching change. All parties to the Armistice had agreed to substitute a League of Nations and a Covenanted Peace for the old unstable and perilous 'Balance of Power'. This special undertaking symbolizes the whole, for it involved complete change and invoked elemental forces. The Pope's appeal for Peace in August 1917 still shows a desire or belief that Europe could resume not only approximately its own boundaries but even approximately its old life. Even in January 1917 the Allies had made it clear that this was impossible, and every utterance of President Wilson, more especially the speeches which formed the legal basis of the peace, made this attitude clearer still. For good or for evil the nations that met at the Peace Conference were pledged to tread paths that were new and strange.

¹ *Imperial Germany* (London, 1914), pp. 239-40.

2. *Origins of the Peace.*

This work does not attempt to describe the origin or general course of the war, but simply the conditions which led to peace. The first three volumes of this history relate and illustrate the sequence of events from the first signs of peace at the end of 1916 till the exchange of ratifications at the beginning of 1920. Volume I covers the preliminaries of the peace in every sense, and is divided into three parts. *The End of the War* describes the military and naval defeat of Germany, and the political aspects of the negotiations leading up to, and including, the Armistice. Part II, *Europe in Dissolution*, exhibits the economic strain laid upon society by the prolongation of the war, and traces the effects of the exhaustion of food supplies. Closely connected, though not identical, with this study of material conditions is the study of the war-aims of belligerents in the later stages of the war as developed under its pressure and elevated and intensified by sacrifice. Part III describes the actual opening, organization, and practical working of the Conference itself. It deals also fully with that most important, always neglected, and now almost wholly forgotten, aspect of the Conference, its executive action in disarming Germany, in rescuing millions from starvation, and in maintaining and enforcing its authority in the more remote parts of Europe. The last chapter of the volume discusses the legal aspects of the situation, exhibiting the revolution or rather the anarchy caused by the dissolution of treaties. It also studies the legal basis of the treaty as founded on the armistices and the negotiations preceding them:

The contents of Volume II¹ are described by its title—*The Settlement with Germany*. The introduction describes the actual course of peace negotiations with the Germans in broad outline up to the signature of Peace. The first chapter deals broadly with certain general aspects of the League of Nations, Labour, Finance, Reparation, and International Communications. The next chapter deals with the military occupation and the military and naval clauses of the Treaty. Three chapters follow, describing the territorial settlements in West and East Europe, and in Africa. They are followed by a chapter analysing fully the legal aspects of the Treaty,

¹ Volumes II and III are now in the Press, and will appear shortly.

and giving, for the first time in this country, in an exhaustive form, the arguments for and against every notable clause in the Treaty as made by Germany and by the Allied and Associated Powers, with such legal comment as is in each case required. The final chapter of this volume describes *The New Germany*, that is the Germany which began its existence with the flight of the Kaiser, which drew up a constitution on a new basis, and which finally accepted the Treaty. The third volume contains a series of illustrative documents, first those illustrating the Brest-Litovsk Treaties or the German ideas of peace, next documents exhibiting the origin of the League of Nations, together with a representative selection of speeches made during the Peace Conference, or with reference to the Peace Treaty, by President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, and General Smuts. It is hoped that these extracts will be of a sufficiently representative character to show the different aspects in which the Treaty has been viewed. The text, both of the German treaty and of the New German Constitution, has also been included.

The plan thus outlined deals necessarily with certain aspects, and certain aspects only, of the Treaty; it is limited in space, and it is limited in time. The subject is the Treaty as it affects Germany, and the date at which that history stops is the 21st January 1920, after the Treaty had come into force, after the Council of the League of Nations had held its first meeting, and when the permanent sessions of the Supreme Council came to an end. This date marks an evident and intelligible line, for it is certain that all negotiations relative to peace since that date must have a different character from all peace negotiations preceding it. As regards limitation of subject it is possible to urge that much has been omitted, but these omissions are deliberate and will be repaired in subsequent volumes. It seemed important, for instance, not to treat of the Polish problem at this stage, which is still in an unsettled condition, and where much will depend on the verdict of plebiscites which have not yet been taken. It was, however, impossible to omit some discussion of that problem, and particularly the strategical aspect of it as it confronted the Germans at the time of the signature of the Treaty. While, therefore, the main treatment of Poland has been reserved for a later volume, when it will be taken in connexion with the

whole problem of East Europe, it was deemed also better to relegate the important question of Shantung and of China to the fifth volume, which will deal more fully with Asiatic problems. The League of Nations and International Labour were topics that could not be treated exhaustively until more experience of the practical machinery set up in each case is to hand, but it was impossible not to give some indication of the handling of these topics at the Conference, and of the origins of each organization. The financial clauses of the Treaty have been treated with relative fullness; the economic clauses, on the other hand, are so bound up with the commercial arrangements of Austria and Hungary, that it was thought better to defer their discussion until the fourth volume, where the Treaties with the Powers are considered and the subject could be discussed as a whole. On the other hand, the clauses dealing with international communications affect Germany so vitally that these have been treated with relative fullness in Volume II. Certain other points, such as the question of war criminals, the trial of the Kaiser, and the practical working of the Reparation Commission, clearly lie beyond the date at which our volumes cease. These questions will ultimately be dealt with at a later stage. The fourth volume, which will include the Treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, will be the next to be issued, and will include a discussion of the general economic problems of Central Europe as a whole.

In a work of this kind it is impossible to avoid criticism from many different points of view, but it may perhaps be well to give a few explanations of some of the practices pursued. Should, for instance, the title be the Conference or the Congress of Paris? There is no essential difference in International Law between the two, but Conferences have usually a less formal character. According to the stricter interpretation, however, it was a Congress, and not a Conference that met at Paris. There were, however, times when it was a Conference, and times when it was a Congress, and the published State papers show, not perhaps unnaturally, that the Powers do not seem always to have realized the difference between these two terms.¹ On the other hand, the public, as a whole, seems to

¹ The matter is complicated by the fact that the sittings of Delegates to a Congress are sometimes described as 'conferences', v. Satow, *Diplomatic Practice*, vol. ii, p. 94, n.

have adopted the title of Conference without any discussion, and as the dip'omatic usage has not been entirely consistent in this matter it was thought best to make use of the popular title, for it is by such titles that events are handed down to posterity. Historians, for instance, have found it impossible to get the public to call the Monroe Doctrine by its more appropriate title of the 'Adams' Doctrine, or to change the name of the battle in which Harold fell, from Hastings to Senlac. In such contests the public will always be victorious, and the historian shows prudence in acknowledging his defeat. As regards the title 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers', this is in strictness confined to the Five Great Powers—United States, France, British Empire, Italy, and Japan. The United States is not an Ally but an Associate. All States adhering to the Entente are known as 'the Allied and Associated Powers'. In practice, however, it has not always been possible to maintain this distinction and the whole group is sometimes generally described as the 'Allies'.

The chronological table in Volume III has been compiled with great care, and with a special purpose. Ever since the days of Bismarck, it has been increasingly true that the best materials for history are to be found in the Press. He taught us that the currents and changes of opinion are sometimes to be found there when official documents give no hint of them. This principle has been followed, and the chronological table deals not only with events but with the opinions of the Press.

The general principle or guiding thread in these volumes has been the attempt to exhibit the Peace as a great constructive experiment. The establishment of this principle will be seen in its most striking light if the state of the world before and after the Peace is examined. Before the war Europe was still concerned with the balance of power and America with isolation, while exploitation of natives went on in dark corners of the earth unchecked by international control. Preparation for war was universal. The Peace settlement has deliberately sought to change the centre of gravity and thus to bring Europe and America into harmony and thus create an international organization. Guilty nations have been punished, and war, which was previously regarded as justifiable, is henceforward looked on as a crime. Disarmament has begun. A league

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has been created to enforce peace and to repair wrong or injustice, if necessary to re-write such parts of the Treaty as seem inconsistent with justice or with expediency.

These confessedly are the ideals and professions of the Powers that concluded the Armistice with Germany. How far they have been realized it is the object of this history at least partially to answer. No attempt to answer that question can be in vain so long as it is made with sincerity, and without malice. For it is no exaggeration to say that the future welfare of the world depends upon its democracies understanding the new principles on which they are to be governed, and on their combining together to make the noblest of them a reality.

PART I: THE END OF THE WAR

CHAPTER I: PART I

THE MILITARY DEFEAT OF GERMANY

1. *Relative Situation of the Belligerents.* The Great War, which flared up in Europe on the 1st August 1914, and which had raged for over two years with fluctuating fortunes but unabated fury, had subsided into comparative stagnation at the close of 1916.

The Central Powers, united in command and organization, and apparently self-supporting as regards economic resources, stood firm and unshaken; their centralized geographical position enabled them to operate effectively on interior strategic lines against any one of the loosely-knit forces of the Allied or Entente Powers. These forces were solely dependent for their maintenance on sea transport, which is comparatively slow and insecure; that they were maintained at all was only possible owing to the unchallenged sea supremacy of the Allies, which in turn depended almost solely on the efficiency of the British Navy and Mercantile Marine; that these forces, dispersed on the outer ring, could deliver anything but desultory half-blows against the Central Powers was in the circumstances hardly conceivable.

2. *Results of the War up to the end of 1916.* At the end of 1916 the balance of the material gains appeared to rest with the Central Powers. The preceding years had produced a series of bitter disappointments for the Allies. In East and West the German armies had won victory after victory, and had overrun some of the richest industrial districts of France, Belgium, and Russia. Germany's aim of securing a crushing military decision in the early months of the War had, it is true, been frustrated, partly by her own military mistakes, partly by the heroism of the Allied Armies. But, although the immediate menace of disaster had been removed, the German outposts

remained firmly entrenched within 55 miles of Paris and 65 of Dover.

3. *Unfavourable Situation of the Allies.* The indecisive battles of Verdun and the Somme appeared to demonstrate the impregnability of field fortifications in Western warfare, while the power of the Russian Colossus had proved a delusion. The entry of Italy and Rumania into the War had produced equally disappointing results, and appeared only to afford further proofs of the military superiority of the Central Powers. Serbia had been crushed and overrun; every effort of the Allies in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East seemed doomed to humiliation or to disaster. Russia was more isolated than ever, and the unfortunate example of Rumania was not likely to tempt other neutrals to join in the Alliance against the Central Powers. The attitude of Greece, for instance, was confused and hesitating.

In other ways the retrospect was equally depressing. The British Navy, which the public had expected to produce spectacular results, only succeeded in meeting the enemy in force on one occasion, when a decision was not reached; the submarine and the Zeppelin, doubly effective from their novel methods, contributed to lower the *moral* of the Allied nations and to stimulate that of their opponents.

4. *The Blockade versus Germany's Resources.* The resources of the Central Powers, both in man-power and material, seemed indeed to be inexhaustible, and their moral cohesion to be unimpaired. Owing to Germany's skilful utilization of all available resources, both in her own country and in those of her allies, it became doubtful whether the pressure of the Blockade would prove effectual in crushing the resistance of the Central Powers. At any rate, the time involved by a mere war of attrition, combined with the exercise of blockade pressure, might prove equally damaging to the Allies' resources. As time went on it became increasingly evident that the defeat of the main German armies remained the primary military objective of the Allies.

5. *Plan of the Allies for the 1917 Campaign.* In spite of the apparently unfavourable situation, the Allied peoples did not lose faith in the future. At a conference held at the French General Headquarters at Chantilly in November 1916, a plan of campaign was drawn up for the Allied Armies during 1917.

This plan, which was unanimously agreed upon by the military representatives of the Allied Powers, comprised a concerted series of offensives on all fronts, so timed as to assist each other by denying to the enemy the power of weakening one front to reinforce another. By this means the Allies hoped to co-ordinate their efforts and to overcome the strategic advantage conferred on the Central Powers by their geographical position. The main German armies in East and West were to be pinned down and defeated by superior forces, when the Italian, Macedonian, Rumanian, and Turkish fronts were expected to fall with comparative ease to the Allied contingents in those theatres.

6. *Germany's Reorganization for renewing the Struggle.* As has been indicated, the end of 1916 marked the close of a definite stage in the world-conflict. Enormous efforts had been made on both sides without attaining decisive results, and, although the Central Powers appeared to hold most of the material gains, these had only been won at a tremendous sacrifice of man-power and material. Germany knew that a long war meant economic ruin, and that victory, to be remunerative, must be rapid. The achievements of the hitherto despised 'Kitchener Divisions' of Great Britain in the Somme battle, together with the vast artillery material at the disposal of the Allies, had come as a shock to the German troops and military leaders. When Rumania declared war at the end of August 1916, von Hindenburg and Ludendorff had been summoned to replace von Falkenhayn at General Headquarters, and sweeping reforms had been instituted in the military and economic organization of Germany, of her allies, and of the occupied territories. The War Ministry in Berlin was reorganized, and a scheme, known as the 'Hindenburg Programme', was formulated in order to exploit to the full the resources of the country in man-power and material. Hindenburg's plans for mobilizing the manhood and womanhood of the country were drastic, and were only adopted by the German Government in a modified degree, but the munitions programme was vigorously carried out. At the same time the establishment of infantry divisions was standardized on a basis of 9 battalions instead of 12, and 13 new divisions were in this way formed to take part in the 1917 campaign. The Artillery, Signal Service, and Air Force establishments were largely increased.

7. *Germany's Strategic Plan for 1917.* The strategic conduct of the War was also modified. In view of the increasing strength of the Entente Powers, of their apparent intention to resume the offensive, and of the time required for the 'Hindenburg Programme' to mature, Germany was compelled to economize her forces, and, temporarily at any rate, to stand on the defensive. The tactical manuals were re-written, and the training of the troops was altered in accordance with this policy. For the time being the doctrine of the 'relentless offensive', so long inculcated in the mind of the German soldier, was abandoned. It was rightly anticipated that the 1917 offensive of the Allies in the West would be directed towards crushing in the great German salient between Arras and Reims. In order to avoid the full force of this blow, a retrenchment, known as the 'Siegfried Line', was prepared between the Scarpe and the Aisne, passing through St. Quentin, and a retirement to this position was timed to commence on the 16th March 1917 and was prepared in the fullest detail.

The adoption of this defensive policy in the West did not mean that Germany was to remain inactive in other directions. The reorganization of the Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Turkish Armies was taken in hand seriously, and plans were laid for undermining Russia's moral cohesion and for extending Germany's domination eastwards. At the same time it was hoped that the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare in the early spring would prove decisive in bringing Great Britain to her knees.

Finally, after the occupation of Bucharest in December 1916, the German Emperor endeavoured to induce the Allies to enter into peace negotiations. As it was soon perceived that these negotiations would be based solely on Germany's territorial conquests, and would satisfy none of the Allies' war-aims, the illusory offer was rejected. Meanwhile, the Allies were re-organizing their forces for a renewal of the struggle. Changes in the Higher Command took place both in the French Army and in the British Navy. A new Ministry was formed in London under Mr. Lloyd George, and the 'War Cabinet' was instituted. In February 1917, the Allies, after a conference at Calais, reaffirmed their plan of joint offensives which had been decided upon at Chantilly in November 1916, and the general conduct

of the campaign on the Western Front was entrusted to the French Commander-in-Chief.

This plan of combined offensives was strategically sound, and its execution might well have proved successful, had not a new factor, hitherto unheeded, paralysed the military strength of the Russian Empire.

8. *The Collapse of Russia.* The enormous casualties suffered by the Russian armies were already producing a feeling of war-weariness among the peoples of Russia. The national life had been dislocated by the over-mobilization of the country's manhood, and the harshness and inefficiency of the bureaucracy had caused widespread unrest. Apart from these factors, few Allied statesmen or soldiers had realized either the degree to which the economic life of Russia depended on Germany, or the powerful ramifications of German influence in all grades of Russian society. The economic interdependence of the different parts of Russia on their vulnerable inland lines of communication was also a vital factor which had not been sufficiently appreciated. The German blockade of Russia was just as effective and noxious in its consequences as that of Germany by the Allies. The anti-Tsarist revolt of March 1917 was accepted almost with relief by the Allies as expressing a new spirit of energy and progress in the Russian people, but its far-reaching effects were not at first foreseen. An age-long *régime* of autocratic tyranny and corrupt government had stunted the mental development and political growth of the Russian peoples, and had paved the way for a terrible social cataclysm. War-weariness and indifference turned to class-hatred and revolt against all authority, until civil order and military discipline were alike swept away in an orgy of bloodshed and cruelty.

The Kerensky government made vacillating efforts to stem the flood of Bolshevism which subsequently swept over unhappy Russia. A gallant though misguided attempt was made to cooperate with the military plans of the Allies, and on the 1st July 1917 a tardy offensive was opened astride the Dniester by the armies of Brussiloff and Korniloff against the Austro-German forces with initial success, which, however, was of but short duration. The poison of Bolshevism, stimulated by German intrigue, rapidly infected all units, and Russia as a military factor went out of the War.

9. *German confidence in the result of the 1917 Campaign.*

Germany little realized what a powder-train she was igniting when by her propaganda she encouraged anarchy and revolt in the armies of the Tsar. The complete disintegration of Russia's social cohesion was as little foreseen by German statesmen as by those of the Allies. The repercussion of Bolshevism on the war-weary German people and on the beaten German Army was afterwards to prove decisive, but at the beginning of 1917 that danger still appeared remote. There were, it is true, other clouds on the horizon, of which the German Higher Command was aware. The unexpected and costly failure in front of Verdun, and the prompt rejection by the Allies of the Kaiser's peace proposal at the end of 1916, had somewhat damped the spirits of the German nation. On the other hand, the appointment of Hindenburg and Ludendorff to the Higher Command proved an enormous access of moral strength. The belief of the army and the people in the ability of these two soldiers was unbounded, and the German nation looked forward with confidence in the coming year to the promised blessings of a victorious peace: to the successful resistance of their armies in the West, to the replenishment of their economic resources from Russia and the East, and to the isolation and decisive defeat of Britain by means of ruthless submarine warfare.

10. *Unrestricted Submarine War and America's Entry.* It was the psychological result of adopting this latter weapon which introduced the final and decisive factor into the situation. A storm of mutual recrimination has raged between the military chiefs and the Imperial Chancellor as to the actual responsibility for resorting to the intensified submarine campaign. Hindenburg excuses himself on the score that the Chancellor never warned him of the effect which it might have on America, Bethmann-Hollweg pleads that he could but follow the advice of his military and naval advisers, and adopt the most effective means of winning the war.

This controversy takes us back to that still greater one regarding the responsibility for the War. Whatever be the verdict of history regarding the contributory causes which led up to the great conflagration of 1914, the main impulse which set the wheels of war in motion was undoubtedly the military policy of the German Empire. The shibboleth of 'militarism', so often appealed to by the Entente propagandists, proved in one sense a two-edged weapon, owing to the vagueness of the

term and its liability to be applied to any organism or dominion founded on military strength. In its original and generally accepted significance, however, the term 'militarism' is specially applicable to that combination of ruthless political lust and organized physical strength which has characterized the development of Imperial Germany both in peace and in war. This doctrine, to which Germany's diplomatic policy was subordinated, definitely involved the United States of America in the War, and thus cast the die which ultimately decided its issue.

During the 1917 campaign, the actual military assistance which America could lend was negligible, although her moral and financial aid were indirectly of great value, and her intervention also made additional shipping available for the Allies.

11. *Effects of Russia's Collapse.* The course of events in 1917 failed to develop in accordance with the plans of either belligerent party. The general and simultaneous offensive, contemplated by the Allies at the Conferences of Chantilly and Calais, did not materialize. As already described the Russian effort collapsed entirely, and Germany was thereby enabled to advance far into Russia and to obtain undisputed command of the Baltic and Black Seas. The economic results, in particular the occupation of Wallachia, enabled Germany to survive the pressure of the Allied Blockade during 1917, and the collapse of Russia hindered in another way the execution of the Allied plan of campaign. Although the German forces in West and East remained between January and November 1917 in approximately the same relative numerical proportions, namely, about 150 divisions in the West to 80 in Russia, yet the Russian *débâcle* enabled Germany to transfer to the West some 40 fresh divisions from her Eastern Front, in exchange for an equivalent number of divisions exhausted in battle or of inferior fighting value. The Russian front thus acted as a reservoir from which the German Higher Command could draw fresh troops in case of need.

12. *The Campaign of 1917.* In the middle of March 1917, the withdrawal of the First and Second German Armies to the 'Siegfried Line' was begun and carried out more or less 'according to plan'. This measure, which the German Higher Command had only resorted to as the result of earnest deliberation and under the menace of the coming Allied offensive, still further handicapped the Franco-British operations.

In spite, however, of the drawbacks involved by the Russian collapse, and some modifications of the original plan caused by the situation in the West, the Franco-British offensive opened in April; the Italian Army was not ready in time to co-operate so early. The British Army gained an initial victory on the Arras-Vimy front; the French attack, however, was a failure and resulted in heavy losses. General Pétain then replaced General Nivelle in command of the French Army, and General Foch was appointed Chief of the General Staff in Paris. The French Army, however, had been badly handled, and its *moral* had suffered in consequence, so that the task of hammering the German defences throughout 1917 devolved largely on the British Army. Had these operations not been continued, the main German armies would have been free to turn on the other Allies. Successful offensives of limited scope were also undertaken by the French during the summer at various points on the Western Front. At the end of July began that more ambitious Allied offensive in Flanders, which is known as the Third Battle of Ypres. The fighting that ensued was of a very stubborn character, and involved both the British and German Armies in great expenditure of man-power and material, but beyond this no definite strategic results were obtained. Towards the end of November the British attack at Cambrai came nearer to gaining a strategic success, but the opportunity was missed.

13. *Results of the 1917 Campaign in the West.* By the end of 1917 Germany had succeeded in parrying all the blows of her enemies on the Western Front, but only at great cost; 70,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the British alone, in spite of the stubborn fighting, and the German armies are estimated to have suffered nearly 2,000,000 casualties on the Western Front during the year.

Ludendorff's verdict on the state of affairs at the end of August is as follows: 'The state of affairs in the West appeared to prevent the execution of our plans elsewhere. Our wastage had been so high as to cause grave misgiving, and had exceeded all expectation.'¹ The resumption of the Flanders battle in October caused the German Higher Command still further anxiety, and all but succeeded in breaking down the resistance of the German Army. Ludendorff describes the British attack of the 4th October on the Passchendaele Ridge as being exceptionally severe, and only resisted at the cost of another enormous sacrifice of

¹ *War Memories*, 1919, vol. ii, 480.

life, and again, 'Our wastage in . . . the fourth Flanders battle was extraordinarily high. In the West we began to run short of troops.' The Allies, too, particularly the British Army, suffered heavy casualties, but the costly Flanders battles must not be judged merely by their material results; they went far to sap the tenacity and moral cohesion of the German Army. Ludendorff himself says: 'Yet it must be admitted that certain units no longer triumphed over the demoralizing effects of the defensive battle as they had done formerly.'¹

14. *Failure of the Submarine Campaign.* The Western Front was not the sole pre-occupation of the German Higher Command in 1917. It must be borne in mind that Ludendorff's strategic conception of the 1917 campaign was based on a defensive policy in the West, coupled with a steady and economical establishment of German ascendancy in the East, while the real decision was to be forced by the submarine war against the tonnage of the Allies; the maintenance of sea transport was recognized as vital to the Alliance against Germany.

Ludendorff tells us that, on the 9th January 1917, when the decision was finally taken to resort to unrestricted submarine warfare: 'The collapse of Russia was in no way to be foreseen, and indeed did not enter anybody's head. We reckoned that the adoption of the submarine campaign would effect a favourable decision for us, at latest before America's new troops could participate in the war; but without the adoption of this submarine war we reckoned on the collapse of the alliance between the Entente Powers.' The ravages caused by the unrestricted submarine campaign were extremely serious. No less than 25 per cent. of the tonnage bound for British ports during April 1917 was sunk by submarine action. In June 1917, the British Admiralty definitely adopted the policy of convoying merchant vessels, and the situation at once began to improve. The labours of the Anti-Submarine Department of the Admiralty also began to produce definite results; 66 enemy submarines were sunk during 1917, as compared with 25 in the preceding year.

After six months of the submarine campaign Ludendorff had to confess that 'in its ultimate results it had not achieved what had been expected of it'; he still hoped, however, 'that the expectations of the Navy would be shortly fulfilled'. By the end of the year the expected decision had still not arrived,

¹ *War Memories*, vol. ii, 492.

but the German Naval Staff was as optimistic as ever. The Higher Command, too, allowed itself the luxury of self-deception.

15. *War-weariness in Germany.* But others, less convinced of the infallibility of the German General Staff, and less confident in the prowess of the German Army and Navy, were more sceptical. The privations caused by the Blockade were becoming acute, the increasing thunder of the Allied artillery in the West, combined with the continued inactivity of the German armies, produced a feeling of nervous tension and protracted disappointment which soon expressed itself in outspoken war-weariness. The tales brought back by the troops of the mines of Messines and of the shell-craters of Flanders found an equally joyless echo in the misery of their homes.

On the 27th June 1917, Hindenburg wrote to the Kaiser as follows: 'The most serious trouble at present is the sinking of the nation's spirits. They must be raised, otherwise we shall lose the war. Our allies, too, require to be vigorously bolstered up, otherwise the danger of their defection is imminent.' These were strong words, but they summed up the situation accurately.

Early in July, the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, practically assented to the Peace resolution policy of the majority parties in the Reichstag. This brought to a head the feud between the Higher Command and the Civil Government which continued until the end of the war, and, indeed, had a vital bearing on its issue. In spite of Ludendorff's efforts, the Reichstag's Peace resolution was published in *Vorwärts*, and the Chancellor resigned. His successor, Dr. Michaëlis, proved unable to cope with the situation, and was replaced in October by Count von Hertling.

16. *War-weariness in Austria-Hungary.* If war-weariness and depression were rife in Germany, they had become infinitely more acute among Germany's allies. Although Austria-Hungary was bound hand and foot to Germany, so that independent action on her part was practically impossible, her statesmen were not blind to the abyss into which she was being led. The Russian Revolution of March 1917 seriously alarmed the Austrian bureaucracy. On the 27th March, Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, met Bethmann-Hollweg at Vienna, and a secret agreement was reached regarding possible peace conditions.¹ At the beginning of April,

¹ *War Memories*, vol. ii, 440-1 *sqq.*, on the *status quo ante bellum*, it was unknown to G.H.Q.

the Emperor Charles, accompanied by Count Czernin and by his Chief of the General Staff, General von Arz, visited the Kaiser at Hamburg for a personal exchange of views. The Austrian representatives pointed out that the resources of their country in man-power and material were exhausted, and suggested that, in order to provide a basis for peace negotiations, Germany should surrender Alsace-Lorraine to France. In compensation for this loss Austria would hand over Galicia to Poland with a view to their combined annexation by Germany.

These suggestions met with stern disapproval at Hamburg. The Austrians returned to Vienna empty-handed, but more than ever convinced of the gravity of the situation. On the 12th April, Count Czernin addressed a strongly-worded protest to the Emperor Charles, in which he again pointed out that Austria's military power was rapidly becoming exhausted, and that it would shortly be necessary to negotiate for a separate peace. The young Emperor thereupon wrote to the Kaiser, pressing his point of view still more urgently than before. This appeal only produced another rebuff, but Count Czernin continued throughout the summer to plead with his German masters.

17. *Caporetto*. The Austro-Hungarian Army was indeed in a bad way. It had only stemmed with great sacrifice the Italian Isonzo offensive of May 1917; the breaking strain had nearly been reached when the Italians renewed their offensive on the Carso plateau towards the end of August. The German Higher Command was at last convinced that the Austro-Hungarian Army would collapse unless it was given some tangible support. An opportunity was afforded by the war-weariness in Italy and by the unpopularity of the war among certain elements of the Italian population. A German Army Staff was at once formed, and six German divisions were made available (two from the West and four from the East). These, with some Jäger battalions and Austrian troops, took advantage of a weak spot in the Italian line near Caporetto in the Julian Alps, broke the Italian front on the 24th October, and rolled it back towards the Piave. The enormous booty which thus fell almost without effort to Austria-Hungary, and the simultaneous collapse of Russia's military resistance, were decisive in bolstering up the wavering resolution of Austria's rulers. The crisis was over, and the Dual Monarchy remained true to the German alliance for another twelve months.

Bulgaria and Turkey, the other allies of Germany, did not cause her so much anxiety during 1917, for, although they were just as anxious for peace as Austria, they were not in a position to break away while Germany's main armies still held their ground in the West and while German mobile reserves were still available. Thus, the loss first of Bagdad and later of Jerusalem, exercised comparatively little effect on Germany. If she could only win in the West, all would eventually be well. The power which bound Germany's allies to her was based on no higher grounds than greed for conquest, coupled with the servility of impotence. Germany's motto, with her allies and her enemies alike, was, 'Let them hate so long as they fear'.

18. *Bolshevism and Germany's Russian Policy.* But a cloud was gathering on the Russian Front, where events had appeared to be proceeding so *planmässig*. Its significance was long unsuspected by the German Higher Command. Germany's policy with regard to Russia had been to employ indirect methods to undermine Russia's power of resistance, while economizing her own military effort. To quote Ludendorff: 'What we anticipated took place; the Russian Revolution weakened the fighting strength of the army. The idea of peace seemed to be gaining strength in Russia.' This policy succeeded, but only too well. The German design was to hypnotize Russia into a nerveless and inert mass, which could be moulded to Germany's future aims; but her spells went wrong, and she invoked instead a demon of savage anarchy, which eventually contributed to her own downfall. Ludendorff indeed later confessed to this fatal development of the German plans: 'Looking back, I can see that our decline obviously began with the outbreak of the Revolution in Russia.' But he was blind to it at the time, although he complains elsewhere in his *Memories* that 'Bethmann-Hollweg and Count Czernin were both completely obsessed by the Russian Revolution. Both feared similar events in their own countries.' The German policy was, however, dictated entirely by the Higher Command. They skilfully used propaganda and fraternization to induce the Russian soldiery to sell their machine guns, and applied the screw when necessary by a short sharp military operation, as at Riga on the 1st September, and in the capture of the Estonian Islands in the middle of October. It is an interesting fact that this latter combined operation was undertaken partly in order

to improve the discipline of the Fleet; the long-enforced inactivity of the surface vessels had induced an unhealthy leaning towards the doctrines of the Independent Socialists, and mutinies had occurred in August.

19. *Brest-Litovsk*. It is curious how slow the German Higher Command was to perceive the real trend of events in Russia, in spite of its available channels of information. Russia's military strength had flickered out with the collapse of Brussiloff's last offensive in July, but it was not until November that the Germans ventured to reduce the number of their divisions in Russia to less than 80, one-third of their total strength in all theatres. It was at that time, so Ludendorff tells us, that the idea of an offensive in the West first originated. During November and December, 24 German divisions were transferred from Russia to the West.

After much disorder and confusion, Lenin and Trotsky secured the upper hand in Petrograd in November, and on the 15th December an armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk between the Central Powers and the Bolshevik leaders. Peace was not finally signed at Brest-Litovsk until the 3rd March 1918, owing to the procrastinations of the Bolshevik negotiators and the dissensions between the Austrian and German plenipotentiaries.¹ On the 18th February the Germans had actually terminated the armistice, and their armies had begun to advance on a 1,000-mile front from the Gulf of Finland to the Black Sea; but there was no further military resistance, and Russia could now be regarded as a dead front. Peace had already been concluded with the Ukraine on the 9th February. Peace with Rumania was not finally signed until the 7th May, though little danger was to be feared from the Rumanian army. But these delays were only technical, and the German Higher Command knew that it was free to turn its attention to the 1918 campaign.

20. *Condition of the Belligerents at the close of 1917*. At the close of 1917 the general situation was very different from what it had been twelve months previously. The strain of the almost continuous battles on the Western Front had drained the manpower of all the European belligerents, and most serious efforts were made to refill the depleted ranks during the winter months. The appointment of Georges Clemenceau as Prime Minister of

¹ v. fuller account in Chapter VI, Part II.

France in November 1917 was a guarantee that the fighting spirit of the French nation was not exhausted, and that the war policy of the Allies would be pursued with relentless vigour. In Great Britain still more men were combed from industry to replace the wastage of the Flanders fighting, and the British divisions (but not those of the Overseas Dominions) were reduced from 13 to 10 battalions. In Germany the 1917 Class (averaging $18\frac{1}{2}$ years) was called up, nearly two years before its normal time.

The universal shortage of material resources gave almost more cause for anxiety. Three years of war had rendered Europe economically unproductive; Russia, one of the world's chief sources of food supply, was plunged in chaos. The submarine campaign, although it had failed to produce the decisive results expected in Germany, was taking enormous toll of the world's shipping, and very seriously jeopardized the food supply of Great Britain.

But the privations of the Allies were insignificant compared to those suffered by the Central Powers. In spite of an elaborate organization, controlled by what had once been the most efficient bureaucracy in the world, Germany and Austria were suffering from an acute shortage of almost every essential raw material, and from a total deficiency of many of them. Neither the oil-wells of Galicia and Rumania, the copper-mines of Serbia, nor the agricultural resources of the whole Danubian basin were sufficient to meet the demands of the prolonged struggle. The dearth of fats and oils of all kinds was particularly disastrous, both to human health and to industrial requirements. In spite of the resources of Westphalia, Silesia, and Poland, coal was extremely scarce, owing to the lack of labour and rolling-stock. The Allied Blockade was doing its work and doing it well.

21. *The Issue at Stake.* It was thus clear, at the close of 1917, that the strain was becoming too great to last, and that the end of the struggle was in sight. But what the end would be was as uncertain as ever. All the European belligerents appeared to have reached the end of their resources; Germany's territorial gains were greater than ever, and, though her people were weary, her armies were still unconquered. The collapse of Russia removed all pressure from her Eastern Front, and it was extremely doubtful if that pressure could ever be revived. Germany was free at last to concentrate superior force in the

main theatre—the Western Front—and thus challenge the final decision.

This challenge could not have been averted by a negotiated peace, to which both parties were stubbornly opposed. Germany's rulers were as determined as ever not to surrender the fruits of their military depredations; on this last point sufficient evidence is supplied by Ludendorff's conditions regarding Germany's future frontiers, as stated at the Crown Council in Berlin on the 11th September 1917.¹ The Allies, for their part, could not consent to sacrifice the ideals which had called them to action and had maintained their solidarity throughout such countless trials. Besides, the entry of America had set the seal on the continuance of the Allies' effort and renewed their faith. If the Allies were trebly armed in knowing the moral justice of their cause, they were quadruply so in the expectation of America's material assistance.

The penultimate factor in deciding the issue of the War was the collapse of Russia, which enabled Germany to concentrate superior military force to attack the Allies in the West. The ultimate factor was the arrival of effective military aid from America—but would it arrive in time to save the Allies in the impending struggle?

22. *The Seeds of Revolution in Germany.* There were only two eventualities which could have prevented the German offensive of 1918: either a revolution in Germany or a defection of her allies. Both of these possibilities were to be reckoned with. As early as the 12th April 1917, Count Czernin, a close and reliable observer of conditions in Germany, had expressed himself as follows in a memorandum addressed to the Emperor Charles: 'I am firmly convinced that if Germany attempts to carry on another winter campaign, revolution will break out in that country.'

This prediction was practically, if not literally, fulfilled. The first Council of Workmen and Soldiers was formed at Reinickendorf before the close of 1917, and throughout January and February 1918 the industrial centres of Germany and Austria-

¹ *War Memories*, English edition, vol. ii, pp. 518-21. He demanded a protective belt round the iron-mines of Lorraine, economic union with Belgium, and, in effect, political control over her. The annexation of Luxemburg, an extension of the German frontier near the Upper Silesian coalfields and Danzig and Thorn, plus power to conscript the inhabitants of Courland and Lithuania, and economic control of the kingdom of Poland, were further demands.

Hungary were seething with half-suppressed revolt. The strikes which began on the 16th January at Vienna, and spread thence to Budapest and Berlin, were political in character, and were at least partly the outcome of the workers' protest against the sabre-rattling policy adopted during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations.

The crisis was tided over; the signing of peace with Russia relieved Germany of one great load of anxiety, and the promise of victory in the West was dangled—a tempting lure—before the war-weary German nation. The bait was swallowed, the murmurs of dissension were stifled, and the nation braced itself for a last effort. Germany's allies, although with little confidence in the issue, followed suit.

23. *Germany's Plan for the 1918 Campaign.* The circumstances which impelled Germany to undertake the great spring offensive are clearly defined. With Austria-Hungary and Turkey at the end of their military strength, and Bulgaria frankly disaffected, the Quadruple Alliance could only be held together by the definite promise of a German victory. The internal cohesion of Germany itself depended on the fulfilment of that long-deferred hope. During two years of almost continuous attacks by the French and British Armies, the German troops in the West had remained on the defensive; their casualties had been colossal and the moral strain enormous; they certainly could not be expected to await a repetition of these hammer-blows by the American Army with fresh troops and unlimited ammunition. Besides, every officer and man of the German Army knew the truth of the military axiom that 'decisive success in battle can be gained only by a vigorous offensive'. Ludendorff defines the position accurately in the following words: 'The situation of our allies and of ourselves, as well as the condition of the army, demanded an offensive which would produce a quick decision. That could only be brought about on the Western Front.'

Time pressed. The blow would have to be delivered at the earliest possible moment if the arrival of the Americans was to be forestalled. Ludendorff's masterly training manual, entitled *The Offensive Battle in Position Warfare*, was issued on the 1st January 1918. The training of the troops could be completed by the middle of March. But a premature start might prejudice success. Offensive operations are largely dependent

on communications, which in turn depend on the state of the ground and weather. Forage is bulky and is difficult to transport in the battle zone; horses may have to depend on grazing as an emergency measure, and this is not to be found before the spring. All these factors had militated against the success of the German offensive at Verdun, which had commenced on the 21st February 1916. The opening of the 1918 offensive was fixed for a month later in the season.

24. *Choice of the Sector of Attack.* The German General Staff considered four alternative sectors of the Western Front for the delivery of the great blow; these were: FLANDERS, YPRES-LENS, ARRAS-LA FÈRE, and VERDUN. The two northern, which would have had the capture of the Channel Ports as their strategic objective, were ruled out owing to the mud of Flanders and of the Lys Valley, which would not be dry enough for operations until the middle of April. The VERDUN sector was also rejected, as its strategic importance was secondary and, from a tactical point of view, the ground was too hilly and broken to be suitable. The remaining sector, which coincided with the famous 'Siegfried Line', did not suffer from the above drawbacks, while it offered the distinct tactical advantage that the Entente troops were known to be holding the line thinly on this front. At the beginning of February the British Army had taken over from the French an additional 28 miles of line, from north of ST. QUENTIN to south of LA FÈRE. This extension of line was not justified by any corresponding increase in the forces available to hold it. On the 1st January 1918, the British Army in France, with a rifle strength of 659,000, had been holding a line 95 miles in length, *i. e.* with rather less than 4 rifles to every yard of front. By the 21st March 1918, it held a line 123 miles long, but its rifle strength had fallen to 616,000, giving less than 3 men per yard of front. The new sector, south of ST. QUENTIN, comprised the broad and marshy OISE Valley and the Forest of ST. GOBAIN; it was held, therefore, less strongly than the more active sectors farther north.

The greater part of the ground south of ST. QUENTIN was entirely new to the British troops; they were unfamiliar with the local topography and defensive organization. Besides, the strength of a modern defensive system depends so vitally on the intimate co-ordination and mutual support of adjoining sectors that any break in its continuity or cohesion, such as

tends to arise at the point of junction between two armies of different nationalities, is a source of both strategical and tactical weakness.

Another tactical disadvantage which the ARRAS-LA FÈRE sector imposed on the British Army was the existence in front of the 'Siegfried Line' of a zone, some 20 miles wide, which had been systematically devastated by the First and Second German Armies before their retirement in March 1917. Communications were therefore difficult and shelter practically non-existent, so that the area was an extremely unfavourable one for the concentration of troops.


From the strategic point of view the choice of the ARRAS-LA FÈRE sector would afford the assailant a chance of definitely separating the French from the British and Belgian Armies by driving them back on their divergent lines of communication; in this eventuality the British and Belgian Armies would be penned into a narrow strip of coast north of the SOMME, where they could hardly hope to maintain themselves.

The choice of this sector for the offensive was therefore amply justified both strategically and tactically, though we have Ludendorff's word for it that the tactical advantages alone were held to be paramount.

25. *Relative Strengths on 21st March 1918.* Ultimate success in war demands the concentration of superior force—moral and physical—at the decisive point and at the most advantageous moment. Granting that the German Higher Command had correctly chosen the time and place for their final offensive blow, the factor of material and moral superiority, upon which the result depended, remains to be considered.

During the greater part of the War the German forces on the Western Front had been slightly inferior numerically to the combined strength of the Allies. Owing partly to the advantages possessed by Germany in her unity of command and her strategical position on interior lines, the Allies had never been able to turn this margin of superiority to account. At the beginning of January 1918 the balance was still in favour of the Allies, who had some 168 divisions with which to oppose some 157 German ones. The rifle strength of the Allies was roughly 1,600,000 to the German 1,230,000. The collapse of Russia, however, enabled the tables to be turned. Between the 1st December 1917 and the end of March 1918, no fewer than

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE AT OPENING OF OFFENSIVE, MARCH 1918.



Grouping & strength of Armies is shown as immediately before the Offensive
 Strength of Armies on 23rd March is shown by supplementary figs (20) by this date Armies had been regrouped as follows:-
 C.P. Rupprecht IVth Army (right) to IInd Army (left)
 German Cr. Prince XVIIIth " " IIIrd " "
 von Gallwitz Vth " & Cth Det. "
 Duke Albrecht from W. Detachment (right)

36 German divisions were transferred from the Eastern to the Western Front, while during the same period all the German divisions in Italy, eight in number, were moved to France.

Thus, on the fateful day of the 21st March the Germans had concentrated 192 divisions (approximately 1,514,000 rifles) against 169 Allied divisions (1,398,000 rifles). The margin of numerical superiority was not very considerable; still, as Ludendorff says in his *Memories*, it was such as the Germans had never yet possessed on the Western Front, and 'afforded prospects of success'.

The Western Front was at that time held by some 112 German divisions in the line, the remaining 80 being in reserve. This formidable mass of manœuvre was too large to be employed in one single operation. Of the 80 divisions available, 55 were destined to deliver the initial assault, while 25 others remained to replace those which might suffer the most severely, or alternatively to meet possible counter-strokes on other sectors of the front. The blow itself was to be delivered along the 50-mile front between CROISILLES (south-east of ARRAS) and LA FÈRE with a force of 5 rifles per yard. We have Ludendorff's statement that the assault was prepared and supported by a concentration of 100 guns to every kilometre of front attacked, *i. e.* one gun to every 11 yards. Owing to the extension of front already referred to, the number of guns available to defend the whole British line only amounted to one gun to every 38 yards, the allotment to the Fifth Army sector being rather less.

26. *The Element of Surprise.* Thus, so far as the initial shock was concerned, the German General Staff might well consider that the concentration of superior force at the decisive point was assured. Moreover, they had not neglected the element of surprise—that factor essential to military success. The effect of any offensive blow is enormously enhanced when it is delivered without warning, and this factor is all the more vital when the numerical superiority possessed by the assailant is not in itself such as to render success a foregone conclusion. The assemblage in secret of the attacking divisions and of the artillery and trench mortars supporting them, together with the concentration of the enormous quantities of ammunition and engineer stores required, was carried out with exemplary skill, and must ever be regarded as a masterpiece of staff work. It involved the massing in a comparatively confined zone of some

800,000 men and 7,000 guns. In spite, however, of the skill with which the concentration was conceived and executed, it did not come as a surprise. The probable designs of the enemy were too obviously indicated, and his preparations were on too vast a scale for a complete surprise to be effected. Thanks to the vigilance of the British General Staff, ample warning was given, both as to the time and place of the offensive. But for this forewarning, the effect of the German blow might well have been annihilating. It must be stated, however, that the French General Staff were as equally convinced that the main German attack would be against the front held by the French Army.

It seems that the German Higher Command was counting very largely on the assistance which their attack would derive from the element of surprise. The British tactics at CAMBRAI in November 1917 had illustrated the possibility of launching an effective surprise attack on a highly organized trench system without the lengthy artillery prelude which in previous battles had invariably disclosed the attacker's intentions. The Germans had not been able to emulate the British achievements in tank construction, partly through having come into the field too late, partly through lack of sufficient labour and raw material. The German gunners had, however, perfected themselves in the calibration of their batteries, and were thus able to open accurate destructive and barrage fire at the last moment before the assault, without having disclosed their presence by previous registration.

27. *Germany's Man-power.* As the German Higher Command depended so largely on obtaining the effect of surprise—a factor which can seldom be reckoned on with certainty—their March offensive must to some extent be regarded as a gigantic gamble. The available reserve of German man-power was insufficient in itself to guarantee victory in a succession of pitched battles. The experiences of 1916 and 1917 must have taught them that they could not expect to suffer less than 200,000 casualties per month during periods of heavy fighting on the Western Front. To meet these casualties Ludendorff had, as he admits, only 'several hundred thousand men' in reserve. Without counting the 1920 class of recruits, not as yet called to the colours, this reserve in the dépôts may possibly have amounted to 500,000, but more probably did not exceed 300,000 men. The Russian Front had been milked dry, not a man under 35 years of age

having been left in the 40 odd skeleton divisions which were holding over 1,000 miles of front between the Baltic and the Black Sea. There remained only a monthly income of recuperated wounded from hospital, returned prisoners from Russia, and a small number of men still being combed from civil occupations. We know that the total from all these sources did not exceed 130,000 per month throughout the summer of 1918. The German Army was thus faced with a probable monthly deficit of 70,000 men, which could only be made good from the capital reserve. This reserve would be exhausted if heavy fighting were to continue for a period of four to seven months, and Germany would then be bankrupt as regards man-power. The decision would have to be reached quickly or the game would be lost, for the American divisions were beginning to arrive in France.

28. *The 'Moral' of the German Army.* Ludendorff admits in his Memories that the German man-power situation prior to the great offensive was 'very serious', and blames the War Ministry for not having done all that was possible in the way of combing out the home defence troops and reserved occupations. At the same time he complains of the deteriorating moral spirit of the army, and ascribes it to the influence of those same dregs of the nation's manhood which he was so imperiously demanding. The infantry battalions at the front could not be kept up to their establishment owing to the absence of 'many thousands of deserters and shirkers', while 'tens of thousands' had avoided conscription by deserting to Holland and other neutral countries. The recruits of the 1919 class, now averaging $18\frac{3}{4}$ years of age, were being drafted in large numbers from the home dépôts to the reception camps, and the influence of these youths, ill-disciplined, under-nourished, and steeped in an atmosphere of war-weariness, was demoralizing the older men. The Higher Command did not realize that it had pumped the German nation dry of its manhood, and that the dregs which it was now trying to utilize would only foul the working of the machine. Germany's manhood had been exploited as only the manhood of France had been exploited in the previous century by the insatiable ambition of Napoleon. That great commander had known how to utilize every available unit of man-power, but he had at the same time recognized that, in war as in every other phase of human activity, 'the moral is to the physical as three to one'. War, as Ludendorff himself once said, is not a

question of mathematics ; but neither the Kaiser, nor Hindenburg, nor Ludendorff was a Napoleon ; all of them lacked the galvanic power to stimulate the spirit of their armies to sacrifice. Napoleon's cause in 1815 was neither nobler nor more inspiring than that of the German nation at bay, but the echo aroused in the breast of almost every Frenchman by the appeal of the Hundred Days found no counterpart in the Germany of 1918.

The German leaders not only failed to perceive the change in the spirit and sentiment of their own armies, they also underestimated the *moral* of their opponents. Through over-confidence in their own qualities and resources the German leaders again committed the error of under-rating the powers of the British Army. The same spirit of tenacity and dogged resistance, which had thwarted the great enveloping sweep of August 1914, was now to meet the full weight of the final blow in March 1918.

29. *The German March Offensive.* The 21st March came and the offensive opened. The early morning mist favoured the rapid advance of the Eighteenth German Army and vitiated the execution of the pre-arranged defence scheme. Farther north, the assault columns of the Seventeenth and Second German Armies were checked by the resolute musketry and machine-gun fire of General Byng's troops. The German infantry lost their covering artillery barrage and were held up in the British battle zone, where they suffered heavy losses. The enveloping attack of General Otto von Below's Army from the ARRAS-CAMBRAI highroad, which had been intended to reach BAPAUME and thus roll up the Third and Fifth British Armies, had failed in its main purpose.

The offensive was pressed on with relentless vigour, and the second line divisions were sent forward to exploit the initial success. Although the Seventeenth Army had failed with heavy losses, the Second and Eighteenth Armies, between CAMBRAI and LA FÈRE, continued the advance westwards and had captured BAPAUME, PÉRONNE, and NESLE by the 25th March, having made good the line of the Upper SOMME. Much had already been achieved : 90,000 British prisoners and 900 guns had been captured, in addition to vast dépôts of supplies and material of every kind. The British line was badly bent, but it was not broken, and French reserves were now coming to its aid. On the 28th March five fresh divisions of the Seventeenth

German Army made a violent assault astride the SCARPE in an attempt to capture ARRAS and the VIMY Ridge, but von Below again failed with heavy loss. The Second and Eighteenth Armies had on the 30th March been definitely brought to a standstill on the general line ALBERT-MONTDIDIÈRE-NOYON, and their offensive powers were exhausted. A final effort on the 4th and 5th April gained HAMEL (12 miles east of AMIENS) and the western bank of the AVRE at MOREUIL, but more could not be done. The great SOMME offensive was at an end.

30. *Continuation of the German Offensive in April, May, and June.* The losses of the Seventeenth, Second, and Eighteenth German Armies had been so heavy, and their difficulties so great as regards communications and supply, that it was out of the question to renew the attack between ARRAS and the OISE. The thinly held sector of the Lys Valley, largely manned by Portuguese troops, offered a tempting bait, and a new offensive was quickly mounted. On the 9th April 14 divisions of the Sixth German Army overran the Portuguese front and gained the line of the Lys. A continuation of the operation on the succeeding days reached the line MERVILLE-MESSINES, but the gallant resistance at FESTUBERT and GIVENCHY prevented the extension of the break farther southwards, thus saving the remaining coal-mines of Northern France. The Fourth and Sixth German Armies continued until the 25th April their efforts to reach the chain of heights north of BAILLEUL, which dominate the Flanders Plain, but, beyond gaining a footing on KEMMEL HILL, nothing substantial was achieved while heavy casualties were incurred.

Ludendorff considered that the continuation of the offensive against the British Army between YPRES and BAILLEUL still gave the best promise of success. The British Army had suffered such losses that its recovery might well seem impossible. The number of effective British divisions had been reduced from 58 to 45, and most of these were below establishment. An advance of a few miles towards HAZEBROUCK and CASSEL would have forced the Allies to evacuate all Flanders as far west as DUNKIRK, and would have brought the German armies within measurable reach of the other Channel Ports. But the four armies of Crown Prince Rupprecht's Group had been heavily engaged, and the losses already incurred had exceeded the estimates of the Higher Command. All the divisions

required at least a month's rest and training out of the line before a further operation could be contemplated.

Although the offensive in Flanders against the British Army still remained Ludendorff's plan for the final and decisive blow, he decided that preliminary operations would have to be undertaken elsewhere in order to disperse the Allies' strategic reserve. Various attacks of limited scope were therefore prepared on the front of the German Crown Prince's Group between MONTDIDIER and the ARGONNE.

The first of these blows was delivered on the 27th May by the Seventh and First German Armies on the CHEMIN DES DAMES between SOISSONS and REIMS. The attack had been prepared with great skill and secrecy; although only intended to reach SOISSONS and the line of the VESLE, it actually penetrated to a depth of 30 miles and reached the line of the MARNE between DORMANS and CHÂTEAU THIERRY by the 31st May. The attack was held up on the west, however, between SOISSONS and VILLERS COTTERETS, and, as in the Lys Valley, the Germans were brought to a halt in an uncomfortable salient, where their communications were extremely precarious.

A fresh attempt was again made on the 9th June when the Eighteenth German Army attacked between MONTDIDIER and NOYON. The operation had been clumsily organized and was an expensive failure.

Meanwhile, on the Italian Front, an offensive was also being prepared. The resources of Austria-Hungary were now at an extremely low ebb, and the Austrian Higher Command, inspired by the German successes in France, as well as by the memory of CAPORETTO, hoped to replenish these resources from the rich plains of Lombardy and Venetia. Although no German troops were available on this occasion to assist them, the Austrians planned an ambitious offensive which was launched on the 15th June at various points between the ASIAGO Plateau and the mouth of the PIAVE. The attacks in the mountain sector against the British and French Corps were checked with heavy losses; the attack on the PIAVE met with more success, but was eventually frustrated by the sudden rising of the river, which swept away the Austrian bridges. The Austrians were forced to return to their original positions, having lost some 24,000 prisoners and 65 guns.

31. *Foch as Generalissimo.* The shock of the German March

offensive and the grave peril, which menaced the cohesion of the Allied Armies, had the effect of bringing home to the Allies the urgent necessity for unity of command. The Franco-British Armies were within measurable distance of destruction when it was realized that all petty rivalries must be jettisoned and that the united military resources of the Allies must be 'pooled' under the direction of a single mind. Fortunately the right man was at hand. General Foch was a soldier with a European reputation, although the real brilliance of his military genius had not then been universally appreciated. It was fitting, too, that the supreme command of the Allies, who were fighting on French soil to protect the liberty of France, should be vested in a Frenchman.

Although the advantages possessed by the Central Powers in their centralized leadership had been fully realized, it is open to question whether the single command could have been adopted earlier by the Allies in view of the diversity of their organization, characteristics, and geographical situation. However that may be, its adoption on the 26th March 1918, under the stress of imminent peril, produced instantaneous results. A strategic reserve of French, British, and American divisions was at once formed, and concentrated in the most vital areas where danger threatened. The relative merits and requirements of all sectors of the battle line were equally considered, so that offensive and defensive dispositions could be co-ordinated along the whole length of the common front. To the institution of the single command, still more to the brilliant soldier who wielded it, is due a large measure of the credit for having brought the German offensive to a standstill.

32. *The Coming of the Americans.* Besides the institution of the single command, the Allies bent all their energies to repairing the gaps made in their resources. By the end of March reinforcements to the extent of some 300,000 were sent across the Channel from England, and every gun lost had been replaced. America was not slow in responding to the appeal which the British Prime Minister addressed to her in the early days of the offensive. During the month of April 118,000 American troops were transported to Europe from America, and in the following month this number was more than doubled. Prior to the launching of the German offensive there were five American divisions in France, of which three only were trained; by the

beginning of July these numbers had risen to 24 and 12 respectively. American troops had counter-attacked vigorously at CHÂTEAU THIERRY at the beginning of June, and were already giving a good account of themselves in the firing line. Ludendorff admits in his Memories that the American troops were arriving more quickly than he had considered possible. He sums up the effect at this stage of American assistance in the following words: 'The American reinforcements as they arrived could relieve French or British divisions in quiet sectors. This constituted a fact of enormous significance and illustrates the influence which the dispatch of troops from the United States exercised upon the issue of the struggle. America in this way became the decisive power of the War.'

33. *The Turn of the Tide.* At the beginning of July the star of the Allies was at last in the ascendant. The situation of the German armies, on the other hand, was rapidly deteriorating. Not only had their battle casualties exceeded all expectations, but a new factor—the influenza epidemic—began to make itself felt. This scourge, passing eastwards across Europe, had already taken its toll of the Allied forces; its effect on the German troops, weakened by indifferent nourishment and forced to fight, rest, and train in the devastated battle zone, was far more serious. The epidemic was particularly prevalent among the units of Crown Prince Rupprecht's Group of Armies, a fact which boded ill for the intended Flanders offensive. This operation was therefore postponed by the German Higher Command until the beginning of August. The average strength of a German battalion on the Western Front, which had been 850 on the 21st March, had fallen to a bare 700 at the beginning of July. Thus, although the German Higher Command had succeeded in concentrating 203 divisions (1,890 battalions) on the Western Front, against only 174 Allied divisions (1,790 battalions), the Allies actually possessed a superiority of some 60,000 rifles.

Even more serious than the consumption of Germany's manpower was the deterioration in the spirit and discipline of the German armies. The low *moral* of the recruits of the 1919 class has already been referred to, and, during the period between April and July, these recruits provided from one-third to one-half of the drafts received by the fighting troops to make good their

battle casualties. The spirit of insubordination grew apace, and was fostered by the simultaneous decline in the quality of the regimental officers due to the high wastage. During the first fortnight of May a serious mutiny occurred in the reinforcement camp at Beverloo in Belgium, among the Alsatians and Poles who had been brought over as drafts from the Russian Front. About the same period, supply trains were being held up and pillaged by armed parties of soldiers in the area of the Eighteenth German Army. An order published on the 8th May by General von Quast, commanding the Sixth Army, mentions 'the slow but steady deterioration of discipline'. On the 7th June General von der Marwitz, commanding the Second Army, published an order in which he said: 'Discipline, which is the keystone of our army, is seriously shaken'; another order, published five days later by the same Army Commander, admitted that 'cases of soldiers openly refusing to obey orders are increasing to an alarming extent'. These occurrences were ominous for the future, for discipline is an essential factor in the cohesion of an army, even when that army is numerically superior and victorious; but when an army suffers reverses or is compelled to give ground, only good discipline can save it from destruction.

34. *The Battles of July.* The first fortnight of July opens the period when the initiative was definitely wrested from the grasp of the German Higher Command. From the 28th June onwards the French and British had begun to improve their position in various sectors by small local operations. The most ambitious of these was the re-capture of HAMEL (12 miles east of AMIENS) by the Australian Corps on the 4th July. Sixty of the 'Mark V' tanks were employed for the first time; the attack was a complete surprise and produced encouraging results.

The German Higher Command was, however, still confident of success, and intended to strike a decisive blow in Flanders at the beginning of August. As Foch's reserves in that area were still too strong, a preliminary operation farther south was necessary to divert them. With this object the German Crown Prince was to carry out a great converging offensive on a 50-mile front east and west of REIMS, directed on EPERNAY and CHÂLONS-SUR-MARNE. The French General Staff obtained ample warning of the attack and took measures accordingly; the Champagne blow spent itself in the air and broke down

completely, again with heavy losses. Ludendorff still failed to realize that he had definitely lost the initiative and must draw in his horns. He began in haste to transfer his reserve divisions, artillery, and aeroplanes to Flanders for the consummation of his long-cherished plan, when suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, Foch's counter-stroke developed.

At dawn on the 18th July, the Tenth and Sixth French Armies, under the command of Generals Mangin and Degoutte, attacked on a 35-mile front between SOISSONS and CHÂTEAU THIERRY. Over 450 tanks, which had been assembled unperceived in the Forest of VILLERS COTTERETS, prepared and assisted the assault. The German Ninth and Seventh Armies were completely surprised, and reserve divisions destined for the north had to be counter-ordered and sent hurriedly to fill the gap. The Germans lost 12,000 prisoners and 800 guns at one blow.


Foch's counter-stroke had completely upset the plans of the German Higher Command, besides inflicting very heavy casualties. It was not, however, until several days later that Ludendorff realized its full significance. The Flanders offensive was then definitely abandoned, and by the end of the month the Seventh Army had been withdrawn behind the line of the VESLE from the precarious CHÂTEAU THIERRY salient. Further, the losses sustained in the July battles had been so great that the German Higher Command was forced to disband ten infantry divisions in order to provide reinforcements for other units. The capital reserve of man-power was exhausted and the German armies were definitely forced to revert to a defensive rôle.

The military situation thus took an entirely new turn. In the words of Field-Marshal Lord Haig's Dispatch: 'The complete success of the Allied counter-attack on the 18th July near SOISSONS marked the turning-point in the year's campaign, and commenced the second phase of the Allied operations. Thereafter the initiative lay with the Allies, and the growing superiority of their forces enabled them to roll back the tide of invasion with ever-increasing swiftness.'

35. *The Allied Counter-offensive in August and September.* If the 18th July was a heavy blow for the German Higher Command, still worse was to follow. On the 8th August the Fourth British Army, under General Lord Rawlinson, with the First French Army under General Debeney on its right, attacked the

RETREAT OF THE GERMAN ARMY 1918.

Scale 1:1,500,000



REFERENCE

- German line at beginning of enemy offensive on 18-7-18. ————
- German line on 2-8-18. - - - - -
- German line in Flanders 11-10-18. ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
- German rear positions. ————

Second German Army on a front of 15 miles between MORLANCOURT (north of the SOMME) and MOREUIL on the River AVRE. The attack, which was planned and executed under the orders of Lord Haig, was carried out by some 17 divisions, and was supported by more than 400 tanks; it came as a complete surprise to the enemy and was entirely successful. The advance was continued until the 12th August, by which time over 30,000 prisoners and 700 guns had been captured. The attack of the 8th August set the seal on the Allied victory of the 18th July, and made the German Armies, both troops and leaders, realize their inferiority on the field of battle. As Ludendorff says, 'The 8th August is the German Army's black day in the history of this war'; and again, 'The 8th August determined the collapse of our fighting powers'.

Marshal Foch's strategic effort was not confined to the victories already won by the French and British Armies between the MARNE and the SOMME. He had taken the measure of the situation and gauged exactly the relative values, moral and material, of the forces now set in motion. His strategic conception involved the crushing of the great German salient which was still thrust deep into the heart of France between ARTOIS and the ARGONNE. This salient was buttressed on the flanks by the great fortified pivots of LILLE and METZ. Between these pivots stretched the strongly entrenched 'Siegfried' Line,¹ with its northern extension, the 'Wotan' Line,² from the SCARPE to the LYS. Behind this barrier a second and shorter retrenchment was being hastily prepared between the SCHELDT and the Upper MEUSE, comprising the 'Hermann', 'Hunding', and 'Brunhild' Lines. The two main faces of this great salient depended on the axes of the SAMBRE and MEUSE Valleys, radiating from NAMUR, which was thus the strategic focus of the whole front. Towards this focus the drives of the Allied Armies were directed, the British and Belgians on the western, the French and Americans on the southern face of the salient.

Foch's blows fell in relentless succession. On the 21st August the offensive was resumed by the Third and Fourth British Armies and continued incessantly for ten days. BAPAUME and PÉRONNE fell, while the extension of the battle northwards by the First British Army resulted in the storming of the 'Wotan

¹ Known by the British as the 'HINDENBURG LINE'.

² Known by the British as the 'DROCOURT-QUÉANT LINE'.

Line' at its pivotal point on the 2nd September. The Germans were thus forced to retire forthwith to their main defensive position, the 'Siegfried Line'.

On the 12th September the First American Army drove in the St. MIHIEL salient east of the Meuse and compelled the Germans to retire to the 'Michel' retrenchment in the WOËVRE Plain. The effect of this operation was considerable, as the threat of further attacks on the southern pivot of their defensive system caused the Germans to withdraw a number of divisions from their northern army groups in order to reinforce the LORRAINE sector.

Throughout September the Allies continued and intensified their offensive blows on the now wavering German armies. On the 26th the French and the Americans attacked on a front of over 40 miles on both sides of the ARGONNE Forest, between the MEUSE and the SUIPPE. On the 27th the Third and First British Armies attacked on a front of 11 miles in the direction of CAMBRAI. On the 28th the Second British Army and the Belgian Army, under the command of King Albert, attacked between YPRES and DIXMUDE. On the 29th the British attack on the 'Siegfried Line' was extended southwards to St. QUENTIN and renewed on a 30-mile front, with the result that the main defences of the 'Siegfried Line' were stormed at one of its strongest points. In three days of heavy fighting the British armies had captured 27,000 prisoners and 400 guns.

During the eleven weeks between the 15th July and the 30th September, the German armies on the Western Front had suffered a succession of defeats which had reduced their spirits and resources to breaking-point. The Allies had captured 254,000 prisoners, 3,670 guns, and 23,000 machine guns. Since the opening of their offensive the German armies had suffered two million casualties in battle. They had been forced to reduce the strength of their battalions from four companies to three, so that, although on paper the 194 German divisions on the Western Front were equivalent in number to the Allied divisions, the latter now mustered some one and a half million rifles as against a bare million on the German side. The *moral* of the German troops was shattered, and their last entrenched line of defence had been pierced in the centre.

36. *Macedonia and Palestine.* While the situation in the West was thus rapidly approaching a decision, events in the

East were developing as unfavourably for the Central Powers. Under the stress of the Allied attacks in France and Flanders, only a few German battalions could be spared to strengthen the disheartened armies of Bulgaria and Turkey. These allies, whose adherence could only be retained by the success of German arms, were now wavering, although the German Higher Command seems to have been singularly blind to their actual state of inefficiency and lack of zeal.

On the 15th September the Allied offensive began in MACEDONIA. Thanks to the magnificent fighting qualities of the Serbian Army, the Bulgarian centre in the mountain sector between the VARDAR and the CERNA was completely broken, and the Allies advanced on NISH and SOFIA. Bulgaria signed an armistice with the Allied Commander-in-Chief on the 29th September.

On the 18th September Lord Allenby opened his PALESTINE offensive, and on the following day three cavalry divisions pushed through the gap made by the infantry and rolled up the whole Turkish Front. The British cavalry reached DAMASCUS on the 30th, by which date 60,000 prisoners and 325 guns had been captured.

The collapse of the Bulgarian and Turkish Armies was the death-blow to Germany's chances of evading defeat. Apart from the political effect of these disasters on the war-weary German and Austrian peoples, the whole of the southern frontiers of Austria-Hungary and Rumania were exposed to the advance of the Allies. This advance now threatened Germany's line of communication with the Ukraine by the Danube. Germany's subsistence during the summer of 1918 had been dependent on the horses, cattle, grain, and oil which she had received from Rumania and the Ukraine. The interruption of the Danube line would be a vital blow.

The German Higher Command realized that, although it was hopeless to try to restore the situation in MACEDONIA, a Danube Front would have to be constituted at all costs. To form a defensive cordon from the Adriatic to the Black Sea involved holding a line 650 miles in length. The available forces in the Eastern and Southern theatres were miserably inadequate for this purpose. One German and one Austro-Hungarian division were hurriedly dispatched towards SOFIA from the Ukraine, while three German divisions in Russia and two

Austro-Hungarian divisions in Italy, all under orders for the Western Front, were diverted in the hope of saving NISH. The German Alpine Corps was also sent to the MORAVA Valley from the Western Front. Thus the Allied victory in the BALKANS deprived the German Western Front of four German and two Austro-Hungarian divisions at the critical period of the War.

37. *Decision in Sight.* About the middle of July 1918, Germany's statesmen began to suspect that the great offensive had definitely failed and that the pendulum of military success was about to swing back. At this time von Hintze, who was replacing von Kühlmann as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, formally asked Ludendorff whether he was still certain of bringing the offensive to a victorious decision. The First Quartermaster-General replied in the affirmative.¹

The defeat of the Second German Army on the 8th August altered Ludendorff's opinion on this point. Count von Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor, and von Hintze, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, went to General Headquarters at SPA on the 13th August to confer with the Higher Command. When Ludendorff had described the military situation and pointed out that a retirement on the West Front would probably be necessary, the Foreign Secretary realized that Germany would have to resort to peace negotiations ere matters grew worse. On the following day a Crown Council was held at SPA, at which the Kaiser and Crown Prince were present. After hearing the statements of his advisers, the Emperor decided that peace negotiations must be initiated as soon as a suitable occasion offered, preferably after a German success, and charged the Foreign Secretary with the duty of approaching the Queen of the Netherlands as an intermediary.

On the 14th and 15th August the discussion was continued with the Austrian Emperor and Count Burian, who had replaced Count Czernin in the spring as Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. The Austrians were anxious to commence peace negotiations at once, but preferred to initiate them by a direct appeal to all the belligerents. For the next fortnight an acrimonious exchange of views was carried on between the German and Austrian Governments, each insisting on the merits of their own proposals. On the 30th August the Austrians threatened

¹ 'I discussed with him my hope of even yet making the Entente ready for peace,' vol. ii, 654.

to act independently, and von Hintze hastened to VIENNA. On the 7th September the Austrian Emperor asked Hindenburg to state his definite plans for the future, and his opinion as to when a suitable moment would occur for opening peace negotiations. After a conference with von Hintze at General Headquarters on the 9th, Hindenburg on the 10th replied that the Higher Command intended to hold the 'Siegfried Line', but that he approved of immediate peace negotiations being opened so long as these were initiated through neutral mediation and not on the lines of the Austrian proposal. The discussions were continued, but finally on the 15th September the Austro-Hungarian Note was issued to the world.

Between the 14th August and the 14th September the conviction began to dawn on the German Higher Command that the military position could only change for the worse, and that no German success, even temporary, was possible. The Allied victories in the Balkans and Palestine, with the consequent menace to Austria's Danube flank, at last succeeded in shaking the Olympic self-confidence of German General Headquarters. On the 21st September Ludendorff suggested to the German Foreign Office that America might be approached through Berne with a view to opening peace negotiations on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. No definite step was taken, however, until the combined Allied offensives in the West on the 26th, 27th, and 28th September called imperatively for a decision. On the evening of the 28th, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were forced to the conclusion that only one chance remained of protracting the struggle, namely to sue for an armistice, to evacuate the occupied territory, and to renew the contest on the frontiers of Germany with a view to rousing the flagging patriotism of their countrymen.

While the statesmen and soldiers of Germany and Austria were hesitating and wrangling, events were developing rapidly on both the Eastern and Western battle-fields. By the 30th September the Belgians had occupied ROULERS, the British had gained the line of the River LYS as far as COMINES and were in the outskirts of CAMBRAI, while the First French Army had entered ST. QUENTIN. On the 29th the Bulgarian Armistice was signed, and on the day after DAMASCUS fell.

This succession of disasters proved too much for the overstrained nerves of the German Higher Command. On the

1st October Ludendorff urged the Government to transmit the peace offer without further delay, as a break-through might occur at any moment; he even went so far as to say: 'The troops are standing firm to-day; what may happen to-morrow cannot be foreseen.'

On the 2nd October Prince Max of Baden replaced Count Hertling as Imperial Chancellor, and on the following day he specifically asked the Chief of the General Staff whether a military collapse was inevitable, and, if so, whether the Higher Command was prepared to accept unfavourable peace terms. On the following day Hindenburg replied that in view of the military situation it was necessary to put an end to the struggle forthwith in order to avoid further sacrifices. As a result of this communication Prince Max issued his First Note to President Wilson on the 4th, requesting an immediate armistice.

38. *The last Phase.* At the beginning of October 1918 defeat stared the German Army in the face. That the German Higher Command was not blind to the situation is proved by the candid exposition made by its representative, Major von dem Busche, to the party leaders of the Reichstag on the morning of the 2nd October. Never before had the Higher Command taken the Civil Government into its full confidence; the result was curious. The Civil Government at once assumed that the military chiefs had lost their nerve; doubts were cast on their ability to appreciate the situation soberly, and it was suggested that other military commanders should be consulted.

President Wilson's reply to the First German Note was dispatched on the 8th October. After further futile discussions and recriminations between the Higher Command and the Civil Government, a non-committal Second Note was issued on the 12th, but the President's prompt and stern rejoinder of the 14th afforded little hope of evasion.

The Allied offensive was continued during October with great determination, although the exertions which the combatants had made during the spring and summer were taxing their strength severely. On the 4th October the Americans resumed their operations between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE, and on the 5th the First and Third German Armies fell back on the whole CHAMPAGNE Front. On the 8th the Third and Fourth British Armies attacked on a front of 20 miles between St. QUENTIN and CAMBRAI. On the 9th the Canadians entered

CAMBRAI, and the 'Siegfried' defensive system had been stormed on a wide front. On the following day the advance was continued to the enemy's last line of defence, the 'Hermann' position, along the River SELLE. On the 11th October the enemy was forced by the pressure on his flanks to commence a general withdrawal between the OISE and the MEUSE to the 'Hunding-Brunhild' line, while in the north he hastened his preparations for evacuating the coast of Flanders.

On the 14th, 15th, and 16th October the Belgian, French, and British forces in Flanders renewed the offensive on the front of the Fourth German Army between DIXMUDE and the River LYS, capturing over 12,000 prisoners and several hundred guns, and advancing to a depth of 18 miles. This advance turned the LILLE defences from the north, and on the 17th October British troops entered LILLE and DOUAI. By the 19th the Allies had occupied OSTEND, BRUGES, and ZEEBRUGGE, thus gaining the whole Flemish coast.

On the 17th October a full session of the German Cabinet was held in Berlin; every aspect of the situation was examined, and President Wilson's reply to the Second German Note was considered. Under interrogation by the Imperial Chancellor, Ludendorff gave equivocal replies and refused to admit the imminence of defeat, although he confessed to the deterioration of the *moral* of the German troops and to their dread of the tank attacks. He characterized the situation as grave but not hopeless. 'War', he said, 'is not like a sum in arithmetic. . . . There is an element of soldiers' luck in war. Perhaps Germany's luck may still turn.' He insisted that the army had a good chance of surviving the critical four weeks ahead; if Germany could only hold out until winter intervened, she might look forward to renewing the struggle in the spring under more favourable circumstances. The War Minister, General von Scheüch, rather detracted from the force of this assertion by stating that if the Rumanian oil supply were cut off the German Army could only carry on the war for another six weeks.

This was cold comfort for Germany's statesmen. Scheidemann, another Secretary of State, was still more depressing; he stated definitely that the length of the war, no less than the privations endured, had broken the spirit of the German people. 'The workers', he stated, 'are inclined more and more to say "Better a horrible end than a never-ending horror".' The

deficiency of meat, potatoes, oil, fat, and rolling-stock was also emphasized.

39. *The End of the Struggle.* On the 17th October the British Army, assisted by the Second American Corps, assaulted the 'Hermann' line on a 10-mile front from LE CATEAU southwards. On the 20th this line had been stormed; the battle extended northwards, and continued until the 25th October. In this battle of the SELLE the Germans lost 20,000 prisoners and 475 guns; their last line of defence on the Western Front had been broken.

On the 20th October the German Government learnt that Turkey had begun separate peace negotiations and that Austria-Hungary was likely to follow suit. On the same day the Third German Note was dispatched to President Wilson, and orders were issued to U-boat commanders to refrain from torpedoing merchant vessels. Nevertheless, on the 25th, the Higher Command, obsessed by a strange reluctance to face the facts, insisted that the crisis could still be surmounted; Ludendorff even tried to induce the Government to break off the peace negotiations. This extraordinary display of obstinacy was the last straw in breaking down the relations between the Higher Command and the Civil Government. On the following day the Emperor asked for Ludendorff's resignation.

Meanwhile the long-delayed Italian offensive had matured, and on the 27th Lord Cavan, at the head of the Tenth Italian Army, broke the Austrian line east of the PIAVE. On the same day Austria-Hungary sued for an armistice, and the German Government dispatched their Fourth Note to President Wilson.

On the 30th October Turkey signed an armistice with the Allied Powers at Mudros. All Germany's allies had now abandoned the struggle; it was impossible for her to hold out longer.

If the Germans were still inclined to postpone their acceptance of defeat, the Allies were in no way disposed to let victory elude their grasp. In spite of the strain which the continuous operations had imposed on the troops, the Allied Armies maintained their offensive pressure.

On the 4th November the British Army attacked on a 30-mile front between the SCHELDT and the SAMBRE, capturing 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns. At the same time the French and Americans pressed the enemy back between the SAMBRE

and the MEUSE, the latter reached SEDAN on the 11th, and the battle now extended from VALENCIENNES to VERDUN.

On the 5th November a Cabinet Meeting was held in Berlin. General Gröner, Ludendorff's successor, gave a candid review of the military situation and stated that the resistance of the German Army to the Allies' attacks could be of but short duration. At last on the 7th the German Armistice Commission left Spa for the Allied lines, and four days later hostilities ceased.

40. *The Factors of Defeat.* To analyse finally the causes which brought about the military defeat of Germany, to enumerate them fully and to appraise their relative importance, is a task which must be left to the historian of the future. It has been the aim of this outline of the later stages of the Great War to set forth in their due proportions, so far as is now possible, the principal factors which appear to have affected the situation.

These factors may be classed generally under the main headings of moral cohesion, man-power, and material resources.

As regards the moral influences involved, the outstanding feature of the War was the sincere and lofty idealism which inspired and maintained the Alliance against the Central Powers. That this spiritual buoyancy survived the reverses and disappointments of the earlier stages of the war differentiates it at once from the spurious *moral* of the German Army and nation, which was nourished by the taste or anticipation of success, and withered when cheated of victory.

The gradual decline in the discipline of the German Army may be attributed mainly to the fact that the rigid military system enforced by Germany's officer-caste constituted an anachronism quite incompatible with the development of a modern national army in a long war. The mutual relations of confidence and friendship between the officer and the private soldier, which were traditional in the Allied Armies, form the only conceivable basis of discipline among democratic troops, hastily recruited and trained, under the leadership of inexperienced officers. It is to this factor and not to the contagion of Russian Bolshevism that the break-down of German discipline must be chiefly attributed. It was largely the collapse of discipline which rendered the German soldier a prey to the 'tank-terror' which obsessed him during the final battles of the war.

Ludendorff and other German military chiefs ascribe the decline of discipline in their armies to the demoralizing influence

of public opinion in the interior of Germany, for which they lay all the blame on the Civil Government. This argument is of course fallacious, for in a national war the army and the nation are one. Ludendorff, however, was no psychologist. The seeds of the German Revolution were engendered by the unsympathetic and unrepresentative system of autocracy under which the country was governed; it was fostered by the pressure of the blockade and by the slow awakening of the national intelligence to reality.

The moral effect on Germany of American intervention in the War can hardly be over-estimated. To the average German and Austrian the United States of America stood as the champion of political liberty and enlightenment, unentangled by the network of European diplomatic intrigue. It was the entry of America into the War, and not the effect of the Allied propaganda, which really convinced the German people that their cause was a wrong one.

The advent of America did of course turn the tables as regards man-power, and reversed the adverse balance of April 1918. During the six months from April to September nearly one and a half million American troops were transported to Europe. It was the 'big battalions' that won, but big battalions alone cannot win against superior skill or determination, as the history of every war has proved; and the big battalions from America were practically untrained.

The considered opinion of the German Higher Command regarding the American troops was expressed as follows at a Cabinet Meeting on the 2nd October 1918: '... in cases where they (the American troops) were successful at first owing to the enormous number of men employed, they were nevertheless driven back in spite of their superior numbers. What is decisive, however, is the fact that they can take over wide stretches of quiet front and set free experienced French and British divisions, thus providing almost inexhaustible reserves.'

Not only had the German Higher Command blundered in its estimate of America's potential assistance, but it grievously miscalculated the cost of defeating the British and French Armies. The great March offensive was launched with a reserve of only 'a few hundred thousand' men in hand. The stoutness of the Allied resistance was not reckoned with by Germany's military chiefs in their characteristic over-confidence regarding

the armament, training, tactics, and leadership of their own troops. At the Cabinet Meetings held on the 9th, 17th, and 20th October 1918, the German leaders excused themselves by laying the blame on every conceivable factor: on the tanks, on bad discipline, on the influenza epidemic, on the potato shortage, on Austria, on Bulgaria, etc., but each time the same refrain recurs that the really decisive factor was the deficiency of man-power caused by the battle casualties. The gamble had failed; the Higher Command had set out to build a tower without counting the cost. By their blindness of perception regarding the moral and material issues at stake Germany's leaders failed to win the War, just as the genius of the Allied Generalissimo and the fighting qualities of the troops he commanded turned that failure into victory for the Allies.

No review of Germany's military defeat can be complete without reference to the decisive part played by the British Navy. Not only did the cumulative effect of the blockade wear down the physical and moral powers of resistance of the German nation and army, but it was the factor of British sea supremacy which enabled the Alliance to be maintained in the face of Germany's strategic position, and which transported across the seas the armed forces and material contributions of Great Britain, of her Dominions, and, finally, of America. Further, by defeating the submarine the British Navy thwarted the deadly and insidious design wherein lay for more than two years Germany's cherished hope of achieving victory.

Amid all the multiplex factors which combined to destroy the German military machine none, however, can claim priority over the joint achievements of the French and British Armies, which fought alongside each other through more than four years of bitter uphill struggle. No words can better express this claim than a passage in Lord Haig's final Dispatch, written on the first anniversary of the great German offensive: 'The rapid collapse of Germany's military powers in the latter half of 1918 was the logical outcome of the fighting of the previous two years. It would not have taken place but for that period of ceaseless attrition which used up the reserves of the German armies, while the constant and growing pressure of the blockade sapped with more deadly insistence from year to year at the strength and resolution of the German people. It is in the great battles of 1916 and 1917 that we have to seek for the secret of our victory in 1918.'

CHAPTER I: PART II

SOME INFLUENCES OF SEA-POWER IN THE WAR

1. *Historical Retrospect of Sea-Power.* In the struggle from 1914 to 1918, Sea-Power played the same part as in earlier wars. Changes of material affected the tactical methods of its employment, but the pressure which lay within its power directly to impose, and the capacity it conferred of transferring troops and maintaining the Allies, were different only in degree from what they were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Napoleon's advent caused war upon land to assume a more comprehensive character than it had borne in the eighteenth century. Naval warfare has indeed always been of an essentially national character, not confined merely to struggles between fleets, but aiming directly at the resources of the enemy nation; yet it has never been conducted with greater rigour than in the recent war. This result is due not to changes either in international law or in its application, but to the conditions of the struggle. France was never so completely surrounded by her enemies, either in the days of Louis XIV, Louis XV, or Napoleon, as Germany was by the end of 1915; nor, great as was the dependence of France in the eighteenth century upon her commerce for the maintenance of a healthy internal condition, was it so great as that of a modern State upon imports from abroad for the life of the individual citizen and the materials for the implements of war. More self-supporting both as to food and military requirements than the Central Powers of the twentieth century, she was at the same time less isolated; while her greater conquests placed her in possession of extensive territories from which she could draw supplies, and made her capable of maintaining a very long struggle. But even under those conditions she was distressed to the utmost by the action of Sea-Power. With such a precedent it was not unnatural that expectations should have been held that modern Germany would not be able to hold out long when invested on two land fronts and by the ocean.

2. *German views of the British 'blockade'.* The oceanic investment called 'the blockade' has formed the subject of

strong expressions of opinion by German writers, as a 'defiance of the laws of nations' and an act of inhumanity. Yet German philosophers, soldiers, and propagandists had long since established the doctrine that War—'the supreme act of the State'—was no longer an affair of armies but of nations. The army became the nation, the nation the army; and each individual had his part to play in the struggle. The applicability of the same doctrine to the sea was inconvenient to a military state which was ringed round by a maritime coalition. Yet earlier German military writers, such as von der Goltz, Bernhardt, and Maltzahn, had well understood that no Power possessing strength at sea would fail to use it as it was used by the Entente navies.

The use of the power to bring pressure upon a nation by cutting off its supplies from abroad has, indeed, never been neglected by any naval power. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, when Spain was our enemy, British strategy aimed throughout at preventing her from obtaining those supplies of bullion from her American Empire upon which depended not only her military effort, but also her national economic life. When Holland and England were at once commercial and military rivals, the national life of each was struck at through the oversea commerce which sustained it. Grass did not grow in the streets of Amsterdam without causing suffering to the inhabitants. The British struggles with France, in so far as they were conducted on the sea—always our principal theatre of war—were marked by the same characteristic. The drain upon the life of France under Louis XIV, brought about by attack on her commerce, is well known; under the Republic the battle of the First of June was fought to prevent a supply of food from reaching France, then suffering from scarcity as the result of a bad harvest. Yet until Germany found the scales weighted against her, neither her historians nor her strategists attempted to condemn measures of sea warfare on the grounds of the resulting distress to the civilian population.

Dependent upon the sea for its prosperity as every country was in the past, this dependence has increased with the changed conditions brought about by the developments of modern life. The war has brought this into striking prominence, though it seems doubtful if its significance had been fully appreciated before. No European country is wholly independent of oversea

supplies of raw materials, though some, as we have seen, are capable of existing for a prolonged time without them. War brings about an enhanced demand; the complex elements of motor transport, munitions, and machinery of all kinds employed by an army, call to their aid so vast and varied a supply of material that hardly a substance can be found that does not, in some form, contribute to the prosecution of the war; and of these some are bound to be the products of other countries. Thus, without oil, neither tanks, aircraft, motor-transport, nor submarines can be moved, and a country which does not possess oil within her borders must import it from elsewhere; and 'elsewhere' may be approachable only across the sea or through the lines of an enemy army.

Not only, however, are almost all substances the raw materials of some form of munition, but the populations themselves are elements of military strength. The munition-maker, male and female, contributes to the fighting power of the Army, and as such is a factor of its power to resist the enemy. No writers, we have said, have more clearly pronounced the doctrine of national war than those of Germany, who lay stress upon the need of sustaining the *moral* of the population and depressing that of the enemy; nor did our late enemies fail to use every measure calculated to produce those results. The submarine campaign aimed, like the blockade, at compelling the Entente to abandon the struggle owing to the shortage of food it would cause; the aerial and coastal bombardments were operative far more in their moral than their physical or material effects. Themselves aiming at moral results by striking at the civil populations, it is singular that able German writers, when the time for propagandist argument has passed, should continue to denounce what they call the violations of international law. Their own acts constitute a refutation of their complaints no less powerful than history and the writings of their countrymen before 1914.

3. *First results of Sea-Power, 1914-15.* The first act of the British Navy was to establish itself in the two gateways through which trade reaches Germany; while the French, after passing its colonial troops across the Mediterranean, took a corresponding position as against Austria. The German war directors were faced with a choice of action. Their principal fleet, inferior in battleship strength to the British, but possessing a superiority

of torpedo craft, might at once put all things to the hazard of a general engagement at sea, thus to prevent a blockade from being established at all; or it might withhold action, hoping, by the action of its lesser vessels, either surface or submarine torpedo craft, or by mining, to reduce the strength of the British Fleet to a point at which a fleet action presented reasonable hopes of success. These views were the subject of much difference of opinion. Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz states that the Chancellor, the Chief of the Cabinet, and the Chief of the Naval Staff were opposed to the former, while he himself 'fought against the withholding of the fleet from the pursuit of its great aim and object'. What the result would have been if Von Tirpitz's policy had been followed we cannot say; but so long as the German fleet did not attempt to break down the control of commerce exercised by the wants of the Entente, the effects of that control could only increase. If the war were short, as the great General Staff was confident it would be, sea-power could not have developed its full effect; since it is, in the nature of things, a slow-acting weapon, especially against a country well stocked from the beginning, hastily purchasing all it could from abroad, and capable of maintaining itself for a considerable time.

The defeat on the Marne showed that the dream of a short war was an illusion; by the end of 1914 no doubt existed but that the war would be prolonged, and that the cutting off of supplies would play an important part. These supplies were of two kinds. Not only were the materials classed as 'contraband', from their applicability to the service of the army, being stopped, but also supplies for the whole people. Tirpitz correctly foresaw the result when he wrote on the 13th March 1915 that 'gradually the blockade of Germany must affect the whole life of the nation'. Two years later the situation was becoming increasingly oppressive. 'If the war lasted,' wrote Ludendorff at the end of 1916, 'our defeat seemed inevitable. Economically we were in a highly unfavourable position for a war of exhaustion. At home our strength was badly shaken. Questions of the supply of foodstuffs caused great anxiety, and so, too, did questions of *moral*. We were not undermining the spirits of the enemy populations with starvation blockades and propaganda.'¹

¹ *My War Memories*, i, p. 307.

4. *Effects of the blockade on enemy moral.* There is a close association between the life of the nation and the spirit of the fighting services. 'The tremendous moral impetus', says Falkenhayn, writing at the end of 1915, 'which the field-army received from the spirit prevailing among the vast majority of the people at home played an overwhelming part.'¹ As the *moral* of the fleet and army was largely a reflection of that of the civil population, so the depression of the national spirits tended to affect the fighting men. Nevertheless, there is little to show that any serious inroad into naval *moral* occurred before the autumn of 1917, nor, in the absence of more information on so complicated a matter of crowd psychology, would it be proper to attribute the eventual decay to any one cause. That the blockade contributed to that decay and accentuated the depression caused by military losses, can hardly be doubted. 'The waning *moral* at home', says Ludendorff, 'was intimately connected with the food situation. . . . In wide quarters a certain decay of bodily and mental power of resistance was noticeable, resulting in an unmanly and hysterical state of mind which, under the spell of enemy propaganda, encouraged the pacifist leanings of many Germans. In the summer of 1917 my first glimpse of this situation gave me a great shock.'²

5. *Action of the German Fleet.* Making due allowance for the desire of a military commander to attribute failure to any other cause than defeat in the field, it seems proper to accept the evidence of the many writers that the blockade, by affecting the stamina of the people, contributed in an important degree to the eventual collapse. A successful action against the Grand Fleet would have gone far towards preventing this, and the prospects of success were greatest in the early days of the war before additions to its units increased its initial superiority. The efforts to reduce the British Fleet in the manner chosen, by attrition, were not effective. The small number of submarines available in 1914 cruised in the North Sea and Channel and secured some successes, but none of a character to weaken the hold of the Navy. Some ships capable of useful services were sunk, the dispositions of the cruising squadrons employed in the northern area had to be modified. But no relaxation of the isolating action of the Fleet was brought about, nor was the

¹ Falkenhayn, *General Headquarters, 1914-1916*, p. 193.

² *War Memories*, i, p. 349.

entry of supplies to Germany rendered any easier. The German minelayers were more successful in the combination of circumstances, to which the submarines contributed, that brought about the loss of a modern battleship—the *Audacious*—a serious blow at a moment when the British superiority of ships of the line was not great; and the submarine and minelayer imposed upon us the necessity of constituting that great auxiliary patrol flotilla which absorbed so many men and formed so important a factor in the subsequent years of war. It was fortunate that the submarine campaign was started on small lines, as this afforded us time to organize the measures to meet it. Our difficulties would have been far greater if the campaign had been withheld, as Tirpitz desired, until the German flotilla could strike us, unprepared, with great strength. It was a mistake on the part of the Germans to drift into a new campaign and deny themselves all the advantages of surprise.

Besides using their strength to bring direct pressure upon the enemy peoples, the navies of the Entente had the immediate and vastly important task of assuring the passage of British and colonial troops into France. How immediate this was can be measured by the dates on which the British Army came into action in August 1914. If the German Fleet had been able to delay the arrival of the Expeditionary Force by blocking the Channel ports of departure and arrival—many of which were undefended—or by other means, the battle of the Marne, the turning point of the war, would have assumed a different complexion. The inactivity of the German Fleet at this juncture shows a complete misconception of the part which the British Army was capable of playing. The urgent need of troops in France affected the defence of trade. Convoys of troop transports from Australia, India, and Canada needed escorts, for German cruisers were still at large. These attacked trade with some freedom in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, did some measurable damage, and were not all disposed of until April 1915. But they were unable seriously to affect the course of trade or the stability of British credit. Far less could they do anything to assist in relieving the pressure that was beginning to be put upon their country. German commerce carried in German bottoms ceased.

6. *Leakage of supplies through neutrals.* Supplies, nevertheless, continued to reach Germany through neutral countries.

This is one of the most delicate and difficult of the problems with which a sea-power is faced in exercising its strength. The interests of neutral powers are bound to be interfered with in any commercial war—even one only of tariffs—and the more completely a navy attempts to obtain the full effect of which it is capable, the more it risks intervention on the part of those who suffer. This truth had been illustrated by the Armed Neutralities of past days. The tendency of International agreements in recent years had been towards securing the rights of neutrals; raw materials had been made free goods in all circumstances; and, though the needs of Germany in matters contraband could not be supplied by her own ports, other channels were available through Holland, Denmark, the Scandinavian powers, and, for some time, Italy. Anticipating a short war, and confident that she could obtain all raw materials directly, and contraband indirectly, Germany believed that her weakness at sea would not affect her operations on land. She does not appear to have realized that ‘absolute war’ is no less applicable to sea- than to land-warfare.

7. *Effect on Germany of the tightening of the ‘blockade’.* To stop all supplies destined for the Central Powers could not be done by naval action only. Neutral waters could be reached and used; and the immunity of raw materials could not at once be removed. Iron ore from Sweden, needed for munitions, could be embarked at Narvik, carried down to the southern point of Norway within territorial waters, and thence across the Skagerak to Dutch waters and Rotterdam, whence it reached Essen, by canal. Even if captured in the short stretch of open water it could not be condemned. Cotton, silk, wool, oil-seeds, rubber, raw hides, and other materials, all of importance either for clothing or munitioning the army, were free at first, but not for long. On the 21st September, unwrought copper, lead, glycerine, ferro-chrome, haematite, and magnetic iron ore, rubber, hides, and skins were added to the conditional contraband list, which steadily increased its scope. Although the term ‘blockade’ is applied to this, no ‘blockade’ was ever declared, for neutral ports cannot be blockaded. But it was possible to restrict trade to neutral ports, and gradually to obtain a control of all sea-borne trade which permitted innocent goods to pass while contraband was held up. The word ‘contraband’ changed its meaning; originally referring only to goods of direct service

to the army, it was extended by logic and necessity to the whole of the enemies' trade.

Food was a matter of greater difficulty; the British attitude at an earlier date had been strongly against treating as contraband food destined for the civil population. But a decree of the German Government in October that stocks of grain and flour were to be seized, furnished a strong argument for permitting no further supplies to enter, since it would be impossible to discriminate between civil and military supplies. The German submarine campaign against merchant ships began in February 1915; it threw to the winds all the restraints hitherto accepted in sea warfare. Retaliation followed early in March when all limits of contraband were abolished by a British Order in Council, which further laid down that if it could be proved that goods came from, belonged to, or were going to the enemy, no matter who were the consignors or consignees, the ships carrying the goods could be sent into port and placed in the Prize Court. In this manner Germany's submarine campaign served to harden the measures against herself.

The submarine campaign, while it was bound to give rise to complications with neutrals of a more serious nature than those likely to result from the ordinary methods of visit and search, could only hope in its early stages to be used as a lever for mitigating the severity of the extension of contraband employed by the Entente. But it was unlikely that any mitigation in the Orders as to food would be made, even if the campaign were dropped, nor, indeed, did the enemy have any hopes that he could secure much relief. The importance of materials such as rubber, copper, and cotton, was so outstandingly clear that their entry could obviously not be allowed by the maritime powers.

The answer to the submarine blows did not lie in abandoning the pressure the sea-powers were exerting upon the enemy—which would have been an admission of loss of command at sea—but in developing an effective offensive against the submarine.

Raw materials, indeed, cast their shadow over the whole war; the need for them affected strategy on land as well as at sea. Thus, even a temporary overrunning of Upper Silesia by the Entente was, in Falkenhayn's eyes, inadmissible, as 'it would have robbed Germany of the rich resources of Silesia, and consequently would have made it impossible for her to continue the

war beyond a limited time'. 'The loss of the frontier territories would have rendered the continuation of the war impossible after a comparatively short time.'¹ Italy's entry into the war added inconveniences, as the Italian ports, so long as a state of hostilities was not declared between her and Germany, were a channel for supply. 'Our communications with the outer world through Italy, which provided us with extremely important raw materials, could not be dispensed with except under the most compelling necessity.'² Rumania, until she joined the Allies, was another source. Could the Central Powers have held out if neither food nor oil had been supplied by Rumania in 1916?

With what anxiety the German General Staff looked upon the situation that was growing as a result of the blockade is evident. Both Ludendorff and Falkenhayn lay emphasis upon the difficulty of maintaining the *moral*, both of the fighting services and the people, under the stress of privations. The makeshifts employed in munitions bear witness to the difficulties in shortage of materials. In his memorandum of Christmas 1915, Falkenhayn was already predicting the possibility of collapse. 'The power of our Allies to hold out is restricted, while our own is not unlimited. It is possible that next winter or—if the Rumanian deliveries continue—the winter after the next, will bring food crises, and the social and political crises that always follow them, among the members of our alliance if there has been no decision by then.'³ How true this was to prove we know. What is remarkable is that resistance was prolonged actually for a year longer than this estimate had foretold.

8. *Effects of the German 'blockade' on Russia.* While the Central Powers were thus cut off from the outer oceans by the Navies of the Entente, and the exiguous channels of supply through neutral ports were constricted by diplomatic and commercial measures, Russia was suffering similar but even more acute difficulties at the hands of Germany. Except as a food-producing and exporting country, Russia was not self-supporting in war. Her munition supply was insufficient, her means of increasing it were undeveloped. Her great retreat in 1915 was largely due to shortage of munitions, and the German command of the Baltic and the Turkish hold on the Dardanelles

¹ *General Headquarters*, pp. 19, 41.

² *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

prevented any rapid means of replenishing them. The Vladivostok route was safe, but long; and both the port and railway were congested. Political difficulties hampered the transport across Scandinavia. Two Arctic channels existed, but of these Archangel is covered by ice for over half the year, and Kola, the port of the Murman railway, was, like the railway, as yet undeveloped. Thus sea-power, though it could carry goods to Vladivostok and Archangel, had then done all that was possible; the only alternative lay in the opening of either the Baltic or the Dardanelles, and neither of these was a purely naval operation.

9. *General Summary.* The blockade of Germany is usually spoken of as relating to the sea. In truth, as we have said earlier, there was no sea blockade in the technical sense of the term, and the isolation of Germany was not only by sea. The armies on land frontiers were performing a similar service. The collapse of Russia, which burst the barriers in the East, broke this blockade, and then the supplies drawn from the Ukraine preserved Austria and relieved Germany. If the Western barrier could also have been broken, whatever might have happened to the armies, a vast territory would have fallen into German hands on which they could have lived and continued to hold out and defy the oceanic blockade. But it would have done still more; it would have aided to a high degree the German offensive at sea. Difficult as the problem proved to defend trade against the submarines operating from Flanders or the Bight, it would have been far more difficult if the northern ports of France had fallen into the hands of the enemy.

Thus a German military victory would have reacted offensively and defensively on the situation at sea. With Lithuania, Courland, the Ukraine, and another large region in France in their hands; with bases on the Channel coast from which submarines could operate—bases whose approaches would be more difficult to mine and to observe than those in the Narrow or North Seas—Germany might well have high hopes of ending the war successfully. When, then, the great attack of March 1918 developed, the replacement of the heavy losses of the forces under Foch was a crucial matter. The Franco-British army, initially inferior to the enemy, had suffered severely. Italy, not yet recovered from Caporetto, could lend small help, and the only available troops lay in England, America, and the Near East.

For the Central Powers, no less than for the Entente, the

occasion demanded the acceptance of the highest risks in preventing or assuring the arrival of reinforcements and the replacement of lost guns. The first troops that could go were the quarter million and more in England, and these were dispatched with the utmost speed. Nothing yet has appeared to explain why the enemy made no attempt to cut the line of communication in the Channel. A difficult, most hazardous venture, indeed; one from which those who took part might not expect to return. But the results of a successful operation would have been so far-reaching that the loss of the whole navy of Germany would have been well incurred in procuring it. The ships were still in good sea-going condition, and the naval mutiny of the preceding autumn had not, it would appear, vitally affected the *moral* of the fleet. The hesitation to incur risks at sea, which prevented her from attempting to influence the course of events in August 1914, once more appeared at a second and even more critical and decisive moment. What may be the reasons for this curious attitude in so military-minded a nation cannot be said. Admiral Tirpitz, writing on the 14th January 1915, attributed the inactivity of the fleet to the mentality of the admirals. 'All their thoughts, instead of being fixed on that (viz. beating England), are centred on technique, which leaves much to be desired in every direction and hinders them from accomplishing anything. . . . The fleet is there, but a Tegetthoff is lacking.' Excellent material, as we know, was in the hands of well-trained officers and men; but somewhere in the highest regions a spirit of distrust appeared to reign. The fleet, built as a 'sally fleet', did not perform its mission of sallying at the moments when its services were most needed, and a finely prepared weapon rusted in the hands of men who seem to have made their calculations in the negative terms of what would happen if they were beaten, rather than in the positive terms of what injury it could inflict upon the fighting forces, both naval and military, of the enemy.

CHAPTER II

THE GERMAN REVOLUTION AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH PREPARED IT

1. *The Chancellor crisis of 1917; Weakness of Bethmann-Hollweg.* Perhaps the best way to impart some understanding of the distribution of German political forces at the beginning of 1918 is to give a short account of the two ministerial crises of the previous year—the substitution of Michaelis for Bethmann-Hollweg and of Hertling for Michaelis. This will tend to indicate the direction in which forces were moving when the year 1918 opened.

The permanent weakness of the Bethmann-Hollweg government lay in the necessity from which it suffered of inclining towards that side with which it had the least real sympathy. It had repeatedly to place itself by the side of the Jingoes because it could not obtain peace, and it would not admit that this failure was due to the fact that the war-aims were unattainable, whether they were those put forward by the more Jingo or by the more moderate section. Until the end of the war all succeeding German governments were to suffer from a similar weakness, that is, they were obliged by the necessity of securing a majority to express public adherence to programmes which could not be realized. The course of events invariably revealed this fact and discredited the Government at the same time.

On the 15th May 1917, Bethmann-Hollweg outlined his policy. He maintained a discreet reserve about war-aims in the West, but suggested the possibility of giving generous treatment to Russia. This speech had been well received by the majority of the Deutsche Partei, and by the National Liberals, Centrists, and Progressives; and even the Majority Socialists were not ill pleased. During the summer, however, partly owing to the more hopeful view taken by British statesmen with reference to submarine warfare, German optimism sensibly diminished; a violent pan-German agitation produced the usual reaction; and the Majority Socialists, alarmed by

the rapidity with which the Independents were gaining on them, became insistent on the necessity for the 'no annexations and no indemnities' formula, and for internal reform in the direction of parliamentarization. The Reichstag was to reassemble on the 5th July, and it was feared that the Majority Socialists would vote against the war credits; but the meetings of the committees, a few days earlier, produced even more disquieting symptoms. In the Main Committee Erzberger (Centre) supported Ebert (Majority Socialist) in demanding that political discussions should precede the passing of the credits, and on the 4th July in the Constitutional Committee the National Liberals, Progressives, and Socialists united in a resolution calling upon the Government to create political equality in the Federal States, and this agreement was the more interesting because most of the Centrists were known to be in favour of the resolution.

2. *Erzberger and the Submarine War, 6th July 1917.* On the 6th July there was a heated debate in the Main Committee, in which Erzberger authoritatively challenged the figures dealing with Entente submarine losses which had been officially published, and demanded the conclusion of a 'peace of understanding'.¹ All accounts agree that the effect of these revelations was most startling and an acute political crisis at once supervened. Next day, in deference to a united request from National Liberals, Centrists, Progressives, and Majority Socialists the Chancellor in person replied. The nature of his reply is uncertain, but it is reported to have included a definite repudiation of 'peace by understanding'. However this may be, it was certainly unsatisfactory to the Centre and Left, and probably to the Right as well. The fact that the Emperor, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff arrived in Berlin on the same day still further indicated the seriousness of the crisis.

3. *Fall of Bethmann-Hollweg, 13th July 1917; appointment*

¹ Czernin and his agents had had dealings with Erzberger. Their outcome is obscure, but Erzberger had admittedly seen and quoted from the secret report of Czernin to the Emperor Charles (12th April) which showed up the failure of the submarine campaign. It may be illustrated by the following quotation:

'It is now 2½ months (almost half the time stated) since the U-boat warfare started, and all the information that we get from England is to the effect that the downfall of this, our most powerful and most dangerous adversary, is not to be thought of.'

Czernin, *In the World War*, p. 149, p. 155 and note. Czernin complains that Erzberger revealed everything to the Reichstag.

of *Michaelis*. The Conservatives and the Independent Socialists were in no sense supporters of Bethmann, but they were holding aloof from the political fray. After some hesitation the Centre had ranged itself, as it was to do so often later, behind Erzberger, in spite of its dislike and distrust of him. The Progressives, or at least the more radical among them, sincerely and in principle desired parliamentarization; the Right section of the National Liberals was, as it had always been, opposed to Bethmann, and on the 9th and 10th July the Left section also turned against him. On the 9th, according to a report which was not denied, he proposed at a Crown Council that the only constitutional reform should be the equalization of the Prussian franchise, and he found even this proposal opposed by all the Prussian ministers. On the 10th, in the Main Committee, Bethmann refused to report what had happened in the Crown Council, and Ebert successfully moved the adjournment. The result of this was to rivet the Progressives to the anti-Bethmann 'block' that was being formed, and to push the National Liberals nearer towards it. Bethmann endeavoured to strengthen his position by proposing a State Council, which should include some Reichstag members, and by issuing the imperial rescript promising the equal franchise to Prussia in time for the next elections. This rescript was granted on the 11th and published on the 12th. On the 13th Ebert again successfully moved the adjournment of the Main Committee, in a speech in which he complained of Bethmann's reluctance to define his war-aims. On the same day the Chancellor resigned, after a threat from Hindenburg and Ludendorff that they would leave office if he remained. The chancellorship was offered to Hertling,¹ the Bavarian Prime Minister, who refused it on the grounds that he was a South German, a Roman Catholic, and too old to carry on the struggle with G.H.Q. Already, too, the Peace Resolution was being drafted, and it is probable that some verbal alterations in it were made at the instance of the generals.

On the whole there seems to be no reason to disagree with Hertling's two comments on Bethmann-Hollweg's fall—that during his last days the general feeling in political circles was that 'Bethmann must go, whoever comes next', and that the action of the generals was 'fabulous, but true'. On the day

¹ Other candidates had been: Hintze for the Jingoës, Bernstorff for the Left, Helfferich, who had little support anywhere and was hated by both extremes, Brockdorff-Rantzau and later Kühlmann for the Moderates.

of Hertling's refusal of the chancellorship it was accepted by Michaelis, who confirmed the common impression that he was 'Ludendorff's man' by interviewing the party leaders in the presence of the generals.

4. *The Reichstag Resolution of the 19th July, distribution of parties.* It was expected, or at least hoped by the Centre and by the Left, that Michaelis would accept their Resolution, especially as the Wolff Telegraph Bureau circulated the terms of it after his reception of the party leaders. On the 19th, in a Reichstag debate, Michaelis declared his attitude to the Resolution :

'What we wish primarily to do is to conclude peace as men who have successfully carried through their purpose. . . . If we make peace we must primarily achieve this, that the frontiers of the German Empire are for all time safeguarded. We must, by way of . . . compromise, guarantee the vital conditions of the German Empire on the Continent and overseas. The peace must provide a basis for a lasting reconciliation of the nations. . . . These ends are attainable within the limits of your Resolution as I understand it. . . . It goes without saying that I stand upon the ground of the Imperial Rescript of July 11th. I also consider it desirable that relations of confidence between Parliament and Government should be made closer by calling to leading executive positions men who, in addition to their personal qualifications for the posts concerned, possess also the confidence of the great parties in the popular representative body. . . .'

After the Chancellor's speech Fehrenbach (Centre) read the Resolution, which ran as follows :

'As on August 4th, 1914, so on the threshold of the fourth year of war, the word of the Speech from the Throne holds good for the German people: "We are not impelled by lust of conquest." For the defence of her freedom and independence, for the integrity of her territorial possessions (*territorialen Besitzstandes*), Germany took up arms. The Reichstag strives for a peace of understanding and the permanent reconciliation of the peoples. *With such a peace forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic, or financial oppressions are inconsistent.* The Reichstag also rejects all schemes which aim at economic barriers and hostility between the peoples (*Absperrung und Verfeindung*) after the war. The freedom of the seas must be made secure (*sichergestellt werden*). Only economic peace will prepare the ground for a friendly intercourse between the nations. The Reichstag will actively promote the creation of International Law organizations.

'So long, however, as the enemy Governments do not accept such a peace, so long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquests (*Eroberungen*) and oppression (*Vergewaltigung*), the German nation will stand together like one man, and unshakably hold out and fight until its own and its allies' right to life and development is

secured (*gesichert*). The German nation is invincible in its unity. The Reichstag knows that it is at one in this statement with the men who in heroic fights are defending the Fatherland. The imperishable gratitude of the whole people is assured to them.¹

The Resolution was passed by 214 votes to 116¹: 17 Poles abstained: the Independent Socialists, National Liberals, most of the Pan-German section, and the Conservatives voted against it; the Ayes were the Majority Socialists, the Progressives (with one abstention), and the Centrists (with two abstentions). It was known, and was emphasized by subsequent press comment, that many National Liberals were really in favour of the Resolution, and that many Centrists had not made up their minds what they meant by it.

5. *Vagueness of the Chancellor's Attitude towards the Resolution.* If the Majority did not know what they meant by their Resolution, it was still harder to find out what the Chancellor meant by it. A few days later Scheidemann (Majority Socialist) declared that Michaelis had accepted the Resolution fully and freely, but there was some excuse for many others who interpreted his speech in rather a different sense. On the 26th Michaelis reaffirmed his position, without throwing much light upon it:

'The enemy press has . . . suggested that I agreed to the Majority Resolution only with an ill-concealed reservation of Germany's desire for conquest. I must repudiate this misrepresentation. . . . As is evident, my statement implied that the enemy must also renounce all idea of conquest. The facts of which I have just informed you make it manifest that our enemies are not in the least considering such a renunciation.'²

Both of Michaelis's statements were extremely unwelcome

¹ The actual party figures at this time were approximately as follows:

Independents (including Alsatians)	19
Minority Socialists	19
Poles	18
Majority Socialists	89
Progressives	46
Centre	91
National Liberals	44
German Fraction	26
Conservatives	45

Total Deputies in Reichstag . . . 397

² This is a reference to the secret agreements made between Russia and France with reference to the Saar Valley and Left Bank of the Rhine, which were then transpiring. Subsequently the full text was published in November by Trotsky. v. Vol. I, Appendix II.

to the Right, and it is probable, in spite of Scheidemann's brave words, that they failed to satisfy the Left. With regard to the other urgent problem—parliamentarization—he was more successful. His appointments—Drews, Kühlmann, Wallraf, Spahn, Schiffer—were personally acceptable to the Left, while the Centre and Right were pleased by the absence of any approach to ministerial responsibility or to control of the executive by the Reichstag. But this was a dangerous success; it was obviously probable that with the process of time the persons nominated would displease the Right, while the Left would not rest satisfied with an unparliamentary régime.

6. *The Papal Peace Note, 15th August, and the Attitude of Michaelis.* On the 15th August the Papal Peace Note began to be discussed in Berlin,¹ and the discussion of this Note proved the beginning of the end of Michaelis's short-lived ministry. The Note produced some admissions, e. g. the admission by *Germania* (a Centrist organ) that there was an Alsace-Lorraine question which might be discussed: on the other hand, its only effect on the equally Centrist *Bayerische Kurier* was to strengthen its insistence on the necessity of indemnities.

On the 21st August Michaelis made a non-committal speech in the Main Committee, and the next day Kühlmann was equally non-committal and rather more conciliatory: Erzberger called upon the Chancellor to define clearly what his speech of the 19th July had meant. Michaelis made a reply in which, according to the official report, he pointed out that the members of the Majority themselves disagreed about the interpretation of the Resolution, while it was unofficially stated that he altogether denied that he had ever accepted it. The session was suspended, and Payer, a Progressive from Württemberg, was sent to Michaelis with an ultimatum. On resumption the Chancellor made some sort of apology, which was apparently unsatisfactory, for it drew a protest from Ebert. It is probable that Michaelis had been forced to maintain his original acceptance of the Resolution, but had not been forced to withdraw his qualifying phrase 'as I understand it'.²

¹ The Note was dated 1st August, but published the 17th. Apart from suggesting disarmament and arbitration its territorial proposals were on the basis of the *status quo*.

² What Michaelis secretly meant by 'as I understand it' was clearly explained in his secret letter to Czernin, 17th August 1917. He suggests 'reinstatement of the *status quo*' as a suitable basis for negotiation. This,

The result of these discussions—combined with the revival of annexationist 'propaganda—was to weaken the Chancellor and to strengthen the Majority block. Michaelis appointed a committee of fourteen (seven from the various parties in the Reichstag, and seven from the Bundesrat) to draw up the answer to the Pope. This arrangement was accepted by the parties, and the National Liberals decided to resume participation in the inter-party conferences. On the other hand, the Progressives and Majority Socialists took the opportunity to renew their demands for parliamentarization and for the repeal of Article 9.¹ Here they reached first principles: the repeal of Article 9 was necessary if the Reichstag was to have any real control over the Federal Government, just as was the reform of the Prussian franchise if the Prussian people was to have any real control over the government of its state. The decision of policy in fact, foreign and domestic, depended not only on internal reform in the Empire but on internal reform in Prussia. Fifteen years before, the difficulties, which were now experienced, had been foreseen by a profound student of German institutions.² 'At present popular government in Germany is neither probable nor desirable. In fact the institutions are by no means adapted to it. . . . The intricate connection between the Prussian and the federal machinery, which works very well so long as both are controlled by a single man, would hardly be possible if

however, 'would not exclude the desired possibility of retaining the present frontiers, and by negotiating (would) bring former enemy economic territory into close economic and military conjunction with Germany (this would refer to Courland, Lithuania, and Poland). . . . Germany is ready to evacuate the occupied French territory, but must reserve to herself the right, *by means of the peace negotiations*, to the economic exploitation of the territory of Longwy and Briey, if not through direct incorporation by a legal right to exploit. We are not in a position to cede to France any notable districts in Alsace-Lorraine. I should wish to have a free hand in the negotiations in the matter of *connecting Belgium with Germany in a military and economic sense*.' Czernin says he replied that he 'interpreted the views of the German Reichstag as demanding a peace without annexations or indemnity, and that it would be out of the question for the German Government to ignore the *unanimous* (sic) decision of the Reichstag'. *In the World War*, pp. 157-60.

In plain words Michaelis intended annexations but proposed to disguise them under the form of 'military and economic control'. For further discussions, v. Vol. I, Chap. V, § 12.

¹ 'Every member of the Bundesrat has the right to appear in the Reichstag, and must be heard there at any time upon his request, in order to represent the views of his Government, even when the same shall not have been adopted by a majority of the Bundesrat. No one shall be at the same time a member of the Bundesrat and of the Reichstag.'

² Lowell, *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, vol. ii, p. 67.

the people became the real source of power.' The institutions were no longer working well, the 'single man' had signed a Rescript on the 11th July promising a democratization of the Prussian franchise. That proved that he was losing his grip on the machine, but no one knew how to accomplish the transition between autocracy and democracy. The majority in the Reichstag did not as yet go as far as the Progressives and Majority Socialists in their demands for the realization of responsible government, and probably did not see the necessity of doing so. Confused and bewildered, they were put off with half measures and with such concessions as the establishment of a 'free committee' to discuss foreign policy or with promises by the 'single man' of a democratic reform of the Prussian franchise. For a time these measures were to succeed but they could not do so indefinitely. The essence of the situation was that no real change could be made in the existing system without eventually affecting every part of it, and, when such changes really began to be made, the result was necessarily the break-down of the machine.

7. *German Reply to the Pope, 19th September 1917, and further Opposition to Michaelis.* The German reply to the Pope's Note was approved by Michaelis's 'Free Committee' of fourteen, and dispatched on the 19th September. Its most explicit sentence was this :

'The special measures which the Government has taken, in the closest contact with the representatives of the German people, to discuss and answer the questions raised prove how earnestly it desires, in unison (*Einklang*) with the desire of His Holiness and with the peace resolution adopted by the Reichstag on July 19th, to find a practical basis for a just and lasting peace.'

Even this was not very explicit: the Left accepted it as a reaffirmation of solidarity with its Resolution, but the Right took it in no such sense. The Right might claim with some justice that its interpretation was correct when Michaelis insisted in a Main Committee discussion at the end of September that his Government was not bound on the Belgian question and that it must decline to define its war-aims, while Kühlmann asserted that there was the most complete agreement not only between the Government and the Reichstag but also between the Government and G.H.Q. In fact the only protest against the Chancellor's attitude on the Belgian question came from the Socialists.

On the 6th October began the last act of the Michaelis drama. After a debate, arising from a Socialist interpellation on political propaganda in the Army, the bourgeois parties professed their satisfaction with the Chancellor's explanations, but the two Socialist sections united in a vote of no confidence. On the 9th Dittmann (Independent Socialist) raised the whole question again, and also complained that the Government proscribed his party, in spite of the Chancellor's promise to treat all parties alike. Michaelis rejoined that he could only trust parties which honestly supported the State, and waxed eloquent on the beauty and utility of the official arrangements for 'enlightenment' (*Aufklärung*), while his colleague Capelle (Secretary for the Navy) declared that it was obvious enough why Independent Socialists, and particularly Dittmann, were so familiar with the details of unrest in the Navy. Trimborn (Centre) greeted with joy Michaelis's plain acceptance of the July Resolution, though it is difficult to see that he was any plainer than before, and Kühlmann made his celebrated 'No, never' declaration about Alsace-Lorraine. The effect of this debate, in spite of Trimborn's expression of a satisfaction which, one may fairly suppose, was not generally shared by his Centrist colleagues, was to close up the Majority in opposition to the Chancellor. By the 12th every one, except the Conservatives, agreed that Michaelis was impossible, and intrigues began for a National Liberal and Centre, *i.e.* & Bülow-Kühlmann combination. Capelle offered his resignation, which the Emperor ultimately refused to accept. On the 23rd the Majority leaders informed Valentini (Chief of the Emperor's Civil Cabinet) that they were expecting a new Chancellor, but that they wished to avoid any encroachment on the Emperor's right of nomination, a curious comment on their former demands for parliamentarization. On the 25th they had the courage to tell Valentini plainly that Michaelis must go, and by that date they had agreed upon a common programme—the equalization of the Prussian franchise, the abolition of the political censorship, the repeal of the combination law (Article 35), and the conduct of foreign policy on the basis of the reply to the Papal Note. It is clear that on the cardinal points—peace and parliamentarization—this programme was weaker than the July demands.

8. *Michaelis succeeded by Hertling, 28th October 1917.* On

the 26th October Lerchenfeld (Bavarian Minister at Berlin) telegraphed to Hertling :

... H.M. will offer you the chancellorship again : G.H.Q. is willing to mix no more in politics : Michaelis becomes Prussian Minister-President : you are first to place yourself in agreement with the different party leaders : will be most joyfully received here. . . .

Naturally this fact was not known at the time, but from the Emperor's refusal of Capelle's resignation on the same date the conclusion was drawn that Michaelis's chancellorship was near its end, and by the next day it was generally assumed that he had presented his resignation.

Hertling arrived in Berlin on the 28th of October, and, accompanied by Michaelis, had an audience of the Emperor. He refused the co-operation of Michaelis, and insisted on himself holding the office of Prussian Minister-President as well as that of Chancellor. He spent the 29th and 30th in negotiation with the Reichstag leaders, the chief difficulty being, apparently, with the National Liberals, many of whom were still holding out for Bülow. They were brought round, however, by Kühlmann, who promised that Friedberg should be Vice-President of the Prussian Ministry. Hertling accepted the fourfold programme and hinted, rather than promised, that Payer should be appointed Vice-Chancellor.

9. *Tendencies at the End of 1917.* This arrangement was not a great advance in the direction of parliamentarization, in view of the fact that all party leaders and not merely the leaders of the majority had been consulted, but the majority programme had been accepted (though it was such a very modest one), and the Left was thus encouraged to welcome Hertling as the first parliamentary chancellor. In his first speech (29th November) in the Reichstag the new Chancellor indicated his acceptance of the four points, but made the reservation, 'Nothing can, or shall, be changed in the foundations of our Imperial Constitution'. When he was twitted by Heydebrand in the Prussian Diet (6th December) with being a parliamentary chancellor, he took the occasion formally to deny it.

In short, the two chancellor crises of 1917 had given Germany the July Resolution as modified in the Reply to the Pope as the basis of her foreign, and the Imperial Rescript of the 11th July as the guiding star of her domestic, policy. They had also conferred upon her, to direct policy, if 'other factors'

would let him, what a Berlin paper was later to describe as 'this Chancellor of the Left, who gets his applause from the Right'.

The anti-parliamentarians found it convenient not to disavow but to interpret the Rescript and the Resolution, while an increasing public opinion found in them ideals, made in Germany, which could be reconciled, in some sort, with the 'Fourteen Points' of President Wilson. The Chancellor himself was glad to be able to expand or contract his interpretations with victory or defeat, with the pressure of the blockade and with the sufferings of the people. Even the majority in the Reichstag was not opposed to a convenient ambiguity, for its chief characteristic was that it preferred to work through the existing executive, even in feeling its way towards responsible government. The victory of that principle was only ultimately determined by the defeat and discredit of autocracy. In this way the Rescript and the Resolution were closely connected with the downfall of the monarchy and on the decision to negotiate for peace.

10. *1918.* The year 1918 began with military conditions that were much more favourable to Germany than could have been expected. Ludendorff says, indeed, that it was possible again, as in 1914 and 1915, to think of deciding the war by an attack on land.¹

11. *Food Situation.* It is probable, too, that the internal situation was, chiefly as a result of the improved military conditions, much more favourable to the Government than could have been predicted at any time during the previous year. The food supply indeed gave little cause for rejoicing; the shortage of fodder necessitated much wasteful slaughtering of pigs; supplies of meat, milk, and fats grew steadily worse; the authorities were harassed by agitations for an increase of the potato ration and discredited by the Neukölln Memorial, with its evidence that even municipalities transgressed regulations, particularly with regard to maximum prices; but there was some consolation in the official belief that the last grain harvests had been better than the estimates showed, and in the raising of the sugar ration. Perhaps the most serious factor of the food situation was the growth of antagonism between town and country, against which the food controller

¹ *War Memories*, ii, p. 537.

found it advisable to issue a warning, but almost without exception the non-socialist papers agreed that although State control of food was imperfectly administered and essentially unpleasant, yet it had proved itself an evil that was necessary for the avoidance of greater evils. Chiefly owing to transport difficulties there was an insufficient supply of fuel in many large towns, and in South Germany many industries had to be restricted or shut down. The shortage of textiles had led to the expropriation of all kinds of sail-cloth, and to demands for cast-off clothing which had met with little success; on the other hand, supplies of flax were improving and there was at least enough wool to meet the demands of the Army, though it was decided to make no new tunics for the Navy. The metal industries were finding it increasingly, but not hopelessly, difficult to obtain raw materials.

12. *Parties.* In internal politics at this time it could be said of only one party, the Independent Socialists, that it was definitely in opposition. The Majority Socialists also demanded the calling of the Reichstag, and threatened unqualified opposition if the Brest-Litovsk negotiations should finally break down owing to the German Government's refusal honestly to apply the principle of self-determination. The interruption in the negotiations led to furious attacks on Kühlmann (Foreign Secretary), quite as furious on the part of the Conservatives, who thought him too weak, as on that of the Majority Socialists, who declared that he had been captured by the reactionaries. That this was one of the occasions when the Higher Command sympathized with the Conservatives was shown by Ludendorff's offer of resignation, which, however, was denied, somewhat vaguely, by the Wolff Bureau.

This offer of resignation¹ illustrates the General Staff's conception of its pseudo-governmental functions: on the 7th January 1918, Hindenburg presented to the Emperor a memorandum in which he claimed that he and Ludendorff had a share of responsibility for the terms of the peace, and that Kühlmann's weakness over the Polish frontier jeopardized the attainment of a settlement likely to ensure a permanent peace. The Chancellor maintained that the responsibility was his alone; but the Generals replied that both the Army and the people attributed part of the responsibility to them, and that

¹ *War Memories*, ii, 547 and seq.

the Government itself had encouraged this attitude, both by proclaiming their agreement with its views and by shielding itself behind their objections to plans which it was unable or unwilling to carry out. It is impossible to deny the justice of this argument.

Altogether there can be little doubt that parliamentary influence had been growing smaller during the last six months, as a result of military successes and of the Bolshevist revolution. The National Liberals had become again as annexationist as the Government; on the 8th January, indeed, they demanded that the Russian peace should include 'those securities which the High Command regarded as necessary'. The Progressives and Majority Socialists had not gone quite so far, but on the whole they had moved pretty steadily in the same direction; certainly neither of these parties would have accepted Lloyd George's and President Wilson's speeches as a basis of discussion. The Reichstag Centre Party, on the 8th January, declared its confidence in the Government. In a recently published book Paul Lensch, who had moved from the Left to the extreme Right of Socialism, had declared that the proof of Germany's revolutionary mission must be the fact of her winning the day in the teeth of a world of enemies. He added that victory must be followed by the overthrow of Junkerism, of the three-class suffrage, and of the anti-parliamentary system: how little such a sequel could be expected was asserted by Liberals like Dernburg and by Independent Socialists like Bernstein, and was sufficiently proved by the Prussian Franchise Bill introduced in December, which contained clauses narrowly limiting the action of the Lower House, and was referred to a hostile committee. In view of such a fact it was idle for *Vorwärts* to talk of Hertling's Chancellorship as 'epoch-making in the same sense as the Russian Revolution'.

The process of parliamentarization, which had had a victory of sorts in the appointment of Hertling, had obviously not advanced; on the contrary, the development had been rather the other way. The Reichstag Majority was less united than it had been; it had by now become extremely doubtful whether most of its constituents retained any enthusiasm for the July Resolution, which had been its great achievement; the only parliamentary opposition came from the Independent Socialists, who could be ignored, and the Majority Socialists. The latter

were so much compromised and so much more opposed to the General Staff than to the Government (and many of them, too, were so sincerely imperialist), that their partial and wavering opposition was a source of weakness as much to themselves as to the Government. None the less most of their supporters were doubtless anxious for peace.

The true weakness of the Government lay partly in its divided character, of which the Brest-Litovsk negotiations were very soon to give another blazing illustration in General Hoffmann's declaration that the self-determination of occupied territories was an internal German question. It lay partly also in the war-weariness of the people, soon to be exhibited in the great strikes, in the war-weariness of the Army, which was well enough known to Ludendorff,¹ and of the Navy, which was too well known to the Independent Socialists; partly in the provocative conduct of such reactionary organizations as the Vaterlandspartei, which produced more or less violent collisions at Cologne, Mannheim, Heidelberg, and elsewhere. Besides all these causes of weakness there were of course the difficulties in the supply of food and raw materials, which if not increasing were at least cumulative in their effect, difficulties which, it was hoped, the Russian peace would alleviate. The essential weakness of the whole position, then, lay in the fact that the Government rested on military success, a condition which accentuated the characteristic German vice of 'Nebenregierung', and which demanded for its continuance more and ever greater military successes.

The discussions in the Main Committee of the Reichstag at the end of January showed sufficiently clearly the attitudes of the various parties at that date. They began with a Majority Socialist attack on the censorship, which had suppressed *Vorwärts* for publishing a report of the Vienna strikes. The freedom of the press was a subject on which the Majority Socialists were always glad to criticize the Government, all the more when they were not very sure of their position on questions of policy. In the debate on foreign policy Scheidemann (*Maj. Soc.*) declared that he found a growing inclination to peace in Wilson's and Lloyd George's speeches, but made it clear that he regarded the Alsace-Lorraine question as purely German. David (*Maj. Soc.*) urged the necessity of an understanding with Trotsky and warned the Government of the

¹ Cf. e.g. ii, 542 and 584.

results of the Pan-German policy, though he disclaimed a desire to threaten them. Of the Centre Party Trimborn supported Kühlmann and found the demands of the Entente regarding Alsace-Lorraine unacceptable, while his colleague Erzberger warned the Government that the Catholic Trade Unions would not tolerate Pan-German war-aims. Fischbeck (*Progressive*) defended Kühlmann and thought that Wilson's message was seriously intended, and Naumann (*Progressive*), after agreeing with him, stated that the growth of revolutionary feeling was a reaction against the activities of Tirpitz and the Vaterlandspartei.¹ Stresemann, for the National Liberals, managed to agree with the Chancellor by interpreting him in the most Jingo sense. Westarp (*Conserv.*) and Wallraf (Minister of the Interior) were uncompromising. The only speaker who came near enough to Entente demands to involve a definite breach with the Government was the Independent Socialist Haase, who declared that if the war could be ended by conceding a referendum to the Reichsland, the concession should be made.

13. *The Independent Socialists.* Before proceeding to deal with the strikes which broke out in Berlin on the 28th January, in some other towns a day or two earlier, it will be useful to say something about the position of the Independent Socialists. The members of this party were not necessarily more radical and extreme than their colleagues of the Majority. They were simply more radically and extremely opposed to the war; it was that fact which caused their secession, and which prevented reunion. In most parts of the country they had not succeeded in capturing the party organizations or the party press; in very few cases had they captured trade unions. They were thus in a position of irresponsibility and almost of impotence, with the natural result that many of them tended farther towards violence and revolution, never so far, however, as the Spartacists and the Bremen Internationalists, led by Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, Otto Ruehle, Rosa Luxemburg, and Klara Zetkin, who approximated very closely to the Russian Bolsheviks. Many of the Independent Socialists, and those the best (e.g. Kautsky, Bernstein, Haase), were convinced revisionists, and fundamentally more antagonistic to the Spartacists than to any of the Majority parties.² They were,

¹ He read out from a handbill calling for a general strike.

² 'Revisionism' meant the adoption of progressive and pacific, as opposed to revolutionary, measures.

moreover, most of them, old rather than young, intellectuals rather than labourers, literary men rather than political tacticians.

14. *The January Strikes.* As has already been stated, the Government's alarm over the Austrian strikes led it to suppress *Vorwärts*, and also the Liberal *Berliner Tageblatt*. This action led to protests in the Main Committee not only from Ebert (*Maj. Soc.*) but also from Stresemann and Trimborn (*Centre*). The Government's alarm may also be judged by the fact that it sent 4,500 tons of flour to Austria, though this action tends to show that it had sufficient stocks to quiet any insistent clamour at home. Towards the end of January Ellenbogen, a Viennese Socialist, and some delegates from Leipzig arrived in Berlin. During the last six months there had been food demonstrations, mainly composed of women, and there had been isolated strikes; but the trade unions, while they had been active enough in the industrial sphere, had discouraged political agitation, and there had been no reason to fear a general or political strike. The violence of the Vaterlands-partei had led, however, to counter-demonstrations and occasional riots. Recent discussions in the Main Committee had shown that though the two sections of the Socialists were more or less at one at least in holding by 'no annexations' as an anti-governmental platform, and that though the Progressives were still, even more doubtfully, on the same side, yet the solid body of anti-annexationist opinion was far from being properly represented in the Reichstag. The soothing effect of Kühlmann's speeches on the 25th and 26th was neutralized by those of Hertling. The position was one of great tension and anxiety, the chief factors in which were popular doubts as to the questions whether the war was being unnecessarily prolonged and whether the Brest-Litovsk negotiations were being conducted so as to ensure the speediest possible conclusion of peace.

On the 28th January a partial strike began in Berlin. Though the chief trade union leaders—Legien, Bauer, and Korsten—were against it, the Central Committee of Trade Unions declared its neutrality. The demands made were:

(1) Peace without annexation or indemnities on the basis of self-determination.

(2) Participation of workers of all nations in peace negotiations.

- (3) Requisition and proper distribution of food.
- (4) Abolition of the state of siege and demilitarization of industry.
- (5) Liberation of political prisoners.
- (6) Universal, secret, and equal franchise for the Prussian Diet.

It is difficult to see why the strikes should have begun just when they did ; there had been no recent political event likely to cause such an outbreak ; it has been suggested that plans had been laid for a general strike and then dropped, and that the strike later began spontaneously ; this explanation is supported by the recent Main Committee discussions of the possibility of a strike and the reading of leaflets agitating for such action, and also by the fact that it was the more highly skilled workmen who struck first.

On the 28th January the official organ of the Gewerkschaften,¹ which had hitherto been the chief force in preventing the Socialist majority from going into opposition, demanded a formulation of German war-aims in the West, as an answer to Lloyd George's speech of 15th January. It demanded also the representation of labour interests in peace negotiations, and the expediting of Prussian Franchise Reform. The raising of such demands at such a moment sufficiently characterized the neutrality of the Gewerkschaften and contrasted with the attitude of the Hirsch-Duncker and Catholic Unions, which supported the Government.

The leaders of the Independent Socialists joined the strike committee doubtless because they sympathized with the movement, the Majority Socialists, as the *Frankfurter Zeitung* put it, 'not to promote the strike but to exert a conciliatory influence and to prevent harm'.

On the 29th January *Vorwärts* was suppressed for publishing too high an estimate of the number of strikers in Berlin, and an official estimate of 125,000 was made : the next day the Trade Unions put the figure at about 350,000, but the official estimate never exceeded 180,000, the declared figure on the 31st January. On this day an intensified state of siege was declared, riots took place with some bloodshed, and Dittmann (*Ind. Soc.*) was arrested. Outside Berlin the most serious strikes seem to have been at Hamburg, Kiel, Danzig, Nurem-

¹ Trade Unions.

berg, Bochum, Dortmund, Mannheim, and Munich: rather oddly, the quietest part of the country was Saxony, the stronghold of the Independent Socialists.

The Government from the beginning refused to negotiate with the strikers themselves, but offered to receive their Reichstag deputies: of this offer at first they declined to avail themselves, but on the 1st February, Scheidemann, Ebert, Haase, and Lédébour were received by the Chancellor in the presence of Payer: they obtained no concession, not even permission for meetings of the strike leaders. On the same day the Commander of the Mark decreed the militarization of certain armament factories, and ordered the men to return to work at latest on the 4th. The President of the Reichstag refused the Socialist Party Directorate's request for the calling of that body, on the ground that all the bourgeois parties were opposed to it.

In spite, or because, of these defeats the Majority Socialists, after the meeting of 1st February, used their influence to bring the strikes to an end, which they succeeded in doing in the course of the next week; and on the 10th February the Military Authorities withdrew their prohibition of meetings and discussions. It is possible that the deputies, though they had obtained no public concessions, had received private assurances, particularly on the question of the Prussian franchise. This view is supported by Vice-President¹ Friedberg's action in the Landtag on the 11th February when he 'urgently recommended' that the consideration of the Franchise Bill be proceeded with, and by Hertling's declaration on the next day that he 'desired no doubt to arise concerning his unaltered determination to bring about the reform by all the means at his disposal'. If some such private assurances had been given, the Majority Socialists must soon have perceived their value, for on the 5th February the National Liberals absented themselves from the meeting of the Reichstag Majority leaders, and on the 20th four out of seven of the National Liberals in the franchise committee of the Prussian Lower House voted against the Government's proposal of equal franchise.

15. *Lessons of the Strike.* There can be no doubt that the main lesson of the strikes was that the Government was still able to suppress any such manifestations. In this connexion it is

¹ i.e. Vice-President of the Prussian Ministry.

significant that the militaristic methods used in Prussia were not employed in the other states. The Bavarian Government, for instance, ostentatiously avoided the declaration of a state of siege, or the militarization of industries, or the punishment of strikers by sending them to the army.

The chief reasons for the failure of the agitation were well set out by Jacob Bengler in the *Freie Zeitung*, an 'advanced' paper published in Switzerland. He considered that they were :

(1) the lowness of Trade Union funds, owing to the absence of many members, and the highness of wages ;

(2) the locking up by employers of a large part of these wages in war loan ;

(3) the dissensions among the Socialists, and the hesitating and half-hearted alliance of the Majority Socialists with the Government ;

(4) the natural pusillanimity of the German Socialist, accentuated by the continued strain of under-nourishment.

The fact, however, that such serious strikes should have been declared on a mainly political platform and even the very success of the Government were ominous for the future. That success, at least in Prussia, had been obtained by the use of military methods, and depended for the possibility of repetition on the continuance of military strength. The calling up of munition workers and of soldiers on leave diminished the available amount of skilled labour and strengthened the untrustworthy elements in the Army. Another result of the suppression of Socialist manifestations was to encourage the activities of the ' Vaterlandspartei ', which had already done harm and now supplied more and more material for Socialist propaganda. The Government, in fact, was engaged in a hopeless attempt to make use of both the Right and the Left, and was bound in the end to fight one or the other. Meanwhile the Conservatives were disappointed in their hope that the strike episode would break up the coalition of the Left, the Progressives particularly being very careful to renew their pledges of co-operation with the Socialists.

16. *The Brest-Litovsk Negotiations.* On 20th February the Ukraine Treaty was approved by all parties in the Reichstag except the Independent Socialists and the Poles. *Vorwärts* indeed declared that the treaty was ' nothing but a scrap of paper, which has yet to be written over by German blood '.

At the same time it asserted that the Official Socialists could only affect policy by staying in the Majority block and influencing it, and it attacked the Independent Socialists for voting against the peace. Similarly the *Internationale Korrespondenz* launched violent attacks against the Bolsheviks. Indeed, the only Majority Socialist paper which opposed the Government's Eastern policy effectively was the *Frankfurter Volksstimme*.

17. *Foreign Policy.* The Government declared its policy by two speeches delivered on the 25th February; one, on foreign policy, by the Chancellor, Count Hertling, and the other, on domestic policy, by the Vice-Chancellor, von Payer. Hertling declared that there was no intention of retaining Belgium, but that Germany must be safeguarded against the danger of that country becoming an 'object or jumping-off ground of enemy machinations'. Similarly, Germany did not think of establishing herself in Esthonia or Livonia: 'regarding Courland and Lithuania . . . it was a question of providing those countries with organs of self-government.' The Petrograd Government had accepted German peace conditions, and negotiations were being resumed at Brest-Litovsk; negotiations with Rumania had begun at Bucharest. 'In contra-distinction to the Central Powers the Entente had from the first pursued aims of conquest. It is fighting for the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. I have nothing to add to what I have already said on this subject. There is no Alsace-Lorraine question in an international sense. If there is such a question it is purely a German question.'

It is obvious that anything except the demands of the most extreme annexationists could be brought within the terms of this speech, certainly anything of what may be called the Ludendorff policy. It was even more obvious that the recent strikes had not disposed the Government to conciliation. On the contrary, its suppression of them had emboldened it to publish its 'veiled annexation policy' in a speech which did not provide very much veil.

18. *Internal Policy.* On the same day the Progressive von Payer made his maiden speech as Vice-Chancellor; the Federated Governments were conscious of their duties to the dependants of soldiers, and had mitigated many a hardship by lowering the age limit for old-age pensions: they had reformed the laws concerning associations. The Reichstag had received

a draft for a Labour Chamber Law which, it was hoped, would satisfactorily settle industrial disputes: there was also a draft bill for redistributing the Reichstag electoral divisions, and another for abolishing para. 153 of the Trade Regulations. The Imperial Government was also considering the question of housing. As for Prussian suffrage reform, von Payer expressed his firm conviction that the franchise provided for in the bill would come, and his reasonable hope that it would come soon. The Reichstag and the Government had come into closer touch, and he hoped that this process of parliamentarization would continue; he then rebuked the Extreme Left and reminded them that the strikes had brought many workmen into economic difficulties, and had cost human lives and human happiness. But the Extreme Right were just as bad: they too denied the good faith of their opponents and predicted downfall for the State if it were not guided by the minority of which they approved. Finally, after declaring that there would have to be new taxes to maintain the equilibrium of the Budget, the Vice-Chancellor announced that the bread ration would after all not be reduced.

This speech was well calculated to make the best of the existing political situation; if assurances about the Prussian franchise were wearing a little thin, at any rate there was no denying the real benefits of the Government's industrial policy. The average Moderate Socialist reader would find it difficult, too, to deny the truth of Payer's strictures on the strikes and the Independents, more especially as he had rebuked the Jingoese even more severely.

That the Extreme Left had in fact lost strength in the country may be seen from the election at Nieder-Barnim early in March, when the Independents lost the seat to the Majority Socialists, after repeated announcements that they were willing to accept the result as an index of the party's decision between the two sections. At the same time, their failure was partly due to their own incompetence in selecting a singularly bad candidate, to their want of a press, and to the fact that all the weight of bourgeois and 'non-party' influence was thrown on to the side of their opponents.

The first days of March were mainly occupied with discussions of the Russian Peace Treaty, and disclosed no new developments in domestic politics, the Majority Socialists con-

tinuing, with the exception of the directors of the *Frankfurter Volksstimme*, to persuade themselves of the uselessness of protest. All other parties but the Independents had acquiesced with varying degrees of enthusiasm or of reserve. The only other feature of interest was a growing optimism among the parties of the Left with regard to Prussian franchise.

19. *The 'Home Front' and Army Moral.* No doubt there were very sufficient military reasons for the commencement of the March offensive, but there were equally urgent reasons of domestic policy. Ludendorff, after describing the loss by desertion and 'skrimshanking' in the winter, declares that in March the army's *moral* seemed to be completely restored, though there was a certain amount of secret agitation. He attributed the failure of the warlike spirit at home to the vices and misdeeds of the Government, but adds that 'the generally improved spirit of the army had a temporary influence on that at home, and this blinded us to a good deal'.¹ This 'improvement at home' was really due to influences already discussed, which all come back directly or indirectly to the fact that the war on two fronts had ended, and that the position on the one remaining front had improved.

It may be doubted, too, whether Ludendorff was justified in boasting of improved *moral* in the army. On the 24th February a Reichstag debate on this subject left a quite different impression. Progressives and Socialists complained of favouritism in the matter of leave, of the retention of Landsturmiers over 45 at the front, of bad medical service, and of the calling-up of individuals for 'political' reasons. There was other evidence also of increasing discontent and indiscipline, particularly in the Navy. Among civilian workmen there was always more and more grumbling about food conditions; but their recent experiences had removed any inclination to strike with the object of forcing the Government to make peace. The Majority Socialists had received the Russian peace very grudgingly and unwillingly, and even outside their ranks there was a good deal of displeasure at its terms. Its value, apart from military considerations, lay in the benefits which many of the public hoped from it, and which, as the experts must have known, were not likely to materialize. There had been signs of Austrian discontent with the alliance, as in Dr. Lammasch's recent

¹ *War Memories*, ii. 586.

speech in the Reichsrath, and Ludendorff at any rate knew well that the alliance depended solely on the hope of German victory. On the whole it is probably true that the military party was as strong as it had ever been, and as closely united with the Government, with which, indeed, its differences were as to methods rather than objects: the various political parties were, except for the Independents, convinced of the futility of clean-cut opposition: the people were, some from conviction and some from recent experience, unwilling to attempt to stop the prosecution of the war: the economic situation was unlikely to be ameliorated as much as was generally expected, and would therefore in effect get worse; military *moral* was not what might be wished, but it was better than it had been and than it was likely to become. It would be exaggeration to say that the domestic situation necessitated immediate military success, but it did require military success, and there was more chance of obtaining it now than there would be later. Ludendorff speaks of the attempt of Colonel von Haefthen,¹ Max Warburg,² and Conrad Haussmann to get into touch with the Entente for the purposes of negotiation. He complains in view of these facts (which he did not know at the time) of Hertling's and Payer's refusal to contradict the rumour that peace could have been obtained in March if he had not insisted on attacking. In truth, no peace could have been obtained which would have been approved by fifty votes in the Reichstag.

20. *First Results of the March Offensive.* When the offensive began, the general feeling in Germany, more particularly as seen in the Press and in the Reichstag, was one of confidence, but of a very tremulous confidence. The opening days of the battle strengthened confidence very much; on the 25th March the *Berliner Zeitung am Mittag* was already announcing that 'the decisive blow of the break-through has followed the breach in the English positions'. The next day the Centre's organ, *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, thought it 'no longer possible to conclude peace on the terms which we were willing to accept a week ago'. *Vorwärts* reported that the whole people was 'imbued with the feeling that if ever military events can bring peace, it will be now'; the Press as a whole was jubilant.

In the early days of April jubilation increased; *Vorwärts*

¹ A Hamburg banker.

² A Progressive member of the Reichstag. Cf. Ludendorff, ii, p. 593.

grieved to think that there was now no way out but a complete German victory and the dangers which that would entail, and the *Welt am Montag* also regretted that a German victory was now inevitable. The Liberal *Frankfurter Zeitung* came to the conclusion that after all, though Briey and Longwy were not necessary to Germany, yet they were more useful to her than to France, and that politics must build on this plain economic fact. At the same time the restoration of Belgian neutrality was unthinkable except as an unarmed neutrality. The *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* began to wonder whether the July Resolution still corresponded to the facts of the situation. Trimbörn (*Centre*) announced that it must be clearly understood that his party, the 'Centre', kept a perfectly free hand for the future peace negotiations. Dr. Ablass (*Progressive*) pointed out that although the Resolution had gained successes in the East, yet it was not an unalterable programme, and was no longer binding.

On the 15th April the Centre's 'Parlamentarische Korrespondenz' asked, 'Who is there who has ever thought of regarding the peace decision of the 19th July as something not to be touched or altered?' On about the same date the *Freisinnige Zeitung* (the organ of the Progressives) declared that 'the Reichstag resolution had presupposed that all the other nations had the will for an understanding . . . this presupposition has proved illusory. . . . When our enemies have such designs, our attitude to the conclusion of peace after a victorious war must be other than it would be, had our enemies been ready and prompt to go along with us.' The *Lokal-Anzeiger* began to wonder whether Erzberger too would not retract, and apart from him Conrad Haussmann was almost the only bourgeois politician who stood by the July Resolution.

Other signs as well as these,¹ in fact, made it clear that the attitudes of German parties to the great questions of war and peace still depended on every change in the military barometer. This fact and the excessive confidence of the moment contained an element of weakness for the prosecution of the war, which can be traced, for instance, in the remark of *Vorwärts*—'Our whole people is imbued with the feeling that *if ever* military events can bring peace, it will be *now*.'

¹ e. g. Zedlitz, who had shown signs of willingness to compromise on the question of the Prussian franchise, was forced to resign the leadership of the Free Conservatives in the third week of April.

21. *April—waning of confidence.* Very early in April the High Command had ceased to share the confidence of the Press. Ludendorff¹ says: 'These actions (April 4) were indecisive. It was an established fact that the enemy's resistance was beyond our strength. . . . G.H.Q. had to take the extremely difficult decision to abandon the attack on Amiens. . . . Strategically, we had not achieved what the events of the 23rd, 24th and 25th had encouraged us to hope for. . . . However, our troops had beaten the French and English and proved themselves superior. That they did not achieve all the success that was possible was due, not only to their reduced fighting value, but above all, to their not being always under the firm control of their officers. . . . It was as yet too early to give a final opinion on the strategic situation; in itself it was by no means favourable.' He then strangely goes on to complain that the Emperor, unlike his grandfather, 'did not find men like Roon and Bismarck, who were resolved in times of stress to demand from the country everything needed for the prosecution of the war'.

Perhaps some hint of the disappointment of G.H.Q. found its way back to Germany, at any rate it is evident that the jubilant spirit was continually decreasing during the rest of April and May, and that the note of anxiety which *Vorwärts* had struck on the 20th March was spreading almost universally. Instead of celebrating the German achievements newspapers insisted on the incompetence and bad *moral* of the English Army, on the exhaustion of French reserves, on the dissensions between members of the Entente, and on the impatience and credulity of coffee-house strategists. The *Berliner Tageblatt* mirrored the hysterical condition of Berlin. 'In the Reichstag they say, our losses were enormous; in the Reichstag they say, the offensive in the West has stuck; in the Reichstag they say, the whole country in front of Ypres is a great lake, and therefore impassable; in the Reichstag they say, all the country between Amiens and Paris is mined, and would be blown up.' Naturally an attitude of confidence in the military situation was preserved, but it is significant that even in reporting such real victories as the capture of Kemmel Hill it was necessary to deprecate depression.

The spread of nervousness at home might have been justified

¹ II. 600-601, 607.

by a knowledge of the state of mind at G.H.Q. : Ludendorff 'expected strong forces of Americans to come. But the rapidity with which they actually did arrive proved surprising. . . . The only increase in drafts from home that I received for the future was furnished by prisoners of war returned from Russia. G.H.Q. now fell back on its own reserves of men, and prepared its drafts from the troops of the Eastern Army and Rumania . . . but these could not suffice unless the Government released the exempted men and took energetic action against deserters and shirkers. Our troops had fought well, but the fact that certain divisions had obviously failed to show any inclination to attack in the plain of the Lys gave food for thought. . . . The way in which troops stopped round captured food supplies . . . was a serious matter. . . . The absence of our old peace-trained corps of officers was most severely felt. In addition, during the first half of the war the Reichstag had made the penal laws more lenient. . . . The Entente, no doubt, achieved more than we did with their considerably more severe punishments.'¹

22. *Erzberger*. When the end of April brought no hope of decision in the West there were distinct signs of a renewal of the pacific spirit and of an increase of liberalism. In this connexion something can be learnt from Erzberger, who, of all German politicians, was, throughout the war, by far the most successful in the art of forecasting public opinion. On the 30th April a concerted Pan-German and National-Liberal attack on him indicated that there was no longer any hope of his running away from the July Resolution, and was accompanied by a determined attempt to induce the Centre to repudiate him and to embroil him with the Chancellor ; neither the Centre party nor the Chancellor was induced to drop Erzberger, and indeed on the 1st May the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* denied the report of dissensions between him and Hertling, though a week after the publication of an acrimonious correspondence showed (what in fact had long been an open secret) that the two were not on the best of terms. On the 4th May Erzberger attacked the Government's Ukrainian policy, and insisted that there must be no more interference with the internal affairs of that country. The three parties—Centre, Progressive and Majority Socialist—drew up a formula emphasizing the need for the supremacy of the civil govern-

¹ II. 610 seq.

ment. Payer expressed his sympathy, but pointed out that such a resolution amounted to a vote of censure. Accordingly the Majority refrained from bringing forward a formal motion, as their last wish at that moment was to destroy the Hertling-Kühlmann-Payer combination. The whole incident shows how Erzberger was a little quicker than any one else to perceive the swing of public opinion, and how both the Government and the Majority parties thought it wise to follow him.

23. *Prussian Franchise.* At about the same time (the end of April and the first half of May) the franchise question was working up to a crisis. A National-Liberal party convention on the 28th April voted for the equal franchise by a large majority; on the 15th May it was announced that the Centre, in spite of the rejection of its proposals for religious guarantees, would vote for equal franchise. The Government would not accept the proposals for additional votes (except one to be given in respect of age) and the Bill was passed with no franchise clause at all. Friedberg (Vice-President) announced that dissolution would follow as soon as the war situation allowed; the Progressives and Social Democrats were enraged, and it was known that the military opposed a dissolution during the continuance of the Western offensive. Discontent was not likely to be diminished by the contemporaneous reduction of the bread ration.

24. *Disappointment with the Eastern treaties.* By the end of April, also, it had become clear, at least to officials and business men, that the Eastern treaties were not going to ease economic conditions as much as had been expected. Of the 1,000,000 tons of grain hoped for from the Ukraine it was now calculated that only 100,000 would be obtained and neither Russia nor Rumania was likely to come up to expectations; the German Press did not conceal its disappointment, especially over the Ukraine. Meat stocks had rapidly dwindled,¹ and, though the meat ration had not been officially reduced, in many towns not more than 5½ ounces were obtainable. The potato ration was maintained at the existing level. At Krupp's there was no shortage of any metal except mica, but outside there was a lack of copper and nickel. The scheme for the 'voluntary' surrender of textiles had not been successful; secondhand

¹ e.g. the number of pigs had fallen during the last twelve months from 5,700,000 to 1,300,000; however, this loss had been to a small extent supplied by the army's release of 300,000 oxen from occupied territory.

leather had been brought under control; at the last Leipzig Fair there had been no rubber, and none of the substitutes were really efficient. The 8th War Loan had been a real success, for it had raised £727,500,000, or about £70,000,000 more than the 7th. The new budget provided for very little fresh taxation, and much over-estimated the probable yield of that, but the declared policy was to postpone financial reform until after the war.

The main interest of domestic politics continued to centre round Erzberger; and controversy still raged as to what had happened in the Main Committee on the 4th May. The object of the Right and of the section of the Centre represented by the *Kölnische Volkszeitung* was the final discrediting of Erzberger and the consequent alienation of the Centre from the Left. This manœuvre was rendered more hopeful by the successes of the end of May, particularly that of the Chemin des Dames. On the whole, however, the attempt to detach the Centre from the Left did not effect much. The Centre was determined to be safe whatever happened, and Erzberger had made up his mind, finally this time, that a peace by understanding was the only practicable, as well as the only Christian, solution. The death of Kaempf, President of the Reichstag, gave the Right a momentary hope of a quarrel among the Majority, but the matter was adjusted by the election of Fehrenbäch (*Centre*) as President and Scheidemann (*Maj. Soc.*) as a third Vice-President.

25. *The Socialist 'Würzburg' Programme of the 24th May.* On the 24th May was published the Socialist programme of action drawn up by the committee appointed by the Party Directorate in accordance with the resolution of the Würzburg Conference; the main political demands were that:

The representative bodies of the people should have a deciding voice in the appointment and dismissal of the Imperial Chancellor, the Secretaries of State, and the Ministers, who must be entirely responsible to the parliaments for their official actions.

The Reichstag should have a deciding voice as to war and peace, and as to the conclusion of treaties of alliance with foreign powers.

That the standing army should be transformed into a people's army, beginning with the reduction of the time of service.

They further stipulated for the abolition of secret diplomacy ; the creation of international legal organizations ; complete liberty for associations and meetings, and the abolition of all exceptional legislation ; complete self-government in communes, regions, and provinces. Finally, they demanded the reconstruction of the educational system, with a view to removing the monopoly of higher education by the ruling classes.

Although it was expressly stated that the Erfurt programme of 1891 was not replaced but supplemented, there can be no doubt that the Würzburg Programme marked the victory of 'revision' and the abandonment of revolutionary methods. It is characteristic that the *Hamburger Echo*, before the war one of the stoutest opponents of revisionism, insisted in its comment that the Socialist Party must, if it did not want to be eliminated and condemned to sterility, be prepared to make, just as it demanded, concessions. Forgetting its old policy of uncompromising opposition, it went on to declare that the majority block, which had been founded the year before in the Reichstag, was the best proof of the success of parliamentary policy on the basis of give-and-take.

26. *Conservative manœuvres against the Majority.* The third of the articles by 'L. H.', with which the (Conservative) *Kreuzzeitung* was endeavouring to split the Majority (and perhaps also to get Bülow as Chancellor), demanded Freedom of the Seas, and (under the phrase 'the broadening of the basis of our existence') continental annexations, that is, unless Germany obtained very favourable economic terms, and lastly a colonial settlement which should include something more than the restoration of all German colonies. This programme was better calculated to capture hesitating politicians of the Centre and Radical groups than crude demands for annexations and indemnities, for it could be interpreted later on either in a more annexationist sense or as evidence of Conservative moderation. For the moment it was evidently not expected to have much effect, as was clear from the editor's disclaimer of responsibility. Still, some slight progress was being made with the manœuvres against the Majority, or at least no ground was being lost, for on the 11th June a fairly large Centre group backed a renewed National Liberal proposal for a plural franchise and religious guarantees. This proposal was generally considered obstruc-

tive, but, in spite of repudiation by the Government, it was passed by an increased majority.

27. *Relations with Austria-Hungary.* Important developments in Austro-German relations were foreshadowed by Payer's speech of the 9th June, in which he declared the thought of separation to be impossible; the centre of gravity must be economic. Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and perhaps Turkey, should be included; there must be a complete military *rapprochement*, to lighten the burden on the individual states. Burian arrived in Berlin two days later, amid Viennese messages demanding the 'Austro-Polish solution' and Berlin insistence that the alliance must come before the settlement of detailed questions; on his departure he professed satisfaction, though he admitted that nothing had been settled. His satisfaction must have been marred by the friction between the two Governments about the distribution of food; Seidler having expressed the hope that Germany would make certain exports to Austria 'in the sense of the agreements concluded in May', the Wolff Bureau circulated a note that Germany intended to do nothing of the kind; on the 20th June the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* semi-officially deplored the attempt to put the blame on Germany, and explained that the nature of the May agreement had been misunderstood; Germany, having no reserves, had made no promise to deliver from her own supply. However, on 22nd June it was announced that Germany had agreed to let Austria have 10,000 tons of bread-corn from her army stocks.

28. *Army Moral.* G.H.Q., meanwhile, had not been gaining, nor even maintaining, confidence. By June it was recognized that 'not only had our March superiority been cancelled, but also the difference in gross numbers was now to our disadvantage . . . new American reinforcements could release English and French divisions on quiet sectors . . . for this reason America became the deciding factor in the war' (I. 637). In spite of this, however, and of the influenza epidemic, Ludendorff continued to believe that his strength was still great enough to allow him to strike 'one more blow that should make the enemy ready for peace', and he therefore planned the attack on Rheims for the middle of July, and 'undertook the operation with the firm conviction that it would succeed'. After the attack on Rheims he still thought that his men 'had shown

themselves in all essentials superior to the enemy, as long as they were handled carefully'; but his strategical judgment was already being overruled partly by considerations of foreign politics, and partly by distrust of his troops: 'I finally decided against the defensive because, quite apart from the bad influence it would have on our allies, I was afraid that the army would find defensive battles an even greater strain than offensive. Reports from the army about the evil influence of the mood prevailing at home, and reports from home about the low *moral* of the army, became more frequent. The army also complained of the effect of enemy propaganda. . . . The reason for the falling off in our *moral* was not to be found in that. It lay very much deeper. . . . A decided deterioration in the army's *moral* resulted from the re-enrolment, after long leave, of soldiers returned from captivity in Russia. . . .'¹

All this is rather confused: it is at any rate significant that one guiding motive at G.H.Q. was consideration of the state of mind of Germany's allies, while the High Command's complaints of the effect of a bad spirit at home on the army were answered by exactly analogous counter-complaints from home. The truth is probably that there was a growing recognition that, in consequence particularly of the Entente's almost inexhaustible new reservoir of man-power, a good result of the war could not be expected even with such victories as could still be hoped for. Ludendorff's assertion that after the attack on Rheims 'a belief in a favourable issue of the war still prevailed in every quarter' hardly squares with the rest of his remarks as quoted above, particularly with his hope that 'one more blow' would make the 'enemy ready for peace' and his admission that the only result of the recent battles was disillusionment. He certainly changed his opinion a little later, when he inquired into the reasons of the failure of the 18th July, and found that 'the men had ceased to believe in the possibility of an attack'.² He spends a good many pages in rebutting charges of favouritism of regular officers, of luxury for officers at the expense of their men, of the unsatisfactory working of canteens, and so on. Complaints on these and similar grounds were periodical in the Reichstag: on 11th June for instance, Wirth (Centre) demanded that leave should not be given to men who procured food for their superiors or who took up

¹ II, pp. 640-42.

² II, p. 671.

war loan, and that something should be done to improve the very bad arrangements for feeding returned prisoners and troops moving from East to West, and Majority Socialist and Independent Socialist speakers made more violent complaints. Müller (*Progressive*) declared that the Army Command flouted Reichstag Resolutions and War Ministry Orders, and had even suppressed a pamphlet of his own. Many of these complaints are of the kind which will always be made, and will always contain some truth; but they indicate two sources of irritation which are not necessary to an Army. * It is undoubtedly true that leave was granted to men who took up war loan, and that some officers did use other means of pressure for war loan propaganda; and also that the Army Command was not purely passive in the matter of propaganda.

29. *Speech of Kühlmann, 24th June, and Resignation.* The chief political incident of this period was the resignation of Kühlmann, and the events that led to it.

On the 24th June, after a long speech on foreign politics, in which he said little that was new, Kühlmann came to the military situation and the prospects of peace: 'Our army, under leaders of genius whom God has given us, has passed from victory to victory. The situation is such that the initiative rests entirely in the hands of the German Supreme Army Command, and that we can hope that the summer and autumn will bring our arms new and great successes. The Austro-Hungarian Army has also in a dashing onslaught attacked the Italian position and achieved noteworthy successes. . . .' Then followed a quotation of Moltke's prophecy that a modern war might last seven years or thirty years, boasts of the German peace offer, the July Resolution, and the reply to the Papal Note, assertions of Russia's responsibility for the outbreak of war. Germany's aims were defined as follows: 'We wish in the world for the German people, and the same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to our Allies, a secure, free, strong, and independent life: we wish beyond the seas to have the possessions which correspond to our greatness, wealth, and proved colonial capacities: we wish to have the possibility and the freedom to carry on a free sea our trade . . . absolute integrity of the territory of the German Empire. . . . We regard Belgium as one of the questions in the entire complex . . . far-going advances on the road to peace are hardly to be expected from public

statements. . . . So long as every overture is regarded by the others as a peace offensive as a trap, . . . so long as every attempt at *rapprochement* is immediately most violently denounced. . . , so long is it impossible to see how any exchange of ideas can be started leading to peace. Without such an exchange of ideas . . . *an absolute end can hardly be expected through purely military decisions alone*, without any diplomatic negotiations. . . . We hope that our enemies perceive that against the resources at our disposal the idea of a victory for the Entente is a dream and an illusion.'

The next day Hertling made a speech which was claimed as support by both the Left and Right, and in which he declared that 'the tendency of the utterances of the Secretary of State was purely to ascribe the responsibility for the continuation of the war to the enemy powers, entirely in the same sense as I had done on the 25th February, for it goes without saying that there can be no question of crippling our energetic will to defend ourselves or of shaking our confidence in victory'.

Kühlmann himself explained that his 'appeal was directed to no one specifically. His intention was clear from the contents of his speech, namely, that negotiations from parliament to parliament, from speaker's tribune to speaker's tribune . . . would hardly bring any material advance on the road to a solution. Therefore, nothing remained but the method of confidential or diplomatic contact.'

These attempts at defence were not very convincing: some observers considered at the time that the considerable interval (nearly three weeks) between the Foreign Secretary's speech and his resignation indicated that he had had some sort of support from G.H.Q. Ludendorff's book shows that his real state of mind gave some ground for the position which Kühlmann took up: Ludendorff says moreover: 'The Secretary of State was only repeating what was in the minds of the majority,' a statement which is borne out by the applause with which the Foreign Secretary's remarks were greeted from the Centre and Left. It is possible that Ludendorff really had been anxious to damp down the very enthusiastic expectations which were then common of the results of the summer campaign, and that Kühlmann went further than the General had intended. This question does not affect the real importance of the speech, which lies rather in its effects than in its causes.

The debate in which the speeches of Kühlmann and Hertling were delivered did nothing to clear up the situation: the Conservative Westarp drew from it the conclusion that 'the Imperial Chancellor cannot and will not pursue the policy of the Peace Resolution as we understand it': the Social Democrat Noske gathered that the Chancellor was advocating a peace by understanding. Such a situation could not but give German foreign policy an appearance of weakness, or intentional ambiguity, or both: nor was this appearance lessened by subsequent events. Official attempts at defending Kühlmann did not indeed withdraw his declaration in favour of peace by understanding, but they did give the impression that the Government had a sense of weakness in confronting annexationist attacks. The military censorship forbade Kühlmann's speech to be interpreted as meaning that a military decision could not end the war, and provoked the *Frankfurter Zeitung* to declare that this was the first time, at any rate so far as was known, that 'the representatives of the military authorities had issued verdicts upon the utterances of those whose business it is to conduct the Government of the country'. It stated also that 'they had tried to prevent the public from adopting particular views of responsible statesmen'. 'If these factors outside parliament, the most important of which is the Chief Command of the Army, as was shown by former crises and has again been demonstrated by these debates, are at all times able to transform those views of the leading statesmen which are disagreeable to them; if they can forbid the public to give assent to such views and can make those who express them apologize, then it does not really much matter who the persons are who conduct public business and who figure as the representatives of German policy before the Reichstag. . . . There are two possible courses which would replace the present uncertainty by a real solution. Either the Chancellor should once more formally declare in the name of the Government that the Government is still prepared to put an end to the war by an understanding which would meet our vital necessities, or else the representatives of those influences, the exponents of which in the Reichstag assert that the Government will not and cannot pursue the policy of understanding, should assume responsibility for Germany's policy. If it is the case that the Chief Command determines the course of our policy,

then the conduct of this policy should quite frankly be taken over by some one who belongs to that school of thought.'

It was the second rather than the first of the *Frankfurter Zeitung's* alternatives which was adopted when Kühlmann was replaced by Admiral von Hintze : no doubt the interval between the 24th June and Kühlmann's resignation was partly lengthened by the difficulty of finding a successor, and there is some reason to suppose that Bülow was the first candidate. Hertling explained that Kühlmann's resignation was necessitated by personal reasons, and it is true that the Foreign Secretary was not *persona grata* with the Emperor, had enemies in high places in his own office, had been weakened by the retirement of Czernin, and also by the *Deutsche Zeitung's* attacks on his private life. But there can be no doubt that the main cause of his fall was what Hertling described as the want of ' a relationship of confidence between him and other factors ', that the chief of the ' other factors ' was G.H.Q., and that the want of confidence was due to political rather than personal reasons. Hintze was generally assumed, equally by the Right and by the Left, to be a representative of the annexationists, and he was welcomed by Ludendorff as a ' strong man ', though the General could not approve of his Russian policy, which he attributed partly to his own views and partly to ' the old tendencies of the Foreign Office '.

In the middle of July, to Hintze's question whether he was certain of finally and decisively defeating the enemy in the offensive which was then taking place, Ludendorff replied, ' To that I answer positively, Yes '.

30. *Deepening Depression—June to August.* The whole Kühlmann incident showed the existence of a dual government in Germany, of which the military part was the stronger : it weakened the civil government without strengthening the Army Command. G.H.Q. had been able to get what it wanted out of the late *régime* without being responsible for it. Now the ' parliamentarization ' of 1917 had been to a large extent neutralized, for there was no pretence that Hintze was appointed with the consent or even with the approval of the Majority.¹ The Generals, in fact, had accepted a larger and more obvious share of responsibility for policy, and would therefore be more

¹ But Hertling did announce that he had obtained guarantees that Hintze would be loyal to his policy.

seriously weakened by want of success. It is probably fair to infer that they were once more placing their hopes on 'one more blow', and that in the light of the military history of the year, of the decline in the *moral* of the army, and of the more rapidly increasing irritation at the food and general economic shortage, these hopes were based on desperation. In short, G.H.Q. now felt that every risk must be taken for the sake of finishing the war quickly.

In spite of Ludendorff's complaints that the Press had not done its share in maintaining civilian *moral*, it had in fact been throughout June very resolutely optimistic, even about the Austrian campaign on the Isonzo. During July, and still more in August, it showed increasing signs of depression, as the offensive of Foch gathered strength. On the 30th July the German wireless declared that 'up to the present the battle has taken a direction which was intended by the German High Command, and it will be further conducted in accordance with the plans of the High Command. The Command has maintained its full freedom of operation. . . .' On the 2nd August the *Vossische Zeitung* reported that the danger was over when Foch was brought to a stand about 23rd July, but it came very near the crime for which Kühlmann had suffered when it reckoned with Foch's formation of a new reserve 'until movement enters the whole front, which, unless politicians can end the war, will one day happen . . .' and on the 3rd August the wireless published Ludendorff's admission that 'our strategical plan of attack has failed'. It is improbable that this would have been said if it were not already known, and equally improbable that much consolation was derived from Ludendorff's statement, 'I look forward with absolute confidence to the results of this great struggle'. At any rate by 10th August the Press was showing unmistakable signs of distrust of the General Staff. On the 11th August the *Frankfurter Zeitung* came pretty near to an open expression of distrust: 'We have always pointed out that we expected no miracles from this campaign. But we trusted firmly in the success of the general plan, and we still do so till the contrary is proved. . . .' Exhortations to civilians to keep up their courage, and to think of the effect of domestic depression on the troops, continued, and by the 18th August the *Frankfurter Zeitung* was lecturing the troops themselves. At the same time, discontent was continually aggravated by the

bitterer and bitterer disappointment and more and more acrimonious wrangling over Eastern policy, on which a lurid light was thrown by the murders of Mirbach and Eichhorn.

All confidence, in fact, had vanished; and it was the same at G.H.Q., as may be seen from Ludendorff's memoirs.¹

Depression was spreading and deepening in the army as well as at G.H.Q.: this became very obvious to the Entente from the examination of prisoners of war. Discouragement among the civilian population was made more difficult to bear by the lateness of the harvest and the reduction of the meat ration: the oat crop was very poor, and in general it was probable that the official estimate of the harvest as better than the previous year's was untrue.

31. *Weakening of the Government, July.* The parties of the Majority had been united in their defence of Kühlmann's speech of the 24th June, but unable to prevent his fall or to influence the appointment of his successor. They continued, however, to make attacks on the Government, some of them (e. g., Scheidemann, 11th July) very violent, and it was to this no doubt, and to the military situation, that was due the change in Hertling's views of the Belgian question in the twenty-four hours from the 11th July to the 12th July: on the first occasion he still held that 'Belgium as a pawn means for us that we must secure ourselves by the peace conditions against Belgium ever becoming a jumping-off ground for our enemies, not only in a military but also in an economic sense'; but by the 12th Belgium had become a pawn for the securing of other peace conditions, and Germany had no intention of retaining it in any form whatever.²

32. *Reduction of War-aims.* On the 13th July the Majority Socialists re-affirmed their independence, on the occasion of voting the war credits, by putting in a plea for peace 'on the basis of the integrity of both sides': this plea did not save Scheidemann from being hissed at a public meeting for voting the war credits at all. On the 4th July the Prussian Franchise Bill had been passed with the plural franchise agreed on by the Right, which still maintained its confidence in spite of the Government's continued determination to dissolve if necessary.

¹ II, 674 and seq.

² The inspired Press made the most of this concession to the Left, but interpreted it in a narrow sense as meaning a Federal Flemish-Walloon Belgium united by commercial treaties to Germany.

On the 25th July Scheidemann (who was touring the country in favour of electoral reform)¹ announced that he had the Chancellor's assurance that, if it were necessary in the interests of the equal franchise, the Prussian Landtag would be dissolved before the end of the year. At once the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* hastened to declare that this announcement was due to a misunderstanding.

During July and August there was a good deal of obscure intriguing in the direction of peace, and towards the end of August there were several members of the Majority Socialist and the Left parties in Switzerland and in touch with various neutral 'peace-makers'. Among them was Scheidemann, though it was possible that he hoped not so much to bring peace nearer as to be able to stiffen the German workers by pointing out that he had gone to Switzerland and none of the Entente Socialists had met him half-way.

August saw a considerable shifting of political opinion towards the Left: mention has already been made of the opposition which Scheidemann met on his equal franchise campaign: there were signs also of dissatisfaction even among the Majority Socialists themselves, of discontent with the leadership of Scheidemann and Ebert, and probably their Swiss visit was not unconnected with this discontent.

In the ranks of the Centre the Left Wing again predominated: even the *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, which was accustomed to make the most Jingo demands, began to think that it might be well to provide British pacifists with encouragement. There were repeated demands, which met with some success, that more influence inside the Centre should be given to the working classes, and at a by-election an unofficial Centre candidate was elected by the progressive section against the official party representative, who was supported by the Bishop. All parties of the Left made increasingly violent attacks on the Government's Eastern policy and particularly on what *Vorwärts* called 'the throne barricade against the peace of the peoples'. There was a general weakening too—even, to some extent, on the Right—about war-aims in the West. By the end of the month Stresemann professed to think that peace would have resulted from an English proposal on the lines laid down by

¹ A few days before the Independent Socialists had prevented him from holding a meeting at Solingen.

Lord Lansdowne, and claimed that the National-Liberals had refrained from supporting the July Resolution only because they knew that the enemy would not respond. Official propaganda was supplied by Dr. Solf, who denied that Germany was ruled by the doctrine of force, promised the restoration of Belgium as an independent state, described the Brest-Litovsk Treaty as a framework, demanded the return of the colonies, and assured his hearers that it would be helping the enemy to react to their knock-out policy in a similar spirit. This speech was very warmly welcomed by the Left (though an Independent Socialist paper thought this and a somewhat similar speech of Prince Max of Baden completely in accord with Pan-German wishes).

The increasing demand for the summoning of the Main Committee and even of the Reichstag led to a meeting on the 22nd August between representatives of the Government, of whom the chief were Payer and Hintze, and the party leaders. Contrary to custom, an official report of the discussion between the Government and the party leaders was issued. According to this report 'the majority of the deputies took the view that even after the conclusion of the negotiations which are at present still pending with Russia the immediate summoning of the Reichstag might be dispensed with. In connexion with this the Foreign Secretary gave more precise information on the external political situation and the results of the deliberations which took place a short time ago at Headquarters in the presence of Austro-Hungarians and after the representatives of Poland had been heard.' It is difficult to understand the nature of the agreement semi-officially announced to have been reached on both Eastern and Western policy, but the Left doubtless did receive assurances of some sort in return for not insisting on the meeting of the Reichstag before the normal date.

33. *The Spa Conferences, 13th-15th August.* It has already been said that Ludendorff decided to arrange conferences with the Chancellor and the Foreign Secretary. These conferences took place at Spa on the 13th and 15th August, and reference is made to them in the official report of the party leaders' meeting. At these conferences Hintze reported Austria's declaration, and his own opinion, that she could not hold out beyond the winter, and that it was doubtful if she could hold out so long. Relations

with Turkey were difficult, and it was necessary either to leave her alone or to acquiesce in presumptuous claims, a choice which could be decided only in one way. The Chief of the General Staff had declared that he could no longer hope to break the fighting spirit of the enemy by military action, and that military policy must aim at gradually paralysing it by a strategic defensive, and the political leaders bowed to this opinion. The Emperor and Ludendorff both insisted that better discipline must be maintained at home, and the Chancellor agreed that authority must be maintained. The Emperor considered that a suitable time must be sought at which to enter into an understanding with the enemy, and desired neutral mediation. Hindenburg promised that the Germans would remain on French soil and thus finally force the enemy to bow to their will.¹

34. *Depression of Government and Public, September.* The effect of these official views upon domestic politics and public opinion became obvious early in September. On the 7th Freytag-Loringhoven, in a public lecture, maintained that the military situation was no worse than it had been two or three times before, but ended up by admitting, 'What we have to do is to push things so far that England and America recognize that we are not to be overcome in the defensive war which we are now conducting'. On the 4th Hertling, in introducing the Prussian Franchise proposals in the committee of the Herrenhaus, emphasized the Government's decision to fulfil the royal promise and his conviction that 'in this difficult question the protection and maintenance of the crown and dynasty are involved': *Vorwärts* thought that this frankness 'a little overstepped the limits of political wisdom', and pointed out that 'there was still a great gulf between its demands and the Government's proposals, with its extra votes for age and equal legislative rights for the Herrenhaus'. However, some progress had been made, with the conversion of so strong an opponent as Stresemann and the report that even in the Conservative Party 'the conviction was growing that reforms must not break down in the Herrenhaus'. On the 12th the Emperor paid

¹ With reference to this promise the official German *Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstands* asserts that the Field-Marshal's 'hope' was turned into a 'statement' by a pencil note which was apparently Ludendorff's. The latter, however, in his *Memories* (II. 686) declares that 'the Field-Marshal took a more optimistic view of the military situation than I did', and this is borne out by Hintze. Ludendorff also says that views on Poland were so divergent that an agreement with Austria-Hungary was impossible.

a visit to Krupp's works and made a speech which his audience, although carefully selected, did not receive very well. The next day the Vice-Chancellor made a very remarkable speech at Stuttgart: Payer said, ' . . . We owe it to the honour of ourselves and our country to hold out . . . I think one would be wronging the German people if one attributed its unmistakable depression to the recent defeats on the Western front. The real ground of our depressed feelings lies . . . in the sense that peace prospects are continually being postponed. . . . This is a feeling which does not fall on Germany and her Allies alone. . . . Our national debt reaches a fantastic amount. . . . The U-boat war has not worked so quickly and surely as we had reckoned. . . . We have only to see to it that the war continues to be waged in a foreign country. . . . For Germany we may certainly say that, undisturbed by all differences of opinion, it will not be divided. . . . In this respect the fate of the Prussian Franchise Bill has a prime importance. . . . If the equal franchise does not emerge from the Herrenhaus committee the Government will dissolve. . . . If conquests are excluded on both sides, then the necessary consequence is the restoration of the territorial status before the war. It is everywhere possible forthwith, only not in our East. . . . Once we and our Allies are again in possession of what belonged to us (including colonies) then—I think I can say this—Belgium will be able to be given back without burden and without reservation.' This was 'the proposal with regard to the Belgian question', which Ludendorff accepted 'because he thought it was to serve as a foundation for the negotiations of the Foreign Secretary', and the publication of which he regretted.

This speech was not likely to cause great enthusiasm, but on the whole it was well received, and even some Pan-German papers made the best of it. The extreme Right, however, would have none of it, and so moderate a Socialist as Wolfgang Heine pointed out that the recent supplementary treaties with the Bolshevists must deprive it of all effect abroad. Its main importance, in short, was that it registered the extent of the Government's approach to desperation.

35. *The Austro-Hungarian Peace Note.* At the time of the Spa discussions General von Arz had told Ludendorff that the Austrian army was no longer in a position to last out the winter, and Hintze's Vienna visit (3rd to 6th September) produced nothing

but assurances that negotiations would be continued, and a hint that the Entente would shortly be forced to show whether it was conducting a predatory war or was really fighting for a League of Nations. This hint was repeated on the 9th by Burian himself, and materialized on the 15th in the Austro-Hungarian peace note, the forerunner of the defection of Germany's allies.

Enough has been written to show that by September Germany was very near desperation, and that the Government did little to disguise the fact. This did not at once lead to a more violent or more open opposition. There were efforts to organize an *union sacrée* from Westarp to Wiemer, that is, an alliance of all the bourgeois parties, behind a programme something like that sketched by Payer; but it was too difficult to get any such programme accepted by the Right, and then the Centre and the Left were beginning to wonder whether such a programme would any longer be good enough. The Socialists were for a time remarkably quiet, hardly troubling to denounce the Supplementary Treaties with the Bolsheviks, which some Progressive papers even mildly welcomed: though the Socialists did promise Troelstra to oppose the Government bitterly if it allowed the Russian question to wreck peace attempts for which the Entente was ready. But already there were rumours of the Kaiser's abdication. Erzberger was becoming more prominent again and was expressing his wonder that the propertied classes all over the world did not rise up and insist on peace, as the only way to avoid Bolshevism. A report reached Berlin from Vienna that the Ministry was to be reconstructed so as to allow for the inclusion of Scheidemann and Erzberger, and some of the Right papers took this with a certain amount of seriousness.

On the 15th the Austro-Hungarian Government issued its invitation to all belligerents to take part in a 'confidential non-binding discussion' on neutral territory.

It is now known that on the 3rd September the German Chancellor had informed the Prussian Cabinet that 'an offer of peace could not, and must not, be made', but 'feelers must be thrown out', and that since the 10th August discussions had been in progress between the two Governments on the question of a peace move, Germany basing her unwillingness on the unripeness of the time and on the advantages of seeking

neutral mediation: when the Note was issued, therefore, it was not unexpected by the German Government, but it was unwelcome on these two grounds. The German Government had, in fact, informed most of the party leaders, excluding some of the Majority Socialists because it feared a press campaign against the supplementary Russian agreement: it is almost certain, however, that the news was already known from unofficial sources. On the 10th September Hindenburg was in favour of neutral mediation without delay. Semi-official denials that the Austro-Hungarian Note was in harmony with her Ally were therefore justified, and so, probably, was the statement that Count Toerring's proposal to the Belgian Government was 'the irresponsible work of an uninvited mediator'. From the 18th September to the end of the month the German Government was making repeated efforts to obtain neutral mediation.¹

36. *Action of the Opposition.* The continued success of the Entente armies, together with the Austro-Hungarian Note (or rather the way in which it had been prejudiced by Payer's speech and in which it was broken to the Reichstag leaders), convinced the opponents of the Hertling régime that the time had come for action. When, at the meeting with the Chancellor the Majority leaders had insisted on the summoning of the Main Committee for the 24th September, the National-Liberals began to angle for participation in the Majority's councils, and very generously dropped all objection to Payer's programme. *Germania* (Centre) would welcome the National-Liberals if they abandoned their opposition to the July Resolution. The Centre wished still to support Hertling, but had no objection to a socialist element in the Government; the Socialists were willing to enter the Government on the following conditions:

(1) Article IX, forbidding simultaneous membership of the Reichstag and the Bundesrat, must be abolished.

(2) Equal, secret, and direct suffrage for all states of the Federation.

(3) The elimination of 'parallel governments' and the appointment of Government representatives from the Majority.

(4) Freedom of meetings and of the Press, and political control of the state of siege, *i.e.* equivalent of martial law.

¹ This is asserted in the official *Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstands*, but was denied by Hintze to Ludendorff on 29th September.

(5) The National Liberals must unreservedly accept the standpoint of the Majority.

(6) The restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro.

(7) The peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest not to hinder the conclusion of general peace.

(8) Autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine.

Ebert pointed out the difficulty of working with the Centre, and both he and Scheidemann spoke against a peace at any price and envisaged the possible necessity of a war of national defence. Meanwhile papers of such various hues as the *Frankfurter*, the *Vossische*, the *Börsen-Zeitung*, and *Vorwärts* were all suggesting that the last word had not been said on indemnities, and that Germany was ready for discussion of the Alsace-Lorraine question, though she must maintain her standpoint.

37. *Meeting of the Main Committee, 24th September.* The situation when the Main Committee met, on the 24th September, was that many members of the Centre were unwilling to join a coalition government because they knew that the Socialists would want Hertling's resignation, the revision of the Brest-Litovsk Treaties, and the repeal of Article IX. The National-Liberals were hoping to take advantage of this to form with the Centre a coalition which should lean to the Right. Such a hope was absolutely doomed: the cleverest tactics could not disguise the fact that political forces had shifted decisively and irrevocably to the Left. It could no longer be doubted that an overwhelming majority of the population now wanted peace and parliamentarization; even though for many of them parliamentarization was only a step to peace. Socialists, Progressives, many Centrists, some National-Liberals, could no longer doubt which way their supporters wanted them to lean, nor be ignorant that those supporters were daily becoming more numerous and more resolved.

The Government did not strengthen its position in the debate of the 24th: Hertling denied that the military situation was as bad as it had been on previous occasions, defended German actions with regard to Belgium, laid the responsibility for the war on Edward VII and Russia, and appealed for unity and confidence. Wrisberg admitted that military reports had under-estimated the enemy, but declared that the High Command was full of confidence. Brüninghaus, for the Admiralty, was

satisfied with the position at sea. Hintze said almost nothing, and Payer defended Eastern policy.

The most noteworthy feature of the ensuing debate was the acceptance of Payer's Stuttgart programme by the National-Liberals, Centrists, and Progressives, which showed that the gulf between the Socialists and the rest of the Majority was not yet bridged. Next was the violent attack made by Gröber on the 'Nebenregierung', which, in view of the fact that he was the great champion of Hertling in the Centre, was evidence of increasing solidarity. That solidarity was further strengthened by Hertling's speech of the 26th, when he acknowledged the objection to the military's conduct of the state of siege, but said that the civil authorities could only do their best to influence it. On the same day solidarity was definitely established by the news of Bulgaria's defection. After that it was vain for the National-Liberals to call for an 'all-party coalition'. Hertling called a meeting of the Prussian Ministry, which decided to vote against the repeal of Article IX in the Bundesrat, and such a decision rendered hopeless all attempts at co-operation with the Majority. On the 29th Hertling and Hintze departed for G.H.Q.,¹ and on the same day *Germania* became enthusiastic for the Socialists and the Conservative press called openly for a dictatorship. By the 30th *Vorwärts* was painting a very depressing future of a Germany deserted by Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and was declaring that any statesman who was not in favour of a peace of understanding deserved to be hanged. On the 1st October the Emperor accepted Hertling's resignation and expressed his desire for a more effective co-operation of the people in determining the destiny of the Fatherland.²

38. *Effect of the Bulgarian Defection.* That the people of Berlin were affected by the Bulgarian news no less than were the politicians was shown by the tone of the press: the *Kölnische Zeitung*, for instance, thanked heaven that Berlin was not Germany. 'As the Bourse yesterday and the riot of rumours showed again, Berlin always beats the Empire by innumerable lengths in nervousness . . . we must, in times like the present, call to the world again and again that Berlin is not Germany';

¹ Cf. Ludendorff, II, p. 722, for Hintze's declaration on this date that a parliamentary ministry was essential and a revolution possible.

² Already the Right was complaining of anti-monarchical propaganda.

but it may be doubted whether this time there was very much difference between the two.

On the 29th September, despite encouraging news from German sources at Sofia, it had been resolved that the new German Government should make a peace offer¹ based on the Fourteen Points, and on the same day the Bulgarian armistice was signed. *Turco-German relations were very strained.

During September pessimism had been deepening at G.H.Q. Ludendorff saw that 'the distressing manifestations in the army would not decrease but rather multiply with the constant retreats and disintegrating influences from home.'² He knew that 'there was no longer any chance of the pendulum swinging in our favour', and by the end of the month 'duty compelled him to substitute action for idle time-wasting. . . . The enemy had to be asked for peace, and an armistice.'³ On the 30th September G.H.Q. asked to be informed of all public announcements with regard to peace negotiations, as otherwise there was a danger of demoralization setting in. On 1st October* Ludendorff requested that the offer of peace should be dispatched at once. 'The troops are holding their own to-day, what may happen to-morrow cannot be foreseen.'

On the 2nd October Major von dem Bussche, as the official spokesman of the Higher Command, assured a meeting of the Reichstag party leaders that the fighting of the last six days had been victorious, but admitted that there was no longer any prospect of forcing the enemy to make peace: the situation might grow worse at any moment, and no time must be lost.

39. *Prince Max of Baden's Chancellorship: Beginning of Peace Negotiations. Character of the New Government.* On the 3rd October it was known that Prince Max of Baden was to be the new Chancellor, at the head of a parliamentary régime, and on the 5th he made his first speech to the Reichstag: he accepted the programme of the Majority and announced that a Note had been sent to President Wilson asking him to take in hand the work of peace.⁴ Prince Max had long been considered a really Liberal politician and a champion of moderate war-aims. He had even been claimed as a colleague by the Baden Socialist party.

¹ Such an offer had been in course of preparation since 21st September.

² II, p. 700.

³ II, p. 719.

⁴ This Note was sent on the 4th, though it is dated the 3rd in the *Official Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstands* (p. 59); it was transmitted via Switzerland on the 5th, and reached Washington on the 6th.

The press was taking a more and more gloomy view, the Berlin Bourse was in a state of collapse, the Russian wireless was quoting an article by 'Spartacus' in the *Izvestiya* calling on the German proletariat to resort to revolution. The Conservative Party, probably as a result of Hindenburg's visit to Berlin, announced on the 2nd October its willingness to accept the Emperor's decree and to co-operate with a Government which aimed at an honourable peace: on the same day the Prussian Landtag was converted to the equal franchise. Nevertheless, the new Government was formed exclusively from the Majority.¹ On the 4th the National-Liberals accepted the Majority programme. But they were not very cordially welcomed, for it was decided that, instead of admitting any fresh National-Liberals to the Government, those members of the party who were in office under the old *régime* should be allowed to remain.

In general the press welcomed the new Government, even the *Kreuzzeitung* being convinced that the Higher Command had agreed to the Chancellor's step, but most of the Pan-German papers continued to denounce the spirit of defeat, for which they saw no justification: the left wing of the Socialists also had misgivings as to the new *régime*.

On the 8th October the Government received Wilson's reply to its peace Note. Meanwhile all interest was concentrated on two points—the possibility of peace, and domestic politics. Expert criticism of the Western front was a little more reassuring, but the general impression was that the war was lost: on the 5th came the news of Ferdinand's abdication (the 4th) and that Russia had repudiated her treaty with Turkey; by this date it was no longer to be doubted that the change in the Turkish Government was a preparation for peace. It was vain for Rathenau to protest that the peace proposal was premature; apart from the Pan-Germans (whose opposition Payer welcomed as strengthening the Government) his only supporter was Haenisch, who kept the flag of Jingo Socialism flying, but can have had no followers left.

¹ The Government was composed as follows: *Vice-Chancellor*, Payer (*Progr.*); *Foreign Affairs and Colonies*, Solf; *War*, General v. Scheüch; *Admiralty*, Admiral von Mann; *Interior*, Trimborn (*Centre*); *Labour*, Bauer (*Maj. Soc.*); *Under-Secretary*, Giesberts (*Centre Labour*); *Ministers without Portfolio*, Erzberger, Gröber (*Centre*), Haussmann (*Progr.*), Scheidemann (*Maj. Soc.*); *Under-Secretaries of Food and Economic Offices*, August Müller, Robert Schmidt (*Maj. Soc.*).

On the 10th a Socialist newspaper was pointing out the incompatibility between the Kaiser's principles and the armistice conditions, and recommending him to improve the prospects of peace by abdication. On the same day, the 10th, the revolutionary council of the Eastern Army¹ published a communist manifesto, whose first postulate was that the Western army had been defeated and was in flight. Strikes were breaking out, notably at Krupp's.

On the 12th October a meeting of the Bavarian Socialist Party demanded a parliamentary commission of inquiry into the responsibility for the failure of the peace offer of December 1916, an inquiry which should not stop at the steps of the throne. The leader of the party, Adolf Braun, warned it that it must work against the now universal feeling for revolution. He believed in revolution, and he believed that it would come soon, but this was not the time, when it was quite impossible to satisfy the demands of the masses flooding back from the front.

On the 9th October Ludendorff thought that the spirit of the army had improved, and that material was sufficient; ² the chief weakness was the lack of reinforcements. He opposed a suggested *levée en masse*, and thought it possible to protect the frontier at a distance from the Western front for a long time, though there was some danger of a break through.

On the 10th Solf reported that Ludendorff considered it impossible to hold the front three months longer; some of the politicians, notably Payer and Erzberger, were anxious to obtain other military opinions, but in view of Ludendorff's insistence that G.H.Q. must bear the whole responsibility, they dared not carry out this project. After a good deal of discussion, Hindenburg and Ludendorff agreed to the text of the reply to Wilson, which was dispatched on the 12th October; in this reply G.H.Q. had obtained the insertion of the paragraph assuming the Entente's acceptance of Wilson's principles, but it had failed to obtain any reservations with regard to the evacuation of occupied territory. (II. 738.)

On the 13th October Erzberger announced that the enemy was being convinced that Germany had changed from an authority state to a people's state. He denied that Germany was offering peace from weakness, but rather invalidated this

¹ The authenticity of this council is not above suspicion.

² Except that the Air Force had only two months' supply of oil.

denial by asserting, with pardonable exaggeration, that the generals and the political leaders had drawn up the last reply to Wilson in a spirit of complete understanding.

On the 15th October the press published the text of Prince Max's letter to Prince Alexander von Hohenlohe; this letter¹ was, indeed, nearly a year old, but it was disconcerting to find that, even so long ago, the new Chancellor had been opposed to parliamentarization and had regarded the July Resolution with the utmost contempt. The Majority Socialists had, according to rumour, only accepted a prince as Chancellor with a good deal of grudging, and now had an excellent excuse for getting rid of him. Yet the expected Chancellor-crisis did not occur; the truth is that by this time every one knew that the Socialists had the game in their hands, and just because they were so strong it was to their advantage to have a Chancellor for whom they were not responsible. It is very likely that there was some bargain between the two, with further pledges of obedience from the Chancellor; in any case, he made no attempt at independent action for the rest of his term of office.

The press as a whole had treated the Note of the 12th October, with its acceptance of preliminary evacuation of occupied territory, as an inevitable necessity; only the extreme Right alone had failed to see the necessity. Even the Vaterlandspartei assured the Government of its support in the great task of winning peace with honour; it added that it would continue that support if it came to a war of national defence. Wilson's second Note (the 14th October) caused general disappointment; it was published in Germany on the 16th, and the immediate result was to increase the number of Conservative organs which called for a war of defence;² it was just these papers, too, which saw in the American President's desire for the 'destruction of the power which has hitherto controlled the destinies of Germany' an attack on the Emperor. The bourgeois Majority papers found this interpretation impossible, in view of the change in Art. IX, which had already passed the Bundesrat, and which was to make it possible for parliamentary ministers to be responsible to the Reichstag.

¹ It described the July Resolution as 'the disgusting child of fear and the Berlin dog-days'.

² The Committee of the Conservative Party announced that there was 'no choice—' the decisive struggle of arms must be carried on to the end '.

40. *Extremist Agitation.* On the 17th October *Vorwärts* reported that there was in the Berlin factories much talk of a Haase-Ledebour Government, which was to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat on a foundation of workmen's councils. *Vorwärts* pointed out, with a truth which was obvious from the past and was to be reasserted by the future, that there was a great difference between the Independents and the Bolshevists. On the 18th the Executive Committee of the Official Socialists published a manifesto, which insisted that great steps had already been taken towards peace and parliamentarization, and that the Socialists would stay in the Government only so long as that process continued; the German workers must beware of the dark forces of reaction, but equally they must avoid Bolshevism and strikes and demonstrations against the Government, which no longer had either sense or object.

There is evidence that by this time the discussion of the question of the Emperor's abdication was general and open, that war-loan placards were defaced and in general that an anti-patriotic attitude was common, and that the police were trusting to the military, but with the consciousness that their trust was likely to be disappointed. There is no considerable evidence that revolution was being systematically prepared,¹ or that efforts were being made to replace the old organization, which was evidently crumbling. The Official Socialists were anxious chiefly to get peace without falling into the disaster of Bolshevism; most of the Independent Socialists, and the best of them, were equally averse from Bolshevism; and most important of all, the whole process was mainly a negative one. It was not that a new power was forcing itself into a position of control, but that the impotence of what had been the guiding power was becoming more and more obvious, while its successors, debilitated by years of indecision, were most concerned to keep the old machinery going in order to avoid a complete break-down.

41. *Answer to the 2nd American Note.* The first meeting of secretaries of state to discuss the answer to be sent to Wilson's second Note was held on the 16th October, when Solf read a telegram from G.H.Q. inquiring whether the internal situation would allow the transfer of all troops from East to West and

¹ Though no doubt something was being done by Spartacists and extremist Independents.

a struggle to the bitter end. He attacked the Higher Command for its attempt to shift responsibility, and maintained that the collapse of military power had caused civilian depression. Solf was supported by Scheidemann and Gröber; Payer again raised the question of consulting other generals than Ludendorff, which Col. von Haeften deprecated. The next day the Chancellor reported that Ludendorff and Hindenburg would resign if other generals were consulted; Haussmann thought their resignation would be disastrous; Scheidemann insisted that it must be avoided, although the National-Liberals had indicated to Solf their want of confidence in Ludendorff and Hindenburg, thus strengthening the Government's hands in the matter. Later in the day Generals Ludendorff and Hoffmann attended; both agreed that not more than twelve divisions could be brought from the East, that to bring so many would mean the loss of whatever economic advantage Germany drew from the Ukraine and an increased danger of Bolshevism, and that the released divisions could be useful only on the defensive. In reply to a definite question Ludendorff said that a break-through was possible, but that he did not fear it. General Scheuch thought that one big reinforcement of 600,000 could be raised, and then 100,000 a month for six months and 150,000 for the next six months; home industries would suffer, and reinforcements would be exhausted by September 1919. Ludendorff then had his usual altercation with the civilians as to whether the army had been demoralized from the 'home front'. He promised that if the army could get over the next four weeks they would be 'out of the wood', and Payer agreed that, provided the answer to Wilson were so worded as to show the people that they had not thrown up the sponge, all would not yet be lost. After some further discussion Ludendorff again admitted that 'the line may be broken and we may be defeated any day'; it was generally agreed that without Rumania oil supplies would last very few months longer. Ludendorff's last word was that, if Wilson stood by his second Note, he must be told to fight for his conditions; there could be no worse conditions. This attitude he maintained on the 18th: on the same day Burian warned the German Government in detail of all the possible consequences of a breach in the negotiations, and Solf informed the Minister of War that he had reason to believe that Luden-

dorff's hopes were not shared by his entourage. On the 20th Hindenburg sent by telephone two suggested additions to the German reply, but it was sent off on that day without them. It left it to the President to create an opportunity for the settlement of the details of evacuation, promised the cessation of the sinking of passenger ships, and emphasized the democratization of the German Government. The Government had, in fact, made up its mind to act against the opinion of Ludendorff.

This is a really epoch-making event; German politicians were at last not only in a position to control policy, but actually bold enough to do so: the significance of this is not lessened by the doubt, which one cannot fail to have after reading the discussion analysed above, whether Ludendorff was not having the greatest difficulty in persuading himself to advise resistance. No doubt the resolution of the civilians was stiffened by communications like that addressed to them on the 20th October by the Imperial Minister at Munich: 'It seems to me to be my duty to issue a warning against judging the true state of public feeling by the firm tone of almost the entire press. In reality, an overwhelming majority are desirous only of peace.'

42. *Influence of trade unions and economic organizations.* Something has already been said of the aversion of most of the Socialist leaders from revolutionary violence; the trade unions as such were even more strongly opposed to any such action. Their leaders were accustomed to a continuous effort to get out of the existing system everything that could be got for the wage-earner.¹ Officially the unions were neutral in politics; they had great sums invested, largely in war loan; there is very little evidence of anything like organized preparation of workers' councils before the Revolution, and certainly such preparation received no support from the unions. Early in 1919 there were repeated complaints from the champions of the councils that 'as Ebert, Scheidemann & Co. undermined and finally abolished the rights of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council in the political field, so Legien, Bauer, and Adolf Cohen did the same in the economic field'.²

¹ Cf. Noske in the Reichstag, 24th October: 'I share the view of Haase that a large part of our economy is ripe for socialization, that is why we do not want it demolished by civil war.'

² *Was die Arbeiterräte wollen und sollen*, Richard Müller.

Pamphlets by supporters of the councils assert, and, from internal evidence, no doubt with truth, that on the 18th October Hugo Stinnes was commissioned by the iron-masters and the mine-owners' association to negotiate with the trade unions for the foundation of 'co-partnership'.¹ At first the negotiations were carried on in Rhenish Westphalia, and at the beginning of November continued in Berlin. Among others the following participated—Stinnes, Vogler, Hugenberg, Ernst von Borsig, Friedrich von Siemens, for the employers; for the workers—Legien, Liepart, Schlickert, Stegerwald, Hartmann, Höfle. 'It was certainly an indescribable triumph for the trade union pundits when the well-known extremist Stinnes found himself ready for a partnership of labour'.¹ The leader of the German iron- and steel-masters, Dr. Reichert, said later that on the 9th October a meeting of industrialists took place at Düsseldorf—'How could industry be saved? How could capitalistic enterprise² be saved from the socialization which was threatening to sweep over every branch of economics, from nationalization and from the approaching revolution? . . . It seemed that only organized labour had an outstanding influence. Therefore it was resolved, in the middle of the general insecurity, in the face of the tottering State and Government, that industry could find strong allies only on the side of the workers, that is, of the trade unions . . . The sacrifice had to be made . . . On November 6 the same representatives of employers and workmen appeared (before the Government) and unanimously demanded the creation of the demobilization office.' Richard Seidel, also a champion of the council system, says, 'In consequence of such considerations (*i.e.*, the connexion between wages and the prosperity of industry) the idea arose that the economic situation should be turned to the advantage of both parties by the co-operation of the employers' and the workers' associations. On this idea was built up the policy which the higher authorities of the trade unions followed during the revolution, "co-partnership for ensuring the transition economy" . . . It sets the finishing touch to a development whose roots lay in the time before the war, its bloom in the action of the trade unions during the war.' These utterances may be of some assistance to the understanding of German history in the last three weeks before the signing of the armistice.

¹ *Arbeitsgemeinschaft*.

² *Unternehmertum*.

43. *The Reichstag establishes responsible government.* The Reichstag met on the 22nd October. Prince Max of Baden described the course of the peace negotiations and the nature of the constitutional changes proposed by his Government—participation of Reichstag members in the ministry, representation of the Chancellor by persons other than heads of offices, the establishment of a State Tribunal to ensure the legal responsibility of the Chancellor, Reichstag control of the declaration of peace and war and, after the establishment of the League of Nations, of alliances; amnesty for political prisoners. These proposals were well received except by the Conservatives, and by the Independent Socialists, who demanded the abolition of the monarchy. There was a good deal of grumbling that the military ‘Nebenregierung’ was not so easily annihilated as the Government thought, as was shown by the continued misdeeds of the censorship and the state of siege. Even Ebert, himself a minister, declared that the military Cabinet must be relieved of its powers; the results of the debates were that the constitutional proposals were stiffened, particularly by the civil control of the military Cabinet and of army appointments, that anti-monarchical suggestions from the Independent Socialists were greeted with applause not only by the Majority Socialists but also to some extent from the Government benches,¹ and that the Poles and Alsations showed their conviction that the end of the German Empire was in sight.

Liebkecht celebrated his release by Bolshevist speeches at Independent Socialist meetings, which greeted them with cries of ‘Long live the German Social Republic!’ But the reception of Kautsky’s pamphlet ‘Die Diktatur des Proletariats’, which rejected any attempt at class dictatorship, seemed to show that the majority of the Independent Socialists was anti-Bolshevist and democratic, although the book was attacked by Klara Zetkin.

The general impression was that the resistance in the West was comparatively successful and that the army was not broken, but there was increasing financial anxiety, which necessitated an official announcement that the Reichstag

¹ Already on the 25th the Government had been informed by its representative in Munich that Wilson’s Note of the 23rd was interpreted as an attack on the Emperor. The German Minister at Berne reported ‘from a reliable source that the conclusion of the Wilson Note refers to nothing less than the abdication of the Kaiser’.

would hold itself responsible for the State's financial obligations, and particularly for the war loan. What was probably a fair account of the state of mind of ordinary people was given by Winnig, the Hamburg labour leader, on the 27th; people who were not agitators were not surprised at the events of the last three months, because as the result of past disappointments they had become thoroughly sceptical; they felt sceptical also about the new Government, which would have to win their confidence gradually; there was—in clubs as well as in factories—a good deal of vague grumbling and of foolish talk about a complete change, 'as in Russia,' which arose from a failure to perceive that nothing but misery would arise from the destruction of the economic basis of society.

44. *The Reception of Wilson's Note of the 23rd October.* Wilson's Note of the 23rd October was received with relief by supporters of the new *régime*, in spite of its insistence on armistice conditions which would put the Associated Powers in a position to enforce any arrangement that had to be concluded and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The immediate result was the attempt of G.H.Q. to insist on the breaking off of negotiations, an attempt which ended in the resignation of Ludendorff, though Hindenburg was persuaded to stay on. Ludendorff's resignation was announced on the 27th, and, on the same day the Emperor was informed by the Emperor of Austria of his unalterable intention to ask within twenty-four hours for a separate peace and an immediate armistice. Germany's reply to Wilson's Note promised that negotiations would be carried on by a people's government and asked for proposals for an armistice.

45. *The Naval Mutiny.* On the 28th October there began at Kiel the naval mutiny which was the occasion of the November Revolution. There had been previous naval mutinies, of which at least one had been publicly known and had made a connexion between the sailors' leaders and the Independent Socialists. The proneness of the sailors to insubordination may be explained partly by the fact that they were recruited from men who had seen the world and from skilled artificers, partly by the inglorious and nerve-trying nature of their war, partly from their continual observation of the great difference between the lives of officers and those of other ratings; it was noticed that discipline was much better on the smaller ships.

The sailors, like other Germans, had by the end of October only one guiding motive—the wish for peace. On the 28th October the fleet received orders to sail; it was asserted at the time, and has been asserted since, that the intention was only to protect the right flank of the German Army, though of course this might lead to a fleet engagement; many officers,¹ especially of the 3rd Squadron and most of all the captain of the *Markgraf*, had declared that it would be better to see the whole fleet blown up than to surrender. In any case, the men were convinced that to sail was suicide, and, in spite of their officers' attempts at persuasion on the night of the 27/28, they resolutely refused. A letter from one of them, dated the 2nd November, admitted that there had been excesses on some ships and estimated that over 1,000 men had been arrested. The men of the 3rd Squadron called a meeting for the 2nd November in the Trade Union Hall, to protest against the arrest of their comrades and other grievances. The meeting was forbidden; the sailors determined on a public demonstration, and demanded the sympathy of the workers. At the time fixed for the demonstration about 3,000 men, mostly sailors, assembled; the authorities caused the alarm to be sounded,² in order to make them return to their quarters, but no notice was taken. The demonstrators marched in procession to the Waldwiese barracks, released their comrades under arrest, and took arms; on their way back they came into collision with a party of mates and 'applicants' under the command of a lieutenant, and there were some casualties. After this the sailors, on the model of the Russian Revolution, chose a council, which by the morning of the 4th November had in its control 20,000 rifles, with 60 rounds of ammunition for each. The infantry who were called in against the sailors let themselves be disarmed; the Kiel workers declared a general strike.

On the 5th a deputation of the Sailors' Council and members of both Socialist parties waited on the Governor and demanded:

1. The release of all men under arrest and political prisoners.
2. Complete freedom of speech and press.
3. No censoring of letters.

¹ Cf. *Von Kiel bis Berlin*, Erich Kuttner, Redakteur des *Vorwärts*.

² According to one account the demonstrators took this alarm for the signal for the execution of their comrades.

4. Suitable treatment of the men by their superiors.
5. Unpunished return of all comrades on board and in barracks.
6. The fleet not to go out in any circumstances.
7. All precautionary measures involving bloodshed to be discontinued.
8. Withdrawal of all troops not belonging to the garrison.
9. All measures for the protection of private property will immediately be taken by the Sailors' Council.
10. No superior officers except on duty.
11. Unlimited personal liberty for each man from the end of one turn of duty to the beginning of the next.
12. Officers who declare their agreement with the measures of the existing Sailors' Council will be welcomed, but not others.
13. Every member of the Sailors' Council to be released from duty.
14. In future no measures to be taken without the concurrence of the Sailors' Council.

The Governor declared that these demands, some of which were political, exceeded his competence, and asked the sailors to await the arrival of Noske and Haussmann, who would come as representatives of the Government; meanwhile the arrested men were released. The Government representatives arrived in the evening, and accepted the fourteen demands, though nothing was said of a fifteenth which had been added—for the abdication of the Emperor. On the 5th of November Kiel was completely in the hands of the Council, who on the same day sent delegates to Lübeck and Hamburg, and soon after to Wilhelmshaven, Oldenburg, Hanover, Cologne, Magdeburg, Brunswick, Leipzig and Dresden—in fact, all North-Western and Central Germany. Everywhere they easily took control, and there was little disorder. At Hamburg Dittmann did attempt to give things a violent turn, denouncing the official Socialists as traitors to the proletariat and the 'popular' government as a bloody joke; but by the 9th of November the *Vertrauensmänner*¹ in the various industries were working for co-operation between the two Socialist parties.

46. *The Revolution in Bavaria.* So far the revolutionary movement had been outwards from Kiel; now it was to begin independently from the other end of the Empire. The hard-

¹ Men of confidence, mandatories.

ships and failures of the war had not decreased Bavarian dislike of Prussia, and it had been for some time obvious that that State was determined on an immediate end of the war, and anxious to sacrifice the Hohenzollerns for that purpose. On the 23rd October, after his release from prison, Kurt Eisner was cheered not only when he demanded the abolition of monarchy, but even when he spoke of the justice and necessity of returning Alsace-Lorraine to France. On the 3rd November the Independent Socialists held a demonstration in favour of peace, obtained the release of those persons still imprisoned for the January strikes, and raised shouts for the republic; on the 5th there was a much bigger demonstration, in opposition to the Pan-German agitation for the continuance of the war; and another demonstration, to demand the abdication of the Emperor, was arranged for the 7th; it was attended by 150,000 persons. Some soldiers raised the cry 'To the barracks', and the crowd obeyed the suggestion. The men in barracks had been forbidden to leave them, but they streamed out, many of them with arms; men under arrest were freed. Railway stations, post and telegraph offices, the headquarters of the military commands, ministries; and newspaper offices were seized. Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils were chosen, and on the 8th the first meeting of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council took place, in the House of Deputies, under the presidency of Eisner, who announced that a Peasants' Council was to be formed and that practically the whole garrison had come over. The next morning appeared the first republican proclamation, and great merriment was caused by the flight of the King, who as late as the 7th had been taking his walk as usual. The success of the Munich revolution was crowned by the, at least temporarily, complete fusion of the two Socialist parties; all branches of administration continued to function, and the peasants promised to see to the feeding of the towns. Kuttner asserts that the Bavarian Revolution was purely spontaneous, and there is no evidence to connect it with the Kiel movement; the success of both must have been responsible for many towns going over to the republic on the 8th, including Bielefeld, Halle, Chemnitz, Dresden, Leipzig, Zwickau, and several towns in Rhenish Westphalia.

47. *The Emperor's acceptance of Responsible Government, 3rd November.* Having seen the beginning and the spreading of

the revolution in the extreme north and extreme south, it is time to return to Berlin, which was left just after the resignation of Ludendorff and the dispatch of the 4th German Note. On the 1st November the general offensive was renewed on the Western front; on the 2nd the Turkish armistice terms, on the 3rd the Austro-Hungarian, were published in the German press; on the same day was published also the Emperor's letter to Prince Max accepting the constitutional reforms and promising co-operation in the new system. The state of siege was relaxed, but not sufficiently to satisfy *Vorwärts*. On the 31st October the Prussian Herrenhaus passed a resolution of loyalty to the monarch, but already, or certainly a day or two after, it was clear that the Socialists would insist on abdication, if necessary by a threat to leave the Government. On the 31st the Emperor departed for G.H.Q., on the advice of various authorities. According to Kuttner, General von Linsingen (commanding in the Mark) was preparing to put in operation the plans worked out in 1916 for suppressing a revolution.

48. *Russian influence on the German Revolution.* It may be well here to insert what is known of Russian co-operation in the German November Revolution. On the 30th October *Germania* complained of the political activities of subordinate members of the Russian Legation, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* reported that Russian diplomatists were actually speaking at Socialist meetings, and the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* asserted that Joffe himself was taking part. Four days later the *Berliner Tageblatt* spoke of the distribution in Berlin of a leaflet inciting soldiers to disobedience; it could not believe that the Independents had anything to do with this, which was as bad as Pan-German propaganda. On the 5th November it was officially announced that revolutionary pamphlets had been found in a Russian courier's baggage; the Government demanded guarantees against a repetition of such conduct, and meanwhile insisted on the recall of all diplomatic representatives, and the next day Joffe left Berlin. Later Joffe asserted that he had supplied hundreds of thousands of marks to Haase and Barth, and that the Independent Socialists had distributed propaganda provided by him. Haase and Barth denied it; Barth said that he had distributed arms, but that they did not come from Joffe. Joffe replied that Barth knew very well that the money

came indirectly from him. The Independent Cohn admitted that the 350,000 marks which he had received from Joffe on the night of 5th–6th November had been used for propaganda, though he had alleged before that they were for Russian prisoners of war.

49. *The Revolution in Berlin.* On the 6th November,¹ Berlin was in a state of the utmost tension ; the news from Kiel was censored ; Independent Socialist meetings fixed for the 7th were forbidden. The Majority Socialist Party Committee and Reichstag Party met and demanded :

1. An immediate armistice.
2. An amnesty for military offenders.
3. The democratization of the Government.
4. The immediate settlement of the Emperor question.

The Minister Drews went to G.H.Q. to discuss the question of abdication, but the Emperor refused on the ground that it would mean anarchy, an objection that was shared by the National Liberals and, to some extent, by the Centrists.² On the 7th the Social Democrats again formulated their demands :

1. Freedom of meetings at once.
2. Police and military to be warned not to be rash.
3. Prussian Government to be transformed at once.
4. Stronger Socialist influence in the Government.
5. The Emperor and the Crown Prince to renounce their rights by noon on the 8th.³

By this time the majority of every bourgeois party, except the Conservatives, was in favour of abdication. Prince Max offered his resignation, but the Emperor induced him to stay on till he had made up his mind.

It was on the 7th that Linsingen did a thing which showed that the old spirit of the Prussian officer was still alive : he

¹ On 5th November a meeting of Secretaries of State was informed by General Gröner that no improvement could be expected in the military situation, and that withdrawal to the frontier must be contemplated, but that he considered it possible to gain time for the negotiation, though he could not estimate how long ; on the 6th Wilson's fourth Note arrived, and on the same day the Armistice Commission left Berlin. The Armistice conditions were presented on the 8th, accepted on the 10th, and came into force on the 11th.

² Moreover, as late as 3rd November, the Progressives were still inclined to think that the Emperor, having become democratic, might be allowed another chance.

³ This was later extended to the 11th.

forbade the formation of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils: 'the revolution was there and a Prussian general—forbade it' (Kuttner). That night the trunk telephones and telegraphs were cut off; next day the railways were stopped, armed posts were placed at street corners, supported by artillery and armoured cars, and the Independent Socialist Däumig was arrested in the street. The population remained quiet, but when the evening came, and no news of abdication, it was clear that they would hold back no longer. In the evening the Social Democrats forced the Chancellor to insist on Linsingen's resignation¹ and to forbid the military to use arms. That day had seen also the resignation of the whole Prussian Ministry and the appointment of Vice-President Friedberg to form a new one.

On the 9th November there was a strike (which Kuttner describes as spontaneous) in most of the Berlin factories; at 10 o'clock it was officially declared by the Social Democrats, and then the rest of the workers came out. The regiments which had been considered most trustworthy went over to the Workers' and Soldiers' Council. At midday Scheidemann announced the abdication of the Emperor,² and at 2 p.m. from the steps of the Reichstag he announced the foundation of the Republic. The police offices and the Wolff Telegraph Bureau were seized, Prince Max resigned the chancellorship, and the Kaiser fled to Holland the same evening.

It is very difficult to understand the relations between the Official Socialists, the Independent Socialists, and the Spartacists on this decisive day.³ In the morning there were discussions between Ebert, Scheidemann, David, and the Independents Ledebour, Vogtherr, and Dittmann. At 3 o'clock Ebert,⁴ Scheidemann, and two representatives of the Workers'

¹ According to the very bourgeois Ferdinand Runkei, *Die Deutsche Revolution*, on the 8th Linsingen warned 'kaisertreu' troops to hold themselves in readiness.

² According to the same authority (Ferdinand Runkei, *Die Deutsche Revolution*) the Emperor's abdication was announced before the news of it had arrived from Spa.

³ Cf. *Die Deutsche Revolution* in *Der Deutsche Geschichtskalender* series, ed. by Friedrich Purlitz.

⁴ The Socialist Ministers had resigned earlier in the day, and Ebert had promised Prince Max (or, so the latter said afterwards) to do his best to keep things quiet till the Chancellor's return from a projected visit to G.H.Q. to obtain the Emperor's decision.

and Soldiers' Council announced to Prince Max that a Socialist government was necessary: he offered the chancellorship to Ebert, who accepted it and issued an appeal to all authorities and officials to continue in their functions. In the evening Liebknecht and Barth (who was at this time Spartacist) demanded that they should form the cabinet, with the co-operation of Haase and some other Independents for three days only: there should be no constituent assembly and all the functions of government should be performed by the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. At 8.30 p.m. the Social Democratic directorate replied to the demands of the Independents as follows: 'We accept your demand that Germany shall be a social republic: we cannot accept your demand for government by the "Vertrauensmänner" of the workers and soldiers, because it is not in accordance with our principles: we cannot agree to the dismissal of the bourgeois members of the Government because that would endanger the food supply: we consider the co-operation of the two Socialist wings necessary at least till the meeting of the constituent assembly: we agree to the proposal that the technical ministers shall be merely advisory: as for the suggestion of two equal leaders of the Cabinet, we are in favour of equality between all members of the Cabinet.'

At 10.30 p.m. Barth presided over the first meeting of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council, in the Reichstag building: it was announced that the police were in the service of the new government, that the administrative services were to go on as before, and that the 'people's commissaries' would be supervised by members of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council: warnings were issued against street demonstrations: it was agreed that factories and military units should elect delegates to the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council, at the rate of one for each thousand voters.

The soldiers insisted that the Socialist groups should unite, and threatened to set up a military dictatorship supporting the Majority Socialists if the Independents would not co-operate. The meeting ended by sanctioning a cabinet of six 'people's commissaries', three from each wing of the Socialist Party—Ebert, Scheidemann, Landsberg, Haase, Dittmann, Barth, and by electing an executive committee of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council.

The day had passed off quietly except for some fighting round the Palace (on which Liebknecht had hoisted the red flag) and in the neighbourhood of the University. On the 10th the two Socialist parties agreed to co-operate on the basis of the previous night's discussion at the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council: it was arranged that the Government should contain none but Socialists; that the 'people's commissaries' should have equal powers; that technical ministers should be supervised by two Socialists, one from each wing; that no time limit should be set to the Independents' membership of the cabinet; that political power should reside in the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, which were to be assembled from the whole empire as soon as possible; and that the question of the constituent assembly should be settled after the consolidation of the gains of the revolution. Military command was taken over by a Soldiers' Council, and the G.O.C. in the Mark announced that he had given orders for the defence of the new *régime*. Work was to be resumed on the 12th.

On the 11th November the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council expressed its admiration of Russia and its intention of renewing relations with that country, and demanded immediate peace, any peace rather than the continuance of slaughter: on the same day the Armistice was signed.

50. *Conclusion.* The history of the last ten months of the German Empire is one of obscure and continually shifting currents: it is easy to see the difference between January and November, the time when on the whole confidence still reigned, when the Generals still looked forward to victory, when it was still true—and soon to be made more unmistakable by successes in the field—that the mass of the people supported the policy of its leaders: between that time and the time when the Government ceased to exist for want of support and of belief in itself, and when the war was ended by an ignominious surrender occasioned by the action of the Generals themselves. It is not so easy to trace the process by which these changes took place. A few conclusions, however, emerge pretty clearly: it was the Higher Command that insisted on the inception of the negotiations which led to the armistice, and it did so because of its view of the military situation: how far the weakness of that situation was caused by factors not directly belonging to it, factors moral and economic, cannot be precisely estimated, but there

is no evidence that it was a break-down at home which caused the break-down in the field, nor that the Generals' pessimistic view was ill-founded, or their later optimism justified. The Revolution was not a violent outbreak which paralysed the Government: it was rather the emergence of discontents bred by the Government's failures and rendered powerful only by its collapse. The German people had borne—the greater part of it gladly, part complainingly—an 'authority state' which was successful, it replaced an 'authority state' which failed and, since success is the essence of such a state, thereby ceased to exist. No doubt there was revolutionary agitation, more or less organized, by the Independent Socialists, by the Spartacists, and by the Russian Bolsheviks; but it does not seem to have been necessary. The six weeks before the signing of the Armistice show a gradual shifting of the German state further and further towards the Left; that shifting corresponded with the will of the mass of the people, but there was a point where it became obvious that they wished it to go no further. They had little sympathy with the Spartacists or the Bolsheviks, and it was made clear that of the Independents it was not the men of violence that had their support but the more moderate men like Kautsky and Bernstein, whose ideal was one of gradual progress under democratic direction. The Revolution began with a naval revolt against slaughter after armistice negotiations had been begun: it spread because almost the whole population was conscious of defeat, anxious for peace and food, and convinced that its Government had failed and ought to be replaced.¹ No attempt was made to suppress it because the Government itself had no principle of existence, having abandoned its old principle and only half adopted the very principle of the Revolution itself. All the business of administration went on because the officials had no mind to do anything but administer, no essential loyalty to the old state, and no essential quarrel with the new: the change was in the transference of authority from the will to victory to the consciousness of defeat.

¹ Cf., e.g. Eisner's Note, 10th November, to Wilson asking for favourable treatment of the new *régime* and admitting that the old deserved no mercy.

CHAPTER III¹

THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

1. *Introductory.* In a previous chapter an account has been given of the military events which led up to the final defeat of Germany and her Allies. It was these events which, as a necessary result, brought about the request on the part of the German Government for cessation of hostilities, and the particular conditions on which the request for an armistice was granted, governed the whole of the succeeding peace negotiations, with which this work is mainly occupied. The Armistice conditions themselves were confined to military matters; they contained the terms on which the Allies agreed to cease hostilities, and these terms included the enforced retreat of the German armies beyond the Rhine, the occupation of a considerable amount of German territory by the Allies, the cession of a very large amount of military material and of a considerable portion of the German fleet. The object of this was to ensure that, with the cessation of hostilities, the military superiority of the Allies should be secured, all danger of a recommencement of the war avoided; in general, they were of such a nature as from the military point of view to place Germany completely under the power of the Allies.

But the negotiations which had preceded the actual drafting

¹ The chief authorities for this chapter are an official publication by the German Government entitled *Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstands*, which contains the official communications which passed between the German Government and the Supreme Army Command, with many other official documents, and the minutes of many of the conferences and discussions. This is the apologia of the civil Government of Germany and was issued with the object of showing that it was not on them, but on the Supreme Army Command, that the responsibility for the final catastrophe rested. It is preceded by a summary which is in many details of a highly controversial character.

For the other side, we have Ludendorff's *Memories* and three small pamphlets, *Das Friedens- und Waffenstillstandsangebot*, in which he has controverted the conclusions maintained in the *Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstands*.

Use has also been made of *Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei* on Count Hertling's Chancellorship, written by his son, Freiburg i. B., 1919.

On the Allied side we have no information.

of the Armistice conditions dealt with matters far beyond this ; though they did not take the form of formal preliminaries of peace, they laid down in general principle the conditions with which the future Peace must comply. It is necessary, therefore, to recount in some detail the political aspects of the diplomatic discussions which occupied the whole of the month of October and their result ; without this it is impossible to understand the nature of the problem with which the Paris Conference, when it met, was confronted.¹

The request for an armistice was addressed to President Wilson on the 4th October. As we now know, it had long been apparent to those in authority that all hopes of a German victory were past, and that nothing but a speedy peace could avoid a catastrophe. The German Government committed the fatal blunder that they had not the courage to face the situation into which they had brought the country, and allowed week after week and month after month to pass by without taking the only steps by which it could be saved. The reason of this was that they knew that the confession of military defeat would necessarily entail a complete overthrow for the whole system of government at home ; the system of authority which had been based on military successes must disappear when the army which had been made the centre of the whole structure of government was defeated in the field.

It may indeed be said that, ever since the failure of the first invasion of France and the check at the Marne, as soon as it became evident that the war would be a long one, the outlook for Germany had been dark ; time fought against her. As the years went by the very successes that were gained confirmed this view, for even success brought ultimate victory no nearer. The defeat of Russia, while it averted the catastrophe in Germany, did not bring peace ; the conquest of Rumania brought no change in the essential situation. The hopes raised by submarine warfare were disappointed. It was this which directly brought about the demand for ' a peace of reconciliation ', a peace without annexations or indemnities. This programme was indeed, during July 1917, agreed to by a large majority in the Reichstag, and it brought about the fall of the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. But even then the military authorities refused to take the only means of carrying out this

¹ The legal aspect is more fully discussed in Vol. I, Chap. IX, q.v.

programme, a complete and full renunciation of any interference with the full independence and integrity of Belgium. It was justly seen by the parties of opposition in Germany that in this way, and this way alone, would it be possible to gain strong support, if not among the governments, at least among the populations in the enemy countries, for an agreed peace. But the Emperor and his advisers refused to learn the lesson while there was yet time. A last ray of hope was given by the Russian Revolution, but this was used, not for developing proposals for peace in the only way in which they could have been successful, but as opening the way for a great offensive on the west, which was, in fact, a last despairing gamble. The offensive opened in March 1918; it had been carefully prepared; in it the last reserves were staked. It failed. This failure left Germany shorn of her last resources, and the reaction from the exaggerated hopes which had been raised was undermining the confidence and loyalty of the nation. The failure was apparent by the beginning of July; Herr Kühlmann, in a speech in the Reichstag, stated what indeed was the simple truth, that there was no hope of a military solution. The words created a great impression, and became the signal for a growing feeling of depression, which was not prevented by the fact that a week afterwards Kühlmann resigned.¹

2. *The German View of the Situation, August–September 1918.* With the beginning of August, the Allies themselves began to take the offensive, and the advance of the English on the 8th was the critical day from which it was apparent to all the world that the situation was simply this, that the German offensive had been repelled, but that they were fighting a last despairing battle to maintain their position. Germany was now confronted with a possibility which they had always refused even to contemplate, defeat on the field of battle, not only a retreat but a *débâcle*. But even then, they delayed, procrastinated and hoped.

On the 14th August an important meeting took place

¹ It is not apparent whether in fact Kühlmann was only expressing his personal view, or whether, as was generally supposed, he was being used by the General Staff to give a warning. From Count Hertling's Memoirs, *Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei*, pp. 116–24, it appears that the Chancellor himself had at any rate not been consulted, and the most probable explanation is that Kühlmann, who was thoroughly dispirited and worn out, was guilty of what was a mere indiscretion. Cp. discussion of above in Chap. II, pp. 82–4.

at G. H. Q., which was attended by the Emperor and his chief military and civil advisers. The deductions derived from the discussion are important. To quote the official record: 'From the military point of view we are not in the position to break the war-will of our opponents, and are henceforward forced to take account of this military situation in the conduct of our policy. Diplomatic threads, with a view to an understanding with the enemy, should be spun at the right moment. Such a moment would offer itself after the next successes in the west. The Supreme Command explains that they would succeed in maintaining themselves on French soil and thereby eventually force our will on the enemy.'

Here then we get the first definite recognition that serious negotiations for peace must be undertaken, but always accompanied by the rider that somehow or other, at some time or other, some military success would be gained of such a kind that they might hope to make it appear that the beginning of negotiations was not the result of military defeat.

The particular form which it was contemplated that negotiations for peace should take, should be a request to one of the neutral Governments, either the King of Spain or the Queen of the Netherlands, to allow itself to be the channel through which discussion should begin. It was generally agreed that the Netherlands would be the better medium, for the simple reason that their proximity to Germany made intercourse easy.

The situation was, however, complicated by the situation of their allies. The condition of Austria was desperate, and the Austro-Hungarian Government had already repeatedly urged the German Government to use any means for bringing the war to an end. On the 14th and 15th August, a further discussion took place at G. H. Q., at which the Emperor Charles and Count Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Chancellor, were present. There was a clear difference of opinion between the two allies. The Austrians proposed that the necessary step should be taken at the earliest possible moment, and that it should take the form of a direct appeal to all belligerent Powers. On the other hand, the German view was: 'It is necessary to wait for a favourable moment; the present moment is too soon, on account of the obscure military situation. It would be better to wait until the establishment in a new line, or, alternatively, some kind of military success

produced a reaction in the enemy.' As regards the form of the step to be taken, an appeal to the mediation of the neutrals was preferable to a general public offer of peace, as suggested by the Austrians.

We may specify the point of view held at this time as follows: They no longer hoped by a successful offensive to break the will of the enemy, but on the other hand, they still professed to anticipate that a successful military defensive, combined with a continuation of the active submarine warfare, would paralyse the war-will of the enemy and so bring them to a condition in which they would be willing to discuss terms of peace which did not mean the defeat of Germany. From this they drew the political conclusion that a suitable moment must be chosen for opening diplomatic negotiations. Meanwhile, the Emperor laid stress on the necessity of home propaganda, with the object of an increase of confidence among the people: 'Fiery speeches must be made by private persons of high position.' As though speeches could be of any effect in view of the realities of the time.

The situation clearly implied a modification of war-aims; there was, however, at this time no formal discussion on the point; it looks as though the patriotic parties still shrank from facing the inevitable necessity of giving up their great schemes.

On the 21st August the whole situation was discussed by members of the Government with the party leaders, and there were fresh discussions at Spa on the 3rd September, this time with regard to war-aims. They turned specially on two points, the future of Belgium and of the border provinces of Russia, including Poland. As to Belgium, it seems to have been agreed that Germany must give up all claim to any annexation in Belgium, and they were inclined to adopt the formula that on other matters they would require nothing more than a guarantee that Belgium should not enter into any closer relations with other States than she did with Germany. With regard to the eastern frontier, there still seems to have been a unanimous opinion that Germany would be in the position to dominate a settlement there. The Polish question must be arranged with the Poles themselves before any discussion with the enemy, and the discussion still continued on the point whether German or Austrian influence should be predominant. There is not the slightest sign of any suggestion

that the Polish question would be settled in accordance with the general European requirements, still less that the establishment of an independent Kingdom of Poland would imply the surrender of any German territory. They still believed that they would be able to secure the close adherence of Poland to Germany, and they were occupied with the point that Lithuania should give the basis for German military influence in Russia. In fact, they expected 'an honourable Peace, which would be agreeable to us and give us security'.

This was the situation to which public expression was given by Payer in a speech at Stuttgart on the 13th September. It was a strong bid for 'a peace of understanding, without annexation, without indemnity'; a peace which, though it might exclude any actual extension of German territory, would still secure German influence, probably over Belgium, and certainly over Poland, Finland, and the Baltic Provinces; a peace which would include the conception of a League of Nations, but a League of Nations which was to be used for the liberation of countries hitherto subject to England by the insistence on the liberty of the seas.

During the last week in September the crisis and decision came. The defection of Bulgaria, the imminent collapse of Austria-Hungary, and, above all, the series of defeats on the western fronts, showed beyond the possibility of doubt that Germany no longer possessed the power of effective resistance. All the hopes they had so long cherished were dissipated and there was no course open to them except to sue for peace, and while doing so, to try to arrange that the terms should be the most favourable that could be negotiated.

On the 15th September the Austro-Hungarian Government had published their Note. After reviewing the general situation and referring to previous similar proposals which had emanated from Vienna, it culminated in a proposal to 'invite all belligerent States' to 'a confidential and non-binding discussion' at 'a place in a neutral country'. It is addressed not only to the belligerents, but also to the neutrals and to the Pope.¹ The proposal was that while the discussion proceeded, the operations of war would not be suspended. The proposal was not well received; Mr. Balfour made a discouraging reply, and imme-

¹ *v.* Vol. I, Appendix IV. In fact, the Note is undated; it was received on the 16th.

diately afterwards a definite rejection was received from President Wilson. The Austro-Hungarian Government answered by declaring that the peace offer remained open, but from this moment in fact all importance had departed from it, and the field was left open for the German Government.

Almost immediately afterwards this was followed by an even more serious event, the defection of Bulgaria. On the 26th a message was received that Bulgaria proposed to make a separate peace. This was confirmed on the following day. The first hopes which had been entertained that the situation might be saved by strengthening the German army in Bulgaria, were shown to be quite useless. The Armistice was signed on the 29th September, and on the 2nd October the Army Command recognized that 'we must renounce every hope of continuing to keep Bulgaria on our side'.

This was the turning point; it was now apparent that the hopes which they had continued for so long to nourish were empty, and there stood before them nothing but the prospect of irremediable defeat.

3. *German Decision to request peace from President Wilson, 29th September.* Under these circumstances, they naturally turned to the previous declarations made by President Wilson, who, in his public statements as to war-aims, had put forward a programme which it was hoped might assure to Germany some mitigation of the more extreme terms which would undoubtedly be imposed, were the enemies of Germany to exert to the full the power which fell to them owing to their victory in the war. Accordingly, on the 29th September, a general agreement was arrived at that the request for peace should take the form of a direct appeal to President Wilson, requesting him to take in hand the restoration of peace, and, with this object, to propose to all belligerent parties the dispatch of delegates with full powers to Washington, it being understood that the Fourteen Points of his speech of the 8th January 1918 would be the basis of the negotiations.

Side by side with this determination there arose an internal political crisis. In view of the state of public opinion in Germany itself, the long-growing dissatisfaction with the subordination of the civil authority to the military power, and in view also of what was known as the opinion among the enemy, it was clear that this proposal, if it was to be effective, must be made

by a government which directly represented the majority parties of the Reichstag, and must be accompanied by far-going concessions as to those points in the German constitution which had for so long been at issue between the Government on the one side and the Liberal and Socialistic parties on the other. As a result of discussions which took place in Berlin between the party leaders, the Emperor on the 1st October accepted Hertling's resignation, and added to the letter in which he did so the following paragraph :

'I desire that the German people should co-operate more effectively than heretofore in determining the destiny of the Fatherland. It is, therefore, my will that men who are supported by the confidence of the people should, to a large extent, participate in the rights and duties of the Government. I request you to conclude your work by carrying on affairs and making a beginning with the measures determined by me until I find a successor for you. I await your proposals for this.'

It was at first expected that he would be succeeded by Payer, member of one of the Liberal parties and Vice-Chancellor, but it was felt that it was necessary to have in this crisis a man who would serve as a symbol of union, and for this purpose there was chosen Prince Max of Baden, the heir to the Grand-duke and the representative of one of the most popular and liberal of the dynasties. He at once assumed office and set about the task of forming his administration.

4. *Intervention of Ludendorff and Hindenburg, 1st-3rd October.* Before he had succeeded in doing so he was, however, confronted by a fresh and most serious factor. On the afternoon of the 1st October, the following telegram was received from Lersner, the Government's representative at G.H.Q. :

'General Ludendorff has just asked Freiherr von Girenau and myself in the presence of General Heye to communicate to Your Excellency his urgent request that our request for peace should be issued at once. To-day the soldiers hold their ground ; it is impossible to foresee what may happen to-morrow.'

This was followed by a telegram from Hindenburg himself, dispatched at 2 o'clock in the afternoon to Payer :

If it is certain that Prince Max von Baden forms a Government by 7 or 8 o'clock this evening, then I may agree with postponement till to-morrow morning. On the other hand, should the formation of the Government be in any way doubtful, I consider the issue of the declaration to the foreign governments to-night required.'

In view of the previous attitude taken by the 'General Staff, this message naturally raised consternation in Berlin.

Prince Max was put into a most difficult position. It would obviously render his task an almost impossible one if his very first act was to send out a request for peace and an immediate armistice under these conditions. Serious as the situation on the western front was, nothing had yet happened to cause them to anticipate that it was so desperate as it now appeared to be. The following picture of a scene which took place at Spa graphically recalls the position :¹

‘The next morning my father (Count Hertling) was discussing with the Emperor the question of his successor as Chancellor ; the Emperor could not yet come to a decision in favour of Prince Max of Baden. During the conversation Ludendorff again came into the room unannounced, and immediately asked in a tone of great excitement : “Has the new Government not been formed yet ?” to which the Emperor answered rather roughly : “I am not a wizard !” (*Ich kann doch nicht zaubern*). On this Ludendorff said : “But the Government must be formed immediately, for the offer of peace must be made to-day.” The Emperor : “You ought to have told me that a fortnight ago.”

Further correspondence took place, but the General Staff maintained their position. On the 2nd October Prince Max still opposed the demand and wished to wait at least a week in order to consolidate the new Government and avoid creating the impression that, in making the proposals for peace, they were acting under the pressure of a military catastrophe. On the 2nd October Hindenburg and Ludendorff came to Berlin and Prince Max addressed to them the definite question : ‘Is the Supreme Army Command aware that the opening of peace negotiations under the pressure of the military situation may lead to the loss of German colonies and German territory, especially of Alsace-Lorraine and of the purely Polish districts in the Eastern Provinces ?’ Hindenburg maintained his position that the Supreme Army Command must insist on the immediate dispatch of the request for peace. ‘The enemy on its side is constantly bringing into the battle new and fresh reserves. The German Army still stands in a firm position and has successfully repelled two attacks. But the situation is growing worse daily, and can force the Supreme Army Command to serious decisions. Under the circumstances, it is enjoined to break off the battle in order to spare the German people and their Allies useless sacrifices. Every day of delay will cost thousands of brave soldiers their lives.’

¹ *Ein Jahr in der Reichskanzlei*, by Karl Graf von Hertling, p. 183.

5. *The Peace Note and its Consequences.*¹ Against this all representations and protests of the Chancellor were of course unavailing, and on the 4th there was dispatched to the Swiss Government for presentation to President Wilson a Note, which was the public and irrevocable record of the defeat of Germany. It runs as follows :

'The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take in hand the restoration of peace, acquaint all belligerent States with this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. The German Government accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of the 8th January 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of the 27th September, as a basis for peace negotiations.

'With a view to avoiding further bloodshed, the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the air.'

On the same day an almost similar Note was dispatched by the Austro-Hungarian Government through the Swedish Government.

The answer to Germany came on the 8th.² It raised three points. The first was :

'Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on January 8th last, and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application ?'

The second dealt with the suggestion of an armistice ; the President said that 'he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil'. In the third, he raised the question of the internal constitution of Germany, stating that 'he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war'.

Of these three points, the second was of the most immediate importance, for it had been the hope of the German authorities

¹ The political aspect is only alluded to here. The whole matter and the legal aspects are more fully given in Vol. I, Chap. IX, q.v. The Appendices III and IV give relevant speeches and documents.

² v. Appendix IV, Vol. I, for full texts.

that they would be able to arrange terms of armistice of such a nature that it would enable them to begin hostilities again, supposing the negotiations for peace broke down, on conditions which would be at least as favourable as those when hostilities ceased; they would indeed, unless special guarantees were required, be more favourable, because the German Army, which was exhausted, would have had an opportunity for recovery. The demand that they should evacuate the occupied territory was the first indication that such a condition would not be complied with. None the less, there was general agreement between the civil government and the military authorities as to the terms of the answer.

The first point, at any rate, could create no difficulty. They had accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of the 8th January and in his subsequent addresses as the foundation for a permanent 'peace of justice'. Consequently the object of the proposed discussions would be only 'to come to an understanding upon practical details of the application of these terms'. They added, however, that they assumed that 'the Governments of the Powers associated with the Government of the United States also adopt the position taken by President Wilson in his public declarations'. It was, in fact, the whole object of the German Government to get this formal agreement from the other enemy States.

As to the second point, they 'declared themselves ready, in agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Government . . . to comply with the proposals of the President in regard to evacuation'. They suggested, however, that a Mixed Commission should be appointed to concert the necessary arrangements.

As to the third point, they pointed out that the present German Government had been formed by negotiations and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag, and that the Chancellor, who spoke in the name of the German Government and of the German people, was supported in all his actions by the will of the majority of the Reichstag.

The next answer of the President of the 14th October made clear the real situation for the first time. After noting the unqualified acceptance of his peace terms, he passes on to the two other points, and in regard to both of them he expresses himself in language of unprecedented directness, and there is a very noticeable accentuation of the demands.

As to the armistice, he refused the proposal for an Allied Commission to discuss the terms, explaining first that 'the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments'; they are, therefore, not to be agreed, but dictated terms, and he proceeds to say that 'no arrangement can be accepted . . . which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field'. There is then to be no hope that the terms would be such as to enable Germany to take up arms again; it must be not a temporary cessation of hostilities, but surrender.

He then refers to the methods in which Germany is conducting the operations and makes it a condition that the German forces should cease 'the illegal and inhuman practices which they still persist in'. There is special reference to the conduct of the submarine war and an undisguised demand that the cessation of the unlimited submarine warfare should be a condition preliminary to an armistice. This meant that the Germans should give up before the armistice the weapon on which they now chiefly depended.

Lastly, he turns to the question of the Government of Germany. Referring to a statement in his address of the 4th July 1918, that the object of the war is 'the destruction of every arbitrary Power that can separately, secretly, or of its single choice disturb the peace of the world', he points out 'that the power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it.' Such alteration is a condition precedent to peace. 'The whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter.'

6. *The Germans decide to accept Wilson's Terms.* The German nation was thereby confronted with the demand for conditions which meant a complete surrender, both naval and military, and at the same time, with a request which could scarcely be interpreted otherwise than as one for the overthrow of the monarchical system and the abdication of the Emperor.

The German Government have published the record of the

prolonged discussions which took place between the army leaders and the civil authorities. In them the whole military situation was explored. The Chancellor, with whom the final decision rested, had to determine whether he would be justified in refusing the only terms that would be offered, in the hope that the German Army would eventually be in a stronger position than it was at the moment. As he said: 'If all the measures are adopted which Your Excellency has proposed, if the front holds for the next two months, is Your Excellency of the opinion that in the course of the next year a position may be created which is better than that in which we at this moment find ourselves? . . . Can we end the war next year under better conditions than at present?' This, of course, was the one thing that mattered. It was no use continuing the struggle if it was predetermined that at the expiration of so many months, after there had been an additional loss of life and loss of the little reserve strength which the German nation had, they would only find themselves in a situation, from the military point of view, worse than that by which they were then confronted. In these discussions Ludendorff and his colleagues were on the defensive. We see the effort always to find some ray of hope, some justification for refusing to accept the terms offered, some justification for a final appeal to the German nation to struggle on for a few months longer, and always, it is clear, that they were unable to find any. Wherever they turned, there was really no hope. Bulgaria had surrendered, Austria-Hungary had appealed for a separate peace. It was necessary to maintain the garrison in the Ukraine, for if it were withdrawn the road would be open to a Bolshevik advance, and, in addition, the food from the Ukraine was absolutely essential to the continued existence of the nation. From here, therefore, no reinforcements could come. A levy *en masse* had been suggested, but Ludendorff refused to consider it, and rightly, for as he pointed out the levy *en masse* had already in fact been used. The whole German nation was already engaged in the war, and it was only a matter of arrangement whether the services of every man and woman should be used at the front, on the lines of communication, or in production at home. The Western front was dependent entirely upon itself, but what was the position there? The whole reserves of the German Army had been completely eaten up. They had for the whole front

only 17 reserve divisions; the numbers in the battalions in the divisions had fallen from 1,000 to a little over 500, and of these 17, only two were fresh; the others were either withdrawn from the line because of their exhaustion, or were being reconstituted.¹ Against them they had the British Army, the divisions of which were being kept up almost to full strength, the French, and the Americans, who already had over a million men in the field and who anticipated another million during the next few months. Supplies were deficient, ammunition was failing, and, above all, they were without any defence against the tanks which were being brought into action in increasing numbers. The German Army was in retreat along the whole line and it required little for the retreat to become the greatest military catastrophe of which history has any record. The railway communication to Germany, divided as it was by the mass of the Ardennes, went either to the north at Liège, or to the south by Trier. On the northern route there were only two main lines available, and the army would have to pass through a comparatively narrow gap not above 60 miles in breadth; through this would have to move the hundreds of thousands of men who were enlined from the sea to Verdun. There was indeed an alternative route, but the Americans were advancing rapidly upon it, and it could be foreseen that within a few days they would occupy the railway line and sever the connexion. If this once happened, the whole forces of the German Army would be driven into a narrow gap. Under the best circumstances an orderly retreat would have been almost impossible, but it was no longer possible to depend upon the cohesion of the soldiers or their discipline. The spirit of disillusionment had spread from the home to the army and back again from the army to the home. The secret propaganda, which for months had been carried on by the Independent Socialists and the Spartacists, was doing its work; the men were conscious of defeat; among many of them confidence in the leadership was gone, and we have abundant evidence how great was the apprehension caused by the incipient signs of disorder and even of mutiny. To impose upon an army in this state the task of retreat under such conditions, before a confident and advancing foe, would have been a senseless and unpardonable waste of life.

¹ According, at least, to the figures of a French official pamphlet.

The situation was one tragic beyond description ; all those who took part in these discussions, acute as the differences between them might be, were united in this, that they were filled with the deepest love of their country and they knew that they were sharing in the ruin of all those great hopes with which the German nation had been inspired, not only since the war began, but for the last two generations. And they knew that all they could aspire to do was to avert some of the effects of the impending catastrophe.

7. *Ludendorff's resignation : The German Note of the 20th October.* The decision, however, was not arrived at without a fundamental difference between Ludendorff and the Civil Government. Ludendorff would have wished at whatever risk to refuse to accept these terms ; he was overruled and resigned ultimately on the 26th, and thus disappeared from the scene the man who, above all others, was responsible, on the one hand, for the immense energy and courage with which the war had been waged, on the other, for the fatal blindness which had allowed all serious proposals for peace to be postponed until it was too late. Hindenburg remained in office, and was to add to the great services he had already done to his country the last melancholy duty of carrying out the military requirements of the Armistice.

The Note, which was dispatched on the 20th October, began by accepting the conditions as to the Armistice ; it left it to the President to create an opportunity to settle the details, trusting that he would approve no demand irreconcilable with the honour of the German people and to paving the way to a peace of justice.

While protesting against the charge of illegal and inhuman practices, whether on land or on the sea, the German Government stated that, in order to avoid everything which might impede the efforts to secure peace, orders had been sent out to all submarine commanders 'precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships'. In fact this had been done, and every effort had been made to prevent the recurrence of any incident that would create a feeling of opposition to the continuation of the negotiations. This we may take as the act which above all others shows the reality of the surrender. By this the Germans had given up one of the chief weapons of warfare without asking for any similar concession from their enemies.

It was a concession that could only be made by a Power conscious of defeat and one which the army commanders strenuously opposed. On the third point the Note at some length explains the changes which were taking place in the German Constitution and declares that 'the permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakeable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance'.

With this answer in his hands, the President was now able to proceed to the next step. He had received from the Germans those complete assurances which he desired and was now in a position to approach the Allies. On the 23rd October two fresh Notes were issued, one to Germany and one to the representatives of the leading Entente Powers. In the Note to Germany he puts on record the result of the previous discussion :

'Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his Address to the Congress of the United States on January 8th, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses, particularly the Address of September 27th, and that it is ready to discuss the details of their application ;

'And that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from Ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of German people ;

'And having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces,

'The President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.'

He then repeated the statement that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration is one 'which would leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements which would be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible'. He proceeded to explain that he had transmitted the correspondence to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent

'with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect

PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF 23RD OCTOBER 1918

peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved, and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view.'

In conclusion, he recurred again to the question of the internal government of Germany, this time in even stronger and more explicit language than he had previously used. The principle of a Government responsible to the German people has, he pointed out, not yet been fully worked out; there is no evidence that guarantees exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice partially agreed upon will be permanent. The heart of the present difficulty has not been reached; the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired. This is the first time in which the name of the Emperor has been mentioned; the conclusion to be drawn from these words was obvious, and, he concluded, if the Government of the United States 'must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not peace negotiations, but surrender'. This was a clear indication that the whole character of the peace would depend upon whether the constitutional changes were carried to a conclusion by the abdication of the Emperor and the overthrow of the monarchical system, and it seemed to imply that if this were done, then Germany might look for terms much more lenient than would otherwise be imposed.

At the same time the interchange of Notes was communicated to the Allied and Associated Powers, and they were asked for 'an expression of opinion as to their willingness and readiness to acquiesce and take part in the course of action with regard to an armistice suggested in this correspondence'.

8. '*The Wilsonian Principles.*' Hitherto we have had to deal with these matters purely from the point of view of Germany. We must now consider the action and policy of the Allies. From the German side we have full information. The

discussions between the Allies have not been divulged. We know nothing of the secret correspondence which took place between the American Government and the European Powers, and we have not been admitted into their confidence as to the discussions which no doubt took place on the problem now presented to them. Should they accept the proposal for an armistice on the conditions that the terms of peace were to be in accordance with the Fourteen Points and the other statements made by the President? What precisely was implied in accepting these conditions is discussed fully elsewhere.

The whole series of pronouncements may, as he himself said, be summed up in a single sentence: 'What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the government and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.' A great ideal, a great hope, a great aspiration; one which was the worthy result of the exchange of opinions which had taken place during the last four years, and one which, if it was attained, might well justify mankind in saying that even the loss and destruction occasioned by the war had not been in vain.

To this or any similar programme the German Government, while victory was still apparently within its grasp, had refused their assent, but conditions of peace which victors might reject, would be very welcome to the vanquished, and if peace could be secured on these terms, though Germany would indeed have lost that predominant position in Europe and the world for which she had so long striven, defeat would be deprived of half its bitterness and she would be able to begin a new era of the world on an equality with—perhaps we may even venture to say in a condition of superiority to—those who had been her enemies.

9. *Allied Attitude as a Whole.* The practical question was whether the Allies would accept these proposals or whether they would determine to refuse the Armistice, to continue the war until they had, as they undoubtedly could if they wished, by the defeat and destruction of the German armies, brought about an unconditional surrender.

There could be little doubt as to the decision; it was indeed within the power of the Allies to press on the course of victory which they had begun, but to take this course would have been the useless squandering of innumerable human lives. It would have meant a fighting advance through Belgium, the continua-

tion of the ravage and destruction which had already laid waste large areas in the north of France. On what ground could this have been justified? On the other hand, there were two clauses which could not be accepted in the way in which they had been originally expressed. It was clearly quite impossible for the British nation to accept the clause as to the freedom of the seas. No doubt in the future, if a powerful and effective League of Nations was established, if it showed itself capable of imposing its decisions upon the world, and if it did succeed in bringing about a reign of universal peace, then the conditions of sea warfare which the experience of generations has shown were essential to the maintenance of the British Empire, would cease to be of any practical importance; to accept the principle of these restrictions beforehand, would have been to give up an essential defensive weapon, and this was a surrender which no nation could make voluntarily, least of all at the conclusion of a successful war. The other point was the restrictions imposed by Article 5 on the pecuniary demands which might be made of Germany. The President spoke merely of restoration of the devastated areas; his words, if strictly interpreted, would exclude demanding from the Germans recompense for personal injury and damage done to civilians; they would exclude also any recompense to Great Britain for the loss involved in the destruction to merchant shipping by the submarines or loss caused by Zeppelin raids on London and other towns. Even if it were agreed not to have any indemnity for the war as a whole, there was clearly no reason for freeing the Germans from obligations to make good damage of this nature.

10. *The Allied Answer of the 5th November.* As a result, the answer of the European Governments was communicated to the President as follows:

‘The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government.

‘Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President’s Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses. They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve

to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.

'Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.'

This answer was on the 5th November communicated by Mr. Lansing to Germany in a Note, in which he says :

'I advised you that the President had transmitted his correspondence with the German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments were disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect the interest of the peoples involved, and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deemed such an armistice possible from the military point of view.'

The words of this Note are of the highest importance, for in them it is clearly expressed that the Allied and Associated Powers are willing to conclude an armistice on the terms embodied in the Note. This was the last diplomatic Note between the parties, before the Germans got into touch with Marshal Foch. Austria-Hungary remained. The Fourteen Points contained a clause (Article 10) :

'The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.'

This implied the maintenance of the integrity of Austria-Hungary with large internal autonomy. Since this had been said, events had moved far and rapidly. The United States had, in a statement by Mr. Lansing on the 28th June, pledged themselves to the position that 'all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule'. Nay, more, on the 3rd September the United States had formally recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a belligerent Government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks ;

thus recognizing Czecho-Slovakia itself as an independent and allied State. This was clearly inconsistent with the grant of any mere autonomy to the territories included in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It implied in fact nothing less than that the Monarchy, as it was known and had hitherto existed, should cease to exist. The President's reply to the Austrian Note on the 18th October, after explaining this, intimated that he was 'no longer at liberty to accept a mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conceptions of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations'.

Meanwhile, in consequence of the defeat by the Anglo-Italian Army, a state of revolution broke out throughout the Monarchy¹; the representatives of the different nationalities seceded from the Reichsrat at Vienna; the Hungarian Government declared its independence and, in fact, the Monarchy was actually in the process of dissolution. A last attempt was made by the Government to assert its existence. In a Note of the 27th, they expressed agreement with the principles laid down in the Note of the 18th, and asked that negotiations for an armistice and a peace should be immediately begun. So far as this concerned peace, it was impossible that the suggestion could be accepted; the principles adopted made it clear that peace must be conducted not with the Government of the Monarchy, but with the Government of the States which were already arising out of the dissolution of the Monarchy which had in fact begun. Only one thing therefore remained, a cessation of hostilities; the army, the last, as it had always been the most effective bond of union, must cease resistance. But in the case of Austria-Hungary, the armistice which was in fact, as elsewhere described, concluded on the 3rd November, was unconditional. The Allies would enter into discussion as to the future arrangements to be made with an entirely free hand.

11. *Collapse of the Ottoman Empire.* The same is true of Turkey. The Turkish Government had also applied for an armistice; the request was granted, but here also the armistice which was concluded on the 30th October between the military

¹ See Vol. IV. For text of Austro-Hungarian Armistice v. *infra*, Appx. V.

commanders, neither in its terms nor in the conditions by which it was accompanied, in any way prejudiced the eventual terms of peace. The Turkish armies ceased the hopeless struggle; Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, were already occupied by the British troops, and by this their eventual separation from the Empire was in fact determined. The armistice required the complete demobilization of the Turkish Army and gave the Allies the right not only to continue the occupation of such Turkish territory as they already held, but to occupy such strategic points as might be necessary for their security. The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus were to be opened so that the way was made clear to Constantinople, and it was the clear intention that the Allies, when in occupation of the capital of the Empire, should, after mature consideration, themselves determine what arrangements they desired to make for the future government of the Empire. On this there was no obligation to consult the Turkish Government, or in fact to recognize the continued existence of that Government.

We have in this chapter traced the stages in the political development which accompanied and were caused by the great events which were taking place at the same time both on the field of battle and within the different countries. The negotiations began on the 4th October, they were, in fact, completed by the final exchange of Notes on the 5th November; it only remained that the terms of the Armistice should be communicated by General Foch as the Military Representative of the Allies to the German High Command. But before this stage had been reached, the revolution which had long been preparing broke out not only in Austria but also in Germany, and when the time came for the acceptance of the Armistice there was no longer a king of Prussia or a German Emperor, and Germany defeated abroad was divided at home. The events narrated in the preceding chapters will show how and why that catastrophe became complete.

PART II: EUROPE IN DISSOLUTION

CHAPTER IV

MATERIAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR UPON NEUTRALS AND BELLIGERENTS, 1918

1. *Total Casualties among Belligerents.* Of all the evils due to fifty-one months of war the loss of human life is that which most impresses the imagination. According to the best returns available the number of men reported as killed or died of wounds was 6,886,000. But this figure excludes Serbian and Rumanian losses, of which no exact particulars are available; nor does it take into account the missing. Considering that the returns give, under the head of 'Missing and Prisoners', 2,500,000 Russian and over 2,000,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers, it is probable that the actual deaths exceeded the official estimates by at least a million. We thus arrive at a total of nearly eight million lives lost in the war, or as a direct consequence of the war. We have then to allow for casualties in the revolutions of Russia and Finland; for mortality due to privations in the occupied territories such as North France, Russian Poland, Galicia, and Serbia; and for the toll which the 'hunger blockade' levied on the urban centres of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Add to these items the indeterminate number of wounded men who survived only as wrecks of themselves; take further into account the injury inflicted on the vital powers of combatants and non-combatants by prolonged nervous and physical strain; and it becomes obvious that the casualty sheets, appalling as they are, give a most imperfect idea of the drain of life and energy which the war entailed.

Still, it is worth while to study the casualty sheets, for they show the principal tax which the war laid upon the flower of national manhood in the belligerent countries.

At the head of the list comes Russia, whose killed were

estimated at 1,700,000, a figure which, as already explained, is far from adequate ; but Russia's population was over 180 millions. Germany, with a population of 68 millions had 1,600,000 deaths recorded and 100,000 missing ; her total losses amounted nearly to the average increase of her population for two normal years before the war. The losses of France were 1,071,000 killed and 314,000 missing out of a population of 40 millions ; and, unlike Germany, she had no reason to expect that the wastage among her men of military age would be soon repaired. Since the beginning of the century the annual increase of the French population had been slight ; and during the war there was a regular excess of deaths over births, amounting on the average to a quarter of a million per annum. The losses of the British Empire were 872,000 killed, and of those reported missing about 80,000 were presumed to be dead. The losses of Austria-Hungary, returned at 687,000, were, like the Russian losses, heavier than the official figure showed. Italy lost 465,000 men, and the United States 53,000.

When we remember that the wave of influenza, which swept over Asia, Europe, and America in the latter half of 1918, was responsible for six million deaths in India alone, it is obvious that the most destructive of modern wars has, in comparison with such epidemics, an insignificant effect on the numbers of the human race. The comparison must, however, be qualified by three considerations. First, the European War bore most hardly upon communities much inferior in fecundity to the agricultural population of Asia ; so much inferior indeed, that their increase or even (as in the case of France) the maintenance of their numbers is only due to the most scientific precautions against disease. The communities in question are, owing to their high standard of hygiene, relatively immune from the more destructive epidemics, and had not in living memory been exposed to such an abnormal drain upon their manhood as that caused by the Great War. Secondly, a small shrinkage in the male population of the great industrial States, such as Germany or France or Great Britain, has a more serious effect upon the general prosperity of the world than a relatively large shrinkage in countries which are industrially undeveloped. Thirdly, the mortality due to the war could be entirely stopped by human action, while that due to an epidemic is always in large measure beyond the range of human control.

2. *Financial Expenditure of Belligerents and its effects.* A great disgust of bloodshed was the most potent reason which made both the neutral and the belligerent nations anxious for the restoration of peace. Next in importance came the fear of a *débâcle* of the whole economic and political fabric of Western civilization. There were special causes to account for the Bolshevik spirit in the northern provinces of European Russia. But it was far from improbable that the contagion of Bolshevism would spread westward, if the war continued much longer. If Germany and Austria-Hungary became seriously infected, who could tell where the spirit of social revolution would stop? Even the neutrals had cause for apprehension, for they too had their labour troubles arising from the war. To remove this danger it was not merely essential that hostilities should cease. A long period of armed peace and unstable equilibrium would be as costly as the war, and even more productive of the revolutionary spirit.

Apart from this danger, the economic situation of nearly all the belligerents had for a long time been developing on lines which gave the most serious cause for anxiety. Millions of men had been put into the field; millions more had been diverted from their normal work to the production of military supplies and equipment, and to services of various sorts behind the lines. Little new wealth was being produced by the European belligerents, but their expenditure and their war debts grew at an alarming pace, as world prices moved steadily upwards, as the foreign exchanges moved against the spending countries, and as recourse was necessary to more and more costly methods of destruction and defence. Great Britain's expenditure may serve as an illustration. The daily cost of the war to Great Britain was, up to March 1915, about £1,500,000. For the financial year 1915-16 it was £3,890,000; for 1916-17 it was £5,510,000; for 1917-18 it was £6,557,000.

The results of this progressively increasing expenditure were summarized in 1918 by the Federal Reserve Board of the United States, than which no more competent authority can be cited. The Board estimated the aggregate war expenditure of the belligerents to the 31st May 1918 at 35,000 millions sterling. It prophesied that the total of 40,000 millions would be reached by the end of the year; and it is improbable that the assumptions on which this prophecy was founded were materially

falsified by the conclusions of the Armistice in November. No great economies could be effected by any of the belligerents until the final peace was well in sight. British expenditure for the financial year ending the 31st March 1919 was substantially the same as for the previous year.

As to the distribution of the financial burden among the several belligerents, it must suffice in this short survey to give a few round figures. Great Britain had shouldered before 1917 a considerable share of the war expenditure of her European Allies, and had incurred vast expenses in improvising a huge land army. Her debt, which on the 1st August 1914 stood at 708 millions sterling, had increased by the 31st March 1919 to 7,435 millions, in which total were included loans of 1,739 millions to the Allies and the self-governing dominions. The United States, who only floated their first war loan in May 1917, had borrowed by the end of 1918 about 16,000 million dollars. In the financial year ending in June 1918 they had expended 8,966 million dollars, and their revenue from 'ordinary receipts' had exceeded 4,000 millions, as compared with 779 millions in 1916. Like Great Britain, the United States found the burden of war expenditure much increased by the necessity of assisting European Allies. By July 1918 the American advances to Allies (excluding bankers' loans) exceeded £1,124,000,000. Large as these figures seem, the liabilities of the continental Powers were heavier in proportion to their resources; and unlike those of Great Britain and the United States, they were met almost entirely by borrowing. The French national debt, which at the outbreak of the war was 34,188 million francs, had increased by the end of 1918 to 147,472 millions. The debt of the German Empire, which before the war was about 5,000 millions of marks, was estimated in 1919 at 160,600 millions. The war loans floated by Austria and Hungary amounted to 42,500 millions of kronen; a further sum of over 30,000 millions was raised by borrowing (in the form of notes) from the banks in Austria-Hungary; and there were considerable loans from Germany. The financial position of the Central Empires was worse than that of their opponents, and not merely because they ended the war in a state of political revolution. The German Government had gambled on the hope of a large war indemnity and had concealed the true financial position from its subjects by issuing

' skeleton ' budgets which bore no relation to the facts. The statesmen of the Dual Monarchy had deliberately inflated the paper currency whenever they judged it inexpedient to float a loan, and had done their best to follow the ostrich-like policy of their chief ally. But the finances of France and Italy gave cause for serious misgivings; and the position of the United Kingdom, though considered relatively sound, is best indicated by the fact that the sum required for the service of the National Debt was £270,000,000 in the year ending the 31st March 1919. This sum, which was much larger than the national revenue had been before the war, included no provision for redeeming the debt.

The enormous expenditure based upon this borrowing had produced an illusive appearance of commercial and industrial activity, and even of general prosperity, in most of the belligerent countries. Wages and profits were high in those trades which were engaged on Government contracts. There was no lack of employment for such male labour as could be spared from the armies; and everywhere this dwindling body was diluted in a greater or less degree with female employees—or even, as in Germany, with prisoners of war. Factories which had lost their normal markets were hastily adapted to the production of military material. Speculation was rife, even where it was restricted by emergency laws, and huge fortunes were made and lost on the stock exchanges. Never had the expenditure of the more thoughtless sections of every social class been more profuse; and extravagance was on the whole most general in those communities whose real prosperity was most undermined by the war. Indeed extravagance was often the result of despair. Men spent because it seemed useless to save; they did their utmost to enjoy the present because they saw no hope for the future. The main facts in the economic situation were everywhere the same: a progressive inflation of currency and a progressive diminution in the supplies of articles of use and luxury. In all the belligerent countries there arose sooner or later a scarcity of foodstuffs, of coal, of raw materials. The belligerents who produced these commodities were short of labour; those who imported them were short of shipping, and were further limited in their foreign purchases by difficulties of exchange. For, although the foreign trade of certain of the belligerents appeared to be in a flourishing condition, their

exports consisted largely in military supplies, and the raw materials of such supplies, which they sold to their associates. In the final stages of the war none of the European allies was able to export largely to any neutral market. Nearly all the surplus coal of Great Britain was required for France and Italy. The iron and steel manufacturers, the wool spinners and weavers of Great Britain were working for the Allied Armies. Her cotton trade was hampered by the want of raw materials; and even if the cotton had been forthcoming, it would have been difficult to find tonnage for the supply of Manchester's principal markets, which lay in the Far East. When, therefore, it was necessary to buy in a neutral country on any considerable scale, the belligerents were commonly unable to pay for goods with goods. They paid in their own currency, which naturally depreciated as their purchases progressed. From this general calamity Japan and the United States were alone exempt. They were in the fortunate position of being able to produce and to export far more than they required from abroad. Had it not been for the loans advanced by American bankers and the American Treasury to the European Allies, the exchange would have gone against the latter more severely in New York than in any neutral money market. But since the value of their currencies was artificially 'pegged up' in New York the true position of their foreign trade was to some extent disguised. Germany and Austria-Hungary had no ally like the United States to break their financial downfall, and it is instructive to observe how the currencies of the Central Empires depreciated in the only neutral markets to which they had free access—those of Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. It might have been expected that Germany at least, after the blockade had cut off the more distant outlets of her exports, would have flooded the contiguous neutrals with supplies of such goods as coal, iron and steel, potash, cement, dyes, and salt, which she could produce without the assistance of raw materials imported from non-European countries. She had every inducement to do this. Not only was it politically important to her that these neutrals should be made as independent as possible of the Associated Powers; all of them produced supplies of which she stood in urgent need, and for which it was most desirable that she should pay in goods. Yet in the later stages of the war she never succeeded in providing these Powers with coal and steel

to the extent of their requirements, although they were prepared to pay fantastic prices ; and in consequence the value of the mark steadily declined on all their bourses.

3. *Effects on Neutrals, e. g. The Argentine, Brazil, Persia.* After what has been said of the belligerents, it will be readily understood that few, if any, of the neutral powers, even those farthest removed from the theatre of war, were other than anxious for the return of peace. Some of them were fortunate enough to possess foodstuffs and raw materials of which the Associated Powers stood in need. The planters of Java and Cuba reaped a golden harvest owing to the exclusion of German and Austrian beet-sugar from the world market. The nitrate oficinas of Chile, so far as they were not financed with enemy capital, benefited by the limitless demand for high explosives made with nitric acid. The grain merchants of the Argentine made enormous sales to the Allies, particularly towards the end of the war, when it was difficult to transport grain from more remote markets such as Australia. But even in these cases the gain was not unmixed with loss. All the neutrals had bought largely from Germany before the war, and had found her one of the best markets for their produce. Whatever consolations the present might yield, they could not look forward with indifference to the permanent annihilation of German trade ; nor could they feel any confidence that, if the war were unduly prolonged, the credits which they had given to Germany's opponents would be a sound investment. Meanwhile the prosperity of these neutrals was at best one-sided. They were deprived of the supplies of new capital which they had regularly drawn from the great industrial powers before the war. They also lost their most desirable class of immigrants. Their exports of some descriptions were abnormal ; but other goods accumulated on their hands, either because Germany was the main market, or because the Associated Powers, in order to economize tonnage, had refused shipping facilities. Thus the warehouses of the Dutch East Indies were full to overflowing with copra and other oleaginous produce ; and Brazil was perpetually harassed by the problem of financing her unexportable coffee. Those who were making money out of the war found it difficult to purchase some of the most necessary supplies. In 1918 neither England nor the United States could supply the South American States with more than a small proportion of the coal which they required ; Brazil, for example,

received little more than a quarter of her normal imports of coal, and the Argentine railways were driven to experiment in the use of grain as fuel. Both in South America and in Asia there was an acute unsatisfied demand for the staple manufactures of the great industrial powers. For every industrial power of any consequence was involved in the war; and the trade of those who still had something to export was being slowly strangled by the dearth of shipping.

We may illustrate the general condition of the outlying neutrals by the case of Persia, a State which seemed less likely than most to suffer by the paralysis of international commerce. During the war Persia found a good market for her exports of opium and petroleum, and her trade in the latter article increased considerably. But her imports, and also other exports which affected more nearly the general prosperity of her population, were adversely affected. The closing of the Dardanelles in 1914 cut off the northern provinces, which were the most flourishing in Persia, from their best route of commercial communication with Western Europe. The collapse of Russia deprived them of their chief customer for raw cotton and other agricultural produce; it also closed the source from which they had obtained their supplies of sugar and cotton piece-goods. The imports of Persia for 1918 were, in quantity, 30 per cent. less than those for 1914; and this reduced quantity was obtained at greatly enhanced prices. Imports of cotton piece-goods fell by 46 per cent., imports of tea and sugar by 66 per cent.; and Persia was obliged by high prices and the difficulty of communicating with foreign markets to curtail severely all but her most indispensable purchases. European goods could only be supplied to her through Mesopotamia or India; and in either case the cost of land transport was excessive owing to the conditions created by the war.

4. *The Problem of Marine Transport.* Let us now pass to the problem of marine transport, which in 1918 was the most urgent problem arising out of the war. In July 1914 the world's merchant fleet (sailing ships included) amounted to about 49 million tons (gross). By the end of 1917 the losses of merchant tonnage from enemy action and marine risks amounted to 11,827,000 tons, of which 7,079,000 tons were British owned. By the 31st October 1918 the losses had risen to 15,007,000 tons, of which 9,002,000 tons were British. The effective supply of

shipping was further reduced by the inactivity of about 4 million tons of German and Austro-Hungarian ships, and a smaller but still considerable quantity of neutral tonnage. Against the losses were to be set new constructions, especially by Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, which by the end of 1918 exceeded 12 million tons gross, making good 80 per cent. of the losses of Allies and neutrals combined. But, of the tonnage controlled by the Allies, a large portion was employed in purely military services, such as patrol-work and the transport of troops and their supplies. The practical efficiency of the rest was diminished by a variety of causes, among which may be more particularly mentioned the cumbrous but necessary system of convoys, and the congestion of Allied seaports. By a series of agreements with the maritime neutrals the Allies had secured for themselves almost a monopoly of merchant shipping; and, if they had not done so, it would have been impossible for them to continue the war. But one effect of this monopoly was that neutral trade, even in the most remote waters of the world, was severely subordinated to the military and economic needs of the Allies. When we look back on the autumn of 1918, after an interval of twelve months, it is probable that the most critical phase of the shipping question was already at an end. The naval authorities of the Allies were confident of their ability to deal with the submarine in future. The American programme of shipbuilding was already far advanced; and, though greatly reduced after the Armistice, it was still so productive that in June 1919 the total of the world's steam tonnage was actually higher by 2 million tons than it had been in June 1914. We now realize that the Allies would hardly have been defeated by the tonnage problem, however long the war had lasted. But the fact remains that, until peace was restored, the general commerce of the world was doomed to suffer from a chronic shortage of ships available for normal trade.

5. *Sufferings in Devastated and Occupied Areas, e. g. Serbia, Galicia.* While the conditions of daily life deteriorated, under the stress of these general evils, in almost every corner of the civilized world, and even in countries which were only half civilized, the full measure of the suffering engendered by the war was only to be appreciated by those familiar with the conditions of continental Europe. Even here there were different degrees of suffering. The European neutrals were less tormented

than the belligerents; the Allied Powers were fortunate by comparison with the blockaded Central Empires; the worst fate of all was that of such territories as Belgium, North-East France, Serbia, Rumania, and Russian Poland, which involuntarily shared the privations of the Central Empires and were furthermore exploited to the utmost for the good of their temporary masters. Some evils, however, were common to the whole continent. Bread, meat, potatoes, and all the common articles of food were scarce except among the agricultural population; they were doled out in rations of varying degrees of inadequacy, and could only be sold at tolerable prices by means of governmental action, which sometimes took the form of subsidies, but more commonly worked by requisitioning and scales of maximum prices. Supplies of coal, wood, and petroleum were insufficient, even in the producing countries; either because the sources of supply had been damaged in the course of military operations, or through scarcity of labour, or finally owing to difficulties of transport. The railways, which were the main arteries of internal trade and distribution in every continental state, were overburdened with military traffic; and, what was worse, the efficiency of their rolling stock and permanent ways deteriorated steadily for want of men and materials to effect the necessary repairs. At the time of the Armistice it was the opinion of experts that the chief problem of reconstruction in continental Europe was presented by the railways, and that the damage due to direct military action was the smallest part of this problem. Even Germany with her unrivalled network of internal waterways had not been able to avoid this common evil; and her enormous captures of railway rolling stock in Russia and Belgium proved altogether insufficient to make good the wastage on her national system. A third general feature was the paralysis of the industries which catered for civilian needs. There was, for example, a general suspension of housebuilding, even in neutral countries. It was impossible to make good the ordinary wastage due to wear and tear; and the problem of rebuilding in devastated territories such as Galicia and Poland had simply to be left unsolved. Textile factories, unless engaged in producing for the armies or in working up substitute materials of domestic origin, reduced their output or even came to a standstill for want of wool, jute, and cotton. The shortage of raw materials was great even

in those countries which were not subjected to blockade restrictions ; it often happened that tonnage could not be spared by the Allies to assist their own manufacturers. The evils of the industrial situation were, however, exemplified in the most striking fashion by the occupied territories and by the Central Empires, in which the shortage of raw materials was even more desperate than the shortage of food.

The condition of the devastated areas, as they appeared at the time of the Armistice, may be illustrated by the cases of Serbia and Galicia. In Serbia it was found, after the Austro-Hungarian retreat, that nearly all factories and industrial establishments had been rendered useless. The saw-mills, the cement-works, the brick-kilns had been deliberately wrecked. The farms had been stripped of 80 per cent. of their livestock, and in many cases of all carts and agricultural implements. Even the houses in some districts had been stripped of furniture and fittings. It was necessary to import by rail all the materials required for reconstruction, but the railways had been made useless for a long time to come by the destruction of bridges, stations, sidings, and rolling stock. Austrian Galicia was still much as it had been left by the Russians after their great retreat. Elaborate statistics of damage had been collected by Austrian officials, and some serious efforts had been made to resume the production of oil. But in the autumn of 1918 many of the Galician peasants were still living in extemporized hovels and dug-outs, without proper food or clothing, without even seed to sow in their fields. It was estimated that 124,000 dwelling-houses and 220,000 farm buildings had been destroyed in Austrian Galicia and the Bukovina. The last Austrian Budget before the Armistice provided for the expenditure of 615 million kronen to build houses and to reconstruct industry and agriculture in these provinces. Work of the same kind, but on an infinitely greater scale, awaited the resumption of peace in the war zone of Northern France, where the destruction was so complete that the advisability of attempting to rebuild many towns which had once been prosperous was held to be an open question. Here, and in Belgium, in Northern Italy and in Russian Poland, it was a question of restoring ruined industries almost from the foundations. All stocks of raw materials had disappeared ; the machinery, when not removed, had been deliberately destroyed. Nothing remained but the bare walls

of the factory, the hungry unemployed, and manufacturers whose capital consisted of their own brains and some amount of depreciated currency. What would be the cost of reconstructing such businesses, whether they could be reconstructed at all, were questions that only time and experiment could solve. But it was essential that the experiment should be made quickly, if it was to have any chance of success, before the skilled population which had been the best asset of the ruined industries was starved or dispersed or fatally demoralized.

6. *Effects of the War on the European Neutral States.* But it is superfluous to enlarge upon the too obvious necessities of the devastated and occupied areas of the Continent. We may now turn to consider the case of those European neutrals who are sometimes supposed to have reaped immense advantages from the war. A survey of their condition in 1918 will convince any unprejudiced reader that, however greatly particular classes and interests in Holland, Switzerland, and Scandinavia may have enriched themselves by the war, these countries were, as a whole, suffering severely by the long continuance of hostilities. Apparent prosperity was purchased at the cost of a severe and general rise in the cost of living, a scarcity of essential commodities, the stagnation or decline of important trades; and all these neutrals were obliged to recognize that, so long as the war continued, their vital interests depended on events which they were, for the most part, unable to control or influence.

7. *Holland.* Before the war the prosperity of Holland was based on the transit trade which passed through Rotterdam, on the colonial trade with the Dutch East Indies, and on her exports of agricultural produce. The transit trade, being chiefly German trade, came suddenly to an end on the outbreak of war. The colonial trade was slower to decline, but in the year 1918 it had fallen to negligible dimensions. These two blows were fatal to the prosperity of Rotterdam; even in 1917 the traffic of the port was only 10 per cent. of the total of 1913. There remained only the export trade in agricultural produce and in a few native manufactures (such as margarine) to which the war had given a temporary stimulus. Depending upon both groups of belligerents for necessary supplies and facilities—on the Associated Powers for cereals, fodder-stuffs, and fertilizers, on Germany for coal, iron, and potash—Holland was obliged to divide between them her surplus of agricultural produce in

agreed proportions, and to allow her importers to give the most stringent undertakings and guarantees that the goods which they received from one group would not be used for the advantage of the other. Thanks to this policy of balance and exchange, the country managed to maintain its more important industries (apart from those dependent on the transit trade) at a tolerable level until the United States entered the war in 1917. But she was then confronted, like the other northern neutrals, with the demand that she should drastically reduce her exports to Germany, on pain of being deprived of all shipping facilities and of practically all the supplies controlled by the Associated Powers. Against this pressure Holland held out until the Armistice was signed; partly, no doubt, from a fear that, if she accepted the proposal of the Associated Powers, the Germans would invade her territory and take by force what they were not allowed to buy; but much more from a well-grounded belief that neither England nor America could supply her with the coal and other German products which she received in compensation for her exports to Germany.

One consequence of the line taken by the Dutch Government was that practically no grain was imported into Holland during 1918, and that the national food-supply remained throughout the year in a precarious position. Bread cards had been instituted in February 1917 on the basis of a normal weekly ration of 2,800 grm. per head per week. But this relatively generous allowance was soon reduced, and by the end of the year the standard ration of 2,800 grm. had to suffice for eleven days. Early in 1918 the Minister of Agriculture announced that, if no grain were imported, the existing ration could not be guaranteed beyond the beginning of April; and at the end of March, as the hope of a compromise with the Associated Powers seemed more remote than ever, the ration was reduced to 1,400 grm. a week, in the hope that existing stocks would thus be made to last until the new harvest. The farmers and the peasants, who numbered 60 per cent. of the population, were able for the most part to ensure their own supplies of foodstuffs in defiance of rationing and requisitioning orders; and, although the Government was obliged, after the spring of 1918, to prohibit exports of food to Germany, the loss of the German market was to some extent balanced by the high prices obtained from the Dutch consumer. Throughout it was the towns which suffered.

They were strictly rationed in meat and in fats. In July the daily ration of butter or margarine was reduced to 25 grm., and a further reduction to 100 grm. a week was foreshadowed. In the last week of October the weekly ration of meat was 200 grm., of cheese 200 grm., of coffee 7 grm. Potatoes (usually of bad quality) were the only foodstuff of which the supply was fairly generous; the weekly ration at this date was 4 kilos. In ordinary times the population might not have experienced any great hardship from being compelled to live upon domestic produce, but the maritime embargo put an end to the imports of nitrates and fodder-stuffs which were essential to the Dutch system of intensive farming. In spite of the inducements given to farmers to extend the arable area, the yield of the chief crops was below the average; and the shortage of fodder-stuffs led to wholesale slaughtering of dairy cattle in the autumn of 1917.

Another consequence was enforced idleness of those national industries which depended upon foreign raw materials. The margarine trade which had worked for the account of, and with materials supplied by, Great Britain, collapsed sharply because Great Britain was no longer dependent on it; and no supplies were forthcoming from other sources. Towards the end of 1917 the cotton-spinning mills, which employed about 26,000 hands, were only able to work sixteen hours a week; and by the New Year most of these mills had closed for want of raw cotton. The cotton-weavers were similarly brought to a standstill because England would no longer supply them with her yarns, of which they had been accustomed to consume 40,000 tons per annum. The shipping yards appeared to be exceptionally fortunate, in that their iron and steel could be obtained from Germany. But in 1917 and 1918 the conditions which Germany attached to deliveries of iron and steel were so severe, and the prices exacted were so high, that many shipbuilders preferred to wait until British materials should be available.

The systematic fashion in which Germany exploited the necessities of Holland was for the Dutch a most galling feature of the situation. The more tenaciously Holland clung to an attitude of economic neutrality, the more confident the Germans became that their coal and iron were indispensable to her. Up to the end of March 1918 it was the German practice, besides charging heavy prices for coal, to claim extensive 'compensa-

tion in the form of licenses to export from Holland fixed quantities of pork, butter, cheese, milk, poultry, eggs, potatoes, and beet-sugar. After March the Dutch Government could no longer undertake to permit these exports on the old scale, and Germany recognized that a renewal of the old agreement was impracticable. None the less she prolonged the negotiations for a new coal agreement up to the end of July, and in those four months suspended her deliveries of coal, hoping by this pressure to extract more favourable terms. The price which she eventually forced the Dutch to promise was 90 guilders (double the price paid before the 31st March) and a commercial credit of 30 guilders for every ton of coal. A final settlement as to iron and steel, potash, dyes, and cement was deferred until the autumn, when the statistics of the Dutch crops and harvests would be available as a basis for discussing compensation. But in the meantime iron, which in the German market cost 120 guilders a ton, was sold in Holland through an official German bureau for 400 guilders a ton and a commercial credit of some magnitude on every truck-load delivered.

These commercial arrangements with Germany were a confession of Holland's economic weakness and threw a heavy strain upon her industries. It is, however, probable that patriotic Dutchmen realized more acutely their country's military and political weakness when England and the United States combined, in March 1918, to requisition the whole of the Dutch shipping which lay in their respective ports. This step, justified by an appeal to the belligerent right of *angary*, was taken by the English and American Governments after the Dutch Government had deliberately refused to approve a chartering arrangement with the owners. Undoubtedly the refusal was due to fear of Germany; nor had the shipowners any cause to complain of the terms which they received for the requisitioned tonnage. The ships were to be returned at the end of the war, and any which had been lost would be replaced as soon as possible. But the Dutch Cabinet argued, with some reason, that more respect was shown for the rights of the individual shipowners than for the sovereign rights of Holland. There was another aspect of the question which was forcibly stated by the American Government in a published dispatch. For the past twelve months Great Britain and the United States had seen large numbers of Dutch vessels lying idle in their ports at a

time when every ton of shipping was urgently required; and it had become apparent that these vessels would not be employed without compulsion in any services that the Associated Powers could facilitate. It was natural under these conditions that the Powers should appeal to their belligerent rights. With this point of view the States-General were disposed to agree, especially when the Associated Powers offered Holland 100,000 tons of grain as a solatium. But the Dutch Cabinet felt the humiliation deeply, and it is probable that their resentment was shared by many of the politicians who urged them to accept the inevitable with a good grace.

For Holland the economic situation was materially eased by the Armistice. Late in November an agreement was concluded under which the Associated Powers undertook to facilitate, within fixed limits, Dutch imports of wheat and rice, oils and fats, fertilizers, and maize for a period of twelve months. But, as a matter of course, this undertaking was accompanied by severe restrictions on Dutch exports to Germany, to be maintained until the conclusion of peace. And it was difficult after the Armistice to obtain any coal from Germany. In November only 44,000 tons reached Holland out of the 120,000 which were due; and at the end of the month the German Government signified that they were unable to make further deliveries for the present. England promised to supply 60,000 tons as a stop-gap, but could not fulfil her promise as promptly as the situation required. It seemed for a time as though Holland would be forced to depend entirely on her own coal-mines, which produced only about 50 per cent. of her normal requirements. Matters improved in January 1919 with the resumption, on a small scale, of the German deliveries, and the prospect of larger supplies from Belgium. But before Holland's supplies of coal—and of a hundred other necessary articles—could be assured it was necessary that conditions of order and peaceful industry should be restored in neighbouring countries. On the political settlement at Paris would depend the future of her colonial trade and of her agriculture, the two most solid of her assets. Some Dutch interests had made money out of the war, and Dutch losses of shipping had been comparatively light. But it would be years, if not generations, before Holland recovered her old importance as an *entrepôt* for the import and export trade of Central Europe. For the present she found herself in a difficult

financial position. Her national expenditure for 1918 was more than double that of 1913, and exceeded the revenue by more than 300 million guilders; a deficit of 130 millions was anticipated in the budget for 1919. Her national debt had risen from 1,100 to 1,850 millions during the war.

8. *Denmark.* The situation of the other European neutrals showed similar disquieting features. Denmark was the most fortunate. She had not suffered such political humiliation as Holland. Her food supplies had not been vitally impaired by the great embargo; through the years 1917 and 1918 she continued to supply Germany and Great Britain with agricultural produce, in 1918 she was even able to assist Norway and Sweden with quantities of grain. In proportion to her own needs she had been better supplied with coal than any other neutral; as the deliveries from England had fallen off, those from Germany had increased, and the enhanced cost of coal was balanced by the higher prices which she obtained for her butter, bacon, and surplus livestock. Thanks to the abundance of her native supplies, and to her careful regulation of prices, she had averted the worst forms of distress. It was calculated that the cost of living of the ordinary working-class household in Denmark had only risen by 66 per cent. up to the beginning of 1918, whereas the percentage of increase in Sweden was 92 per cent., and in Norway, the least well administered of the Scandinavian States, it was 130 per cent. Yet even in Denmark there was widespread suffering. In July 1918 a law was passed granting State subsidies to the Communes in augmentation of their special funds for the reduction of prices and the relief of the poor. The expenditure from central and local sources which this law sanctioned amounted roughly to £1 per head of the population. The commune of Copenhagen budgeted for the expenditure of 37,000,000 kronen in war relief during the period 1st July 1918 to 31st March 1919. This was no doubt, to some extent, a policy of State-relief in aid of wages. But a large part of the relief expenditure was necessitated by unemployment. Owing to the embargo a number of industries were deprived of raw materials, others were crippled by the high price of coal and the difficulty of obtaining iron on any terms from Germany. In the winter of 1917-18 there were over 40,000 unemployed in Denmark, and it was estimated that the dependants of these workmen numbered 110,000. In June 1918

the numbers of the unemployed had fallen to 25,000, but the winter of 1918-19 raised the total to 66,000, representing a total of distressed persons not far short of 250,000 in a population of about 3,000,000 souls. One of the worst features in the situation at this date was the difficulty of inducing the unemployed to accept work when it could be found for them. In its anxiety to keep Denmark free of Bolshevism the Danish Government had sanctioned an unduly generous system of relief which, when once put in practice, was not easy to reform. The problem became less acute in 1919, but it was necessary to extend the system of exceptional relief over the winter of 1919-20. Large fortunes had been made in Denmark during the war, by the farmers, by the shipowners, by the owners of war factories, and by the speculators who made a profession of contraband trade with Germany. But these gains had been greatest in the early years of the war, and they had been very unequally distributed among the population. The profits derived from the export of agricultural produce, which were the most widely diffused, were to some extent counterbalanced by the serious reduction in the livestock of the country which became necessary when the embargo cut off supplies of fodder-stuffs and fertilizers. The farmers in disposing of their cattle and horses to Germany had been selling their industrial capital.

9. *Norway.* In Norway there had been the same unequal distribution of gains and losses without the same systematic effort to diminish inequality by taxation and relief. Colossal profits had been made by the shipping industry in the years 1914-17. Although its gross losses from submarine activity amounted to 50 per cent. of the mercantile tonnage which it possessed at the beginning of the war, the net losses were only about 28 per cent., since the Norwegian owners had made extensive purchases of shipping in 1915 and 1916; and this adverse balance was considerably reduced in a few months after the Armistice. The fishing industry and the manufacturers of fish products had enjoyed abnormal prosperity owing to a steady demand from Germany and the purchase of the greater part of the catch in two successive seasons by Great Britain. The manufacturers of carbide, of synthetic nitrates, and of other electro-chemical products, the producers of zinc and aluminium, the match trade and the wood-pulp trade also made large profits which, in some cases, continued to accrue throughout the war. The abnormal pros-

perity of such trades was reflected in the figures of the national revenue: the new taxes of the 1917-18 budget, which were estimated to yield 58½ million kronen, actually produced 132 millions. But the cost of living increased in a higher proportion than elsewhere in Scandinavia; it was even estimated by a statistical expert that the percentage increase between July 1914 and November 1918 was greater in Norway than in England—160 per cent. as against 122 per cent. Norwegian wages, it is true, rose sharply in 1917 and 1918, and they were supplemented to some extent, in the case of the poorer classes, by the action of the Communes in distributing certain necessities of life at artificially low prices. But even so the standard of life deteriorated among the manual workers, and the recipients of fixed incomes. They spent more than of old on food of an inferior quality and reduced quantity; they spent less on other necessities and decencies. In 1918, with the increasing shortage of raw materials due to the embargo, employment became irregular in certain industries, especially in those producing textiles, wood-pulp, and canned fish. The Government, which had deferred all experiments in rationing until the eleventh hour and had relied mainly upon an imposing but ineffective system of maximum prices to alleviate the effects of scarcity, was obliged at the end of 1917 to disclose the full seriousness of the food situation. The rationing of sugar commenced in November 1917; cards for bread, flour, farinaceous foodstuffs, and coffee came into force on the 13th January 1918, and the sugar ration was simultaneously reduced by one-half. The basic ration of bread was fixed at 200 grm. a day, that of coffee at 250 grm. a month, that of sugar at 250 grm. a week. A warning was issued by the Rationing Director that no increase of the bread ration could be expected before November. In April rationing schemes were issued for milk and potatoes; the basic ration of milk was fixed at $\frac{1}{4}$ of a litre per day, and that of potatoes at 2 kg. per week. The shortage of potatoes was a disaster second only to that of bread, these being the two staple articles of diet among the working classes. The new system of rationing, at first welcomed by public opinion, was soon denounced as intolerably severe, and in the towns there was a considerable ferment which resulted in the formation of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils, and in demands that labour should be diverted from the manufacture of luxuries and

war material to the production of food, that the army should be reduced, and that military training should be abolished. There were even threats of a general strike unless the Government took steps to reduce the high cost of living. Though these proposals emanated from a minority, and the unions were still controlled by moderate leaders, there was sufficient inflammable material in the country to alarm the Government. The rations of workmen were increased and the Storting voted 1,000,000 kronen for the relief of the unemployed, but it was known that, unless supplies of grain and flour could be obtained from abroad, there would be no bread ration from the end of August until the new harvest became available in November. Fortunately this danger was averted. On the 30th April 1918, Dr. Nansen signed at Washington an economic agreement under which Norway obtained leave to import fixed quantities of food, fodder-stuffs, fertilizers, and other goods on condition of rigidly restricting her exports to the Central Powers. But these supplies had still to be purchased and transported from overseas, and they would not in any case remove the necessity for rationing. In August steps were taken to control the new crop of potatoes, and in September a scheme for controlling butter (on the basis of a weekly ration of 50 grm.) was brought into force. The bread and coffee rations were slightly increased in November, but it was not until the spring of 1919 that the authorities began to speak of unrationed bread as a possibility of the near future.

The state of Norwegian industry remained precarious long after the signing of the American agreement. The cotton mills, for example, received no raw cotton at all until September, and up to the end of 1918 had secured of raw cotton less than one-fourth, and of cotton yarns about one-third, of the quantities received in 1916. The fish-catch of 1918 was very poor, as the stimulus of the British purchasing contract no longer existed. Shipping profits had declined, and in nearly all branches of trade business was slack and hours of labour were reduced. For the financial year 1918-19 the Government appropriated 101 million kronen to purposes of relief, and actually expended 111 millions; for 1919-20 the necessary grants under this head were estimated at nearly 39 millions. Under the pressure of such burdens the national budgets increased rapidly; in 1917-18 the expenditure was 446 million kronen as compared with 142 millions for 1913-14; and the estimates for 1918-19 (which

appear to have been exceeded) were 625 millions. The national debt, which stood at 363 million kronen before the war, was more than 570 millions by the end of 1918-19.

10. *Sweden.* A Swedish observer remarked in 1918 that the whole body of his countrymen had become lethargic and indifferent to external events, principally from lack of food. The war had borne more hardly upon the masses in Sweden than in most neutral countries, because the relations of Sweden with the Allies had been strained from an early period in the war. The Swedish Government had objected to giving the guarantees, in respect of goods imported from overseas, which had been obtained from Denmark and Holland and Switzerland; and, although some Swedish manufactures were of importance to the Allies, the country had no such lever to use in economic negotiations as the Danes possessed in their agricultural produce and the Norwegians in their merchant shipping. The army, the official classes, and the aristocracy had been stiffened in their resistance to Allied demands by the fear of Russia and the conviction that close friendship with Germany ought to be the sheet anchor of national policy. To this conviction the Government made great sacrifices, consenting, for example, to become dependent on German supplies of coal, which were inferior in quality and involved heavy demands for compensation; and also rejecting the offer of the Allies to facilitate regular importations of grain and fodder. Even in 1916 Swedish imports of grain and flour and colonial goods were altogether insufficient, and the embargo of 1917 led to an acute food crisis. The bread ration was 260 grm. a day, the butter ration 50 grm. a week, the coffee ration 200 grm. a month. There were also rations for pulse, milk, pork, and coffee. Often the rations were not forthcoming; substitutes for tea, coffee, and cocoa were in general use; meat was irregularly obtainable, and then only in small quantities. In the free market tea realized 50 kronen and coffee 30 kronen a kg.; butter was 12 kronen a kg., and potatoes 30 kronen per 100 kg. The cost of living, which had increased, up to the end of 1916, by about 40 per cent., rose by another 50 per cent. in 1917; and the prices of food, boots, and clothing increased in a still higher ratio. It was true that, in Sweden, as in most other neutral countries, the agricultural population was much less affected by the food shortage than were the towns. But the town

population was 28 per cent. of the whole; and, owing to the passive resistance which the farmers offered to the requisitioning of their grain, it was found, at the end of 1917, that the bread ration of the towns could not be maintained at the existing level for more than four or five months unless considerable imports of wheat and rye were forthcoming. The economic situation led to the overthrow, in the autumn of 1917, of the Coalition Ministry which had governed Sweden from the beginning of the war. A new Liberal Cabinet came into power and at once proceeded to negotiate with the Associated Powers.

These negotiations were eventually successful: On the 29th May 1918 a comprehensive agreement was signed, by which the European Allies undertook to facilitate Swedish imports in accordance with a fixed scale of rations; while Sweden in return agreed to restrict her exports (particularly those of iron ore) to the Central Powers, and to allow 400,000 tons of Swedish shipping to be chartered for Allied Services. The Agreement was received with very general satisfaction in Sweden, in spite of some complaints as to the magnitude of the concessions demanded by the Allies. During the summer supplies began to arrive under the Agreement, and in the autumn it was found possible to increase the bread ration. But still the public were warned that they must not expect an increase in the ration of fats, and that there would be a continued scarcity of meat other than pork. Prices did not fall with the increase of general supplies; it was officially calculated that at the end of 1918 the general cost of living was 167 per cent. higher than in July 1914.

Industry, moreover, still languished in most of its branches. The winter of 1917-18 had been a period of general depression. Even the iron trade, the largest and usually the most flourishing of all, showed a decline of production as compared with 1917, which had been considered a bad year. By January 1918 stocks of cotton were practically exhausted; the jute mills had been without raw material since the preceding May; no wool had been imported in 1917, and the wool-spinners were dependent on native wool of inferior quality and insufficient quantity. The foreign markets of the timber trade, the match factories, and the pulp factories were in great measure cut off by the submarine campaign and the import restrictions of the Allies; the boot factories were without leather, and the margarine

factories were without oils and fats. The want of raw materials was slowly repaired. Cotton and copper began to arrive in the autumn of 1918; in the winter were received small quantities of wool, jute, and tanning materials; but even at the end of March 1919 the only industries which were adequately supplied were the cotton and the electrical trades. For the year 1918 exports were even worse than in 1917; there was a sharp decline in the exports of iron ore, iron, and electrical machines. In the winter of 1918-19 the problem of unemployment was serious.

11. *Switzerland.* The position of Switzerland, surrounded on all sides by the belligerents, and obliged to import through their territories everything that she needed, was singularly precarious. Like Denmark and Holland she had protected herself by allocating her available exports in roughly equal proportions between the two groups of belligerents. She had always been dependent upon Germany for coal, and, owing to her geographical position, could not hope to obtain much from other quarters during the war. Even if the difficulty of price could have been surmounted, the available railway systems could not have hauled 200,000 tons of coal a month from French or Italian ports to Switzerland. For grain, fodder, and fertilizers she was absolutely dependent on the goodwill of the Associated Powers. Their consent was necessary before a single truckload of overseas goods could reach the Swiss frontier; and in 1918 it was only by their help that Switzerland could procure the tonnage necessary for bringing her supplies to Europe. Alone of the European neutrals she was destitute of shipping. For that reason, and through her poverty in natural resources, Switzerland had comparatively little to offer in compensation for the assistance of the belligerents, except the products of her electro-chemical and engineering trades, chocolate, condensed milk, cheese, and livestock. Her great assets were her unimpeachable neutrality, and a strategical position so strong that neither group of the belligerents could afford to see her thrown into the arms of the other. But, as the crisis of shipping and railway transport developed in 1918, so the anxieties of Switzerland increased. The difficulty of finding a market for her manufactures, other than munitions and food-supplies, still further complicated the economic position. Her three best customers were Germany, the United Kingdom, and

France ; and all were anxious, for financial reasons, to exclude unnecessary imports.

In 1918 the supplies and the foreign trade of Switzerland were protected by a whole series of agreements. Her imports of cereals, fodder, and sugar were regulated by an agreement with the United States which assured her rations of these articles from the 1st October 1917 to the 30th September 1918. A shipping agreement with Germany, signed on the 24th April 1918, promised safe-conducts to ships bringing these rations to Cette and other neutral ports ; and in August 1918 the safe-conduct was extended to cover the principal raw and subsidiary materials required by Swiss industry. But Switzerland was expected to hire the necessary tonnage in the neutral shipping markets ; and this became an impossible condition as the Allies gradually brought under their own control the greater part of Swedish, Dutch, and Danish shipping. Hence the actual imports of Switzerland were much smaller than her treaty rations. At length, on the 22nd January 1919, more than two months after the signing of the Armistice, the Associated Powers signed an agreement by which they guaranteed shipping for the carriage of 70,000 tons of Swiss supplies a month. The Swiss-American agreement had left Switzerland dependent on Germany for coal and iron ; and in May 1918 Switzerland concluded an agreement by which she undertook to supply Germany with dairy produce, chocolate, and cattle in compensation for 200,000 tons of coal and 19,000 tons of iron a month. Already for three years the imports of Switzerland from overseas had been controlled, in the interest of the Allied Powers, by a special Swiss trust (the *Société suisse de Surveillance économique*), and similar arrangements of a less elaborate character had been created to control imports from Germany. But in July 1918 a new organization, the *Schweizerische Treuhandstelle*, was created by the Federal Government to enforce the more rigid conditions which were now imposed by Germany. The general foreign trade of Switzerland was protected by further compacts : a transit agreement with Germany which gave facilities for trade between Switzerland and the Northern Neutrals ; and financial agreements with France and England by which these countries, in return for commercial credits and other advantages, undertook to permit the import into their territories of limited quantities of Swiss luxury goods.

In spite of all these precautions, Switzerland suffered severely in 1918 from scarcity and high prices. The shortage of fodder-stuff entailed a reduction of her cattle-herds; but she was still obliged to continue her exports of fresh milk, condensed milk, and cheese to the belligerents, and in October 1918 a rationing system was introduced for milk. In August it was officially stated that for the coming winter the daily ration of bread would be 225 grm., and that of potatoes only 100 grm. The quantity of meat available for distribution in 1917 had been 38 per cent. below normal, and it was estimated in August 1918 that the position would be considerably worse in the near future; the weekly ration would be less than 500 grm. per head, and could only be maintained by heavy inroads upon the depleted livestock of the country. As for prices, those of cereals stood, in the early part of 1918, at 200 per cent. above the figures of 1914; the increase in the price of beef was 150 per cent., of pork nearly 300 per cent., of lard 200 per cent., of household coal more than 400 per cent. The coal situation had already been serious in 1917, when the average monthly consumption of the country was 222,000 tons. From May 1918 the supplies promised by Germany were only 80,000 tons a month, and drastic restrictions were imposed on the consumption of fuel, gas, and electricity both in industry and in private households. At the Armistice the German deliveries of coal abruptly ceased, leaving Switzerland with stocks in hand for two and a half months on the existing basis of consumption. It was expected that unless new sources of supply could be promptly arranged, there would be a general cessation of work in Swiss factories which depended on coal and electricity for their power.

In conclusion we must glance at the condition of the Central Empires, which had borne the full weight of the maritime blockade, in addition to the strain of a military effort second only to that of France.

12. *Effects of War on Belligerents, e.g. Germany.* During the war the German population declined by about 2,700,000 souls, and in 1918 was estimated at 65,000,000, whereas, but for the war, it would probably have exceeded 73,000,000. The shrinkage was due partly to a progressive fall in the birth-rate, which began in 1915, partly to an abnormal mortality among the civilian population. These two causes were hardly less important than the losses in the field. The explanation assigned for

the increase of civilian mortality was malnutrition, to which were attributed 260,000 deaths in 1917 and 294,000 in 1918. A proportion of these deaths was due to hunger oedema, a species of dropsy first noticed in 1916, which specially affected the old, the overworked, and the inmates of institutions in which no food was supplied outside the usual rations. But the effect of poor diet was less to encourage special epidemics than to weaken the individual's power of resistance to ordinary diseases, such as tuberculosis and influenza. There was reason to fear that the vitality of the rising generation had been permanently impaired, at least among the poorer classes in the towns.

The pinch of hunger had been felt in Germany since Easter 1916, when the meat ration was severely curtailed owing to the shortage of all kinds of livestock. In the following autumn, bread and potatoes became the staple foods of the rationed classes, and the caloric value of the official rations during the winter of 1916-17 was never more than one-third of the normal. Frequently it was less, for the potato crop of 1916 was poor, and swede-turnips (*kohl-rabi*), which were much inferior in nutritive value, were commonly substituted for potatoes. It was in this winter that the civilian death-rate showed the first sharp rise; now also began a decline in the general standard of physical efficiency, which was reflected in the reduced output of mines and industrial establishments, and in a heavier drain on the funds of sickness insurance societies. The rations of meat and bread were augmented in 1917, and henceforth it was possible to sustain life on the rationed foods; but the poor never had the opportunity of recovering the strength which they had lost in the '*kohl-rabi* winter'.

At least half the population always obtained more food than the official schedules of rations would indicate. In defiance of all rationing and requisitioning orders the agricultural classes maintained their old scale of food consumption and sold surreptitiously, at fantastic prices, from 25 to 33 per cent. of the more portable foodstuffs which they produced. The wealthier town-folk spent recklessly on illicit purchases of food. Supplementary rations were granted to heavy manual workers, to young children, to nursing and expectant mothers. But in 1917 and 1918 all important foodstuffs were controlled. The law-abiding and the poor had no means of adding considerably to their rations. Such people in Berlin, during the spring and early summer of

1918, were expected to live for a week on 4 lb. of bread, $7\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of potatoes, $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of meat (not always obtainable), and $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of sugar with minute portions of fish, butter, margarine, cheese, and jam. In July and August the Berlin ration of bread was slightly, and that of potatoes materially, reduced. At Hamburg the rations were worse than at Berlin, owing to a local scarcity of potatoes. Everywhere the meat ration was precarious during this summer; cattle were so starved as to be hardly worth slaughtering. In August it was decided that one week in every three should be meatless; in September still severer restrictions on the consumption of meat were officially predicted.

By comparison with the food shortage all other economic difficulties were generally regarded as insignificant. Yet these difficulties were appalling. The grandiose schemes of industrial reconstruction, which had been so much canvassed in 1916 and 1917, rested on the assumption of a victorious peace—a peace which would bring to Germany annexations, indemnities, a new harmony of labour and capital, a new zeal for work, a new outburst of inventive genius. But in fact Germany was to commence the new era with diminished territories, with a colossal war debt, with indefinite liabilities for reparation to her enemies, and with a labour crisis of the most acute description. To keep her industrial population alive, to set her peace industries in motion, she required immense imports of foodstuffs and raw materials. It was not easy to see how she could pay for these imports either with goods or with services. She was evidently to lose most of her merchant shipping. Her coal and iron trades were so crippled by difficulties of labour and transport, and by the actual or prospective loss of some important mine-fields, that they could barely satisfy the more urgent needs of the home market. Her stocks of manufactured goods were practically exhausted.

13. *Austria-Hungary.* In the Dual Monarchy there was also a food crisis which was aggravated by official incompetence and corruption, and by the total absence of national solidarity. The Austrian Government was slow to introduce a control of foodstuffs. It received the minimum of assistance from Hungary, and it was never strong enough to keep illicit trade and local selfishness within tolerable limits. So Cracow was allowed to starve in the early summer of 1918, while the peasants of Western Galicia sold their produce to speculators from Vienna and Buda-

pest; and the Czech farmers of Northern Bohemia deliberately refused to supply the German colonists of the adjacent mining districts. The outlying provinces, such as Tyrol, Dalmatia, and Istria, were badly supplied with bread-corn and other necessities, though their local produce was systematically requisitioned for the army and Vienna. Even in Vienna it was barely possible to live on the official rations, especially in June and July 1918 when the bread ration was reduced by one-half owing to the expense of the bread subsidy. At that time the daily allowance of solid food to a resident in Vienna was 3 oz. of bread and flour, 1 oz. of meat, $\frac{1}{4}$ oz. of fat, $2\frac{1}{2}$ oz. of potatoes, $\frac{3}{4}$ oz. of jam. In August the bread ration was restored to the old level, but meat became practically unobtainable on ration cards. In September the supply of milk to adults was suspended. In October the fat ration was reduced to two-thirds of an ounce per week. In Prague and other Bohemian towns the bread ration was the same as in Vienna, but meat, flour, potatoes, and milk were even scarcer. From the middle of March to the beginning of May Cracow was without bread and flour, and almost without fat; when bread was again forthcoming, potatoes disappeared.

Scarcity was aggravated by the high prices due to an inflated paper currency. For the working classes, minor officials, and poorer professional people it had become impossible to save or to retain savings, and often it was a question of choosing between food and the bare decencies of life. Food prices, indeed, were regulated, but the controlled articles were often not to be bought at the legal price. Fine flour, which should have been sold at 1.20 kr. per kilogram, actually fetched 24 kr.; the best meat was surreptitiously offered at 42 kr. when the legal price was 12 kr. A reel of cotton cost 40 to 80 kr., a cheap shirt at least 120 kr., a ready-made suit of clothes 800 kr. Yet the manufacture of paper money continued without intermission. Each new drain on the public purse was met by another issue of bank-notes, which led automatically to a further rise of prices.

In other respects also the economic position of Austria-Hungary was worse than that of Germany. The krone was almost incredibly depreciated on the few foreign exchanges where it was still quoted. Such Austro-Hungarian industries as were fortunate enough to rely on raw materials of domestic origin were in the grip of a transport crisis and a coal crisis. The transport crisis was caused by a shortage of rolling-stock. Owing


to the scarcity of lubricants and the use of inferior substitutes for copper, 30 per cent. of the railway engines on the Austrian and Hungarian systems were constantly under repair. The coal crisis arose from the fact that, although more hands were employed in the mines in 1918 than in 1914 the output had diminished by over 20 per cent.—a fatal deficit when no supplies could be got from Germany. In September only the scantiest supplies were reaching Prague and Vienna, and numbers of factories ceased work for want of coal. The most ominous aspect of the shortage was that it originated in disaffection among the Czech miners. The industries of German Austria, which had hitherto been supported by the co-operation of German, Slav, and Magyar, were now threatened with extinction by the violence of racial hatred. Hungary might stand alone in virtue of her great agricultural resources. Czecho-Slovakia could perhaps count on a prosperous future as an independent industrial state; but for the German provinces the disruption of the monarchy spelled industrial ruin.

[The following table shows the pre-war value of the various currencies mentioned above in terms of English currency :

Austria-Hungary	Krone	=	10 <i>d.</i>
Denmark	}	Krone	= 1/1½
Sweden			
Norway			
France	Franc	=	9·5 <i>d.</i>
Netherlands	Guilder	=	1/7·8
United States	Dollar	=	4/1·82

The following table shows the English equivalents of certain metric weights and measures :

1 gramme	=	15·4323 grains (7,000 grains = 1 lb.).
1 kilogram	=	2·2046 lb.
1 litre	=	0·8799 quart.]



CHAPTER V

THE PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL WAR-AIMS OF THE BELLIGERENTS

1. *General.* The political war-aims of the different Powers, more especially in the first years of the war, were stated only in the most general terms. Statesmen had not the time, nor always the desire, to particularize, to apply hard theories to fluid facts, or to draft precise clauses for a peace treaty which seemed distant and of which the basis could not wholly be foreseen. Moreover, statesmen are usually persons whose motives and policies cannot be defined in an epigram or compressed into a phrase. 'The alchemy that could condense Thiers or Bismarck . . . into a formula is a lost art. History does not work with bottled essences but with active combinations; compromise is the soul, if not the whole, of politics.' In this war statesmen were driven by events, for events were so compelling, and changes of fortune so swift, that even the greatest leaders were thrown this way and that by conflicting currents of opinion and circumstance. The war was greater than any man or any government or any country; there were times when none could tell whither the world was tending or what would be the issue. Hence it is that in the early stages of the war neither side was willing to draw up too full a confession of faith, nor to state its minimum demands. Another reason is that both the Entente and the Central Powers were bound by secret agreements, without reference to which the public and avowed aims of the belligerents cannot be understood.¹ Finally and most important, the issues of the struggle, the sufferings and the sacrifice produced great principles of which few had dreamed at the beginning.

2. *German war-aims up to the Peace Proposals, December 1916 - January 1917.* The public war-aims of Germany need not be dealt with at any length. From the Kaiser and Crown Prince downward all German statesmen were prolific in utterances

¹ This chapter deals with official war-aims in so far as they were public, or have subsequently been published.

and communiqués to the public, but these had practically no reference to their secret aims or agreements. The Kaiser's 'marginalia', for instance, make it impossible to suppose that he really looked on the war as one of self-defence as he so loudly avowed. Secret agreements did really hamper the public utterances of Entente statesmen, but Germany's statesmen felt no difficulty in making speeches entirely at variance with their secret objects. Hence while the speeches of Entente statesmen need supplement or comment, those of Germans require interpretation or flat contradiction. Publicity with the German Government was simply a means of deception, and was in the end recognized to be such by all impartial observers. The German assertions that they desired to respect the freedom of small States, to restrain militarism, and to establish international covenanted peace simply could not be believed as long as the German General Staff held power, and it was obvious to all that it did so at the end of 1916, when the German Government formally announced its desire to make peace proposals. As it happens, we know what the basis of these proposals was, for Ludendorff describes them in his *Memories*.¹ France was to restore the occupied parts of Alsace, but Germany was to insist on the economic and strategic rectification of her French frontier,² and on financial compensation. Germany would restore Belgium 'subject to definite guarantees for Germany's safety, which would be negotiated with the Belgian Government'. Germany and Poland (which had been declared independent of Russia on the 5th November 1916) were to have frontiers secured strategically and economically against Russia. It was not simply proposed that the German Colonies should be restored, but that there should be 'a Restoration of Colonies on the basis of an agreement securing to Germany colonial possessions corresponding to her population *and her economic interests*'. There was to be an indemnity to German concerns or to private persons injured by the war and, as has been said before, financial compensation from France. There was to be renunciation of

¹ *War Memories*, i, p. 320. They were adopted, on the 29th January 1917, by the Kaiser at a meeting at which Hindenburg, Ludendorff, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Zimmermann were present.

² Economic rectification meant apparently that the Briey iron mines and the Longwy steel mines were to be occupied or controlled. v. Michaelis to Count Czernin, 17th August 1917, v. *In the World War*, p. 158.

all exclusive economic measures or preferences calculated to interfere with normal trade, and the 'freedom of the seas' was to be guaranteed.

'These', says Ludendorff significantly, 'are the only German conditions which ever reached the enemy from our side with any co-operation on my part.'¹ It is therefore of interest to examine them. The terms are obviously based on the principle of securing complete strategic security, though even this does not account for the contemplated increase to the Colonial possessions of Germany. More ominous still sound the economic rectifications of the French frontier, and the conditions as to indemnity and financial compensation. In short, the peace was to be a military one of the old type, consisting purely of strategic and economic advantages, of financial indemnities which were all on one side, and of the creation or restoration of dummy independent states like Belgium or Poland, where these were necessary to secure further advantages to Germany. As there is no proposal for reduction of armaments it seems to follow that such a peace would have left intact the armed menace of Germany's military power, and indeed endowed it with increased prestige. Moreover, and this is one of the most important facts in the whole war, neither Germany nor German Austria had any down-trodden brethren to free or lost German territories to redeem.² If Germany retained her existing boundaries she retained the power of oppressing Danes in Schleswig, Poles in Posen and Silesia, and pro-French sympathizers in Alsace-Lorraine. Further, Ludendorff's strategic rectifications in France and in connexion with Poland would have brought even more alien subjects under German rule. Even the maintenance of the *status quo*, quite apart from any strategic rectifications proposed, enabled Germany to continue her work of denationalizing her Slav or Danish or pro-French subjects. Because of this very fact, after war had once been declared, the Entente Allies could not rest content with the *status quo*, while Germany could have done. For that

¹ Even Ludendorff was not all-powerful in Germany, and in particular at Brest-Litovsk the negotiations followed a course of which he disapproved. But, generally, from the end of 1916 until his fall, Ludendorff was more powerful than any other individual, not excluding the Kaiser. His influence on the peace negotiations in 1916 and in August 1917 was particularly marked.

² Bulgaria, with 'Macedonia and the Dobruja' as her war-aims, was the only one of the Central Powers which could put up any claim of this sort, and in neither area was their claim undisputed.

condition permitted Germany to extend beyond her true ethnic limits, and prevented France, Italy, Rumania, and Serbia from doing so.

3. *Entente War-aims, 1914-15.* The Entente war-aims in the first years of the war were stated in brief and general terms by Mr. Asquith on the 9th November 1914. 'We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium¹ recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed.' M. Viviani, then Prime Minister of France, while endorsing these views on the 22nd December 1914, made a very significant addition. 'France will lay down arms only . . . when the provinces torn from her have been rejoined to her for ever.' French official opinion followed him in insisting on the fact that Alsace-Lorraine be ceded without a plebiscite. Italian statesmen, after Italy had entered the war in May 1915,² put forward large claims in the name of *Italia Irredenta* and of strategic security, always specifically naming Trieste and the Trentino. They also added demands for the territorial restoration, not only of Belgium and Serbia, but also of Montenegro. Russian official statesmen announced the creation of an autonomous and united kingdom of Poland, including Posnania and Galicia, and expressed in general the feelings of Pan-Slavism.³

4. *Entente Secret Agreements, 1915-17.* Such were the avowed Entente aims, up to the 12th December 1916, when the Germans made peace proposals, in reply to which, at the suggestion of President Wilson, the Allied Powers joined in a common statement of general demands. The Entente secret agreements, which were subsequently published by the

¹ In a subsequent speech Mr. Asquith said, 'and I will add Serbia'. The points mentioned in this speech of 9th November 1914 are more fully dealt with in a previous speech of 25th September 1914.

² War was not declared against Germany until 27th August 1916, over a year after Italy's declaration of war against Austria-Hungary.

³ e. g. M. Sazonoff in the Duma, 8th August 1914: 'It was clear that, if we drew back, it would be the beginning, not only of the abnegation of Russia's historical rôle as the protector of the Balkan people, but the recognition that the will of Austria, and behind her that of Germany, is law in Europe.' The same day the Tsar used similar expressions to a deputation of the Duma.

Bolsheviks, must be taken as supplementary to and explanatory of these public utterances. The most important of these secret agreements were those affecting Russia and Italy. Negotiations with the Russian Government as to Constantinople were conducted by Memoranda and an agreement was reached before the end of March 1915 between Russia on the one side and England and France on the other.¹ At the end of the war European Turkey, east of the Enos-Midia line, the city of Constantinople, the Asiatic Bosphorus, the Dardanelles and certain islands were to be annexed by Russia, subject to her consenting to Constantinople becoming a free port for the transit of goods not going into or coming out of Russia, and to her permitting the free transit of merchant ships through the Straits. The Russian Government agreed also to the recognition of certain rights of England and France in Asiatic Turkey, which were reserved for further precise definition,² and, with some reservations, to the putting of the sacred Mussulman places and Arabia under independent Mussulman rule and the enlargement of England's sphere of influence in Persia. Thus, for the first time in history, Russia had gained the consent of England to occupy Constantinople, possession of which had been the goal of every Russian Tsar since Peter the Great. The public announcement of this fact was made just before the fall of Tsardom, but too late to save it.

The Treaty of London was signed on the 26th April 1915, between Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. 'Under the treaty of peace' Italy was to receive the Trentino and the Southern Tyrol up to the Brenner, which included over 250,000 Germans. She also gained Trieste, the whole Istrian peninsula and a frontier running from just south of Tarvis to the heights just west of Fiume. This last city, as is well known, was not given to Italy by this treaty. By these arrangements great numbers of Slovenes were placed under Italian rule. In addition, Italy was to receive nearly one-half of Dalmatia including Sebenico, which, like every other Dalmatian town and district except Zara, contained a great predominance of Jugo-Slavs over Italians. As regards Albania, the town of

¹ Italy signified her adhesion to this agreement after joining in the war.

² These were further defined by later instruments such as the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 and the agreement at St. Jean de Maurienne in 1917. The quotations from the Secret Treaties are taken from the *Manchester Guardian*, except the Treaty of London, the text of which was published 30th April 1920.

Valona with a small hinterland was to be received in absolute property by Italy, which was also to control 'a small autonomous neutralized state' in Central Albania and to conduct the foreign relations of Albania. Italy was not, however, to 'oppose' the possible desire of France, Great Britain, and Russia to distribute among Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece the northern and southern parts of Albania (Art. 7). Italy was also to receive the twelve Greek islands known as the Dodekanese, which she already occupied and which contained an almost exclusively Greek population (Art. 8). Finally, by Article 9, 'France, Great Britain, and Russia recognize that Italy is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean', and her right, in case of a partition of Turkey, to a 'just share' in the basin of the Mediterranean, especially as regards the province of Adalia. By Article 13 Italy was also to receive 'compensation' if France and Great Britain extended their colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany. Even setting the uncivilized races aside these arrangements obviously violated ethnic justice and were based on almost purely strategic principles, while the phrases 'balance of power' and 'compensation', which all the Allies subsequently repudiated, are specifically mentioned with approval. It is, however, necessary to distinguish carefully between the arrangements for occupying Albania and Asia Minor, which were of the nature of mandatory commissions over uncivilized races, and those for annexing the Southern Tyrol, the eastern half of the Istrian peninsula, and Western Dalmatia, which involved the inclusion in Italy of great numbers of German or Slav peasants, who, if consulted, would certainly have opposed such annexations.¹

5. *Allied Answer to German peace proposals and to President Wilson, December 1916-January 1917.* The difficulties and embarrassments produced by these secret agreements were clearly seen when President Wilson requested both belligerents to state their detailed aims. The Allies answered as follows on

¹ Other secret agreements were: (1) A secret Treaty of 8th August 1916 with Rumania, handing over to her the Bukovina, Transylvania, and the whole Banat, which involved Rumania obtaining hundreds of thousands of non-Rumans (*v. map*). This Treaty was abrogated by Rumania signing a separate Treaty with Germany in 1918. (2) A secret agreement with Japan of which the details are obscure, by which she acquired the right to control the Shantung peninsula. *v. President Wilson's answer after speech of 4th September 1919, and Mr. Lansing's evidence before the Senate of 12th August.*

the 10th January 1917. They demanded in the territorial sense, 'The restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Roumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination, the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization' (par. 8). These generalities are somewhat vague; the first sentence appears to cover such cases as Alsace-Lorraine,¹ the Trentino, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it is carefully not stated that it does. In the next sentence 'liberation' is used in two different senses. 'Liberation' of the Italians obviously meant annexation to Italy. 'Liberation' of the Slavs, 'Roumanes', and Czecho-Slovaks could apparently be interpreted to mean some kind of autonomy inside Austria-Hungary, for Lord Robert Cecil stated in the House of Commons on the 24th August 1917, that we were 'not pledged to the form of liberation'. Thus these statements indicated no attempt or resolve to break up Austria-Hungary. On the other hand the phrases used as regards Turkey in Europe, combined with the secret agreements as regards Asia Minor, did practically commit the Allies to breaking up the Turkish Empire,² and these were largely necessitated by the Russian attitude. It was also due to the latter that the Allies were obliged to announce their belief that the Tsar really meant to give independence to Poland.³ On the other hand the Allies collectively declared their whole-hearted adhesion to the League of Nations (par. 2) as proposed by President Wilson, and formulated their more general aims as follows: 'The restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, with the compensations due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, in Rumania, with just reparation; the re-organization of

¹ Mr. Balfour in a dispatch of 16th January 1917 to Washington wrote of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and of *Italia Irredenta* to Italy, as indicated in the Allied demands of 10th January 1917.

² v. Mr. Balfour's dispatch 16th January 1917: 'Evidently the interests of peace and the claims of nationality alike require that Turkish rule over alien races shall, if possible, be brought to an end.'

³ Par. 9 of Allied Note of 10th January 1917: 'The intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia in regard to Poland have been clearly indicated by the manifesto he has just addressed to his armies' (in which he declared his intention of creating a 'free' and undivided Poland). The term 'Slavs', when used in connexion with 'Roumanes' and Czecho-Slovaks, apparently was not intended to include Poles.

Europe, guaranteed by a stable *régime* and based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements so as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack' (par. 9). This final statement of Allied aims at the beginning of 1917 was comprehensive, but offered itself to criticism in some directions as 'imperialistic' in character. It was, however, very significant that the German Government would publicly state no territorial claims at all, and left the world in obscurity even on so crucial a matter as Belgium. The Allied war-aims were moreover soon obscured in importance by the initiation of the German submarine campaign and the consequent entry of America into the war.

6. *The views of President Wilson, 1914-22nd January 1917.* The utterances of President Wilson have a unique significance, not only because they were taken as the legal basis of the Peace negotiations, but because they form a definite and coherent body of political doctrine. This doctrine, though developed and expanded in view of the tremendous changes produced by the war, was not formed or even altered by them. His ideas, like those of no other great statesman of the war, are capable of being worked out as a complete political philosophy. A peculiar interest, therefore, attaches to his pre-war speeches, for they contain the germs of his political faith and were not influenced by the terrifying portents of to-day. The tenets in themselves were few and simple, but their consequences, when developed by the war, were such as to produce the most far-reaching results. It is not possible or necessary to discuss how far these tenets were accepted by the American people as a whole, for, as the utterances of their legal representative at a supreme moment of world history, they will always retain their value.

The fundamental principles of the President's philosophy are that there is no difference between private and international morality, that tyranny should be resisted within a nation just as aggression should be resisted from without, that morality, not expediency, is the sole guide in politics, and that 'we will never condone iniquity because it is most convenient to do so'. To force as the rule either of domestic or international policy he was sternly opposed. 'The new things

in the world are the things that are divorced from force. . . . (they are) the moral compulsions of the human conscience' (5th June 1914). In these ideas there was nothing new. Burke or Canning or Gladstone would have denounced the doctrine that force was right, would have agreed that questions of policy or diplomacy should 'be shot through with the principles of life', that political morality did not change with climate or continent, that nations, like individuals, should be free, and that the sanctions of policy depended ultimately upon the public opinion of the world.¹ But they would not have derived these doctrines from the Declaration of Independence, from the writings of Hamilton, or from the speeches of Jefferson.

7. *American origin of his political philosophy.* Herein lay the peculiarity of the President's philosophy. He had read and re-read with a student's care and an evangelist's ardour the writings and the speeches of the great men who formed the Republic and built up the splendid fabric of her political philosophy.² He read them, as he openly avowed, not only as memories of the past but as lessons for the future, and in order to shape the existing policy of his country in the light of their ideas as modified by the infinitely more complex forces of to-day. In European eyes the peculiarity was that he conceived all his principles of public policy upon American lines, but believed that these contained all the doctrines necessary to the salvation of the world as a whole. The Virginia Bill of Rights supplied him with the cogent doctrine that 'a people has a right to do anything they please with their own country and their own government', and that it could change that government not once but as often as it pleases.³ This was the creed of freemen on which the Con-

¹ Cf. Wilson's speech of 30th June 1915: 'I think the sentence in American history that I myself am proudest of is that in the introductory sentences of the Declaration of Independence, where the writers say that a due respect for the opinion of mankind demands that they state the reasons for what they are about to do.'

² Cf. Lord Acton, *Historical Essays and Studies* (1907), p. 492: 'In the little band of true political theorists, composed of Harrington and Locke, Rousseau and Jefferson, Hamilton and Mill, the rank of Siéyès is very far from being the lowest.' Two of these, it will be noticed, are Americans, and Lord Acton also expresses his opinion (p. 124) that 'they (the Americans) are our equals in political philosophy' and 'surpass us as writers . . . on the art of government'.

³ 25th October 1913. This Bill of Rights doctrine he derived remotely

stitution, the independence, and the existence of the United States was based. It was associated with a principle of equal importance; the United States held that all their citizens were equal and therefore could not contemplate annexation or the permanent control of subject races. It was natural for President Wilson to say, when speaking of Latin America before the war: 'I want to take this occasion to say that the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest' (27th October 1913). The Monroe doctrine was merely an extension of this idea. The United States, having renounced all territorial aims on the American continents for themselves, felt justified in imposing a similar self-denying ordinance upon others. It was the duty of the United States to protect liberty throughout the New World against all aggression from without. 'From the first . . . we have set America aside as a whole for the uses of independent nations and political freemen' (7th December 1915). 'America means something that is bigger than the United States, and we stand here with the glorious power of this country ready to swing it out into the field of action whenever liberty and independence and political integrity are threatened anywhere in the Western Hemisphere' (13th June 1916). He spoke thus when the shadow of war was already darkening, but many of his pre-war utterances show that this guarantee of material protection to the New World had always been part of his conceptions, as indeed of most other recent American Presidents. His policy to the other States of the American continent is further of interest as showing the extent to which he believed in moral suasion as the rule of international fair-dealing. The policy towards Mexico, for example, as explained by the President himself,¹ was to leave her to work out her own salvation on the lines of the Virginia Bill of Rights. The United States would never step in to administer Mexico permanently, for that would prevent Mexico from acquiring political education and responsibilities by her own blunders. One thing is significant. The President refused to recognize Huerta as legal ruler of Mexico partly because his hands were

¹ 'from Runnymede, when men said: "We will not have masters, we will be a people and we will seek our own liberty"' (5th June 1914).

¹ Interview of 23rd May 1914, quoted in James Brown Scott's *President Wilson's Foreign Policy: Messages, Addresses, Papers*, New York, 1918, pp. 388-91.

stained with blood, partly because he aimed at a military despotism, a thing abhorrent to the free and constitutional nations of the Western Hemisphere. The President's normal conceptions of relations to the other American States are illustrated by his address to the Pan-American Scientific Congress at Washington of the 6th January 1916. He advocated the States of America 'uniting in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity'.¹ He alluded to the adhesion made by practically all American States to treaties binding them to investigate their mutual disputes and to settle them by arbitration, and stated that the whole arrangement was based 'so far as the stronger States are concerned, upon the handsome principle of self-restraint and respect for the rights of everybody . . . upon the principles of absolute political equality among the States, equality of right, not equality of indulgence. . . . No man can turn away from these things without turning away from the hope of the world. These are things for which the world has hoped and waited with prayerful heart.' It is impossible to read these words without seeing an anticipation of the League of Nations in this proposed covenant of the American States,² just as the President's refusal to recognize military despotism as legal in Mexico, and his distinction between Huerta and the Mexican people, foreshadow his subsequent denunciation of the Kaiser and his disavowal of any desire to quarrel with the German people.

Woodrow Wilson, then, had a theory of international relations which he had already partially applied in the New World and which he believed would ultimately win its way by sheer moral force in the Old. In America these ideas had a field cleared from hampering traditions, prejudices, and difficulties. America, therefore, had a message for the world. The United States, said he on the 13th June 1916, 'have not the distinction of being masters of the world, but the distinction of carrying certain lights for the world that the world has never so distinctly seen before, certain guiding lights of liberty and principle

¹ Article 10 of the League of Nations (*v. Appx. III, Vol. III*) runs on practically identical lines.

² The arbitration treaties here referred to were between various American States and the United States. They contained no qualifying clauses about not submitting vital questions concerning national honour to arbitration but were terminable after a period of years.

and justice'. Compounded as she was of virile stocks from the Old World, mediating the blood and the traditions of Europe, America had a supreme opportunity for understanding and advocating those 'moral inspirations which lie at the basis of all freedom'. There was no difference between the American views and those of earnest and aspiring men all over the world, except that the United States was more free to advocate them. A practical beginning had already been made in the first years of his administration in the thirty odd treaties of arbitration concluded between the United States and the other Powers, to which practically every great nation, with the significant exception of Germany, had acceded. The spiritual and moral influences of these principles could be expected ultimately to gain universal acceptance. Speaking almost at the very moment that the Kaiser at Potsdam decided on the war, the President showed his vision of the future in words that subsequent events made at once ironical and prophetic. 'My dream is that as the years go on and the world knows more and more of America it will also drink at these fountains of youth and renewal . . . that the world will never fear America unless it (the world) feels that it is engaged in some enterprise which is inconsistent with the rights of humanity. . . . To what other nation in the world can all eyes look for an instant sympathy that thrills the whole body politic when men anywhere are fighting for their rights? *I do not know that there will ever be a declaration of independence and of grievances for mankind, but I believe that, if any such document is ever drawn, it will be drawn in the spirit of the American Declaration of Independence*' (Speech on 4th July 1914).

8. *President Wilson's attitude during the War, 1914-16.* A month after this utterance the war began. The President had no doubt of America's attitude, and he had indeed already defined it by anticipation. The military policy of the United States had always been defensive, and the New World had not been attacked. The warning of Washington against 'entangling alliances' had held good before the war. 'We cannot form alliances with those who are not going our way . . . we need not and we should not form alliances with any nation in the world' (16th May 1914). It held good after it. By her mixed blood, by her exclusive position, the United States was fitted to mediate between the nations of Europe and not to

take sides in the quarrel. It was not even her right to judge them, for 'no nation is fit to sit in judgment upon any other nation' (20th April 1915). It was America's duty to remain neutral in 'thought, word, and deed', and hope that the truth of her principles would ultimately be made clear to the Old World, not by force but by their evident value.¹ Moreover, the chief service that could be rendered to humanity was to check the extension of the war into new fields. These considerations led the United States to neutrality 'not only by their separate life but also by a clear perception of international duty'. Even so late as the 27th May 1916 the President said of the war, 'with its causes and objects we are not concerned'.

With the beginning of the year 1916 the President had none the less begun to realize the unprecedented character of the war. 'The world will never be the same again. . . . The change may be for weal or it may be for woe, but it will be fundamental and tremendous' (29th January 1916). He later pointed out, the United States 'are participants whether we would or not in the life of the world' (27th May). In the earlier speech he used the significant phrase: 'Peace is not always within the choice of the nation.' He had already stated on the 7th December 1915, that 'We (Americans) regard war merely as a means of asserting the rights of a people against aggression', and the disputes with Germany on the submarine question in 1916 made it clear that he thought intervention possible, and led to his formal threat to sever diplomatic relations on the 18th April. The German Government, thus brought to book, gave way in substance on the 4th May, but without allaying entirely the suspicions of the President. He uttered a further grave warning on the 30th May 1916. 'We are ready to fight for our rights when those rights are coincident with the rights of man and humanity.' Thus he realized that neutrality was becoming harder, and seemed to be moving towards the view that force might be necessary to protect those common interests of humanity which every nation ought to defend and which one nation at least was endangering. In a speech of the 27th May 1916 he spoke even more clearly. He said that the peace that was to be concluded after the war

¹ This was the thought underlying the much-discussed sentence of the 10th May 1915: 'There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right.'

must have an aspect of permanency unknown before, that secret diplomacy must go, that 'the nations of the world must in some way band themselves together to see that right prevails as against any sort of selfish aggression'. There must be a common agreement for a common object and . . . at the heart of that common object must lie the inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind.' Three days later he asserted that the world had so changed that Washington's formula of 'entangling alliances' no longer made him afraid, and thus his own warnings against alliances no longer held good. 'I shall never myself consent to an entangling alliance, but I would gladly assent to a disentangling alliance—an alliance which would disentangle the peoples of the world from these combinations in which they seek their own separate and private interests and unite the people of the world to preserve the peace of the world upon a basis of common right and justice. There is liberty there, not limitation. There is freedom, not entanglement. There is the achievement of the highest things for which the United States has declared its principle.' This did not mean that the President here contemplated war as a possibility, it only meant that he would strive to make peace permanent when it came by imposing new moral obligations on all nations, moral obligations which the United States had already accepted herself and embodied in the 'disentangling alliance' which had already made some progress between the United States and all the Latin American Republics.

9. *The President's suggestions to the Belligerents, 22nd January 1917.* It was with these principles in his mind that the President took action, when the German Government made its famous appeal 'to enter forthwith into peace negotiations' on the 12th December 1916, which was addressed to all neutral Powers and to the Vatican.¹ On the 18th December the President addressed suggestions to the various belligerent Governments asking them to consider terms of peace, though he disclaimed having been prompted to this step by the overtures of the Central Powers. He stated that he was merely taking 'soundings', not offering peace or even proposing

¹ Under Article 8 of the Hague Convention President Wilson had previously informed the Belligerents on the 5th August 1914, that 'I should welcome the opportunity to act in the interest of European peace either now or at any other time'. Wilson's suggestions were dated the 18th, and presented the 20th December.

mediation. He asked all nations then at war to state their views as to the terms of a possible peace and as to arrangements which would satisfactorily act as a guarantee against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in future. He pointed out that the objects of the war, as 'stated' by the belligerent Governments on each side, were 'virtually the same'. They were: that smaller nations should in the future be as secure and free as the great states now at war, that great states should have security in the future, and that each, while likely to be jealous of rival leagues and of the balance of power, would unite to form a League of Nations, 'to ensure peace and justice throughout the world'. That, however, could only be after the war. He concluded by asking the authoritative spokesmen to state the precise objects for which they had been waging war as they had previously stated them only in general terms.

To these communications the Central Powers replied merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace, while, as above mentioned, the Entente Powers 'replied much more definitely and have stated in general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement'. While thus recounting the history of this negotiation to Congress on the 22nd January 1917, the President seized the opportunity to formulate the American attitude. He disclaimed any voice in the actual terms of peace, but claimed the right to 'have a voice in determining whether they (the terms) shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant'. No covenant of co-operative peace could be lasting without the co-operation of the peoples of the New World, and if that were so, the New World had a right to state its views before it was too late. Peace could not be permanent if there was a 'new balance of power', only if there was 'a community of power, not organized rivalries but an organized common peace'. Belligerents on both sides had given assurances as to this, but it was necessary to state plainly what these assurances implied. The peace must be a 'peace without victory', for only a 'peace between equals can last', and alone provides the right state of mind. Similarly there must be equality of rights between nations

great and small, for 'mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not equipoises of power'.

The President then proceeded, with implicit reference to the Virginia Bill of Rights, to say that 'No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property'. He instanced Poland as an example, stating that statesmen everywhere were agreed that she should be 'united, independent, and autonomous', and stated that security of life, worship, industrial and social development, should be henceforth guaranteed to all peoples living hitherto under Governments 'devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own'.

He then laid down the broad principles that every nation 'should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea' and 'free access to the open paths of the world's commerce'. In addition, the 'freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and co-operation'. This was closely connected with the problem of limiting naval armaments and must be combined with an effort to reduce military ones. For 'the question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and mankind'.

In asserting that, upon such terms, the United States would join the other nations in guaranteeing the peace of the world, the President said: 'I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed and striven for. I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world.' Each nation, great or small, should be left free to pursue its path unhindered. There should be a union of all nations, for 'there is no entangling alliance in a concert of power'; there should be freedom of the seas, for which the United States had stood at international conferences; there should be moderation of armaments. 'These', he concluded, 'are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And they are also the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere,

of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.'

10. *The President's Declaration of War, February-April 1917.* This address is of the greatest importance because it sums up in ringing sentences the whole past policy, purpose, and aim of the President, and shows how he deduced his principles wholly from American sources, but none the less viewed America and Europe as bound in a spiritual partnership, and working to a common goal. He was never again to enjoy the same freedom of utterance or to possess the same commanding detachment of view. When he spoke on the 22nd January the United States were still at peace. A fortnight before that date the German Government had secretly decided on a ruthless submarine campaign,¹ and on the 31st January they made known their intention to the world. On the 3rd February the President announced to Congress that he had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, and on the 2nd April he recommended Congress to declare war against her, to which Congress assented on the 4th and 5th. The most important immediate effect of this declaration was to dispose at once of the view which had been so frequently advanced, that victory was impossible for either side, and that peace would result from their mutual exhaustion. Ludendorff's words, written after Wilson's failure to produce peace in January, are even more applicable to the situation after America's entry into the war in April. 'The war had to continue and to be decided by force of arms. It was to be victory or defeat.' According to Ludendorff this result was due to 'the will of the Entente', but in fact it was the first effect of the ruthless submarine campaign.

The attitude assumed by President Wilson, even after he had entered the war, was never the same as that of the Allies. This was partly because the United States were not bound by the secret Treaties,² partly because they formed no party to the Quadruple (soon to be the Triple) Alliance, partly because they looked at the war from a different angle. The

¹ The decision was approved on the 9th January by the Kaiser. *v. Ludendorff's War Memories*, English translation, vol. i, p. 317.

² The President always refused to recognize the Treaty of London (26th April 1915), but apparently accepted some of the other secret agreements. See answer *re* Shantung after his speech of 4th September. Such expressions as 'the Allies and the United States' and 'the Allied and Associated Powers' indicate the position of the United States.

consequences of the President's principles were also extremely far-reaching because they were definite and concise, and their propagandist value to the Allied cause in awakening opposition to the Government in Germany, and still more in Austria-Hungary, was quite incalculable. According to Admiral Tirpitz, the prestige of the President was established on the Continent after the Note to Germany of the 20th April 1916. It continued to increase after the message of the 22nd January 1917, until it culminated in the 'Fourteen Points', the 'Five Particulars', and the correspondence preceding the Armistice.

11. *Entente War-aims as modified by the fall of Tsardom, March 1917.* The year 1917 was so full of great events that it tested, at once and to the full, the value of the war-aims and ideals of the different Powers. In March Tsardom fell and a Revolutionary Government arose which lost no time in repudiating imperialistic aims and stating that 'Free Russia does not aim at dominating other nations, at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying by force foreign territories; but that its object is to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny' (10th April). These sentences contained immense possibilities, they led to the abandonment of the Russian demand for Constantinople, and ultimately to the profound changes implied in the formulae of 'self-determination, no annexations, no indemnities'. For the moment the most important effect was upon the freedom of Poland, on which the utterances of Tsardom had never been convincing. The American President had already attracted universal attention by his demand for a 'united, independent, and autonomous Poland'. The new Russian Government endorsed his words: 'In the name of the higher principles of equity, it (Russia) has removed the chains which weighed upon the Polish people.' With this phrase Poland's servitude was finally ended. Before the end of October the Russian Foreign Minister announced that the British and French Governments had given a pledge to the effect that an 'independent and indivisible Poland constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace', to which the Italian Government also publicly agreed. Before the end of the year a separate Polish army had been organized in Russia and a Polish legion of volunteers and deserters had been assembled in France, at the moment when the Polish Legion

in Austria was being disbanded, and this practical expression of Polish national feeling was ultimately of great importance. Thus the embarrassment produced by the old Russian attitude as regards Poland and Constantinople had been entirely removed before the end of 1917.¹ In addition, the attitude of Rumania in signing an armistice preparatory to separate peace negotiations released the Allies from their obligation to carry out the most ethnically unjust of all the secret agreements made during the war. It was just at this moment that publication of the Entente secret agreements by the Bolsheviki did almost as much injury to their cause as their liberation from Russian and Rumanian obligations had done good.

12. *The Austro-German peace offensive in 1917.* Apart from America's entry into the war and the Russian Revolution, the most striking feature of 1917 was the peace offensive of Austria-Hungary. Secret negotiations began with France in March, in April pressure was put on Germany, and, when Ludendorff finally closed this negotiation, Count Czernin had recourse to the German Reichstag through various agencies.² The Reichstag Resolution, which was passed by 214 votes to 116, on the 19th July, demanded 'a peace of understanding' with which 'forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic, or financial oppressions are inconsistent'. Bethmann-Hollweg resigned and his successor Michaelis attempted to evade this Resolution, but, after a passage of arms in the Reichstag, he was forced to do lip-service to it. How little his public professions really represented his views is shown by his private letter of the 17th August to Count Czernin,³ in which he outlined certain strategic and economic concessions for Germany as the conditions of peace. There was no suggestion in this letter of

¹ In its last moments, the Tsarist Government had agreed with the French Government, in return for a free hand in Poland, to guarantee the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, to the inclusion within French territory of the whole coal district of the Saar valley, and to the constitution of a neutral and autonomous state on the left bank of the Rhine which was to be occupied with French troops. This arrangement was not, however, apparently endorsed by the other Allies (v. Mr. Balfour, House of Commons, 19th December 1917), and may be considered to have lapsed after the fall of Tsardom. It reappeared in a different form at the time of the Peace Conference (v. Vol. II, Chap. II, Pt. I, 1, § 4).

² Czernin, *In the World War*, English translation, pp. 143-58; Ludendorff, *War Memories*, ii, pp. 440-4. Czernin suggested the surrender of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany and the addition of Galicia to Poland, which should be under German control. Czernin wished Austria-Hungary to get some sort of control over Rumania.

³ Count Czernin, *In the World War*, pp. 157-9.

desire to limit armaments or to join the League of Nations or to respect the rights of small nations. Yet it was on these lines that he now replied to the Pope, who had addressed a Note to the Belligerents recommending Peace on the 1st August. On the 19th September Michaelis replied publicly to the Pope, enthusiastically welcoming 'the simultaneous and reciprocal limitation of armaments' and 'the institution of compulsory arbitration in international disputes'. On the 11th September, at a Crown Council at Berlin, Ludendorff omitted all reference to either point and laid down the following terms as 'military necessities'.¹ On the west he demanded a rectification of the frontier at the expense of France so as to throw a protective belt round the iron mines of Lorraine, economic union with Belgium and in effect political control over her, and the annexation of Luxemburg. On the east he demanded an extension of the German frontier near the coal-fields of Upper Silesia and Danzig and Thorn, plus power to conscript the inhabitants of Lithuania and Courland, and economic control over the kingdom of Poland, which was not to go to Austria. He adds grimly: 'The discussions on war-aims between the Imperial Chancellor and G.H.Q. were purely academic. Every one knew that the terms of peace would be decided by the way the war ended, and by nothing else, and that we should have to make up our minds according to circumstances.' On the 9th October, Kühlmann, the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, referred to the Pope's intervention publicly as follows: 'It is an absolutely erroneous conception of German policy to think that we play high or low, become conciliatory or stubborn according to the results of individual military enterprises. This is absolutely false.' Thus Kühlmann publicly denied the war-aims of Germany to be what Ludendorff affirmed in secret that they must be and were. Michaelis combined these two different voices: in public he assured the Pope and the Reichstag that he disclaimed annexations; in private he forced Czernin to accept them. These contradictions could not long be concealed, and they had their effect in disheartening both public and rulers. Russia was soon to be the victim, but, paradoxically enough, the victim was to drag down the oppressor. For it was the Brest-Litovsk

¹ *War Memories*, ii, pp. 516-22. Michaelis's demands in his letter of 17th August to Czernin are practically the same as these.

negotiations, that orgy of strategic and economic aggression, which first taught an astonished world the inner meaning of a 'German peace'. The lessons had their effect in Germany too, even though Brest-Litovsk was approved by the Reichstag. For even there the truth of a saying of Mr. Lloyd George was to be proved, 'National honour is a real thing and the nation that disregards it is doomed'.

13. *President Wilson's commentary on the Austro-German Peace Offensive.* During the summer President Wilson delivered several speeches on war-aims and policies, dealing chiefly with the danger to the Allied Powers of accepting peace at the moment. He ascribed the eagerness for peace which he saw manifested from Berlin and Vienna to the fact that the German Government could not go further and dared not draw back. 'The military masters under whom Germany is bleeding see very clearly to what point Fate has brought them. If they fall back or are forced back an inch, their power both abroad and at home will fall to pieces like a house of cards. It is their power at home they are thinking about now more than their power abroad. It is that power which is trembling under their very feet; and deep fear has entered their hearts. They have but one chance to perpetuate their military power or even their controlling political influence. If they can secure peace now with the immense advantages still in their hands which they have up to this point apparently gained, they will have justified themselves before the German people: they will have gained by force what they promised to gain by it. . . . If they fail, their people will thrust them aside; a Government accountable to the people themselves will be set up in Germany. . . . If they succeed, they are safe and Germany and the world are undone; if they fail, Germany is saved and the world will be at peace. If they succeed, America will fall within the menace. We and all the rest of the world must remain armed, as they will remain, and must make ready for the next step in their aggression; if they fail, the world may unite for peace and Germany may be of the union' (14th June 1917). This merciless analysis of Germany's motives, this separation between her Government and people, was carried yet further in the President's reply to the Peace Appeal of the Pope on the 27th August 1917.¹

¹ President Wilson replied, apparently, because the Treaty of London, Article 15, pledged Great Britain, Russia, and France to support Italy if she

'The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment, controlled by an irresponsible Government. . . . This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. . . . Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honour it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation? . . . We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation, could now depend on.' The style of this address was new in diplomacy, the attempt to separate people and government had always been considered dangerous, yet the overwhelming moral force of the appeal drove its message home. Ludendorff, in commenting on the President's attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Germany, says it aroused protest in the Reichstag. But, as he sorrowfully admits, 'even thus we could not muster the strength to repudiate his action with the righteous indignation it deserved'.¹

14. *President Wilson recommends a Declaration of War on Austria-Hungary, 4th December 1917.* On the 4th December President Wilson addressed Congress recommending a Declaration of War on Austria-Hungary. 'Austria-Hungary is for the time being not her own mistress, but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business. The Government of Austria-Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative, or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own, and regard the Central Powers as but one.' He disclaimed at present declaring war against Bulgaria and Turkey, as they were mere tools and 'do not yet opposed the representatives of the Holy See taking part in any negotiations for the conclusion of peace.

¹ *War Memories*, ii, p. 523; v. Wilson's speech 4th December 1917, quoted *infra*, p. 200.

stand in the direct path of our necessary action'. As ultimate aims he stated that the peace 'must deliver the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the peoples of the Balkans, and the peoples of Turkey, alike in Europe and in Asia, from the impudent and alien dominion of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy'. He stated clearly, however, that he did not wish to 'impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire', but simply to see 'that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters, great or small'. At the end of this year, after endless negotiations for peace, Austria-Hungary had been cheered by the great victory at Caporetto over her hated enemy Italy, but this immediate declaration of war by President Wilson altered the whole situation. None the less by this time Austria-Hungary was fettered too fast to Germany to be moved. As Count Czernin subsequently confessed of his negotiations in the year 1917¹: 'The future will show what superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, . . . but that of the leaders of the German military party, which had attained such enormous power in the country.' In this passage, though not in all his speech, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister seems to be repeating the very words of the American President.

15. *Opening of the Brest-Litovsk Negotiations.* The month of December 1917 saw the opening of peace negotiations between Russia and the Central Powers, and the opening of that extraordinary Conference at Brest-Litovsk which was to have so far-reaching an echo among industrial workers. Its main effects are analysed elsewhere but some of them must be mentioned here. It brought two things well into the sunlight: first, that a 'German peace' meant aggressions and rectifications on a scale hitherto deemed incredible, and next, that the working man all over the world, and not only he, but all classes of every belligerent nation, desired to know what were now the war-aims of the Entente. Relieved as they were from the burden of Russian Tsardom, clarified and purified by sacrifice and suffering, it was now not only possible but essential to

¹ v. his speech of 11th December 1918, in *In the World War*, pp. 325-36. In this speech Czernin acquitted the German Kaiser of responsibility for the failure of negotiations, apparently on the ground that he was a mere tool of the militarists.

state these ideals with the plainness and fullness that the world demanded. For it was intolerable to democratic states that men should be dying daily by thousands for causes and for objects which they did not understand.

16. *Mr. Lloyd George's statement of British War-aims, 5th January 1918.* Of none of the Entente Powers were the war-aims less clearly defined than in the case of Great Britain. Even on subjects of capital importance their statesmen did not always seem agreed. Thus Mr. Bonar Law had spoken as if the German Colonies were to remain English, and General Smuts had hinted at some kind of international control.¹ Mr. Bonar Law had suggested as late as the 12th December 1917, that an economic League might be formed against Germany; other ministers had seemed to deprecate this project. Sir Edward Carson had spoken contemptuously, and General Smuts enthusiastically, of the League of Nations. To put an end to these flagrant anomalies, a systematic outline of war-aims was authoritatively given by Mr. Lloyd George on the 5th January 1918.

By way of marking the importance of the occasion the British Prime Minister had consulted beforehand the leaders of Labour and the two most eminent Parliamentary leaders, who were not in the Ministry, Viscount Grey and Mr. Asquith, as well as certain overseas representatives. He claimed 'national agreement as to the character and purpose of our war-aims and peace conditions' and stated that he was speaking for 'the nation and the Empire as a whole'.

Lloyd George first explained what the British Empire was *not* fighting to do. He declared that the British were not aiming at the 'break-up of the German peoples or the disintegration of their State or country'. He even disclaimed fighting merely to 'alter or destroy the Imperial Constitution of Germany', though he considered military autocracy 'a dangerous anachronism', and thought the adoption of democratic institutions by Germany would make it easier to negotiate peace. As regards Alsace-Lorraine 'We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand they make for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without any regard to the wishes of the population, two French provinces were

¹ v. Speech of Mr. Bonar Law, 4th August 1916; v. Speeches of General Smuts, 15th and 22nd May 1917.

torn from the side of France. . . . This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century.'

Lloyd George then denied that we were fighting to 'destroy Austria-Hungary', but stated that 'the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war'. As with President Wilson, the 'break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war-aims', but 'genuine self-government on true democratic principles' must be 'granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it'. This principle, however, led to complete emancipation in the case of at least one race, for 'we regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue'. It is more difficult to say what was meant by the further statement: 'We also mean to press that justice be done to men of Rumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations.' This cannot mean independence, and probably implies autonomy or home rule, such as would also be extended to those Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs who remained under Hungary and Austria.

As Mr. Lloyd George used the principle of national self-determination it told in favour of, as well as against, the Central Powers, and that not only in the case of Austria-Hungary. Thus we are not fighting 'to deprive Turkey of its capital (Constantinople) or of the rich and renowned lands of Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race'.¹ This was a notable recantation from the Allied reply of the 10th January 1917, which announced 'the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization'. As regards the subject lands of Turkey (Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Palestine), these were entitled to 'a recognition of their separate national conditions', and the previous (secret) agreements were not to prevent a free discussion between the Allies as to their future, as the Russian collapse had changed all the conditions.²

¹ He stipulated, however, that the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea should be 'internationalised and neutralised'.

² Mr. Balfour stated in the Commons on the 20th June 1918 that 'the (secret) treaties were made in obedience to motives which would have moved any Government in power at the time to make the same or a similar arrangement'. He added that they were 'no obstacle to peace' and that the Allies would listen to 'reasonable suggestions' now.

Cf. Mr. Asquith at Paisley on the 5th February 1920, *Manchester Guardian*, 6th February:

'They had fathered upon him and his colleagues some treaties which did

As regards Russia, he said that she could only be saved by her own people. He stated, however, that 'an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe'.

Passing to the German Colonies, he declared they would be 'held at the disposal of a Conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such Colonies'. The governing consideration should be 'to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or Governments'. Native chiefs and councils were 'competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members'. 'The general principle of national self-determination is, therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those of other occupied European territories.'

Dealing with more general topics, the British Prime Minister demanded 'the complete restoration, political, territorial, and economic, of Belgium, and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces'. Next, 'the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania'. He insisted on 'reparation' but disclaimed a demand for a war indemnity or an attempt 'to shift the cost of warlike operations from one belligerent to another, which may, or may not, be defensible'.

not exist at all except in their imagination, and those which did exist—namely, the arrangements made with Italy and Rumania—were made not before the war, not at the time he was inviting the people to wage war for self-determination, but in one case two years and in the other nine months after we had entered the war. They were arrangements which he was perfectly prepared to vindicate and justify, and for the vital object of bringing first Italy, and then Rumania, on to the side of the Allies. At the time the treaty with Italy was made the French and ourselves were fighting for our lives on the western front. Russia, after a very valiant start, had had a setback. . . .

'The Italian treaty, for which not only he and the British Government but France and Russia were equally responsible, represented the terms upon which Italy was prepared to join forces. It involved undoubtedly the acquisition by Italy, if we were successful, of some not inconsiderable accessions of territory. But it was then a most complex and difficult question, just as now the Conference in Paris was finding it difficult to disentangle the problems of nationality upon the two sides of the Adriatic and the adjacent countries to the north.

'It was an almost hopeless task, and he was perfectly prepared to justify, under all the circumstances of the case, every one of the conditions as being justified by ethnological, historical, or strategic considerations. Personally, he would be only too glad for that secret treaty to go before the League of Nations to be subjected to the most minute and, if necessary, suspicious scrutiny by the impartial representatives of all the nations in it.'

As regards reparation for injuries done in violation of international law, he instanced specially the outrages on British seamen. He also indicated that the control of raw materials would be a difficulty after the peace and 'that those countries which have control . . . will desire to help themselves and their friends first'. He finally emphasized three conditions as essential to permanent peace: (1) re-establishment of the sanctity of treaties; (2) a territorial settlement based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; (3) the creation of some international organization 'to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war'.

This statement of Entente war-aims was the most comprehensive, as well as the most authoritative, made by any European statesman previous to the Armistice. It contained a working out of the principle of self-determination so logical as to rank Kaffirs and Turks with Italians or Slavs. It represented Entente war-aims as freed from the burden imposed on them by Russian autocracy. It made it possible for Austria-Hungary to remain relatively intact, and for Turkey to preserve Constantinople, and thus opened the way for separate negotiation with these two Powers. On one point alone was it meagre. The League of Nations, both as regards limitation of armaments and arbitration, was indeed adopted, but without much definiteness and without conspicuous enthusiasm. This may have been due to the fact that Clemenceau, the new Premier of France, had declared on the 18th November 1917 that he desired victory before the League of Nations. He had also stated that he did not think the League essential to the War, and he could not consent to Germany becoming a member after the War, for her signature would be valueless.

17. *President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points', 8th January 1918.* A few days after Mr. Lloyd George had spoken, the American President delivered on the 8th January what was to prove the most important of all speeches on war-aims. It contained the 'Fourteen Points', which may be grouped for our purposes in the following way:

(a) *Territorial.* Belgium to be evacuated and restored (*Point 7*). All French territory to be freed 'and the invaded portions restored'; 'the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine . . . should be righted,

in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all' (*Point 8*). A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy 'along clearly recognizable lines of nationality' (*Point 9*). 'The freest opportunity of autonomous development to the peoples of Austria-Hungary, which it was not intended to destroy' (*Point 10*). Evacuation and restoration of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Access to the sea to be given to Serbia. Relations of the several Balkan States to be determined and international guarantees of their political and economic independence and territorial integrity to be entered into (*Point 11*). 'Secure sovereignty' to be assured to the Turkish parts of the present Ottoman Empire, 'undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development' to other nationalities now under Turkish rule. The commercial freedom of the Dardanelles to be internationally guaranteed (*Point 12*). Poland to include indisputably Polish populations, and to have 'free and secure' access to the sea and to have her independence and integrity guaranteed by international covenant (*Point 13*). All Russian territory to be evacuated and settlement on the lines of her own choice and of a welcome into the League of Nations. 'The treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill' (*Point 6*). 'A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims . . . the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined' (*Point 5*).

(b) *Freedom of the Seas and of Economic conditions*. 'Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas . . . except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants' (*Point 2*). 'The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance' (*Point 3*).

(c) *Reparation, etc.* Statements to the effect that all invaded and occupied territories must be restored (*Points 8 and 11*).

(d) *League of Nations*. 'A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike' (*Point 14*).

‘Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety’ (*Point 4*). ‘Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind’ (*Point 1*).

The President differed little from the Prime Minister in his territorial demands. It is true that he demanded international guarantees for the economic independence and territorial integrity of the Balkan States and of Poland, but these were only special extensions of the universal territorial guarantee implicit in the League of Nations. His treatment of Austria-Hungary was identical with that of the Prime Minister, but his handling of the Turkish problem was not incompatible with the preservation of Ottoman sovereignty over the autonomous nationalities. He went further than the Prime Minister in stating that access to the sea was necessary for Poland and Serbia and insisted also on the ‘freedom of the seas’. His attitude on freedom of economic conditions differed somewhat from that of the Prime Minister, and he was less insistent on reparation. As regards ‘open covenants’ the President had the support of Clemenceau, though the British Prime Minister had not mentioned it. On the other hand, the President’s advocacy of the League of Nations was enthusiastic and determined, and formed the broad base of his edifice, while in that of the Prime Minister it seemed rather an accessory than an essential. It was perhaps the most significant and vital of all Wilson’s services that he never ceased to urge that the constitution of the League of Nations must be a part, and in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself.

18. *German Attitude towards the ‘Fourteen Points’ and to Lloyd George’s speech of the 5th January.* The attitude of the Central Powers towards these two great speeches by the representatives of Anglo-Saxondom was speedily defined by Count Czernin and the German Chancellor. It does not seem worth while to analyse their replies and their qualified acceptance of the ‘Fourteen Points’, for by this time both were in the grip of Ludendorff and they remained so until the Hindenburg line and German militarism were shattered together. Until that date the speeches of the civilians in Germany were simply intended to conceal the existing situation. If any of them dared to take any other line, as in the case of Kühlmann, he

was promptly removed. The facts were not known to the world at the time, and therefore, in spite of the acquisitions made by Germany at Brest-Litovsk, there was some excuse for some of the British and American public thinking that such speeches offered the basis for negotiation.¹ As they are known to us to-day by the admissions of Ludendorff and Count Czernin, it is unnecessary for us to spend any time on them. The key-note was secretly given by Ludendorff in council with Czernin and Hertling, 'If Germany makes peace without profit, then Germany has lost the war' (5th February 1918).²

19. *President Wilson's further speeches, 11th February-27th September 1918.* On the 11th February the President laid down Four Principles as essential to a permanent peace :

Principle 1. 'Each part of the final settlement must be based on the essential justice of that particular case.'

Principle 2. 'Peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now for ever discredited, of the Balance of Power'; but that

Principle 3. 'Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states'; and

Principle 4. 'All well-defined national elements shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism.'

He had prefaced these four principles by some very significant phrases : 'There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. . . . "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.' On the 4th July, speaking

¹ As e.g. Lord Lansdowne in his letter of the 5th March 1918. It was unfortunate that the Supreme War Council at Versailles issued a statement on the 4th February stating that they could not accept the professions of Hertling and Czernin and had decided on the vigorous prosecution of the war. This suggested the quite misleading impression that soldiers were dictating Allied policy.

² Count Czernin, *In the World War*, p. 247. It is characteristic that Hertling dared not openly oppose Ludendorff on this, but whispered across the table to Czernin, 'Leave him alone; we two will manage it together without him'.

by the tomb of Washington, he outlined Four Objects, of which the second and fourth were similar to those of the 11th February. The first declared for the destruction or reduction to virtual impotence of every arbitrary power, and the fourth was a demand for the League of Nations, which he summarized in the following fashion: 'What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.'

In the last of his great speeches before the Armistice, delivered on the 27th September, the President stated Five Particulars as the basis of peace which were necessitated by the fact that 'there will be some parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy'. Of these particulars the first, second, and fifth had already been outlined in previous utterances. The third stated 'there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations'. The fourth, 'and more specifically, there can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control'. He added that the United States was 'prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest'. Then, recalling once more that Washington's immortal warning was against 'entangling', not 'disentangling', alliances, he said, 'we recognize and accept the duty of a new day' and 'hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights. . . . National purposes have fallen more and more into the background, and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place'. Thus under the stress and strain of war Europe and the world had come round to accept American principles. For, if peace was to be permanent, the world must be regenerated as a commonwealth of independent nations composed of free citizens able to choose their own governments. There was now no difference to exist between America and Europe, and just as the American War of Independence had inaugurated a revolution in govern-

ment in the New World, this war was to inaugurate a revolution not only in the Old World but in all the world. America and Europe were not only to be one in sympathy but to be bound together by a charter of freedom which would show that there was to be no difference between American principles and those of mankind. That this was the underlying idea of the President is certain, for not only does he explicitly state this in his above-quoted address of the 22nd January 1917, but on his return from Europe he spoke thus on the 6th September 1919. 'I discovered that what we called American principles had penetrated to the heart and understanding not only of the great peoples of Europe, but to the hearts and understandings of the great men who were representing the peoples of Europe. . . . I can fancy those men of the first generation that so thoughtfully set this great Government up, the generation of Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, and the Adamses—I can fancy their looking on with a sort of enraptured amazement that the American spirit should have made conquest of the world.'

20. *Political effect of the President's Speeches.* With the President's address of the 27th September was terminated that remarkable series of political speeches, which began with the 'Fourteen Points', and which subsequently became the legal basis of the Armistice. It is, however, important to point out that the President himself stated that the 'Fourteen Points' were 'only her own (i. e. America's) *provisional* sketch of principles and the way in which they should be applied' (11th February 1918). Nor does this end the matter. Immediately after the speech of the 4th July Mr. Lloyd George made a public utterance to the effect that the Kaiser 'can have peace to-morrow' if he will accept the President's terms. That experienced diplomat Lord Lansdowne¹ at once intervened to point out that the President's speech of the 4th July was not 'an outline of peace terms but a very nobly-worded description of the things for which the associated peoples of the world were fighting', and that these premises, even if accepted, 'would place us at the beginning, and not at the end, of a very complicated negotiation'. The political effect of the President's speeches did not, however, depend on whether or not the 'Fourteen Points' or

¹ Letter of 31st July. Lord Lansdowne was at this date considered by some to be a pacifist, and his opinion did not, therefore, carry the weight these particular observations certainly deserved.

the Four Objects or the Five Particulars offered an adequate basis for negotiation or could be taken as the draft clauses of a Treaty. These utterances rang through the world as no speeches had rung since the days of Canning, and the effect produced on the autocrats and peoples of Europe was not dissimilar. As Czernin wrote, 'In the eyes of millions of people this programme opened up a world of hope'.¹

21. *The President's attitude towards Smaller Nationalities, February–November 1918.* In two directions the President's utterances were of such fundamental importance as to deserve still further examination. One of the most important points of the President's programme was the uplifting of the smaller nationalities. This idea was not new, for the sympathy with Serbia and Belgium had been universal in England and France. But the circumstances of America's origin made her naturally the hope of small nations who longed to be free and great, and the voice that came over the water was listened to with eagerness and joy. Rumania was cheered, at the moment just before she was forced to sign an armistice in December 1917, by a message from the President to the effect that, whatever happened, the United States would ultimately restore that independence of which Germans and Bolsheviki were depriving her. This whole attitude was of great importance towards the beginning of 1918, when the original belligerents were feeling the strain of the War, and when peace was continually on the lips and in the minds of men. It was in this light that this ardent championship of the rights of small states acquired new importance as the lesser nationalities gradually emerged from the wreck of Russian, Turkish, and Austro-Hungarian Empires. It was towards the latter that the President's attitude showed the most marked change, and it appears to have been much influenced by the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities held at Rome in the second week of April 1918. At the beginning of June the President formally announced that the United States had followed these proceedings with great interest and that 'the national aspirations of Czecho-

¹ Czernin, *In the World War*, p. 189. The late Mr. Roosevelt did not think Americans were among these millions. 'It is sheer nonsense to maintain that the American army is fighting for his (the President's) fourteen points. There is not one American in a thousand who has ever heard of them. The American army is fighting Germany, and the American people want Germany smashed.' *The Times*, 5th December 1918.

Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs for liberty have the lively sympathy of this Government' (29th May). This declaration was immediately endorsed by the three Entente Powers (3rd June). It was a very significant one, and when German and Austrian sympathizers and officials sought to construe the President's utterance as a mere declaration in favour of autonomy he issued a new statement (28th June) that the position of the United States Government was that 'all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule'. This was very important, for the independence of Czecho-Slovakia meant the break-up of Austria-Hungary. On the 3rd September the President went even further and recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a belligerent Government.¹ When on the 18th October he answered the Austrian Note requesting an armistice, he quoted the above-mentioned declarations and stated that they had been made since the 'Fourteen Points' and prevented his negotiating with Austria-Hungary on the basis of the 'mere autonomy' of these peoples in accordance with Point 10² of the 'Fourteen Points'. 'The President is therefore no longer at liberty . . . he is obliged to insist that they (Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs) and not he shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations.' The independence of Poland with implied access to the sea had already been asserted by the President as far back as the 22nd January 1917, it had been explicitly reaffirmed as the Thirteenth Point, and this had been publicly endorsed by the other Allies. The general effect of the President's utterances, first by his sympathetic reference to Polish independence in 1917, and next by his efforts on behalf of Yugo-Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks in 1918, had been greatly to assist those elements of liberty and revolution which sought and ultimately achieved the break-up of Austria-Hungary.³ By giving voice to their aspirations he did more also in another way. 'If you

¹ This body had originally been formed of Czecho-Slovak exiles and had for head Masaryk, the first President, and as secretary Beneš, the first Foreign Minister of the Republic.

² Point 10. 'The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.'

³ This attitude was the more significant in view of the fact that negotiations were proceeding between France and Austria-Hungary so late as February 1918. *v.* French and Austrian official statements, Ap. 4, 6, 8, 1918.

could catch some of these voices that speak of the utter longing of oppressed and helpless peoples all over the world, and hear something like the battle hymn of the Republic, hear the feet of the great hosts of liberty going to set them free, to set their minds free, to set their lives free, to set their children free, then you would know what comes into the hearts of those who are trying to contribute all the brains and power they have to this great enterprise of liberty' (18th May 1918).

22. *The President's attitude towards the German Government, 1918.* In regard to the German Government the President's avowed policy differed from that of the Entente. This difference can be well illustrated by contrasting his utterances with those of other Allied leaders. Mr. Lloyd George said on the 5th January 1918, 'Nor did we enter this war merely to alter or destroy the Imperial Constitution of Germany. . . . Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that in her the old spirit of military domination had indeed died . . . and would make it much easier to conclude a broad democratic peace with her. But after all that is a question for the German people to decide.' Mr. Wilson's attitude was very different. He claimed indeed, 'We intend no wrong against the German Empire, no interference with her internal affairs' (4th December 1917). But he held fast to a political theory which in effect led him very far. The people were under God, the origin of all just power, and therefore the German Government, like all military autocracies, was an illegitimate one. It was not however to be interfered with in peace time, except by the operation of the moral influences of liberty,¹ but in war time it was to be swept from the earth by the armed forces of freedom. 'We wanted', said he on the 6th September 1919, 'to destroy autocracy everywhere in the world.' While Great Britain spoke of destroying militarism, the President spoke of destroying autocracy, or at least of reducing it to virtual impotence. The German Government was one which feared its people and therefore, just as Washington drove tyranny from America, it was for another President, following in his steps in the light of a larger day, to drive it from Europe. A strong stand was

¹ Except when a new one arose, as that of Huerta in Mexico, which the President refused to recognize, as 'based upon intrigue and assassination', 2nd September 1916.

indeed needed, for in May and June a peace atmosphere was spreading on both sides. On the 17th May 1918 General Smuts said, 'We will not have a peace secured merely by the unaided efforts of armies in this war'; on the 24th June Kühlmann said, 'An absolute end can hardly be expected through purely military decisions alone, without any diplomatic negotiations'. Both statesmen seemed to hint at an informal conference. This was not the language then used by the President. He spoke on the 18th May, 'We are not to be diverted from the grim purpose of winning the war by any insincere approaches upon the subject of peace'. 'There must now be settled once for all what was settled for America in the great age upon whose inspiration we draw to-day' (4th July 1918). 'Force, righteous force', was to 'cast every selfish dominion down in the dust' (6th April). The German Government was tyrannical not only inside Germany but because of its widespread domination and influence outside it, it was a 'power to which the world has afforded no parallel and in the face of which political freedom must wither and perish'. Without guarantees of the will of the German people treaties of settlement with the German Government 'no man, no nation could now depend on'. In his view Germany's statesmen, and still more the Reichstag majority, desired 'justice' and 'not dominion' but the military leaders had cowed or deceived them.¹ The German people must recognize that 'we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. . . . They have convinced us that they are without honour and do not intend justice' (27th September 1918). These tremendous denunciations, such as had never been heard in European Chanceries, found an echo in Germany itself. For they made clear the stern alternative. The Kaiser and Junkerdom stood between the German people and the realization of permanent peace. The President had often proclaimed this in public, and there came a time when he stated it in the course of negotiation with the German Government. In his reply of the 8th October 1918 to the German overture for an armistice, the President asked the Imperial Chancellor 'whether he . . . is speaking merely for the constituted

¹ This view is supported by Czernin, *In the World War*, p. 156, 'Certainly the great majority in Germany, counting them per head, supported the (Reichstag) resolution.' Cp. on this point *supra*, Chap. II, § 4 sq.

authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war'. The Chancellor in reply claimed to speak for the great majority of the Reichstag, and 'in the name of the German Government and of the German people'. In response to a query as to whether the German Government accepted the President's speech of the 4th July in which he demanded the abolition of arbitrary power, the German Note of the 20th October stated that there had been 'a fundamental change' in Germany and that the responsibility of the Government had been established. The President answered stiffly on the 23rd October that if the Government of the United States 'must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now . . . it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender'. On the 27th the German Government replied by saying that a People's Government would conduct the peace negotiations and have the military power subject to it. On the 9th November the Supreme War-Lord fled to Holland.

A discussion between two countries which ended in the acceptance of a new constitutional theory by one party and the subsequent flight of its ruler, is a perhaps unique result of a correspondence dealing primarily with negotiations for an armistice. Yet it was the logical deduction from the doctrines and ideas of the President, and from the public effect of his war-aims. For, once the armed struggle began, his theories led straight to the conclusion that all governments must rest on the choice of the people and, more important still, that peoples must be given the opportunity of that choice if they desired it. Hence the true importance of the Covenant of Nations consisted in the fact that it would stabilize and make permanent the new democracies. The war had thrown down all military autocracies, the peace would prevent them from ever rising again. The war had brought new nationalities to life, the Covenant would safeguard their future. This perhaps was the most important of all the principles enunciated by the President, for it was the most far-reaching in its effects. Guarantees for democracy¹ meant guarantees of territorial

¹ There is a distinct analogy between this theory of guaranteed democracy in the world and the form of republicanism guaranteed to each State of the Union by Article 4, Section 4, of the American Constitution. What the United States were willing to guarantee to their component States under the Constitution, the League of Nations is to guarantee to nations under the

integrity and independence for each nation; and these constituted an obligation which involved the whole world, Old or New, in the Concert of Power. There was, and there could be, no limited liability in affairs of such importance, and the Covenant meant the Monroe doctrine applied to the world.¹ It was on these principles that the President ended the war, and it was these principles which he sought subsequently to embody in the Covenant. 'It is our inestimable privilege to concert with men out of every nation what shall make not only the liberties of America secure but the liberties of every other people as well' (4th July 1918). 'I hold the doctrine of Article X (of the Covenant) to be the essence of Americanism' (Letter of 9th March 1919).

23. *Conclusion.* The war-aims of Germany were adapted to the occasion and the moment, and varied with the event and the audience and with military failure or success. Hence within ten months they passed from the aggressions of Brest-Litovsk to the acceptance of the 'Fourteen Points'. The war-aims of the Entente were affected by secret agreements based upon the conclusion of alliances essential to the defeat of Germany. But these institutions and their history did not prevent them from subscribing in general to the 'Fourteen Points'. Indeed, the principles of Mazzini, of the Rights of Man, and of Magna Carta bear a strong resemblance to them and, as nations always conform to their historic instincts, the stress and strain of war eventually induced the Entente nations to adopt as principles those principles of political liberty which they had originally learnt from their own institutions. Like other Powers, the United States entered the war because their vital interests were at stake. But, unlike other Powers, the United States had a ruler who had pondered much on political philosophy and had had time to reflect upon international policies during the War, and to think them out in relation to American political ideals. Hence the 'Fourteen Points' and the 'Five Particulars' had a clearness of outline and

Covenant. The only difference is that in the latter case 'democracy' means not only republicanism but constitutional government generally.

¹The President made this quite clear in two instances. Speaking of Poland on the 4th September 1919, he stated this was a State which could not exist independently without international guarantees. Speaking of militarist autocracy on the 6th September 1919, he says, 'We don't want to see anything like that done again, because we know that democracy will only have to destroy that form of government'.

a breadth of vision such as the political speeches of no other war leader could possess. The ultimate importance of these speeches was not propagandist or political, though their effect in each case was great. It lay in the fact that they became the basis of the Armistice and of the Peace Settlement. The fact has sometimes been questioned, but the truth can be settled in decisive fashion. In their reply to the German observations on the Conditions of Peace, the Allies specifically made that claim. They referred to the President's speech of the 8th January 1918 and the 'principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses' as 'the agreed basis of the peace',¹ and quoted in a special memorandum of several pages the governing passages of these speeches, which they claimed to have followed in the Peace Settlement. The actual last words of the reply were a quotation from the President's speech of the 27th September 1918. Both German and Entente Governments had therefore adopted the 'Fourteen Points', the only difference between them was one of interpretation. The President's principles had conquered Europe and the Covenant of Nations remains as the most striking monument to his efforts. What still remains to be seen is whether political life can be the same for the New World as for the Old, and whether the Wilsonian principles can conquer America.

¹ White Paper, Misc. No. 4, 1919. Covering Letter, p. 7. Reply, pp. 8-9.

CHAPTER VI: PART I .

THE WAR-AIMS OF LABOUR

1. *Pre-war Attitude of International Labour.* The attitude of Labour Organizations towards the political issues of the war was the natural result of their pre-war policy. Although that policy was, in a broad sense, the same for the Labour Organizations of the different countries, it is possible to distinguish the purely international policy from the action of the separate Labour Organizations in the several countries. Joint action of an international character was the aim of the policy expressed at many international Socialist Congresses, and at the Congress of 1907 this policy was expressed in a resolution as follows: 'If war threatens to break out it is the duty of the working class in the countries concerned and of their Parliamentary representatives, with the help of the International Socialist Bureau as a means of co-ordinating their action, to use every effort to prevent war by all the means which seem to them most appropriate, having regard to the sharpness of the class war and to the general political situation. Should war none the less break out, their duty is to intervene to bring it promptly to an end and with all their energies to use the political and economic crisis created by the war to rouse the populace from its slumbers and to hasten the fall of capitalist domination.'

This was the policy of the pre-war *Internationale* on which were represented the political labour groups of twenty-eight countries; and it is to be presumed that the resolution represented the official policy of the constituent groups in regard to war and the danger of war. In November 1912 a special Congress had been held at Basle to protest that there should be no participation of the Great Powers in the Balkan War; and another Congress, at which it was proposed to discuss methods of stopping wars, was to have been held in Vienna in August 1914. When, however, war was declared on the 28th July by Austria against Serbia, the governing body of the *Internationale*, the Socialist Bureau, met at Brussels, decided

to hold the Congress in Paris on the 9th August and issued a statement to the effect that they had heard declarations from representatives of all nations threatened by a world war describing the political situation in their respective countries. The Bureau urged the workers to demonstrate against war, and it indicated that the German and French workers would bring pressure to bear on their Governments 'in order that Germany may secure in Austria a moderating action and in order that France may obtain from Russia an undertaking that she will not engage in the conflict'.

The pressure of Labour organizations on the governments of the several countries was, however, never exerted and other forces moved rapidly towards war. Jean Jaurès was murdered in Paris on the 31st July; and thus not only the French but the whole Labour movement was deprived of a keen intelligence and a lofty imagination. The visit of a German socialist to Paris on the 1st August proved useless for affecting the situation, and the *Internationale* for all practical purposes disappeared when the different national sections for various reasons decided to support their governments. From this point, therefore, the policy of Labour Organizations may best be understood by reference to the several nationalities.

2. *War Attitude of British Labour, 1914-16.* The British section of the *Internationale* issued a protest against war on the 1st August, and on the 2nd August an anti-war meeting was held in Trafalgar Square, under the auspices of the same group, at which a resolution against war was carried, specially protesting against 'any step being taken by the Government of this country to support Russia either directly or in consequence of any understanding with France'. On the 3rd August the German advance on Belgium and Sir Edward Grey's speech changed the attitude of most of the labour representatives in the House and the general feeling of labour in the country. When war was declared by Great Britain, the Executive Committee of the Labour Party urged concentration upon relief work and later joined the recruiting campaign (29th August). This was a first step towards definite support of the Government, and the next was the entry of Mr. Henderson into the Coalition Government with the approval of a joint meeting of the Labour members of Parliament and the Executive of the Labour Party. The British Socialist Party also decided to

support the war; but the Independent Labour Party issued a manifesto of opposition on the 13th August and continued throughout to oppose the Government's policy.

On the industrial side Labour supported the Government. The Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress issued a manifesto expressing pride at the assistance given by labour to the war, and on the 15th October a joint manifesto was published signed by representatives of various labour organizations and by most labour members of Parliament, declaring support of the war to be necessary for the safety of democracy. Clearly, then, practically the whole of organized labour accepted the view taken of the international situation by the Government and there was no distinctively labour policy in regard to the aims to be pursued in the conduct of the war.

Throughout 1915 the Labour Party and the Trade Unions continued to support the Government in its external policy, although difficulties increased in regard to the munitions industries, and there was some support given to those sections of labour which opposed the war, because of discontent at the Government's industrial policy. There was still, however, no alternative war policy.

3. *Changes introduced by the Russian Revolution.* At the end of 1916 Mr. Henderson was made a member of the War Cabinet in Mr. Lloyd George's new Government. Mr. Barnes was made Minister of Pensions, and Mr. Hodge, Minister of Labour. Officially, therefore, Labour was in complete agreement with the Government's war policy; but the whole situation was changed by the Russian Revolution and the unexpected length of the war. The success of the Russian workers in overthrowing the Tsar's power gave confidence to the workers in other countries. Suggestions began to be popular in labour organizations that the Government was incapable of taking steps towards peace and there seemed to be no possibility of a conclusive victory. Therefore, the British Labour Organizations tended to support a Stockholm Conference; Mr. Henderson resigned from the War Cabinet (11th August 1917) and a new and definite labour policy in regard to war-aims began to be formulated by various labour groups. A national conference of the Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress was held on the 28th December 1917, at which a memorandum on war-

aims was approved, and thus labour had a definitely expressed policy of its own in regard to the ending of the war. From this time no member of the Government could be any longer recognized as representative of the opinion of organized labour.

The situation in Great Britain at the end of 1917 is also indicated by the action taken by the leaders of what had come to be known as the Shop Stewards' movement.¹ Official trade unionism was unable to oppose the Government's industrial policy; but discontent was growing, and the unofficial Shop Stewards' Committees, particularly in the engineering trade, became the exponents of the policy of 'peace by negotiation'. The difficulty was made still greater when it became necessary for the Government to seek for more men for the army in the early months of 1918. The 'man-power controversy', as it was then called, brought out opposition in the industrial sphere. The official ballot of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, announced on the 20th February 1917, gave 121,017 against, and only 27,570 for the Government proposals; and at various conferences of Shop Stewards, for instance, on the 25th January 1918 and the 9th March 1918, the discussion turned upon the possibility of trade-union action to secure an early peace. Some district committees of trade unions proposed that the Government should adopt the war-aims of the Labour Party, particulars of which are given below, before making any further call upon the man-power of the nation. Thus opposition, suspicion of the aims of the Government and an alternative policy were being developed, when the opening of the German offensive on the 21st March 1918 enabled the Government to escape effective criticism and to pursue its own policy.

The German offensive having been exhausted, criticism of the Government's policy became vigorous again when the Allied Powers were seen to be in the ascendant. No one yet expected a speedy and sudden end to hostilities. The Labour Party and even the official trade union organization, therefore, were all the more eager to press upon public attention the statement of generous war-aims and the adoption of steps towards negotiation. It was now appreciated by the whole of organized labour that even domestic and industrial

¹ This was an organization of trade unionists based not on the craft to which a man belongs, but upon the 'shop' or section in which a man works; and the stewards, the representatives of the 'shop', became rivals of the official trade-union secretaries.

grievances, which were more easily understood by the rank and file, could not be redressed so long as the war continued. The British Labour movement took the lead in promoting the expression of an inter-ally labour policy for the conclusion of the war; and although the inevitable entanglements of war-time foreign negotiations were perhaps hardly appreciated by the majority of organized labour, suspicion was widespread that the European Governments were not working towards the aims which labour had welcomed when President Wilson had given them expression. The terms of the Armistice, however, satisfied British labour and opposition to the Government died down.

4. *France.* In France, after the conference of the International Bureau at Brussels, a manifesto was issued to the workers urging them to efforts for preserving peace; and when negotiations with Germany failed, a deputation of Socialist Deputies went to the Premier to urge a manifestation of the desire for peace on the part of France. The general opinion of the party in this crisis was not adverse to the Government and two Socialists were permitted by the Party to enter the new Coalition Ministry of National Defence. M. Albert Thomas afterwards became Minister of Munitions, thus binding the Socialist Party even more closely to the war policy of the Government.

A division of opinion, however, eventually developed which was due partly to the sufferings of the working-classes in the war, but partly to suspicion of the motives of the various Governments which succeeded one another without perceptibly bringing nearer the possibility of peace. Exactly the same process of change from support to criticism of the administration went on in the Confédération Générale du Travail (C.G.T.). Despite its strong 'class' and anti-nationalist pre-war policy, there was a general agreement of its members that France was the victim of aggression and therefore the Syndicats strongly supported the war, until a division between groups developed which at length turned the anti-war minority into an acknowledged majority at the Congress of July 1918. Food prices, the immense casualties, the length of the war and the stern repressions of any industrial movement all compelled the organized workers to distrust the Government. The C.G.T., however, was more closely allied during the war than ever before to the

Socialist Party, and therefore the changes in French labour opinion and policy can be adequately rendered by reference to the history of the Socialist Party.

5. *The French Socialists go into Opposition, 1917-18.* The division of opinion which first showed itself in the early part of 1917 was due very largely to the policy of the French Government in regard to Russia. Suspicions began to be aroused that the purposes of the Allies in the war were not what they had been or at least not what they were generally believed to have been at the beginning. In April 1917 a deputation of Socialists sent to Russia reported against the French Government's policy; and, although the Executive of the Party voted against the Stockholm proposal, the minority on that occasion were able at a meeting of the Federation of the Seine to show that Socialist opinion was moving against the Government. The Prime Minister, M. Ribot, was particularly opposed when he spoke in slighting terms in the Chamber of the League of Nations as a programme for peace. The opposition to the Russian and Stockholm programmes of labour led to M. Thomas's announcement that he would resign from the Government; but the Party decided that he should remain. Meantime a long statement of the Labour attitude towards the war was drawn up by the Socialist Party, emphasizing the need for fighting but expressing suspicion of certain tendencies. The statement declared for a plebiscite in Alsace and Lorraine. For some time the Party tried to affect French policy. M. Ribot resigned and M. Painlevé, with M. Ribot as Foreign Minister, was Premier until M. Ribot resigned; and in November 1917 the Painlevé Ministry fell.

Labour organizations, both in the Chamber and outside had become strongly critical of the Government. The Socialist Party was divided in regard to voting war credits and participating in the Government, as the October Conference at Bordeaux showed, the minority being more and more clearly opposed to the tendency of the Allied policy at this time. M. Clemenceau, who succeeded M. Painlevé, made the Socialist opposition certain and unequivocal both by his action in the industrial sphere, and by his open disregard of the aims publicly expressed by the representatives of organized labour.

A definite protest was made in January 1918 by the Socialist Party against the declaration of the Allied Governments

at the Versailles Conference : and from the 18th February the Socialist Party worked in close connexion with the British Labour Party in its statement of war-aims. This statement was understood in France at least to be in opposition to Governmental policy, as M. Clemenceau showed in his attack on the Socialist Party in the Chamber on the 15th March. In France as in Great Britain the German offensive led to a subduing of labour criticism ; but when the Allies once again were seen to be secure, opposition broke out. In the use of force for suppressing the great munition strike, which occurred at St. Etienne, the Government did not increase the friendship of Labour organizations ; and in July at the first full congress of the C.G.T. held during the war, the mood of the trade unionists was clearly shown to be adverse to the Government's policy. In September, French representatives were present at the Inter-Allied Labour Conference in London, and in October those who had been in the minority in the Socialist Party definitely gained control of the situation. Both sections, however, strongly supported the idea of the League of Nations ; and the Left Wing, now in control, was strongly internationalist. Thus at the Armistice French Labour looked to President Wilson, but was in open opposition to its own Government and thoroughly suspicious of the real aims of the Allies.

6. *Italy.* The Italian Socialist Party resigned from the *Internationale* when war broke out and attempted during the first part of the war to be ' neutralist '. The official members of the Party in the Chamber supported Italy's non-intervention ; and yet the German Socialists who came to Italy in 1914 and 1915 were by no means welcomed by their Italian comrades. In September 1914 there was a meeting of Italian and Swiss Socialists at Lugano at which both parties agreed to work for the neutrality of their Governments, and in 1915 the Italian Socialists began the organization of the Zimmerwald Conference. The *Confederazione Generale di Lavoro* was also officially neutralist. There was, however, an unofficial minority both in the Socialist and in the trade union organization which strongly supported Italian intervention ; and Bissolati,¹ a Socialist, entered the Coalition Cabinet in 1915, just before war was declared on Austria. This group was assisted by

¹ Bissolati had some important ideas on the subject of justice to the Yugo-Slavs which he openly expressed ; he resigned office at the end of 1918.

a nationalist group of Irredentists who were also Socialists; and among the trade unions a pro-war policy resulted in the formation of the *Unione Italiana di Lavoro*. The various pro-war groups sent representatives to the Inter-Allied Labour Conference in London in September 1918, and voted in favour of the war-aims there proposed; but even in this group the movement had been increasingly away from the policy of the Allied Governments, and at the close of the war nearly the whole of organized labour in Italy was not only in opposition to their own Government but dissociated from the Socialist and Labour parties of other Allied countries and looking to Moscow and the third *Internationale*.

7. *Russian Labour Movements*. In Russia the influence of the organized workers was such that although the opponents and critics of war policy in the various other belligerent countries looked to the Revolution for inspiring phrases, Russia itself, when the Peace Conference met, was cut off from the rest of Europe. The Revolution of March 1917 was recognized by all the most intelligent leaders of the labour movement in all countries as involving a violent break with Governmental policy at least in the East. The publication of hitherto secret treaties shook the confidence of some labour groups in Allied countries, and the Russian phrases 'self-determination', 'no annexations', and 'no punitive indemnities', were so attractive to many that even the German military *régime* seemed for a time to be finding a use for idealism. Confusion and general distress, and the hopeless failure of a military offensive, produced the second Revolution on the 7th November 1917, and left the Bolsheviki in control. The temptation was too strong for the German militarists, and the peace negotiations begun at Brest-Litovsk on the 22nd December seemed to show to Labour in all countries that there could be no genuine conversion of the military mind except by force of arms. So it came about that Russia herself was not an effective force at the Peace Conference, although throughout the closing stages of the war the influence of new schemes and policies of labour organizations in Russia undoubtedly affected the situation both in Central Europe and in the Allied nations.¹

The neutral countries also played a part in the making of the situation which existed when hostilities ceased. Lack of

¹ The Bolshevik attitude is treated more fully in Chapter VI, Pt. II, q.v.

food and raw materials had affected labour in Scandinavia, Holland, and Switzerland: labour organizations were unable in those countries to maintain the traditional opposition to war; but the most direct influence of neutral labour was in the international sphere, and it may therefore be discussed under the heading of international action.

8. *German Labour Organizations.* The policy of the German labour organizations had not such a direct bearing on the terms of peace as had that of Allied labour organizations; but the actual position of the German labour organizations at the Armistice was perhaps one of the chief causes of the entire destruction of all German power. The Peace Conference is remarkable as compared with other such Conferences in that one party to the proposed Treaty was not represented at the Conference and the terms were, therefore, entirely designed by the Allied and Associated Powers; but this was due largely to the fact that Revolution had destroyed the Governments of the Central Powers. The final overthrow of the military power was in great part due to the distrust shown by German labour organizations.

At the very beginning of the war the Social Democratic Party in the Reichstag voted war credits, with only four abstentions, on the ground that the Fatherland must be defended. A 'Burgfriede' was declared between the Government and the Socialists. There was, however, strong opposition by a small group, which became more public in June 1915 when the Pan-Germans began to popularize war-aims involving annexations. The Majority Socialists published war-aims on the 25th August 1915, which besides the *status quo* appeared only to include commercial advantages for Germany and vague terms such as the Freedom of the Seas and International Arbitration.

By December 1915 the division in the party was obvious, and the Minority group was organized definitely in opposition to the German Government; but the opposition was weakened by disagreement between its members. As in the Allied countries, there was a very general growth of suspicion; and although the leaders of the minority had many different views and policies, their support came from a very widespread public feeling that the policy of the Government aimed at annexations, and that the war was one of conquest and not of self-defence.

As in the Allied countries, industrial groups were drawn

into the controversy of the political labour groups; but in Germany the trade union leaders were more and more inclined to support the Government on the ground that the existing order conferred benefits. The rank and file, however, in so far as it was not distracted by army service or military control, appears to have been increasingly distrustful and feeling ran high when, on Labour Day, 1916, Karl Liebknecht was arrested and condemned to two and a half years' penal servitude.

9. *Growth of the 'Minority' Socialists, 1916-18.* In the summer of 1916 the general discontent and suspicion drove the Majority Socialists to take a more critical attitude towards the Government and it was no longer possible for the Government entirely to suppress discussion of war-aims by the 'Minority'. In October, however, *Vorwärts*, which had been a 'Minority' organ, was suppressed for ten days and afterwards reappeared as a 'Majority' organ more amenable to pressure from the Military High Command. The Conference of the Party (21st September), however, and peace meetings (1st October) at Frankfurt drove the 'Majority' to declare for the *status quo* rather than annexations or advantages as their chief war-aim. The 'Majority' also strongly approved of the Government's offer of peace in December 1916, and the greater part of the labour organizations appear to have been considerably surprised that the Allies thought the terms of the offer unsatisfactory.

The whole of the year 1917 in the German Labour organization was dominated by the Russian situation. The March Revolution caused great hopes and strengthened the anti-governmental tendencies. The Majority issued, in reference to a Stockholm conference, a new declaration of war-aims, again suggesting the *status quo* with regard to German territory, but desiring independence for Ireland, Egypt, India, Morocco, Finland, and Tripoli. The 'Minority', on the other hand, expressed themselves as desirous of disarmament and arbitration, together with a redrawing of the map of Europe on the basis of nationality. The views of the 'Minority', however, had little influence on German policy, more especially as the Russian Revolution, from which so much had been hoped, seemed to be ending in confusion. The Government refused the now general demand for a clear statement of war-aims; the new Chancellor, Michaelis, confused all the issues

in his self-contradictory speeches of July ; and at the close of the year the annexationist parties seemed to be in complete control of the situation. The general confidence in the Government and the military command was being slowly undermined by economic distress and postponement of any end to the struggle ; but criticism was dumb during the successful offensive.

The whole concentrated and suppressed distrust burst out when the Allied offensive began in the summer of 1918 ; and the labour organizations were able to take advantage of the situation and to assume control in the autumn. By that time, however, their statement of war-aims was obsolete and the world situation had left their controversies almost entirely domestic in importance.

10. *International Labour Policy, 1914-17.* We may now turn from the separate actions of the labour organizations in the different countries to the joint action by which international labour policy was eventually revived. The International Socialist Bureau was transferred in October 1914 from Brussels to The Hague ; but, as it has already been pointed out, action could be taken during the war at first only by the national sections of the labour movement each in isolation.

In February 1915 there was a Conference in London of labour organizations in the Allied countries, at which it was agreed that the war must be carried on until Germany was defeated. In April 1915 a similar Conference of Socialists of Germany, Austria, and Hungary was held in Vienna ; and although the attitude expressed towards the war was indefinite, general resolutions as to war-aims were passed, including disarmament and self-determination. In September 1915, at Zimmerwald, an anti-war Conference of Socialists was held ; but although those present were of different nationalities, there were no official representatives of any belligerent country except Italy.¹ The Conference was quite ineffective even in the labour movement ; but a second Conference of the same groups was held at Kienthal on the 24th April 1915, at which it is interesting to note that Lenin was present to represent Russian Socialists. Discontent was expressed at the inaction of the official Socialist Bureau at The Hague ; but again no

¹ The manifesto signed by those present called on the Socialists of all countries to renew the class-war in order to end the war of the nations. At the later Kienthal Conference the suggestion was made to found a new *Internationale* and to repudiate the official Socialist Bureau.

definite results were attained. It was evident that the time had not yet come for international action by labour.

In April 1917 an invitation was issued by the Dutch and Scandinavian labour organizations to an international conference at Stockholm, to which city the Socialist Bureau was removed. The political influence of M. Branting was of international importance, especially as he was known to be favourable to the Allies by contrast with the Conservative Party in Sweden. His support of the Stockholm project gave him an international position in regard to war-aims. The Russian Revolutionary Council of Soldiers and Workers supported the Stockholm plan, and discussions began in all the belligerent countries as to the wisdom of a meeting of labour representatives from enemy countries while the war still continued. There was still strong opposition, especially in France, among the workers to any conference with German Socialists, who were felt to be deeply committed to the policy of a militarist Government; but despair of any conclusion to the war was driving the people to look about for some new method of approach to a settlement. By the autumn of 1917 in all belligerent countries organized labour was inclined to feel that the Governments could do nothing and that labour itself must make the first move towards peace. It was agreed that the conference at Stockholm could not be regarded as in any sense official or as involving binding agreements between labour organizations in enemy countries; but the mere proposal of a Conference roused strong feeling, especially in Allied countries, and the Governments decided to oppose the suggestion. The next move began in England.

11. *The International Labour Conference of London, 20th February 1918.* The British Trade Union Congress at Blackpool (in September 1917) resolved that an Inter-Allied Conference of Labour Organizations should be held; and a joint Conference of the Labour Party and the Trade Union Congress, held in London on the 28th December 1917, approved a memorandum on war-aims, which was made the basis of an invitation to the labour and socialist groups of all the Allied countries. A preliminary meeting took place in Paris on the 15th, 16th, and 17th February, and the full Conference assembled in London on the 20th February 1918. Most of the Allied countries were represented, and there were delegations representing the Czecho-Slovak Socialists of America, Polish groups, and the

South Slavs. The Bolsheviks refused to be represented and also refused passports to other Russian parties; no reply was received from Rumania. A telegram, indicating partial agreement, was received from Mr. Gompers in America.

12. *Terms of the British Labour Memorandum on War-aims.* After certain preliminary motions on the part of the Italian and other groups, the Conference approved and adopted the British memorandum on war-aims, which begins by reasserting the declaration of the Conference held on the 14th February 1915, and proceeds to a reasoned statement of the purposes and policies for the sake of which Labour organizations supported the war. The memorandum accepts President Wilson's phrase 'to make the world safe for Democracy' as the first reason for 'supporting the continuance of the struggle'. It sets out a scheme for a League of Nations, the reference of all disputes to arbitration, 'the frank abandonment of every form of Imperialism', and it asserts, practically in Wilson's phrases, that 'every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival States'. In detail the memorandum proposes as war-aims: (1) the restoration of Belgium and reparation by Germany for wrong done to Belgium; (2) a plebiscite for Alsace-Lorraine; (3) the evacuation of Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, and Albania, and reorganization of the Balkan peoples under an International Commission; (4) an indefinite proposal with regard to Italian Adriatic problems; (5) the reconstitution of Poland; (6) a 'free state under international guarantee' for the Jews in Palestine; (7) administration of Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia by a Commission under the League of Nations, and 'neutralization' of the Dardanelles; (8) not the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary but national independence, if demanded by the 'Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs'; (9) in colonies and dependencies either 'administrative autonomy' or 'progressive participation in local government'. Further, 'the return of colonies to those who possessed them before the war or the exchanges or compensations which might be effected ought not to be an obstacle to the making of peace', and it was proposed that a system of control under the League of Nations ought to be established for 'the colonies of all belligerents in tropical Africa'. The

memorandum then proceeds to suggest freedom of trade, the open door, the international improvement of factory conditions, and the international control and allocation of exportable surpluses of foodstuffs and raw materials in order to prevent famine and unemployment. As regards accusations of acts of cruelty and violence, an international Court of Claims and Accusations is suggested.

The Conference also decided that it would be useful to call an International Conference of Labour and Socialist organizations in a neutral country, at which all the organizations represented should be those which declared their war-aims to be in conformity with the principles 'No annexations or punitive indemnities and the right of all peoples to self-determination'. It was plainly agreed that representatives from the parties of the Central Powers should meet the Allied representatives. Further, it was resolved that a Labour representative should attend the Peace Conference, and that there should be a special Labour and Socialist Conference sitting concurrently with the official conference.

This memorandum was communicated to the Socialist parties of the enemy countries and favourable replies were received from the Austrian Social Democratic Party and the German 'Minority' Socialists. The German 'Majority' Socialists replied on the lines of their memorandum for Stockholm in June 1917.¹

13. *International Labour at the Period of the Armistice.* A fourth Inter-Allied Conference of Labour and Socialist groups met in London on the 17th September 1918, at which the American Federation of Labour was represented. The Conference resolved unanimously that the Allied Governments should issue a joint statement of their war-aims, thereby making it understood that, in the view of organized labour, the Governments had not yet definitely stated their terms. It had, indeed, been continually suggested that the aims of the Governments were not based upon any principles but changed with the military situation. The 'Fourteen Points' of President Wilson were accepted in a resolution of the London Conference, and some discussion resulted from the attempt of the American delegation to press for a resolution against conferences with

¹ *i.e.* the *status quo* for Germany and independence for Ireland, Egypt, India, Morocco, Finland, and Tripoli.

labour representatives from enemy countries. The American policy, however, was rejected by the Conference.

The whole international situation was transformed by the complete collapse of the Empires of Germany and Austria. Republics, dominated by organized labour, were set up in Germany on the 9th November 1918, and in Austria on the 12th November. Hostilities had ceased on the western fronts. Peace seemed to be near, and in the minds of the majority foreign policy gave place to the re-settlement of domestic conditions. The interval between the Armistice and the opening of the Peace Conference at Paris on the 18th January 1919 was not used by labour organizations for the formulation or the advocacy of any definite programme of international policy, although preparations were made for the renewal of the Socialist *Internationale*. An International Labour and Socialist Conference was held at Berne from 26th January to 10th February 1920, at which resolutions in regard to the peace were proposed; but the separation between the Governments and the labour organizations of the various Allied countries was not bridged, and the attention paid by the workers to the problems of demobilization, unemployment, and the securing of their industrial position almost entirely absorbed the thought of organized labour, thus leaving labour organizations without direct power in international politics while the Peace Conference was being held.

14. *Summary.* The position of labour organizations during a great war is obviously difficult and even equivocal. They stand in their expressed programmes opposed to the system within which war and the preparation for war are constituent elements; but they have to work in the world as it is. The history of their action during the war has shown that the real issues involved in the contact of sovereign governments were not fully appreciated by the majority of organized workers in any country before the war; but the tendency to a new conception of foreign policy became clearer as the war continued, and organized labour was able to indicate its nature, if not to enforce its application. Thus it came about that when war first broke out Labour organizations, in spite of their pre-war tendencies, supported the governments of all belligerent countries, that after two years' war experience new divisions appeared in the Labour groups, and that the majority of organized

labour in every belligerent country, except perhaps the United States, was in opposition to the Governments at the close of hostilities. A few of those who were, before the war, connected with labour organizations remained to the end supporters of the governmental policy ; but when the drafting of the Peace Treaty had to be considered there were practically no official representatives of labour in any of the Allied Governments.¹

¹ Count E. Vandervelde in Belgium and Mr. Barnes in Great Britain were the only Plenipotentiaries representative of Labour, though Mr. Gompers (U.S.A.) was attached to the American Delegation and acted as President of the Commission for International Legislation on Labour.

CHAPTER VI: PART II.

THE BOLSHEVIK ATTITUDE AT BREST-LITOVSK AND ITS EFFECTS

1. *Bolshevik Negotiations for Peace, November 1917, and German Acceptance of them.* By the time of the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, the 6th and 7th November 1917, the break-up of Russian society and of the army had already proceeded far. There was a general desire for peace. Under the Bolsheviks the disintegration proceeded yet more rapidly, and they at once proclaimed the attainment of 'a just and democratic peace' as one of the first aims of their policy. Accordingly on the 20th and 28th November Lenin proposed to all belligerents that they should conclude an armistice and negotiate for a general peace, and on the 29th the Central Powers accepted the invitation. Local armistice *pourparlers* were already taking place in the East, but official negotiations were started at Brest-Litovsk on the 3rd December, which resulted in the signature of an armistice on the 15th. The Rumanians, placed in a hopeless position by Russian action, were compelled to follow suit, and signed an armistice on the 9th December at Focsani. The Brest Armistice followed the general lines laid down by Ludendorff as early as the summer of 1917: 'they were based on the desire to come to an understanding with Russia, for the needs of the War demanded peace in the East.' There was no surrender of arms, no cession of territory, and no neutral zone. The Russians succeeded in inserting a clause aimed against the moving of German troops from one part of the front to another, but they were clearly not in a position to enforce it, and the clause was so worded as to present no real obstacle to German troop movements. By Article 9 negotiations were to be started as soon as possible, and these duly began on the 22nd December at Brest-Litovsk.

In the meantime, an important Conference was held on the 18th December at German General Headquarters, under the presidency of the Kaiser.¹ He agreed to Germany acquiring a

¹ v. Ludendorff, *War Memories*, ii. 544-5 sqq.

large protective belt on the Prussian-Polish frontier, and he also approved Hertling's agreement to a personal union of Courland and Lithuania to Prussia or Germany, provided that the Federal Princes consented. It was decided to propose, but not to demand, the evacuation by the Russians of Esthonia and Livonia, with a view to allowing these countries to exercise the right of self-determination. There were, however, no joint conferences between the Germans and their allies prior to the arrival of the delegations at Brest, and this fact was subsequently recognized by the German military authorities to have been a considerable drawback.

2. *Attitude of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Bolsheviks at the Conference.* The main positions of the three chief Powers concerned were relatively simple and did not fundamentally change. The Germans were immediately concerned to arrive at an early settlement which would enable them to withdraw the maximum number of troops from the East for the Western offensive, which had by then been decided upon.¹ In addition, they intended to make the territories which they occupied, and particularly the Baltic States, closely dependent upon Germany, while they imperatively required the material resources of South Russia in order to ease the internal situation. Looking further ahead, they wished to establish such relations with Russia as would assure their permanent economic and financial predominance over her. At the same time, German politicians feared the effect of revolutionary ideas and of President Wilson's principles and were anxious to disguise their designs by elaborate lip-service. The Austrian position has been clearly summed up by Czernin: 'Peace at the earliest moment is necessary for our own salvation, and we cannot obtain peace unless the Germans get to Paris—and they cannot get to Paris unless their Eastern front is free. That is the circle complete.' In the negotiations with the Bolsheviks the Austrians played an altogether secondary part, but during January the disastrous condition of the Austrian food supplies brought to the forefront the necessity for an immediate 'bread-peace' with the Ukraine. The Russians were primarily concerned with setting forth their principles of a peace settlement in such a manner as would react at once upon the proletariat of all the belligerents and would thus lead to the outbreak of

¹ See Vol. I, Chap. I, § 19.

the World Revolution, which would replace the Imperialists' War by the Class War, which was the first essential of their political doctrines. They went to Brest-Litovsk 'relying solely upon the revolutionary succour of the working classes of the other belligerent countries—above all, of Germany and Austria-Hungary'. This, the most important aspect of their attitude, was at the time partially obscured by the fact that their ideas were then little known and were only beginning to be translated into practice, and by the prominent position which they gave to the question of self-determination. This was readily interpreted by large circles of foreign opinion in the sense of national self-determination, rather than in the sense of class-determination, which was the real standpoint from which the Bolsheviks approached the question of nationality.

3. *Opening of the Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk.* The negotiations began on the 22nd December and consisted of a series of four separate sessions, at which all the chief plenipotentiaries were present.¹ In the intervening periods important consultations with their respective Governments took place, while certain special committees and the bulk of the delegations continued detailed work at Brest. The Bolshevik insistence on 'no secret diplomacy' gave the negotiations an entirely novel aspect from the start. They had begun the publication of the secret treaties in the last week of November, and they now began to issue a series of daily reports on the proceedings at Brest, supplemented by wireless invectives from Krylenko, the Bolshevik Commander-in-Chief, and from Tsarskoe Selo. The German Government were forced to follow suit and to issue their own account of the sittings. These were in the main records of the speeches made, for only occasionally was procedure by written documents adopted, although Trotsky was anxious thus to pin the Germans down. The general effect was one of a discussion before the world, in which the standpoint of each side was necessarily reflected in the versions reported of the proceedings.

The conference opened in a significant manner, for, far from the Bolsheviks being presented with bases for the conclusion of peace, Joffe, on the request of Kühlmann, read a statement setting out the Russian principles of a general peace. These comprised: evacuation of occupied territories and no 'forcible

¹ These were Joffe and Trotsky for the Bolsheviks, Kühlmann and General Hoffmann for Germany, and Czernin for Austria-Hungary.

appropriations', complete political independence of nations deprived of it during the War, self-determination for nationalities not hitherto independent, no war indemnities or economic boycotts, and the settlement of colonial questions in accordance with the above principles. Owing to disputes among themselves the answer of the Central Powers was delayed until Christmas Day; it was then delivered by Czernin and it accepted the principles of no forcible annexations and of no war indemnities, but not that of a free plebiscite for national groups not hitherto independent, and the whole was carefully bound up with the acceptance by the Allies of the offer of general peace, which was decided on at that session. Czernin's declaration was, however, received by the world in general as indicating a renunciation of occupied territories and some surprising concessions to the Russian standpoint. The Allies were given until the 4th January to answer the general peace offer, but meanwhile negotiations affecting Russia specially were to continue. No direct answer was given by the Allies, but on the 5th January, Lloyd George made an important speech on war-aims, while on the 8th President Wilson laid down the Fourteen Points; the sixth of these demanded German evacuation of Russia and free opportunity for the self-development of Russia, with Allied aid.

4. *Differences between Kühlmann and Ludendorff produced by Trotsky's Attitude.* The immediate result of the Christmas Day reply was to call forth violent protests from German General Headquarters against the weak concessions to the Russians on the question of self-determination, and the sittings of the 26th and 27th December revealed to the Russian delegates that the Germans had no intention of giving way on the question of the occupied territories. After much difficulty, on the 28th it was decided to form a committee to work out details for the eventual evacuation of Poland, Courland, and Lithuania, and for a subsequent plebiscite; but in this document there also appeared the vital argument that the existent representative bodies in the occupied territories had already exercised the right of self-determination, and that a plebiscite would only be of a confirmatory nature. This answer of the 28th swept aside the apparent concessions of the Christmas Day reply, and the Russian delegation, in extreme dejection, returned to Petrograd for instructions, while on the German side the acute divergence of opinion between Kühlmann and Ludendorff had to be patched up by a personal conference, which took

place on the 2nd January at Berlin in the presence of the Kaiser. Ludendorff again urged the absolute necessity for hurrying on the negotiations in connexion with plans for the Western offensive; the suggestion of Kühlmann himself that Ludendorff should come to Brest was finally not accepted, nor were any definite instructions in the sense required given to Kühlmann, and Ludendorff was only prevented by Hindenburg from resigning. The quarrel hinged on the desire to have the peace recognized as due solely to military success and not to adroit diplomacy, but, when put in the form of responsibility for the peace terms, Hertling's contention was incontrovertible that he, as Chancellor, was solely responsible. Hertling had expressly approved Czernin's Christmas Day reply, and Czernin had aided Kühlmann by speaking of separate Austrian negotiations with the Bolsheviks. From the Russian point of view the importance of this division of German opinion lay in the opportunity it afforded for protracting the negotiations and for placing the Germans in the unfavourable light desired. This opportunity was fully taken by Trotsky, at the time Commissary for Foreign Affairs, who arrived at Brest on the 7th January. He had already been active in enunciating the Bolshevik determination to conclude no peace that was not 'just and democratic', and in exposing the rôle of the Germans as protective liberators. During the adjournment the Bolsheviks had proposed the removal of the negotiations to Stockholm and in the same message had denounced the proposals put forward by the Central Powers on the 28th December as contrary to the principles of self-determination. Consequently the Central Powers were considerably relieved at the reappearance of the Russian delegation at Brest, and on the 9th January they presented Trotsky with a virtual ultimatum insisting on the continuance of the negotiations at Brest. This was accepted by him on the next day. Although he had been forced to abandon the Stockholm project, the anxiety of the Germans had been evident, and he made good use of the ensuing week in conducting elaborate discussions with Kühlmann as to self-determination. It is impossible to examine here the speeches on this question, but the two essential points were: 'What constitutes a nation?' and, 'How is self-determination to be realized in practice?' On neither was any agreement reached; the Germans maintained that part of a nation (e.g. some of the

Poles), and not merely the whole of a nation, could have the right of self-determination; the Russians allowed that the Ukrainians were in process of establishing themselves as an independent nation, but asserted that this was entirely an internal Russian affair; the Germans refused to permit the creation of a 'vacuum' by withdrawing from the occupied territories; the Russians insisted that no free choice was possible while foreign troops were in occupation, and denied the representative character of the *bourgeois* institutions set up by the Germans. Later both sides modified their positions to some extent, but it was impossible to overcome the root difficulty of arranging for any kind of real choice on the part of the inhabitants concerned so long as German troops were still in their country. It is difficult to estimate Kühlmann's motives for initiating these lengthy debates on political philosophy and political science, for he exposed himself to a number of humiliating verbal rebuffs and did not make any great headway towards a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks. Trotsky is perhaps near the mark when he states that Kühlmann hoped to come to a tacit understanding with the Bolsheviks whereby German annexations could be cloaked behind democratic formulae. But a further reason of great importance influenced Kühlmann in spinning out the negotiations.

5. *The Ukrainian Treaty of 9th February 1918.* Throughout the discussions the Bolsheviks were in a strong position, for from the first they had not hesitated to apply the right of self-determination to the various nations of the former Russian Empire; but in so doing they exposed themselves to attack from a most dangerous quarter. Discussions with a separate Ukrainian delegation had been proceeding since the 4th January. The position in the Ukraine was exceedingly complex; a semi-independent, Social-Revolutionary government had been established in Kieff and had been partially recognized by the Bolsheviks, who were at the moment negotiating with it for the cessation of help to Korniloff and Kaledin. In consequence, the Bolsheviks on the 10th January permitted the Ukrainians to participate as an independent delegation in the Brest Conference. The Ukrainians at once made recognition of their independence the principal condition among their exaggerated demands on the Central Powers. The latter seized upon the Ukrainians as an invaluable means of baffling Trotsky, who recognized their presence as 'a great trump card in Kühlmann's

hands'. Besides the public sittings, a number of private interviews took place between the Ukrainians, the Germans and the Austrians, and these were facilitated by Czernin falling conveniently ill in the middle of January. The Ukrainians, backed by General Hoffmann, succeeded in excluding any Polish representatives who would have summarily refused the Ukrainian demand for the district of Kholm;¹ but they were induced to give way over their initial claim for the incorporation of Eastern Galicia in their new State. The negotiations as to supplies of grain were making some advance, when on the 15th January Czernin received the first despairing appeal with regard to the Austrian food situation. On the 17th he received the news of the serious strikes that had broken out in Vienna, and on the 21st he returned there. 'The Ukrainians no longer treat with us: *they dictate!*' The food position was of such seriousness that all the subsequent endeavours of Czernin were concentrated on achieving the earliest possible peace with the Ukraine in return for supplies, even at the price of disastrously embittering relations with the Poles over Kholm and Ruthenian autonomy.

The Austrian strike movement was succeeded in the last days of January by still bigger strikes in Germany. These took place against the wishes of the majority of the German labour leaders, and seemed to presage important results for the Bolshevik endeavours at Brest and elsewhere. Trotsky had left Brest on the 18th January in order to place before the third Congress of Soviets the position with regard to peace. At this Congress

¹ The Kholm district lies mainly between the rivers Bug and Wieprz, in the south-east of Russian Poland. It formed part of Poland from the middle of the fourteenth century until 1912, when the Russian Government, despite violent Polish protests, formed it into a separate Government, under Russian law and directly governed from Petrograd. The population has for centuries been in part Polish and in part Ukrainian; among the latter the Uniate Church was from the first strong. There is little past evidence of any strong racial hostility in the district. The frontier, as drawn by the Treaty of the 9th February, ran farther west than that of 1912, thus including a greater number of Poles. The approximate proportions of the two nationalities in the district before the war were: Poles 335,153, Ukrainians 287,236, according to the language census of 1897. The religious census, revised by Dziewulski in 1906, gives the following percentages: Catholics 46·01, Greek Orthodox 35·7, Jews 14·2, Protestants 3·9. It seems certain, however, that the religious census does not correspond to the racial one, *i. e.* there are Catholic Ukrainians. It is probable that the Poles in 1906 numbered about 400,000, and that the Ukrainians actually exceeded this total. The line of national demarcation runs roughly as follows: south through or near Janów and Lomazy to Uscinów, thence south-east to Jarosławiec, and south to Jarczów.

Trotsky admitted that the Government might be compelled to sign a peace of annexation, but at the final vote he and the majority successfully opposed any capitulation, and, as against Lenin and the minority, urged 'a Holy Guerrilla War', rather than abandon the principles that had been so loudly proclaimed before the world. Trotsky returned to Brest on the 28th January with instructions to maintain a strong policy in accordance with the Left Social-Revolutionary formula of a peace only on true, democratic grounds. He was naturally elated at the internal condition of Austria, and the news of the German strikes added another feather to his cap. He had brought with him a new delegation from the Ukraine representing the Bolsheviks, who had by that time made great progress in conquering the weak authority of the Kieff Social-Revolutionary Government, and he refused to allow Czernin to deal solely with the Kieff delegation, on the ground that the change in the Ukrainian situation had now made it entirely unrepresentative. This was essentially the case, and prompt action was necessary on the part of the Central Powers if there was to be any Government left in the Ukraine with which to make peace. During the 4th and 5th February Kühlmann and Czernin were conferring in Berlin with the political and military leaders, and they returned with the aim of concluding peace immediately with the Ukraine and of then forcing Trotsky to come to terms. The Treaty with the Ukraine was signed on the 9th February; three days later Kieff was finally captured by the Bolsheviks, almost the whole of the Ukraine was overrun by them, and the Kieff Government, having fled to Jitomir, invited the assistance of the Germans and Austrians in driving them out. Still the Central Powers, having the Treaty and the invitation, had beaten the Bolsheviks by a short head.

The main purpose of the Treaty was to hand over the material resources of the Ukraine to the Central Powers, but the economic and financial articles were so drafted that, besides immediate assistance, lasting predominance was to be maintained. A number of special agreements as to grain had to be made during the ensuing months at Kieff, and the carrying out of their conditions depended almost entirely upon the energy and organization of the German and Austrian occupying authorities; but the net result was a most important contribution to German resources and an absolutely invaluable increase of Austrian food

supplies. In return, the independence of the Ukraine was implicitly recognized, although its frontiers were entirely uncertain, except on the west. Here the district of Kholm was included in the Ukraine and the frontier then followed the old Austro-Russian boundary, but a subsequent annex rendered the annexation of Kholm subject to the investigation of a special commission composed of all the parties concerned.

6. *The Russian Treaty signed 3rd March ; its main provisions.* On the very day on which the Ukrainian Treaty was signed, the Bolsheviks issued a wireless message calling on the German army to refuse obedience to the Kaiser. At the request of Hindenburg, Kühlmann was at once instructed to present an ultimatum demanding a settlement on German lines. On the 10th February Trotsky declared the state of war to be at an end, but he refused to sign the Treaty. He considered it possible that the *moral* of the German troops in the east, and German public opinion behind them, would prevent any further German advance. In this he was fatally wrong. German General Headquarters had already been pressing Hertling to denounce the Armistice, and at the decisive conference of Homburg, the 13th February, Ludendorff succeeded in gaining his object. The Armistice was declared to have lapsed automatically and hostilities recommenced on the 18th February. There was no resistance from the few remaining Russian troops; enormous quantities of stores were seized; great tracts of additional territory were occupied, the final line of occupation being approximately Narva-Pskov-Polotsk-Orsha-Mogilev; south of this the Germans continued to drive the Bolsheviks out of the Ukraine, and by May were in occupation of all its nine provinces and much of the territory of the Don Cossacks. In the early morning of the 24th February the Council of People's Commissaries decided to accept the German peace terms; a new delegation left for Brest on the same day, and on the 3rd March the Treaty was signed. This comprised nine documents; it is doubtful whether the Russian signatories had even read them all.

By the political treaty Russian sovereignty was renounced over Poland, Lithuania, and Courland, and their future fate was to be decided by Germany and Austria-Hungary in agreement with the inhabitants. Finland and the Aaland Islands were to be evacuated (the Bolsheviks had already recognized Finnish independence). A German 'police force' was to remain in

Esthonia and Livonia 'until security is guaranteed by their own national institutions and until public order is restored'. The evacuation of the remainder of the occupied territories was to take place after the complete demobilization of the Russian army and after the conclusion of a general peace. The Bolsheviks were to recognize the Ukraine Treaty of the 9th February, and to conclude peace immediately with the Ukraine. In the Caucasus, the districts of Kars, Ardahan and Batum were ceded to Turkey. Thus the dismemberment of the Russian Empire was rendered as complete as the Germans at that time could hope for. The economic and financial articles followed the same general lines as Germany's other Eastern treaties and were designed to make Russia a commercial preserve for the Central Powers. The Russo-German commercial treaty of 1904, which was most unfavourable to Russia and had been imposed on the Ukraine a month previously, served, with suitable modifications, as the basis for the regulation of economic matters; most-favoured-nation treatment was guaranteed till 1925; the usual special precautions were inserted to safeguard a commercial *Mittel-Europa*, and, in general, all Russian imports and exports were regulated in such a manner as to ensure German predominance. The ground covered by the series of treaties was immense, and no details were overlooked; on such relatively minor matters as the cost of maintaining prisoners of war and merchant shipping the Central Powers were just as insistent as on the immediate resumption of the payment to their nationals of the Russian State Debt. Finally, it should be noticed that special protection was provided for Germans in Russia, and they were expressly excepted from the nationalizing and expropriatory decrees of the Bolsheviks; this was also extended to the numerous German colonists (about 2,000,000), who were to a large extent relieved of their allegiance to Russia.

7: *Reception of the Treaty in Russia and in Western Europe.* It was this article that was picked out by the Left Social-Revolutionaries for particular attack, on the grounds that it was tantamount to a partial restoration of private property in land and that it provided opportunity for the re-establishment of a *bourgeoisie*. This party had, after initial wavering, hitherto co-operated with the Bolsheviks, but throughout the Brest negotiations they had strongly held to the position that, if a satisfactory peace could not be obtained, war must be continued,

Their conception of such a war was of an anarchical kind, 'an insurrection of the people', in conformity with their terrorist traditions. Trotsky had, in the main, supported this policy; but on the 8th March he resigned his post as Commissary for Foreign Affairs, took no part in the peace struggles of the ensuing days, and henceforth devoted himself to the creation of a Red Army. The fourth Congress of Soviets opened at Moscow on the 14th March, and after heated discussion the Treaty was ratified on the 16th, thanks to the influence of Lenin, who succeeded in winning over a majority of the Bolsheviks, while the Left Social-Revolutionary party broke with him and no longer co-operated with the Bolsheviks. The opposition to Lenin had a very strong case in laying stress on the ruinous, territorial losses to be suffered by Russia, on the rupture of the economic life of Great Russia, which would be caused especially by the loss of the grain and coal of the Ukraine, and on the moral blow to revolutionary prestige, if such terms were accepted. This last point was, perhaps, of special significance in Western Europe. During the beginning of the Brest negotiations the attitude of the Bolsheviks to the Germans had evoked considerable admiration in certain sections of public opinion in Allied and neutral countries. This became much tempered when it became apparent that what was being said at Brest differed much from what was being done in Russia, particularly after the Constituent Assembly was dissolved. Trotsky's ineffective *beau geste* of the 10th February and its consequences showed conclusively that, despite the many diplomatic successes of the Bolsheviks at Brest, 'General Hoffmann's boot was the only serious reality,' and the acceptance of the Treaty, amounting to a complete withdrawal of the loud-sounding Bolshevik protestations of December, was taken by Western public opinion as an ignominious and shameful capitulation.

At the same time, it is difficult not to admit that Lenin's policy of 'the breathing space' was the only practical possibility in the circumstances—largely, but not wholly, due to the Bolsheviks themselves. 'Their knees are on our chest and our position is hopeless.' Russia was exhausted and absolutely disorganized. To continue the War with Allied assistance would, according to Lenin, be merely to assist the victory of one group of Imperialists over the other group at the expense of the yet further ruin of Russia; left to themselves, the out-

come would be an indecisive prolongation of the struggle, which would become more and more favourable to the revolution of the war-wearied masses. Nor had the Allies, in a situation of desperate intricacy and uncertainty, been able to come forward with any clear Russian policy, save that of keeping Russia in the War. Lenin, of course, stoutly denied that he had betrayed anything or anybody; for his obligations were not to the Allied Imperialists, but to the 'labouring masses' of the surrendered territories, and he had done everything possible to save them and to shatter German Imperialism—except that he had refused to continue the War in conjunction with the Allies. The impression caused in the West by his refusal to do this was naturally immense and was necessarily intensified during the vital strain following on the German offensive of the 21st March. In justice to the Bolsheviki it must be conceded that they made no attempt to conceal the nature of the Brest Treaty. Lenin stigmatized it thus: 'We were compelled to sign a "Tilsit" peace. We must not deceive ourselves. We must have courage to face the unadorned, bitter truth. We must size it up in full, to the very bottom, the abyss of defeat, partition, enslavement, and humiliation into which we have been thrown. The clearer we understand this, the firmer, the more hardened and inflexible will become our will for liberation, our desire to arise anew from enslavement to independence, our firm determination to see at all costs that Russia shall cease to be poor and weak, that she may become truly powerful and prosperous.' At the end of the same speech, the counterpart to this nationalist appeal is essential: 'We are for the "defence of our fatherland", but the war for the fatherland towards which we are moving is a war for a socialist fatherland, for Socialism, as a part of the universal army of Socialism.' Ludendorff was correct in summing up the Brest conditions as being 'aimed at the Bolsheviki, whose propaganda made a chronic state of warfare against them inevitable'.

8. *German Treaties signed with Finland (7th March) and with Rumania (7th May).* For the moment, however, the Germans had achieved a great victory. Further, the utter collapse of Russia under the Bolsheviki allowed them to settle with Finland and Rumania almost exactly as they pleased. Finland signed a treaty on the 7th March, by which German control over Finnish commerce, industry, and finance was ensured; even

recognition of Finnish independence was rendered largely illusory by the stipulation that no territorial changes were to be made without consultation with Germany, and still more so by the acceptance of the White Finns' appeal for German help against the successful Red Finns. Like the Baltic States, Finland came in all respects under the sway of Germany, even to the point of exchanging its republican form of government for a German monarch. Rumania was far more difficult, for, although the chaos in Russia placed Rumania in an ever-increasingly hopeless position, acute disputes between the members of the Quadruple Alliance prolonged the negotiations for several months. A preliminary peace was signed at Buftea on the 5th March, but the final peace was not signed till the 7th May, at Bucharest. The voluminous treaties constituting it are perhaps the most damning evidence available of what a victorious Germany would have been. Even more than the other German treaties, those of Bucharest provided indirectly for enormous war indemnities; Rumanian oil and grain were virtually ceded to the Central Powers; her sovereignty was reduced to a farce; evacuation was only to take place 'at times later to be agreed upon'; all the Dobruja and all the crests of the Carpathians were to be given up. The whole amounted to a permanent servitude of Rumania.

9. *Results of the Treaties during the summer of 1918.* Yet, although in Rumania, Poland, and the Baltic countries, the Germans, as a result of their military ascendancy and of their consequent treaties, had imposed themselves successfully as masters, the Russian problem in all its huge complexity was beyond their powers. Much, indeed, was done in the Ukraine, and something during the summer in the Caucasus; but German attention was mainly directed towards producing economic results, and their vague, political designs were subordinated to this end. The Bolsheviks, between the Germans on the one side and the Allies and the 'counter-revolutionaries' on the other, tried to make the most of their position with a view to re-organization, and particularly in the army, where with German aid they achieved notable results. Their actions in Russia were almost uniformly favourable to the Germans, with whom they signed important supplementary treaties as late as the 27th August. The Bolsheviks guaranteed to oppose to the full the Allied forces in North Russia, and they definitely renounced sovereignty over

Esthonia and Livonia and implicitly over Georgia ; but Baku was left to them, and Germany undertook not to split up Russia any further. Additional, financial, and commercial clauses emphasized the principle, so unwaveringly upheld by the Germans at Brest, of the complete indemnification of Germans for all losses or damages. Very heavy gold payments were also demanded of the Bolsheviks, two of which were actually made before the Armistice.

10. *The Allies and the Anti-Bolsheviks.* Looking at the position at the end of 1918, the effect of the peace efforts in the East will be seen to be very considerable. The military advantages to Germany need no comment in this chapter. Politically, the break-up of the former Russian Empire, which had begun in 1917, was, for a time at least, definitely achieved and Great Russia was cut off both from the Black Sea and, with the exception of the small Petrograd window, from the Baltic. Finns, Esths, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, and Georgians had all struggled for some organization of national life whilst in German occupation, and most of the few, capable, public men of these nations had almost necessarily worked, to some extent at least, with the Germans. When the victory of the Allies was achieved, these small nationalities overwhelmed them with protestations and appeals for assistance and recognition. Yet, in the case of the Baltic States, the menace of the Bolshevik irruption was so pressing that the Armistice allowed the continuation of German occupation, pending further decisions.

On the other side, those anti-Bolsheviks in the Don country, in Siberia, and at Archangel, who had continued their trust in the Allies, represented, in general, the idea of a Russia, less Poland, which was to be resuscitated in some form of federal unity. Allied intervention in Russia had been in origin anti-German ; the Brest treaties had impelled the Allies to do their utmost to keep German troops in the East and to deny Russian resources to the Central Powers. In being anti-German this effort became more and more anti-Bolshevik, and after the Armistice the initial *raison d'être* of military intervention necessarily disappeared, to be replaced by fear of the spread of Bolshevik ideas of revolution, by desire to heal the sufferings of Russia and by moral commitments to those who had always kept their faith in the Allies.

11. *Effect of the Bolshevik Ideas upon Western Political*

Thought. Between the two groups of anti-Bolsheviks, but not opposed in concert by both, were the Bolsheviks. Their revolutionary propaganda had penetrated far and wide—most notably in Germany. The Brest treaties had ushered in a so-called peace, and diplomatic relations had been resumed shortly afterwards. As a result Mirbach was sent to Moscow—to be murdered—and Joffe to Berlin, to work for the outbreak of the German revolution. This was indeed achieved, but in very different circumstances from those for which the Bolsheviks had hoped. They had not expected either group of belligerents to be victorious; now they suddenly found themselves liberated from one alliance of Imperialists, but in danger from the other alliance and unable to reverse at a blow the consequences of the Eastern treaties. Again the policy of a ‘breathing space’ was put forward, but it was combined with a frenzied reduplication of efforts to bring about a general European revolution.

Thus, by the close of the year, it was evident that the demand for evacuation and the right of self-determination meant for the Bolsheviks nothing but the right of ‘bolshevizing’, and the appeal of their peace formulae at Brest had long since lost its original force. Yet, in their arguments with the Germans, they had applied self-determination in a bold and far-reaching way, that remained not without influence in many quarters; Ireland and Bosnia, Egypt, India, and Persia appeared along with Posen and Alsace-Lorraine and Armenia. The Russian catchword of ‘peace without annexations or indemnities’, which the Bolsheviks had taken over and amplified, had made a deep, if indefinite, impression. The demand for no economic boycotts figured among the war-aims of many anti-Bolshevik bodies of opinion, and the precedent of the attempt to realize ‘no secret diplomacy’ was not forgotten. The effect of these ideas was conflicting and to a large extent impalpable, and they had become, in the main, divested of any specifically Bolshevik setting, but, in conjunction with President Wilson’s enunciation of principles, they coloured the minds and imaginations of such numbers that they exercised an immediate and profound influence upon the Peace Conference.

PART III:
CONFERENCE PRELIMINARIES:
ORGANIZATION AND EXECUTIVE
WORKING

CHAPTER VII

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

PART I: PREPARATIONS AND PERSONNEL

1. *The Conference a Dynamic and not a Static Body.* So great a piece of machinery as the Conference of Paris was not, and could not have been, created in a day. It was constructed largely out of the experimental organizations which in the course of the War the Allied and Associated Powers had erected to direct their policy and co-ordinate their strategy. There had also been in all countries more or less specific preparation for the work of peace, which had produced organizations for the purpose. When the expected moment at last arrived, these vast pieces of machinery were brought together at a common centre, and an attempt was made to fashion them into a common instrument. Such a task was in itself a stupendous undertaking, and involved the interests and passions of a host of officials both professional and amateur. It is not surprising, therefore, that the task was never really completed. Much of the machinery elaborately organized during the War was never fitted into the Conference engine, and substitutes had to be improvised for the needs of the moment. Only experience could show how the machine would work, and experience is a ruthless taskmaster. The Conference was dominated by personalities whom the events of the War had made the directing minds of organizations far greater than any that had ever previously existed. They were none of them men who could be fettered by a system; they used and 'scrapped' their materials ruthlessly, and thus continually changed the Conference machine to suit the needs of

the moment and of the situation. It is impossible to describe the Conference as a static body. It should rather be regarded as a living organism whose cells were constantly changing, and at times it assumed confessedly strange and distorted forms at the imperious will of masters, who in their turn were in the grip of the great forces of public opinion.

2. *Previous Preparations made by Subordinates and not concerted.* All the States at war knew that a moment must come when diplomacy must re-state the facts as they had been established by arms. But none knew how or when the moment would come, until the final struggle was almost over. Such preparations as were made in the several States before the Conference were thus necessarily of a very general character, and their exact value at the critical moment could not be foreseen. The nature of the peace would be governed by the military situation when the War ceased. On this great fact would depend all else, and no one scheme could therefore be drawn up which could be put into force when peace came. Two other considerations also militated against the value of such preliminary work. The heads of the Governments and their most responsible advisers had not yet the leisure themselves to direct it, yet without their supervision much of it must be useless since it could only have value if used by them or those in close touch with them. Moreover, schemes of organization for the Conference needed to be drawn up by the Allies in concert, for only the close co-operation of the several Governments could have elaborated any scheme which would have stood the test of practice. But such co-operation was impossible under the conditions of the World War. The Inter-Allied machine that had been so slowly and so painfully constructed had been a machine for war. The principal statesmen had no leisure to work out the organization of a Conference of Peace, and, if they had had leisure, they would have shrunk from raising problems which might have divided them in the face of a still unbeaten enemy.

3. *Nature and Value of these Preparations.* The preparations for the Conference then were made for the most part by subordinate departments, without the direction of the heads of States, without Inter-Allied consultation and co-operation, and with only a vague idea of how the schemes would be applied in practice. Their influence on the Conference must not, however, be under-estimated. Their labours had produced an enormous

amount of material for the use of the men of action, and, though much of this work was wasted, much proved to be of the greatest value. The elaborate plans that were drawn up by the officials of France, the United States, and Great Britain were not without influence at a later date even on the details of organization, and ideas appeared at the Conference which could be traced back to laborious pens working at a time when the Germans seemed almost invincible, and when few could foresee that the *disjecta membra* of four Empires would provide the materials on which the statesmen of the Allied Powers were to work.

In all countries during the War the value of specialized knowledge had in time been fully recognized. Even in History, Geography, and Political Science, subjects on which statesmen often claim that they are adequately equipped, the value of expert knowledge was eventually universally admitted, and the diplomatic, military, and economic organizations gradually obtained the services of men who, with more or less truth, could claim to be specially fitted to advise those who had to grapple with the great problems of the reconstruction of the world.

4. *French Preparations.* It was only natural that in France the services of academic knowledge and technical skill should be recognized at an early date, and a Committee of Historians and Publicists was set up to survey the problems of settlement. Each Government Department was also in touch with experts who placed their knowledge at the disposal of the departmental chiefs, and in some cases became departmental chiefs themselves. Adequate co-ordination and co-operation was, however, lacking. Each Department made its plans on its own initiative. There was no general scheme. The Quai d'Orsay was not in close touch with the Ministry of Commerce, or with the French General Staff on this subject, and the group of men who surrounded the Premier—who in the long run would alone count, if a peace by victory were attained—were not themselves sufficiently in command of a joint organization which could express the ideals and interests of France. The result was that there was no fully matured plan ready when the Armistice came. The military conditions of the Armistice were laid down by the Commander-in-Chief; its political basis was, as is narrated elsewhere, supplied by the President of the United States; but nothing was signed or sealed as to the conditions and organization of the Conference. A plan had

to be improvised in great haste, and improvised it was with all that scientific skill and the supreme mastery of historical and diplomatic facts for which Frenchmen are distinguished. But it bore the marks of its origin. Each Department had set forth its demands in detail, and the total result was rather overwhelming, while the scheme of organization prepared by the officials of the Quai d'Orsay, though ingenious and scientific, lacked reality, since it had not been made in consultation with the men who would have to work it, had not attempted to use the existing organizations, and had not been discussed with, and adapted to, the need of France's Allies. This fact was unfortunate, since Paris was the seat of the Conference, and the French had the greatest opportunity of devising a scheme for Conference organization. Fortunately for France, she possessed among her principal statesmen several who were specially endowed with both the skill and knowledge to conduct the affairs of a Conference. Alone of those representing the Great Powers, her Plenipotentiaries had themselves sufficient knowledge of principles and facts to conduct discussions without relying too greatly upon 'experts' and hasty coaching. The French Plenipotentiaries were in that sense less dependent on their subordinates than those of any other Great Power.

5. *The Preparations of the United States.* In the United States an elaborate organization had long been in existence, whose sole function was to prepare for the coming Peace Settlement. Dating from before America's entry into the War, it rapidly increased in size and importance after she became a belligerent. Under the general control of Colonel House it enlisted the services of many of the most distinguished academic figures in the United States, as well as of brilliant journalists, lawyers, and business men. Elaborate researches were made into the Geography, Ethnography, and Economic conditions of Europe and the Middle East. Elaborate maps were prepared showing the result of these researches, and the whole mass of evidence was continually overhauled and restated in the light of new facts. Specialists from different parts of the United States were employed to draw up memoranda, and to supply statistics on subjects which would probably come before the Peace Conference.¹ The worth of all such preparatory

¹ In addition there was a committee of historical, economic, and ethnological experts, which was under the control of Professor Coolidge at Vienna,

research was great. The weak side of the organization lay in its divorce from the practical side of the conduct of the War, the officials could not always use the material, and the academic experts had not always enough knowledge of current events. There was therefore much wasted labour, as well as much material of special and peculiar value. The internal organization of the machine was also defective. Its separate parts were not sufficiently co-ordinated, and its members too often worked in water-tight compartments. In spite of the brilliance of its personnel and the immense amount of material which it accumulated, these defects were to prove a serious handicap to its usefulness at the Conference. Nevertheless, the conception was a great one, and it contributed much towards the final settlement.

6. *British Preparations.* At London also there was a good deal of preliminary study of the Conference. In 1917 the Foreign Office set up an elaborate organization to prepare plans, and to study and obtain information on the subjects likely to be discussed. Special offices were opened, where not only was the plan of an organization drawn up and a special clerical staff was trained, but also an editorial staff was established to prepare handbooks on the Geography, History, and Economic conditions of every part of the world likely to come under discussion. An attempt was made to associate other government departments in the scheme—the Geographical Section of the General Staff supplied the maps; a special section of the Admiralty Staff the geographical description; and the War Trade Intelligence Department the economic sections. The General Staff had also prepared elaborate materials for drawing the military and strategic frontiers, and had produced a mass of material which ultimately proved of much practical use. In this way a real centre of Conference preparations was made, but unfortunately consultation with other departments stopped at these sections. There was no real consultation amongst those who were actually responsible for affairs, and this preparation was not controlled or encouraged by the War Cabinet which decided policy, and which handled the Inter-Allied Conferences during

and which travelled about most of Eastern Europe in the winter of 1918 and spring of 1919, studying the actual economic conditions and the wishes of the inhabitants of territories likely to be in dispute. Some of the information thus supplied was of great value as being more recent than any other.

the War. Hence the Foreign Office had all this time been working under considerable disadvantages. There was a divorce between action and theory; much of the work done was found to be superfluous; while the elaborate plans of organization could only be partially put into action when the Conference came into being. Such a result, however regrettable, was perhaps inevitable in the existing organization of the Government, but the value of much of the work done was gradually realized as the Conference progressed.

7. *The Preparations of Other Countries.* In other countries less elaborate plans were made, and were concerned almost entirely with the special interests of the countries concerned rather than with all the aspects of a general peace settlement. But the Italians, as well as the Yugo-Slavs, Czecho-Slovaks, Rumanians, and other smaller nations all organized elaborate Departments of Propaganda during the War, in which their various technical experts were employed. All these in a sense were preparing a case for the Conference, and each nation thus brought to Paris a mass of statistics and memoranda to substantiate its claims. Most of this was purely *ex parte* pleading, but it at least secured that every side of the case would be buttressed by all the arguments that the ingenuity and industry of its supporters could produce, while many of the briefs were prepared by historians, geographers, and economists of international reputation.

8. *Place of the Conference.* Peace suddenly arrived, and with disconcerting speed, while these plans were being elaborated by a thousand pens in hundreds of busy offices. The Armistices were indeed the last documents signed without reference to the Allied peace staffs. For the time had now arrived to turn theory into practice, to summon a Conference to settle the fate of the world, and to make the business of concluding Peace the first charge on the energies of the heads of the States. The first question was to determine the place of the Conference. There were many who would have preferred the Conference to meet in some neutral spot, and of all those suggested, Geneva seemed most suitable. Those who were thinking of Geneva, however, regarded the Conference as a place where victors and vanquished were to meet for long discussion, with neutrals also taking an active part in the settlement of affairs, in which they had a tremendous interest. They forgot that the enemy States

had as yet signed away no frontiers, and that the enmities between peoples (which no change of Government could assuage) persisted to a far greater degree than after any previous war. In the minds of the Allied Powers the enemy must be kept clear of the Conference until the details of the Peace were settled, and the terms must then be imposed on them by the overwhelming military preponderance of the Allies. Such was especially the view of the French statesmen, and France which had suffered so much had great claims on the consideration of her Allies. For such a Conference Paris was the natural place of assembly. At Versailles was already established the Supreme War Council of the Allies, and Paris, which had been made by circumstances the principal centre for the direction of the War, was also therefore the most suitable place for a Conference, which, it was soon to be seen, was to be largely an extension of the Inter-Allied Supreme Council. Thus, though Brussels was mentioned by a few, Paris—twice threatened by the enemy—now became the centre of a world that had risen in arms against him.

9. *Date of the Opening.* As to the date of the opening of the Conference there was no settled plan, though no one disputed the urgent necessity of a speedy conclusion. But several circumstances prevented the rapid setting up of the Conference machinery which some desired. The President of the United States must appear in person, and he could not arrive before the middle of December. Once arrived he must have a breathing-space to get into touch with the principal Allied statesmen, and survey, as it were, at close quarters a scene he had hitherto only viewed from afar. When he actually did arrive he found the British people in the throes of a general election, which the Coalition Government had decided was necessary to give it the authority to conduct the Peace negotiations, and to bridge the transition between War and Peace. Until that election was over the composition of the Government which would represent the British people at Paris was in theory uncertain. In spite of other obvious difficulties the nucleus of a Conference organization was, however, established by the middle of December. Had there been any one with power to act, much preliminary Inter-Allied negotiations could have then begun. So centralized were, however, the three principal governments in the hands of their three heads that nothing could be decided till these three met, and, owing largely to political exigencies, the British Premier

was unable to meet his colleagues until the 12th of January. Over two months therefore elapsed between the Armistice and the Conference.

10. *Advantages and Disadvantages of Delay.* This interval was not, however, altogether wasted. It enabled informal exchanges of views to take place between President Wilson and the French, British, and Italian Governments, and it gave an opportunity to the staffs of experts to hasten the conclusion of labours which Peace had found painfully in arrears. In both France and England some co-ordination began between government departments which had hitherto worked without consultation. The researches and preparations of subordinate departments could also be reviewed by those persons in close relations to the heads of the States, and thus brought into some sort of harmony with the ideas of those who were to be Plenipotentiaries. Some attempt could be made to reduce the mass of information which had been gathered together into a form suitable for the necessities of democratic statesmen. Smaller nations, also, whose countries up till the time of Peace had been under the sway of the enemy, had time to constitute Governments and to appoint representatives who should stand for something more than a political clique. For Poland, for Czecho-Slovakia, for the new Yugo-Slav State, and for Rumania the interval was of great importance, and it might well be claimed that the Conference as a whole gained rather than lost by this enforced delay, however dearly Europe had to pay for every month that extended the interval before a firm and lasting peace could be signed.

11. *Character of the Delegations.* Meanwhile there gradually assembled at Paris the host of Delegates and Officials who were to constitute the Conference. The characteristic that struck most observers was their number.¹ Castlereagh took with him to Vienna a staff of 14. The British Delegation at Paris numbered nearly 200, with as many clerks and typists. The Americans had almost as many. The French could, of course, rely on their government departments. The Italians were little less numerous. Smaller countries had as many as 50 or 60

¹ The total number of delegates (excluding Plenipotentiaries) given in the French official *Composition et Fonctionnement*, dated 1st April 1919, which is far from complete, amounted to 1,037. There were also 70 Plenipotentiaries, or 104 with substitutes. Many 'experts', etc., from the various countries also visited Paris to bring information or to advise on some special subject.

Delegates. The British occupied five hotels, other countries were housed in proportion, and once the fashion had been set, every nation had to fly its flag from a similar institution. The Delegations included a great variety of men, professional and amateur. Of professional Diplomats there were singularly few. During the War the Foreign Ministers of all the principal Allied Countries had found their power divided between the heads of the Governments with their special secretariats, the soldiers, and other government departments. This development was fully reflected in the Delegations, and, though the Foreign Offices and professional diplomats of the principal countries were naturally much in evidence, they were subordinate to a number of other influences which had attained to power during the War. This was an important fact in shaping the whole character of the Conference, for it meant that form and precedent would play an insignificant part. Soldiers were present in great force. During the War they had been the principal advisers of the statesmen in the great Inter-Allied Conferences at Versailles and elsewhere, at which the main lines of policy were decided. Insensibly they had claimed a greater and greater share in deciding not only strategy but policy. Though at Versailles there was a Supreme War Council in permanent session, the principal Allied Powers were also represented at Paris by some of their greatest soldiers, each with a powerful and efficient staff trained and tested by war. In the British and French Delegations these influences were especially strong.

12. *The 'Experts'*. There were present also a large number of 'experts' on territorial and economic questions. Many of these were 'experts' only in name. They had made themselves familiar during the War with the subjects on which they acted as advisers. This was especially the case with the American and British Delegations, and much of the knowledge which they paraded was necessarily somewhat superficial.¹ At the same time many of them were men who had experience of great affairs during the War, and in all there was a breadth of outlook as well as an absence of that pedantry which can often be observed in specialists. The British and American Delegations were both especially strong in financial and economic

¹ For example, at the opening of the Conference, none of the British experts on one country had ever been in that country.

questions.¹ The French were more fully informed on territorial points; the Italians confined themselves more rigorously to points in which they were specially interested. The 'experts' of the smaller nations were simply advocates of national claims, though some of them were men of high distinction.

13. *The Plenipotentiaries.* Controlling the policies of each Delegation were the Plenipotentiaries² of which each of the great Powers had five, while the smaller Powers had anything between one and three. In most cases the head of the State was present, and acted as chief Plenipotentiary. M. Clemenceau was by nature and experience not likely to share his power with any one, and neither the Foreign Minister, M. Pichon, nor the brilliant M. Tardieu ever challenged the supremacy of their chief. President Wilson by virtue of his office stood above all other American Plenipotentiaries, and the others were only his advisers, though in his absences their powers were considerable, Mr. Lansing and Colonel House acting as his principal seconds. Similarly the British Prime Minister assumed absolute control of British policy, Mr. Balfour acting for him in his absence, but remaining completely subordinate during the greater part of the time. The British Dominions were each represented by its Premier, who played a double rôle, for he had also a position in the British Empire Delegation, which met frequently to discuss the broad lines of policy. India was in a similar position. She was represented by her Parliamentary spokesmen, the Secretary of State and Lord Sinha, with the co-operation of the Maharaja of Bikanir. Italian policy perhaps owed more in some respects to the experience of Signor Sonnino than to the direction of the Prime Minister himself, but Signor Orlando was by the course of events forced into a position akin to his colleagues. The Japanese Delegation, which acted throughout with great self-restraint, was led by the Marquis Saionji and Baron Makino.

Among the Smaller Powers the interests of Belgium were entrusted to M. Hymans, the Foreign Minister, though his chief M. Delacroix and King Albert himself visited Paris on occasion. He was distinguished by the courage and eloquence with which he defended the rights of the Smaller Powers. Poland, whose

¹ e.g. other delegations attached much importance to the views of Professor Shotwell and D. H. Miller of U.S.A. Delegation.

² For a full list see Vol. III, Appendix III, and Vol. I, App. VI.

policy was at first in the hands of the leader of the National Democrats, M. Dmowski, was later under the control of the Prime Minister, M. Paderewski, himself, who was undoubtedly more representative of the New Poland. The Yugo-Slavs had a very strong panel, which included besides M. Pashitch the Serbian ex-Premier, Dr. Trumbitch, Dr. Smodlaka, and Dr. Zholger, representing both Croats and Slovenes as well as Serbs. Rumania was also under the control of its Premier, M. Bratianu, amongst whose colleagues M. Misu stood out especially. Czecho-Slovakia was also represented by its Premier, M. Kramař, and its young Foreign Minister, M. Beneř, while Greece possessed the most distinguished of all the statesmen of the Smaller Powers in M. Venizelos, who had also with him his Foreign Minister, M. Politis. The new kingdom of the Hedjaz was fittingly represented by the dignified and skilful Emir Feisul. Other nations played a subordinate part. But it must be remembered that besides those officially recognized as States and entitled to take part in the Conference with Plenipotentiaries, there were numerous other claimants represented who laid their views before the Conference as opportunity afforded. Of these none was more ably led than the Zionist Jews by Dr. Weizmann and M. Sokoloff. The claims of the Armenians were in the experienced hands of Boghos Nubar Pasha. The Esthonians, the Lithuanians, the Letts put forward the claims of the Baltic Provinces to independence, and there were also present the Ruthenians, the Georgians, and many other subject nationalities of the former Russian Empire. The Syrians and Lebanese were also represented. Even the claims of the Egyptians, Irish, Aaland Islanders, Schleswigers were asserted and the representatives of the last two were officially recognized.¹ The question of the position of Russia was to occupy much of the attention of the Great Powers, but though during the whole period of the Conference a Committee of Russian statesmen representing practically all anti-Bolshevik elements was functioning in Paris, none of their number were allowed to present a case officially to the Conference until after the Treaty with Germany was signed.

¹ Even so distant a 'nationality' as the Koreans of Siberia attempted to obtain representation. These were represented by two delegates, who started on the 5th February but, as their mode of travelling was chiefly on foot, they only reached Archangel in July, and Paris in December. They accordingly decided to wait for the League of Nations as the Conference had practically ended.

PART II: SECTION I

FIRST STAGE. THE 'COUNCIL OF TEN'

1. *A French Memorandum the Basis of Discussion.* The Conference of Paris began on Sunday, the 12th January 1919, with an informal meeting of the Heads of the four Great Powers and their Foreign Ministers. It purported to be merely a 'conversation' between these statesmen. It was in reality a continuation of the Supreme War Council, which had been formed during the War, and in fact when its military advisers were present it assumed that name from the first, while its methods of organization and its Secretariat were simply a continuation of those employed by that body. To this Council (to which Japanese representatives were added on the 13th January) was submitted a French Memorandum, attributed by the press to M. Berthelot, which presented a comprehensive scheme for the procedure of the Conference. From the discussions on this document grew the first organization of the Conference which persisted till the middle of March. The document in its first form was typically French, being precise and comprehensive, and based upon principle. The final decisions, however, were the result of a very frank exchange of views. Though considerable agreement was obtained, there was much compromise, so that a scheme was eventually agreed to which left many difficult points to be decided later, and was consequently illogical and incomplete.

2. *What Powers to be represented and number of Plenipotentiaries.* The first question was to decide what Powers were to be represented at the Conference, and what number of Plenipotentiaries were to be allowed to each. It was finally determined to admit all those who had declared war on, or had broken off relations with Germany, though the neutrals were to be allowed to take part in discussions which affected their special interests. Some difficulty was caused in regulating the exact status of Serbia and Montenegro, but the question of recognizing the new State of Yugo-Slavia was shelved.¹ The Hedjaz was also forgotten for a moment.

More difficult was it to assign the number of Plenipotentiaries

¹ It was finally recognized on the 2nd June by France and Great Britain; the United States had already accorded recognition in January.

to each State. The usual diplomatic rule was adopted that all decisions must be unanimous, and, as the decisions of the Conference would not depend upon votes, the exact allotment was less important than it might have otherwise been. But as the number allotted affected the status of the Powers, the question of sentiment came in, and the decision was therefore a delicate one, and necessitated much discussion. The five Great Powers were given five Plenipotentiaries each; Serbia and Belgium, and—to the general surprise—Brazil, three each; China, Greece, Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Siam, and Czecho-Slovakia, two each; and the other South American Republics, one each. Most striking of all was the fact that the British Dominions and India were given separate representation—a fact of great importance in the history of the British Empire, and one which not unnaturally roused considerable feeling outside it. All Powers were permitted to use the panel system in the selection of their Plenipotentiaries. The exclusions were not less notable: neither Russia nor her subject races (except Poland) found a place. The neutrals were not given representation on the same footing as the Allied States, but were to be summoned when required.

The position of the enemy States had at this time not even been considered. The Conference was, and was officially termed, a Preliminary Peace Conference, by which it was implied that it was for the purpose of producing agreement among the Allied Powers. The exact form of negotiation with the enemy could be considered later when it was seen how these discussions worked out. Yet it was apparent from the outset that, if the Allied Powers were agreed, their enemies, now rendered completely defenceless, would be given little opportunity to initiate discussions which might divide their opponents.

3. *Form of the Conference.* More important than this question, which was fairly easily settled, was that of the exact form of the Conference, and in particular of the relations between the Great Powers and their smaller Allies. It was the same question as had been raised at the opening of the Congress of Vienna, and it was solved, in substance though not in form, in the same way. The full Conference was to consist of the Plenipotentiaries of all the Powers, Great and Small.¹ But

¹ The term 'Great Powers' first appears in official discussions at the Congress of Vienna. Consult Vol. III, Appendix IV, for organization of Conference.

from the first the Great Powers decided to keep the decisions of the main questions in their own hands,¹ and not to submit them to the General Conference until they had first settled them amongst themselves. For this purpose they kept as the main organ of the Conference the 'Council of Ten', which, as has been stated, was simply an extension of the Supreme War Council. M. Clemenceau was President of this body, and he was also formally elected President of the General Conference at its first sitting. To the 'Council of Ten', which in theory was simply to conduct 'conversations', was given the right to decide what questions should be referred to the larger Conference. It could reserve for itself all questions which it thought needed preliminary treatment. The rights of the five Great Powers were also safeguarded by a rule that they should be represented on all Committees or Commissions set up, the Smaller Powers being only represented when questions affecting them were under discussion.

4. *Supremacy of Great Powers recognized in Council of Ten.* This decision, which established the legal right of the Great Powers, was no doubt inevitable. It was a recognition at the outset of the fact that legal power must correspond to actual power, and the concession of a seat in the larger Conference to the Small Powers, and the promise that their voices should be heard when their interests were affected, satisfied them for the moment, though some grumbling was heard. As events turned out, the Great Powers kept matters in their own hands to a much greater extent than was at that time anticipated, and the bulk of the Treaty was made by them alone, and only presented to their smaller allies when the time for signature came. The first meeting of the Plenary Conference was held on the 18th January, but its business was almost entirely formal. At the second various Commissions were appointed, but these also were merely a formal ratification of the decision of the Great Powers. An attempt of the Small Powers to assert their rights was nipped in the bud at the second meeting.² The natural result was that the Plenary Conference played only a formal part in the organization. It held only six meetings before the Treaty with Germany

¹ They soon called themselves The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and by this term maintained their privileged position in the actual Treaty.

² M. Clemenceau alluded quite frankly to the fact that the Great Powers, whose authority was supported by 12,000,000 soldiers, must control the Conference.

was signed, and the only one of real interest and effect was that in which the Covenant was debated. The Small Powers henceforth had to be content to state their case before the tribunal of the Great Powers, except that they had a partial representation on some of the Commissions set up, as will be seen below.

The 'Council of Ten'¹ then, as it was informally called, consisting of the Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers of America, Great Britain, France, and Italy, together with two representatives of Japan, formed the real Conference of Paris until the middle of March, when the 'Council of Four' was substituted for it. From the first it acted as a Cabinet and not as a Legislature. It was secret, informal, and adaptable. Its model was the Supreme War Council, which in its turn had been modelled on the British War Cabinet. Its Secretariat was also the Secretariat of the whole Conference, and this body, which played a very important part, must be described at more length.

5. *The Secretariat of the Peace Conference.* The Secretariat of the Peace Conference expressed the methods and ideals of the statesmen who had brought the War to a victorious conclusion. The co-ordination of Allied effort in war is notoriously the most difficult task which any statesmen can undertake. National jealousies and misunderstandings must occur, while differences of language add to the difficulties of space and time. These defects, so fatal to many coalitions, had been felt by the Allies during the War, and were one cause of its long duration. One cause of ultimate success was the establishment of the Inter-Allied Council, which had frequent meetings, and of a Secretariat which could see that the decisions of the leaders were translated into action. To both Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau, men like Sir Maurice Hankey were necessities without which much of their imagination and energy would have been idly expended. There was thus gradually built up a system of recording meetings and decisions, and of circulating information and memoranda which enabled the statesmen to handle, with some sort of efficiency, the thousand complicated problems that pressed for decision in the course of a world war.

This system was the model on which the Secretariat of the Conference was built. M. Dutasta was Principal Secretary-General, but Sir Maurice Hankey played a rôle that in many

¹ Its exact title was for long a matter of dispute, and the phrase the 'Big Ten' was in current use.

respects was even more important, especially after he became unofficial secretary to the 'Four'. The other three Secretary-Generals, Mr. Grew, Count Aldrovandi, and M. Saburi, were mainly content to follow the lead of their colleagues. The principal duty of the Secretariat was to record discussions and decisions of the informal 'Conversations' in M. Pichon's rooms, which were the real deciding factor in the Conference during the first period. Through them also were submitted the documents and memoranda which one country wished to circulate to its Allies. They controlled, at the orders of their chiefs, the agenda of the meetings, and this important task, which needed much delicacy, was one on which many results depended. Too much stress cannot be laid on the system of reports or abstracts of the 'Conversations' which recorded and circulated discussions as well as decisions. These were made by a very efficient staff of Assistant Secretaries largely drawn from the Versailles War Council, and were at one period given a large circulation amongst the principal Allied Delegations. They enabled the large number of technical delegates to follow the ideas of the Supreme Chiefs, and on occasion to correct their misconceptions, and to offer advice on problems before the Conference. Unfortunately, the system also tended to delay and to irrelevant discussion. The 'Conversations' tended to become too much a debating assembly. When the 'Council of Four' was instituted later, the system of recording the conversations was abandoned. But it was soon found to be a necessity for the transaction of business, and was quickly re-instated, in a modified form.

To the meetings of the 'Council of Ten' were also summoned the technical delegates of the Great Powers. For each subject on the agenda, whether financial, economic, territorial, or military, experts attended who had got up the case before the meeting, and who could give information and advice to the Plenipotentiaries. These technical delegates were for the most part silent; their views were only given to the meeting through the mouths of the Plenipotentiaries. But on many occasions it was found necessary for them to intervene in the debate, and by permission they could state their case themselves. The selection of these delegates by the Secretaries-General put considerable power into their hands. The duty was sometimes not an enviable one, since the Plenipotentiaries would often raise a subject for discussion at very short notice, for which

maps and other information had to be obtained under great pressure of time.

6. *Programme of the Conference.* Once the form of the Conference was agreed upon, the most important problem was to determine the questions to be considered, and the order in which they were to be taken. At the outset the mind of none of the principal statesmen was clear on this point. They were obviously feeling their way. The French scheme, which had submitted a tabulated list of eighteen groups of subjects on which decision was necessary, was at once brushed aside. President Wilson had a smaller list and the first place on it was occupied by the question of the League of Nations. Mr. Lloyd George wished to include as one of the urgent subjects the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War, and the punishment of those guilty of offences against the Law of Nations. In the minds of others it was imperative to dispose first of those questions the settlement of which would allow demobilization to take place. There was also the question of providing immediate employment for both the Plenary Conference and for the large body of experts of the different Powers. The obvious mode of procedure was to appoint a number of technical committees to report on the various subjects of the details of which the statesmen must be to a large extent ignorant. But it was soon apparent in the discussion that many subjects which affected the vital interests of the Great Powers could only be approached gradually, and could not be handed over to subordinates without some terms of reference being given, for which preliminary discussions amongst the principal statesmen themselves were needed. Moreover, the formation of a large number of committees would make it impossible for the statesmen to control their discussions, and difficult for the Smaller Powers to supply a sufficient number of delegates. In these circumstances it was suggested that the Smaller Powers be asked to submit their case in writing, especially on territorial questions, for the consideration of the Great Powers. In the end this difficult subject, like so many others, was solved by a compromise which allowed matters to wait on events. Only a few committees were immediately set up, and these were appointed in the Plenary Session of the Conference. They included the important League of Nations Commission; others were shortly added on the Responsibility for the War, on Reparation, and on the International Régime for Ports, Water-

ways, and Railways. On these Commissions, as they were universally called, the Great Powers were allowed two-thirds of the representation, and each appointed two or three delegates. The Small Powers had to be content with five or six delegates between them, the appointment of whom sometimes caused some trouble. At this stage many were under the impression that the Plenary Conference of all the Powers would consider the reports of these Commissions, but it will be seen they were eventually dealt with in quite a different way.¹ Meanwhile, the Smaller Powers were asked to draw up their claims in writing on the territorial questions, but no decision was made as to how these were to be discussed. They were also soon called upon to state their claims orally before the Council of Ten, which resulted, as will be seen later, in the institution of further Commissions.²

7. *The Question of an Official Language.* A further preliminary question which caused some difficulty was that of the language to be used as the official tongue of the Conference. French, since it had replaced Latin in the seventeenth century, had always been the recognized language for all Conferences, and it had been used in the Hague Conferences at which extra-European Powers had been present. In the Supreme War Council French and English held equal place, French being the official language at meetings held in France, English at the less frequent ones held in England. The French claimed that, though all the documents might be drawn up in French and English for the Conference of Paris, and conversations proceed in either tongue, yet that the French text of the Treaty should be treated as the final authoritative one in case of dispute. The Anglo-Saxon Powers refused to allow this, pointing out that English was the official tongue not only of the British Empire and the United States, but also of the Pacific Powers. They claimed, therefore, full equality for the English text of documents, and it was pointed out that this was an essential consideration in a Treaty which had to be ratified by the American Senate. The Italians were prepared to acquiesce in French as the official language, but if English were given equal claims, they asserted

¹ See Vol. I, Appendix VI. With the exception of the League of Nations Commission and the Military, Naval, and Air Committees, the most important were dealt with by the 'Council of Four' themselves, a few only being handled by the 'Council of Ten'.

² See Vol. I, Appendix VI. These were the five Territorial Commissions on which only the Great Powers were represented.

the right of Italian also to rank equally. No agreement could be formally reached at this time. In the discussions at both the 'Conversations', the Plenary Conference, and the Commissions, both French and English were freely used, interpreters being supplied. It is stated in the Treaty with Germany 'that French and English texts are both authentic', and owing to circumstances no Italian version was prepared. The Anglo-Saxon Powers may be said, therefore, to have gained their point. But it should be noted that Italian texts were prepared of the Austrian and Bulgarian treaties, and in these Treaties the French text is superior to all others.¹ The Germans, of course, used their own tongue when the time came to negotiate, but there was no German text of the Treaty. On the whole great prestige was gained for the English tongue, one of the smaller causes of which, perhaps, was that while M. Clemenceau had an excellent knowledge of English, neither President Wilson nor Mr. Lloyd George could express themselves in French.

8. *Publicity of Proceedings.* Most difficult of all these early decisions, perhaps, was that of the question of publicity of the proceedings. An army of pressmen had come to Paris, and the attention of the whole world was concentrated on the Conference. Its decisions affected every nation, and the news of its proceedings was eagerly awaited at every quarter of the globe. Further, it was asserted that by the acceptance of President Wilson's first point, 'Open Covenants openly arrived at', the Allied Powers had committed themselves on this question, and it was claimed that only by giving publicity to the proceedings of the Conference could a settlement be arrived at which would satisfy the expectations of the peoples. The removal of the press censorship had already taken place—in theory at least—in England and America, though it was maintained in France, and the press representatives at Paris were not unnaturally anxious to have access to information which should provide them with news with which to satisfy their employers. Such claims naturally weighed with statesmen who depended

¹ Extract from passage following Art. 381 in the Austrian Treaty: 'The present Treaty, in French, in English, and in Italian shall be ratified. In case of divergence the French text shall prevail except in Parts I (Covenant of the League of Nations) and XIII (Labour), where the English and French versions shall be of equal force.' (v. p. 114 in Blue Book CMD. 400. 1919.)

for their position on public opinion. But from the first, there was no intention of allowing the press access to the really intimate discussions of the 'Council of Ten'. It was pointed out that the Council was a Cabinet, and not a Parliament of Nations, and that even among the most democratic peoples such discussions had always been held in secret. It was claimed that the final decisions must come about by a general agreement among many Powers with diverse interests, and that to discuss differences in the press would be to inflame public opinion, and thus to render impossible those compromises which are the only solution of deadlocks.¹ Such was the defence published on the 17th January when it was announced that while the press would be admitted to the big Plenary Sessions,² the informal sittings would be held in secret, and that only official *communiqués* concerning them would be issued. It must be confessed that these last were of the baldest description, but special departments were also organized by each Delegation, which transmitted to the press such information as their Plenipotentiaries allowed them to communicate. It was soon found, however, that many of the most intimate discussions of the 'Council of Ten' could not be kept secret. Accounts containing the *ipsissima verba* of the Plenipotentiaries appeared in more than one newspaper, and though attempts were made to check the leakage, they were practically without avail. The large number of people admitted to the conversations in one capacity or another, and the extended circulation given to the papers of the Council, made it certain that news of important discussions would leak out. Further, when the Territorial Commissions were appointed, the progress of their discussions was very accurately reported in the press, and was known immediately to the Small Powers concerned. By this means the public were kept aware of much of the most secret things in the Conference, but of course they could not know how much was really authentic, and the Plenipotentiaries were not committed to statements which thus appeared, as they would have been to more official ones. The tempers of the chief statesmen were none the less

¹ It must be confessed that one or two official statements to the press, which revealed differences between the Allies, tended greatly to increase the difficulties of successful settlement of the points in dispute. To this extent, therefore, the official defence seems justified.

² From the sixth sitting, at which the German Treaty was presented, the press were, however, excluded.

severely tried at this stage, but later on, after the 'Council of Four' was instituted, secrecy was much more successfully maintained.¹ This fact undoubtedly caused some of the attacks on the Conference procedure which began at a later date.

9. *Plenary Sessions.* The First of the 18th January accepted these arrangements with few protests. The Second, on the 25th, appointed the Commissions on the League of Nations, on Reparations, etc., not without some further protests, in which Belgium and Canada joined. The Delegates of the Smaller Nations on these Commissions were elected by the Smaller Nations at a special sitting.² After this second meeting the Plenary Conference practically ceased to function, except for purely formal purposes, the only serious discussion being that on the Covenant of the League of Nations.³

10. *The Time of the 'Council of Ten' taken up by Executive Matters.* The 'Council of Ten' meanwhile found that it was greatly occupied with executive matters. The Armistice with Germany had to be renewed, the questions of Russia and Poland were urgent, and numerous other matters of first-rate importance were constantly arising. It cannot be too strongly stressed that during all the time the Conference sat, it acted as the executive Government of a Europe and Asia torn by war, threatened by revolution, and almost deprived of the necessities of life. Though one very successful piece of machinery was set up in the case of the Supreme Economic Council, political and military problems were constantly arising which could only be settled by the action of the Heads of the States themselves. This fact was one of the great causes of delay in the work of the Conference, and, if the principal statesmen admittedly showed an inability or reluctance to allow their subordinates to deal with these matters, we must remember their peculiar situation, surrounded as they were by the leaders of all the European States who were continually demanding counsel, aid, and protection.

11. *Slow Progress.* In such circumstances only slow progress could be made. At the end of January and the beginning of February the 'Council of Ten' discussed the future of the German Colonies, and definite progress was marked by the adoption of

¹ Yet the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of 21st June 1919 contained an account of a session of the Council of Four, which was striking in its verisimilitude.

² On one occasion, when the South American States combined to secure a majority of seats allotted to the Smaller Powers, the Great Powers intervened and nominated those whom they considered most suitable.

³ For List of Plenary Sessions v. Vol. I, Appendix VI.

the 'Mandate' principle, one of the great decisions of the Conference which was intimately connected with the establishment of the League of Nations. It should be noted that the representatives of the Dominions, as well as of Portugal, Belgium and China, were admitted to plead their claims before the Council. The actual allocation of the German colonies was not, however, at this time decided. Further Commissions were also set up on Economic questions, Financial questions and International Labour Legislation, but none of the Commissions, whose terms of reference were of the vaguest, made much progress, except that on the League of Nations, under President Wilson himself, and the very efficient one on Labour.

12. *Small Nations appear before the 'Council of Ten'.* In February a further step was taken, which led to further developments. Just as the Small Powers who had claims on the Colonies had been admitted to plead their claims before the 'Council of Ten', so the other small nations were now received, in order to lay their claims before the Great Powers.¹ It must be admitted that these statements, though interesting, were in one sense a waste of time. The Small States had already been asked to draw up their claims in writing, and these statements were merely a repetition of arguments which could be more easily studied in print. The examination by the statesmen of the Great Powers was perfunctory, and without point, as the claims admitted were immediately referred to Commissions of the Great Powers for report. At the same time the dignity of the Small Powers was flattered, and a vent, as it were, provided for their energies. But the procedure was not a considered one, and is a good example of how the Conference was allowed to drift into a course of action which dissipated its energies and aggravated the slowness of proceedings. The really effective result was the appointment of the Territorial Commissions of the Great Powers to report on these territorial questions. These were five in number: Czecho-Slovak and Polish affairs each having a separate Commission, while Rumanian and Yugo-Slav, Greek and Albanian; Belgian and Danish, were referred to three others.

¹ The dates were as follows: The Rumanians, Feb. 1; the Greeks, Feb. 3, 4; the Czecho-Slovaks, Feb. 5; the Hedjaz, Feb. 6; the Belgians, Feb. 11; the Syrians, Feb. 13; the Druses, Feb. 15; the Serbs and Croats and Slovenes, Jan. 31, Feb. 18; the Danes, Feb. 21; the Albanians, Feb. 24; the Armenians, Feb. 26; the Zionists, Feb. 27; the Montenegrins, March 5.

13. *Weaknesses in Organization of the Territorial Commissions.*

These Commissions were to do very important work, but it should be noted at the outset that there were grave defects in the manner in which they were set up, which seriously affected the quality of their output. In the first place they were not appointed as part of a considered scheme for dealing with the whole of the territorial questions before the Conference. They were constructed *ad hoc* to deal with the territorial claims presented to the Conference by some of the smaller Nations. Some unfortunate anomalies thus appeared at the outset. The Greek Commission, for example, was primarily appointed to consider Greek claims in Europe, but it dealt also with Greek claims in Asia Minor—a subject very different in its character. More serious was the fact that the Plenipotentiaries reserved to themselves the treatment of all subjects in which the Great Powers themselves were vitally interested. Not only French claims on the Left Bank of the Rhine, but also Italy's claims on the Tyrol and the Dalmatian Coast, and the whole of the settlement of the Middle East as well as Constantinople, were withdrawn from the competence of the Commissions, and the effect on the discussion of both Yugo-Slav and Greek pretensions was little short of disastrous. The principal statesmen had in fact refused to apply the lesson that had been learnt by some Delegates, that the whole settlement was one, and that each decision depended in a sense on all the rest. Some attempt was made to remedy this defect by appointing on the 27th February a 'Central Commission on Territorial Questions',¹ to co-ordinate the work of the other Commissions and to discuss points not referred to them. This Commission was a strong one, but it had no power over the reserved questions above referred to, and it did little or nothing to see that the whole settlement was a just one. Some co-ordination was, however, obtained by the fact that the Powers were represented by the same Delegate on more than one Commission, and that the Commissions occasionally sat in joint session.

14. *Personnel of the Commissions.* The personnel of these important Commissions deserves some special mention. The French were able to rely on their Plenipotentiaries to supply their senior member, and M. Tardieu and M. Jules Cambon

¹ Its members were M. Tardieu, Sir Eyre Crowe, Dr. S. E. Mezes, the Marquis Salvago Raggi, and M. Otchiai. For further details *v.* Vol. III, App. IV.

between them were able to represent France on all. The Americans appointed academic experts, who had made a prolonged study of the points involved, and showed moreover great practical ability. The British Empire employed either its Colonial Premiers or its Foreign Office officials, especially Sir Eyre Crowe, who played a distinguished part. There were not, however, many of the British officials who possessed special knowledge of the subjects studied, and the result cannot be described as satisfactory. Fortunately, as the work of the Commissions developed the services of other experts of the British Delegation were made available by means of specially appointed sub-committees. By these means some grave defects were corrected, though errors had already been committed which could not be retrieved. The Italian experts had excellent information on regions intimately connected with Italy, but were not so well equipped for detailed discussion on more remote regions. The Japanese, here and elsewhere, played mainly a watching part.

The Protocols of the Commissions were freely circulated amongst the Delegations. By this means the economic and communications sections, as well as the strategic experts, could gather the lines of argument and intervene with advice. The work of the excellent French Geographical Section was supplemented by the admirable maps turned out by the improvised American and British Geographical Sections. For the first time both the Plenipotentiaries and professional diplomatists were able to avail themselves of first-class maps, explained by really competent instructors. In this important work the French and British General Staffs played the principal rôle.

15. *Progress of their Work.* Meanwhile the important Commissions which dealt with Reparation, International Waterways, International Labour, etc., whose work is recorded elsewhere, were gradually organizing sub-committees for detailed questions. Practically no professional diplomatists found a place on these Commissions, but on these also the British made considerable use of the Colonial Premiers as their first representatives, though the bulk consisted of special experts. The Smaller Powers were able to nominate men of high distinction on those Commissions on which they had representation, and, where the interests of the Great Powers allowed it, to contribute greatly to the solution of the problems involved. Gradually, as the

Commissions set up their organization, the whole body of Delegates was drawn into the machine in one capacity or another, and an enormous series of notes, memoranda, and statistical material was circulated from one department to another. At the same time it was gradually becoming apparent that the Conference must function while it was in session as the executive of the world, and the Delegates and Plenipotentiaries were continually interrupted in their consideration of permanent settlement by being forced to consider questions which required immediate action. For some of these immediate problems, special committees were set up, such as that on Teschen, and another to deal with current Polish Affairs, but on the whole these questions were dealt with by the 'Council of Ten' itself, with some assistance from the Council of Military Representatives at Versailles. It was fortunate, indeed, that the Supreme Economic Council under the chairmanship of Lord Robert Cecil gained every day in reputation, and that the vigorous and capable Mr. Hoover was thus able to direct his work of relief in a way which would have been impossible had reference had to be made to higher authority.

One of the principal functions of the 'Council of Ten' during this time was to provide for several renewals of the Armistice with Germany. Out of these discussions arose the important considerations of the Military, Naval, and Air Restrictions to be imposed upon Germany, the decisions on which (as will be seen) affected the Conference profoundly. As is narrated elsewhere, the Military terms grew up out of an attempt to impose more stringent conditions upon Germany. For this purpose Military, Naval, and Air Commissions were set up, after preliminary discussions, in the 'Council of Ten'.¹ Composed of soldiers and sailors, these Commissions, though faced with a formidable task, were ready to report at an earlier date than the other Commissions, except that on the League of Nations. The first draft of this last Commission, which had worked with great energy, was able to be discussed by the Plenary Conference on the 14th February, but the criticisms then expressed necessitated a revision of this draft. President Wilson then returned to America, leaving, as he said, full powers to Mr. Lansing and Colonel House in his absence. Mr. Lloyd George also returned, to cope with the growing labour difficulties in England. In their absence the proposals for dis-

¹ Only the principal Allied and Associated Powers were represented on these Commissions.

arming the Germans came up before the 'Council of Ten'. At the same time a situation arose which necessitated the consideration of the shape of the Treaties themselves.

16. *The Idea of a Preliminary Peace with Germany arises.* Hitherto affairs affecting Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey had all been considered together. But in the eyes at any rate of the French, British, and Americans, it was Germany which had loomed largest, and the menace of the overthrow of all stable government on the East of the Rhine made a speedy peace with her seem all the more important. Meanwhile public opinion was looking for results. No decisions of importance were as yet announced, and though the growth of the scheme of a League of Nations was a supreme accomplishment, yet some thought of it as beginning at the wrong end. In face of the insistent demands of the Western democracies, the need of a settlement which would permit of an almost complete demobilization of the Allied Armies grew more and more urgent. As it was, the demobilization of the American, British, and Dominion forces was proceeding at such a pace that French statesmen and soldiers grew anxious, lest sufficient superiority over the enemy should not remain to make all idea of a refusal of the Allied Peace Terms out of the question.

Towards the end of February there thus grew up the idea of a Preliminary Peace with Germany, which should settle the main items in dispute with her, and in particular impose on her almost complete disarmament. But to the Americans the idea of more than one Treaty with Germany gave the greatest uneasiness. There was also the question of the place of the Covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty. Its advocates could never consent to its being relegated to a subsequent Treaty and it was soon to be seen that its completion was a necessary condition of the completion of all the rest. These arguments were anxiously debated by the Allied statesmen at the end of February and the beginning of March. The idea of presenting only the Military Terms to Germany, whether as an Armistice or as a Preliminary Peace, was soon seen to be impossible. It was determined therefore to include in this German Treaty at least the principal demands to be made on her, especially her territorial cessions. These decisions were taken in the absence of the three principal statesmen, M. Clemenceau being wounded by an assassin on the 19th. February, Mr. Lloyd George

being absent till the 5th March, and President Wilson till the 14th March. But orders were sent out on the 23rd February by the ministers acting in their absence to all the Commissions to report by the 8th March. On the return of the principal Plenipotentiaries the discussion was renewed, and a decision was gradually reached. Those mainly interested in a settlement with Austria and Hungary were naturally somewhat alarmed at a turn of events which postponed the satisfaction of their own claims. But the necessity of a speedy settlement with Germany was apparent to all. The German Treaty was therefore from this moment given precedence. But in spite of many protests in the press, another decision of cardinal importance was also made. The Treaty with Germany was also to include the Covenant of the League of Nations. The importance of the decision cannot be over-estimated. It ensured the acceptance of the Covenant by the Paris Conference, and by making it an integral part of the Treaty it allowed many compromises to be made in the Treaty itself, which were based on the acceptance by the world of the idea of a powerful and practical League of Nations.

17. *Slow Progress of the Conference increases necessity for New Organization.* It was hoped that, by concentrating on Germany, the conclusion of one Treaty at least had been drawn nearer, but much remained to be done. The reports of the Commissions were now being received, but they had yet to be considered by the principal statesmen, and as their subordinates had worked without supervision or direction of their chiefs, it was quite uncertain if their recommendations could be accepted. Thus the only parts of the Treaty which were ready for signature were the Military, Naval, and Air Terms, which were finally passed by the 'Council of Ten' on the 17th March. What might happen to the reports of others was seen when that of the Polish Commission was submitted to the 'Council of Ten' on the 20th March. Though unanimous, some of its main conclusions were rejected, and it was referred back for amendment. The publicity which this drastic action obtained in the press did not contribute to the harmony of the Conference. When it is remembered that none of the important territorial questions had yet been decided; that the whole financial and economic settlement was yet in the hands of the Commissions, and that it had already been whispered that Italy's vital interests in Fiume and elsewhere must

be settled before she would sign a treaty with Germany, it can be imagined that the case for those who wished a radical change to be made in the procedure of the Conference was a strong one.

18. *Results in the Establishment of the 'Council of Four'.* This movement, which had been strongest amongst the nearest advisers of the British Prime Minister, gathered force in the middle of March. It was felt that the 'Council of Ten' was too large a body to deal quickly and effectively with all the important problems pressing for settlement. Moreover, it had been found impossible to keep secret its decisions. The full details of the Military, Naval, and Air Terms had appeared in the press, and other matters even more delicate. The time was now approaching when formal decisions must be reached on questions on which it was known the principal statesmen were not yet in agreement. Secrecy was considered an essential condition for the construction of those compromises by which alone amity could be preserved. The presence of the British Prime Minister in Paris was considered so urgent that on the 17th March his three colleagues addressed to him an open letter expressing this view, and he was doubtless able to make his own terms as to the conditions of his stay. It was thus gradually decided to substitute a Council of the Heads of the four European Great Powers for the larger 'Council of Ten', and the report of the Polish Commission was the last subject discussed officially by that body. Before this matter was settled, the informal meetings of the 'Four' had commenced, and as the new idea gathered strength the old organization was completely dropped. On the 25th March it was announced in the press that informal discussions of the chief delegates would be substituted for the previous procedure. The growing impatience of public opinion at what was considered the unjustifiable delay in the completion of the Treaty undoubtedly contributed to this result. Both the British and French legislatures were showing signs of great restiveness. On the 24th March a petition was signed by 100 members of the British Parliament, asking for an opportunity to discuss Germany's capacity to pay, and on the 25th M. Franklin-Bouillon made a violent attack on M. Clemenceau in the Chamber of Deputies. Speedy and secret decisions appeared to the principal Plenipotentiaries to be essential to the maintenance of their position.

PART II : SECTION II

SECOND STAGE. THE 'COUNCIL OF FOUR'. THE 'COUNCIL OF FIVE'. THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ENEMY.

1. *First Meeting of the 'Council of Four'.* It was under such circumstances that there began the meetings of what was soon called the 'Council of Four'. M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, President Wilson, and Signor Orlando from the comparative comfort of the arm-chairs at the Hôtel Bischoffen, Mr. Lloyd George's flat, or M. Clemenceau's office, discussed the big problems of the settlement. An official interpreter was at first the only outsider admitted, as a concession to Signor Orlando's ignorance of English. The Secretariat was relegated to an ante-room, and the technical experts as a rule merely entered the room for a moment to elucidate a point or to give the required information. Even now, however, the 'Council of Four' could not devote its whole attention to the permanent settlement. On the 21st March a Bolshevik Revolution had broken out in Hungary, and on the 5th April Bavaria adopted a Communist régime. Discussions on the Saar Valley and on Reparations had to be sandwiched in amongst other matters. Further, it was soon apparent that Italy would demand satisfaction not only in the Tyrol, but also in Dalmatia and especially in Fiume, as the price of her signature. In these circumstances it was not surprising that no decisions could be announced, and it was further found that the absence of a Secretary from the room prevented that recording of agreements on paper which is necessary to the transaction of business. At one moment it appeared as if the 'Council of Four', in spite of its informality, would be no better instrument to construct a speedy peace than the 'Council of Ten'.

2. *More formal Procedure adopted.* Fortunately, these disadvantages were found out in time. The informal appointment of Sir Maurice Hankey as Secretary to the Council of Four enabled changes in the procedure to be made, which resulted in much greater efficiency. Minutes, such as had been taken of the 'Council of Ten', were introduced, and though their circulation was severely limited, the decisions arrived at were drafted with sufficient care, and on them the text of the Treaty could be founded. The experts were used more expeditiously and

suitably, and were sometimes present in considerable numbers and during most of the sessions, and their advice was assimilated by the Four. Informal Inter-Allied Committees were formed, such as that on the Saar Valley *régime*, which took their instructions direct from the chief Plenipotentiaries, and worked out the details of their plans.

3. *Advantages and Disadvantages of this Procedure.* Almost all the principal decisions of the Conference, so far as the Treaty with Germany was concerned, were in fact made by the 'Council of Four', which, as was revealed by the subsequent withdrawal of Signor Orlando, was in many respects a 'Council of Three'. Such a procedure had many obvious advantages. It made possible a frank decision between the Chiefs of the three States which between them controlled an overwhelming preponderance of the military, naval, and economic resources of the world. It enabled compromises to be more easily arranged, and ensured almost complete secrecy in discussing the difficult questions on which the British Empire, France, and the United States were not yet in agreement. It was not impossible for three men to master the main principles of the whole settlement, and in any case they had to be responsible for the decisions. By centralizing all discussions in one small private room, they ensured that they should themselves absolutely control the making of the Treaty. The preliminary work of the Delegations might be said to have been done when the Commissions had reported. If more advice was wanted it could be obtained; meanwhile, it was essential that the three men whom the peoples looked to as responsible for the settlement should themselves make it.

All this was true, but the disadvantages of such a procedure were many. It threw greatly increased power into the hands of those who formed the personal staffs of the chief statesmen. Neither the Chiefs nor their immediate following could be fully informed as to the many questions on which decisions were made, yet advice was sought from subordinate officials and irresponsible sources, which would have been of greater value if checked by the machinery already established in Paris. The recommendations of the Commissions were often altered and adjusted without reference to those who had made them, with the result that confusion necessarily followed. Nor was the intensified secrecy established an unmixed blessing. The press, deprived of its sources of information, became more violent as

it became less omniscient, and public opinion, from which the statesmen might perhaps have learnt much, if it had been wisely consulted, was confused and irritated. The Small Powers were also almost entirely excluded from participation in these decisions, in many of which they were vitally concerned. The influence of these great defects is seen in every page of the Treaty itself, and still more in the discussions which followed upon its signature.

Yet it must be remembered that the state of Europe was such that speedy decisions were now of paramount importance. The difficulty of working efficiently the great Inter-Allied machine had been clearly demonstrated in the previous period. No means had been found of controlling the work of the Commissions while it was in progress. The principal statesmen not unnaturally shrank from a procedure which might leave them at the mercy of their own officials. The plan which they followed was in fact a natural result of the temperaments of President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemenceau. Each had been accustomed to work in a loose informal organization, on which their own wills could be clearly stamped. And none can deny that the procedure which they adopted showed them to be endowed with such courage, energy, and power of concentration as few statesmen have possessed.

4. *The Drafting Commission.* In this procedure one Commission played an important part. A Drafting Commission had already rendered great assistance to the other Commissions by turning the substance of their decisions into legal phraseology.¹ Not only were the decisions thus rendered more clear, but the articles of the Treaty were prepared as the work of the Commissions proceeded. No other Commission surpassed this one in energy and powers of work, and its freedom from legal pedantry can be seen in the simple language in which the Treaties are drawn up. It was now able to render the greatest assistance to the 'Council of Four' by clothing often loosely-worded decisions in concise and explicit phrases, which could be inserted directly into the Treaty. In some cases it may be said to have gone further in interpretation than was perhaps intended, but it is difficult to see how the Treaties could have

¹ Its members were: Dr. J. B. Scott (United States of America), Mr. C. J. B. Hurst (British Empire), M. Fromageot (France), Signor Ricci Busatti (Italy), M. H. Nagaoka (Japan).

been drawn up without the assistance of a body at once so assiduous, so expert, and so full of resource and initiative.

5. *The 'Council of Five'*. Meanwhile another machine had been created, which also played an important part. The Foreign Ministers excluded from the 'Council of Four' were formed into another body called the 'Council of Five',¹ for on this body Japan was represented. This body was able to relieve the 'Council of Four' of some of the minor problems which were pressing for settlement, especially those needing immediate action. It maintained the procedure of the old 'Council of Ten', and circulated formal minutes. As the Treaty approached completion it was a convenient route for the insertion of clauses which had been overlooked, while it was able to proceed with the discussion of the Austrian Treaty during the time that the principal statesmen were absorbed in the negotiation with Germany. It was, however, completely subordinate to the 'Council of Four', and for that reason lacked authority and initiative. Nevertheless, it was an important piece of machinery, not the least of its results being that it employed the energies of the Foreign Ministers and of a mass of subordinate officials. On one or two occasions it held joint sittings with the 'Council of Four', so that the old 'Council of Ten' was practically reconstructed, but these meetings were not a success.

6. *More rapid Progress of the Work produces a Crisis*. So rapidly did matters now proceed that on the 14th April an official *communiqué* was issued, to the effect that the Germans were invited to come to Versailles on the 25th April. At the same time the official decision that the Treaty with Germany would be signed first was made known. These announcements precipitated something like a crisis in the Conference. As the time for the final signature approached, all those who were specially interested in obtaining certain forms of settlement redoubled their efforts. Already on the 8th April 370 members of the British Parliament had sent a telegram demanding Mr. Lloyd George's adhesion to his election pledges. Public opinion indeed necessitated the return of the Prime Minister to England on the 14th April to speak in the House (16th). Though the exact terms of the decisions had on the whole been kept secret, sections of both the French and British press had begun to press for a vindictive peace. The French claim to the Left Bank of the Rhine was

¹ Often called amongst the Anglo-Saxon delegates 'The Second Eleven'. *

voiced in many papers, an attack to which Marshal Foch's interview in the *Daily Mail* of the 19th April added some weight, and *The Times* continued its determined onslaught on Mr. Lloyd George.

7. *Italy leaves the Conference.* More serious was, however, the attitude of Italy. No sooner had the Germans, on the 21st, consented to send delegates on a specific date, than the Adriatic question, which had been discussed among the Four since the 14th April, became acute. On the 23rd President Wilson issued his open statement on Fiume, with the result that Signor Orlando left Paris, and the Italian Delegation withdrew from all participation in the Conference. But the Three continued their discussions, and the work of the Conference went on as before. Indeed, the only apparent effect on the German Treaty was the insertion of a clause that ratification by three of the Principal Allied Powers should be sufficient to bring it into force—a decision which in another connexion was to be of great importance at a later date. There were other threatening questions, but one great work was accomplished at this time. On the 28th April, in the Fifth Plenary Session, the Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted by the Allied Powers, and the text announced to the world. Two days later Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and the main body of the German delegates arrived at Versailles.

8. *The German Delegation.* When it was first announced to the German Government that discussion of the principles of the Treaty would not be permitted, they had proposed to dispense with the Plenipotentiaries and staff, and merely send secretaries to receive the document and bring it to the German Government. The Allied refusal to consider this procedure, which was accompanied with the announcement of military preparations in the Army of Occupation, induced them to revert to their original plan, and a full and very competent staff appeared at Versailles. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau was himself a trained diplomatist, and he was accompanied by a body of delegates which adequately represented the technical skill of the German people. The presence of numerous officials of the old *régime*, as well as a number of distinguished academic experts, ensured that the Germans would take full advantage of every opportunity afforded them of expostulation or criticism. The delegates were accompanied, too, by a number of press correspondents,

and it was clear that the Germans hoped that the weapon of publicity could be used by them with advantage. These points had been, however, thoroughly considered by the Allied statesmen. The Germans were treated with the courtesy, but also with the rigour which it is customary to show in transacting business with enemies. They were allowed unrestricted intercourse with their own country, but they were given no opportunity of meeting the Delegations assembled at Paris. Their movements were controlled by military officers, and except for the one or two formal occasions on which they met the Allies, they had no intercourse whatever with their enemies. There was, indeed, much justice in their plea that their work could have been done just as efficiently in their own country as in the carefully guarded hotels at Versailles.

9. *The Presentation of the Treaty to the Small Powers.* On the 7th May the Peace Treaty was handed over to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, who met the assembled Allied Plenipotentiaries with a speech, of which the defiant tone caused much surprise. The delay had, however, been utilized to settle many important points. The Japanese succeeded in establishing their claims to Shantung, and thus avoided the necessity of following the Italian example. The Belgians were less successful in their claims, in spite of a personal visit from King Albert, but acquiesced in the decision of the Four. The other Powers had little time to register protest. The full text of the Treaty was not presented to the Plenary Conference until the day before it was presented to the Germans.¹ Though no formal vote was taken, their assent was obtained, but much indignation was expressed at the almost total exclusion of the Small Powers, including the British Dominions, from the final decisions. They had, it is true, been represented on the Commissions which had drafted the Economic and Financial Clauses, and those dealing with Reparations. But the reports of these Commissions had been altered at will by the 'Council of Four', and their criticisms on these alterations had not been invited. In the circumstances, however, they had no alternative but to acquiesce, but the Session was notable for a protest by the Chinese, and one by

¹ On the same day as the Treaty was handed over to the Germans two important decisions were announced, the distribution of the Mandates of the German Colonies and the important Treaty between France, Great Britain, and the United States, which was intended to give special protection to France.

Marshal Foch. If the Small Powers were given the full Treaty only at the last moment, the public were denied the full text altogether. A comprehensive summary was indeed issued, but the full text was kept secret in the Allied countries. The protests raised in the Allied press were made the sharper by the fact that the Germans not only published the Treaty in their own country and language, but issued an English version.

10. *Procedure of Discussion with the Germans.* Over seven weeks had yet to elapse, however, before the Treaty with Germany was signed. It had been announced by M. Clemenceau at the public handing over of the Treaty that the Germans must make their representations in writing on the details of the clauses, that a period of three weeks would be allowed for the purpose, and that no oral discussions whatever would be permitted. This last decision was dictated possibly as much by the difficulty of organizing such discussions as by the fear that the Allies would fail to show a united front to the enemy. The Italians had returned to the Conference on the 5th May, Signor Orlando resuming his seat at the 'Council of Four' (6th), and whatever differences there had been amongst the Allies they were united in their resolve to impose a peace on Germany. The Germans adapted themselves, under protest, to the procedure laid down, and began to issue a steady stream of notes and memoranda on the different aspects of the Treaty. They could not, of course, be prevented from publishing their notes in Germany, and many of them were also published in Entente countries, with the answers of the Allied Powers, so that something like public discussion took place. Preliminary answers were drafted by the personal staff of the 'Council of Four', after such consultation with the members of the Delegation as the Plenipotentiaries saw fit to make. These were, however, only preliminary. The Germans secured a further interval of seven days in which to make their reply, and Count Brockdorff-Rantzau consulted his Government at Spa on the 23rd May. The final German Counter-proposals, which were not handed over till the 30th May, amounted to 443 pages, dealing in detail with the various parts of the Treaty, the whole being summarized in a covering note which was a passionate plea against the whole responsibility of the War being thrown upon the German people, and an elaborate exposition of the impossibility of carrying out the terms of the Treaty. To deal

with this voluminous document ten Inter-Allied Committees were set up, consisting of the principal experts on the various subjects. Meanwhile a vigorous campaign was prosecuted in portions of the French and English press against any alteration in the original terms. The final decisions were not taken by the Allied statesmen without much deliberation, and their reply was not handed over until the 16th June.

11. *The Final Stages.* The final result of all the discussions was to leave the Treaty substantially intact, though important concessions were made. On the whole the machinery of the Conference worked well in these discussions. Opportunity was given to the body of delegates to exercise their influence upon the answer, and the final decisions were only made by the 'Council of Four' after the observations of their staff had been duly weighed. Mr. Lloyd George entered into the final discussions after several meetings of the British Empire Delegation, which were attended by many of his colleagues from the British Cabinet, as well as by all the Plenipotentiaries of the Dominions, and by his military and naval advisers. A covering letter was drawn up by a Committee composed of M. Tardieu, Mr. Hudson (U.S.A.), Mr. Philip Kerr, Count Vannutelli-Rey, and M. Saburi. It was an open secret that the wording of this vigorous rejoinder was mainly due to the British member of the Committee.

Only a week was allowed to the Germans to accept or refuse the Treaty thus modified. Ominous preparations were made in the Allied Armies on the Rhine, and, though for some time the issue appeared to be in doubt, and involved the resignation of both Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and the German Government, there was really no alternative before the German people. After a vain effort to secure eleventh-hour concessions, the Weimar Assembly authorized the new Government to sign, and on the 28th June the final scene took place at Versailles.

12. *The Significance of the Signature.* The Treaty thus drawn up was signed by all the Powers, Great and Small, with the single exception of the Chinese, whose empty places were a protest against the Shantung settlement. That such a result was possible is in itself a tribute to the capacity and resolution of the principal statesmen. Though the Treaty with Germany comprised only part of the problems which had to be solved, yet it was felt by all that the main task of creating definite peace had been accomplished, and, as a matter of fact, the other instruments

signed on the same day, as well as the discussions with the Austrians, which were already far advanced, denoted that much progress had already been made towards the whole settlement. Many, no doubt, like General Smuts, felt that the Treaty had disappointed the expectations of the peoples. That many of its clauses were either unjust or injudicious is true. But with all its imperfections it yet marked the beginning of a new era. Not only did the Treaty contain the Covenant of the League of Nations, but the text of the Treaty itself bore testimony to the conviction that only through some form of international co-operation could the problems which had confronted the Conference be solved. The most hopeful aspect of the Treaty was the fact that much in it was provisional, and depended on future decisions of the Powers. The recognition that all the problems of the world could not be solved in one place and at one time was surely the most sensible decision that emanated from the Paris Conference.

13. *Discussions with Austria begun.* Meanwhile, the discussions with Germany had not absorbed the whole time of the Conference since the 17th May. On the 14th May the Austrians arrived at St. Germain, Dr. Renner acting as their chief Plenipotentiary. The hopes of those who expected to be able to complete the Austrian Treaty at once were, however, illusory. By adapting the German Treaty to the case of Austria, very rapid progress had been made in the drafting of the Treaty (a method of procedure which still further enhanced the importance of the Drafting Commission); but the Italian Delegation had returned and resumed its functions at the beginning of May, and it was found that the agreement of the Four Powers on the disputed points was hard to obtain. The reports of the Territorial Commissions on the frontiers of Austria had been referred to the 'Council of Five', and had been approved by the date on which the Austrians arrived. But opportunity was taken of re-opening delicate questions, and the 'Council of Four', preoccupied with the German problem, had not the energy to force a settlement. It was thus not till the 2nd June that the Treaty was presented to the Austrian Delegation, and even then the principal military and territorial terms were lacking.

This further delay was due to a revolt of the Small Powers against the dictation of the Great. In the German Treaty only Poland had been directly affected. In the Austrian Treaty

several Small Powers were vitally interested. In these circumstances the claim of the Small Powers to a period of delay for a consideration of the proposed frontiers could not be refused. Unfortunately this delay proved to be of longer duration than had been anticipated. Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson had departed immediately after the signing of the German Treaty, and with their departure the Conference lost both authority and driving power. The new 'Council', a compromise between the 'Council of Ten' and the 'Council of Four', being deprived of the services of Sir Maurice Hankey, proved a far less capable instrument than its predecessors. The necessity of a speedy peace with Austria was not so patent as in the case of Germany. In these circumstances the final presentation of the Treaty made slow progress, and the Austrians had leisure to compile an enormous mass of written notes, memoranda, and protests which added to the embarrassments of the delegates. The final stages and the negotiations with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Turkey will be described in later volumes of this work.¹

14. *The 'New States' Treaties.* The interval between the presentation of the Treaty to the Germans and its final signature produced, however, other important results besides the negotiations with the Austrians. Chief of these was the Treaty drafted for Poland, which protected the cultural and religious rights of the minorities in the New States. This procedure, which had important precedents in the Treaty of Berlin, was no doubt mainly designed to protect the Jews of Eastern Europe. But it also applied to the enemy minorities transferred to the new States, and was an important recognition of the right of the new International Council to act as the protector of the weak. As will be seen in a later volume, the attempt to apply the same procedure to Rumania, Greece, and Yugo-Slavia caused great difficulties at a later stage.

15. *General Considerations.* With the signing of the Treaty with Germany on the 28th June, the Conference concluded its principal work. Henceforward it still had tasks of great importance and difficulty, but it entered on a new phase with the departure of the 'Big Three'. It will be at once realized that

¹ To the general surprise a Turkish 'Delegation' was actually summoned to Paris and stated its views before a revived 'Council of Ten' on the 17th June. The only result was to provoke a caustic rejoinder, and the Delegation left Paris again on the 28th June.

it is as yet impossible to form a complete picture of the Conference, or to pass judgment on its work, for that will be the task of the next generation. The Conference depended on many secret and subterranean influences which cannot as yet be revealed, and much that appears to-day as almost inexplicable will be shown by future historians to depend on causes of which we are almost entirely unaware. Nevertheless, some attempt to sum up its main characteristics in however tentative a fashion is necessary, since it is only by attempting to realize how the statesmen failed to satisfy completely the hopes which were held by the peoples at the outset of the Conference, that any progress can be made towards remedying their shortcomings. If the record of secret conferences, discarded expedients, and unsatisfying compromises appears to read strangely in the light of much that was promised in the years of the war, this comparative failure is due to causes of which some can be discerned, and therefore prevented from producing similar results in the future.

In the first place, it is necessary to remember that this Conference, like all others that preceded it, was limited by events that had occurred during the war, and were perhaps necessary to the winning of it. Like their predecessors at the Congress of Vienna, the principal statesmen were bound by agreements—written and unwritten—which they had made amongst themselves during the course of a long and fluctuating struggle. It was indeed asserted by many that the acceptance of the Fourteen Points abrogated *ipso facto* all the previous secret agreements of the Allies. Such was indeed the position taken up by President Wilson, who had not been a party to them. But this point of view could not be wholly accepted by his Allies, for they would have been then charged with disregarding the sanctity of written engagements, which had formed one of the chief justifications of the war against Germany. The result was a compromise; but the actual existence of the Treaties in itself prevented an open discussion of all the problems at the Conference, and it was one cause why the principal statesmen insisted on reserving for their own personal discussion so many of the disputed points. Another difficulty was the necessity of securing unanimity of decision among the Great Powers, which caused much delay and was fruitful in producing at times most undesirable compromises.¹

¹ It is well known that the most rapid and smooth period of the Con-

Even more important influence was exerted on the course of the discussion by the fact that the Powers had played very different parts in the struggle against the Central Empires. The fact that French soil had been the arena of the conflict, and that so much French blood had been shed to achieve victory, counted enormously in all the discussions at the Conference. If the entry of the United States into the struggle had decided the issue of the War, her sacrifices had been much less than those of the principal European combatants. It was only natural, therefore, that these latter should feel that they ought to have a deciding voice in many questions in which they disagreed with her. Moreover, questions of reparation and security touched them more nearly than they touched a State from the New World, and they could perhaps claim to be more intimately acquainted than their American Ally with most of the problems of the settlement. The psychological effect of considerations like these, which were at times openly stated, cannot be over-estimated.

Had the Fourteen Points been a more precise document, it might have provided in itself a framework for the organization of the Conference. But it asserted only general principles, leaving entirely vague the practical methods by which they were to be carried out. This fact, together with the equally obvious consideration that the Allied Powers had made no concerted preparations for the great task before them, made it certain that the organization of the Conference would be hastily improvised and liable to be constructed to suit the needs of the moment rather than the permanent necessities of the world. The result was that the Allies were forced to have recourse to the one instrument which had been proved in practice to meet their needs, and the Conference organization was therefore an adaptation of the Supreme War Council. The procedure of the Supreme War Council may be traced to that set up by Sir Maurice Hankey for the British War Cabinet. That it was an advance on all previous methods by which great political decisions have been taken, few will deny, and the proof is that the records of the Conference of Paris will show far more of the conference was that during which the Italians were absent from it. This result was due mainly to the fact that Three statesmen were much more likely to agree in decisions than Four. Where unanimity was essential to all decisions the effect of the opposition of one might be virtually to veto all business.

actual work of the Conference than those of any previous assembly. Even in its latest stages there was a far more systematic attempt to formulate the discussions and decisions of the statesmen on matters of immense delicacy and importance than had ever before been made. But, while this machinery was very suitable to the rapid and secret action which is necessary for the conduct of war, it may be questioned if it was so well adapted to devise a settlement based on principles laid down in the Fourteen Points. The attempt to utilize it to cope with the enormous number of problems which confronted the statesmen at Paris by the creation of the Commissions ended in failure. No control was exercised by the Central body over the Commissions while they were engaged in their work, and the experts who sat on them were therefore not expressing the ideas of their chiefs, who often ultimately refused to be bound by their conclusions.¹ The result was that much of the work of the Commissions was wasted, that the compromises of the Council of Four were substituted for their conclusions, and that the latter were often made in haste and without reference to those most able to give an important judgment. This failure of the principal statesmen to make adequate use of the body of expert knowledge assembled at Paris is one of the main causes why parts of the settlement are not only unjust but unworkable.

Against these palpable defects must be set the great work of the Conference in turning the Treaty of Peace into an instrument for creating the League of Nations. While the discussions which followed the Treaty showed the great dangers which lay in this form of procedure, yet it can probably be safely asserted that it was the only way that the League could have been made part of the Peace Settlement. To have produced unanimity on this point amongst the twenty-six States who signed the German Treaty would almost certainly have been impossible, unless the signature had been made the only way to enjoy the benefits of the peace. So many vested interests were challenged by the League, and so many new forces had been liberated in Europe, which were antagonistic to it, that unless the League had been made a part of the peace it might have been postponed for a generation.

Even more important was the fact that the Treaties them-

¹ The principle was at one time enunciated that, if a Commission was unanimous in its report, the Four would not interfere. This was not, however, uniformly adhered to in practice.

selves were made to centre round the idea of the League to so great an extent that without it they become plainly unworkable. It may be asserted with truth that this result was not in the mind of any responsible statesmen when the Conference opened. It was, as is explained elsewhere, the natural result of the discussions at Paris, though it owed much also to the strenuous advocacy of President Wilson. But the recognition thus secured that the problems raised at Paris can only be solved by a form of permanent international organization is perhaps the greatest result of the Conference. Had the Paris organization been more scientific and less easily adapted to the moods of the moment, such a result might have been impossible.

The supremacy of the Great Powers was open and avowed at the Conference, and has been the subject of bitter criticism on the part of the Small Powers and their advocates both during and subsequent to the Conference. It may, however, be doubted if any advantage would have been gained by giving the Small Powers a greater share in the actual decisions. The Small Powers were described at the Conference as the 'Powers with limited interests', and the phrase was not inapt. With one or two exceptions they did not look beyond what they conceived to be their own limited interests, and so bitter were their disputes amongst themselves, that only the coercion of the Great Powers, which was indeed freely applied, could have produced satisfactory results. More serious were the complaints of the Small Powers that on many vital points they were not even given an opportunity to state their views and much less were they allowed to enforce them. The procedure of the 'Council of Four' deprived them of any real knowledge of what was going on, and drove them to intrigue and to agitation. More tact and sympathy on the part of the principal statesmen might have avoided many difficulties, but the Small Powers eventually had no confidence that they would be treated in a manner such as Allies had a right to expect. That their own often extravagant demands played a part in this result cannot be denied, but these were in part a reflex of the manner in which they were handled.

Another aspect that will long be open to question is whether the Conference would have been more successful had the whole course of the discussions been more open to the criticism of an informed public opinion. Though in the first stages of the Conference a great deal of truth leaked out, this was not so in the later stages, and from first to last the public had no certainty

that the information which was given them in the press was not merely the opinion of journalists. They could not distinguish between the true and the false reports circulated, and this was just what the principal statesmen desired, since it prevented them from being committed before their peoples until the moment for signature had come. Public opinion was thus at the mercy of the sensational journalist who could direct attention to the aspect of the Treaty which it was desired to attack. Had fuller official information been allowed to the peoples, it is possible that some errors might have been avoided. Nor is it easy to see why some of the decisions were not published at an earlier date, or why at first the public received only a summary and not the full text of the Treaty as signed. While there was much to be said for the concealment of the processes by which decisions among Allies were reached, it is not easy to understand, and still less to defend, the suppression of those decisions when finally concluded and even after they had been communicated to the enemy. At the same time it must be confessed that in no country did the press take a very wide view of affairs, or show itself very sensible of its responsibilities, and on the whole in each country it was the advocates of extreme national interests who showed the greatest vigour in making their voice heard.

At any rate, those who believe that the Treaties do not represent the real wishes of the peoples concerned, but only the prejudiced views of a few ill-informed and badly inspired men, have the consolation of knowing that much in the Treaties is obviously provisional. All that part that is penal is deliberately temporary in character, while for the first time there has been deliberately adopted the doctrine that the international settlement needs continual revision in the light of the changing circumstances of the world. Opportunity is thus now provided for the public opinion of the world to act upon the documents drawn up at Paris, and even at this early stage it is seen that some parts will not long survive the criticisms that have been directed upon them. The problem now is to ensure machinery both for the revision of the Treaties and the consideration of such matters as either proved too difficult to find any solution at Paris, or were deliberately ignored there. This machinery must respond to the informed opinion of the peoples of the world. That the statesmen of the Paris Conference have perhaps made such a process possible is their greatest claim to the gratitude of posterity.

CHAPTER VIII

EXECUTIVE WORKING OF THE CONFERENCE

PART I. POLITICAL AND MILITARY WORKING OF THE ARMISTICE COMMISSION AT SPA

1. *Constitution of the Allied Armistice Commission at Spa.* The terms of the Armistice were drawn up to prepare the ground for the peace deliberations, which were to be based upon the main principle of the prevention of future war. Though the terms were severe and were drawn up somewhat hastily, they were very complete and revealed few mistakes when put to the test of execution. An important feature was that the national pride of the Germans in their army was left untouched, and this fact facilitated the fulfilment of most of the conditions.

The members of the Allied Armistice Commission were all soldiers who had taken part in the War in France, Belgium, or Italy. The German Mission, however, contained a few civilians representing the German Foreign Office or financial and economic organizations. Of the Allied Missions the French was the largest, and their chief was appointed President of the International Armistice Commission, acting directly under the orders of the Marshal commanding the Allied Armies. The Italian Mission consisted of one officer only. Most of the discussions at the daily meetings took place between the French President and the German President; the other chiefs of Missions, however, also took part in the discussions whenever it was necessary.¹

2. *Attitude of the various Allied Powers.* There was naturally some difference of attitude towards the Germans amongst the

¹ The following were the chief officers, Inter-Allied Armistice Commission :
President and French representative—General of Division P. Nudant.

American—Major-General C. D. Rhodes (15/11/18 to 27/12/18) and
Brig.-General M. H. Barnum (27/12/18 to 7/7/19).

Belgian—General Major Hector Delobbe (15/11/18 to 7/7/19).

Italian—Colonel État majeur Vito Scimeca (15/11/18 to 3/9/19).

British—Lieut.-General Sir R. C. B. Haking (15/11/18 to 21/8/19).

NOTE.—The American representation on the Armistice Commission had closed down by the 10th September 1919.

members of the various Allied Missions. The French and Belgians had been living for forty years under the shadow of a German invasion, they had seen large portions of their countries devastated, and many of their women and children sacrificed to the devastation of war. They were also influenced by the possibility of Germany again becoming great and once more directing her vast hordes of soldiers westwards across the Rhine. The British and Americans could never quite get over the Anglo-Saxon feeling that it is difficult to hit a man when he is down. The result of this was that the American and British Missions were less vindictive, less suspicious, and more prepared to receive and consider German protests than either the French or the Belgians. This did not, however, in any way impair the most cordial relations between the members of the Allied Missions because each understood and respected the feelings of the other.

The French President was at all times most careful to prevent friction between the Allied Missions, and ready to receive suggestions, and, if necessary, represent to the Marshal Commanding the Allied Armies any criticism or disagreement brought forward by the chiefs of the other Allied Missions. He held a meeting of the chiefs of the other Allied Missions at his Headquarters every evening, when he read out the most important of the notes that were to be presented to the Germans at the Conference next day. The subject of these notes was discussed, and any suggestions made were duly considered and agreed upon or discarded. In this matter the Armistice Commission maintained its rôle of working as an Allied whole.

3. *German Attitude, the Withdrawal of German Troops, the Blockade, German Troops in the Baltic States.* It was apparent from the first that the Germans were prepared to carry out the terms they had accepted, so far as lay in their power, and so long as there was no way of escaping them. On many occasions they made urgent appeals against various decisions of the Allied and Associated Governments, and brought forward well-prepared arguments in support of these appeals. In fact, a brief statement of their chief protests will go far towards giving a description of the whole working of the Armistice Commission.

The Germans first endeavoured to obtain an extension of time to get their armies across the Rhine, and claimed that it was an impossible military operation to withdraw over three

million men in the depths of winter by few roads all converging on the limited number of Rhine bridges. The main argument they used was that, owing to the revolution, the loss of discipline and the spread of Bolshevism, the retreat of the army would turn into a disorganized rush for home, that food would not reach the soldiers, who would, in consequence, take it from the inhabitants, who, in their turn, would rise against them, whilst chaos and anarchy would supervene. The German retreat, favoured by exceptionally good weather for November and December, was, however, successfully carried out without any of the alarming results anticipated by the Germans, and with only one slight modification, made as much for the convenience of the Allies as the Germans. The retreat was, without doubt, a fine military performance, and its completion was due to the inherent discipline of the individual German soldier, who had not had time, or who had too much common sense, to assimilate readily the teachings of Bolshevism, and who was told that the German army was unbeaten, but that peace had been arranged. The writer talked to several German soldiers during the retreat, and they were firmly convinced of this idea. There is little doubt that the fear of the spread of Bolshevism in Germany was genuinely possessed by all members of the German Armistice Commission, and it was brought forward again and again as an argument in favour of ameliorating the conditions imposed by the Allies. Fortunately for the Germans, and probably for the Allies also, the German Bolshevist leaders were never men who carried weight with the populace, they mostly showed their thieving proclivities at too early a stage, and failed to obtain a sufficient criminal following amongst the law-abiding and well-disciplined German inhabitants.

The second great appeal of the Germans—the most emphatic of all—was to raise the blockade. Every possible argument : starving women and children ; spread of Bolshevism owing to there being no raw material to keep the inhabitants employed, and especially the demobilized soldiers, at work in the factories, and the consequent unrest due to non-employment ; the absence of food, especially fats ; the great increase in mortality and in infantile diseases ; and finally, the impossibility of paying any reparation until commerce was re-established. This appeal was received with more consideration by the Americans and British than by the French and Belgians. The two last-named were

fully alive to the fact that the Germans, if they had won the war, intended to cripple French and Belgian trade and had prepared the way by removing a large amount of machinery from France and Belgium into Germany and destroying a great deal more in the great French and Belgian centres of industry. No sympathy could be expected by the Germans from that quarter and, consequently, they pressed both the British and American Missions to plead their cause with the Allied and Associated Governments.

It is a curious fact that, when these appeals were being made, the Germans handed to each Mission a book written in English containing long accounts of supposed atrocities committed by British troops and by the British authorities in various wars in the past. The Germans appeared to fail to realize that the continued hostility of the British, and probably of the American people also, was largely kept alive by propaganda in the press of those countries, and that the issue of such a book would tend to increase rather than to diminish their unpopularity with all classes of Anglo-Saxons.

An argument which was frequently brought forward by the Germans in favour of mitigation of the terms of the Armistice was the instability of their Government, and, consequently, its limited power of carrying out some of the terms as interpreted by the Allies. This was particularly noticeable as regards the evacuation of Russia and the Baltic Provinces by the German troops who were occupying those countries. It is possible that the wording of the clause of the Armistice dealing with this subject might have been clearer. The German argument was that she was directed by the Allies to retain her troops in Russia to oppose Bolshevism, whilst the Allies by means of the blockade placed every possible impediment in her way as regards the supply of those troops. Further, that when in the early days she wanted to withdraw her troops the Allies would not permit it, and later when the Allies wished her to withdraw them her Government had insufficient power over them to enforce their orders. The actual result was that in spite of the most urgent written demands by the Allies, which demands were followed by threats, the Germans maintained troops in the Baltic Provinces actually fighting against the Lithuanians and Letts, who were recognized and supported by the Allied Governments, until December 1919, more than a year after the Armistice had been

concluded. It was only after the failure of the German troops against Riga towards the end of November, that the Germans found they were not able to maintain their position in the Baltic Provinces and then acceded to the demands of the Allied Mission sent out to superintend the evacuation, and commenced to withdraw. Whether this evacuation includes all the German-born soldiers who became civilians and took up land in the Baltic Provinces when they got into the country, it is too early to state. There is no doubt, however, that Germany, finding trade success and expansion of territory barred to her in the West, will use every means in her power to develop towards Russia in the East.¹

Although the transfer of machinery, including agricultural machines, has not yet been completely carried out by Germany, there is little doubt that they had a large amount available, and it is probable that the demands of the Allies in this respect did not press upon them so heavily as the demands for locomotives and rolling stock, especially the former. The Germans, with their usual organizing powers and forethought, had made every preparation for a successful termination to the War, and, whilst demanding very high indemnities, they were prepared to gain further advantages by flooding the Allied countries with articles of German manufacture and thus providing ample opportunities for work and profit for their own people and the demobilized army.

4. *Procedure of the Commission: its relation to the Supreme Council.* During the first months of the Armistice a meeting of the whole International Commission was held daily at 10 a.m. in a large room on the ground floor of the Hôtel Britannique at Spa. The German Mission occupied one side of a long table, the Allied Missions the other side. Most of the staffs on each side occupied chairs behind their own chiefs. Every Note that passed across the table was in the language of the Mission it emanated from, and everybody spoke in their own language, which was immediately interpreted into the other two languages.² A few very long Notes were handed across without being read, also many other Notes on minor matters, otherwise all Notes were read out in the language of origin and then translated. The meetings rarely lasted more than an hour, and sometimes only

¹ This subject is more fully discussed in Part III of this chapter.

² The three languages were English, French, and German.

a few minutes. Towards the summer, when the mass of the work of the Commission was completed, meetings were held about twice a week. It was considered desirable that several days should not be allowed to pass without a meeting in order that proper intercourse should be maintained between the Allied Missions, as a whole, and the Germans.

All important instructions and Notes from the Allied and Associated Governments were sent by them to the Marshal Commanding the Allied Forces, who took action in the matter by forwarding instructions to the President of the International Armistice Commission. The last-named officer delivered the Note as described above. It will be seen that the Armistice Commission had no power to initiate any decision, but it had full power by verbal statements at the meetings to elaborate, explain, or emphasize a subject which was being dealt with.

The attitude of the Germans at the daily meetings was always dignified and correct, even when the most severe decisions were imposed upon them, and it was rare that any heated controversy arose between the Germans and the chiefs of the Allied Missions. When the Allies decided to occupy a bridge-head at Strasbourg owing to the failure of the Germans to comply with certain conditions of the Armistice within the given time, the German President of the Mission resigned as a protest and was replaced by another German General. The resignation of the former was looked upon with regret by the Allied Missions because he had always carried out his difficult duties with dignity and ability. His successor, however, showed himself capable of continuing the work in a similar manner.

At the commencement of the Armistice there was some attempt on the part of the Germans to deal more sympathetically with one or other of the Allied Missions in turn than the others. This may have been done with the intention of setting one Allied Mission against the other. The relations between the Allied Missions were, however, so cordial that if the Germans ever held this idea they soon abandoned it. In addition to the daily conferences the staffs of the various Allied Missions were in constant touch with the staff of the German Mission. The various chiefs of the Allied Missions had on a few occasions individual meetings with the chief of the German Mission, on special matters referring to their own country. If any important subject was discussed at such a meeting the President of

the International Armistice Commission was informed so as to avoid any possible cause of friction. On the occasion of these meetings the extreme formality of the daily sitting was relaxed and both sides were able to speak more freely, with the result that the efficient working of the Armistice Commission was improved.

5. *Various Activities of the Commission.* Although naval matters were frequently referred to, and Notes on that subject were constantly passed across by the Germans, there was no naval representative amongst the Allied Missions, though there were two with the German Mission. These Notes on naval matters referred chiefly to the blockade and to the transfer of mercantile vessels from the Germans to the Allies. These Notes were at once transmitted to the chief of the Allied Naval Armistice Commission, who dealt by wireless direct with the German Admiral appointed for the purpose in Germany. The Germans made several requests that personal intercourse should be established to deal with all naval questions, stating that the system of communication by wireless was unsatisfactory ; this request was not, however, granted.

The chiefs of the various Missions were never informed as to the policy of their various Governments on the points raised by the Germans. This was probably an advantage, because it left the chiefs of Missions a free hand to comment without bias on all transactions which took place and thus present to their higher authorities an independent view of each question which arose.

During the early weeks of the Armistice the most important matter from the British and American point of view was the repatriation of the prisoners of war interned in Germany. The German plea that they were unable to keep these prisoners in their camps, and that they were suffering because they had broken out and were wandering across the country to the Rhine, was never accepted by the Allies, and every effort was made to compel the Germans to feed, clothe, and repatriate these prisoners in comfort. Owing to the steps taken by the British and American higher authorities, and their constant pressure on the Germans through the Armistice Commission, the prisoners of war were repatriated with surprising rapidity and, with a few exceptions, in comparative comfort. Both the Dutch and the Belgian authorities and inhabitants showed exceptional kindness and zeal in facilitating the operation. In fact, we owe those countries a deep debt of gratitude for the manner in which they

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looked after these soldiers. The French evacuation of their prisoners, though hampered to some extent by lack of sea transport, also worked rapidly and well. Owing, no doubt, to language and to blood relationship, the American and British Missions were at all times in the closest relations and agreement with each other. They held similar ideas and approached questions from the same Anglo-Saxon point of view. This statement does not mean that their relations with other Missions were any less cordial, but a common language was bound to draw them closer together.

The details of the work of the Armistice Commission were carried out by sub-commissions appointed to act under the Chief of each Mission, including the Germans. The most important of these sub-commissions were :

- (1) For the repatriation of Allied prisoners of war.
- (2) For the surrender by the Germans of certain arms, aeroplanes, etc.
- (3) For the surrender of certain mercantile and agricultural machinery.
- (4) For the surrender of certain locomotives and railway wagons.
- (5) For certain financial and commercial questions.

These sub-commissions held meetings amongst themselves, including the German representatives, and reported daily to the chief of their own Mission on the progress made in the execution of the terms of the Armistice and any other matter in connexion with their particular branch of the work. The American and British chiefs of Missions forwarded the necessary reports on these subjects to their higher authorities, together with comments of their own in a daily report. These reports thus formed a complete record of all the transactions which took place between the Allies and the Germans throughout the whole period of the Armistice, and will form interesting reading in the future. After the Armistice had been in operation a few weeks no less than 45 copies of the British daily report were called for to be forwarded to various government, military, economic, and financial high officials.

6. *Winding up of the Commission.* During the summer of 1919 the greater part of the work of the Armistice Commission was completed, and it was possible by the end of August to

reduce the staff of the various Missions. By the end of August all the Generals who were chiefs of the various Allied Missions were recalled, except the French General who remained as President of the International Armistice Commission. At the end of June the Allied Armistice Commission moved from Spa to Cologne because the accommodation taken up by the various Missions at Spa was urgently required by the inhabitants, who had most generously placed their houses at the disposal of the Missions in most cases without payment. The German Mission moved from Spa to Dusseldorf and the daily meetings ceased, such work as remained being carried out by notes and by individual meetings. During the autumn and winter of 1919 the Missions were still further reduced, the British Mission consisting of two officers only, whilst the American Mission was completely withdrawn, the French Mission also being reduced.

It is out of the question in a brief review to describe the many details of the work of the Armistice Commission, but the Notes passed between the Allies and the Germans embraced a vast number of different subjects dealing with all quarters of the globe, and referring to many economic, financial, and commercial questions as well as to military matters. During the early months of the Armistice sometimes actually over 100 notes on different subjects were passed to and fro almost every day.

CHAPTER VIII

EXECUTIVE WORKING OF THE CONFERENCE

PART II

THE WORK OF THE SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

(FOOD PROBLEMS AND RELIEF)

1. *Economic Organization during the War.* Inter-Allied economic organization during the war grew up by degrees in response to the ever-increasing difficulties of the supply and revictualling of the armies and civilian populations of the European Allies.

Stern necessity forced the Allies, as the progress of the war increased their material difficulties, to adopt a steadily developing measure of joint economic organization.

Three reasons especially compelled these combined efforts. Firstly, it was necessary to co-ordinate the purchases of the Allies so as to prevent unnecessary competition from forcing up prices to an unreasonable extent. Secondly, supplies of certain commodities were short and had to be allocated amongst the Allies in fair proportions, regard being paid to the effect on the successful prosecution of the war rather than to the material financial resources of particular Allies. Thirdly, it was vitally necessary so to organize supplies and shipping as to make the best possible use of the available tonnage.

The Royal Commission on Sugar Supplies, which had been formed in August 1914, began to buy also for the Allies early in 1916, and this was followed by the Wheat Executive—(October 1916)—through which all the Allies and several of the neutrals purchased their supplies of cereals. Other purchasing bodies developed as integral parts of British Departments; for example, wool, jute, and leather were bought by the Contracts Department of the War Office, and Australasian and South American meat by the Board of Trade.

Prior to the entry of the United States into the war, this organization was centralized mainly in the hands of the British

Government, owing to the fact that at this period the economic and financial strength of the Allies lay primarily in the resources of the British Empire. During this period, therefore, Inter-Allied control in the strict sense of the word did not exist. This situation changed in 1917, when the ravages of the submarine warfare and the need of tonnage for transport of American troops to Europe and of British and other troops to the Eastern theatres of war reduced enormously the amount of shipping available for the transport of supplies, both civil and military, and made necessary a careful examination of every demand for tonnage with a view to its reduction, and an elaborate organization so as to avoid any possibility of waste.

The financial and economic centre of gravity of the Allies' resistance passed largely from Great Britain to the United States, and this shifting was reflected especially during the last six or eight months of the year in a greater measure of real Inter-Allied control. A definite co-ordinating machinery so far as shipping was concerned was provided by the formation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council in March 1918, for the allocation of tonnage amongst the Allies. At the same time there were established a number of so-called Inter-Allied Executives and Programme Committees, whose function it was to draw up agreed programmes of imports for all the Allies within the limits laid down.

The Inter-Allied Council on Finance and War Purchases was created to deal with the finance of purchases by the European Allies in the United States. In addition to the Wheat Executive and the centralized sugar purchasing arrangements, the Meat and Fats Executive was set up in August 1917, for centralizing purchases of meat, fats, and a number of other foodstuffs. It conducted its purchases in New York through the Allied Provisions Export Committee, which contained representatives of all the Allies. The Sugar Commission also established for similar purposes an Inter-Allied Committee in Washington. The Inter-Allied Oilseeds Executive came into existence a short time afterwards and both concentrated purchases of oilseeds for all the Allies all over the world and organized shipments. On similar lines Inter-Allied committees and executives were started for nitrates, copper, petroleum, wool, etc.

The piece-meal formation of the varying forms of international co-operation, each of which was created to deal with

some specific problem—some executively and some only in an advisory capacity—resulted in a certain lack of co-ordination. The creation of the Inter-Allied Food Council in August 1918 supplied an important need in this respect so far as the various Food Executives were concerned, while the Inter-Allied Munitions Council fulfilled the same function with regard to a large number of articles required for munitions purposes. But a number of Programme Committees remained quite unrelated to one another, or to any higher authority except in so far as their requirements for tonnage ultimately brought them under the sway of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. Owing to the fact that during the later stages of the war by far the most important factor so far as supplies were concerned was the shortage of tonnage, the Allied Maritime Transport Council did in effect play the part to a considerable extent of a co-ordinating body, but its scope of action was in theory limited. It had no definite power, for example, to decide on questions of general policy which frequently arose, especially as regards raw materials for industry, except so far as it dictated a policy by refusing or allocating tonnage.

In the later stages of the war, finance was entirely subordinated to considerations of military policy and of the organization of shipping. This, however, had its disadvantages. Since nearly the whole burden in respect of tonnage fell on Great Britain and in respect of finance on the United States and Great Britain, symptoms began to develop of a sense of irresponsibility in respect of these matters on the part of some of the other Allies. The absence, moreover, of a single logical organization for final responsibility not only of policy in respect of shipping but in respect of all economic conditions began to be felt. It is probable that, if the war had continued much longer, the Inter-Allied organization for securing co-operation would have been straightened out and completed.

2. *The Economic State of Europe at the Time of the Signing of the Armistice.* The signing of the Armistice on the 11th November 1918 found the whole world unprepared for the cessation of hostilities. Extravagant hopes were entertained by the majority of people that the period of stringency would almost immediately come to an end, and there started very quickly an agitation in favour of the removal of those controls within the Allied countries on which the Inter-Allied organiza-

tion had been built up. Despite the opposition of organized labour, which in Great Britain was in favour of the retention of much of the existing Inter-Allied machinery with regard to food, the popular clamour for the abolition of controls was too strong to resist, and most of the war-time restrictions were removed. The enormous feeling of relief that the war had ended and the optimism produced by victory far more complete than most people had come to believe possible, blinded the eyes of the allied peoples to the true condition of the European continent and to the inevitable consequence at that stage of letting the economic affairs of Europe look after themselves.

It is indeed clear that the Inter-Allied organization outlined above was essentially a product of war conditions and was to a large extent unsuited to peace problems.

Finance and the need for economy, which had perforce to be submerged during the war under the pressure of graver considerations, began to insist on playing their proper part as war conditions receded. At the same time the immediate easing of the tonnage situation due to the cessation of submarine warfare, the abandonment of the convoy system and the drastic curtailment and ultimate abandonment of the munitions programme, lent added force to the demand from many quarters for the abandonment of Inter-Allied arrangements ostensibly based mainly on the shortage of tonnage. With the ceasing of control over tonnage the chance of the formulation of a uniform economic policy disappeared. It was indeed unfortunate that at the end of the war no central Inter-Allied organization had been created able to deal without challenge with broad questions of economic policy. For whilst in fact the Inter-Allied Executives were liquidating their commitments and busily destroying their organizations, the state of a large part of Europe was rapidly going from bad to worse. Four years of warfare had sapped the foundations of the economic life of Europe and had removed more of these organizations on which alone economic reconstruction could rapidly be attempted than was for some time suspected.

Many of the evil effects of the war were cumulative in their operation and did not appear at once. It is useful to summarize briefly the economic state of Europe at the end of 1918 and during the early part of 1919.

(a) *Food Conditions.* Hostilities ceased at the beginning of

the winter of 1918-19, when import had been reduced to a minimum in Allied countries and supplies of food were short throughout practically the whole of Europe, and the neutral as well as the belligerent states had suffered severely by the blockade of the Central Empires. It was possible, however, very soon after the Armistice to increase materially the supplies of food to the allied and neutral countries which had shipping at their disposal, and the danger of a really acute shortage of food was temporarily at any rate removed. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, conditions were very different; lack of fertilizers had brought about a great decrease in the yield of the soil; large areas of land had been the scene of hostilities, and cultivation was far below pre-war standards. In Poland, Rumania, and Yugo-Slavia, the occupying armies had eaten up all supplies of food; famine conditions prevailed over a large part of Eastern Europe; the winter was approaching and such slender stocks as remained from the last harvest must inevitably soon be exhausted completely. Shortage was especially felt in meat and fats owing to the necessity of using cereals for direct human consumption, and the lack of nearly all forms of concentrated feeding stuffs. Germany, herself, was in a position only slightly less serious than that of the countries to the east and south. It became apparent that without substantial supplies from outside it would be impossible for these countries to carry on till the harvest. The peril of a widespread extension of Bolshevism was very real, and was only to be averted by the timely provision of food.

(b) *Transport.* The general effect of the conditions which have just been described was to increase enormously the dependence of Europe upon supplies of food from overseas. Despite the alleviation in overseas transport, the pressure upon ships remained very great. For various reasons voyages were far slower than before the war and the decrease in the effective carrying capacity of the world's mercantile marine was in a greater ratio than the decline in the actual number of ships as shown by comparison between the volume of shipping before and after the war. It was a matter of great difficulty to carry the additional volume of foodstuffs required to meet the European food situation. On the continent of Europe itself, land transport was in an utterly chaotic condition. Everywhere the railway systems had broken down; an enormous mileage

of permanent way had been destroyed by military operations. Moreover, the confusion caused by the sudden defeat of the Central Empires disorganized transport throughout large parts of Europe with specially disastrous effects on the output and distribution of coal. The formation of new states full of separatist nationalist sentiment and jealous of each other, led to the enforcement of customs and transport regulations designed apparently merely to be harmful to the rapid interchange of commodities and traffic on which the recovery of internal transport depended. The reconstruction of the transport systems, therefore, throughout the European continent was a matter of the most urgent and vital necessity.

(c) *Production and Exchange.* During the war production had been directed towards maximum output for war purposes, while the supply of articles for normal peace consumption had decreased very greatly. Industrial machinery and mines had been destroyed in Belgium, and on a large scale in Northern France, Poland, and Italy. Raw material (except in the case of the United Kingdom) was exceedingly short and in many parts virtually non-existent.

During the war, moreover, millions of workers had been withdrawn from productive employment. The termination of the period of gigantic war effort on the part of the peoples of all the belligerent States brought about a deep and lasting reaction. Everywhere the workers were tired and in many countries they had been for long under-nourished. The reduction in hours and in the intensity of working which followed the Armistice soon led to a decrease in the output of labour over large parts of Europe, amounting to about 50 per cent. as compared with pre-war conditions. The result of the consequent enormous decrease in the output of industry, and the difficulty of converting machinery quickly from war to peace production, was that the new States in Eastern Europe in which food conditions, etc. were worst, were completely unable to help themselves, while the capacity of the other European countries to help them was very much reduced. It was necessary, therefore, in order to meet the pressing needs of German-Austria, Poland, the Baltic Provinces, Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Yugo-Slavia, to provide food in the form of relief. These countries could not find the finance, and supplies were granted them mainly by the United States and Great Britain. In the case

of Germany no credits were granted, but sufficient food to tide her over the period before the new harvest was supplied in return for payments in gold.

(d) *Currency.* The financial necessities of all European belligerents had caused them to depreciate their currencies during the war. In some cases, revolution or the creation of new States left in circulation several currencies of doubtful value. This provided an additional handicap of great strength to the restarting of normal trade relations inside and especially outside the borders of the issuing country. Only by the increase of production and of transport by which trade could be rendered possible could the currencies be put straight. The difficulties already indicated, coupled with the inability of Governments to break themselves of the bad war habit of profligate creation of paper money in order to meet inflated expenditures, have tended as the months have passed to increase rather than to diminish the difficulties imposed by the chaotic conditions of the European currencies.

3. *Inter-Allied Organization during the Armistice.* It is doubtful whether any of the Allied Governments realized at the time of the Armistice the extent of the dislocation of the economic life of Europe. Two or three Ministers of the European Allies, whom circumstances had brought into closer relation with the economic situation, however, had a clearer appreciation of the situation than either the United States Government, which was naturally less able to appreciate what had happened, or their own colleagues.

In November 1918, immediately after the Armistice, proposals were put forward by representatives of the British, French, and Italian Governments that the existing organization of the Allied Maritime Transport Council with any necessary additions, should be converted into a general Economic Council with a view to maintaining the existing Inter-Allied co-operation in a modified form. This course would have had the great advantage that it would have enabled at once a comprehensive survey to have been made of the state of European countries before the dispersal of the war organization. The machinery might then have been adjusted with comparative ease to meet the situation which such a survey would at once have disclosed. The proposals, however, were not adopted.

In December 1918 the French Government, mainly under

the inspiration of Monsieur Clementel, who had taken a great part in the establishment of the Inter-Allied war organizations, made formal proposals to the British and American Governments. Whilst the *régime* of control in operation at the end of the war should give place to complete commercial liberty as soon as circumstances permitted, it was urged that, during the period of dangerous transition, concerted and uniform action and control should be maintained over fundamental foodstuffs, textile materials, leathers, certain minerals and metals, coal and wood. This control should have as a special object the desirability of assuring to the invaded and devastated districts of Europe proper food supplies and raw materials adequate to restart their industries on such terms as would enable them to compete fairly with other Allied and Neutral countries.

Great Britain accepted this policy late in December 1918 on condition of its acceptance by the United States. The American Government, however, took up the view that, with the cessation of hostilities, Inter-Allied organizations which had arisen out of war necessities should, as soon as possible, be discontinued and that the new problems of the Armistice period should be dealt with by new bodies. The American attitude proved decisive and, as has already been stated, the Governments of the different Allied countries under strong pressure from the trading classes in each country, proceeded to de-control supplies to a large extent within their own countries, and to liquidate most of the existing Inter-Allied machinery.

(a) *Supreme Council for Supply and Relief.* After a number of discussions held in London and Paris the Inter-Allied Supreme Council for Supply and Relief was established by the Supreme War Council largely at the instance of the American Government. It met for the first time on the 11th January 1919. The Council consisted of two representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, and one representative of the Allied High Command. Its object was 'to investigate and consider the requirements for relief in Europe and their relation to the general supply of allied and neutral countries, and to determine the general policy of European supply and the measures which shall be taken for its execution'.

Mr. Hoover, who had been during the war Director of

American Relief in Belgium, was appointed Director-General of Relief, to be assisted by a Permanent Committee of the Council with a Permanent Inter-Allied Secretariat. The Council was to collaborate to such extent as would be found necessary with experts of the existing Inter-Allied bodies. The Council devoted practically the whole of its attention to the investigation of the urgent problems of relief in Eastern Europe. It decided that all relief should be given in the name of the Allied Governments and should be administered through one body only. In accordance with the recommendations of the Permanent Committee, it was decided that Allied Missions should be sent to :

- (a) Trieste, with branches at Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade and perhaps Agram (Zagreb), to represent the Associated Governments in the Adriatic ;
- (b) Bucharest, to represent the Associated Governments in Rumania ;
- (c) Constantinople, to represent the Associated Governments in Turkey and to co-operate with the Mission at Bucharest ;
- (d) Warsaw, to represent the Associated Governments in Poland.

Where there was an Allied army in occupation, it was agreed that the Military Authorities should be made responsible for the administration of relief.

The Supreme Council of Supply and Relief was thus set up as an additional body alongside the existing bodies and organizations dealing with shipping, food, blockade, munitions, etc. It had no organic connexion with them, and its action as a centralizing body in economic matters was consequently extremely limited in scope. Furthermore, it lacked the necessary authority and machinery for giving effect to its recommendations. It soon became clear that a central economic body must be constituted with wide terms of reference and with the ability to give effect to its decisions through existing Inter-Allied organizations.

(b) *The Supreme Economic Council.* (i) *Organization prior to the Signing of Peace on 28th June 1919.* On 8th February 1919 the Supreme Council passed the following resolution proposed by President Wilson :

'i. Under present conditions many questions not primarily of a military character which are arising daily and which are bound to become of increasing importance as the time passes, should be dealt with on behalf of the United States of America and the Allies by civilian representatives of these countries experienced in such questions as finance, food, blockade control, shipping, and raw materials.

'ii. To accomplish this there should be constituted at Paris a Supreme Economic Council to deal with such matters for the period of the Armistice. The Council shall absorb, or replace, such other existing Inter-Allied bodies and their powers as it may determine from time to time. The Economic Council shall consist of not more than five representatives of each interested Government.

'iii. There shall be added to the present International Permanent Armistice Commission two civilian representatives of each Government, who shall consult with the Allied High Command, but who may report direct to the Supreme Economic Council.'¹

The powers of the Supreme Economic Council were further discussed by the Supreme Council at a meeting held on the 21st February, and it was then decided that measures of a transitory character should be referred to 'the Economic Council established on President Wilson's motion, while those of a permanent character should be considered by a special Economic Commission to be established later'. The functions of the Supreme Economic Council were defined as follows :

'To examine such economic measures as shall be taken during the period of reconstruction after the War so as to ensure (a) a due supply of materials and other commodities necessary for the restoration of devastated areas ; (b) the economic restoration of the countries which have suffered most from the War ; (c) the supply of neutral and ex-enemy countries without detriment to the supply of the needs of the Allied and Associated countries.'

The fundamental characteristic of the Supreme Economic Council was that by its constitution it had authority only to deal with problems arising during the Armistice period and which were of a transitory nature. Its place in the general organization of the Peace Conference was thus somewhat apart and divorced from the other bodies. It was responsible for the immediate executive work of handling the economic difficulties of Europe during the Armistice and reported direct to the Supreme Council of heads of States in the same manner

¹ These civilian representatives were, in fact, never appointed to the Armistice Commission. In practice, however, the Military representatives on the Armistice Commission who were in constant touch with the members of the Supreme Economic Council, referred to that Council all economic questions as they arose.

as the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was responsible for foreign policy and the Treaty, and the Inter-Allied General Headquarters which was responsible for military arrangements. But the Supreme Economic Council took no part in the drafting of the economic conditions of the Peace Treaties, which were drawn up by economic experts attached to the Peace Conference, nor was it ever consulted officially by the Peace Conference on any of the economic questions at issue.

Although created after the Armistice the Supreme Economic Council was composed solely of Allied States, so that as a step towards the wider form of internationalism it had no advantage except that it was born into a world in which hostilities had nominally ceased.

The Supreme Economic Council met for the first time on the 17th February 1919, and decided that it should co-ordinate the work of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, the Food Council with its Committee of Representatives in London, the various Programme Committees, the Supreme Blockade Council, the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief, etc., and thus centralize for the time being the economic policies of the Allied Governments. It was at first intended that these various organizations should report their decisions to the Supreme Economic Council while retaining for the most part their existing organization, but it was later decided that they should be resolved into separate sections of the Supreme Economic Council with their Headquarters at Paris, although the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, which acted as the Shipping Section of the Supreme Economic Council, maintained its existing organization in London. The Food Section assumed the functions of the Permanent Committee of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief and of the Inter-Allied Food Council, while the Committee of Representatives in London continued for a time to function there as a Subcommittee of the Food Section; but it was later abolished. The Wheat Executive and the Meats and Fats Executive continued in London but reported from time to time to the Food Section. Sections were formed for the purpose of dealing with finance, communications, raw materials, shipping, etc. The following is a list of the Sections of the Council and the Chairman of each :

Food and Relief Section	Mr. Hoover, U.S.A.
Finance Section	Mr. Norman Davies, U.S.A.
Communications Section	General Mance, U.K.
Raw Materials Section	M. Loucheur, France
Blockade Section	Mr. Vance McCormick, U.S.A.
Shipping Section (Allied Maritime Transport Executive)	Mr. Kembal Cooke, U.K.

The Supreme Blockade Council became the Blockade Section of the Supreme Economic Council, adopting the title of the Superior Blockade Council.

While it is true that the centralizing of these various inter-allied bodies in the Supreme Economic Council gave the appearance of the establishment of a well-defined co-ordinating organization for dealing with the economic necessities of Europe, in reality the effectiveness of this organization was enormously reduced by the concomitant disintegration of the controls, both national and international, which proceeded rapidly during the first half of 1919. The Inter-Allied Food Council, which had merged into the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council, was a body shorn of most of the powers which it had enjoyed during the war period; the relaxation of tonnage control prevented the successful adoption of any definite policy in regard to the allocation of the supplies for European countries. It is a fact of great importance that the Supreme Economic Council possessed no executive powers except through the inter-allied organizations which it had absorbed. It never possessed independent funds which it could apply to any object, and its work in connexion with relief mainly consisted in the co-ordination so far as it was able of the expenditure of funds which various Allied Governments had voted for special and restricted purposes, with which it was very difficult for the Council to interfere directly.

The Council was composed of five delegates from each of the principal powers—the United States, France, Italy, and the British Empire. After a time Belgian delegates were added. In the case of the British Empire these were, with the exception of the principal delegate, chosen for each meeting according to the questions under discussion, from a panel of British Empire representatives. It was decided in principle that the meeting should be presided over in rotation by the Chief Representative of each of the Allies, viz. Lord Robert Cecil for Great Britain, Mr. Hoover for the United States, Monsieur Clementel for France, Signor Crespi for Italy. But in practice after the first two or

three meetings, in the first place by the courteous invitation of the Chief Representative of the Ally whose turn it was to preside and later by the tacit but cordial agreement of the whole Council, Lord Robert Cecil almost invariably presided at the meetings in Paris prior to the signature of the Peace. There was also a Permanent Inter-Allied Secretariat which prepared the agenda and agreed the minutes. In addition to the actual delegates, officials who were directly concerned by the business under discussion usually also attended.

Each of the Sections had a Permanent Chairman appointed from one or other of the Allies and a secretary. Meetings of the full Council were always held at the beginning of each week, and frequently more than one meeting was held during the week. The various Sections met later in the week and reported their recommendations for the information or approval of the Council at its meeting early the following week.

The British Empire Economic Committee was an important body so far as the British Delegation was concerned. It was composed of the British delegates on the Council and the representatives on the various Sections together with the chief officials in Paris of all Government Departments affected. It also included representatives of the Self-governing Dominions. It met once a week to consider the problems under discussion and to formulate the general lines of British policy with regard to them. The American Delegation had a similar Committee fulfilling somewhat similar functions.

The greater part of the detailed executive work on each subject was performed by the Sections. Where questions of general political policy were concerned, or if it was found impossible to get substantial agreement in the Supreme Economic Council, the matter was referred for final decision to the Council of Heads of States or to the Council of Foreign Ministers. Generally, however, within the limits of its wide terms of reference, final decisions on economic matters rested with the Supreme Economic Council.

The bulk of the work of the Supreme Economic Council and of its Sections prior to the signing of Peace with Germany related, firstly, to the relief of the famine-stricken countries in Eastern Europe and, secondly, to the revictualling of Germany in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. The practical work accomplished by the Supreme Economic Council

in both these principal directions is surveyed in some detail later.

The most difficult and the most contentious part of the work of the Supreme Economic Council arose out of the economic relations with Germany during the Armistice. For the purpose of co-ordinating the treatment of the various economic problems connected with the revictualling of Germany and the administration of the occupied territory and for relieving the Supreme Economic Council itself of much of the consequent detailed work, the Council constituted on the 14th April a special Sub-Committee on Germany, whose duty it was to co-ordinate the decisions taken by the different Sections with regard to Germany and to form a channel of communication on economic matters to and from the Germans.

At first the only direct communication with the German Government was through the Armistice Commission at Spa, but in March a German Finance Commission was established at Château Vilette, near Paris, and negotiations on finance matters were conducted there directly between the Finance Section of the Supreme Economic Council and the German Commission. In April the Supreme War Council approved a memorandum recommending the establishment of a German Commission at, or near, Paris, which should be able to decide on all questions arising out of the provision of foodstuffs to Germany and on immediate economic relations with Germany.

While a certain number of communications on economic matters continued to be made to and from the German Government through the Armistice Commission at Spa, and were transmitted by that body to the Sub-Committee on Germany for the decision of the Supreme Economic Council, the greater part of the economic negotiations with the Germans henceforth took place at Versailles, which became the headquarters of the German Economic Commission.

One of the most important functions of the Supreme Economic Council and one whose operation involved difficult and delicate questions, was to take over from the Inter-Allied High Command the control of economic affairs in the Occupied Territory of the Rhineland. This control had hitherto been exclusively military in its character. The Occupied Territory had been divided into four zones, occupied respectively by the Belgian, the British, the American, and the French Armies.

These zones had been arbitrarily defined without any relation to the social and the economic structure of the country, and it was inevitable that this should lead to administrative anomalies and to serious disturbance of economic life. While many of the problems dealt with by the Army Commands were primarily of a military nature, others were directly economic or affecting only the civil administration, which was chiefly in the hands of the Germans themselves. Moreover, a large number of Inter-Allied Commissions were dealing with specific economic questions on the left bank of the Rhine: for example, the Armistice Commission at Spa with various Sub-Commissions dealing with the execution of the terms of the Armistice in occupied territory; a number of bodies controlling transport; the Paris Left Bank Committee, mainly concerned with trade and blockade; a General Inter-Allied Economic Commission at Luxemburg, also interested in trade questions; and, finally, the Military Authorities themselves who were taking action each in respect of their own zone. The food supplies for the occupied territory were imported through the Rotterdam Food Commission acting under the Supreme Economic Council, while the actual transport and distribution was undertaken by the Army Commands.

It became clear that economic questions affecting the occupied territories would not be efficiently dealt with so long as so many competing authorities were concerned with them and they had no common policy. Nor could economic questions affecting the Left Bank of the Rhine be dissociated from the policy which was adopted with regard to unoccupied Germany. The Supreme Economic Council therefore recommended to the Supreme War Council on the 21st April that an Inter-Allied Commission, consisting of one Commissioner appointed by each Ally concerned with the administration of the occupied territories, should together with an Italian liaison officer be set up with full authority to co-ordinate the administration of the four Army Commands of all economic, industrial, and food questions in accordance with the policy laid down from time to time by the Supreme Economic Council; and that orders should be issued under the authority of the Supreme War Council to the Army Commands in the various areas that directions given by the Commissioners should be uniformly executed throughout the whole area. In accordance with this decision

the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission was set up with Headquarters at Luxemburg and later at Coblentz.

The Council also devoted a considerable amount of attention to the general economic effects of the Allied blockade of Bolshevik Hungary and Bolshevik Russia. At the beginning of July it drew the attention of the Supreme War Council to the serious consequences to the economic life of the other states of South-Eastern Europe resulting from the complete cessation of trade and communications with Hungary, and it urged the necessity of the adoption of some policy which would speedily enable international transport across Hungary to be resumed, without necessarily involving the recognition of Béla Kun's Government.

With regard to the Russian problem, it recommended also early in July that credits from the Allied Governments should at once be made to those areas of Russia then under the jurisdiction of the 'Provisional Government of Russia'. It proposed that a Commission should be organized from the countries supplying the credits and goods in order to determine the nature of such credits and commodities to be supplied. For various reasons, however, these recommendations were not in fact carried into effect.

The Blockade of Germany had, as is shown later, been very greatly relaxed prior to the signing of Peace so far as food, raw materials, medical supplies, etc., were concerned. Indeed, from the end of 1918 and onwards, the Blockade of Germany so far as it existed was due not to the action of the Allies but to the break-down of German finance. If Germany had been able to provide the means of purchase, food in full measure to meet her needs would have been rendered available. Nevertheless, the Superior Blockade Council under instruction from the Council of Heads of States maintained sufficient of the machinery of the Blockade in existence, though not in operation, so as to be of use in case Germany had refused to sign the Peace Treaty.

(ii) *Relief Work of the Supreme Economic Council.* From the very day of the Armistice, when orders were given to divert certain wheat cargoes at Falmouth that they might be ready to proceed to any port where their cargoes would be most needed, the Allied Governments recognized the importance of food supplies as a stabilizing factor in the politics of Central and Eastern Europe.

The inevitable defects of the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief have been already alluded to. With the formation of the Supreme Economic Council, the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief became the Food Section of that body, and Mr. Hoover became its Chairman with the title of Director-General of Relief. Mr. Hoover's appointment in this capacity conferred a double advantage upon the Council. In the first place, his own organizing abilities, his vast energy and mastery of detail, had been ripened by years of experience in the intricate science of food administration, both as the Head of the Belgian Relief organization and as Food Administrator of the United States. In the second place, he provided ready to hand a staff and an organization built up under his personal supervision for the relief of Belgium, whose individual members had had in a minor degree the necessary experience of the practical difficulties of reorganizing national life in a country where famine and war have played their destructive parts. Further, the established reputation and high authority of Mr. Hoover in all matters connected with food and relief, as well as the fact that the United States necessarily provided the major part of the actual foodstuffs available for relief, made it easier for him properly to co-ordinate the Relief Missions sent out by the British, French, and Italian Governments with the work of the American Missions. It is a remarkable tribute to the personnel of the various Allied nationalities concerned with relief, as well as to the power of Mr. Hoover's personal authority, that no difference of opinion of any importance at all arose either in Paris or in the many countries in which, under conditions of peculiar difficulty and delicacy, representatives of the various Allies worked side by side in one common task.

Towards the end of February 1919 steps were taken by the Governments of the United States and Great Britain to provide funds for the relief work of the Supreme Economic Council. On the 23rd February Congress voted 100,000,000 dollars for relief, to which some 5,000,000 dollars was added from the President's personal fund. To this vote the condition was attached that it should not be used on behalf of enemy countries. Soon afterwards Parliament voted 12½ million pounds to the same purpose, to be used primarily for relief supplies of food and raw materials from the United Kingdom to any country except Germany, in whose case it had been agreed that supplies

should only be furnished against direct payment, and Belgium, where the Commission for the Relief of Belgium was still functioning.

The provisioning of Germany was arranged for in the Brussels Agreement (alluded to below), but the condition attached to the relief credit by the Government of the United States might have prevented adequate relief work being undertaken in Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey. At the same time the condition of Austria, and in particular of Vienna, was unhappy in the extreme. The reports received left no doubt as to the urgent situation of the capital, and in Austria perhaps more than in any other European country it was the vital interest of the Allies to secure that the existing Government should not be imperilled by a disastrous failure of the food supply. Among the first considerations of the Finance Section of the Supreme Economic Council was the question how, whether in the form of relief or otherwise, Austria could be supplied with the necessary foodstuffs for which she had at the moment no means of making a cash payment.

An agreement was ultimately reached which may be summarized as follows :

Great Britain, France, and Italy borrowed each 16,000,000 dollars from the United States to be used in payment for foodstuffs of United States origin destined for Austria. These goods were not to be transported in American vessels. In consideration of this loan the Governments concerned agreed to advance credits in equal thirds for the relief of Austria, and to finance food supplies consigned under the organization of the Supreme Economic Council, inclusive of those already supplied under provisional arrangements. The security provided by Austria consisted of gold and silver coinage, certain foreign securities, and the proceeds of sales of timber from State forests. The repayment of this loan was to be a first charge on Austria and was to take priority of her reparation obligations.

Relief Missions were either established by, or brought under the authority of, the Supreme Economic Council in the following countries : Poland, Serbia, Rumania, Turkey, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Austria, the Baltic Provinces and South Russia. A special Relief Mission was also established at Trieste for the purpose of supervising and expediting the deliveries of relief

goods to Austria and other States. The duty of these Missions also was to keep the Supreme Economic Council informed of the situation in periodical reports, and to give all possible assistance, moral and material, to the administration of the countries in which they were situated. Reports were considered at the weekly meetings of the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council, and later at the bi-weekly meetings held in the offices of the Director-General of Relief.

The relief work accomplished divides itself naturally into :

1. Food and miscellaneous relief ;
2. Reconstruction relief, e.g. funds for the repair of railways, telephones, etc.

From the spring of 1919 to the end of the year the work of relief continued. During this period approximately one and a half million tons of relief supplies were delivered at an estimated cost of sixty-five million pounds. This figure is not inclusive of 900,000 tons of food supplied to Belgium and Northern France, nor of 160,000 tons of foodstuffs supplied to Finland by the United States. The gross expenditure, exclusive of loans or of expenditure in relief by the various Allied Armies, amounted to 800,000,000 dollars, of which about 300,000,000 dollars was represented by cash payments. Of this total the British contribution, although necessarily subordinate to that of the United States, is an important and, in many ways, an indispensable item. Serbia, Poland, Rumania, and Austria were the chief recipients of British relief. Amongst other items Poland received some £120,000 worth of bread grains, £60,000 worth of pork products, £144,000 worth of clothing and cloth, £100,000 worth of boots, and £130,000 worth of drugs and hospital material. Serbia received £300,000 worth of bread grains and flour, £155,000 worth of fats, £438,000 worth of clothing and cloth, and £500,000 worth of hospital material. Rumania received £980,000 worth of bread-grain and flour, £26,000 worth of fats, and £27,000 worth of coal. These figures, taken at random, give a fair example of the British share in relief work, but Great Britain did more on critical occasions when immediate relief was vital. She provided ships for the carriage of relief stores other than her own (e.g. when at one period she provided ships as an emergency measure to transport 80,000 tons of United States army stocks which otherwise could not have been lifted). It should be remem-

bered that these additional shipping facilities were given at a time when British shipping was carrying to France and Italy immense quantities, running into millions of tons, of the material most needed for peace reconstruction.

The general rule was followed that no part of the £12,500,000 voted by the British Government for relief should be utilized for the purchase either of American produce or of produce requiring replacement in Allied countries from America, except in the case of supplies sent to enemy countries for which American credits were not available. The greater part of the burden for providing relief foodstuffs naturally fell on America, which alone of the Allies possessed the necessary resources. British credits were in fact used for what Great Britain herself could supply, and the general policy followed was that Great Britain should in all the countries where relief operations were undertaken supplement the relief undertaken by the United States by furnishing such commodities or services as were outside the power of the United States. An alternative policy would have been to concentrate British relief upon certain areas, leaving other parts of Europe to American relief. The policy adopted was undoubtedly wise, emphasizing as it did the collective efforts of the Allies to alleviate the sufferings of the war. In particular it was proposed by the British, and approved by the Finance Section of the Supreme Economic Council, that a considerable proportion of British relief credits should be made available for reconstruction expenditure required in connexion with relief. In most cases the problem of reconstruction was intimately bound up with the problem of food relief. In nearly all countries transportation difficulties, due to the dilapidation of railroads, roads, etc., accentuated, or even created, a food shortage.¹

British representatives on Relief Missions were instructed to confine themselves closely to a purely advisory and helpful rôle. They were forbidden to concern themselves with political matters. A further injunction was that they should not endeavour, under cover of relief work, to advertise or in any way parade the advantages of a British trade connexion.

It is not too much to say that the work of the Allied Relief Missions in Central, South, and Eastern Europe was of incalculable value not only to the relieved but to the Allies. It is short-

¹ For further details of reconstruction expenditure see below under 'Reconstruction Relief'.

sighted to urge that the work accomplished by Relief Missions of this nature was necessarily of a hand-to-mouth character, and provided no guarantee for the future, while even destroying initiative on the part of the peoples who received relief. The fact is that four and a half years of war had so disorganized the economic life of the countries in question that, at the moment when relief was undertaken, food was a prime necessity of existence to an extent never realized under former conditions. It may be contended that the stability of all the provisional Governments established or seeking to establish themselves during the early months of 1919 consisted entirely in the measure of their ability to provide food for their people. In these circumstances, with the Bolshevist peril looming large in the East, even hand-to-mouth relief was of the utmost importance and value.

At the same time not all the relief credits were expended in immediate food relief. Reconstruction in the shape of railway repair, re-establishment of postal communications, etc., was just as immediately urgent and was also of a more lasting character.

4. *Reconstruction Relief. Work of the Communications Section.* Reconstruction relief may be defined as the combined efforts towards the re-establishment of industrial and other communications of Central and Eastern Europe undertaken under the auspices of the Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council. This body was formed in March 1919 as a purely consultative committee co-ordinating the voluntary efforts of the various Allied Powers:

- (1) by the establishment of Transport Missions in the countries concerned;
- (2) by securing and administering through its Transportation Missions credits for the purchase of surplus army plant;
- (3) by recommending and administering through its Transportation Missions relief credits for the purchase of new railway material and for the repair of existing railway material;
- (4) by the allocation, where necessary, of German rolling stock from the Armistice pool.

The Communications Section had no formal executive powers and exercised its functions in the various countries through these Missions by personal influence and by mutual

arrangement with the Administrations assisted. As a matter of fact the decisions of the Communications Section and the representations of its Missions were almost invariably accepted without question throughout Europe, and were acted upon as those of an executive body would be.

The Communications Section found existing in Europe a condition of general transportation very nearly approaching chaos. As a result of destruction or deterioration the communications of Central and Eastern Europe were inadequate to the economic needs of the population, and even to the immediate transportation of the necessary relief stores. The absolute lack of repair material was a further limiting factor in the work of reconstruction, and the disorganization of administration, due to the splitting up of the railway systems by new nationalities created by the Peace Treaty, and, in some cases, the wholesale changes of personnel, were very serious factors in the situation. Moreover, there was a great shortage of coal in most countries, and almost continual labour troubles were experienced, due partly to the unsatisfactory conditions of work, and partly to the reaction from nearly five years of intensive production, coinciding with a general lowering in the standard of living.

The Communications Section was at first composed of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, together with a representative of Marshal Foch as the Officer Commanding-in-Chief the Allied Armies. Later a Belgian delegate was added, also a representative of the British Naval Section and a financial representative of the French Foreign Office.

• Transportation Missions were established by the Communications Section in Poland, the Baltic Provinces, Austria, Hungary, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, and the Adriatic (with Headquarters at Trieste). In addition, there were British Military Missions in Rumania, Serbia, and Bulgaria (based on Constantinople), a British Military Mission in Trans-Caucasia, and French Missions in Rumania, Northern Greece, and Turkey, while Inter-Allied Communication Missions were established for the rivers Danube and Elbe.

It was agreed that, although the functions of the Communications Section were economic rather than military, the existing military organization alone possessed at the time the facilities

for prompt and effective action. It became necessary, therefore, that the Technical Missions sent out by the Supreme Economic Council should define their relations with any existing Military Missions under the High Command. These relations were defined as follows :

‘ When a Military Mission exists under the High Command its relations with the Technical Missions of the Supreme Economic Council will be the same as its relations with the Civil Organization concerned, to assist which is the duty of the proposed Mission.’

The Technical Missions of the Communications Section reported to, and received instructions from, the Communications Section through the channel laid down by the Ally responsible in each case for executive action. The general principle followed was for Missions to be sent to every country assisted, but in each case one Ally was charged with the necessary local executive action.

The work of reconstruction proceeded throughout the year. In many cases, notably in Serbia and the Baltic Provinces, an almost complete destruction of communications, railway, postal, and telegraphic, had to be overcome. In others, e. g. Poland, Serbia, and Rumania, grants were made from British Relief credits for the purchase of repair material. Armistice locomotives and wagons were furnished to Poland, Lithuania, Czecho-Slovakia, Serbia, and Rumania. Different Missions had different difficulties to contend with. The work of the Polish Mission was much hampered by the fact that military operations were proceeding throughout almost the entire period of its labours. The Austrian Mission was chiefly concerned in securing the minimum supply of coal necessary to ensure Austrian railway communications. The Yugo-Slav Mission was chiefly occupied in recreating from the beginning the destroyed railway system of old Serbia. In this latter case reconstruction advanced so far that on the 13th October 1919 through railway communication was restored between Paris and Constantinople by the opening of traffic on the new railway bridge over the river Save at Belgrade.¹ The Adriatic Mission was chiefly concerned with the control and expedition of relief supplies through Trieste to the various parts of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire.

¹ The bridge was closed again towards the end of the year, but is expected to reopen shortly.

The Communications Section further undertook the work of restoring the communications of the Danube. A provisional Danube Commission was formed at the end of April 1919, under the presidency of Admiral Troubridge, R.N., to facilitate the circulation of relief goods and commercial barges, to collaborate with the Communications Missions established in the Riparian States, and to improve, as quickly as possible, the means of communication between the Commands of the three sections into which the Danube was divided for executive working purposes. This Commission accomplished invaluable work in these directions, and paved the way for the Commissions set up under the Peace Treaty for the eventual control of the Danube by including representatives of all the non-enemy Riparian States. Further, the Communications Section, in order to relieve the strain on the transport of relief to Czecho-Slovakia, through Trieste, took steps in April 1919 to open the Elbe for relief traffic to Czecho-Slovakia.

In all the fields of its activity the Communications Section strove to accomplish work of permanent value. It took the largest share in the repair and reorganization of destroyed railway systems. Without its efforts the food supplies voted for the relief of the distressed countries of Europe would never have reached their recipients. Further, the information which in the course of its labours the officers attached to its various Missions have collected as to conditions in general, quantity and quality of rolling stock, etc., is proving, and will prove, of the utmost value to the various Commissions established under the Peace Treaty for the final regulation of matters of this nature.

In mid-February 1920 the Commission for the Repartition of rolling stock in the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, entered upon its work at Vienna under the presidency of Sir Francis Dent. This Commission will work almost entirely upon statistics collected by the Transportation Missions of the Communications Section. The Communications Section has also concerned itself with the question of the resumption of through train services in Europe.

5. *Negotiations with Germany on the Economic Clauses of the Armistice.* (a) *General Arrangements under the Armistice Agreement.* It was well known to the Allies that the pressure of the blockade upon the economic life of Germany during the latter part of the war had become extreme. In articles other

than food, it was possible to manage after a fashion, by the aid of numerous substitute materials ; but in the case of foodstuffs, the nutritive value of the substitute foods which were consumed in large quantities was exceedingly small, and the population suffered intensely from the lack of the most essential articles of normal diet. Owing to the cutting off of the great quantities of fodder which Germany had been accustomed to import before the war, her live stock diminished both in quantity and quality. Meat, milk, and all forms of animal fat grew exceedingly scarce, and no effective substitute for these could be found within the country. The importation of artificial fertilizers had also ceased during the war, with the result that the yield of cereal crops, potatoes, and sugar beet had diminished to a great extent. Germany also suffered from a number of bad harvests during the war. The greatest shortage of all that the German population had to endure was during the winter of 1916-17, when a considerable proportion of the people had to live largely on swede turnips and kohlrabi ; many of the weakest were killed off during this period, and the powers of endurance of the remainder were very much reduced. At the end of the war conditions were no worse than during previous years of the war, and were better than the winter of 1916-17 : the effect on the population, however, of lack of protein and animal fat was cumulative, and the working capacity and power of resistance to disease of the people had been greatly reduced by the end of 1918. The Inter-Allied Scientific Food Commission has estimated that the average 'man' doing normal work requires 3,300 calories per day in order to maintain his health and working efficiency. Before the war, the average consumption in Germany amounted to as much as 4,020 calories per man per day, but at the end of the war the food obtainable on the German ration cards yielded only about 1,500-1,600 calories. The actual producers of food were of course much better off, and those who had money to buy additional food through illicit trade could supplement their official rations to a considerable extent ; but most of the poor in industrial districts and of the middle classes with small incomes were forced to be content with food far below their normal health requirements.

The knowledge that Germany had not got enough food to tide her over until next harvest, and the fear that complete

anarchy might break out unless measures were taken by the Allies, led to the insertion in the Armistice Agreement of 11th November 1918 of Article XXVI, which was to the effect that, although the blockade would continue to be maintained in principle, the Allies would permit the provisioning of Germany to the extent that would be considered necessary.

A great reduction in the merchant tonnage owing to the submarine campaign necessitated the immediate putting into use all the vessels of the German merchant fleet, and on the second renewal of the Armistice of the 16th January 1919, the German Government agreed to place for the duration of the Armistice the whole merchant fleet under the control and under the flags of the Allies. The details respecting the employment of German tonnage were drawn up in the Agreement of Trier of the 17th January 1919, when the Allies stated that they were prepared to permit the importation in the first instance of 200,000 tons of breadstuffs and cereals and 70,000 tons of pork products and condensed milk provided that the German mercantile fleet was at once handed over.

A protracted series of negotiations then took place at Spa and Trier during the next two months to regulate the conditions of supply of food to Germany, the terms on which the ships were to be transferred, and the method of payment for the food. The delay in making actual deliveries of food arose from the refusal at first of the German Government to hand over the ships in accordance with the Armistice Agreement, without first receiving a guarantee from the Allies for the delivery of definite quantities of food before the harvest. A settlement was finally reached by the Brussels Agreement of 13th-14th March 1919. It was under this Agreement that the whole of the subsequent deliveries of food to Germany were made during the Armistice period to the end of August 1919. The Allies undertook :

(i) To provide themselves, or to give permits for the import from neighbouring neutrals of such part of the 270,000 tons of the food agreed to at Trier as was not covered by contracts which had been made in the earlier agreement. This was subject to the immediate sailing of the German ships from their harbours.

(ii) To give Germany facilities for the purchase and import up to 300,000 tons of breadstuffs or their equivalent in other

human foodstuffs and 70,000 tons of fats, including pork products, vegetable oils, and condensed milk. These quantities did not include fish caught in European waters, or vegetables.

(iii) Germany was allowed to export all commodities except those to be enumerated subsequently in a prohibited list, to any neutral or other approved destination, but the proceeds from these exports were required to be converted into payment for foodstuffs.

(iv) It was agreed that the carriage of German supplies by the 1st September should be a first charge upon the use of the German mercantile marine.

(v) All ships over 2,500 tons gross (with a few exceptions) were to be delivered forthwith, while the question of the provisional exemption of ships between 1,600 and 2,500 tons was held over for further consideration.

(vi) Germany was permitted to import foodstuffs within the above quantities from neutrals.

(vii) Germany undertook to transfer at once sufficient gold to pay for the foodstuffs that were immediately to be sent in. She undertook at the same time also to set in motion arrangements for requisitioning all the securities in Germany which might be used for financing purchases from overseas and to furnish lists of such securities for which the Allies might make such selections as are likely to be most useful for this purpose.

It was further decided that an Inter-Allied Food Commission should be established at Rotterdam to negotiate with representatives of the German Government with regard to details of quantity, prices, and other commercial arrangements arising out of the deliveries in the agreement. It was later arranged that a Shipping Commission also should be established there for working out details arising out of the transfer of the German mercantile tonnage. The Food Commission referred all questions of policy to the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council, whilst the Shipping Commission referred in the same way to the Allied Maritime Transport Executive.

(b) *Execution of the Programme of Supplies in the Brussels Agreement.* The delay which took place in the handing over of the German merchant fleet had serious results. The tonnage situation was still very far from normal and the Allies were committed to a large relief programme in respect of most of the European countries. The shortage of tonnage throughout the world was

an important factor in limiting the supplies which could be brought quickly to Europe. Indeed the supplies of the Allies were in great danger of falling into arrears. It was not until the end of May that German ships which had been sent to load in the United States began to arrive with their cargoes in German harbours, while the vessels which were sent to the Argentine did not begin to leave South American ports for Germany until July. By the 1st September 1919, steamers totalling 1,598,210 gross tons had been delivered to the Allies of which about 1,000,000 tons were under British management.

The administration of the enemy tonnage was undertaken by the Allied Maritime Transport Executive which worked for this purpose as the Shipping Section of the Supreme Economic Council. It was laid down by the Supreme Economic Council that the following purposes should have priority in use of German tonnage during the period covered by the Brussels Agreement :

- (i) The carriage of foodstuffs to Germany up to the limit made by the Allies.
- (ii) The carriage of supplies for military purposes in general.
- (iii) The supplementing of the Allied tonnage programme.

The German Government was credited with the bare boat hire of their ships under Allied management averaging about 12s. per gross ton per month, and they were charged for the freight on supplies carried to Germany at British Blue Book rates. As has been pointed out, the delay in the handing over of German tonnage necessitated the diversion of tonnage from other programmes, and deliveries were necessarily slower than they would otherwise have been. By the end of April not more than 200,000 tons in all had been delivered by Great Britain and the United States. In anticipation of the signature of the Brussels Agreement, stocks of food had been stored in Rotterdam in readiness for shipping ; and, on the arrival of the first deposit of gold at Brussels a few days after the agreement was signed, deliveries began to be made to Germany. The first British consignment consisted of pork products and condensed milk, which were commodities of which Germany was specially urgently in need. As a result in the delay in the handing over of German tonnage, it was found necessary, to secure continuity in the supply of foodstuffs to Germany, to employ Wheat Executive tonnage of which the main proportion available for

diversion was British. The fulfilment of monthly deliveries of food to Germany contemplated under the Brussels Agreement was hindered more than in any other way by the difficulty experienced by Germany in financing her imports. The Allies had laid down that no goods should be sold to Germany on credit, and that she should only receive such quantities of food or other materials as she could pay for in actual cash or its equivalent. A large part of the work of the Finance Section of the Supreme Economic Council consisted in examining and testing various proposals put forward for the finance of these imports.

All the obvious methods of making payments abroad broke down in practice. The large sums already borrowed from European neutrals and the disorders in the interior of Germany prevented the raising of new credits from those countries on any appreciable scale. It had been anticipated that the use of German tonnage for Allied purposes would show a credit balance which could be used to cover part of the German food purchases. In point of fact the receipts arising from the hire of the German ships were more than off-set by the freight charges for the carriage of German supplies and by considerable expenditure for bunkering, repairs, etc., the net result being a debit on the food account. The extreme shortage of raw materials and food resulting from the blockade, the break-down of transport inside Germany, and the unrest caused by the revolution combined to prevent any large exportation of goods from Germany.

The sale of German-owned foreign securities proved very disappointing: the greater part of the holdings were not immediately realizable and the process of collection and sale involved considerable time, so that scarcely any resources were available from the sale of these securities until after the termination of the period covered by the Brussels Agreement. The final estimate of the realizable value of the foreign securities within a relatively short period is not more than £20,000,000. The one large source of foreign purchasing power abroad which remained to Germany was the stock of gold valued at about £120,000,000, which was accumulated in the Reichsbank. Small quantities of the gold holdings in the Reichsbank had already been used during the war to finance purchases from neutral countries, but the stocks still stood at the end of the year at more than double the pre-war amount. There were many objections urged

from the point of view both of the Allies and of Germany against the export of large quantities of German gold, but finally the lack of any other means of payment overcame this reluctance.

The whole of the supplies of food from the United Kingdom and the United States were paid for by German gold which was placed at the disposal of the Allies in Brussels or Amsterdam. The nominal value of the gold handed over amounted in all to 1,050,000,000 gold marks (£52,500,000 sterling). This gold was divided between the two Allies by mutual arrangement in accordance with the amounts of the contracts which each made for the supply of food to Germany. The United Kingdom received £16,000,000 sterling and the United States £36,500,000 sterling.

The German Government all along was exceedingly unwilling to agree to deliver up additional consignments of gold, and deliveries under contracts were continually being held up owing to lack of the necessary finance. This involved considerable delays and modifications in the order in which the different contracts were fulfilled, since many of the products supplied by the United Kingdom (for example, bacon and vegetable oils) were of a perishable nature and could not be easily stored without danger of deterioration. In certain cases, in which products of this order were concerned, shipments were allowed to Rotterdam in anticipation of funds which were on their way, but no actual deliveries could be made until the necessary finance had been received. At the beginning of May the delay on Germany's part of making payments was so serious that it even appeared as though part of the contracts already made would have to be cancelled.

During the period covered by the Brussels Agreement, the British Government contracted to supply to Germany, including the occupied territories, 300,950 tons of foodstuffs at an approximate cost of £15,104,000 c.i.f. Rotterdam, and by the end of August 228,000 tons (value £10,231,000) had been delivered. By about the same date the United States had delivered 482,828 tons of foodstuffs, while France had supplied 21,332 tons of palm kernels and fat backs. The bulk of the British deliveries consisted of fats, while the American deliveries were mainly cereals. Thus under the Brussels Agreement and for the most part before the formal removal of the blockade, the Allies had facilitated the import into Germany of 732,000

tons of foodstuffs; in addition a considerable but unknown quantity of foodstuffs was imported by Germany over her land frontiers, and she had received 131,000 tons of wheat and 12,300 tons of linseed from the Argentine. More could certainly have been provided if Germany had been able or willing to pay for it, but the quantities supplied could not in the time have been very largely increased owing to the shortage of tonnage, for which the delay in handing over the German vessels was to a considerable extent responsible.

In fixing the prices at which British supplies were sold to Germany, care was taken to avoid justification for the reproach that profits were being made at the expense of Germany's necessity. The prices charged were not strictly speaking full commercial prices, for they were either the current market price in the country of origin without regard to the probable course of the market, or else the actual cost of the supplies to the British Government. The prices were quoted c.i.f. Rotterdam. In the case of fats, the prices of many of the articles supplied as determined on this basis turned out exceedingly favourable to the Germans. For example, linseed oil was still being supplied in November 1919 under contract at £78 per ton, although the world price at that moment was £120. Rice was another conspicuous example of a similar nature. On the other hand, in the case of potatoes the movement of markets was rather against the German Government.

The distribution of the imported foodstuffs inside Germany was a responsibility laid upon the German Government, which fixed its own prices for internal sale. It was laid down in the Brussels Agreement that the Germans should distribute their supplies, including both domestic and imported foodstuffs, in such a way that the total rations should be approximately equivalent in the occupied territories as in the rest of Germany. The allocation of foodstuffs as between the occupied and the unoccupied territories was determined by the Rotterdam Food Commission, in conjunction with representatives of the German Government. A stipulation was made in the Brussels Agreement that no food supplies from Allied sources should be distributed to unemployed persons, who by their own fault or choice failed to obtain work. This clause was inserted mainly with a view to assisting the German Government to check the spread of internal disorders inside Germany,

and to increase her ability to export goods in payment of food-stuffs. For the same purpose it was suggested to the Germans subsequently that it was advisable that the imported food should be distributed primarily to the mining and industrial districts. The Germans did in practice give preference in this respect to coal-miners, to large towns with over 50,000 inhabitants, and to industrial districts. Owing to the political uncertainty connected with the Peace terms, a good deal of imported food was not actually distributed but was stored up against emergencies, especially in the event of the non-signature of the Peace and the renewal of the Allied blockade. When the German Government finally decided to sign the Peace its stocks of fats were so large that it was able shortly afterwards to double the food rations throughout Germany. On the whole the distribution of the imported food by the German authorities appears to have been efficiently and satisfactorily carried out.

(c) *Revicualling of the Occupied Territories on the Left Bank of the Rhine.* While the sending of food to unoccupied Germany was inevitably delayed by the failure of the Germans to hand over their ships in accordance with the Armistice obligations, the state of the civil population in the German territory under the administration of the Allied Governments was such that it was evident that, in order to preserve tranquillity amongst the population, supplies must be imported at once without waiting for the fulfilment of the Armistice conditions by the German Government. At the commencement of the occupation, the several Armies undertook responsibility for the food supply of their areas. To secure co-ordination, the Supreme Economic Council on the 25th February 1919 placed the feeding of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine under an Inter-Allied Military Commission which reported to the Food Section. Subsequently, the responsibility for settling questions of principle on the subject of food distribution in the occupied territories was transferred to the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, responsible as before to the Supreme Economic Council. The final distribution of imported foodstuffs within each army zone was undertaken by the German Civil Authorities entrusted with the local distribution of food in general.

The first supplies to be distributed in occupied territories were surplus army stocks, which were issued as emergency rations by the Military Authorities to the German Civil authorities.

In the British zone distribution began at the end of March. Owing to the low value of the Mark, it was not possible to demand from the population the whole of the cost price of the rations expressed in Marks, and, as the Civil Authorities were unable to bear the financial loss involved in selling the rations below cost price, it was decided under the Brussels Agreement that emergency rations should be issued to the German Food Authorities against a receipt, and that the cost of these supplies should be met out of the general funds provided by the German Government for imported foodstuffs for the whole of Germany. Emergency supplies of this nature were continued until the 15th May. The total value of the emergency supplies issued in the British zone in the form of army stocks and to be paid for out of the general German Food account was £772,706.

The British and part of the American supplies under the Brussels Agreement were shipped to Rotterdam in the first instance and were dealt with there by the Inter-Allied Rotterdam Food Commission. It was at first arranged that 10 per cent. of the total quantity of foodstuffs sent into Germany should be allocated to the occupied areas, but this proportion was later raised to 12 per cent. in conformity with the German general rationing plan, which it had been requested by the Allied Governments should be laid before the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council.

As was to be expected, owing to the large amount of food which was imported in the occupied territories through the agency of private trade, food conditions there improved very rapidly from the end of May onwards, and towards the end of the period covered by the Brussels Agreement were such that for a time the whole of the imported foodstuffs arriving at Rotterdam were diverted to the unoccupied parts of Germany. The very high prices in Marks at which the imported foodstuffs had to be sold, prevented demand from expanding with the increase of supply.

(d) *Relaxation of the Blockade.* When hostilities came to an end with the signing of the Armistice, Germany's overseas trade, with the exception of the Baltic, was completely cut off by the naval blockade; at the same time, her commerce with the neutral European countries was strictly limited by a number of conventions which had been made between the Allied

Powers and the Neutral Governments. These agreements restricted the export to Germany from neutral countries of both imported and domestic supplies: (a) The imports of food, raw materials, etc., into these countries were rationed in accordance with their minimum domestic consumption by the Allies on condition that the goods in question were not re-exported. To ensure the fulfilment of this guarantee, the goods were consigned to special associations recognized for this purpose by the Allied Governments and subject to the supervision and control of Inter-Allied Trade Committees situated in the principal ports of the countries concerned. All firms suspected of enemy dealings were 'black-listed', *i. e.* debarred from receiving imports. (b) With regard to domestic commodities, the Neutral Governments undertook to give the Allied Governments option to purchase a certain percentage of their exportable surplus of various products or in some cases the whole of it, and to restrict their exports of these articles to Germany to certain specified quantities. The blockade thus exercised a very effective check on the exportation of goods from European neutrals to Germany.

The determination of the blockade policy to be pursued during the period of the Armistice was a matter of great difficulty. On the one hand, humanitarian considerations resulting from the known distress and hunger in Germany; the grave peril of Bolshevism and internal anarchy inside Germany; and the desirability of enabling Germany to resume her economic activity and thus be in a position to make reparation for the destruction which she had wrought, pointed to a speedy relaxation of the blockade and a restoration of import and export facilities to Germany. On the other hand, the fear that Germany would be able during the Armistice to accumulate large reserves of food and other material if the blockade were relaxed and that, with the consequent access of strength, she might refuse to sign the Peace Treaty; and, further, the disinclination to permit Germany to utilize means of payment such as gold and securities for the purchase of foodstuffs, etc. which would otherwise be available to meet some of the reparation claims of the Allies, afforded important reasons in favour of maintaining the blockade with undiminished severity. The Armistice agreement of the 11th November had in fact maintained the blockade in principle but stated that

'The Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany . . . to such extent as shall be found necessary'. In practice, however, the effective operation of the blockade was reduced to a very great extent during the Armistice, as a result mainly of the Brussels Agreement and of the measures taken to secure its fulfilment. These in effect removed the blockade so far as foodstuffs were concerned.

During the course of the Armistice, the previous limitations on the import and export trade of neutral countries were gradually suspended. As early as January 1919 the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief had recommended the relaxation of the existing quantitative restrictions on the import of certain cereals and other foodstuffs, and during February and March the permitted quantities were considerably increased, or, in some cases, commodities were definitely placed on the free list. As a result of the rations established under the Brussels Agreement, re-export to Germany was permitted subject to the concurrence of the Food Section and to a licence being obtained from the Inter-Allied Trade Committee; and the Supreme Economic Council agreed at its third meeting that any quantities of food exported to Germany from neutrals should be allowed to be replaced. By April, quantitative restrictions on the import of foodstuffs were wholly suspended; and on the 28th of the same month—it being plain that Germany would not succeed in importing anything like the full quantities allowed under the Brussels Agreement—the Supreme Economic Council decided that a licence was no longer required for the export of foodstuffs from neutrals to Germany. Thus by the end of April there was no limitation on the import of foodstuffs into neutral countries except for such regulations as the exporting country might see fit to prescribe, and no check on re-export except as regards Bolshevik Hungary and Bolshevik Russia.

With regard to the limitation on the export of home-grown produce from neutral countries, the existing limitations on the export of fish from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark were withdrawn in March, as a result of the Brussels Agreement; but were maintained in the case of Holland owing to the fact that the natural market for the relatively small catch of Dutch fish was the Occupied Territory, which was able to absorb the whole quantity offered.

At the beginning of April the Supreme Economic Council

agreed to the removal of restrictions on coastal and fishing traffic between German ports and on the passage of German ships between Germany and Scandinavian neutrals, subject to the condition that the Allied naval authorities were informed of the names of the ships employed on different voyages and that licences were obtained from the Inter-Allied Transport Commissions for the import of goods other than foodstuffs into Germany. The existing procedure in regard to the examination of ships' manifests was also modified in Germany's favour.

On the 24th March the Supreme Economic Council agreed that, with a view to assisting Germany to obtain credit in neutral countries for the purchase of food supplies, an immediate announcement should be made that no firm in any neutral country would in future incur the penalty of black-listing on account of permitted dealings with Germany, and that negotiations with neutral firms, though included in the 'black lists', would be permitted subject to the approval of the Blockade Section. Later on (on the 24th April) the Supreme Economic Council agreed to the definite withdrawal of black lists. Nationals of Allied countries were permitted to trade with Germany subject to such conditions as their Governments saw fit to impose, and on the 22nd April the Supreme Economic Council decided that remittances to Germany should be permitted, the proceeds being made available for the food account.

In order to enable Germany to purchase larger quantities of food from neutral countries, the Finance Section agreed with representatives of the neutral Governments that Germany should be permitted to export 29,000,000 gold marks to these countries for the payment of interest on previous credits which she had raised there, on the understanding that the loans were renewed and additional credits were extended to Germany. Germany was also permitted to export gold and securities for certain specific food purposes, e. g. in part payment for a quantity of Norwegian herrings and fats. As a result of these various measures, Germany was enabled to finance considerable food purchases from neutral countries; her food imports from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, subsequent at the end of October at about 74,375 tons, a considerable proportion of which came in during the period to the end of August. By the 1st September, 130,909 tons of wheat and 12,338 tons

of linseed had also been received by Germany from the Argentine, this purchase having been financed by the sale of German-owned securities to the Argentine.

So far as the import of raw materials into Germany was concerned the Blockade was lifted in May to the extent that Germany was permitted to import raw materials which were German property and paid for before May 1919, and which were at that time in adjacent neutral countries and the Scandinavian states. The extreme difficulty which the Germans experienced in financing the importation of absolutely indispensable foodstuffs, rendered it necessary to confine to the importation of food virtually the whole of the German gold and other finance available for the purchase of foreign supplies. As an exceptional case and in order to increase the output of coal, the Allies sanctioned, in accordance with the Brussels Agreement, the importation of 30,000 tons of petrol and a considerable quantity of mining materials required by Germany for the production of coal, but lack of finance prevented the importation of these supplies. In order to increase Germany's capacity to finance the import of foreign foodstuffs, the blockade restrictions on her exports were, to a large extent, removed, and she was permitted by the Brussels Agreement to export to any approved destination all goods except those on the prohibited list, which was drawn up subsequently. She was also permitted to dispose of German cargoes held up in neutral ports, subject to the proviso that the whole of the proceeds of these exports should be made available for food purchases.¹ In order to enable her to make arrangements for the marketing of her products overseas for this purpose and for the purchase of foodstuffs in the Argentine she was permitted to communicate by post and cable with any neutral country, in regard to the exportation of any commodities not on the prohibited list and in regard to the importation into Germany of foodstuffs and raw materials. The list of prohibited exports referred to above consisted of two classes of goods; the first, the export of which was absolutely prohibited in principle, comprised :

Gold
Silver

Securities
War Material.

¹ Later this was extended to cover all kinds of 'permitted imports'.

The second list :

Coal	Sugar
Coke	Window glass
Lumber	Electrical Machines and
Timber and Wood-pulps	parts
Dyestuffs	Machine tools
Certain types of Iron and	Machinery.
Steel	

The exportation of goods on this list was permitted subject to a right of pre-emption on the part of the Allies. Germany was free to export overseas one-third of her exportable surplus of these goods, but the remaining two-thirds were to be offered, in the first instance, to the Allies for purchase at equitable prices determined by them: if the option were not exercised within four days following the receipt of the statement of the surplus available for export during the succeeding month, Germany could export the whole of that quantity* to overseas neutrals. The Allied option did not hold good for that part of the surplus which was exported overland to contiguous neutrals. It was very difficult to carry into effect the provisions of this ruling, and in practice the Allies were not in a position to control the quantities of German goods that were exported.

These attempted limitations were due to the double fear, firstly, that stocks of goods thought to be required for reparation purposes might be disposed of before the Treaty was signed or reparation became operative; secondly, that industries in Allied countries, particularly in the devastated areas, might be prevented from recovering by being undersold by goods accumulated for this purpose by Germany during the war. Whilst the first had some substance, events have shown that the second had no real foundation.

The effect of these measures was that, months before the Germans signed the Peace Treaty at Versailles, the blockade had been relaxed to so great an extent that only the skeleton of it remained, although the machinery still continued, ready to be reimposed, if need be, in the event of Germany refusing to sign the Peace Treaty.

6. *The Organization of the Supreme Economic Council after the signing of Peace with Germany.* The Supreme Economic

Council had been created for the express purpose of dealing with relief, transport, and economic problems during the Armistice. Some part at least of the formal justification for its continued existence would therefore appear to have lapsed with the signing of the Peace Treaty and the prospects of complete ratification. But it was evident that the economic factors which had led to the formation of the Supreme Economic Council had by no means lost their significance by July 1919.

On the 28th June, at the last meeting attended by President Wilson, the Council of Heads of States came to the following decision :

‘That in some form international consultation in economic matters should be continued until the Council of the League of Nations has had an opportunity of considering the present acute position of the economic situation, and that the Supreme Economic Council should be requested to suggest for the consideration of the several Governments the methods of consultation which would be most serviceable for these purposes.’

The Supreme Economic Council accordingly set up a Committee on Policy to report on the form of organization desired. The Committee proposed that an International Economic Council should be constituted to take the place of the Supreme Economic Council, and that it should hold its meetings in each of the chief Allied capitals in turn, its first session to be held in Washington immediately after the ratification of peace by the United States. Unfortunately internal political events delayed the ratification of peace by the United States, and it was not possible to proceed with this part of the proposals. For a time the possibility of widening the scope of the Supreme Economic Council and including representatives of other countries on that body was canvassed; but it was impossible to obtain general agreement, and the proposal was dropped. The Supreme Economic Council therefore retained its old title, but the arrangement of holding, at wider intervals, meetings in the different Allied capitals in place of the weekly meetings in Paris was adopted.

The situation from the point of view of the organization and work of the Supreme Economic Council was fundamentally different in a number of important respects after the German ratification of Peace. In the first place, the general lines

of administration of relief in Eastern Europe had been laid down, and the organization of the supply of food to Germany was in full operation. There remained, therefore, little more work to be done by the Council so far as questions of relief policy were concerned. The Brussels Agreement with Germany came to an end at the end of August, while in the case of the relief countries the necessity for the supply of food was, with the exception of Austria, rapidly ceasing with the approaching harvest. By the end of August there was little left for the Supreme Economic Council or its Food Section to accomplish in respect of what had been its two chief functions hitherto, save to wind up its commitments.

Secondly, the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission had been set up with the signing of Peace and was playing a considerable part in the external economic relations of Germany and Austria.

Thirdly, the breaking up to a large extent of the organization of the Peace Conference in Paris and the withdrawal of the Americans led to a transfer of the economic centre of gravity from Paris to London.

Fourthly, the rapid decline in the exchanges of the Allied countries in Europe and the increasing difficulty of financing importation from the producing countries, made it clear that the conditions of supply of necessaries for the Allies themselves could no longer be neglected and the economic interests of the European Allies required a closer degree of co-operation and mutual assistance.

Fifthly, the American delegates regarded their mandate to the Supreme Economic Council as having come to an end with the signature of Peace. Although they continued to sit on the Supreme Economic Council for a time (the last meeting attended by American delegates was on the 1st August), they were principally concerned during that time with completing the deliveries of food which the United States administration had agreed to make, and making arrangements for closing down their organization throughout Europe. Mr. Hoover and all the American delegates who had been primarily concerned with the Council had returned to America by September and were not replaced.

The new work that lay before the Supreme Economic

Council was indicated in a reference made to it by a decision of the Supreme Council in July :

Resolved,

'That the problems arising out of the present difficulties of providing food, coal, and raw materials to Allied Powers should be submitted to the Supreme Economic Council for examination and report.'

In order to deal with the problems thus raised, the Supreme Economic Council built up a new type of organization.

(i) *Food.* At the meeting held in London on the 1st August, the British, French, Italian, and Belgian Delegations on the Council agreed that, in view of the fact that the continued internal control of certain foodstuffs (for example, wheat and sugar) was inevitable, co-operation in national buying would prevent an undue rise in prices of essential foodstuffs. It was accordingly decided that a Committee with representatives from the different Governments, including producing countries, should be entrusted with the determination of questions on general policy and the collection and study of data, and that the Wheat Executive should be retained as a Consultative Body. The American Delegates stated that, owing to the fact that the American Food Administration came to an end with the signature of Peace, and as they had no authority to act in this matter, they could not take any active part in the proposals laid down without instructions from Washington. They put forward, however, the objection on general grounds, that joint purchasing of this nature on the part of the chief European consuming countries might react unfavourably on the future supply of foodstuffs to Europe by decreasing production in the producing countries, and they urged that such a scheme should not be carried out except with the co-operation of the United States Government. The other Allied delegates agreed that the co-operation of the United States was of the utmost importance, and stated that they would place the scheme before its final adoption before the United States Government with an invitation to co-operate. This invitation was in fact communicated to the United States Government, but henceforth the United States took no direct share in this or any other of the activities of the Supreme Economic Council.

A memorandum providing for the establishment of the Consultative Food Committee was agreed to at the meeting of the Supreme Economic Council in Brussels on the 20th September

1919. It was laid down that the headquarters of the Committee should be in London. Its functions were 'To provide a means of consultation on questions of food policy, and the co-ordination of action in connexion therewith, with the intention of bringing producers and consumers into close relation so as to avoid profiteering which reacts on the general cost of living throughout the world'. Each party to the agreement undertook to be responsible for providing its own finance and tonnage.

The Consultative Food Committee set up Sub-Committees to deal with the following commodities :

- (a) Wheat and flour.
- (b) Meat.
- (c) Sugar.
- (d) Hog products.
- (e) Butter and cheese.

The procedure of these Sub-Committees was in many respects similar. Orders for purchases were sent to the various exporting countries. In the case of wheat and flour, meat and sugar, orders for purchases were sent to the various exporting countries through the agency of a single organization, in all cases that set up by the British Government. Purchases which for some reason or other could not be made according to this method were reported by the respective Allied delegates to the Sub-Committee concerned, so that complete exchange of information regarding prices and available supplies was effected. In the case of hog products, it was agreed that purchases in New York on behalf of each country should be co-ordinated among the buying agencies of the several Governments. In the case of butter and cheese, it was arranged that in North America and other exporting countries, Belgian, Italian, and British buyers should co-operate within agreed limits of price. Repartition of purchases in Denmark was also agreed, and the French Government undertook to prevent competition by private importers by restricting the use of refrigerated tonnage to normal Government imports.

Under the original constitution of the Consultative Food Committee, its functions ceased on the 31st December 1919, but it was decided at the Rome meeting of the Supreme Economic Council on the 22nd November that the Consultative Food Committee should be prolonged until the 31st August 1920,

and the Sub-Committees of the Consultative Food Committee should be continued in operation so long as the Consultative Food Committee held their continuance to be necessary.

In addition to its function in relation to the supply of foodstuffs to Allied countries, the Consultative Food Committee also served as an expert body to which the official food requirements presented to the Allied Governments by the German and Austrian Governments respectively were submitted for examination and criticism on behalf of the Reparation Commission.

(ii) *Coal*. The Supreme Economic Council agreed on the suggestion of the American delegates at its meeting on the 1st August that the Supreme Council should be asked to establish immediately a Coal Commission to undertake the co-ordination of the production and distribution of coal throughout Europe. The Reparation Commission for Germany, the Teschen Commission, the Plebiscite Commission for Silesia, and the different Commissions charged with transport, should all be instructed to co-operate with this Coal Commission and assist in the work of the Coal Commission to the full extent of their powers. A Committee was appointed to draw up recommendations for the Supreme Council which were approved by that body, constituting a European Coal Commission composed, in addition to two representatives of the principal Allies, of representatives of Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. The European Coal Commission reported direct to the Supreme Council and not through the Supreme Economic Council. It established a Sub-Commission in Mährisch Ostrau, in Bohemia, to co-ordinate the work of the mines in Upper Silesia, Teschen, and Dombrova, to stimulate their production and regulate distribution. Germany was invited to send representatives to the Sub-Commission, but declined to do so. In practice, the bulk of the work of the European Coal Commission was devoted to the urgent problem of the supply of coal to German-Austria and, although its Sub-Commission did useful work, the Commission as a whole lacked the authority necessary for putting its recommendations into force; in time its chief function in relation to Austria was taken over by the Commission on Organization of the Reparation Commission, which established a Coal Sub-Commission for dealing with coal questions arising out of the Reparation clauses of the Peace Treaty:

(iii) *Raw Materials*. The Supreme Economic Council

decided on the 1st August to set up a Raw Materials Committee to prepare reports on the present and prospective supply of raw materials to Europe, with special reference to the influence of measures of Government control on the prices and distribution of these raw materials. This Committee was, in a sense, the successor of the Raw Materials Section of the Supreme Economic Council, which had adjourned its sittings in May, largely owing to the fact that the food situation as a whole in Germany and relief countries was so serious during the first half of 1919 that no funds were available for supply in any appreciable quantities of raw materials. The new Committee was set up mainly with a view to increasing the information available on the supply of raw materials to European countries themselves. At the same meeting, an International Statistical Committee was also constituted with a view to producing an International Monthly Bulletin on Statistics on the lines of a Bulletin which had already been issued by the British Department of the Supreme Economic Council. It was laid down that this Committee was to act in consultation with the Economic Section of the League of Nations' Secretariat, and it was contemplated that the work of this Committee would eventually be taken over by the League of Nations. At a subsequent meeting of the Council in Rome, on the 21st November, these two Committees were amalgamated into a single Committee on Raw Materials and Statistical Information, to which was entrusted the following duties :

(a) to be acquainted at all times with the situation as regards raw materials ;

(b) to collect and publish as far as may be considered opportune for publication in the Statistical Bulletin, or elsewhere, all statistical or other information concerning not only the situation as regards raw materials, but also authorized controls, regulations, and important economic facts ;

(c) to consider the actual results on the supply of raw materials, distribution of trade, etc., arising either from Government action or from the commercial practices of the various nations ;

(d) to study the possibilities of increasing production in the producing countries and the means of removing the obstacles to such increase.

The cessation of weekly meetings of the Supreme Economic

Council and the fact that meetings began to be held successively in each of the Allied capitals, necessitated the establishment of a body to meet frequently to examine and deal with questions of detail and matters requiring immediate attention in the intervals between the meetings of the full Council. On the recommendation, therefore, of the British Delegation, a Permanent Committee was set up by the Supreme Economic Council at its meeting on the 1st August. The Permanent Committee was to sit in London and was composed of one representative from each of the Governments with the following terms of reference :

‘To dispose of matters of routine or current business, referring to the full Council questions of great importance, or cases in which difference of opinion has occurred.’

This was in effect an Executive Committee dealing on behalf of the Council with all questions except those of great importance, and a practice was established of submitting in the first instance to the Permanent Committee all matters that were intended to be laid before the next meeting of the Supreme Economic Council.

The change in organization, which has been described above, led to considerable alterations in the status and headquarters of the sections—the Food Section met only twice during July and ceased to meet at all after the establishment of the Consultative Food Committee, which in effect succeeded to it. The name of the Finance Section was altered to the Finance Committee and it was decided that it should refer both to the Supreme Economic Council and to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission. The Communications Section continued to function as before, although its headquarters were moved to London. The Allied Maritime Transport Executive, which also had its headquarters in London, continued to act as the Shipping Section of the Supreme Economic Council, but it was decided that it should in future refer for final decision to the Committee on Organization of the Reparation Commission, instead of to the Supreme Economic Council, all questions of enemy tonnage which relate to reparations.

The Sub-Committee on Germany was adjourned *sine die* by a decision of the Council on the 1st August, but it was agreed that it should be called in case its assistance were needed

by the Reparation Commission or by the Supreme Economic Council.

At the last meetings of the Supreme Economic Council in Brussels on the 20th September and in Rome on the 21st-22nd November, the Supreme Economic Council had under consideration the serious consequences to trade and commerce throughout Europe resulting from the growing disorganization of currencies and exchanges. The gravity of the situation was fully recognized and it was agreed that it was most desirable that steps should be taken to bring about an improvement in the situation through international co-operation.

At the meeting in Rome, the relations between the Supreme Economic Council and the League of Nations were discussed and the following resolution proposed by the Italian Delegation was agreed :

‘The Supreme Economic Council after discussion of its future and its relations with the League of Nations, considers any definite decision to be premature and gives instructions to its Permanent Committee in London to keep in close touch with the League of Nations for the purpose of studying from every relevant standpoint the relations between the Council and the League, and remits all decisions to a future meeting, fixed provisionally for the beginning of January in Paris.’

On the 18th January 1920, at the meeting of the Council of Prime Ministers in Paris it was decided to remit to the Supreme Economic Council the responsibility for any Inter-Allied decisions of an economic nature arising out of the scheme for reopening commercial relations with the Russian people.

CHAPTER VIII

EXECUTIVE WORKING OF THE CONFERENCE

PART III

MAINTENANCE OF AUTHORITY OF CONFERENCE: POLAND, GERMANY, HUNGARY

1. *Introductory.* The method by which the Peace Conference exercised its authority over various States necessarily differed with regard to (a) Allied countries, (b) new States formed either wholly or in part out of former enemy States; (c) enemy countries.¹

As regards the first of these items it will be sufficient to observe that the maintenance of the authority of the Conference in regard to the Allied States was based on the fact of these States being themselves parties to the creation of the Conference and forming part of its executive. It was also much influenced by the fact that unanimous decisions of the Four Great Powers were necessary.

In the case of enemy States, the authority of the Conference was in each instance based upon definite regulations and upon conditions laid down in the several Armistice Conventions. The case of Hungary, however, needs separate consideration in view of the fact that that country was ruled during part of the period here covered by a government which deliberately defied all authority, while professedly respecting the will of the Conference.

The new States were in one sense in the same position as previously established Allied States, for their status as Allies was recognized; but on the other hand their cases need special treatment, as they owed their existence, or at any rate a greatly improved position, to the authority of the Conference.

It is proposed therefore in this chapter to discuss in some

¹ These definitions do not cover those political organizations such as Latvia, which once formed part of the Russian Empire but whose independence has not yet been recognized.

detail the manner in which the Conference exercised its authority over Poland, Germany, and Hungary, the cases of the other States being covered generally by the principles there laid down.

2. *Poland.* In the case of Germany, the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference was in the position of a judge administering the law as laid down in the Armistice Convention; in the case of Poland (as of other new States) the Council found itself somewhat in the position of parents *vis-à-vis* a child. It can fairly be said that the child was generally obedient and docile, but the young Poland, perhaps because of her extreme youth, proved occasionally refractory. However, the only case in which the Supreme Council found it really difficult to enforce its will on Poland was with regard to Eastern Galicia. This question involved a number of difficult and delicate problems. There had been disputes for centuries between the Poles and the Ruthenes, which latter people formed the majority of the population in East Galicia, and had connexions with the Ukrainians over the border. The attitude of the Supreme Council to the question was also complicated by the fact that the Great Powers were not always in agreement. The immediate cause of the local resort to arms in East Galicia lay in the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian armies, which opened many different possibilities as to the future.

3. *Events in Eastern Galicia, November 1918–April 1919.* Early in November 1918 hostilities broke out between the Polish and Ruthenian inhabitants of East Galicia. The Ruthenian formations merged themselves into a Ukrainian Army raised from Russian subjects, and the Ruthenian authorities in East Galicia recognized the supreme authority of the Ukrainian Directory or Government on the 20th January 1919.¹ Prior to the intervention of the Peace Conference, various attempts had been made to bring about a cessation of hostilities between the Poles and Ukrainians. On the 24th February 1919, an Allied Mission had succeeded in concluding a truce between the two parties, but this was revoked by the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief four days later. The truce was indeed doomed to prove abortive since it was based on an arrangement which corresponded neither to the ethnology of the country nor to the military situation.

¹ This recognition was revoked on the 28th August 1919.

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On the 19th March the Supreme Council first took action in the matter, and dispatched a telegram to the opposing commanders calling upon them to conclude a truce immediately, and offering to hear representatives of both sides subject to the immediate suspension of hostilities. On the 24th March a reply was received from the Ukrainian Commander accepting the proposal of the Supreme Council, but in the absence of any definite reply from the Polish authorities, hostilities continued. On the 2nd April the Supreme Council decided to set up an Inter-Allied Commission in Paris for the express purpose of arranging an armistice in Eastern Galicia, and on the 3rd April the following telegram was dispatched to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs :

'It will be recalled that in its note of the 19th March the Conference suggested to both the Polish and Ukrainian Governments, that a suspension of arms should be arranged in Eastern Galicia pending the discussion at Paris of an armistice under the mediation of the Allied and Associated Governments. To further these objects the Conference has decided to appoint an Armistice Commission to hear the representatives of the two belligerents, and this Commission will begin its sittings in Paris as soon as it is informed that a truce has been concluded and that accredited Polish and Ukrainian representatives are ready to present their views. To save time, it is suggested that representatives be appointed from the Polish Delegation now in Paris. If the plan of mediation proposed by the Allied and Associated Governments is to be carried out, it is essential that the Convention for the suspension of arms which is now being arranged in Eastern Galicia should contain nothing that would prejudice the nature of the future Armistice, and the Allied and Associated Governments cannot doubt that in the negotiation for a suspension of arms the Polish Government will act upon this principle.

(Signed) WOODROW WILSON G. CLEMENCEAU
D. LLOYD GEORGE V. E. ORLANDO'

4. *Supreme Council threaten economic pressure. Poland's defiance.* The 'Commission for the negotiation of an armistice between Poland and the Ukraine' at once set to work at Paris under the presidency of General the Rt. Hon. Louis Botha, and after consulting delegations of the two parties, unanimously approved the draft of an Armistice Convention which was presented to the representatives of Poland and Eastern Galicia on the 12th May. The Convention was accepted by the East Galician Delegation, but was rejected by the Polish Delegation on the general military grounds that the safety of the Polish State precluded the acceptance of any armistice which did not allow

of a Polish military occupation of East Galicia. As the Commission considered that this contention raised questions of general policy which were beyond its competence, it submitted a full report of its proceedings to the Supreme Council of the Conference. The latter body, after a thorough investigation of the facts of the case, addressed a strong telegram to General Pilsudski on the 27th May, concluding with the following declaration :

'The Council feel it their duty, therefore, in the most friendly spirit but with the most solemn earnestness, to say to the Polish authorities that, if they are not willing to accept the guidance and decisions of the Conference of Peace in such matters, the governments represented in the council of the principal allied and associated governments will not be justified in furnishing Poland any longer with supplies or assistance. If it is her deliberate purpose to set at naught the counsel proffered by the Conference, its authority can no longer, it is feared, be made serviceable to her.'

To this threat of economic pressure General Pilsudski replied justifying the operations in East Galicia mainly on the ground of a possible combined attack on Poland by Germany and the Bolsheviks in the event of the break-down of the peace negotiations, and on the necessity for Poland to guard against this danger by effecting a military junction with Rumania. About this time, however, the Polish advance in East Galicia ceased, and the Peace Conference proceeded to consider the future status of that country. Meanwhile, frequent representations were received as to the unfavourable military situation created for Poland by the restrictions placed on her operations, and on the 25th June the Polish Government was authorized by the Conference to proceed with the military occupation of Eastern Galicia up to the River Zbrucz. In judging the actions of the Polish Government in thus refusing to obey the Conference, it must be remembered that in other matters the Polish Government had generally bowed to the rulings of the Conference with a good grace, even when such rulings involved national disappointment on matters of prime interest. The reason why the Peace Conference ultimately judged it right to sanction the Polish occupation of Eastern Galicia was due to the fact that a new situation had been created, which was in part produced by the Polish advance. The Conference acted on the basis of the new situation thus created. It is therefore not easy to judge the action of the

Polish Government, though it is not possible to deny that its refusal to obey the Conference had serious results upon other States in stimulating their resistance to the authority of the Conference in local areas, where the armies of the Great Powers could not make their influence felt.

It will be unnecessary to discuss in detail any of the questions regulated under the Treaty of Versailles, since by her prompt ratification of that Treaty Poland accepted all the decisions of the Conference embodied therein. The same may be said of the 'Minorities Treaty'. By their action with regard to these two Treaties the Polish Government and Diet added much to their prestige in the eyes of the Peace Conference and the world, while M. Paderewski enhanced his already high reputation for political wisdom and moral courage.

5. *Germany.* The Armistice of the 11th November 1918, and the several protocols by which it was renewed and extended from time to time, constituted the basis on which the Peace Conference was able to exercise its authority over Germany. Speaking generally, the Conference succeeded in enforcing its demands upon Germany in all cases where such demands were definitely covered by the terms of the Armistice, but realized its inability to make other and less specific demands on Germany. In certain cases where it was of special importance to secure the compliance of Germany with some fresh proposal, the matter was incorporated in a protocol for the renewal of the Armistice. In other and less important cases the Armistice Commission arranged matters. After Germany had accepted the Treaty of Versailles the Conference was able, indeed was compelled, to extend the scope of its authority over Germany. Even before ratification the Conference promptly intervened when any actual or prospective infringement of the Treaty of Peace occurred, just as it had always done in the case of an infringement of the Armistice Convention. It will be unnecessary to examine in detail any of the many occasions on which the Conference enforced its demands with regard to questions specifically covered by the original Armistice. In early days delay occurred in connexion with some such matters, e. g. the handing over of prisoners and of material of war, but the German Government readily yielded to the strong representations made by Marshal Foch on behalf of the Conference. It will, however, be useful to mention certain other special cases

which were either not covered or only partially covered by the Armistice.

6. *Posen.* This case needs to be mentioned in this chapter firstly because it involved the imposition on Germany of an obligation of great importance not covered by the Armistice of the 11th November, and secondly because in this connexion an authority other than the Armistice Commission was empowered to deal with the German Government on behalf of the Council of the Conference.

The origin of the conflict between the German and Polish inhabitants of Posnania was to be found in events connected with the passage through that province of M. Paderewski, in the company of a British Mission, on his way to Warsaw in December 1918. The occasion provoked patriotic demonstrations on the part of the Polish-speaking inhabitants, which led to reprisals by the Prussian troops stationed in Posen. As the General commanding the German troops had declared that he had lost control over them, order was restored by the National Council of Posen with the aid of volunteer Polish formations. Collisions followed between German and Polish residents in neighbouring towns and villages, which led to the Polish administration being extended. At the same time the military situation began to assume the character of a regular state of war between the German garrison troops in Posnania and the local volunteer Polish forces.¹

At the end of January 1919, the Conference decided to send an Inter-Allied Commission to Poland with a view to bringing about a cessation of these hostilities, and on the 3rd February Marshal Foch communicated the above resolution to the German Government. To this, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau replied that the Inter-Allied Commission should exercise its activities only outside the limits of German territory as indicated in the Armistice Convention, and that the German Government reserved its sovereign rights within these limits. The German Note concluded with the following paragraph :

'The ultimate nationality of those territories, called "German-Poland" by Marshal Foch, will be decided only by the Peace Treaty. Germany declines at present to accept her adversaries' demand as regards the attitude of her representatives in the said territories.'

¹ These forces were drawn from the Prussian Poles alone, not from the Russian or Austrian Poles, so that the question of Polish interference from outside did not arise.

The Inter-Allied Commission, on its arrival in Poland, was quick to realize that the military operations in Posnania could only be stopped by laying down a provisional line of demarcation to be respected alike by Germans and Poles, and such a line was defined in Article 1 of the Convention for the renewal of the Armistice, which was signed on the 16th February. Germany agreed to cease immediately all offensive operations against the Poles 'in the region of Posen and in all other regions', and to forbid German troops to cross a line which was geographically defined in the Convention. Immediately after the signature of this Convention, the Council of the Conference instructed the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland to establish relations with the German Government and High Command, so as to regulate all matters arising under the above-mentioned Article 1. In reply to this the German Government appointed a Commission with full powers to negotiate with the Inter-Allied Commission on this subject, but it never accepted the Convention drawn up by the two commissions in question. It is needless to say there was never any question of attempting to dispose of German sovereignty over this territory except under the conditions of the Treaty of Peace.

7. *The Transport of General Haller's Army.* This case is mentioned as one of the most important examples of a difference of opinion between the Conference and the German Government as to the interpretation of one of the clauses of the Armistice.

Article 16 of the Armistice Convention provided that the Allies 'shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern frontier, either via Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to revictual the populations of those territories or to maintain order'. Basing its action on this clause, the Conference demanded that the German Government should allow General Haller's Polish Army to be transported from France to Poland via Danzig.¹ This demand was resolutely opposed by the German Government, whose true line of objection was that they did not wish Haller's troops to be in Danzig for fear of prejudicing the ultimate fate of that city. They defended their refusal on the following grounds :

- (i) That the transport of an army did not come within the meaning of Article 16, and

¹ This army consisted of Polish men, volunteers from America, or deserters from the German army. They had been organized and equipped on the Western front.

- (ii) that Poland was not one of the Allies at the time of the signing of the Armistice, and therefore the movement of Polish troops could not in any case be admissible under its terms.

The Conference contented itself with extracting a qualified admission from Germany as to the technical right of the Allies to use Danzig for the purpose in question, but it eventually accepted the proposal of the German Government that General Haller's Army should be transported by rail across Germany, or alternately by sea or rail via Stettin or Königsberg. In fact, the direct railway route alone was used.

In connexion with this question it is interesting to note that, at one period of the negotiations, the matter was being dealt with on behalf of the Conference by the Inter-Allied Commission in Poland previously referred to. Although the German Commission was allowed to discuss the matter with the Inter-Allied Commission, the German Government subsequently questioned the authority of the latter body to deal with the question. The Conference then transferred the negotiations to Marshal Foch for action through the Armistice Commission at Spa, in view of Article 34 of the Armistice Convention, which recognized the principle of a permanent International Armistice Commission being established to regulate all questions arising out of the Armistice Convention.¹

8. *The Evacuation of the Baltic States.* At the conclusion of the Armistice the Germans, by virtue of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, were holding a general line covering the Baltic States on the East. Article 12 of the Armistice Convention laid down that the Germans were to withdraw from the territory which was formerly part of the Russian Empire, 'as soon as the Allies shall consider this (withdrawal) desirable, having regard to the interior conditions of those territories'.² Article 14 of the

¹ Extract from Article 34 : 'Pour assurer dans les meilleures conditions l'exécution de la présente convention, le principe d'une commission d'armistice internationale permanente est admis. Cette commission fonctionnera sous la haute autorité du Commandement en Chef militaire et naval des Armées alliées.'

² Article 12 : 'Toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvent actuellement dans les territoires qui faisaient partie avant la guerre de la Russie devront également rentrer dans les frontières de l'Allemagne, définies comme ci-dessus, dès que les Alliés jugeront le moment venu, compte tenu de la situation intérieure de ces territoires.' The last clause is the one about which all the discussion took place.

Convention further specified that German troops were 'to cease at once all requisitions, seizures, or coercive measures for obtaining supplies intended for Germany in . . . Russia'.


The German troops and authorities in the Baltic States in no way complied with these terms. They repeatedly violated Article 14, and they did not wait for the authorization of the Allies provided in Article 12, in order to withdraw their troops. Towards the end of November 1918 they began their withdrawal, which they so arranged as to hinder the defensive organizations of the newly formed national governments in every possible way, and so as designedly to facilitate the entry of Bolshevik troops into the towns evacuated. At the same time they confiscated supplies of food and clothing and conveyed rolling-stock to Germany. Towards the end of February 1919 the Bolsheviks had overrun the whole of Latvia¹ and a large portion of Lithuania, which fact enabled the German Government to assume the *rôle* of liberators, and to send fresh German troops to Libau. By the end of February a German 'Army of Occupation' about twenty thousand strong was concentrated in the Libau-Windau area under the command of General von der Goltz. On the 16th April the Balts at Libau, with the connivance of the German military authorities, carried out a *coup d'état* culminating in the arrest of the members of the Lettish Government and the disarming of Lettish troops.

On the 23rd April the first of several Allied Notes with regard to General von der Goltz's activities in the Baltic States was transmitted to the German Government through the Armistice Commission. This Note demanded the immediate re-establishment of the Lettish Government with full liberty to carry out its duties, and power to enrol Lettish troops. As the Germans sent an evasive reply on the 4th May the Allies again demanded that the Germans should cease from interfering with local political and military organizations, that the German force should no longer be designated an Army of Occupation, and

¹ Latvia or Lettland, covering 68,000 square kilometres, comprising Southern Livonia,* Courland, and Latgalia (the last-named comprising the three north-western districts of the government of Vitebsk); population 2,500,000, of whom nearly 2,000,000 are Letts; capital, Riga. The area has not been diplomatically defined.

* The northern half of the former Russian province of Livonia is Estonian. The boundary line runs approximately from Hainasch through Walk.


BALTIC STATES



REFERENCE

- Old Boundary of Germany ++++++
- New " " " - - - - -
- Boundaries of Provinces of Russian Empire ······
- Chief Railways —————

Scale 1: 4,500,000



that General von der Goltz should be recalled. These demands were not complied with, and on the 23rd May the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris decided to dispatch an Allied Military Mission to the Baltic States to enforce the Allied demands. After a further exchange of Notes, the German Government replied to the Allied demands on the 8th June to the following effect :

- (1) That evacuation was taking place.
- (2) That General von der Goltz had not kept back arms from the Lettish troops.
- (3) That the mobilization of Letts would endanger the lines of communication of the German troops.
- (4) That General von der Goltz could not interfere in Latvian internal affairs (implying that the Allied demand for the restoration of the Lettish Government involved such an interference).

By the beginning of June the evident intention of the Germans to continue their advance northwards into Esthonia had created a very serious situation, and had shown clearly that the integrity of the Baltic States could not be preserved unless they were completely evacuated by German troops. On the 18th June, Marshal Foch, under instructions from the Supreme Council, directed the Germans :

- (a) to stop all further advance towards Esthonia ;
- (b) to evacuate Libau and Windau at once, and to complete the evacuation of all territory which before the war formed part of Russia with the least possible delay, in accordance with Article 12 of the Armistice.

About this time the German Government were also informed through the Armistice Commission, that General Gough had been authorized to enter into direct communication with the local German command with a view to the settlement of all questions relating to the execution of the above demands.

9. *Supreme Council demand evacuation under threat of economic pressure, 27th September.* German troops, however, continued to arrive in the Mitau district, and the attitude adopted by General von der Goltz led to a fresh demand, transmitted on the 1st August, calling upon the German Government to recall General von der Goltz, to proceed at once with the evacuation of Latvia by land and by sea under the

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supervision of General Gough, and to complete the evacuation by the 30th August.

At the end of September the situation remained materially unchanged, while lack of discipline among the German troops in the Baltic States had led to a number of acts of violence. Accordingly the Supreme Council again considered the case on the 27th September, and, in view of the non-compliance of the Germans with the many demands which had been presented by the Allies, decided to apply economic pressure to Germany in order to enforce the terms of the Armistice. At the same time the Supreme Council, rejecting the German Government's contention that it could not compel troops in the Baltic regions to obey orders, insisted on the complete evacuation of these regions by all German troops and formations, and on the withdrawal of all German soldiers who had been enlisted in Russian formations after demobilization.

The decision to resort to pressure on Germany in order to obtain compliance with the Allied demands was communicated to the German Government in the following terms :

'The Allied and Associated Governments hereby notify that, until they are satisfied that their demand is being effectively executed, they will not entertain any of the applications put forward by the German Government for the supply of foodstuffs and raw materials. They have consequently given instructions not to proceed with the examination of any of these applications.

'Furthermore, the Allied and Associated Governments will refuse all financial facilities from which the German Government might at the present time derive advantages or which it may seek from the Allied and Associated Governments or their nationals.

'In the event of non-compliance on the part of the German Government, the Allied and Associated Powers will take such other measures as they shall judge necessary to enforce the aforesaid terms of the Armistice.'

This threat of pressure apparently created a strong impression on the German Government, who replied on the 4th October proposing that a mixed Commission comprising German representatives as well as representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers should be formed in order to examine the situation and then 'to take, supervise, and carry through the measures necessary for the expeditious completion of the evacuation'. It was at the same time intimated that General von der Goltz had been recalled and replaced by Lieutenant-General von Eberhardt. The German Government further declared its fixed

purpose to do everything in its power to fulfil its obligations for evacuation, but protested vigorously against the threatened measures of compulsion.

The Supreme Council replied maintaining its attitude with regard to the latter measures, until such time as the evacuation should be reported as proceeding satisfactorily, but agreed to the establishment of the proposed Commission. This body was set up with the least possible delay under the Presidency of the French General Niessel, and included representatives of each of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, with whom Admiral Hoppman was subsequently associated as the German representative.

The Commission proceeded on the 5th November, first to Berlin, where it took cognizance of the measures taken by the German Government in connexion with the evacuation, and thence to Tilsit. Its task was much facilitated by the crushing defeat inflicted by the Letts on the Russo-German force under Colonel Bermont, after which the Commission interceded with both the Letts and Lithuanians on behalf of the Germans so as to allow their evacuation to proceed without further molestation. By the middle of December all the German troops in the Baltic States had been evacuated, but only with great loss to Lettish and Lithuanian property. The Commission was loyally supported by the German Delegate, Admiral Hoppman, but with this one exception the German authorities in the Baltic States persisted in placing all possible obstacles in the way of the evacuation, while General von Eberhardt's statements and promises proved as unreliable as those of his predecessor.

10. *Summary of the Baltic Question.* The incidents and decisions recorded above fall within two distinct periods, viz. :

- (a) from the 11th November 1918 to the 18th June 1919, during which time German troops remained in the Baltic States with the consent of the Allies ;
- (b) the period subsequent to the Allied demand, made on the 18th June, for the complete evacuation of this region.

The original provision under Article 12 of the Armistice Convention of the 11th November, that the German troops were to withdraw from Russian territory 'as soon as the Allies shall consider this (withdrawal) desirable' was a demand of

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which the expediency was doubtful. The idea underlying this clause was that German troops should protect these regions from Bolshevik invasion so long as such protection should be necessary, but that at the same time Germany should be prevented from thereby obtaining political advantages in the Baltic States. In fact, Article 12 was an effort to obtain from Germany loyal co-operation in a cause which it was the wish of the Allies to promote and of the Germans to hinder, and the Conference eventually realized that the attempt was impracticable. The German Government repeatedly disputed the interpretation placed on Article 12 by the Allied and Associated Governments, namely, that Germany had thereby undertaken to leave her troops in the east until the Allies considered their withdrawal advisable. The German Government contended that the words 'dès que les Alliés jugeront le moment venu' in the text of Article 12 denoted merely the extreme date to which the German troops could occupy the areas in question, and not the earliest date at which evacuation could take place. On these grounds the German Government, in a Note transmitted through the Armistice Commission on the 29th May, refused to recognize any orders for the retention of German troops in Russian territory.

The German Government certainly realized the weakness of the Allied position during the early period of these negotiations, and it has been shown how they took advantage of it. In a Note dated the 11th October 1919, the German Government commented on the inconsistency of the Allied demands :

'The Allied and Associated Governments asked the German Government for the first time in their Note of June 18th to depart from the regions of the Baltic and Lithuania, after they had expressly demanded in May, and without regard to the protest of the German Government in connexion therewith, that the German troops should not be withdrawn from there.'

Thus, the question of the German troops in the Baltic States was not placed on a really satisfactory basis until the Allied note of the 18th June referred to above, when the complete evacuation of Russian territory was first demanded. The right of the Allies to insist upon such evacuation was never disputed by the German Government, but the latter resorted to every form of subterfuge in order to postpone the execution of the Allied demand.

11. *Article 61 of the German Constitution of August 1919.* This case is mentioned as it involved vigorous intervention by the Peace Conference in a matter which was in no way connected with the Armistice Convention.

Article 61 of the new German Constitution, signed on the 31st July 1919, provided for the admission to the Imperial Council of Germany of representatives from Austria, when that country should join the German Empire.¹ The Conference informed the German Government that this Article contravened Article 80 of the Treaty of Peace, which says 'Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.'² The Conference threatened to extend the occupation of German territory unless steps were at once taken to repeal the 61st Article of the new German Constitution. The German Government replied that it regarded the repeal as unnecessary in view of Article 178 of the new German Constitution, which stated that the German Constitution could not override the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.³ They added that it was assumed in Germany that Article 61 could not come into force unless the League of Nations had first assented to the union of Austria to Germany. In view of this reply, the Conference contented itself with insisting that the German Government should formally recognize the principle that no Article in the German Constitution could be valid if it were contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace. The matter was ended by the Chief of the German Delegation signing a declaration to this effect at Versailles on the 22nd September 1919.

12. *The Scapa Flow Incident and the delay in the Deposit of Ratifications.* Germany, having already ratified the Treaty of Versailles on the 9th July 1919, the conditions necessary for its

¹ Extract from Article 61 : 'German-Austria shall, after it has joined the German Realm, have the right to participate in the Council of the Realm with such a number of mandates as shall correspond to the size of its population. Until that time the representatives of German-Austria shall have an advisory vote.'

² For such purpose the Council must be unanimous. Therefore, a single power, e. g. France or Italy, can forbid Austria joining Germany.

³ Extract from Article 178 : 'The conditions of the Peace Treaty, signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919, are not affected by this Constitution.'

being brought into force were fulfilled when three of the Great Powers, namely France, Great Britain, and Italy, had ratified it by the middle of October. The formal deposit of ratifications, from the date of which the Treaty would actually come into force, was, however, delayed for two reasons :

1. To enable all the preliminary arrangements to be made for taking over the administration of the surrendered territory and plebiscite areas, as well as for the transport thereto of the troops intended as garrisons ;
2. To obtain the signature by Germany of a Protocol to the Peace Treaty, the object of which was twofold, viz. :
 - (a) To safeguard the execution of certain unfulfilled conditions of the Armistice, the expiration of which would otherwise leave the Allies without legal redress in the matter.
 - (b) To obtain reparation for the scuttling of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow, an unforeseen breach of the Armistice, which, by reason of the date and circumstances of the incident, was unprovided for in the terms of any other instrument.

This Protocol was duly drawn up and communicated to the German Government on the 1st November, with a request that a German Delegation should be sent to Paris with plenary powers to sign the Protocol and to settle, with the Representatives of the Allies, the details of the execution of the clauses of the Peace Treaty, which would have to be carried out immediately on its coming into force. Herr von Simson arrived in Paris, as the head of the Delegation, on the 25th November.

These incidents coincided with the non-ratification of the Peace Treaty by the American Senate. This was followed by an immediate change in the attitude of the German Delegates, who stated that they were obliged to return to Berlin to consult their Government regarding the terms of the Protocol, and the arrangements proposed by the Allies for the administration of the Areas of Occupation, although these were well known to the German Government at the time when the Delegation left Berlin. A series of Notes and verbal communications from the German Government through Baron von Lersner then began, in which :

1. The German Government endeavoured to secure the

repatriation of the German prisoners of war in French hands without reference to the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, and to obtain a modification of the Clauses of the Treaty concerning the surrender of guilty persons, in compensation for the possible absence of American Delegates on the various Commissions;

2. Objection was raised to the final paragraph of the Protocol, by which the Allies had reserved the right to use military measures in the enforcement of their demands;

3. A refusal was made to the demand for the surrender of 400,000 tons of floating docks, etc., in compensation for the loss of the German fleet at Scapa Flow, responsibility for the destruction of which was not admitted.

The counter-proposals of the German Government were considered by the Supreme Council in consultation with their naval and military advisors, and on the 8th December a Note was presented to Baron von Lersner for transmission to the German Government, which though not prescribing a time limit, was virtually in the nature of an ultimatum.

It maintained:

1. That there were no grounds on which Germany could base a claim for any modification of the Treaty on account of the possible absence of American Delegates from the various Commissions. France would automatically liberate her prisoners as soon as the Treaty came into force.

2. That the Allies still adhered to the terms of the Protocol regarding the reparation due by Germany for the destruction of their Fleet in Scapa Flow, but that they were prepared to examine in an equitable spirit any claims put forward by Germany that such reparation would seriously affect her ability to satisfy her legitimate needs, having in view the economic condition of her ports.

3. That from the time when the signing of the Protocol and the deposit of ratifications brought the Treaty into force, the execution of the clauses of the Protocol would be guaranteed by the general provisions of the Treaty as well as by the usual methods recognized by the law of nations.

Up to that time the denunciation of the Armistice would give the Allied Armies every latitude as regards the military measures that they might consider necessary.

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The German Reply to the Allied Note was received in Paris on the 15th December. It was couched in conciliatory terms, and stated :

1. That the German Government desired to remove the misapprehension according to which it claimed the *right* to alter the conditions of peace regarding the surrender of guilty persons and the repatriation of prisoners of war in view of the temporary absence of the United States representatives from the Commissions provided for in the Peace Treaty. The German Government had never made its consent to the coming into force of the Treaty dependent on the previous settlement of this question.

2. That in view of the explanation given of the meaning of the final paragraph of the Protocol concerning the coercive measures to be used in certain eventualities, the German objections to the paragraph no longer held good.

3. That the German Government was ready to pay compensation for the sinking of the German warships at Scapa Flow, but was not in a position to do so in the manner provided in the Protocol. She was willing at the same time to submit detailed proposals regarding compensation, which, although involving a very heavy burden in Germany's present state, was yet not incompatible with her vital interests.

This German reply practically ended the matter. On the 10th January ratifications were formally exchanged and the Treaty came into force. The repatriation of German prisoners in France began. M. Clemenceau on the same day addressed a letter to Baron von Lersner, in which he informed him that the Allies did not desire to injure the vital interests of Germany, but that the 192,000 tons of dock materials, offered by the German Government as a complete settlement, must be handed over at once. The balance of the Allied demand was about 200,000 more tons, and, as there might have been a mistake as regards the 80,000 tons of floating docks at Hamburg, a new inquiry would be held. The Allies would then be disposed to reduce their total demands to 300,000 tons, 'or even below if the necessity for reduction is shown by convincing argument'. All such tonnage, when the amount was finally fixed, would have to be handed over in thirty months. This letter marked the final stage of what had threatened to be a most serious

incident. It seems evident that the Allied original demand for 400,000 tons of floating dock material was excessive, but the German Government's attempt to evade their obligation was most serious in view of the non-ratification of the Treaty by the United States Senate. The Allied Governments felt that the authority and prestige of the Conference were at stake and acted accordingly. The situation was a grave one, but the Allied offer to compromise as to the amount of material to be surrendered enabled the German Government both to save its face and to give way. The German Government accepted in principle the demand for compensation for the sinking of their interned fleet, but obtained a guarantee of substantial reduction of the amount demanded; on the other points raised in this last diplomatic duel the German Government gave satisfactory replies and assurances. Consequently from this final contest as to its authority the Conference emerged victorious. When the final judgment is taken it will be seen that the Conference procured the disarmament of millions of men and enforced their authority over a great country which they never held by effective military occupation. In the main the points, on which the Conference had to give way, were those on which the interpretation of articles in the agreements was difficult, or where the obligations entered into by Germany were such as she could not practically carry out. Even in such cases as that of the Baltic Provinces the Conference eventually enforced its will. On the whole, as regards Germany, it is the success, and not the failure, of the Conference to enforce its will which should arouse notice.

13. *Hungary. Armistice Difficulties.* No better instance than that of Hungary could perhaps be chosen if it were desired to find an occasion for criticizing alike the basis, that is to say the Armistice terms, on which the Supreme Council endeavoured to base its control of an enemy Power pending the conclusion of peace, and the illogical policy which resulted from the nature of that basis.

The origin of many of the difficulties which took the Conference so long to solve was the unsatisfactory Armistice concluded on the 3rd November 1918, between representatives of the Italian Supreme Command and the Supreme Command of what still called itself the Austro-Hungarian army. According to the solemn declarations of the spokesmen of the peoples which composed it, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had ceased


to exist; not only had the Poles, Czechs, and Yugo-Slavs proclaimed their independence, but the two sovereign peoples of Austria-Hungary themselves, the German-Austrians and the Magyars, had, during the preceding ten days, by solemn acts fully representative of the population, and, in the case of Hungary, with the constitutional consent of the King, pronounced respectively for full independence. It might have been argued that the Austro-Hungarian army was still in existence, and that it was necessary to treat with it as an entity. Unfortunately, even on this basis the Armistice must be considered in the highest degree unsatisfactory. Based as it was almost entirely on the particular desiderata of Italy, it, in fact, satisfied Italian requirements only. Consequently, the question of Hungary was covered only by such general clauses as the right of Allied armies to move freely over, and to occupy, all such places in Austro-Hungarian territory as they should consider necessary.

A further Military Convention relating specifically to Hungary was consequently necessary, and on the 13th November such a Convention was signed at Belgrade on behalf of General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in South-east Europe, by Voivode Mishitch (the Serbian Chief of Staff), and General Henrys on the one hand, and by the delegates of the new Hungarian Government on the other. This Convention provided for the occupation of a specified zone of Hungarian territory, the right to extend this occupation wherever it might be thought necessary, and the demobilization of all the Hungarian forces except six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions.


Drawn up as it was by the Franco-Serbian Command, this convention took sufficient account of Serbian requirements; and allowed the Serbs to occupy an area in the south of Hungary which exceeded not only the boundaries they received under the Treaty, but which even went beyond their territorial claims. The same, however, was not the case with regard to the territories in which the new Czecho-Slovak State and Rumania were respectively interested.

14. *Difficulties between Rumania and Hungary, November 1918-March 1919.* Rumania had re-entered the war only on the 9th November, and consequently had not participated in the final hostilities on the Hungarian front. Little account was therefore

HUNGARY



Scale 1:4,000,000



REFERENCE

- ① Hungarian Armistice line, 13th November 1918
- ② Extension of Rumanian line, February 1919
- ③ Rumanian Treaty line of 17th August 1916
- ④ Permanent boundary of Czecho-Slovakia as announced by the Supreme Council, 13th June 1919
- ⑤ Approximate line of greatest Rumanian advance



NOTE

On the 13th March 1919, Col Vix in the name of the Allies summoned the Hungarian Government to withdraw its forces to line ③. The area between ② and ③ was to be treated as a neutral zone. On the 13th June 1919 the Conference ordered the Soviet Government at Budapest to withdraw its forces behind the lines of permanent frontiers accorded to Czecho-Slovakia ④ and to Rumania approximately that of ②.

taken of Rumania's requirements, the Armistice line in Hungary being fixed only about half-way through Tránsylvania along the line of the River Maros. Controversy during the next nine months revolved in fact round the two questions of the extent of Hungarian territory which the Rumanians should be allowed to occupy, and the extent to which Hungary had carried out her obligation under Article 2, to demobilize all her forces except the six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions already mentioned. In deference to a strong Rumanian protest and to the evidence which was produced to show that the Hungarian regular or irregular forces were terrorizing the Rumanian parts of Hungary remaining in Hungarian occupation, General Franchet d'Esperey proposed in February, and the Conference finally agreed, to extend the Rumanian line of occupation to the west so as to include the three cities of Arad, Nagy Várad, and Szatmár Néméti. On the 19th March, Colonel Vyx, the French officer at the head of the Military Mission in Budapest, presented to the Károlyi Government a demand that all Hungarian forces should be withdrawn to a line corresponding to that fixed by the Rumanian Treaty of the 17th August 1916, leaving a neutral and unoccupied zone between this line and the new line which the Rumanians were to occupy. It was made perfectly clear by Colonel Vyx that these new lines were lines of military demarcation, and had nothing to do with the territorial frontiers which were subsequently to be established; Count Károlyi, however, thought fit to distort Colonel Vyx's communication, and to launch on the Hungarian public a manifesto in which he declared himself unable to accept frontiers so detrimental to the interests of Hungary, and handed over supreme power to the Hungarian proletariat. Such was the genesis of the Hungarian communist revolution.

15. *Béla Kun's Revolution.* On the 21st March a Soviet Government under the nominal presidency of M. Garbai and actual direction of Béla Kun, was established in Budapest. The object of its policy could hardly have been doubtful, for the commissaries lost no time in openly proclaiming that their sole interest was the furtherance by all means at their disposal of an international campaign for the domination of the proletariat. They announced an alliance with the Soviet Government of Moscow, and their intention of carrying hostilities into every *bourgeois* country of the world. They did not, however, state

exactly whether they did or did not undertake to recognize Hungarian obligations under the Armistice Conventions of the 3rd and 13th November agreed to by their predecessors. On the 1st April General Smuts was charged by the Supreme Council with a mission to Budapest to demand formally from the Communist Government whether they did or did not accept the lines of military demarcation laid down by the Entente Powers. General Smuts proposed to Béla Kun that, provided the Soviet Government at once withdrew their forces behind the line already marked out for them, Allied troops would occupy the zone between this line and the line to which the Rumanians would advance—in which zone would now be included the three large cities mentioned above. The Soviet Government, after some hesitation, replied that they would acknowledge their obligation to accept the two Military Conventions, and that they would withdraw their troops to the line indicated, but that they would only do so if the Rumanian forces retired to the original Maros line mentioned in Article 1 of the Convention of the 13th November, and if Allied troops occupied the whole zone thus established between the Rumanian and Hungarian forces. These proposals General Smuts categorically refused to accept.

16. *Béla Kun attacks Czecho-Slovakia, April-June.* The Soviet Government were, however, thinking not of peace but of war. They had at their disposal a considerable number of unemployed officers of the former Austro-Hungarian and even German armies. While personally totally opposed to the Communists, these officers conceived that the best hope of saving territory for Hungary was by armed resistance. Consequently, they put themselves at the disposal of Béla Kun for the organization of a powerful Red army to carry on hostilities against their Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian neighbours. For some weeks the new Red army was small in numbers and badly organized. The Rumanian forces took advantage of the situation and had occupied not only the line allowed them, but had pushed on to the Theiss by the end of April.

The Czecho-Slovaks had also advanced into Hungary from the north, and occupied the important coal areas of Salgó Tarján and Miskolcz. Their left wing established liaison with the Rumanian right wing in the neighbourhood of Csap on the 1st May. The Rumanians were anxious to advance on Buda-

pest, and had no doubt that within a few days the whole Communist movement would have collapsed. In Budapest, as elsewhere, this was generally believed to be the case, and in a speech on the 3rd May at Budapest, Béla Kun is reported to have said, 'The quality of most of the troops is such that Budapest is exposed to a Rumanian attack without defence'. The Supreme Council, however, considered it necessary to check the Rumanian forces at the Theiss, thereby leaving to Béla Kun not only the time to build up his Red army, but the opportunity of spreading throughout Hungary the idea that the Conference was on his side against Rumania.

The Rumanians were, however, in a strong position on the Theiss, and Béla Kun, once he had organized his army, preferred to throw it against the Czecho-Slovak forces, strung out as they were over country not easily defensible and seriously lacking as regards communications. An important factor underlying the Hungarian decision to attack the Czecho-Slovaks was the desire to regain immediately the coal-mining area of Salgó Tarján and Miskolcz, which was ethnically Hungarian, one of the few coal districts left to her.¹ Again, the prospect of separating the Czecho-Slovaks from the Rumanians and opening a way for a Russian Bolshevik advance across the Carpathians into Hungary may well have dazzled the eyes of the Communists. Moreover, in the Czecho-Slovak army there was not only a lack of guns and munitions, but a certain degree of apathy and a certain current of socialism, which militated against a successful encounter with the Hungarian Bolshevik forces. Consequently, the Hungarian Red army, gaining strength as it advanced, secured a series of successes, and within a few weeks had progressed far into the heart of Czecho-Slovakia.

17. *Intervention of the Peace Conference, 13th June.* At this moment, the Conference at last intervened, and on the 13th June addressed communications to the Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian Governments and to the Soviet Government at Budapest. It called upon the latter immediately to withdraw behind the new frontiers accorded to Czecho-Slovakia and Rumania. Béla Kun thereupon ordered a withdrawal, his eagerness for this being strengthened by the fact that the Czecho-Slovak army, reorganized by General Pellé, was now

¹ The mines of Pécs were eventually awarded to Hungary, but were then in Serbian occupation.

successfully counter-attacking. Within a few days he had withdrawn to the line indicated to him, and he then requested the Conference to call upon the Rumanians to carry out their part of the bargain. A new consideration, however, now came into play; the Rumanians declared that it would be dangerous for them to leave the line of the Theiss until the Hungarians had actually carried out Article 2 of the Military Convention—that is, had demobilized all their forces except six infantry and two cavalry divisions. Allied military opinion admitted the justice of this contention, and recognized that the general policy of Béla Kun had amounted to a complete violation of the Armistice Convention.

18. *Occupation of Budapest by Rumanians, 8th August.* On the 17th July General Franchet d'Esperey, acting on instructions from Paris, demanded that the Budapest Government should resign and make room for a government freely elected by the people; otherwise military action would immediately be taken against Hungary. This was the first active step taken by the Allies for the suppression of the Soviet Government, and on the 25th July the Conference issued a wireless communication formally declaring their readiness to enter into peace negotiations with Hungary if a representative government were established. Béla Kun, anxious to bolster up his tottering *régime* by a successful coup, replied to General Franchet d'Esperey's ultimatum by opening a regular offensive against the Rumanian forces. The Hungarians launched their attack on the 20th July. They broke through to a depth of from 15 to 35 kilometres and claimed to have captured 75 field guns and 36 heavy guns. The Rumanians, however, were well prepared, and as a result of their counter-attacks on the north and south, and the concentration of the Rumanian reserves in the centre, the Hungarians were forced back over the River Theiss along the whole front by the 26th July. The Rumanians crossed the Theiss a few days later, and by the 8th August they had occupied the city of Budapest itself and all Hungary east of the Danube. In these circumstances the Conference dispatched a Mission composed of four Allied generals to Budapest to get into touch with the Hungarian Government and see that the Armistice was observed and that disarmament was effectively carried out. The Mission was also to establish liaison with the Commanders of the Rumanian and Yugo-Slav armies, with a view to preventing any measures being taken such as might

prolong the existence of disturbed conditions in Hungary. For their political guidance the Allied representatives were informed that the Conference had no desire to interfere with the internal affairs of the Hungarian people, but could only treat with a government such as could be trusted to carry out its international obligations.

The Rumanian advance, justified though it was by the local situation, had taken the Supreme Council by surprise, and they at once sent an urgent communication to the Rumanian Government, calling on them to stop the forward movement of their troops. The Rumanians were, however, convinced that only by the occupation of Budapest could the final downfall of the Communist *régime* in Hungary be secured. They accordingly persisted in their advance, and from the moment when the Rumanian forces entered the Hungarian capital, the problem of enforcing the will of the Conference upon Hungary changed to that of enforcing it upon a recalcitrant ally.

19. *Summary.* To sum up, the root causes of all the misunderstandings and difficulties which occurred in the case of Hungary as of other parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were:

1. That there was no unity either of military command or of political direction in the treatment of the forces of the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a whole.

2. That the Military Conventions establishing the Armistice had taken little or no account of the interests of some of the parties most concerned, and that nine months after the Armistice Rumania had (rightly or wrongly) received no compensation in kind for her material losses during the war.

3. That when dealing with the Soviet Government at Budapest, which made no secret of its bellicose intentions, the Conference preferred relying on the verbal assurance of Béla Kun to observing or controlling his actions.

4. When at last plans were considered for a combined military operation to enforce the observance of terms which Hungary had disregarded for nine months, the matter was so delayed that in the meanwhile, Rumania, the State most directly interested, had already taken independent action. In fairness to Rumania it must, however, be recognized that it was the Hungarians who took the initiative by invading Rumanian territory, and that the force of the Rumanian counter-attack carried it through to Budapest.

CHAPTER IX

THE LEGAL BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE BY TREATIES

PART I

THE BREAK-UP OF THE WORLD'S SYSTEM OF TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

§ I. INTRODUCTION

THE effect of the World War of 1914-1918 upon the institutional and legal fabric of human society is a subject of vital importance in all studies of social, economic, political, and legal conditions during the years of war and of reconstruction. The war has affected the municipal legal systems of all the world's States, both belligerent and neutral; and it has also affected, in many important particulars, the system of International Law. Not only has the war shaped and modified the rules and principles of municipal and international law: it has also determined the nature and the scope of relations, and especially of contractual relations, between States and between individuals.

Prior to the outbreak of the World War of 1914-1918 the relations of States one to another were governed, in the main, by a system of international rules and principles based partly upon custom and partly upon a mass of written agreements. In a certain sense the States of the world formed a vast community in which common and separate interests, within the environment of economic and social evolution and of political progress, struggled for mastery. Various factors tended to produce world unity. The existence of groups of States helped to narrow and limit the particularist tendencies of certain of the great political entities, and the interdependence of all communities in the matter of trade produced a measure of international co-operation. The subtle ties of friendship, art, and literature led to a certain unity in the world, while religious,

labour, and intellectual movements operated in the same direction. But the spirit of nationality, the divergence of political systems, the rivalry in commerce, and the march of territorial expansion all accentuated the differences in aim and in method between individual communities within the world-community as a whole. The chief bond which held the world's States together in a vast community of communities was one of a legal character. All of the States had become associated, in one way or another, in a 'family of nations' which recognized the binding force of international law and international morality. This legal and moral system was crude at best; it lacked many of the essential elements possessed by any one of the leading national systems of law and justice. But it formed the legal basis of international relations, and it gave promise of further evolution to meet the needs of the States' community.

The war, unprecedented in scope and violence, has dealt the whole system of international law, both customary and conventional, a rude blow from the effects of which it will take many years to recover; ¹ and never again will this system be exactly what it was before, for new factors have been produced by the war itself which are leading, under the shaping hand of the League of Nations and other widespread influences, to novel principles and processes of international action.

With many of the immediate effects of the war on the system of international law we are not now concerned. Only treaties and conventions, as distinct from international customs, fall within our survey; and here again we are concerned merely to point out, in the briefest manner, the effect of the shock of war upon the network of treaties and conventions which, in 1914, linked the States of the world together in amicable relations. The outbreak of the war resulted in the annulment of many treaties and conventions and in the suspension or unenforceability of many others. A reference to the juridical principles, which are to be applied to this partial collapse or break-up of treaty relationships of States, forms merely a prelude to the study of the efforts to replace the state of war by a stable *régime* of friendly international relations based upon Treaties of Peace. The various stages in this process will form the main subject-matter of the present

¹ See Lawrence, *The Society of Nations*, 1919, Lecture IV.

chapter. We shall see how the negotiations of 1918 led to pre-armistice international Agreements and how these Agreements lie at the basis of Armistice Conventions and Treaties of Peace alike. In many ways these pre-armistice Agreements constitute the foundation of the entire structure of the World's Peace; and as such this deserves the painstaking study of historians and statesmen.

§ II. THE EFFECT OF WAR ON TREATIES: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Our first inquiry must be this: What, at the moment of the outbreak of war in 1914, were the recognized principles of international law as to the effect of war on treaties, or conventions, between States? The answer to this question is not altogether easy, owing largely to variance in international practice and to differences of opinion among the leading international jurists.¹ But it is at least possible to classify the various kinds of treaties and conventions and to state the law, in so far as the law is at all settled, in regard to each one of them.

I: *First Method of Classification*²

A. There are, in the first place, *treaties to which other States besides the belligerents are parties*. These treaties are of two kinds, which publicists designate as 'great international treaties' and 'ordinary treaties'.

(1) In considering the juridical effects of war on 'great international treaties' it is necessary to distinguish four separate and distinct situations.

(a) The first situation arises when the cause of the war is entirely unconnected with the treaty in question. In such case the treaty is unaffected by the war; it remains in force. Thus, the great Treaty of Paris of 1856 settled for a time the Eastern question; and Prussia and Austria were two of the signatory Powers. The war of 1866 between these two States

¹ On the whole subject of the effect of war on treaties, see Hall, *International Law*, 7th ed., 1917 (edited by Professor A. Pearce Higgins), pp. 397-408; Lawrence, *International Law*, 4th ed., 1910, pp. 360-5; Westlake, *International Law*, Part II: War, 1907, pp. 29-32; Oppenheim, *International Law*, 2nd ed., 1912, Vol. II, pp. 128-31; Crandall, *Treaties: Their Making and Enforcement*, 2nd ed., 1916, § 181.

² This method is based largely on Lawrence, *op. cit.*, pp. 360-5.

was caused by German affairs which were entirely unconnected with the Turkish Empire and with its dependencies. The effect of the war of 1866 upon the Treaty of Paris of 1856 was to leave it entirely unaffected. The rights and obligations of Prussia and Austria under the Treaty of Paris remained exactly what they were before the outbreak of the war of 1866.

(b) The second situation arises when, although the cause of the war is entirely unconnected with the treaty in question, the war operates nevertheless to prevent the performance of certain of its obligations by the belligerent States. Such obligations are suspended for the time being; but they revive again as soon as the belligerent State is able to perform them. Thus, during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 it was impossible for France, hard hit by the war, to fulfil its guarantee of the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire under the treaty of 1856 with England and Austria. On the other hand, obligations of the treaty which it is possible for the belligerent State to fulfil at all times during the war, especially obligations which exact merely passive acquiescence and no active support, are unaffected by the war and are not suspended. The entire treaty is unaffected so far as neutral signatory Powers are concerned; it remains fully binding on them throughout the war.

(c) The third situation is where the war arises out of the treaty itself. Thus, in 1877 Russia and Turkey, two of the several parties to the Treaty of Paris of 1856, engaged in a war over the Eastern question. The effect of war upon such a treaty is doubtful; it depends chiefly on the will of the neutral signatory Powers. But, in the instance just given, the Treaty of Berlin (1878) shows the views held by the several signatory Powers as to the effect of the war of 1877 upon the earlier Treaty.

(d) The fourth situation is created where two or more States are at war and where the question is as to the effect of the war upon great law-making treaties of which the regulations contemplate international society as a whole. The general principle here is that such a treaty is unaffected by the war. When, however, such a treaty deals with the laws of war, the war itself brings the treaty into operation.

(2) The second kind of treaties to which one or more States besides the belligerent Powers are parties are the so-called

'ordinary treaties'. The effect of the war upon such treaties depends upon their subject-matter. As a general principle it may be said that they are either obligatory, or suspended, or abrogated, so far as the belligerent States are concerned, but that they are unaffected with regard to third parties. Thus, a convention in regard to maritime capture would be brought into operation by the war; it would be binding as between the belligerent States and as between each of them and neutral signatory Powers. A treaty of commerce, on the other hand, would cease to be binding on the belligerents, but would seem to be obligatory as between each of the belligerents and the neutral States who were parties to it. A treaty of alliance between three States would be completely abrogated, however, by the outbreak of war between two of the signatory Powers.

B. There are, in the second place, *treaties to which the belligerent States only are parties*. Such treaties are of four kinds.

(1) So-called *pacta transitoria* are treaties which—even though they may be performed by one single act or by a series of acts—establish a permanent state of things. Such treaties are unaffected by war; as, for example, treaties of cession or recognition, or boundary conventions. Thus, the boundaries between belligerent States established by convention prior to the war remain as they are, until they are readjusted by the treaty of peace or completed conquest.

(2) Treaties of alliance and conventions, which bind the parties to friendship and amity, are abrogated by war.

(3) Treaties which regulate ordinary social, political, and commercial intercourse, such as postal and commercial treaties, extradition treaties, conventions in regard to property, and the like, form a third group. The effect of war upon them is doubtful under existing law and practice. They are indeed at least suspended during the war; but it is uncertain whether they are revived by the fact of the re-establishment of peace, or whether they are abrogated by the war and must be entered into afresh on the conclusion of hostilities. The practice of States gives no certain answer to these questions. Generally the treaty of peace deals with such treaties; the parties expressly annul them, continue them, or replace them by new arrangements. In the absence of such express stipulations no rule can be laid down as clear law; but it may be held on

general principles that treaties of the kind now under consideration are merely suspended by war and that they revive at the conclusion of peace, unless the treaty of peace provides otherwise.

(4) Treaties which regulate the conduct of signatory States towards each other as belligerents, or as belligerent and neutral, are brought into operation by war.

II: *Second Method of Classification*

According to Westlake¹ it is the 'general rule that war abrogates the treaties existing between the belligerents, and that their revival, if desired, must be expressly provided for in the treaty of peace'.

'To this rule, however,' continues Westlake, 'there are certain exceptions.

'First, all conventional obligations as to what is to be done in a state of war must continue in force, or they would have no position at all. . . .

'Secondly, transitory or dispositive treaties, including all those which are intended to establish a permanent condition of things, form another exception. . . .

'A third exception is that of treaties establishing arrangements to which third powers are parties, such as guarantees and postal and other unions. . . . Outside the exceptions which have been discussed, treaties between belligerents do not survive the outbreak of war. . . .'

III: *Third Method of Classification*

There is still another method of dealing with the problem of classifying treaties from the point of view of the effect upon them of the outbreak of war. Classifying them in reference to parties, it may be said that treaties fall into three main groups.

A. *Bilateral treaties* between two States which become opposing belligerents. In accordance with the general practice of States and the view held by most jurists, the effect of war is to terminate all such treaties.²

B. *Multilateral treaties where all the parties are belligerents.* This case seems to be covered neither by the precedents of

¹ *International Law*, Part II: War, 1907, pp. 29-32.

² But see I, B, (3), *supra*, pp. 362-3.

the past nor by the writings of international jurists. On principle it would seem possible to treat these treaties in the same way as bilateral treaties between two opposing belligerents, and thus to regard them as terminated as between all parties, unless they are specifically revived at the termination of hostilities in the treaty of peace.

C. *Multilateral treaties where one or more of the parties are neutral.* The general view of the jurists is that such treaties are not terminated by the outbreak of war; as between the belligerents they are merely suspended during war, and as between each belligerent and each neutral party they are not even suspended but retain their full force and effect during hostilities; while at the conclusion of peace they revive automatically and become operative upon all parties. In order to prevent the automatic revival of such treaties it is necessary to insert in the treaty of peace an express stipulation to this effect.

§ III. THE EFFECT OF THE WAR OF 1914-18 ON TREATIES

A careful and detailed application of the fundamental legal principles governing the effect of war on treaties to the treaty-system in force in 1914 is one of the most important of all the many branches of present-day juridical study. It is manifestly impossible, however, within the limits of this chapter, to deal adequately with the many and complex problems connected with the effect of the World War upon the hundreds of treaties and conventions which bound the States one to another in 1914. Such an inquiry would involve a consideration of the great law-making treaties no less than of the almost innumerable treaties concluded for all kinds of other purposes. It would involve the examination of many groups of treaties and conventions, such, for example, as those which relate to the conduct of hostilities, arbitration, extradition, the slave trade, post, telegraphy and radio-telegraphy, fisheries, patents and trade marks, copyright, commerce and navigation, joint-stock companies, sanitation, agriculture and labour, and all the far-reaching subjects of territorial and political authority in all parts of the world.

The outbreak of the war and the practices of the belligerent and neutral States during the war have affected this whole

treaty-system in countless directions.¹ There has been indeed a partial, but nevertheless a far-reaching, break-up of the treaty relations which existed in 1914. The effects of this break-up are seen most clearly in the treaty relations between the two opposing groups of belligerent States; but they are also observable in respect to treaties which involve neutral States as parties. Indeed, it is hardly possible to contend that the treaty relations of any one of the world's States have been unaffected by the great struggle which has swept over all the continents and all the seas.

The necessity of dealing with this vast problem on general principles of international law is partly obviated by reason of the fact that the Treaties of Peace contain certain provisions in regard to the effect of the war upon treaties. With these provisions we shall deal briefly in a later portion of the present chapter; but we shall see that, even after we have studied the stipulations of the treaties, we shall still remain in doubt as to the after-war status of many of the most important treaties and conventions which possessed binding force in July 1914.

PART II

THE STAGES IN THE HISTORY OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Throughout the whole period of the war there was much public discussion of the possibility of ending the conflict by means of negotiation; but in the present chapter only the later stages of this discussion will be brought under review. These stages begin with the German peace note of the 12th December 1916, and end with the conclusion of treaties of peace at Paris. These later stages constitute the history of diplomatic and authoritative public discussion of the possibility of re-establishing the world's peace and of the terms to be embodied in the treaty or treaties of peace.

It is not one of the purposes of the present chapter to trace, even in outline, the evolution of thought which led ultimately to

¹ On the effect of the war on the treaty guaranteeing Belgium's and Luxemburg's neutrality, see Baty and Morgan, *War: Its Conduct and Legal Results*, 1915, pp. 229-43; Phillipson, *International Law and the Great War*, 1915, pp. 1-26. On the effect of the war upon certain Hague Conventions, see Hall, *op. cit.*, 1917, pp. xxxviii, xxxix, 478 seq. Consult also the Index, s. v. Hague Conventions.

the armistices and to the assembling of the Peace Conference at Paris ; but the marking of the several stages in the history of the documents and public statements relating to war-aims and peace proposals will enable us to study in clearer light the period in which agreement was reached as between the Allied and Associated Powers on the one side and Austria-Hungary and Germany on the other, as to the fundamental principles or bases upon which peace might be concluded. This agreement of the parties upon fundamentals is of vital importance in its relation to the Armistice Conventions, the discussions at the Peace Conference, and the terms of the Treaties of Peace.

(1) *First Stage.* The first of the several stages begins with the German Peace Note of 12th December 1916, the German note to the Pope of the same date, and President Wilson's note to the belligerents of 18th December 1916. The German notes, in which Germany and her Allies declared themselves ready to enter forthwith into peace negotiations, and the President's note, in which he sought to elicit the respective views of the belligerents as to the terms of peace, were unconnected in origin ; but the issue of all three of them within the short space of a week initiated the authoritative discussion of peace terms. The replies to these notes contained certain of the fundamental demands of the Allies ; and it may well be that the justice of these demands, embodied in documentary form and supported by the cogent reasoning of Mr. Balfour's dispatch (16th January 1917) commenting on the Allied note of 30th December 1916 was one of the main factors in slowly influencing the mind of the President towards American participation in the war. Certain it is that in his Address to the Senate on 22nd January 1917, after he had received the German reply (25th December 1916) to his note and after the issue also of the German and Austrian notes to neutrals (11th January 1917), the President drew attention to the fact that the Entente Powers had replied 'much more definitely' to his note than had the Central Powers, and that they had 'stated, in general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the dis-

cussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace.'

The Allied replies had indeed brought a 'definite discussion of the peace' much nearer; but for nearly two years that discussion was by way of public pronouncement by statesmen and the further interchange of diplomatic notes, not by way of a peace conference as had been proposed by the Central Powers in the first German note to the United States. A few days after the President had addressed the Senate (22nd January 1917) the German Government announced the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare (31st January). On the 3rd February the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and on the 6th April declared war upon her.

Prior to this had occurred the first Russian Revolution (12th March), to be followed by the repudiation of imperialism by the Russian provisional Government (10th April), and the appeal of the Russian Soviets for a restatement of the war-aims of the Allies (30th May). The Russian Government aimed at securing a general peace; while the German Reichstag, by the majority resolution of 19th July 1917, declared that it also sought a 'peace of understanding and the permanent reconciliation of the peoples'.

The first period of discussion of peace terms, initiated in December 1916, by Germany and the United States, had produced a clear statement of Allied demands; but it had ended in the collapse of all German plans for the negotiation of a peace treaty round the table of a conference.

(2) *Second Stage.* The second stage in the history of the discussion of peace terms begins with the sending of the Pope's note to the belligerents (1st August 1917) and ends with the delivery of President Wilson's speech in which he announced 'the programme of the world's peace' in 'Fourteen Points' (8th January 1918). Each one of these important pronouncements is inspired by lofty ideals, and each embodies definite principles to be applied in the peace settlement. But there is this vital difference between the Pope's plan of settlement and that proposed by the President. The Pope proposed what in substance amounted to a *status quo ante bellum*, whereas the President demanded a recognition of the fact that the pre-war age is 'an age that is dead and gone', that the peace settlement must embody 'essential rectifications of wrongs and

assertions of right', and that through it all must run 'the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak'.

The salient characteristics of this second stage in the efforts of statesmen to arrive at a satisfactory agreement upon peace terms are marked by

(a) The Pope's note and the replies of the belligerents of both groups ;

(b) The speeches of Herr Michaelis (28th September 1917), Count Czernin (2nd October, 4th and 6th December), and Baron von Kühlmann (9th October) on the one side, and of M. Ribot (12th October), Mr. Wilson (4th December), and Mr. Lloyd George (5th January 1918) on the other side ;

(c) The peace terms of the Russian Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates (20th October 1917), Trotsky's note containing proposals for an armistice (22nd November), and his note to the Entente Allies (7th December), the general statement of the principles of Russia, and of the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk (22nd December), and Trotsky's invitation to the Allied peoples and Governments (29th December).¹

(3) *Third Stage.* The third stage, inaugurated by President Wilson's address to Congress on 8th January 1918, in which he set forth the Fourteen Points of a future peace settlement, culminated in the meeting of representatives of the Allied and Associated States and of Austria-Hungary and Germany, to conclude armistices. Within this period notable speeches, embodying proposals of peace terms and criticism of these proposals, were delivered by the leading statesmen of both groups of belligerents ; and the delivery of those speeches, particularly those of President Wilson, constitutes the first important aspect of the period from the point of view of the peace settlement. The second important aspect of the period consists of the exchange of diplomatic notes. This correspondence began with the Austrian peace note (15th September 1918) and the German note to President Wilson (4th October) and ended with President Wilson's last note to Germany (5th November), and the meetings of the military and naval representatives of both groups of belligerents to consider the

¹ Practically all these documents may be found in Dickinson, *Documents and Statements relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims, 1919.*

Armistice. This third stage in the history of negotiations is of vital importance, for at its conclusion agreement had been reached by the Powers with Austria-Hungary and Germany alike as to the basis of the peace.

(4) *Fourth Stage.* The fourth stage consists of the few days during which the terms of the Armistice were considered by the representatives of the Allied and Associated States and Germany. The conclusion of the Armistice Convention ends this brief period on 11th November 1918.

(5) *Fifth Stage.* The fifth stage extends from the conclusion of the Armistice with Germany to the meeting of the Peace Conference held at Versailles on 7th May 1919.

(6) *Sixth Stage.* The sixth stage consists of the period from the 7th May to the 28th June 1919—the period of the discussion of the provisions of the draft Treaty of Peace with Germany. The signing of the Treaty at Versailles on 28th June 1919 occurred exactly five years to the day after the assassination of the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand at Serajevo.

The few weeks which constitute this sixth period are hardly of less importance than those which make up the third. The third is marked by the formation of the pre-armistice Agreement, while the distinctive mark of the sixth is the comparison of the Agreement with the draft Treaty by the parties to the peace negotiation and the divergence of views as between the two groups of negotiators.

PART III

THE CONCLUSION OF PRE-ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS

§ I. THE SEVERAL AGREEMENTS

Whether or not it may be held that the Allied and Associated Powers were bound by a legal or by a moral obligation either to Bulgaria or to Turkey to conclude Armistice Conventions and Treaties of Peace upon agreed terms and principles is a question which must be left for the moment on one side.¹ It is at least clear that the diplomatic correspondence of the autumn of 1918 led to (1) legal obligations binding the Powers on one side and Germany on the other side, and (2) moral obligations binding upon the Powers and Austria-Hungary

¹ See Part V, *infra*.

alike. We must now turn our attention to the stages in the process of forming these two pre-armistice Agreements.

The Agreement concluded between the Powers and Austria-Hungary is separate and distinct from that formed between the Powers and Germany. Not only are the two Agreements separate and distinct in respect to parties and process of formation, but they also differ in the matter of terms and principles. While certain of the addresses and speeches of President Wilson are taken as the common basis of both Agreements; yet an analysis of the two sets of diplomatic notes indicates clearly that the Agreements, while possessing features in common, yet differ each from the other in most important particulars.

§ II. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE POWERS AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

(1) *Austro-Hungarian Note (15th September 1918)*. In its note of 15th September the Austro-Hungarian Government expressed the view that 'a certain agreement relative to the general basic principles of a world-peace manifests itself'. 'It is true,' continued the Austrian Government in a later portion of the note, 'it must be remembered, that an agreement on general principles does not suffice, but that it is, further, a matter of reaching an accord on their interpretation and their application to individual concrete war and peace questions.' The Austro-Hungarian Government proposed, therefore, to the Governments of all belligerent States 'to send delegates to a confidential and non-binding discussion on basic principles for the conclusion of peace'.

(2) *American Note (16th September)*. In its answer to this note the Government of the United States declared that there was 'only one reply' to make to the suggestion of the Austro-Hungarian Government. The Government of the United States 'has repeatedly and with entire candour stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace, and can and will entertain no proposal for conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain'.

(3) *Austro-Hungarian Note (7th October)*. To this the Government of Austria-Hungary replied as follows in its note of 7th October: It 'offers to conclude with him [the President

of the United States] and his Allies an armistice on every front, on land, at sea, and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the "Fourteen Points" in the message of President Wilson to Congress of 8th January 1918, and the Four Points contained in President Wilson's address of 11th February 1918, should serve as a foundation, and in which the view-points declared by President Wilson in his address of 27th September 1918 will also be taken into account.'

(4) *American Note (18th October)*. In his note of 18th October, in reply to the Austrian note of 7th October, President Wilson declared that he could not 'entertain the present suggestion' of the Austrian Government 'because of certain events of the utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his Address of 8th January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace . . . the President formulated at that time occurred the following: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a *de facto* belligerent Government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Yugo-Slavs for freedom. The President is therefore no longer at liberty to accept a mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.'

(5) *Austro-Hungarian Note (27th October)*. The Austrian note of 27th October was in reply to this note of President Wilson of 18th October. In it the Government of Austria-Hungary, 'in the sense of the decision of the President to deal in particular with Austria-Hungary in regard to the question of an armistice and peace', declares that, 'as in the

case of the preceding statements of the President, it also adheres to his point of view as laid down in his last Note regarding the rights of the peoples of Austro-Hungary, particularly those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs. Consequently, as Austria-Hungary accepts all conditions upon which the President makes an entry into the negotiations regarding an armistice and peace dependent, nothing now stands in the way, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, of the commencement of *pourparlers*. The Austro-Hungarian Government declares itself in consequence prepared, without awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter into *pourparlers* regarding peace between Austria-Hungary and the States of the opposing party, and regarding immediate armistice on all the fronts of Austria-Hungary. It begs President Wilson to be good enough to make overtures on this subject.'

Upon the basis of this correspondence the War Council of the Allied and Associated States drew up the terms of the Armistice and Austria-Hungary accepted them on 3rd November 1918.

It seems clear from this correspondence and the conclusion of the Armistice based upon it, that the parties had reached agreement upon the following particulars :

(a) The 'foundation' of the peace negotiations shall be the 'Fourteen Points' (address of 8th January 1918), with the exception of Point Ten, and the 'Four Principles' of the address of 11th February 1918. Point Ten is modified in the sense of the notes of 18th and 27th October: the peoples of Austria-Hungary are to have not merely an 'opportunity of autonomous development', they are themselves to decide their own fate on the principle of self-determination.

(b) The 'view-points' of the speech of 27th September 1918, 'the Five Particulars', will also be taken into account.

The question as to the nature of this Agreement between the Powers and Austria-Hungary is one of fundamental importance. As already indicated, this Agreement upon the 'foundation' of the peace negotiations and the 'view-points' to be taken into account created at least moral obligations binding upon both parties. But is it to be viewed as creative not only of *moral* but also of *legal* obligations?

The whole problem is complicated because of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the fact that at least

since the Armistice of 3rd November 1918, the Powers have dealt separately with Austria and with Hungary. The view may be held that the Armistice of the 3rd November was based on the unconditional surrender of Austria and Hungary; and that it was in fact an Armistice of a purely military character and one without any political bearing at all. If indeed the State with which the Powers were at war and with which President Wilson had exchanged diplomatic notes, namely, the State of Austria-Hungary, had in fact ceased to exist as such, having been dissolved into its constituent elements, namely Austria and Hungary, then it becomes more difficult to hold that the Powers were bound by legal as distinct from moral obligations in framing the clauses of the treaties of peace with Austria and Hungary. To all seeming the Conference never came to any clear conception of the nature of the difficulties and of the true solution of this whole problem.

It is not proposed in the present chapter to attempt to come to any definite conclusion upon a problem of so much difficulty and complexity. It must suffice to indicate that the pre-armistice correspondence created an Agreement that certain fundamental terms and principles ought to be embodied in the treaties of peace with Austria and Hungary. The obligations resulting from this Agreement were at least of a moral character. Even if these obligations were purely moral and possessed no legal validity, it is difficult to hold that they ceased to be binding by reason of subsequent events. Even if the Armistice of 3rd November was in fact based upon unconditional surrender, it could hardly be maintained that the Powers were thereby absolved from their moral obligation to frame the treaties of peace with Austria and Hungary upon the lines of the addresses and speeches of President Wilson as specified (and modified in one important particular, namely, 'autonomy') by the diplomatic correspondence.

§ III. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE POWERS AND GERMANY

A. *The Diplomatic Correspondence of October and November 1918*¹

(1) *German Note (4th October)*. The diplomatic correspondence between the Governments of Germany and the United States in reference to an armistice and a peace began with the German note to President Wilson of 4th October 1918. In

¹ v. Appx. IV, pp. 448 sqq.

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this note the German Government 'requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerent States of this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations. ' It [the German Government] accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his Message to Congress of January 8th [the Fourteen Points].'

(2) *American Note (8th October)*. President Wilson's answer, embodied in his note of 8th October, was essentially a *questionnaire*. He deemed 'the answers to these [three] questions vital from every point of view'.

(a) 'Before making a reply to the request of the Imperial German Government and in order that the reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the Note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his Address to the Congress of the United States on January 8th last and in subsequent Addresses, and that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?'

(b) 'The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.'

(c) 'The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war.'

(3) *German Note (12th October)*. The German note of 12th October contained replies to the three questions of the President.

(a) 'The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January 8th and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the

application of these terms. The German Government believes that the Governments of the Powers associated with the Government of the United States also adopt the position taken by President Wilson in his address.'

(b) 'The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation. The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed Commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.'

(c) 'The present German Government, which has undertaken the responsibility for this step towards peace, has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.'

(4) *American Note (14th October)*. On 14th October President Wilson replied to the German note of 12th October. 'The unqualified acceptance', declares the President, 'by the present German Government, and by a large majority of the German Reichstag, of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his addresses to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January 1918, and in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his opinion with regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October 1918.' In the President's 'frank and direct statement of his opinion' he proceeds to specify three conditions precedent to the cessation of hostilities by means of an armistice.

(a) 'It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and the Allies in the field. He feels confident that . . . this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.'

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(b) Neither the United States nor (the President is 'quite sure') the Allies 'will consent to consider an armistice as long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhuman practices which they still persist in', such as the sinking of passenger ships and their boats at sea by German submarines and the wanton destruction of cities and villages by the German forces in the course of their enforced withdrawal from France and Flanders. 'The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to the cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued.'

(c) It is necessary also to call the attention of the German Government 'to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the 4th of July last. It is as follows: "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world, or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency." The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. . . . The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.'

(5) *German Note (20th October)*. On 20th October the German Government replied to President Wilson's note of 14th October in which he had specified three conditions precedent to a cessation of hostilities by means of an armistice.

(a) 'In complying with the proposal to evacuate occupied territories, the German Government started from the standpoint that the procedure in this evacuation and the conditions of armistice are to be left to the judgment of the military advisers, and that the present relative strengths on the fronts must be made the basis for arrangements that will safeguard and guarantee it. The German Government leaves

it to the President to create an opportunity to settle the details.'

(b) 'The German Government protests against the charge of illegal and inhuman practices . . . made against the German land and sea forces, and thereby against the German people.' German troops are under the 'strictest instructions to respect private property and to exercise care for the population'. 'Where excesses occur . . . the guilty are punished.' The German Navy has never 'purposely destroyed lifeboats with their occupants'. The German Government proposes that the 'facts be cleared up by neutral Commissions'. In order to avoid everything which might hamper the work of peace, the German Government has caused orders to be dispatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships.

(c) As a fundamental condition for peace, the President prescribes the destruction 'of every arbitrary power that can separately, uncontrolled, and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world'. The Constitution of the Empire has been fundamentally altered in order that the will of the people shall prevail for 'decisions on war and peace'. 'The question of the President, as to whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing with, is therefore clearly and unequivocally answered by the statement that the peace and an armistice offer issues from a Government which is free from all arbitrariness and irresponsible influence, and is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people.'

(6) *American Note (23rd October)*. President Wilson's note of 23rd October, in reply to the German note of 20th October, begins by declaring that, in view of assurances received from the German Government, the President cannot decline 'to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice'. These assurances are the following :

(a) 'the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in [the President's] Address to the Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918 [containing the Fourteen Points], and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses, particularly the Address of September

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27th [containing the 'Five Particulars'], and that it desires to discuss the details of their application';

(b) the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that 'this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from Ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag, and for an overwhelming majority of the German people';

(c) 'the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces'.

The President announces, in his note, that he has transmitted his correspondence with the German Government to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent. In so doing he has suggested to those Governments that if they are 'disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved, and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they [the Associated Governments] deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.'

In a previous portion of his note the President had expressly stated that 'the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into, and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible'. The latter part of the note deals with 'the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded'. This reason is the uncertainty as to the true seat of political and military power in Germany. It 'does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out, or that any guarantees either exist or

are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. . . . It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany . . . [The] nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy . . . [In] concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it [the Government of the United States] must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender.'

(7) *German Note (27th October)*. In its brief reply of 27th October the German Government takes cognizance of the President's note and assures him that 'the peace negotiations will be conducted by a People's Government, in whose hands the decisive legal power rests in accordance with the Constitution, and to which the Military Power will also be subject'. The note concludes with the statement that 'the German Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the President in his manifestations has described'.

(8) *American Note (5th November) and Allied Memorandum (5th November)*. President Wilson's note of 5th November to the German Government concludes the correspondence. In this note the President communicates to Germany the text of the 'memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments' on the correspondence that had taken place between the President and the German Government. The Allied Governments, in this memorandum, 'declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent

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Addresses,' subject, however, to two 'qualifications'. These two qualifications are the following :

(a) The Allied Governments 'must point out' that 'Clause 2 [point two of the President's 'Fourteen Points'], relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.'

(b) 'Further,' declare the Allied Governments, 'in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to Congress of January 8, 1918 [the 'Fourteen Points'], the President declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understood that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.' President Wilson states that he is 'in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted'.

President Wilson's note concludes with a notification to the German Government that 'Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government, and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice'.

B. *Stages in the Negotiation*

If this correspondence, consisting of eight notes in all, be analysed, it will be found that it represents two distinct stages in the negotiations which had as their ultimate objects the conclusion of an armistice and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

(1) *First Stage.* The first of these two stages begins with the German note of the 4th October and ends with the German note of the 27th October. Throughout this whole period the only parties to the conversations conducted by exchange of notes were the Government of Germany on the one side and the Government of the United States on the other. The object of the German Government, in beginning the correspondence, had been to induce the President of the United States 'to take in hand the restoration of peace'. But before he was willing

to move in this direction the President insisted upon a clear understanding, as between the German Government and himself, as to (a) conditions precedent to the conclusion of an armistice, (b) the terms of an armistice, and (c) the terms of peace and the principles of settlement. Without discussing in detail the successive steps of the negotiations which terminated with the German note of the 27th of October it may be said that by that time general agreement had been reached, as between the German and American Governments, on the three important matters with which the notes deal.

(a) *Conditions Precedent to an Armistice.* As conditions precedent to the conclusion of an armistice the German Government, on the insistence of the President, had given its solemn assurances that there should be an immediate evacuation of all territories occupied by the armies of the Central Powers, the process of evacuation to be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the American and Allied Governments;¹ that illegal and inhuman practices of warfare on the part of German armed forces shall cease and that the humane rules of civilized warfare shall be observed by them both on land and at sea; and that the present German Government, free from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is responsible, under the existing constitution, to the German people, and that the military power is subject to this 'People's Government'.

(b) *Terms of the Armistice.* As to the terms of the armistice, provided an armistice be deemed possible, from the military point of view, by the enemies of Germany, there was agreement between the German and American Governments that such terms of armistice shall provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees that the military supremacy of the United States and the Allies shall be maintained, and that they shall leave these Powers in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities by Germany impossible.

(c) *Terms of Peace and Principles of Settlement.* As to the terms of peace and the principles of settlement the German and American Governments had reached general agreement that

¹ Although immediate evacuation formed one of the conditions precedent to an armistice, the Powers did not insist upon the fulfilment of this condition prior to the conclusion of the Armistice Convention. The Convention itself provided for evacuation. See further Part IV, § 1, p. 389, and Part VI, (1), (2), pp. 420-1.

such terms and principles shall be those stated by President Wilson in his Address to Congress on 8th January 1918, and in his subsequent address, particularly the address of the 27th September, and that the object of peace discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application.

In view of this general agreement between the German and American Governments as to (a) the conditions precedent to an armistice, (b) the terms of an armistice, and (c) the terms and principles of peace, President Wilson transmitted his whole correspondence with Germany to the Allied Governments for their consideration. In its brief note of 27th October, the German Government informed President Wilson that it awaited 'the proposals for an armistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the President in his manifestations has described'. With this note the first stage of the negotiations terminated.

(2) *Second Stage.* The second stage of the negotiations which led to the meeting of representatives of the Allied and Associated States with representatives of Germany, for the purpose of considering the question of an armistice and, if possible, of settling its terms, was inaugurated by President Wilson's last note to Germany—the note of the 5th of November 1918. From every point of view, this note is the most important of all the notes exchanged between the German and American Governments in the weeks immediately preceding the Armistice of the 11th of November; for it constitutes the formal and written offer of the Allied and Associated States to conclude with Germany (a) an armistice convention, and (b) a treaty of peace. This offer, it is conceived, was accepted by Germany by the act of sending representatives through military channels, to meet Marshal Foch for the purpose of arranging an armistice. By the acceptance of the offer a solemn Agreement was reached which served, both morally and legally, as the basis of the armistice convention and the treaty of peace.

Owing to the great importance of this preliminary Agreement, or Contract, between the Allied and Associated States and Germany, it is necessary to discover and to understand its terms. Its express terms are set forth in the President's note of the 5th November and the Allied memorandum which it embodied; its implied terms are to be found, it is conceived, in the preceding correspondence between the German and American Governments which embodied the general agreement

between those Governments, which led the President 'to take in hand the restoration of peace' by the transmission of the correspondence to the Allies, and which was adopted as their own by the Allied States in the memorandum of 5th November. In other words, in order to discover the terms of the Agreement between the Allied and Associated Governments and the German Government it is necessary to read the express offer of the 5th November in the light of the entire correspondence which began on the 4th October. All the Allied and Associated States became parties to this correspondence by the memorandum of 5th November; for by that memorandum the Allies ratified the correspondence conducted by President Wilson alone, save for two important reservations in regard to the 'freedom of the seas' and 'restoration'.

C. *The Agreement as to an Armistice and a Peace*

(1) *The Armistice.* What, then, was the Agreement, if any, as to the terms which should be embodied in an armistice convention? The President's note of the 5th November contains only two express references to an armistice. In the beginning of the note the President drew careful attention to his note of the 23rd October in which he had advised the German Government that he had transmitted his correspondence with it to the Allied Governments, 'with the suggestion that, if those Governments were disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect the interest of the people involved and ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deemed such an armistice possible from the military point of view'. At the end of the note the German Government was notified by the President that 'Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government, and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice'.

It is obvious that the appointment of Marshal Foch to

'communicate' the 'terms of an armistice' to German representatives indicated that the Allied and Associated Governments viewed the sort of armistice indicated by President Wilson in his correspondence with the German Government as an armistice which was 'possible from the military point of view' of the enemies of Germany. But, what was the Agreement between the Associated and Allied Governments and the German Government as to the nature of the armistice? The express terms of the Agreement are embodied in the President's note of the 5th November, for the reason that this note constituted the offer of Germany's enemies which was accepted by the act of sending representatives to meet Marshal Foch.

In the first place, therefore, it seems clear from the note of 5th November that the armistice which Marshal Foch was entitled to insist upon was one which, in the express words of the note, 'would fully protect the interest of the peoples involved and ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed [in its correspondence with President Wilson]'.

In the second place, it seems equally clear that the note of 5th November must be read in connexion with the preceding correspondence and that any terms as to an armistice agreed upon in that correspondence between the German and American Governments must be regarded as implied terms of the Agreement between all the Allied and Associated Governments and the German Government. If we are entitled to adopt this principle, and on the general rules of contract law it would seem that we are, the implied terms in the Agreement in question include, amongst others, the immediate evacuation of all invaded territories, the maintenance of the military supremacy of the Allied and Associated States, and the perfecting of arrangements to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible.

In the third place, it is to be noted that the express Agreement between Germany and her enemies, embodied in the note of 5th November, contained, in addition to provisions as to the armistice, the 'terms of peace' and the 'principles of settlement'. Inasmuch as the terms of peace and the principles of settlement had been agreed upon in advance, it is clear that the agreed terms of the armistice must be read in connexion

with them. In the words of the note of 5th November, the terms of the armistice were to be 'the necessary terms of such an armistice as would . . . ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed'. In other words, the armistice convention must be framed with a view to the conclusion of a peace treaty based upon the 'terms of peace' and the 'principles of settlement' agreed upon in advance by Germany and her enemies. Various clauses of the Armistice Convention of the 11th November 1918 must be viewed as based upon this principle, that the armistice terms may, where necessary for safeguarding and enforcing the details of the peace to which both sides have agreed in advance, actually embody 'terms of peace' and 'principles of settlement'. Thus, for example, the provisions of the Armistice Convention (11th November 1918) as to the 'annulment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties' (Clause XV) and 'reparation for damage done' (Clause XIX) are to be studied from this point of view, as we shall see presently.

(2) *The Peace.* Passing on now from the consideration of the Agreement from the point of view of the terms of armistice, it is necessary to inquire as to its provisions in regard to the 'terms of peace' and 'principles of settlement'. Prior to the dispatch of the note of 5th November, the German and American Governments had reached agreement upon the fundamental point that the President's address of 8th January 1918, and his subsequent addresses, were to be the basis of the peace. The note of 5th November embodies the memorandum of the Allied Governments; and it is this memorandum which must be viewed as the documentary embodiment of the provisions of the Agreement as to 'terms of peace' and 'principles of settlement'. President Wilson's attitude towards two of the 'terms of peace' is worthy of special consideration at a later stage of our investigation; but, for the present, it is only necessary to draw careful attention to the vital portions of the Allied memorandum itself. 'The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow,' state the Allied Governments, 'they declare their

willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918 [the address containing the 'Fourteen Points'], and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses.' The 'qualifications' of the 'terms of peace' contained in the President's Address of 8th January 1918 are two in number. In reference to Point two of the President's 'Fourteen Points'—the point in regard to 'the freedom of the seas'—the Allies 'reserve to themselves complete freedom' when they enter the Peace Conference. The President is silent in regard to this qualification. In reference to the declaration in several of the 'Fourteen Points' that invaded territory must be 'restored' as well as evacuated and freed, the Allies expressly state what they understand this provision implies, namely, compensation for all damage done to the civilian population and their property. The President expressly states that he is in agreement with the interpretation given by the Allied Governments.

In this memorandum by the Allied Governments the fundamental provisions of the Agreement as to the peace are to be found; and, inasmuch as these provisions are based on certain addresses of President Wilson, it becomes necessary to analyse these addresses with some care and to consider one of them in its relation to the two 'qualifications' of the Allies.

PART IV

THE TERMS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE PRE-ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS AND GERMANY

The terms and principles of the pre-armistice Agreement in regard to the armistice and the peace are embodied in (1) five addresses and speeches of President Wilson delivered in 1918, and (2) eight notes exchanged between President Wilson and the German Government in the months of October and November 1918.

(1) *The Addresses and Speeches.* The addresses and speeches are the following: Address to Congress of 8th January 1918 (Fourteen Points); Address to Congress of 11th February 1918 (Four Principles); Speech at Baltimore of 6th April 1918;

Speech at Mount Vernon of 4th July 1918 (Four Objects) ; Speech at New York of 27th September 1918 (Five Particulars). In their memorandum of 5th November 1918, contained in the President's note to Germany of that date, the Allied Governments refer to the ' terms of peace ' laid down in the Address of 8th January 1918, and the ' principles of settlement ' enunciated in the four subsequent addresses and speeches. If the language of the Allied memorandum be interpreted in a narrow sense the ' terms of peace ' include only the Fourteen Points and the ' principles of settlement ' include only the thirteen principles set forth in three separate sets—Four Principles on 11th February, Four Objects on 4th July, and Five Particulars on 27th September. These Points and Principles constitute no doubt fundamental provisions of the Agreement ; but it is conceived that they do not form all of the ' terms ' and ' principles '. Indeed, if the memorandum be interpreted in a broad sense the intention of the parties was that the full text of all five utterances of the President should be the basis of the Agreement—not only the ' Fourteen Points ' and the ' Thirteen Principles ', but all other terms of peace and principles of settlement contained in the five addresses and speeches. The discussions between Germany and the Powers at Paris make it clear that we must adopt this broader interpretation ; for both parties to the discussion rely on many passages in the President's five addresses and speeches which are not specifically included in the ' Fourteen Points ' and the ' Thirteen Principles '. Any passage which may be viewed as expressing a term of peace or a principle of settlement finds its proper place, therefore, in the provisions of the Agreement.

(2) *The Notes.* It seems equally clear that the diplomatic notes of October and November 1918 form also a part of the Agreement as to an armistice and a peace. The last note (5th November) is based on all the preceding ones ; and in it the Allies clearly make themselves parties to the entire correspondence between the American and German Governments. This correspondence embodies very important terms and principles, particularly in reference to an armistice, as we have already seen.¹

The offer of the Allied and Associated Powers, contained in the note of 5th November 1918, was that the Armistice Con-

¹ See Part III, § III, *supra*, pp. 373–80.

vention and the Treaty of Peace should be based on President Wilson's addresses and speeches and on the diplomatic correspondence; and it was this offer which Germany accepted. These documents constitute the entire Written Agreement—the basis of the agreed Armistice and the agreed Peace alike. To the terms and principles embodied in this Written Agreement we must now turn our attention.

(3) *Comments.* Five preliminary observations may, however, be made:

In the first place, the 'ideals' expressed by the President in his public utterances are actually 'terms of peace' and 'principles of peace' and are so regarded by the parties to the discussions of the draft Treaty, in its relation to the Agreement, at the Paris Conference.¹ 'Justice' and 'freedom', for example, are actual principles of settlement.

In the second place, only a study of the complete text of all the five addresses and speeches and of all the eight notes will, in their relation one to another, give the full meaning of the 'terms of peace' and 'principles of settlement'.

In the third place, the excerpts from the addresses, speeches, and notes, which have been arranged systematically under headings in the pages which follow, must be studied in connexion with their context; and for this purpose the reader should refer to the full text of the documents in the Appendix. Only by so doing will the full intent of the contracting States be revealed.

In the fourth place, it is to be observed that, although the addresses and speeches are treated in the present part of this chapter only in their relation to the Agreement with Germany, they have nevertheless a wider significance, for they were intended to serve as a programme for the world's peace and were so treated by the negotiators of the several treaties of peace.

In the fifth place, the speeches of the responsible statesmen of the belligerents during 1918 must be read in connexion with President Wilson's addresses and speeches; for they are important as showing the full intent of the parties as to the meaning and scope of the 'terms of peace' and 'principles of settlement' contained in the President's utterances.²

¹ See Part VIII, *infra*.

² See, for example, the speeches of Count Czernin and Count von Hertling

§ I. THE ARMISTICE

The Agreement embodies, amongst others, the following provisions in regard to the nature and terms of an armistice¹:

(1) The Armistice must 'fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed'.

(2) The Armistice must provide for (a) the immediate evacuation of all invaded territories, (b) the maintenance of the military supremacy of the Allied and Associated Powers, and (c) the perfecting of arrangements to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible.

(3) The Armistice Convention may, for the purpose of safeguarding and enforcing the details of the peace to which both sides have agreed in advance, actually embody 'terms of peace' and 'principles of settlement'.

§ II. THE NATURE OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

(1) *Final Settlement.*

Address of 8th January 1918: 'We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which . . . made the life of our people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence.'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'He [Count von Hertling] refuses to apply them [the general principles of the Allied and Associated Powers] to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement . . . [the] items in the final accounting.'

Speech of 6th April 1918: '[Germany's] present Chancellor has said . . . that he believed that peace should be based upon the principles which we had declared would be our own in the final settlement.'

delivered on 24th January, in reply to President Wilson's address of 8th January 1918 (the Fourteen Points); Mr. Lloyd George's speech of 12th February, Mr. Balfour's speech of 13th February, Signor Orlando's speech of 13th February, and Baron Sonnino's speech of 23rd February; Count Hertling's speech on 25th February, and Mr. Balfour's speech of 27th February, in reference to President Wilson's address of 11th February (Four Principles); and Mr. Balfour's speech of 30th September in reference to President Wilson's speech of 27th September (Five Particulars).

¹ See Part III, § III, *supra*, p. 373 sqq.

Speech of 4th July 1918 : ‘The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No half-way decision is conceivable.’

Speech of 27th September 1918 : ‘[The issues of the war] must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all, and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest. This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace. . . . We all agree that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the Governments of the Central Empires. . . . [No] peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting. There should exist no doubt about that.’

(2) *Parties to the Settlement.*

Address of 11th February 1918 : ‘We cannot have general peace for the asking or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful States. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it, because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain, and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice rather than a bargain between Sovereigns.’

Address of 11th February 1918 : ‘[The] covenants [of the peace] must be backed by the united force of all nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost.’

Speech of 27th September 1918 : ‘[The] whole world has been drawn into [the war]. The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual States. . . . peoples of all sorts and races . . . are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement. . . . Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?’

(3) *Common Judgment of All.*¹

¹ See § II (2), *supra*.

(4) *Open Covenants.*¹

Address of 8th January 1918: 'It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit thenceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular Governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world.'²

Address of 8th January 1918 (Point One): 'Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.'

(5) *Principle.*³

Address of 8th January 1918: 'An evident principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined [in the Fourteen Points] . . .'

Address of 11th February 1918: '[We] entered upon this war upon no small occasion, and . . . we can never turn back from a course chosen upon principle.'

Speech of 6th April 1918: ' . . . [The] principles we [have] declared would be our own in the final settlement.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '[The Governments of the Central Empires] observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest . . .'

Speech of 27th September 1918: ' . . . [No] peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting.'

§ III. INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

(1) *New International Order.*

Address of 8th January 1918: 'What we demand in this war . . . is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world

¹ See also § III (5), *infra*, pp. 399-400.

² In this same address the President remarks: 'The Russian representatives have insisted very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed doors, and all the world have been the audience as was desired.'

³ See also § II (1), *supra*, pp. 389-90.

be made fit and safe to live in, and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation . . . as against force and selfish aggression.'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'After a settlement all round effected in this fashion by individual barter and concession he [Count von Hertling] would have no objection . . . to a League of Nations which would undertake to hold the new Balance of Power steady against external disturbance. It must be evident to every one who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion [as that proposed by Count von Hertling]. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon the broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches. . . . [Count von Hertling] is in fact living in his thought in a world dead and gone. . . . It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of people affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade. . . . We believe that our own desire for new international order, under which reason and justice and the common interests of mankind shall prevail, is the desire of enlightened men everywhere. Without that new order the world will be without peace, and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development. Having set our hand to the task of achieving it, we shall not turn back.'

(2) *Common Will and Concert of Mankind.*

Speech of 4th July 1918: ' . . . What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: 'The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual States. . . . Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights? . . .'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '[The Governments of

the Central Empires] observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '... [The] general and common family of the League of Nations.'

(3) *International Law and Morality.*¹

Address of 8th January 1918 (Point Seven): 'Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of International Law is for ever impaired.'

Address of 8th January 1918: 'We do not wish to fight her [Germany] . . . if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair-dealing.'

Speech of 4th July 1918: 'Third, the consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honour and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another, to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.'

Speech of 4th July 1918: '*What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.*'

(4) *Separate Alliances, Covenants, Understandings, and Combinations of States.*²

Address of 8th January 1918 (Point One): 'Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.'

¹ See also the stipulations as to 'illegal and inhuman practices' in warfare embodied in the correspondence of the autumn of 1918 (Part III, § III, pp. 376-7).

² See also § IV, (8), *infra*, pp. 402-5.

Address of 11th February 1918: 'Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists . . .'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now for ever discredited, of the Balance of Power; but that

'Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States.'

Address of 11th February 1918: '[A general peace] cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful States. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it . . .'

Speech of 27th September 1918: ' . . . Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights? . . .'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '(3) There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

'(4) And, more specifically, there can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League . . .

'(5) . . . Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities . . . [must be excluded] in definite and binding terms.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: ' . . . [The] United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations . . . We still read Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle, and we recognize and accept . . . a general alliance which will avoid entanglements . . .'

(5) *Open Covenants*.¹

(6) *Common Covenants and Understandings*.²

Speech of 27th September 1918: ' . . . [The] United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the

¹ See § II, (4), *supra*.

² See also § IV, (5), *infra*.

maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest . . . [A] general alliance . . . will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.'

(7) *The Sanctity and Guarantee of Treaties.*¹

Address of 8th January 1918: 'For such arrangements and covenants [the Fourteen Points] we are willing to fight until they are achieved. . . .'

Address of 8th January 1918 (Point Fourteen): 'A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees . . .'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'Covenants must now be entered into which will render [the disregard of the rights of small States and of nationalities] impossible for the future.'

Speech of 4th July 1918: 'Third, the consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by . . . principles of honour and respect for the common law of civilized society . . . to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed. . . .'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '[The Governments of the Central Empires] have convinced us that they are without honour, and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest . . . [we] cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. . . . [The] only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honoured and fulfilled [is a League of Nations] . . . formed under covenants which will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality . . . peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws, and only upon that word. . . . The reason . . . why it [the peace] must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy. . . .'

(8) *Freedom of the Seas.*

Address of 8th January 1918 (Point Two): 'Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in

¹ See § III, (3), (6), *supra*. Cf. § III, (10), and § IV, (11), *infra*, pp. 407-8.

whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.’¹

Memorandum of the Allied Governments (embodied in President Wilson’s note to Germany of 5th November 1918): ‘They [the ‘Allied Governments] must point out, however, that Clause 2 [Point Two of the Fourteen Points], relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.’

President Wilson makes no comment, in his note of 5th November, upon this qualification of Point Two.

(9) *Reduction of Armaments.*

Address of 8th January 1918 (Point Four): ‘Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.’

(10) *League of Nations.*

Address of 8th January 1918 (Point Fourteen): ‘A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.’

Speech of 4th July 1918: ‘Fourth, the establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

‘These [four] great objects can be put into a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.’

Speech of 27th September 1918:

‘(3) There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

¹ Address of 11th February 1918: ‘He [Count von Hertling] agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order.’

'(4) And, more specifically, there can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott, or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

'(5) All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '... [Only] special and limited alliances entangle, and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance. . .'

§ IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

(1) *Autocracy and Militarism.*¹

Address of 8th January 1918: 'But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her [Germany] on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is Imperial domination.'

Address of 11th February 1918: '[America] entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany against the peace and security of mankind. . . . She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered as nearly as may be impossible.'

¹ Various passages in the addresses and speeches of President Wilson from 8th January to 27th September 1918, inclusive, declare the war to be a struggle between autocracy and militarism on the one side and democracy on the other. No attempt has been made to collect in the present chapter all of these passages. For certain of these passages, see § III, (1), pp. 391-2; § IV, (6), (8), (9), (10), (11), pp. 400-8. On the stipulations as to autocracy and militarism embodied in the diplomatic correspondence of the autumn of 1918, see Part III, § III, *supra*, pp. 373-80.

Address of 11th February 1918 : 'Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation—emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers—whatever the difficulties and present partial delays.'

Speech of 4th July 1918 : 'These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace :

'First, the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world, or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency.'

(2) *Democracy.*¹

Address of 11th February 1918 : 'I have spoken thus only that the whole world may know the true spirit of America, that men everywhere may know that our passion for justice and self-government is no mere passion of words, but a passion which once set in action must be satisfied. The power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people . . . it springs out of freedom and is for the service of freedom.'

Address of 11th February 1918 : ' . . . peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent . . . '

(3) *Self-determination.*²

Address of 11th February 1918 : 'Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected ; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. . . . This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiance and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future.'

¹ See also § II, (4), p. 391 ; foot-note to Address of 8th January 1918, § III, (1), p. 392, (10), pp. 396-7 ; § IV, (6), (7), pp. 400-2. On the stipulations in regard to democracy embodied in the diplomatic correspondence of the autumn of 1918, see Part III, § III, *supra*, pp. 373-80.

² See also § IV, (5), (6), (8), (10), *infra*, pp. 399-407.

Address of 11th February 1918: 'The principles to be applied are these: . . .

'Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now for ever discredited, of the Balance of Power; but that

'Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States.'

Speech of 6th April 1918: '[The] principle of the free self-determination of nations [is one] upon which all the modern world insists.'

Speech of 4th July 1919: 'Second, the settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.'

(4) *Nationality*.¹

Address of 11th February 1918: 'The principles to be applied are these: . . .

'Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetrating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.'

(5) *Equality of Nations*.²

Address of 8th January 1918: 'An evident principle runs through [the Fourteen Points]. . . It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.'

Address of 8th January 1918 (Point Fourteen): 'A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants

¹ See also § IV, (3), *supra*; and § IV, (6), (8), *infra*, pp. 400-5.

² See also Part IX: Economic Terms and Principles, *infra*.

for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.'

Address of 8th January 1918: 'We have no jealousy of German greatness and there is nothing in this programme [the Fourteen Points] that impairs it. . . . We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair-dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery. Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions.'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities. . . . Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future.'

Speech of 6th April 1918: 'For myself I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely proposed—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '[The issues of the war] must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise . . . but with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '(1) The impartial justice meted out . . . must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.'

(6) *Common Rights and Interests of all Nations.*¹

Speech of 11th February 1918: 'They [the Fourteen Points] cannot be discussed separately or in corners. None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force,

¹ See also § II, (2), p. 390; § III, (1), (2), (3), (6), pp. 391–5; and § IV, (8), (10), (11), *infra*, pp. 402–8. Cf. § III, (4), *supra*, pp. 393–4.

if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes and does not seek to obscure them. . . . He sees that*. . . national aspirations must be satisfied even within his own Empire in the common interest of Europe and mankind.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: 'The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual States. Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peoples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement. . . . The issues are these: Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force? Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purposes and interest? Shall peoples be ruled and dominated even in their own internal affairs by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice? Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations, or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress? Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights? . . . [These are the issues], and they must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all, and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest. This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace. . . .'

Speech of 27th September 1918: 'In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations, let me say also that the United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest. We still read Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances

entangle, and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '... (2) No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.'

(7) *Reign of Law.*

Address of 4th July 1918: 'These [four] great objects can be put into a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.'

(8) *Justice.*¹

Address of 8th January 1918: 'It is this happy fact [that the day of secret covenants is gone]... which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view... What we demand in this war... is that the world be made... safe for every peace-loving nation which... wishes to live its own free life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are partners in this interest, and... unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us... For such arrangements and covenants [the Fourteen Points] we are willing to fight... until they are achieved, but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove... An evident principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined [in the Fourteen Points]. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand.'

¹ See also § II, (2), p. 390; § III, (1), pp. 391-2, (10), 396-7; § IV, (2), (5), pp. 398-400; and § IV, (9), (10), (11), pp. 405-8.

Address of 11th February 1918: 'What we are striving for is a new international order based upon the broad and universal principles of right and justice. . . . The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress [on 8th January 1918]. . . . I mean only that those problems, each and all, affect the whole world, that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connexions, the racial aspirations, the security, and the peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. . . .

'The principles to be applied are these :

'First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent.'

Address of 11th February 1918: '[Every] item of [the settlement] must be submitted to the common judgment [of all the parties to the war] whether it be right and fair and an act of justice rather than a bargain between Sovereigns. . . . It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and equal conditions of trade.'

Speech of 6th April 1918: 'The man who knows least can now see plainly how the cause of justice stands and what the imperishable thing is he is asking to invest in.'

Speech of 6th April 1918: 'We must judge as we would be judged. . . . We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready whenever the final reckoning is made to be just to the German . . . Power as with all others. There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment if it is indeed to be a righteous judgment. To propose anything but justice, evenhanded and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonour our own cause. For we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord. . . . [Those who speak for Germany] have avowed that [what they seek] was not justice but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will.'

Speech of 6th April 1918: 'We cannot mistake what they

[the military masters of Germany] have done—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Rumania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. . . . They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere impose their power . . .

Speech of 27th September 1918 : ‘ [This] is a peoples’ war, not a statesmen’s. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken. I take that to be the significance of the fact that assemblies and associations of many kinds . . . are still demanding, that the leaders of their Governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what . . . they are seeking in this war, and what they think the items of the final settlement should be.

‘ They are not satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen’s terms—only in the terms of territorial arrangements and discussions of power, and not in terms of broad-visioned justice and mercy and peace, and the satisfaction of those deep-seated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world.

‘ Perhaps statesmen have not always recognized this changed aspect of the whole world of policy and action . . . [only] one thought is to satisfy those who struggle in the ranks . . . ’

Speech of 27th September 1918 : ‘ [The price of a secure and lasting peace] is impartial justice in every form of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed, and not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. [The] indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations; formed under covenants that will be efficacious.’

Speech of 27th September 1918 :

‘ (1) The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that knows no favourites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

‘ (2) No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.’

Speech of 27th September 1918 : ‘ Germany is constantly

intimating the "terms" she will accept, and always finds that the world does not want terms of peace. It wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing.'

(9) *Right.*

Address of 8th January 1918: 'We have entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence.'

Address of 8th January 1918: 'An evident principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined [in the Fourteen Points]. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak...'

Address of 8th January 1918: 'In regard to those essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right [the Fourteen Points] we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all Governments and peoples associated... against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end. For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight... until they are achieved, but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove.'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities... Covenants must now... render such things impossible for the future.'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'What we are striving for is a new international order based upon the broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches... justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing...'

Address of 11th February 1918: '... [Every] item of it [the settlement] must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between Sovereigns.'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.'

Speech of 6th April 1918 : ' This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free and for the sacred rights of free men everywhere. . . . [The German programme] once carried out, . . . the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right [must] begin again at its beginning . . . '

Speech of 6th April 1918 : ' Let everything that we say, . . . everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response. . . . Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it, or dominion as she conceives it, shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is therefore but one response possible from us : force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.'

Speech of 4th July 1918 : ' Third, the consent of all nations to be governed [by international law, to the end that there may be] . . . a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

' Fourth, the establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right . . . '

Speech of 27th September 1918 : ' The issues are these : Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force ? Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purposes and interest ? . . . Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations, or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress ? Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights ? . . . '

(10) *Freedom*.¹

Address of 8th January 1918 : ' An evident principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined [in the Fourteen

¹ See also § III, (8), pp. 395-6 ; § IV, (1), (2), (8), pp. 397-8, 407. No effort has been made to collect all of the President's references to 'freedom', 'liberty', and 'liberation' in his utterances of 1918. The full text of the addresses and speeches should be consulted in Vol. I, Appendix III, pp. 481-48.

Points]. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak . . . The moral climax of this, the culminating and final war for human liberty, has come, and [the people of the United States] are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.'

Address of 8th January 1918 : ' [It] is our heart-felt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.'

Speech of 6th April 1918 : ' This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free and for the sacred rights of free men everywhere . . . On [the German] programme our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations, upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag, whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it . . . That programme once carried out, . . . the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right [must] begin again at its beginning . . . [We] have to redeem the world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do.'

Speech of 4th July 1918 : ' There must now be settled once for all what was settled for America in the great age upon whose inspiration [of freedom] we draw to-day.'

Speech of 4th July 1918 : ' Our case differs from [that of Washington and his associates] only in this, that it is our inestimable privilege to concert with men out of every nation what shall make not only the liberties of America secure, but the liberties of every other people as well.'

(11) *Guarantees.*¹

Address of 11th February 1918 : ' [What] we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain.'

Address of 11th February 1918 : [The] covenants [of the

¹ See also § III, (1), (4), (9), (10), pp. 391-4, 396-7 ; § IV, (1), (8), (9), (10), *supra*, pp. 397-8, 402-6.

peace] must be backed by the united force of all nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost.'

Speech of 27th September 1918: '[Every] victory of the nations associated against Germany brings the nations nearer the sort of peace which will bring security and reassurance to all peoples, and make the recurrence of another such struggle of pitiless force for ever impossible . . .'

Speech of 27th September 1918: The Governments of the Central Empires 'have convinced us that they are without honour, and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest . . . [We] cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us . . . [All who sit at the peace table must pay the price of impartial justice and create] the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honoured and fulfilled . . . That indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations, formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws, and only upon that word. For Germany will have to redeem her character not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows. As I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself . . . It is necessary to guarantee the peace, and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an after-thought. The reason—to speak in plain terms again—why it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connexion with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Rumania.'

§ V. TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL TERMS AND PRINCIPLES

A. *General Principles of Settlement*

- (1) *Self-determination*.¹
- (2) *Nationality*.¹
- (3) *Equality of Nations*.¹

¹ See § IV, *supra*, pp. 398–400.

(4) *Common Rights and Interests of all Nations.*¹

(5) *Justice.*¹

(6) *Right.*¹

(7) *Freedom.*¹

(8) *Wishes, Natural Connexions, Racial Aspirations, Security, and Peace of Mind of Peoples.*²

(9) *No Conquests and No Annexations.*

Address of 8th January 1918: 'The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by . . .'

Address of 11th February 1918: 'There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages.'

(10) *No Bartering of Peoples and Provinces: Interest and Benefit of Populations.*³

(11) *Political Independence and Territorial Integrity of All States: Mutual Guarantees.*⁴

B. *Terms and Principles of the Fourteen Points*⁵

I: *Principles affecting Allied Territories*

Several of the Fourteen Points deal specifically with certain of the allied countries and allied territories occupied by enemy armed forces. It is important to set these out textually as a basis for our consideration of the terms of peace and principles of settlement which they embody.

(1) *Russia.* Point Six: 'The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome assistance also of every kind that she may need and

¹ See § IV, *supra*, pp. 402-5.

² See § IV, (8), *supra*, pp. 405-6.

³ See § IV, (3), *supra*, pp. 398-9; and § VII, (8), *infra*, pp. 413-14.

⁴ See § III, (10), pp. 396-7, and § IV, (5), *supra*, pp. 399-400. Cf. B, (III), (5), *infra*, p. 414.

⁵ Those of the 'Fourteen Points' which deal with territorial and political questions must be studied in their relation to the general principles of settlement (A, *supra*), and in connexion with specific references in President Wilson's speeches of 1918 to the various countries and territories. No effort has been made in the present chapter to collect all these passages.

may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.'

(2) *Belgium*. Point Seven: 'Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of International Law is for ever injured.'¹

(3) *France*. Point Eight: 'All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.'

(4) *Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro*. Point Eleven: 'Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro . . . evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.'²

(5) *Poland* (see III, (1), *infra*, p. 413).

These Points, which expressly relate to allied countries and territories (except Poland; see III, (1), *infra*), embody the following terms and principles of peace:

(1) *Evacuation*. 'All Russian territory', 'all French territory', 'Belgium', and 'Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro' must be 'evacuated' (or, in the case of all French territory, 'freed'). Points Six, Seven, Eight, and Eleven.

(2) *Restoration*. 'Belgium', the 'invaded portions' of

¹ Address of 11th February 1918: '[Count Czernin] sees . . . that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may involve.'

² On the terms and principles of Point Eleven in regard to the Balkans in general, see III, *infra*, pp. 413-14.

France, and the 'occupied territories' of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro must be 'restored'. Points Seven, Eight, and Eleven.¹

(3) *International Law*. The carrying out of the terms of Point Seven (Belgium) will restore confidence in International Law.

(4) *Right*. The 'wrong' done to France in 1871 (Alsace-Lorraine) 'should be righted' (Point Eight).

(5) *Independent Determination of Political Development and National Policy*. Applied to Russia (Point Six).

(6) *International Co-operation* in obtaining for Russia 'an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy' (Point Six).

(7) *Assistance* 'of every kind' should be rendered to Russia (Point Six).

(8) *Common Rights and Interests of Free Nations*. In the 'evacuation' and 'restoration' of Belgium there must be no attempt to limit 'the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations' (Point Seven). The wrong done to France in 1871 (Alsace-Lorraine) should be righted 'in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests of all' (Point Eight).²

(9) *Free Access to the Sea*. Serbia should be 'accorded free and secure access to the sea' (Point Eleven).

(10) *Guarantees : Security of Peace*.³

(11) *League of Nations*. Russia should be assured 'a sincere welcome into the society of free nations' (Point Six).

II: Principles affecting Enemy Territories

Several of the Fourteen Points deal, either expressly or impliedly, with enemy countries and enemy territories.

(1) *Austria-Hungary*. Point Nine: 'A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.'

Point Ten: 'The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose

¹ Cf. Point Six (Russia). See § VI, (2), *infra*, for the Powers' interpretation of the term 'restoration' (= compensation for all damage to civilian population and their property). Note esp. pp. 420-7.

² Cf. Point Six (Russia) and the separate 'interests' of her sister nations)

³ See (8), *supra* on this page.

place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.' ¹

(2) *Germany*. Point Eight: '[The] wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.'

(3) *Turkish Empire*. Point Twelve: 'The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.'

The following terms of peace are embodied in the Points which relate expressly or impliedly to enemy countries and territories:

(1) *Restitution: Righting of Wrong*. Point Eight clearly implies that Alsace-Lorraine is to be returned to French sovereignty.

(2) *Readjustment of Frontiers: Principle of Nationality*. Point Nine clearly implies that the territories of Austria-Hungary inhabited by populations of Italian nationality should be ceded to Italy.

(3) *Sovereignty: and the Principle of Nationality*. 'The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty.'

(4) *Autonomous Development of Peoples and Nationalities*. The 'peoples' of Austria-Hungary and the non-Turkish 'nationalities' of the Ottoman Empire should be accorded the opportunity of 'autonomous development'. Points Ten ² and Twelve.

(5) *Free Passage: Equality of Nations: International Guarantees*. The 'Dardanelles should be permanently opened

¹ It is to be observed that the pre-Armistice Agreement with Austria-Hungary provided for the independence, as distinguished from the mere 'autonomy', of the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs. See Part III, § II, p. 411. In the pre-Armistice Agreement with Germany Point Ten appears to have been retained in its original form.

² See the foot-note to Point Ten, *supra* on this page.

as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees'. Point Twelve.

(6) *Guarantees*. Points Eight, Ten, Twelve.

III: Principles affecting both Allied and Enemy Territories

(1) *Poland*. Point Thirteen: 'An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.'¹

(2) *Territories on Italian Frontiers*. Point Nine: 'A re-adjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.'

(3) *Balkans*. Point Eleven: '. . . Serbia [should be] accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.'

(4) *Colonial Possessions*. Point Five: 'A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.'

The principles embodied in these Points are :

(1) *Political Independence*. 'An independent Polish State should be erected' (Point Thirteen).

(2) *Adjustment of Frontiers: Principles of Allegiance and of Nationality*. Poland should include 'the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations' (Point Thirteen).² A re-adjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be 'effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality' (Point Nine). The

¹ Address of 11th February 1918: '[Count Czernin] sees that an independent Poland made up of the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another is a matter of European concern and must, of course, be conceded'.

² Address of 11th February 1918: '... contiguous to one another. . .'
See (1) *Poland*, *supra* on this page.

'relations of the several Balkan States to one another [should be] determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality' (Point Eleven).

(3) *Free (and Secure) Access to the Sea.* An independent Polish State should be 'assured a free and secure access to the sea' (Point Thirteen); and Serbia should be 'accorded free and secure access to the sea' (Point Eleven).

(4) *Common Interests of all Nations.* The erection of an independent Poland is 'a matter of European concern' (Address of 11th February 1918).

(5) *Political and Economic Independence and Territorial Integrity: International Guarantees.* The 'political and economic independence and territorial integrity' of Poland (Point Thirteen) and of the several Balkan States (Point Eleven) should be guaranteed by international covenants.¹

(6) *Impartial Adjustment of Colonial Claims: Interests of Population and Equitable Claims of Governments.* In determining all questions of sovereignty over colonies 'the interests of the populations concerned' are to be given equal weight with the 'equitable claims' of Governments.

IV: Summary

The main principles of territorial and political settlement which are embodied in the Fourteen Points are the following :

- (1) *Evacuation.*
- (2) *Restoration.*
- (3) *Restitution.*
- (4) *Maintenance of International Law.*
- (5) *Right.*
- (6) *Independent Determination of Political Development and National Policy.*
- (7) *Nationality; and Allegiance.*
- (8) *Sovereignty.*
- (9) *Autonomy.*
- (10) *Common Rights and Interests of Free Nations.*
- (11) *Equality of Nations.*
- (12) *Free Passage; and Free and Secure Access to the Sea.*
- (13) *International Co-operation and Assistance.*

¹ Cf. Point Fourteen: 'A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.'

(14) *Impartial Adjustment of Colonial Claims : Interests of Populations and Equitable Claims of Governments.*

(15) *International Guarantees*, especially of (a) Free Passage through the Dardanelles and of (b) the Political and Economic Independence and Territorial Integrity of Poland and the several Balkan States.¹

(16) *League of Nations : Admission of Russia.*

The general conclusions to be drawn from a study of the territorial and political terms of the Fourteen Points are (1) that certain of them relate to matters, such as evacuation, which were dealt with, at a later time, in the Armistice Convention, while most of them concern matters embodied in the draft Treaty of Peace ; and (2) that many of them, such as the principles of Right and the Equality of Nations, are of general scope and are applied in the draft Treaty to the settlement of questions other than those which are purely political and territorial, for instance, economic questions.

§ VI. REPARATION

(1) *No Contributions and no Punitive Damages.*

Address of 11th February 1918 : ‘ There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages.’

(2) *Compensation for all Damage to Civilian Population and their Property.*

President Wilson’s note of 5th November 1918 : ‘ . . . The President is now in receipt of a memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on this correspondence, which is as follows : . . .

“ Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies.

“ By it they understood that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.”

¹ Cf. Point Fourteen, p. 414, n. 1, *supra*.

‘ I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted. . . ’

§ VII. ECONOMIC TERMS AND PRINCIPLES

- (1) *Removal of Economic Barriers ; and*
- (2) *Equality of Trade Conditions.*

Address of 8th January 1918 (Point Three) : ‘ The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.’

Address of 8th January 1918 : ‘ We have no jealousy of German greatness . . . we do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world . . . ’¹

Address of 11th February 1918 : . . . ‘ It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade . . . ’

Speech of 6th April 1918 : ‘ They [our ideals] are rejected [in the German programme] for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it . . . [The German ideals shall not prevail].’

(3) *No Separate and Selfish Compacts and Combinations with regard to Trade.*

Address of 11th February 1918 : ‘ He [Count von Hertling] cannot ask the benefit of common agreement in the one field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he sees that separate and selfish compacts with regard to trade and the essential materials of manufacture would afford no

¹ See § IV, (5), *supra*, pp. 399–400.

foundation for peace. Neither, he may rest assured, will separate and selfish compacts with regard to provinces and peoples.

Speech of 27th September 1918: Principles 3-5 (inclusive).¹

(4) *No Employment of Economic Boycott or Exclusion; except by League of Nations.*

Speech of 27th September 1918: The Fourth Principle.²

(5) *Self-determination.*

Speech of 4th July 1918: The Second Principle.³

(6) *International Guarantee of the Political and Economic Independence and Territorial Integrity of Poland and the several Balkan States.*⁴

PART V

THE PRE-ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND THE ARMISTICE CONVENTIONS

The military, naval, and aerial superiority of the Allied and Associated Powers led, in the autumn of 1918, to the successive conclusion of the following Armistice Conventions⁵ with the enemy States of Central Europe:

- (1) With Bulgaria, 29th September 1918.
- (2) With Turkey, 30th October 1918.
- (3) With Austria-Hungary, 3rd November 1918.
- (4) With Germany, 11th November 1918.

Within a period of six weeks the march of the World War had thus been stopped on all fronts and the relations of the two opposing groups of belligerents had been placed upon the contractual basis embodied in the several Armistice Conventions.

One of the most important inquiries of the historian who deals with the legal aspects of the war must be this: To what extent and in what respects are these several Armistice Conventions, and the Conventions prolonging armistice conditions, based upon pre-Armistice Agreements as to the conditions of a cessation of hostilities and the terms and principles of peace?

¹ For the text of the principles, see § III, (10), *supra*, pp. 396-7.

² For the text, see § III, (10), *supra*, pp. 396-7.

³ For the text of the principle, see § IV, (3), *supra*, pp. 398-9.

⁴ See § V, (B), 4 and 5, *supra*, p. 410; and III, pp. 413-14.

⁵ All the Texts in App. V, pp. 459-97.

And, were such pre-Armistice Agreements of a legal or a moral character? ¹ No comprehensive answer to these and other related questions will be attempted in the present chapter; it must suffice to point out certain general considerations which may help to guide the investigator.

In the first place, each separate Armistice Convention must be studied not only by itself but also in its relation to the others. Each Convention was but part of the larger Armistice which caused a cessation of hostilities on all the closely related fronts.

In the second place, President Wilson's addresses and speeches of 1918 were couched in terms which embraced 'the programme of the world's peace' (Address of 8th January 1918). The terms and principles embodied in the President's pronouncements were communicated, by public channels at least, to all the enemy States; and they served as the leading terms and principles of a legal international pre-Armistice Agreement between the Powers on the one side and Germany on the other. Whether or not it is possible to maintain that they also served as the legal basis of the Armistice Conventions and Treaties of Peace between the Powers and Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey may be left on one side for the present. It is at least clear that, in view of the extraordinary importance with which President Wilson's utterances of 1918 were invested by both groups of belligerents in the public discussion of peace terms and principles during 1918, they may be regarded as the terms and principles of a moral obligation binding upon the Entente Powers and Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey.²

In the third place, it is not unimportant to observe that the Austro-Hungarian note of 15th September 1918, inaugurating the two vital series of notes exchanged between (1) Austria-Hungary and the United States and (2) Germany and the United

¹ The nature of the Agreements between the Powers and Austria-Hungary, and between the Powers and Germany, has been considered briefly in Part III, *supra*, pp. 370-3 and pp. 373-86 respectively.

² The whole problem as to Turkey is, in a certain sense, complicated by her unconditional surrender. But, if the Powers were bound in a moral pre-armistice obligation to base the peace with her upon President Wilson's principles, it is difficult to see why the fact of her unconditional surrender should result in absolving the Powers from this moral obligation and in giving them a free hand to deal with her, or not to deal with her, as they alone thought fit. Assuming the existence of a moral obligation, surely this moral obligation survived the unconditional surrender and the Armistice of 30th October 1918, and bound the Powers.

States upon the subject of an armistice and peace, preceded the conclusion both of the Bulgarian and of the Turkish Armistice Conventions. By the time the Armistice Convention with Bulgaria was concluded (29th September 1918) the world, including Bulgaria, was aware of President Wilson's reply of 16th September to the Austro-Hungarian note of 15th September 1918, a reply in which the President declared that he had 'repeatedly and with entire candour stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace'. By the time the Armistice Convention with Turkey was concluded (30th October 1918) the correspondence between the United States and Austria-Hungary had terminated (27th October 1918) and that between the United States and Germany had nearly reached its final stage. President Wilson had announced (23rd October 1918) that he had transmitted his correspondence with Germany to the Allies; and Austria-Hungary had declared (27th October 1918) that it awaited 'the proposals for an armistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the President in his manifestations has described'. All of these indications point to the conclusion that the Allied and Associated Powers were at least morally bound to conclude an armistice and a peace with Bulgaria and Turkey upon the terms and principles laid down by President Wilson in 1918; but they are indications only and the problem may be left for future solution.

In the fourth place, it is clear from the diplomatic correspondence of the autumn of 1918 that the pre-Armistice Agreements between the Powers and Austria-Hungary and Germany both related to an armistice as well as to a peace.¹

Although the several Armistice Conventions differ one from another in certain important particulars, owing in part to variety of local military, territorial, and political conditions, they yet embody a number of common principles, such as the evacuation of occupied regions, demobilization of a large part of the armed forces, restitution of property, and the like. A detailed comparative study of the Conventions from the point of view of the principles therein contained, and with the object of testing these principles by the touchstone of pre-Armistice Agreements, would be most instructive. This study must, however, be omitted from the present chapter, save for

¹ See Part III, *supra*.

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a cursory examination of the Armistice Convention with Germany.

The main result of the conclusion of the several Armistice Conventions was the stopping of hostilities and the placing of international relations upon a contractual or conventional basis. The way for this situation was prepared in large measure by the pre-Armistice Agreements, for they had specified the terms of the Armistice as well as those of the Peace. So long as the Armistice Conventions were complied with by all parties, and were not terminated, the belligerent States were given time in which to draft, discuss, and sign the Treaties of Peace themselves. The conclusion of Armistice Conventions meant indeed actual progress towards a resumption of the amicable relations, based upon treaties and conventions, which had been severed by the outbreak of the war in 1914.

Before dealing, however, with the discussions at Paris in reference to the Agreements and the Armistice Conventions it will be necessary to consider certain aspects of one of the Armistice Conventions—the one with Germany. Not only the special place occupied by Germany in the war, but the vital importance of the principles at issue between her and the Allied and Associated Powers, demand at least some consideration of the terms of the Convention which caused a cessation of the hostilities by and against her.

PART VI

THE PRE-ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS AND GERMANY

The Armistice Convention with Germany applies several distinct principles. Certain of the most important of these are the following :

(1) *Cessation of hostilities* by land, at sea, and in the air (Clauses I, XX).

(2) *Evacuation* of the invaded countries (including Belgium, France, Luxemburg, as well as Alsace-Lorraine, on the Western Front, and Russia and Rumania on the Eastern Front) and of Austro-Hungary (Clauses II, XII, XIII) and East Africa (Clause XVII).

German troops which have not left the above-mentioned

territories [on the western front] within the period fixed [fifteen days] shall be made prisoners of war' (Clause II).

Occupation by the Allied and United States Forces jointly shall keep pace with the evacuation in the areas of the Western Front (Clause II).

(3) *Repatriation*, 'beginning at once, to be completed within fifteen days, of all inhabitants of the countries [Belgium, France, Luxemburg, "as well as Alsace-Lorraine"] above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial, or condemned).' Clause III.

(4) *Surrender of armaments*. 'Surrender in good condition by the German Armies' of equipment consisting of the specified number of guns, machine guns, trench mortars, and aeroplanes; these to be delivered *in situ* to the troops of the Allies and the United States. Clause IV.

(5) *Delivery of vehicles*. The specified number of locomotives, wagons, and motor lorries shall be delivered in good working order to the Powers. Clause VII.

(6) *Restoration, Reparation, and Restitution*. These three distinct, but closely related, principles are all applied in the Convention.

(a) *Restoration*.

On frequent occasions during the progress of the War the Allied and Associated Governments and their responsible statesmen spoke of 'restoration' as one of the essential terms of a settlement. Thus, in the reply of the Allies (10th January 1917) to President Wilson's note of 18th December 1916, they demanded 'the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, with the compensations due to them'. Terestchenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Kerensky Government, referred, under date of 28th September 1917, to 'the evacuation and restoration of heroic little countries' as consonant with justice; and he announced, as a cardinal principle of Russian policy, 'the restoration, on the basis of the free self-definition of the Polish people . . . of an independent Polish State.' In his speech of 5th January 1918, Mr. Lloyd George declared that one of the 'first requirements . . . always put forward by the British Government and their Allies, has been the complete restoration, political, territorial, and economic, of the independence of Belgium, and such reparation as can be

made for the devastation of its towns and provinces. . . . Next comes the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania. The complete withdrawal of the alien armies and the reparation for injustice done is a fundamental condition of permanent peace.'

'Restoration' formed also a vital principle of President Wilson's Fourteen Points (8th January 1918). Countries and territories occupied by the enemy, declared the President in Points Six, Seven, Eight and Eleven, must be 'evacuated' (or 'freed') and 'restored'.¹

In his speech in the House of Commons on 27th February 1918, several weeks after the announcement of the Fourteen Points, Mr. Balfour referred also to 'restoration'. Speaking of the invasion of Belgium, he said: 'Well, there is only one course for the offending nation to pursue in those circumstances, which is to say, as they have said, "I have sinned". That they have said through the mouth of the former Chancellor. The next thing to do is to say, "Having sinned, I make reparation, I restore again what I never should have taken, and I restore it necessarily without condition". What does the statesman [Count Hertling] who now meets with the unqualified approval apparently of my hon. friend [Mr. Holt] say on this subject? He says: "By all means restore Belgium. We do not want to stay there. But we must take care that it shall not become a jumping-off ground for enemy machinations". . . . What sort of conditions is it that Count Hertling contemplates when he says that Belgium must no longer be the jumping-off ground for enemy machinations? . . .'

At a later time Mr. Balfour gave the term 'restoration' a still wider application. Speaking in reference to President Wilson's speech of 27th September, he said on 30th September 1918, that 'after you have freed Europe from Prussian militarism, after you have restored Asia as well as Europe to a position in

¹ But see Part IV, § vi, *supra*, pp. 415-16, and (6.) b, *infra*, p. 424. It is to be noted that 'restoration' was applied in the Fourteen Points to certain specified countries and territories; it was not stated as a general principle applicable to *all* occupied regions. This matter is of importance owing to the fact that the Allies in their memorandum of 5th November 1918, interpreted 'restoration' as meaning 'compensation'. Was the principle of 'compensation' to apply only to the countries and territories specified in the Fourteen Points dealing with 'restoration'? Or, was the principle of 'compensation' to be applied generally to *all* the civil populations which had suffered from the aggression of Germany? See pp. 424-6, *infra*.

which self-development is possible for the various nationalities, then and then only will your League of Nations work.'

What exactly was meant by the statesmen of the Allied and Associated Powers when they demanded the 'restoration' of countries or parts of countries occupied by the enemy? The term itself is vague; but, if it be studied in the light of the full context of the official documents and speeches in which it appears, it acquires somewhat more definite meanings. In its broadest sense it would seem to include not only evacuation, but reparation, and perhaps also penalties and indemnities. But, in general, the speakers seem to draw a distinction between (1) evacuation and restoration, and between (2) restoration and reparation. Occupied territories are not only to be completely evacuated by enemy forces, they are also to be completely restored—restored intact. Not only are they to be completely evacuated and restored, but they are to be the recipients of reparation for the wrongs committed during their occupation by the enemy. A hint as to the meaning of 'restoration' is given by Mr. Lloyd George when he states, in his speech of 5th January 1918, that one of the first requirements of the Allies is 'the complete restoration, political, territorial, and economic, of the independence of Belgium'. This means, it would appear, that Belgium is to be completely free and independent in respect to her territories and her political and economic life. Belgium sovereignty is to be unfettered by territorial, political, or economic concessions to the enemy as part of the terms of peace. This principle, assert the Powers, must be applied not only to Belgium, but to Serbia and to Montenegro, and to the occupied regions of France and other States.

Many clauses of the Armistice Convention appear to be applications of the principle of restoration in the sense or senses employed by the statesmen of the Powers prior to the delivery to Germany of the note (and memorandum) of 5th November 1918, in which they define 'restoration', as used by President Wilson in the Fourteen Points, as 'compensation' for all damage to the civilian population and their property. There are various clauses which provide that the enemy, on evacuation, must leave the invaded countries and territories intact; that they must restore these regions to their true sovereigns, through the agency of the occupying forces, without

evacuation of the inhabitants and without damage or harm to the persons or property of the inhabitants. Thus, for example, the Convention provides that 'no destruction of any kind [is] to be committed'.

'Military' establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact. Industrial establishments shall not be caused to depreciate in value. The principle of restoration is embodied likewise in certain of the naval conditions of the Convention; for example, the ones which provide for the enemies abandonment, *in situ* and intact, of port material.'

Restoration underlies, in certain of its aspects, Clause XV, which provides for the 'annulment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties'.

The fundamental purpose of these and other clauses of the Convention seems to be that the evacuation shall result in the restoration—physically, economically, and politically—of the invaded countries and territories.

The Financial Clauses of the Convention deal with reparation and restitution—two principles closely related to restoration.

(b) *Reparation.* Clause XIX (Financial Clauses) provides as follows:

'With the reservation that any subsequent concessions and claims by the Allies and United States remain unaffected, the following financial conditions are imposed:

'Reparation for damage done.

'While the Armistice lasts, no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies to cover reparation for war losses.'¹

It seems clear that in the 'reparation for damage done' of Clause XIX we are dealing with the 'restoration' of the Fourteen Points as interpreted by the Allies to mean 'compensation' for all damage done to the civilian population or their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air (Memorandum of 5th November 1918). What exactly was in the mind of the President when, on 8th January 1918, he spoke of 'restoration' in his Fourteen Points, it is impossible to say. It would appear from our study of the history of the term that he meant restoration in one or other of the broader senses, not in the more limited sense of 'com-

¹ The remaining portions of Clause XIX deal with restitution. See (c), *infra*, p. 426.

penation'. But the authoritative interpretation of the term 'restoration' by the Allies and President Wilson himself on 5th November 1918, seems to mean that they expressly narrowed the term to mean (1) compensation and compensation only, and (2) compensation only to the civil populations of the countries and territories expressly named in the Fourteen Points.

It should be observed, however, that in the Memorandum the Powers state that they 'feel that no doubt ought to exist as to what this provision [of the Fourteen Points as to 'restoration'] implies. By it', they continue, 'they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage . . .' The term 'restoration' thus *implies* that 'compensation' will be made for all civilian 'damage' to the populations of the specified regions. Does it imply more? And, if so, what? Does it, for example, imply not only 'compensation for all damage done' by Germany's aggression, but also the wider field of liability included in the term 'restoration' as understood prior to the 5th November? Does this wider field of liability include 'war costs'? Does the German liability—in its narrower or in its wider sense—include the civilian populations of Allied countries not specified in the Fourteen Points? The memorandum refers to the 'civilian population of the Allies'. Does this refer to all the Allies or only to such Allies as are mentioned specifically in Points Six, Seven, Eight, and Eleven ('restoration')?

This is, indeed, a question of the interpretation of an interpretation; and upon the correct answer to that question depends the fidelity, or infidelity, of the Powers to the obligations incurred by the Memorandum as an integral part of the pre-Armistice Agreement.

In whatever way this fundamental question may ultimately be answered by impartial historians of the Armistice Convention and the Treaty with Germany, in their relation to the pre-Armistice Agreement, it is clear that the reservation inserted at the beginning of Clause XIX of the Armistice Convention ('any *subsequent* concessions and *claims* . . . remain unaffected'),¹ while it may have been at the time merely a draftsman's cautious and innocent phrase, nevertheless opens the door for the entry into the Treaty of Peace of many 'subsequent claims'

¹ The italics are those of the author.

not based upon the Armistice Convention. By becoming a party to the Armistice Convention, Germany agreed to the inclusion of the reservation; and of course the Convention, in cases of conflict with the terms of the pre-Armistice Agreement, must be the governing instrument. But the question is open to argument as to whether or not the insertion of the reservation in the Armistice Convention conflicted with the terms of the earlier Agreement as to what exactly the Armistice Convention should include.

(c) *Restitution.* The evacuation of Alsace-Lorraine (Clause II) may be looked upon as a step preliminary to the formal restitution of the two provinces to France.

The last part of Clause XIX provides as follows :

‘ Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium and, in general, immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in the invaded countries.

‘ Restitution of the Russian and Rumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that Power.

‘ This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until peace is concluded.’

The Convention thus draws a clear distinction between reparation and restitution. ‘ Reparation ’ is ‘ compensation for damage done ’, while ‘ restitution ’ is the return of territories or properties belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers or their populations to their rightful sovereigns or owners. Both ‘ reparation ’ and ‘ restitution ’ fall within the category of ‘ restoration ’. But it is clear from the Convention that certain of its clauses go beyond ‘ reparation ’ and ‘ restitution ’ and belong to ‘ restoration ’ in its broadest sense.

(7) *Guarantees.* Many clauses of the Convention ensure, by military and naval arrangements, that the military supremacy of the Powers shall be maintained, that a renewal of hostilities by Germany shall be rendered impossible, and that the Powers shall have the ‘ unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the peace to which the German Government had agreed ’. These clauses seem fully consonant with the terms of the pre-Armistice Agreement as to the terms of an armistice.¹

Two questions will long occupy the attention of historians.

¹ See Part III, § III, pp. 373-80, and Part IV, § I, *supra*, p. 389.

How far does the Convention comply in strictness with the terms and principles of the pre-Armistice Agreement? In what respects, if any, does it conflict with that Agreement? It is clear from our previous study that certain of its terms, such, for example, as those relating to evacuation and guarantees, are in strict compliance with the provisions of the Agreement. But there are certain other terms of the Convention which seem to run counter to the Agreement. Thus, the 'reservation' at the beginning of Clause XIX, appears to introduce the possibility of claiming more from Germany than the Agreement in strictness permits.

In the second volume of this work the subject of the present chapter—the legal basis of international relations prior to the re-establishment of peace by treaties—will be still further considered. In the discussions at the Peace Conference the terms and principles of the pre-Armistice Agreements and Armistice Conventions played a *rôle* of great interest and importance; and to this aspect of the history of the Conference special attention will be directed.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

EXTRACT FROM ALLIES' REPLY OF JANUARY 10, 1917, TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF DECEMBER 18, 1916

VIII. They consider that the Note they handed to the United States in reply to the German Note answers the question put by the American Government, and forms, according to the words of that Government, 'an avowal of their respective views as to the terms on which the war might be concluded'. Mr. Wilson wishes for more; he desires that the belligerent Powers should define, in the full light of day, their aims in prosecuting the war. The Allies find no difficulty in answering this request. Their war-aims are well known; they have been repeatedly defined by the heads of their various Governments. These war-aims will only be set forth in detail, with all the compensations and equitable indemnities for harm suffered, at the moment of negotiation. But the civilized world knows that they imply, necessarily and first of all, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, with the compensations due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, in Roumania, with just reparation; the reorganisation of Europe, guaranteed by a stable régime and based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization.¹

IX. The intentions of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia in regard to Poland have been clearly indicated by the manifesto he has just addressed to his armies.²

X. There is no need to say that, if the Allies desire to shield Europe from the covetous brutality of Prussian militarism, the extermination and the political disappearance of the German peoples have never,

¹ Par. VIII from 'first of all' was quoted by the Allies in their memorandum, June 16, 1919, to the Germans, 'Basis of the Peace Negotiations'. (Cmd. 258) Misc. no. 4 (1919). This affects Constantinople. Contrast Lloyd-George, January 5, 1918 (v. *supra*, p. 190) and Speech in *The Times*, February 27, 1920.

² Stating his intention of creating a 'free' Poland uniting the three parts into which it was partitioned.

as has been pretended, formed part of their designs. They desire above all to ensure peace on the principles of liberty and justice, and upon the inviolable fidelity to international engagements by which the Government of the United States have ever been inspired.

XI. United in the pursuit of this lofty aim, the Allies are determined, severally and jointly, to act with all their power and to make all sacrifices to carry to a victorious end a conflict upon which, they are convinced, depend not only their own welfare and prosperity but the future of civilization itself.

APPENDIX II

EXTRACTS FROM SECRET AGREEMENTS RESPECTING THE BOUNDARY OF THE RHINE, &c.

From a confidential telegram from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (M. Pokrovsky) to the Russian Ambassador at Paris, February 12, 1917.

M. Doumergue submitted to the (Russian) Emperor the desire of France to secure for herself at the end of the present war the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and a special position in the valley of the River Saar, as well as to attain the political separation from Germany of her trans-Rhenish districts and their organisation on a separate basis *in order that in future the River Rhine might form a permanent strategical frontier against a Germanic invasion.* Doumergue expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would not refuse immediately to draw up its assent to these suggestions in a formal manner.

His Imperial Majesty was pleased to agree to this in principle, in consequence of which I requested Doumergue, after communicating with his Government, to let me have the draft of an agreement, which would then be given a formal sanction by an exchange of Notes between the French Ambassador and myself.

Proceeding thus to meet the wishes of our ally, I nevertheless consider it my duty to recall the standpoint put forward by the Imperial Government in the telegram of February 24, 1916, No. 948, to the effect that, 'while allowing France and England complete liberty in delimiting the western frontiers of Germany, we expect that the Allies on their part will give us equal liberty in delimiting our frontiers with Germany and Austria-Hungary'. Hence the impending exchange of Notes on the question raised by Doumergue will justify us in asking the French Government simultaneously to confirm its assent to allowing Russia freedom of action in drawing up her future frontiers in the west.

Note of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of February 14, 1917, No. 26, addressed to the French Ambassador at Petrograd:

In your Note of to-day's date your Excellency was good enough to inform the Imperial Government that the Government of the Republic was contemplating the inclusion *in the terms of peace to be offered to*

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Germany of the following demands and guarantees of a territorial nature :

(1) Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France.

(2) The frontiers are to be extended at least up to the limits of the former principality of Lorraine, and are to be drawn up at the discretion of the French Government so as to provide for the strategical needs and for the inclusion in French territory of the entire iron district of Lorraine and of the entire coal district of the Saar valley.

(3) The rest of the territories situated on the left bank of the Rhine which now form part of the German Empire are to be entirely separated from Germany and freed from all political and economic dependence upon her.

(4) The territories of the left bank of the Rhine outside French territory are to be constituted an autonomous and neutral State, and are to be occupied by French troops until such time as the enemy States have completely satisfied all the conditions and guarantees indicated in the treaty of peace.

Your Excellency stated that the Government of the Republic would be happy to be able to rely upon the support of the Imperial Government for the carrying out of its plans. By order of his Imperial Majesty, my most august master, I have the honour, in the name of the Russian Government, to inform your Excellency by the present Note that the Government of the Republic may rely upon the support of the Imperial Government for the carrying out of its plans as set out above.

—(*Manchester Guardian*, December 12, 1917.)

Telegram from the Russian Ambassador in Paris, March 11, 1917, No. 168.

See my reply to telegram No. 167, No. 2. The Government of the French Republic, anxious to confirm the importance of the treaties concluded with the Russian Government in 1916 for the settlement on the termination of the war of the question of Constantinople and the Straits in accordance with Russia's aspirations, anxious, on the other hand, to secure for its ally in military and industrial respects all the guarantees desirable for the safety and the economic development of the Empire, recognises Russia's complete liberty in establishing her western frontiers.

(Signed) ISVOLSKY.

—(*Manchester Guardian*, December 12, 1917.)

Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons on December 19, 1917, referring to this proposal for a buffer state, said categorically :

We have never expressed our approval of it, nor do I believe it represents the policy of successive French Governments who have held office during the war. Never did we desire and never did we encourage the idea.

APPENDIX III

EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT WILSON'S SPEECHES
IN 1918

In the correspondence regarding the negotiations* for peace in October 1918, the German Note of October 12 stated, 'The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January 8 and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms'. President Wilson's utterances have therefore a definite bearing on the legal basis of the Treaty.

The following illustrative extracts are therefore quoted :

(1) SPEECH OF JANUARY 8, 'THE FOURTEEN POINTS'

Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible bases of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers, to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement. The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace, but also an equally definite programme of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers on their part presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific programme of practical terms was added.

That programme proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied—every province, every city, every point of vantage—as a permanent addition to their territories and their power.

It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders, who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They cannot entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective Parliaments or for

the minority parties, that military and Imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan States which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war ?

The Russian representatives have insisted very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then ? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of July 19th last, the spirit and intention of the Liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation ? Or are we listening in fact to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction ? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

But whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war, and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory.

There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candour. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only; but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definitive terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candour and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain.

There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Empires, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power apparently is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what is humane and honourable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a

generosity of spirit, a universal human sympathy, which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond with utter simplicity and frankness.

Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open, and that they shall involve and permit thenceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular Governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world.

It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence.

What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in, and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own free life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world, as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us.

The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme, and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this:

One. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

Two. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

Three. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

Four. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

Five. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

Six. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing, and more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

Seven. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of International Law is for ever impaired.

Eight. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

Nine. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

Ten. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

Eleven. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

Twelve. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

Thirteen. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and

whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

Fourteen. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the Governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end. For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved, but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace, such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove.

We have no jealousy of German greatness and there is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise, such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair-dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world—the new world in which we now live—instead of a place of mastery. Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions.

But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is Imperial domination.

We have spoken now surely in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through the whole programme I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.

Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle, and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honour, and everything they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

(2) SPEECH OF FEBRUARY 11, 'THE FOUR PRINCIPLES'

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS,

On January 8th I had the honour of addressing you on the objects of the war as our people conceive them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain had spoken in similar terms on January 5th. To these addresses

the German Chancellor replied on the 24th, and Count Czernin for Austria on the same day. It is gratifying to have our desire so promptly realized that all exchanges of view on this great matter should be made in the hearing of all the world.

Count Czernin's reply, which is directed chiefly to my own address of January 8th, is uttered in a very friendly tone. He finds in my statement a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own Government to justify him in believing that it furnishes a basis for a more detailed discussion of purposes by the two Governments. He is represented to have intimated that the views he was expressing had been communicated to me beforehand, and that I was aware of them at the time he was uttering them. But in this I am sure he was misunderstood. I had received no intimation of what he intended to say. There was, of course, no reason why he should communicate privately with me. I am quite content to be one of his public audience.

Count von Hertling's reply is, I must say, very vague and very confusing. It is full of equivocal phrases and leads it is not clear where. But it is certainly in a very different tone from that of Count Czernin and apparently of an opposite purpose. It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes the unfortunate impression made by what we had learned of the conferences at Brest-Litovsk. His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international counsel. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities, and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the twenty-three States now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighbourhood.

He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation, for that could in no way impede the ambitions of the military party, with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments. That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies he demands must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic provinces, with no one but the Government of France the 'conditions' under which French territory shall be evacuated, and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland. In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan States he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey, and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire to the Turkish authorities themselves.

After a settlement all round effected in this fashion by individual

barter and concession he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a League of Nations which would undertake to hold the new Balance of Power steady against external disturbance.

It must be evident to every one who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice—no mere peace of shreds and patches. Is it possible that Count von Hertling does not see that, does not grasp it, is in fact living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he utterly forgotten the Reichstag resolutions of July 19th, or does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a general peace, not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements between State and State.

The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress. I, of course, do not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions as to the way in which those problems are to be dealt with. I mean only that those problems, each and all, affect the whole world, that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security, and the peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. They cannot be discussed separately or in corners. None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.

Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, and that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world? The Reichstag resolutions of July themselves frankly accepted the decisions of that court. *There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages.* Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.

We cannot have general peace for the asking or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful States. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it, because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain, and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice rather than a bargain between Sovereigns.

The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs, or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. She would disdain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to impose her own will upon another people. She is quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketch of principles and of the way in which they should be applied. But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany against the peace and security of mankind, and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization. She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered as nearly as may be impossible.

This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future, and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice, and are willing to maintain it at any cost. If territorial settlements, and the political relations of great populations which have not the organized power to resist, are to be determined by the contracts of the powerful Governments, which consider themselves most directly affected, as Count von Hertling proposes, why may not economic questions also? It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade.

Count von Hertling wants the essential bases of commercial and industrial life to be safeguarded by common agreement and guarantee, but he cannot expect that to be conceded him if the other matters to be determined by the articles of peace are not handled in the same way as items in the final accounting. He cannot ask the benefit of common agreement in the one field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he sees that separate and selfish compacts with regard to trade and the essential materials of manufacture would afford no foundation for peace. Neither, he may rest assured, will separate and selfish compacts with regard to provinces and peoples.

Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that an independent Poland made up of all the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another is a matter of European concern and must, of course, be conceded; that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may involve; and that national aspirations must be satisfied even within his own Empire in the common interest of Europe and mankind. If he is silent about questions which touch the interest and purpose of his Allies more nearly than they touch those of Austria only, it must, of course, be because he feels constrained, I suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved and the necessity of candidly applying

them, he naturally feels that Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the United States with less embarrassment than could Germany. He would probably have gone much farther had it not been for the embarrassments of Austria's alliances, and of her dependence upon Germany.

After all, the test of whether it is possible for either Government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious.

The principles to be applied are these :

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent ;

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now for ever discredited, of the Balance of Power ; but that,

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival States ; and

Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.

A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative except among the spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany. If they have anywhere else been rejected the objectors have not been sufficiently numerous or influential to make their voices audible. The tragical circumstance is that this one party in Germany is apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death to prevent what all the world now sees to be just.

I would not be a true spokesman of the people of the United States if I did not say once more that we entered this war upon no small occasion, and that we can never turn back from a course chosen upon principle. Our resources are in part mobilized now, and we shall not pause until they are mobilized in their entirety. Our armies are rapidly going to the fighting front, and will go more and more rapidly. Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation—emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers—whatever the difficulties and present partial delays.

We are indomitable in our power of independent action, and can in no circumstances consent to live in a world governed by intrigue and force. We believe that our own desire for new international order, under which reason and justice and the common interests of mankind shall prevail, is the desire of enlightened men everywhere. Without that new order the world will be without peace, and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development. Having set our hand to the task of achieving it, we shall not turn back.

I hope that it is not necessary for me to add that no word of what I have said is intended as a threat. That is not the temper of our people. I have spoken thus only that the whole world may know the true spirit of America, that men everywhere may know that our passion for justice and for self-government is no mere passion of words, but a passion which once set in action must be satisfied. The power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interests of our own. It springs out of freedom, and is for the service of freedom.

(3) SPEECH OF APRIL 6, 1918

This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free and for the sacred rights of free men everywhere. The nation is awake. There is no need to call to it. We know what the war must cost: our utmost sacrifice, the lives of our fittest men, and if need be all that we possess. The loan we are met to discuss is one of the least parts of what we are called upon to give and to do, though in itself imperative. The people of the whole country are alive to the necessity of it and are ready to lend to the utmost even where it involves a sharp skimping and daily sacrifice to lend out of meagre earnings. They will look with reprobation and contempt upon those who can and will not, upon those who demand a higher rate of interest, upon those who think of it as a mere commercial transaction. I have not come, therefore, to urge the loan, I have come only to give you if I can a more vivid conception of what it is for.

The reasons for this great war, the reason why it had to come, the need to fight it through and the issues that hang upon its outcome are more clearly disclosed now than ever before. It is easy to see just what this particular loan means, because the cause we are fighting for stands more sharply revealed than at any previous crisis of the momentous struggle. The man who knows least can now see plainly how the cause of justice stands and what the imperishable thing is he is asked to invest in. Men in America may be more sure than they ever were before that the cause is their own, and that if it should be lost their own great nation's place and mission in the world would be lost with it.

I call you to witness, my fellow-countrymen, that at no stage of this terrible business have I judged the purposes of Germany intemperately. I should be ashamed, in the presence of affairs so grave, so fraught with the destinies of mankind throughout all the world, to speak with truculence, to use the weak language of hatred or vindictive purpose. We must judge as we would be judged. I have sought to learn the objects Germany has in this war from the mouths of her own spokesmen and to deal as frankly with them as I wished them to deal with me. I have laid bare our own ideals, our own purposes without reserve or doubtful phrase, and have asked them to say as plainly what it is that they seek.

We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready whenever the final reckoning is made to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German Power as with all others. There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment if it is indeed

to be a righteous judgment. To propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonour our own cause. For we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord.

It has been with this thought that I have sought to learn from those who spoke for Germany whether it was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking. They have answered, answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it was not justice but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will.

The avowal has not come from Germany's statesmen. It has come from her military leaders, who are her real rulers. Her statesmen have said that they wished peace and were ready to discuss its terms whenever their opponents were willing to sit down at the conference table with them. Her present Chancellor has said—in indefinite and uncertain terms indeed and in phrases that often seem to deny their own meaning, but with as much plainness as he thought prudent—that he believed that peace should be based upon the principles which we had declared would be our own in the final settlement. At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in similar terms; professed their desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiances. The action accompanied and followed the profession. Their military masters, the men who act for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution, proclaimed a very different conclusion. We cannot mistake what they have done—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Rumania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. From this we may judge the rest. They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy. Their fair professions are forgotten. They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere impose their power and exploit everything for their own use and aggrandizement; and the peoples of conquered provinces are invited to be free under their dominion!

Are we not justified in believing that they would do the same things at their Western front if they were not there face to face with the armies whom even their countless divisions cannot overcome? If, when they have felt their check to be final, they should propose favourable and equitable terms with regard to Belgium and France and Italy, could they blame us if we concluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a free hand in Russia and the East? Their purpose is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Balkan Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition and build upon that dominion an Empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then erect an Empire of gain and commercial supremacy—an Empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe—an Empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East. In such a programme our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations upon which all the modern world insists, can

play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it.

That programme once carried out, America and all who care or dare to stand with her must arm and prepare themselves to contest the mastery of the world, a mastery in which the rights of common men, the rights of women, and of all who are weak, must for the time being be trodden under foot and disregarded, and the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right begin again at its beginning. Everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin, and the gates of mercy once more pitilessly shut upon mankind! The thing is preposterous and impossible; and yet is not that what the whole course and action of the German armies has meant wherever they have moved? I do not wish even in this moment of utter disillusionment to judge harshly or unrighteously. I judge only what the German arms have accomplished with un pitying thoroughness throughout every fair region they have touched.

What, then, are we to do? For myself I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely proposed—a peace in which the strong and the weak should fare alike. But the answer when I proposed such a peace came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer. I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything that we say, my fellow-countrymen, everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response till the majesty and might of our concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat the force of those who float and misprize what we honour and hold dear. Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it, or dominion as she conceives it, shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is therefore but one response possible from us: force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.

(4) SPEECH OF JULY 4, 'THE FOUR ENDS'

GENTLEMEN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND MY FELLOW-CITIZENS,

I am happy to draw apart with you to this quiet place¹ of old counsel in order to speak a little of the meaning of this day of our nation's independence. The place seems very still and remote. It is

¹ Mount Vernon.

as serene and untouched by the hurry of the world as it was in those great days long ago when General Washington was here and held leisurely conference with the men who were to be associated with him in the creation of a nation. From these gentle slopes they looked out upon the world and saw it whole, saw it with the light of the future upon it, saw it with modern eyes that turned away from a past which men of liberated spirits could no longer endure. It is for that reason that we cannot feel even here, in the immediate presence of this sacred tomb, that this is a place of death. It was a place of achievement. A great promise that was meant for all mankind was here given plan and reality. The associations by which we are here surrounded are the inspiring associations of that noble death which is only a glorious consummation. From this green hillside we also ought to be able to see with comprehending eyes that world that lies about us, and should conceive anew the purposes that must set men free. It is significant of their own character and purpose and of the influences they were setting afoot that Washington and his associates, like the Barons at Runnymede, spoke and acted not for a class but a people. It has been left for us to see to it that it shall be understood that they spoke and acted not for a single people only but for all mankind. They were thinking not of themselves and of the material interests which centred in the little groups of landowners and merchants and men of affairs with whom they were accustomed to act in Virginia and the colonies to the north and south of her, but of a people which wished to be done with classes and special interests and the authority of men whom they had not themselves chosen to rule over them. They entertained no private purpose, desired no peculiar privilege. They were consciously planning that men of every class should be free and America a place to which men out of every nation might resort who wished to share with them the rights and privileges of free men. And we take our cue from them, do we not? We intend what they intended. We here in America believe our participation in this present war to be only the fruitage of what they planted. Our case differs from theirs only in this, that it is our inestimable privilege to concert with men out of every nation what shall make not only the liberties of America secure, but the liberties of every other people as well. We are happy in the thought that we are permitted to do what they would have done had they been in our place. There must now be settled once for all what was settled for America in the great age upon whose inspiration we draw to-day. This is surely a fitting place from which calmly to look out upon our task that we may fortify our spirits for its accomplishment. And this is the appropriate place from which to avow, alike to the friends who look on and to the friends with whom we have the happiness to be associated in action, the faith and purpose with which we act. This, then, is our conception of the great struggle in which we are engaged. The plot is written plainly upon every scene and every act of the supreme tragedy. On the one hand stand the peoples of the world—not only the peoples actually engaged, but many others also who suffer under mastery but cannot act; peoples of many races and in every part of the world—the people of stricken Russia still among the rest, though they are for the moment unorganized and

helpless. Opposed to them, masters of many armies, stands an isolated friendless group of Governments who speak no common purpose, but only selfish ambitions of their own, by which none can profit but themselves, and whose people are fuel in their hands—Governments which fear their people and yet are for the time their sovereign lords, making every choice for them and disposing of their lives and fortunes as they will, as well as of the lives and fortunes of every people who fall under their power—Governments clothed with the strange trappings and primitive authority of an age that is altogether alien and hostile to our own. The past and the present are in deadly grapple, and the peoples of the world are being done to death between them. There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No half-way decision would be tolerable. No half-way decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace: *First*, the destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world, or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence. *Second*, the settlement of every question, whether of territory or sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery. *Third*, the consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honour and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States, and in their relations with one another to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right. *Fourth*, the establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned. These great objects can be put into a single sentence. *What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.* These great ends cannot be achieved by debating and seeking to reconcile and accommodate what statesmen may wish, with their projects for balances of power and of national opportunity. They can be realized only by the determination of what the thinking peoples of the world desire, with their longing hope for justice and for social freedom and opportunity. I can fancy that the air of this place carries the accents of such principles with a peculiar kindness. Here were started forces which the great nation against which they were primarily directed at first regarded as a revolt against its rightful authority, but which it has long since seen to have been a step in the liberation of its own people as well as of the people of the United States.

And I stand here now to speak¹—speak proudly and with confident hope—of the spread of this revolt, this liberation, to the great stage of the world itself. The blinded rulers of Prussia have aroused forces they knew little of, forces which once roused can never be crushed to earth again, for they have at their heart an inspiration and a purpose which are deathless and of the very stuff of triumph.

(5) SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 27, 1918, 'THE FIVE PARTICULARS'

. . . I have come to seek an opportunity to present to you some thoughts which I trust will serve to give you, in perhaps fuller measure than before, a vivid sense of the grave issues involved, in order that you may appreciate and accept with added enthusiasm the grave significance of the duty of supporting the Government by your men and your means to the utmost point of sacrifice and self-denial. No man or woman who has really taken in what this war means can hesitate to give to the very limit of what they have, and it is my mission here to-night to try to make it clear once more what the war really means. You will need no other stimulation or reminder of your duty.

At every turn of the war we gain a fresh consciousness of what we mean to accomplish by it. When our hope and expectation are most excited, we think more definitely than before of the issues that hang upon it, and of the purposes which must be realized by means of it. For it has positive and well-defined purposes which we did not determine and which we cannot alter. No statesman or assembly created them, no statesman or assembly can alter them. They have arisen out of the very nature and circumstances of the war. The most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them. They were, perhaps, not clear at the outset, but they are clear now.

The war has lasted more than four years, and the whole world has been drawn into it. The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual States. Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peoples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement.

We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome. Its challenge drove to the heart of everything we cared for and lived for. The voice of the war had become clear, and gripped our hearts. Our brothers from many lands as well as our own murdered dead under the sea were calling to us, and we responded fiercely and of courage. The air was clear about us. We saw things in their full, convincing proportions as they were, and we have seen them with steady eyes and unchanging comprehension ever since. We accepted the issues of the war as facts, not as any group of men either here or elsewhere had defined them, and we can accept no outcome which does not squarely meet and settle them.

The issues are these: Shall the military power of any nation or

¹ Made beside the tomb of Washington.

group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force? Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purposes and interest? Shall peoples be ruled and dominated even in their own internal affairs by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice? Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations, or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress? Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They are the issues of it, and they must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests—but definitely and once for all, and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest. This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with. . . .

If it be indeed and in truth the common object of the Governments associated against Germany and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by the coming settlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price, that will procure it, and ready and willing to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honoured and fulfilled.

That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed, and not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations, formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws, and only upon that word. *For Germany will have to redeem her character not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows.*

And as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace, and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought.

The reason—to speak in plain terms again—why it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Rumania.

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like a practical programme. These, then, are some of the particulars, and

I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace :

First, The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

Second, No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

Third, There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

Fourth, And, more specifically, there can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty, by exclusion from the markets of the world, may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

Fifth, All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world. Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

The confidence with which I venture to speak for our people in these matters does not spring from our traditions merely and the well-known principles of international action which we have always professed and followed.

In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations, let me say also that the United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest. We still read Washington's immortal warning against 'entangling alliances' with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle, and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights. . . .

It is the peculiarity of this great war, that, while statesmen have seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and their point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the background; and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes.

That is why I have said that this is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken. I take that to be the significance of the fact that assemblies and associations of many kinds, made up of plain workaday people, have demanded almost every time that they came together, and are still demanding, that the leaders of their Governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is that they are seeking in this war, and what they think the items of their final settlement should be.

They are not yet satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen's terms—only in the terms of territorial arrangements and discussions of power, and not in terms of broad-voiced justice and mercy and peace, and the satisfaction of these deep-seated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world. . . .

And I believe that the leaders of the Governments with which we are associated will speak, as they have occasion, as plainly as I have tried to speak. I hope that they will feel free to say whether they think that I am in any degree mistaken in my interpretation of the issues involved or in my purpose with regard to the means by which a satisfactory settlement of these issues may be obtained. Unity of purpose and of counsel are as imperatively necessary in this war as was unity of command in the battle-field; and with perfect unity of purpose and counsel will come assurance of complete victory. It can be had in no other way. 'Peace drives' can be effectively neutralized and silenced only by showing that every victory of the nations associated against Germany brings the nations nearer the sort of peace which will bring security and reassurance to all peoples, and make the recurrence of another such struggle of pitiless force and bloodshed for ever impossible, and that nothing else can. Germany is constantly intimating the 'terms' she will accept, and always finds that the world does not want terms of peace. It wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing.

APPENDIX IV

NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING THE ARMISTICE

THE GERMAN NOTE TO PRESIDENT WILSON, OCTOBER 4, 1918.¹

(Transmitted through the Swiss Government.)

'The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify

¹ Extract from Austro-Hungarian Peace Note to President Wilson not dated, sent 15th September 1918, received Washington 16th September:

'The Royal and Imperial Government would like, therefore, to propose to the Governments of all belligerent States to send delegates to a confidential and non-binding discussion on basic principles for the conclusion of peace in a place in a neutral country and at a near date which would have to be agreed on, the delegates who are appointed to make known to one another the conception of their Governments regarding those principles, to receive

all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking measures to avoid further bloodshed.

'It accepts the programme set forth by the President of the United States in his Message to Congress of January 8th. The German Government requests the President of the United States to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

'(Signed) Max, Prince of Baden.
'Imperial Chancellor.'

The date of this communication is marked October 3, in 'Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstands'. It appears to have been sent late on the 4th to Switzerland, transmitted via Switzerland on the 5th, and to have reached Washington on the 6th. It is here therefore called the Note of the 4th.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO PRESIDENT WILSON,
OCTOBER 7, 1918.

From the Minister of Sweden to the Secretary of State.

'LEGATION OF SWEDEN, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
October 7, 1918.

'EXCELLENCY,

'By order of my Government I have the honour confidentially to transmit herewith to you the following communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President of the United States of America :

'The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war and repeatedly given documentary evidence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and honourable peace, hereby addresses itself to his Lordship the President of the United States of America, and offers to conclude with him and his allies an armistice on every front, on land, at sea, and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the Message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address of February 11, 1918, should serve as a foundation, and in which the view-points declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account. Be pleased to accept, etc.

'(Signed) W. A. F. EKENGREN.'

analogous communications, and to request and give frank and candid explanations on all those points which need to be precisely defined.

'The Royal and Imperial Government has the honour to request the Government of —, through the kind mediation of your Excellency, to bring this communication to the knowledge of the Government of —.'

To which the President replied on the 16th September :

'The Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government.

'It has repeatedly and with entire candour stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace, and can and will entertain no proposal for conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.'

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PRESIDENT WILSON'S REPLY TO THE FIRST GERMAN NOTE,
OCTOBER 8, 1918.

(Addressed to the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires at Washington.)

' SIR,

I have the honour to acknowledge on behalf of the President your Note of October 6th enclosing a communication from the German Government to the President, and I am instructed by the President to request you to make the following communication to the Imperial German Chancellor :

' Before making a reply to the request of the Imperial German Government and in order that the reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the Note of the Imperial Chancellor.

' Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his Address to the Congress of the United States on January 8th last and in subsequent Addresses, and that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application ?

' The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil.

' The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

' The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answers to these questions vital from every point of view.

' Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.'

THE SECOND GERMAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 12, 1918, IN REPLY TO
PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF OCTOBER 8TH.

' In reply to the questions of the President of the United States of America the German Government hereby declares :

' The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January the 8th and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms.

' The German Government believes that the Governments of the Powers associated with the Government of the United States also adopt the position taken by President Wilson in his address. The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard

to evacuation. The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed Commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.

'The present German Government, which has undertaken the responsibility for this step towards peace, has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

'SOLE,

'*State Secretary of Foreign Office.*'

PRESIDENT WILSON'S REPLY TO THE SECOND GERMAN NOTE OF
OCTOBER 12TH, OCTOBER 14TH, 1918.

'In reply to the communication of the German Government dated the 12th inst., which you handed me to-day, I have the honour to request you to transmit the following answer :

'The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government, and by a large majority of the German Reichstag, of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his addresses to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision in regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918.

'It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

'The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor (he is quite sure) the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they persist in.

'At the very time the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety ; and in their present enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages (if not destroyed) are being stripped not only of all they contain, but often of their very inhabitants.

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'The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

'It is necessary also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the 4th of July last. It is as follows :

"The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world, or if it cannot be presently destroyed at least its reduction to virtual impotency."

'The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it.

'The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves.

'The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.

'The President will make a separate reply to the Royal and Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary.

'Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.'

PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF OCTOBER 18TH, IN REPLY TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 7TH.

From the Secretary of State to the Minister of Sweden.

'SIR,

'I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of the 7th inst., in which you transmit a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President. I am now instructed by the President to request you to be good enough, through your Government, to convey to the Imperial and Royal Government the following :

'The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestion of that Government because of certain events of the utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his Address of January 8th last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary whose place among the nations we wish

to see safeguarded and assured should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

' Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States the Government of the United States has recognized¹ that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a *de facto* belligerent Government, clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks.

' It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Yugo-Slavs for freedom.

' The President is therefore no longer at liberty to accept a mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.

' Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

' (Signed) ROBERT LANSING.'

THE THIRD GERMAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 20TH, 1918, IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF OCTOBER 14TH.

' In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of the occupied territories, the German Government has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers, and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard.

' The German Government suggests to the President that an opportunity should be brought about for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the U.S. will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honour of the German people and with opening a way to a peace of justice.

' The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces, and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat destructions will always be necessary, and are, in so far, permitted by International law.

' The German troops are under the strictest instruction to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions the guilty are being punished.

' The German Government further denies that the German Navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers.

¹ On the 3rd September 1918 the President had 'recognized' the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a 'belligerent Government'. On the 28th June 1918 he had defined the position of the United States Government, as that 'all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule'.

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‘ The German Government proposes, with regard to all these charges, that the facts be cleared up by neutral Commissions.

‘ In order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace, the German Government has caused orders to be dispatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return.

‘ As the fundamental condition for peace, the President prescribes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly, and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the representation of the people of the German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Government. The Constitution did not provide for a concurrence of the representation of the people in decisions of peace and war.

‘ These conditions have just now undergone a fundamental change. The new Government has been formed in complete accordance with the wishes of the representatives of the people, based on equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this Government.

‘ In future no Government can take, or continue in, office without possessing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Chancellor of the Empire to the representatives of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded.

‘ The first act of the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag a Bill to alter the constitution of the Empire, so that the consent of the representatives of the people is required for decisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance.

‘ The question of the President, with whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing, is, therefore, answered in a clear and unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a Government which, free from any arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people.

‘ (Signed) SOLF,
‘ State Secretary of the Foreign Office.’

PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF OCTOBER 23RD, 1918, IN REPLY TO THE THIRD GERMAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 20TH.

(Addressed to the *Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland at Washington.*)

‘ From the Secretary of State to the *Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland, ad interim* in charge of German interests in the United States.

‘ SIR,

‘ I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Note of the 22nd transmitting a communication under date of the 20th from the

German Government and to advise you that the President has instructed me to reply thereto as follows :—

‘ Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his Address to Congress of the United States on January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses, particularly the Address of September 27th, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany’s behalf, but from Ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag, and for an overwhelming majority of the German people ; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

‘ He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into, and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible.

‘ The President has therefore transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved, and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view.

‘ Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds. The President would deem himself lacking in candour did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded.

‘ Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his Note of October 20th, it does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out, or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent.

‘ Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been ; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the

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military authorities of the Empire in the popular will ; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired ; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany.

Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany.

If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.

Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

THE FOURTH GERMAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 27TH IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF OCTOBER 23RD.

The German Government takes cognizance of the reply of the President of the United States.

The President knows the deep-rooted changes which have taken place and are still taking place in German constitutional life. The peace negotiations will be conducted by a People's Government, in whose hands the decisive legal power rests in accordance with the Constitution, and to which the Military Power will also be subject.

The German Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the President in his manifestations has described.

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 27TH IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF OCTOBER 18TH, 1918.

In reply to the Note which President Wilson on October 18th addressed to the Austro-Hungarian Government, and in the sense of the decision of the President to deal in particular with Austria-Hungary in regard to the question of an armistice and peace, the Austro-Hungarian Government has the honour to declare that, as in the case of the preceding statements of the President, it also adheres to his point of view as laid down in his last Note regarding the rights of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, particularly those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs.

Consequently, as Austria-Hungary accepts all conditions upon which the President makes an entry into the negotiations regarding an armistice and peace dependent, nothing now stands in the way, in the

opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, of the commencement of *pourparlers*.

The Austro-Hungarian Government declares itself in consequence prepared, without awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter into *pourparlers* regarding peace between Austria-Hungary and the States of the opposing party, and regarding immediate armistice on all the fronts of Austria-Hungary.

It begs President Wilson to be good enough to make overtures on this subject.¹

PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE OF NOVEMBER 5TH, 1918, IN REPLY TO THE FOURTH GERMAN NOTE OF OCTOBER 27TH.

'SIR,

I have the honour to request you to transmit the following communication to the German Government.

'In my note of October 23, 1918, I advised you that the President had transmitted his correspondence with the German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments were disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deemed such an armistice possible from the military point of view. The President is now in receipt of a memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on this correspondence, which is as follows :

'The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent Addresses.

'They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept.

'They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.

'Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that the invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies.

¹ The terms of the Austro-Hungarian Armistice were signed on the 3rd November. That with Bulgaria had been signed on the 30th September, and with Turkey on the 30th October.

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'By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.

'I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted.

'I am further instructed by the President to request you to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government, and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice.¹

'Accept, sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT LANSING.

'To MR. HANS SULZER, *Minister of Switzerland, in charge of German interests in the United States.*'

APPENDIX V

TEXTS OF ALL THE ARMISTICES

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¹ The German Government then approached the Allied military authorities, and on 6th November an Armistice Commission was appointed in Germany. On the 8th they received the Allied military conditions at the Allied General Headquarters with an official demand that they must be accepted or rejected in seventy-two hours, which gave them till 11 a.m. on the eleventh day of the eleventh month. It was actually signed at 5 a.m. on 11th November at Rethondes station in the Forest of Compiègne.

PART I

CONDITIONS OF AN ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY¹

Signed November 11, 1918

(Translation.)

BETWEEN Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, acting on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers, in conjunction with Admiral Wemyss, First Sea Lord, of the one part; and Secretary of State Erzberger, President of the German Delegation, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Count von Oberndorff, Major-General von Winterfeldt, Captain Vanselow (German Navy), furnished with full powers in due form and acting with the approval of the German Chancellor, of the other part;

An Armistice has been concluded on the following conditions:

CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE CONCLUDED WITH GERMANY

A.—ON THE WESTERN FRONT.

I.—Cessation of hostilities on land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

II.—Immediate evacuation of the invaded countries:—Belgium, France, Luxemburg, as well as Alsace-Lorraine, so ordered as to be completed within fifteen days from the signature of the Armistice. German troops which have not evacuated the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will be made prisoners of war. Joint occupation by the Allied and United States

ENTRE le Maréchal Foch, Commandant en Chef les Armées Alliées, stipulant au nom des Puissances Alliées et Associées, assisté de l'Amiral Wemyss, First Sea Lord, d'une part; et M. le Secrétaire d'État Erzberger, Président de la Délégation allemande, M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire Comte von Oberndorff, M. le Général-Major von Winterfeldt, M. le Capitaine de Vaisseau Vanselow, munis de pouvoirs réguliers, et agissant avec l'agrément du Chancelier allemand, d'autre part;

Il a été conclu un armistice aux conditions suivantes:

CONDITIONS DE L'ARMISTICE CONCLU AVEC L'ALLEMAGNE

A.—SUR LE FRONT D'OCCIDENT.

I.—Cessation des hostilités sur terre et dans les airs six heures après la signature de l'armistice.

II.—Évacuation immédiate des pays envahis:—Belgique, France, Luxembour, ainsi que de l'Alsace-Lorraine, réglée de manière à être réalisée dans un délai de quinze jours, à dater de la signature de l'armistice. Les troupes allemandes qui n'auront pas évacué les territoires prévus dans les délais fixés seront faites prisonnières de guerre. L'occupation par l'ensemble des troupes

¹ The French version is the official text of the Armistice.

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forces shall keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation or occupation shall be regulated in accordance with a Note (Annexe No. 1), drawn up at the time of signature of the Armistice.

III.—Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within fifteen days, of all inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial, or convicted).

IV.—Surrender in good condition by the German Armies of the following war material :

5,000 guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field).

25,000 machine-guns.

3,000 trench mortars.

1,700 fighting and bombing aeroplanes—in the first place, all D 7's and all night-bombing aeroplanes.

The above to be delivered *in situ* to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the Note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

V.—Evacuation by the German Armies of the districts on the left bank of the Rhine. These districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States Armies of Occupation.

The occupation of these territories by Allied and United States troops shall be assured by garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblenz, Cologne), together with bridgeheads at these points of a 30-kilometre (about 19 miles) radius on the right bank, and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the area.

alliées et des États-Unis suivra dans ces pays la marche de l'évacuation. Tous les mouvements d'évacuation ou d'occupation sont réglés par la Note Annexe No. 1, arrêtée au moment de la signature de l'armistice.

III.—Rapatriement, commençant immédiatement et devant être terminé dans un délai de quinze jours, de tous les habitants des pays énumérés ci-dessus (y compris les otages et les prévenus ou condamnés).

IV.—Abandon par les Armées allemandes du matériel de guerre suivant en bon état :

5,000 canons (dont 2,500 lourds et 2,500 de campagne).

25,000 mitrailleuses.

3,000 Minenwerfer.

1,700 avions de chasse et de bombardement (en premier lieu tous les D 7 et tous les avions de bombardement de nuit).

A livrer sur place aux troupes des Alliés et des États-Unis dans les conditions de détail fixées par la Note Annexe No. 1, arrêtée au moment de la signature de l'armistice.

V.—Évacuation des pays de la rive gauche du Rhin par les Armées allemandes. Les pays de la rive gauche du Rhin seront administrés par les autorités locales sous le contrôle des troupes d'occupation des Alliés et des États-Unis. Les troupes des Alliés et des États-Unis assureront l'occupation de ces pays par des garnisons tenant les principaux points de passage du Rhin (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne) avec, en ces points, des têtes de pont de 30 kilomètres de rayon sur la rive droite, et des garnisons tenant également les points stratégiques de la région. Une zone neutre sera

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A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine, between the river and a line drawn parallel to the bridge-heads and to the river and 10 kilometres (6½ miles) distant from them, between the Dutch frontier and the Swiss frontier.

The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine districts (right and left banks) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signing of the Armistice.

All movements of evacuation and occupation shall be regulated according to the Note (Annexe 1) determined at the time of the signing of the Armistice.

VI.—In all territories evacuated by the enemy, evacuation of the inhabitants shall be forbidden; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants.

No person shall be prosecuted for having taken part in any military measures previous to the signing of the Armistice.

No destruction of any kind to be committed.

Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores, food, munitions and equipment, which shall not have been removed during the periods fixed for evacuation.

Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, &c., shall be left *in situ*.

No measure of a general character shall be taken, and no official order shall be given which would have as a consequence the depreciation of industrial establishments or a reduction of their personnel.

VII.—Roads and means of communications of every kind, railroads, waterways, roads,

réservée sur la rive droite du Rhin entre le fleuve et une ligne tracée parallèlement aux têtes de pont et au fleuve, et à 10 kilomètres de distance depuis la frontière de Hollande jusqu'à la frontière de la Suisse. L'évacuation par l'ennemi des pays du Rhin (rive gauche et rive droite) sera réglée de façon à être réalisée dans un délai de seize nouveaux jours, soit trente et un jours après la signature de l'armistice. Tous les mouvements d'évacuation ou d'occupation sont réglés par la Note Annexe No. 1, arrêtée au moment de la signature de l'armistice.

VI.—Dans tous les territoires évacués par l'ennemi, toute évacuation des habitants sera interdite; il ne sera apporté aucun dommage ou préjudice à la personne ou à la propriété des habitants. Personne ne sera poursuivi pour délits de participation à des mesures de guerre antérieure à la signature de l'armistice. Il ne sera fait aucune destruction d'aucune sorte.

Les installations militaires de toute nature seront livrées intactes; de même les approvisionnements militaires, vivres, munitions, équipements, qui n'auront pas été emportés dans les délais d'évacuation fixés. Les dépôts de vivres de toute nature pour la population civile, bétail, etc., devront être laissés sur place.

Il ne sera prise aucune mesure générale ou d'ordre officiel ayant pour conséquence une dépréciation des établissements industriels ou une réduction dans leur personnel.

VII.—Les voies et moyens de communications de toute nature, voies ferrées, voies navigables,

bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.

All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain.

5,000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons, in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed in Annexe No. 2 (not exceeding 31 days in all),

5,000 motor lorries are also to be delivered in good condition within 36 days.

The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within 31 days, together with all personnel and material belonging to the organization of this system.

Further, the necessary working material in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*.

All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent way, signals and repair shops shall be left *in situ* and kept in an efficient state by Germany, so far as the working of the means of communication on the left bank of the Rhine is concerned.

All lighters taken from the Allies shall be restored to them.

The Note Annexe 1 defines the details of these measures.

VIII.—The German Command shall be responsible for revealing within 48 hours after the signing of the Armistice, all mines or delay-action fuzes disposed on territories evacuated by the German troops, and shall assist in their discovery and destruction.

The German Command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken

routes, ponts, télégraphes, téléphones, ne devront être l'objet d'aucune détérioration. Tout le personnel civil et militaire actuellement utilisé y sera maintenu. Il sera livré aux Puissances Associées : 5,000 machines montées et 150,000 wagons en bon état de roulement, et pourvus de tous rechanges et agrès nécessaires, dans les délais dont le détail est fixé à l'Annexe No. 2, et dont le total ne devra dépasser trente et un jours. Il sera également livré 5,000 camions automobiles en bon état dans un délai de trente-six jours.

Les chemins de fer d'Alsace-Lorraine dans un délai de trente et un jours seront livrés, dotés de tout le personnel et matériel affectés organiquement à ce réseau. En outre, le matériel nécessaire à l'exploitation dans les pays de la rive gauche du Rhin sera laissé sur place. Tous les approvisionnements en charbon et matières d'entretien, en matériel de voies, de signalisation et d'atelier, seront laissés sur place. Ces approvisionnements seront entretenus par l'Allemagne en ce qui concerne l'exploitation des voies de communication des pays de la rive gauche du Rhin. Tous les chalands enlevés aux Alliés leur seront rendus. La Note Annexe No. 1 règle le détail de ces mesures.

VIII.—Le Commandement allemand sera tenu de signaler, dans un délai de quarante-huit heures après la signature de l'armistice, toutes les mines ou dispositifs à retard agencés sur les territoires évacués par les troupes allemandes et d'en faciliter la recherche et la destruction. Il signalera également toutes les dispositions nuisibles qui auraient pu être prises (tel qu'empoisonne-

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(such as poisoning or pollution of wells, springs, &c.).

Breaches of these clauses will involve reprisals.

IX.—The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States armies in all occupied territories, save for settlement of accounts with authorized persons.

The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhine districts (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

X.—The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war, including those under trial and condemned. The Allied Powers and the United States of America shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they think fit. This condition annuls all other conventions regarding prisoners of war, including that of July 1918, now being ratified. However, the return of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and Switzerland shall continue as heretofore. The return of German prisoners of war shall be settled at the conclusion of the Peace preliminaries.

XI.—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from territory evacuated by the German forces shall be cared for by German personnel, who shall be left on the spot with the material required.

B.—CLAUSES RELATING TO THE EASTERN FRONTIERS OF GERMANY.

XII.—All German troops at present in any territory which before the war formed part of

ment ou pollution de sources et de puits, etc.). Le tout sous peine de représailles.

IX.—Le droit de réquisition sera exercé par les Armées des Alliés et des États-Unis dans tous les territoires occupés, sauf règlement de comptes avec qui de droit. L'entretien des troupes d'occupation des pays du Rhin (non compris l'Alsace-Lorraine), sera à la charge du Gouvernement allemand.

X.—Rapatriement immédiat, sans réciprocité, dans des conditions de détail à régler, de tous les prisonniers de guerre, y compris les prévenus et condamnés, des Alliés et des États-Unis. Les Puissances Alliées et les États-Unis pourront en disposer comme bon leur semblera. Cette condition annule les conventions antérieures au sujet de l'échange des prisonniers de guerre, y compris celle de juillet 1918 en cours de ratification. Toutefois, le rapatriement des prisonniers de guerre allemands internés en Hollande et en Suisse continuera comme précédemment. Le rapatriement des prisonniers de guerre allemands sera réglé à la conclusion des préliminaires de paix.

XI.—Les malades et blessés évacués par les Armées allemandes, seront soignés par du personnel allemand qui sera laissé sur place avec le matériel nécessaire.

B.—DISPOSITIONS RELATIVES AUX FRONTIÈRES ORIENTALES DE L'ALLEMAGNE.

XII.—Toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvent actuellement dans les territoires qui

Austria-Hungary, Roumania, or Turkey, shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on 1st August, 1914, and all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia, must likewise return to within the frontiers of Germany as above defined, as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories.

faisaient partie avant la guerre de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de la Roumanie, de la Turquie doivent rentrer immédiatement dans les frontières de l'Allemagne, telles qu'elles étaient au 1^{er} août 1914. Toutes les troupes allemandes qui se trouvent actuellement dans les territoires qui faisaient partie avant la guerre de la Russie devront également rentrer dans les frontières de l'Allemagne, définies comme ci-dessus, dès que les Alliés jugeront le moment venu, compte tenu de la situation intérieure de ces territoires.

XIII.—Evacuation of German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners and agents, civilian as well as military, now on the territory of Russia (frontiers as defined on 1st August, 1914), to be recalled.

XIII.—Mise en train immédiate de l'évacuation par les troupes allemandes, et du rappel de tous les instructeurs, prisonniers et agents, civils et militaires, allemands, se trouvant sur les territoires de la Russie (dans les limites du 1^{er} août 1914).

XIV.—German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other coercive measures with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (frontiers as defined on 1st August, 1914).

XIV.—Cessation immédiate par les troupes allemandes de toutes réquisitions, saisies, ou mesures coercitives en vue de se procurer des ressources à destination de l'Allemagne, en Roumanie et en Russie (dans leurs limites du 1^{er} août 1914).

XV.—Annulment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

XV.—Renonciation au traité de Bucarest et de Brest-Litovsk, et traités complémentaires.

XVI.—The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their Eastern frontier, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of these territories or for the purpose of maintaining order.

XVI.—Les Alliés auront libre accès aux territoires évacués par les Allemands sur les frontières orientales, soit par Dantzig, soit par la Vistule, afin de pouvoir ravitailler les populations et dans le but de maintenir l'ordre.

C.—CLAUSE RELATING TO EAST AFRICA.

C.—DANS L'AFRIQUE ORIENTALE.

XVII.—Evacuation of all German forces operating in East Africa within a period specified by the Allies.

XVII.—Évacuation de toutes les forces allemandes opérant dans l'Afrique orientale dans un délai réglé par les Alliés.

D.—GENERAL CLAUSES.

XVIII.—Repatriation without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all interned civilians, including hostages and persons under trial and condemned, who may be subjects of Allied or Associated States other than those mentioned in Clause III.

XIX.—*Financial Clauses.*—With the reservation that any subsequent concessions and claims by the Allies and United States remain unaffected, the following financial conditions are imposed:

Reparation for damage done.

While the Armistice lasts, no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies to cover reparation for war losses.

Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium and, in general, immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plant for the issue thereof, affecting public or private interests in the invaded countries.

Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that Power.

This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until peace is concluded.

E.—NAVAL CONDITIONS.

XX.—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea, and definite information to be given as to the position and movements of all German ships.

Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is

D.—CLAUSES GÉNÉRALES.

XVIII.—Rapatriement, sans réciprocité, dans le délai maximum d'un mois, dans des conditions de détail à fixer, de tous les internés civils, y compris les otages, les prévenus ou condamnés, appartenant à des Puissances Alliées ou Associées, autres que celles énumérées à l'article III.

XIX.—*Clauses financières.*— Sous réserve de toute renonciation et réclamation ultérieure de la part des Alliés et des États-Unis: Réparation des dommages.

Pendant la durée de l'armistice, il ne sera rien distrait par l'ennemi des valeurs publiques pouvant servir aux Alliés de gages pour le recouvrement des réparations de guerre. Restitution immédiate de l'encaisse de la Banque nationale de Belgique, et, en général, remise immédiate de tous documents, espèces, valeurs (mobilières et fiduciaires avec le matériel d'émission) touchant aux intérêts publics et privés dans les pays envahis. Restitution de l'or russe et roumain pris par les Allemands ou remis à eux. Cet or sera pris en charge par les Alliés jusqu'à la signature de la paix.

E.—CLAUSES NAVALES.

XX.—Cessation immédiate de toute hostilité sur mer et indication précise de l'emplacement et des mouvements des bâtiments allemands. Avis donné aux neutres de la liberté concédée à la navigation des marines de guerre et de commerce des Puis-

given to the Navies and Mercantile Marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

XXI.—All Naval and Mercantile Marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

XXII.—To surrender at the ports specified by the Allies and the United States all submarines at present in existence (including all submarine cruisers and minelayers), with armament and equipment complete. Those that cannot put to sea shall be deprived of armament and equipment, and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. Submarines ready to put to sea shall be prepared to leave German ports immediately on receipt of a wireless order to sail to the port of surrender, the remainder to follow as early as possible. The conditions of this Article shall be completed within 14 days of the signing of the Armistice.

XXIII.—The following German surface warships, which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, failing them, Allied ports, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only care and maintenance parties being left on board, namely :

6 battle cruisers.
10 battleships.

sances Alliées et Associées dans toutes eaux territoriales, sans soulever de questions de neutralité.

XXI.—Restitution, sans réciprocité, de tous les prisonniers de guerre des marines de guerre et de commerce des Puissances Alliées et Associées au pouvoir des Allemands.

XXII.—Livraison aux Alliés et aux États-Unis de tous les sous-marins (y compris les croiseurs sous-marins et tous les mouilleurs de mines) actuellement existants, avec leur armement et équipement complets, dans les ports désignés par les Alliés et les États-Unis. Ceux qui ne peuvent pas prendre la mer seront désarmés de personnel et de matériel, et ils devront rester sous la surveillance des Alliés et des États-Unis. Les sous-marins qui sont prêts pour la mer seront préparés à quitter les ports allemands aussitôt que des ordres seront reçus par T.S.F. pour leur voyage au port désigné de la livraison, et le reste le plus tôt possible. Les conditions de cet article seront réalisées dans un délai de quatorze jours après la signature de l'armistice.

XXIII.—Les navires de guerre de surface allemands qui seront désignés par les Alliés et les États-Unis seront immédiatement désarmés, puis internés dans des ports neutres, ou, à leur défaut, dans les ports alliés désignés par les Alliés et les États-Unis. Ils y demeureront sous la surveillance des Alliés et des États-Unis, des détachements de garde étant seuls laissés à bord. La désignation des Alliés portera sur :

6 croiseurs de bataille.
10 cuirassés d'escadre.

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8 light cruisers (including two minelayers).

50 destroyers of the most modern type.

All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German Naval bases, to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. All vessels of the Auxiliary Fleet are to be disarmed. All vessels specified for internment shall be ready to leave German ports seven days after the signing of the Armistice. Directions for the voyage shall be given by wireless.

XXIV.—The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all minefields and destroy all obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

XXV.—Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the Navies and Mercantile Marines of the Allied and Associated Powers. This to be secured by the occupation of all German forts, fortifications, batteries and defence works of all kinds in all the routes from the Cattégat into the Baltic, and by the sweeping up and destruction of all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters without any questions of neutrality being raised by Germany, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions to be indicated, and the plans relating thereto are to be supplied.

XXVI.—The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to

8 croiseurs légers (dont 2 mouilleurs de mines).

50 destroyers des types les plus récents.

Tous les autres navires de guerre de surface (y compris ceux de rivière) devront être réunis et complètement désarmés dans les bases navales allemandes désignées par les Alliés et les États-Unis, et y être placées sous la surveillance des Alliés et des États-Unis. L'armement militaire de tous les navires de la flotte auxiliaire sera débarqué. Tous les vaisseaux désignés pour être internés seront prêts à quitter les ports allemands sept jours après la signature de l'armistice. On donnera par T.S.F. les directions pour le voyage.

XXIV.—Droit pour les Alliés et les États-Unis en dehors des eaux territoriales allemandes de draguer tous les champs de mines et de détruire les obstructions placées par l'Allemagne, dont l'emplacement devra leur être indiqué.

XXV.—Libre entrée et sortie de la Baltique pour les marines de guerre et de commerce des Puissances Alliées et Associées, assurée par l'occupation de tous les forts, ouvrages, batteries et défense de tout ordre allemands, dans toutes les passes allant du Cattégat à la Baltique, et par le dragage et la destruction de toutes mines ou obstructions dans et hors les eaux territoriales allemandes, dont les plans et emplacements exacts seront fournis par l'Allemagne, qui ne pourra soulever aucune question de neutralité.

XXVI.—Maintien du blocus des Puissances Alliées et Associées dans les conditions actuelles, les

remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany during the Armistice as shall be found necessary.

XXVII.—All Aerial Forces are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

XXVIII.—In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports, Germany shall abandon, *in situ* and intact, the port material and material for inland waterways, also all merchant ships, tugs and lighters, all Naval aircraft and air materials and stores, all arms and armaments and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.

XXIX.—All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian warships of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant ships seized in the Black Sea are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned, and German materials as specified in Clause XXVIII are to be abandoned.

XXX.—All merchant ships at present in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers are to be restored to ports specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

XXXI.—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

XXXII.—The German Government shall formally notify all the

navires de commerce allemands trouvés en mer restant sujets à capture. Les Alliés et les États-Unis envisagent le ravitaillement de l'Allemagne pendant l'armistice dans la mesure reconnue nécessaire.

XXVII.—Groupement et immobilisation dans les bases allemandes désignées par les Alliés et les États-Unis de toutes les forces aériennes.

XXVIII.—Abandon par l'Allemagne, sur place et intacts, de tout le matériel de ports et de navigation fluviale, de tous les navires de commerce, remorqueurs, chalands, de tous les appareils, matériel, et approvisionnements d'aéronautique maritime, toutes armes, appareils, approvisionnements de toute nature en évacuant la côte et les ports belges.

XXIX.—Évacuation de tous les ports de la mer Noire par l'Allemagne et remise aux Alliés et aux États-Unis de tous les bâtiments de guerre russes saisis par les Allemands dans la mer Noire; libération de tous les navires de commerce neutres saisis; remise de tout le matériel de guerre ou autre saisi dans ces ports, et abandon du matériel allemand énuméré à la clause XXVIII.

XXX.—Restitution, sans réciprocité, dans des ports désignés par les Alliés et les États-Unis de tous les navires de commerce appartenant aux Puissances Alliées et Associées actuellement au pouvoir de l'Allemagne.

XXXI.—Interdiction de toute destruction des navires ou de matériel avant évacuation, livraison ou restitution.

XXXII.—Le Gouvernement allemand notifiera formellement à

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neutral Governments, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the Allied and Associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials, or not, are immediately cancelled.

XXXIII.—No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the Armistice.

F.—DURATION OF ARMISTICE.

XXXIV.—The duration of the Armistice is to be 36 days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the Armistice may be repudiated by one of the contracting parties on 48 hours' previous notice. It is understood that failure to execute Articles III and XVIII completely in the periods specified is not to give reason for a repudiation of the Armistice, save where such failure is due to malice aforethought.

To ensure the execution of the present convention under the most favourable conditions, the principle of a permanent International Armistice Commission is recognized. This Commission shall act under the supreme authority of the High Command, military and naval, of the Allied Armies.

The present Armistice was

tous les Gouvernements neutres et en particulier aux Gouvernements de Norvège, de Suède, de Danemark et de la Hollande, que toutes les restrictions imposées au trafic de leurs bâtiments avec les Puissances Alliées et Associées, soit par le Gouvernement Allemand lui-même, soit par des entreprises allemandes privées, soit en retour de concessions définies, comme l'exportation de matériaux de constructions navales, ou non, sont immédiatement annulées.

XXXIII.—Aucun transfert de navires marchands allemands de toute espèce sous un pavillon neutre quelconque ne pourra avoir lieu après la signature de l'armistice.

F.—DURÉE DE L'ARMISTICE.

XXXIV.—La durée de l'armistice est fixée à trente-six jours, avec faculté de prolongation.

Au cours de cette durée l'armistice peut, si les clauses ne sont pas exécutées, être dénoncé par l'une des parties contractantes, qui devra en donner le préavis quarante-huit heures à l'avance. Il est entendu, que l'exécution des articles III et XVIII ne donnera lieu à dénonciation de l'armistice pour insuffisance d'exécution dans les délais voulus, que dans le cas d'une exécution mal intentionnée. Pour assurer dans les meilleures conditions l'exécution de la présente convention, le principe d'une commission d'armistice internationale permanente est admis. Cette commission fonctionnera sous la haute autorité du Commandement en Chef militaire et naval des Armées Alliées.

Le présent armistice a été signé

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signed on the 11th day of November 1918, at 5 o'clock a.m. (French time).

(Signed)

F. FOCH. ERZBERGER.
R. E. WEMYSS. OBERNDORFF.
WINTERFELDT.
VANSELOW.

11th November 1918.

The representatives of the Allies declare that, in view of fresh events, it appears necessary to them that the following condition shall be added to the clauses of the Armistice :

“ In case the German ships are not handed over within the periods specified, the Governments of the Allies and of the United States shall have the right to occupy Heligoland to ensure their delivery.”

(Signed)

R. E. WEMYSS, F. FOCH.
Admiral.

The German delegates declare that they will forward this declaration to the German Chancellor, with the recommendation that it be accepted, accompanying it with the reasons by which the Allies have been actuated in making this demand.

(Signed) ERZBERGER.
OBERNDORFF.
WINTERFELDT.
VANSELOW.

ANNEXE No. 1.

I.—The evacuation of the invaded territories, Belgium, France and Luxemburg, and also of Alsace-Lorraine, shall be car-

le 11 novembre 1918, à 5 heures (heure française).

(Signé)

F. FOCH. ERZBERGER.
R. E. WEMYSS. OBERNDORFF.
WINTERFELDT.
VANSELOW.

11 novembre 1918.

Les Représentants des Alliés déclarent qu'en raison des événements nouveaux, il leur paraît nécessaire que la condition suivante soit ajoutée aux clauses de l'armistice :

“ Dans le cas où les bateaux allemands ne seraient pas livrés dans les délais indiqués, les Gouvernements des Alliés et des États-Unis auront le droit d'occuper Héligoland, pour en assurer la livraison.”

(Signé)

R. E. WEMYSS, F. FOCH.
Amiral.

Les délégués allemands déclarent qu'ils feront parvenir cette déclaration au Chancelier Allemand, avec la recommandation de l'accepter, en l'accompagnant des raisons qui ont motivé cette demande de la part des Alliés.

(Signé) ERZBERGER.
OBERNDORFF.
WINTERFELDT.
VANSELOW.

NOTE ANNEXE No. 1.

I.—Évacuation des pays envahis : Belgique, France, Luxemburg, ainsi que de l'Alsace-Lorraine, se fera en trois phases

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ried out in three successive stages according to the following conditions :

1st stage.—Evacuation of the territories situated between the existing front and line No. 1 on the enclosed map, to be completed within 5 days after the signature of the Armistice.

2nd stage.—Evacuation of territories situated between line No. 1 and line No. 2 to be carried out within 4 further days (9 days in all after the signing of the Armistice).

3rd stage.—Evacuation of the territories situated between line No. 2 and line No. 3, to be completed within 6 further days (15 days in all after the signing of the Armistice).

Allied and United States troops shall enter these various territories on the expiration of the period allowed to the German troops for the evacuation of each.

In consequence, the Allied troops will cross the present German front as from the 6th day following the signing of the Armistice, line No. 1 as from the 10th day, and line No. 2 as from the 16th day.

II.—*Evacuation of the Rhine district.*—This evacuation shall also be carried out in several successive stages :

(1) Evacuation of territories situated between lines 2 and 3 and line 4 to be completed within 4 further days (19 days in all after the signing of the Armistice).

(2) Evacuation of territories

successives, dans les conditions suivantes :

1^{re} Phase.—Évacuation des territoires situés entre le front actuel et la ligne No. 1 de la carte jointe, terminée dans un délai de cinq jours après la signature de l'armistice.

2^e Phase.—Évacuation des territoires situés entre la ligne No. 1 et la ligne No. 2, terminée dans un délai de quatre nouveaux jours (neuf jours au total après la signature de l'armistice).

3^e Phase.—Évacuation des territoires situés entre la ligne No. 2 et la ligne No. 3, terminée dans un délai de six nouveaux jours (quinze jours au total après la signature de l'armistice).

Les troupes alliées et des États-Unis pénétreront dans ces différents territoires après l'expiration des délais accordés aux troupes allemandes pour l'évacuation de chacun d'eux.

En conséquence, le front allemand actuel sera franchi par les troupes alliées à partir du sixième jour qui suivra la signature de l'armistice, la ligne No. 1 à partir du dixième jour, la ligne No. 2 à partir du seizième jour.

II.—*Évacuation des Pays du Rhin.*—Cette évacuation se fera également en plusieurs phases successives :

(1) Évacuation des territoires situés entre les lignes No. 2, 3 et la ligne No. 4, terminée dans un délai de quatre nouveaux jours (dix-neuf jours au total après la signature de l'armistice).

(2) Évacuation des territoires

situated between lines 4 and 5 to be completed within 4 further days (23 days in all after the signing of the Armistice).

(3) Evacuation of territories situated between lines 5 and 6 (line of the Rhine) to be completed within 4 further days (27 days in all after the signing of the Armistice).

(4) Evacuation of the bridge-heads and of the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine to be completed within 4 further days (31 days in all after the signing of the Armistice).

The Allied and United States Army of Occupation shall enter these various territories after the expiration of the period allowed to the German troops for the evacuation of each; consequently the Army will cross line No. 3, 20 days after the signing of the Armistice. It will cross line No. 4 as from the 24th day after the signing of the Armistice: Line No. 5 as from the 28th day: Line No. 6 (Rhine) the 32nd day, in order to occupy the bridge-heads.

III.—*Surrender by the German Armies of war material specified by the Armistice.*—This war material shall be surrendered according to the following conditions: The first half before the 10th day, the second half before the 20th day. This material shall be handed over to each of the Allied and United States Armies by each

situés entre la ligne No. 4 et la ligne No. 5, terminée dans un délai de quatre nouveaux jours (vingt-trois jours au total après la signature de l'armistice).

(3) Évacuation des territoires situés entre la ligne No. 5 et la ligne No. 6 (ligne du Rhin), terminée dans un délai de quatre nouveaux jours (vingt-sept jours au total après la signature de l'armistice).

(4) Évacuation des têtes de pont et de la zone neutre de la rive droite du Rhin, terminée dans un délai de quatre nouveaux jours (trente et un jours au total après la signature de l'armistice).

Les troupes d'occupation alliées et des États-Unis pénétreront dans ces différents territoires après l'expiration des délais accordés aux troupes allemandes pour l'évacuation de chacun d'eux. En conséquence, la ligne No. 3 sera franchie par elles à partir du vingtième jour qui suivra la signature de l'armistice; la ligne No. 4 sera franchie par elles à partir du vingt-quatrième jour qui suivra la signature de l'armistice; la ligne No. 5 à partir du vingt-huitième jour; la ligne No. 6 (Rhin), à partir du trente-deuxième jour, pour l'occupation des têtes de pont.

III.—*Livraison par les Armées allemandes du matériel de guerre fixé par l'Armistice.*—Ce matériel de guerre devra être livré dans les conditions suivantes: la première moitié avant le dixième jour; la deuxième moitié avant le vingtième jour; ce matériel sera remis à chacune des Armées Alliées et des États-Unis par

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larger tactical group of the German Armies in the proportions which may be fixed by the permanent International Armistice Commission.

chacun des groupements tactiques de l'Armée allemande dans les proportions qui seront fixées par la Commission permanente d'Armistice.

ANNEXE No. 2.

Conditions regarding communications, railways, waterways, roads, river and sea ports, and telegraphic and telephonic communications :

I.—All communications as far as the Rhine, inclusive, or comprised, on the right bank of this river, within the bridgeheads occupied by the Allied Armies shall be placed under the supreme and absolute authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, who shall have the right to take any measure he may think necessary to assure their occupation and use. All documents relative to communications shall be held ready for transmission to him.

II.—All the material and all the civil and military personnel at present employed in the maintenance and working of all lines of communication are to be maintained in their entirety upon these lines in all territories evacuated by the German troops.

All supplementary material necessary for the upkeep of these lines of communication in the districts on the left bank of the Rhine shall be supplied by the German Government throughout the duration of the Armistice.

III.—*Personnel.*—The French and Belgian personnel belonging to the services of the lines of communication, whether interned or not, are to be returned to the French and Belgian Armies during the 15 days following the

NOTE ANNEXE No. 2.

Conditions intéressant les Voies de Communication (voies ferrées, voies navigables, routes, ports fluviaux et maritimes, télégraphes et téléphones):

I.—Toutes les voies de communication situées jusqu'au Rhin inclus, ou comprises sur la rive droite de ce fleuve à l'intérieur des têtes de pont occupées par les Armées Alliées, seront placées sous l'autorité pleine et entière du Commandant en Chef des Armées Alliées, qui aura le droit de prendre toutes les mesures qu'il jugera nécessaires pour en assurer l'occupation et l'exploitation. Tous les documents relatifs aux voies de communication seront tenus prêts à lui être remis.

II.—Tout le matériel et tout le personnel, civil et militaire, utilisés actuellement pour l'entretien et l'exploitation des voies de communication, seront maintenus intégralement sur ces voies dans tous les territoires évacués par les troupes allemandes.

Tout le matériel supplémentaire nécessaire pour l'entretien de ces voies de communication dans les pays de la rive gauche du Rhin sera fourni par le Gouvernement Allemand pendant toute la durée de l'armistice.

III.—*Personnel.*—Le personnel français et belge, appartenant au service des voies de communication, qu'il soit interné ou non, sera remis aux Armées françaises et belge dans les quinze jours suivant la signature

signing of the Armistice. The personnel belonging to the organization of the Alsace-Lorraine railway system is to be maintained or reinstated in such a way as to ensure the working of the system.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies shall have the right to make all changes and substitutions that he may desire in the personnel of the lines of communication.

IV. — *Material.* — (a) *Rolling stock.*—The rolling stock handed over to the Allied Armies in the zone comprised between the present front and Line No. 3, not including Alsace-Lorraine, shall amount at least to 5,000 locomotives and 150,000 wagons. This surrender shall be carried out within the period fixed by Clause VII of the Armistice and under conditions, the details of which shall be fixed by the permanent International Armistice Commission.

All this material is to be in good condition and in working order, with all the ordinary spare parts and fittings. It may be employed together with the regular personnel, or with any other, upon any part of the railway system of the Allied Armies.

The material necessary for the working of the Alsace-Lorraine railway system is to be maintained or replaced for the use of the French Army:

The material to be left *in situ* in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, as well as that on the inner side of the bridgeheads, must permit of the normal working of the railways in these districts.

(b) *Permanent way, signals and workshops.*—The material for

del'armistice. Le personnel affecté organiquement au réseau exploité par les chemins de fer d'Alsace-Lorraine sera maintenu, ou remis en place, de façon à assurer l'exploitation du réseau.

Le Commandant en Chef des Armées Alliées aura le droit de faire dans le personnel des voies de communication toutes les mutations et tous les remplacements qui lui conviendront.

IV. — *Matériel.* — (a) *Matériel roulant.*—Le matériel roulant remis aux Armées Alliées dans la zone comprise entre le front actuel et la ligne No. 3, non compris l'Alsace-Lorraine, sera d'une importance au moins égale à 5,000 locomotives et 150,000 wagons. Cette livraison sera effectuée dans les délais fixés par la clause VII de l'armistice, et dans des conditions de détail à arrêter par la Commission d'Armistice internationale permanente.

Tout ce matériel sera en bon état d'entretien et de roulement et pourvu de toutes les pièces de rechange ou agrès usuels. Il pourra être utilisé avec son personnel propre, ou tout autre, sur un point quelconque du réseau ferré des Armées Alliées.

Le matériel affecté organiquement au réseau exploité par les chemins de fer d'Alsace-Lorraine sera maintenu, ou remis en place, à la disposition de l'Armée française.

Le matériel à laisser sur place dans les pays de la rive gauche du Rhin, ainsi qu'à l'intérieur des têtes de pont d'autre part, devra permettre l'exploitation normale des voies ferrées de ces territoires.

(b) *Matériel de voie, de signalisation et d'atelier.*—Le matériel

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signals, machine tools and tool outfits, taken from the workshops and dépôts of the French and Belgian lines, are to be replaced under conditions, the details of which are to be arranged by the permanent International Armistice Commission.

The Allied Armies are to be supplied with railroad material, rails, incidental fittings, plant, bridge-building material and timber necessary for the repair of the lines destroyed beyond the present front.

(c) *Fuel and maintenance material.*—The German Government shall be responsible throughout the duration of the Armistice for the release of fuel and maintenance material to the dépôts normally allotted to the railways in the territories on the left bank of the Rhine.

V.—*Telegraphic and Telephonic Communications.*—All telegraphs, telephones, and fixed W/T stations are to be handed over to the Allied Armies, with all the civil and military personnel and all their material, including all stores on the left bank of the Rhine.

Supplementary stores necessary for the upkeep of the system are to be supplied throughout the duration of the Armistice by the German Government according to requirements.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies shall place this system under military supervision and shall ensure its control, and shall make all changes and substitutions in personnel which he may think necessary.

He will send back to the German Army all the military personnel who are not in his judg-

de signalisation, les machines-outils et l'outillage prélevés sur les ateliers, les dépôts des réseaux français et belge seront remis dans des conditions de détail à arrêter par la Commission d'Armistice internationale permanente. Il sera fourni aux Armées Alliées le matériel de voie, rails, petit matériel, appareils, matériel de pont, et les bois nécessaires à la remise en état des lignes détruites au delà du front actuel.

(c) *Combustible et matière d'entretien.*—Pendant la durée de l'armistice, les combustibles et matières d'entretien seront libérés par les soins du Gouvernement Allemand aux dépôts normalement affectés à l'exploitation, dans les pays de la rive gauche du Rhin.

V.—*Communications télégraphiques et téléphoniques.*—Toutes les lignes télégraphiques et téléphoniques, tous les postes de T.S.F. fixes seront passés aux Armées Alliées, avec tout le personnel civil et militaire et tout leur matériel, y compris tous les approvisionnements constitués sur la rive gauche du Rhin.

Les approvisionnements supplémentaires nécessaires pour l'entretien du réseau devront être fournis pendant la durée de l'armistice par le Gouvernement Allemand au fur et à mesure des besoins.

Le Commandant en Chef des Armées Alliées occupera ce réseau militairement, en assurera la direction, et fera dans le personnel tous les remplacements et mutations qu'il jugera utile.

Il renverra à l'Armée allemande tout le personnel militaire qu'il n'estimera pas nécessaire

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ment necessary for the working and upkeep of the railway. pour l'exploitation et l'entretien du réseau.

All plans of the German telegraphic and telephonic systems shall be handed over to the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Tous les plans du réseau télégraphique et téléphonique allemand seront remis au Commandant en Chef des Armées Alliées.

CONVENTION PROLONGING THE ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY, 13TH DECEMBER, 1918

CONVENTION.

The undersigned, in virtue of the powers with which they were endowed for the signing of the Armistice of the 11th November, 1918, have concluded the following additional agreement :

1. The duration of the Armistice signed on the 11th November, 1918, has been prolonged for a month, i.e. till 5 a.m. on the 17th January, 1919.

The one month's extension will be further extended until the conclusion of Peace preliminaries, provided this arrangement meets with the approbation of the Allied Governments.

2. The clauses of the Convention (11th November) which have been incompletely fulfilled will be carried out during the period of extension, according to the conditions laid down by the Permanent International Armistice Commission following the orders given by the Allied Generalissimo.

3. The following clause is added to the Convention of the 11th November, 1918 :

'From now onwards the Generalissimo reserves to himself the right of occupying (when he deems it advisable), as an additional guarantee, the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine, north of the bridgehead of Cologne, and as far as the Dutch frontier.

'Six days' notice will be given by the Generalissimo before the occupation comes into effect.'

Trèves, 13th December, 1918.

(Signed) F. FOCH.
WEMYSS, Admiral.

ERZBERGER.
A. OBERNDORFF.
WINTERFELDT.
VANSELOW.

CONVENTION PROLONGING THE ARMISTICE WITH
GERMANY, 16TH JANUARY, 1919

CONVENTION

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries (Admiral Browning taking the place of Admiral Wemyss), vested with the powers in virtue of which the Armistice Agreement of 11th November, 1918, was signed, have concluded the following supplementary Agreement :

1. The Armistice of the 11th November, 1918; which was prolonged until the 17th January, 1919, by the Agreement of the 13th December, 1918, shall be again prolonged for one month, that is to say, until the 17th February, 1919, at 5 a.m.

This prolongation of one month shall be extended until the conclusion of the Peace preliminaries, subject to the approval of the Allied Governments.

2. The execution of those clauses of the Agreement of the 11th November which have not been entirely carried out shall be proceeded with and completed during the prolongation of the Armistice, in accordance with the detailed conditions fixed by the Permanent International Armistice Commission on the instructions of the Allied High Command.

3. In substitution of the supplementary railway material specified by Tables 1 and 2 of the Spa Protocol of 17th December, i.e. 500 locomotives and 19,000 wagons, the German Government shall supply the following agricultural machinery and instruments :

400 two-engined steam plough outfits, complete, with suitable ploughs,

6,500 drills,

6,500 manure distributors,

6,500 ploughs,

6,500 Brabant ploughs,

12,500 harrows,

6,500 scarifiers,

2,500 steel rollers,

2,500 Croskill rollers,

2,500 mowing machines,

2,500 hay-making machines,

3,000 reapers and binders,

or equivalent implements, according to the scale of interchangeability of various kinds of implements considered permissible by the Permanent International Armistice Commission. All this material, which shall be either new, or in very good condition, shall be delivered together with all accessories belonging to each implement, and with the spare parts required for 18 months' use.

The German Armistice Commission shall, between the present date and the 23rd January, supply the Allied Armistice Commission with a list of the material that can be delivered by the 1st March,

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which must, in principle, constitute not less than one-third of the total quantity. The International Armistice Commission shall, between now and the 23rd January, fix the latest dates of delivery, which shall, in principle, not extend beyond the 1st June.

4. The officers in Germany delegated by the Allied and Associated Powers to organize the evacuation of the prisoners of war belonging to the armies of the Entente, together with representatives of the Relief Associations of the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy, shall form a Commission charged with the care of Russian prisoners of war in Germany.

This Commission, the headquarters of which shall be in Berlin, shall be empowered to deal with the German Government direct, upon instructions from the Allied Governments, regarding all questions relating to Russian prisoners of war.

The German Government shall accord the Commission all travelling facilities necessary for the purpose of investigating the housing conditions and food supply of such prisoners.

The Allied Governments reserve the right to arrange for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war to any region which they may consider most suitable.

5. *Naval Clauses.*—Article XXII of the Armistice Agreement of the 11th November, 1918, shall be supplemented as follows :

‘In order to ensure the execution of such clause, the German authorities shall be bound to carry out the following conditions :

‘All submarines capable of putting to sea, or of being towed, shall be handed over immediately and shall make for Allied ports. Such vessels shall include submarine cruisers, mine-layers, relief ships and submarine docks. All submarines which cannot be surrendered shall be completely destroyed or dismantled, under the supervision of the Allied Commissioners.

‘Submarine construction shall cease immediately, and all submarines in course of construction shall be destroyed or dismantled under the supervision of the Allied Commissioners.’

Article XXIII of the Armistice Agreement of the 11th November, 1918, shall be supplemented as follows :

‘In order to ensure the execution of such clause, the German Commission shall furnish the Inter-Allied Naval Armistice Commission with a complete list of all surface vessels constructed or in course of construction (launched or on the stocks), specifying probable dates of completion.’

Article XXX of the Armistice Agreement of 11th November, 1918, shall be supplemented as follows :

‘In order to ensure the execution of such clause, the Allied High Command informs the German High Command that all possible measures must be taken immediately for delivery, in Allied ports, of all Allied merchantmen still detained in German ports.’

6. *Restitution of Material carried off from Belgian and French Territories.*—As restitution of material carried off from French and

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Belgian territory is indispensable for setting factories once more into working order, the following measures shall be carried out, viz. :

- (a) All machinery, machinery parts, industrial or agricultural plant, accessories of all kinds and, generally, all industrial or agricultural articles carried off by German military or civilian authorities or individuals, under any pretext whatever, from territories formerly occupied by the German armies on the Western front, shall be placed at the disposal of the Allies for the purpose of being returned to their places of origin, should the French and Belgian Governments so desire.
These articles shall be returned without further alteration and undamaged.
- (b) In view of such restitution, the German Government shall immediately furnish the Armistice Commission with all official or private accounts, agreements for sale or hire, or correspondence relating to such articles, together with all necessary declarations or information regarding their existence, origin, adaptation, present condition and locality.
- (c) The delegates of the French or Belgian Government shall cause inventories or examinations of such articles to be made on the spot in Germany, should they think fit.
- (d) The return of such articles shall be effected in accordance with special instructions to be given as required by the French or Belgian authorities.
- (e) With a view to immediate restitution, declarations shall more particularly be made of all stocks of driving belts, electric motors and parts thereof, or plant removed from France or Belgium and existing in dépôt parks, railways, ships and factories.
- (f) The furnishing of the particulars referred to in Articles 3 and 6 hereof shall commence within 8 clear days from the 20th January, 1919, and shall be completed in principle before the 1st April, 1919.

7. As a further guarantee, the Supreme Allied Command reserves to itself the right to occupy, whenever it shall consider this desirable, the sector of the fortress of Strassburg formed by the fortifications on the right bank of the Rhine, with a strip of territory extending from 5 to 10 kilometres in front of such fortifications, within the boundaries defined on the map appended hereto.

The Supreme Allied Command shall give 6 days' notice prior to such occupation, which shall not be preceded by any destruction of material or of buildings.

The limits of the neutral zone will, therefore, be advanced by 10 kilometres.

8. In order to secure the provisioning of Germany and of the rest of Europe, the German Government shall take all necessary steps to place the German fleet, for the duration of the Armistice, under the

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control and the flags of the Allied Powers and the United States, who shall be assisted by a German delegate.

This arrangement shall in no wise affect the final disposal of such vessels. The Allies and the United States shall, if they consider this necessary, replace the crews either entirely or in part, and the officers and crews so replaced shall be repatriated to Germany.

Suitable compensation, to be fixed by the Allied Governments, shall be made for the use of such vessels.

All questions of details, as also any exceptions to be made in the case of certain types of vessel, shall be settled by a special agreement to be concluded immediately.

Trèves, 16th January, 1919.

(Signed) FOCH
BROWNING.

ERZBERGER.
OBERNDORFF.
VON WINTERFELDT.
VANSELOW.

CONVENTION PROLONGING THE ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY, 16TH FEBRUARY, 1919

CONVENTION

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries, possessed of the powers in virtue of which the Armistice Agreement of 11th November, 1918, was signed, have concluded the following additional agreement :

Admiral Wemyss being replaced by Admiral Browning, General v. Winterfeldt by General v. Hammerstein, and the Minister Plenipotentiary Count v. Oberndorff by the Minister Plenipotentiary v. Haniel.

I.—The Germans are to cease all hostilities against the Poles at once, whether in the district of Posen or any other district. With this end in view, they are forbidden to allow their troops to cross the following line—the old frontier between East and West Prussia and Russia as far as Louisenfelde, from thence the line west of Louisenfelde, west of Gr. Neudorff, south of Brzoza, north of Schubin, north of Exin, south of Samotschin, south of Chodziesen, north of Czarnikau, west of Miala, west of Birnbaum, west of Bentschen, west of Wollstein, north of Lissa, north of Rawitsch, south of Krotoschin, west of Adelnau, west of Schildberg, north of Doruchow, to the Silesian frontier.

II.—The Armistice of 11th November, prolonged by the Agreements of 13th December, 1918, and 16th January, 1919, until 17th February, 1919, is further prolonged for a short period, the date of expiry not being given, the Allied Powers and those associated with them reserving to themselves the right to terminate the period at 3 days' notice.

III.—The carrying out of those clauses of the Agreement of 11th November, 1918, and of the additional Agreements of 13th December,

1918 and 16th January 1919, the terms of which have not yet been fully carried into effect, will be continued and completed during the prolongation of the Armistice, according to detailed arrangements made by the Permanent Armistice Commission, acting on instructions issued by the Supreme Allied Command.

Trèves, 16th February, 1919.

(Signed) FOCH.
BROWNING.

ERZBERGER.
FREIHERR V. HAMMERSTEIN.
VON HANIEL.
VANSELOW.

PART II

PROTOCOL OF THE ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED POWERS AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Signed November 3, 1918

With Appendix

A.—MILITARY CLAUSES.

I.—Immediate cessation of hostilities on land, by sea, and in the air.

II.—Complete demobilisation of the Austro-Hungarian Army and immediate withdrawal of all units operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

There shall only be maintained in Austro-Hungarian territory, within the limits indicated below in Par. 3, as Austro-Hungarian military forces, a maximum of 20 Divisions reduced to their pre-war peace effective strength.

Half the total quantity of Divisional artillery, Army Corps artillery, as well as their respective equipment, beginning with all such material which is within the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian Army,

A.—CLAUSES MILITAIRES.

I.—Cessation immédiate des hostilités sur terre, sur mer et dans l'air.

II.—Démobilisation totale de l'armée austro-hongroise et retrait immédiat de toutes les unités qui opèrent sur le front de la mer du Nord à la Suisse.

Il ne sera maintenu sur le territoire austro-hongrois, dans les limites ci-dessous indiquées au paragraphe 3, comme forces militaires austro-hongroises, qu'un maximum de 20 divisions réduites à l'effectif du pied de paix d'avant guerre.

La moitié du matériel total d'artillerie divisionnaire, d'artillerie de corps d'armée ainsi que l'équipement correspondant en commençant par tout ce qui se trouve sur les territoires à évacuer par l'armée austro-hongroise,

shall be concentrated within localities to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, for the purpose of being surrendered to them.

III.—Evacuation of all territory invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of the war, and withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian forces, within a space of time to be laid down by the General Commanding-in-Chief of the Allied forces on the different fronts, beyond a line fixed as follows :

From Piz Umbrail as far as the North of the Stelvio, it will follow the crest of the Rhaetian Alps as far as the sources of the Adige and of the Eisach, passing then by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and on the heights of the Oetz and the Ziller.

The line thence turns south, crossing Mount Toblach as far as present frontier of Carnic Alps. It follows this line as far as Mount Tarvis, thence to watershed of Julian Alps by Col de Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terglou) and watershed Podberdo, Podlaniscam and Idria. From this point the line turns south-east towards the Schneeberg, excluding the whole basin of the Save River and its tributaries ; from Schneeberg it descends the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglia and Volosca in evacuated territories.

It will follow the administrative limits of present province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisarica and Tridania and to the south, territory limited by a line from the shore of Cape Planka to the summits of water-

devra être réuni entre des points à fixer par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique pour leur être livré.

III.—Évacuation de tout territoire envahi par l'Autriche-Hongrie depuis le début de la guerre et retrait des forces austro-hongroises dans un délai à déterminer par les Généraux Commandants en chef les forces alliées sur les différents fronts, au delà d'une ligne fixée comme suit :

Du Piz Umbrail jusqu'au nord du Stelvio, elle suivra la crête des Alpes Rhétiennes jusqu'aux sources de l'Adige et de l'Eisach, passant alors par les monts Reschen et Brenner et sur les hauteurs de l'Oetz et du Ziller.

La ligne ensuite se dirigera vers le sud, traversera le Mont Toblach et rejoindra la frontière actuelle des Alpes Carniques. Elle suivra cette frontière jusqu'au Mont Tarvis, et après le Mont Tarvis, la ligne de partage des eaux des Alpes Juliennes par le Col Prédil, le Mont Mangart, le Tricorno (Terglou) et la ligne de partage des eaux des Cols de Podberdo, de Podlaniscam et d'Idria. A partir de ce point, la ligne suivra la direction du sud-est vers le Schneeberg, laissant en dehors d'elle tout le bassin de la Save et de ses tributaires ; du Schneeberg, la ligne descendra vers la côte, de manière à inclure Castua, Mattuglia et Volosca dans les territoires évacués.

Elle suivra également les limites administratives actuelles de la province de Dalmatie, en y comprenant, au nord, Lisarica et Tridania et au sud, jusqu'à une ligne partant sur la côte du Cap Planka et suivant vers l'est les

shed eastwards so as to include in evacuated area all the valleys and watercourses flowing towards Sebenico, such as Cicola, Kerka, Butisnica, and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago and Puntadura islands, in the north, up to Meleda, in the south, embracing Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzolä, Cazza and Lagosta as well as neighbouring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, only excepting the islands of great and small Zirona, Bua, Solta and Brazza.

All territories thus evacuated will be occupied by Allied and American troops.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds (including coal) within these territories to be left *in situ*, and surrendered to the Allies and America according to special orders given by Commander-in-Chief of forces of Associated Powers, on different fronts.

No new destruction, pillage or requisition by enemy troops in territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by Associated Powers.

IV.—Allied Armies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory which shall be necessary.

Armies of Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times

sommets des hauteurs formant la ligne de partage des eaux, de manière à comprendre dans les territoires évacués toutes les vallées et cours d'eau descendant vers Sebenico, comme la Cicola, la Kerka, la Butisnica et leurs affluents. Elle enfermera aussi toutes les îles situées au nord et à l'ouest de la Dalmatie depuis Prémuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago et Puntadura au nord, jusqu'à Meleda au sud, en y comprenant Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Lazza et Lagosta ainsi que les rochers et îlots environnants, et Pelagosa, à l'exception seulement des îles Grande et Petite Zirona, Bua, Solta et Brazza.

Tous les territoires ainsi évacués seront occupés par les forces des Alliés et des États-Unis d'Amérique.

Maintien sur place de tout le matériel militaire et de chemin de fer ennemi qui se trouve sur les territoires à évacuer.

Livraison aux Alliés et aux États-Unis de tout ce matériel (approvisionnements de charbon et autres compris) suivant les instructions de détail données par les Généraux Commandants en chef les forces des Puissances associées sur les différents fronts.

Aucune destruction nouvelle, ni pillage, ni réquisition nouvelle par les troupes ennemies dans les territoires à évacuer par l'ennemi et à occuper par les forces des Puissances associées.

IV.—Possibilité pour les Armées des Puissances associées de se mouvoir librement par l'ensemble des routes, chemins de fer et voies fluviales des territoires austro-hongrois nécessaires.

Occupation par les Armées des Puissances associées de tous points stratégiques en Autriche-Hongrie

as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have right of requisition on payment for troops of Associated Powers wherever they may be.

V.—Complete evacuation of all German troops within 15 days not only from Italian and Balkan fronts but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary before that date.

VI.—Administration of evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will provisionally be entrusted to local authorities under control of the Allied and associated armies of occupation.

VII.—Immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, of all prisoners of war and interned Allied subjects and of civilian populations evacuated from their homes on conditions to be laid down by Commanders-in-Chief of forces of Allied Powers on various fronts.

VIII.—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel who will be left on the spot with medical material required.

B.—NAVAL CONDITIONS.

I.—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that free navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines

et à tous moments jugés nécessaires par ces Puissances, pour rendre possible toutes opérations militaires ou pour maintenir l'ordre.

Droit de réquisition contre paiement pour les Armées des Puissances associées dans tous les territoires où elles se trouveront.

V.—Complète évacuation, dans un délai de 15 jours, de toutes troupes allemandes, non seulement des fronts d'Italie et des Balkans, mais de tous territoires austro-hongrois.

Internement de toutes troupes allemandes qui n'auraient pas quitté avant ce délai le territoire austro-hongrois.

VI.—Les territoires austro-hongrois évacués seront provisoirement administrés par les autorités locales sous le contrôle des troupes alliées ou associées d'occupation.

VII.—Rapatriement immédiat, sans réciprocité, de tous les prisonniers de guerre, sujets alliés internés et populations civiles évacuées, dans les conditions à fixer par les Généraux Commandants en chef les Armées des Puissances alliées sur les fronts.

VIII.—Les malades et blessés évacués seront soignés par du personnel austro-hongrois qui sera laissé sur place avec le matériel nécessaire.

B.—CLAUSES NAVALES.

I.—Cessation immédiate de toute hostilité sur mer et indications précises de l'emplacement et des mouvements de tous les bâtiments austro-hongrois.

Avis sera donné aux neutres de la liberté concédée à la navigation des marines de guerre et de commerce des Puissances alliées et

of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

II.—Surrender to the Allies and United States of America of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines completed between years 1910 and 1918 and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and to remain under supervision of the Allies.

III.—Surrender to the Allies and United States of America, with their complete armament and equipment, of 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpedo-boats, 1 mine-layer, 6 Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and United States of America.

All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and United States of America, and are to be paid off, completely disarmed and placed under supervision of Allies and United States of America.

IV.—Free navigation to all warships and merchant ships of Allied and Associated Powers to be given in Adriatic, in territorial waters and up River Danube and its tributaries, and Austro-Hungarian territory.

Allies and Associated Powers shall have right to sweep up all minefields and obstructions, and positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to ensure free naviga-

associées dans toutes les eaux territoriales, sans soulever des questions de neutralité.

II.—Livraison aux Alliés et aux États-Unis d'Amérique de 15 sous-marins austro-hongrois achevés de 1910 à 1918 et de tous les sous-marins allemands se trouvant ou pouvant pénétrer dans les eaux territoriales austro-hongroises. Désarmement complet et démobilisation de tous les autres sous-marins austro-hongrois, qui devront rester sous la surveillance des Alliés et des États-Unis d'Amérique.

III.—Livraison aux Alliés et aux États-Unis d'Amérique, avec leur armement et équipement complets, de 3 cuirassés, 3 croiseurs légers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpilleurs, 1 mouilleur de mines, 6 monitors du Danube à désigner par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique.

Tous les autres bâtiments de guerre de surface (y compris ceux de rivière) devront être concentrés dans les bases navales austro-hongroises qui seront désignées par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique et devront être démobilisés et complètement désarmés et placés sous la surveillance des Alliés et des États-Unis d'Amérique.

IV.—Liberté de navigation de tous les bâtiments des marines de guerre et de commerce des Puissances alliées et associées dans l'Adriatique, y compris les eaux territoriales, sur le Danube et ses affluents en territoire austro-hongrois.

Les Alliés et les Puissances associées auront le droit de draguer tous les champs de mines et de détruire les obstructions dont l'emplacement devra leur être indiqué.

Pour assurer la liberté de navi-

tion on the Danube, Allies and United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defence works.

V.—Existing blockade conditions set up by Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture with the exceptions which may be made by a Commission nominated by Allies and United States.

VI.—All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by Allies and United States of America.

VII.—Evacuation of all the Italian coast, and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory, and abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

VIII.—Occupation by Allies and United States of America of land and sea fortifications and islands which form defences, and of dockyards and arsenals at Pola.

IX.—All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to Allies and Associated Powers to be returned.

X.—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

XI.—All naval and mercantile prisoners of war of Allied and Associated Powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

The undersigned plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, signify

gation sur le Danube les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique pourront occuper ou démanteler tous les ouvrages fortifiés et de défense.

V.—Maintien du blocus des Puissances alliées et associées dans les conditions actuelles, les navires austro-hongrois trouvés en mer restent sujets à capture, sauf les exceptions qui seront admises par une Commission qui sera désignée par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique.

VI.—Groupement et immobilisation dans les bases austro-hongroises désignées par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique de toutes les forces aériennes navales.

VII.—Évacuation de toute la côte italienne et de tous les ports occupés par l'Autriche-Hongrie en dehors de son territoire national et abandon de tout le matériel flottant, matériel naval, équipement et matériel pour voie navigable de tout ordre.

VIII.—Occupation par les Alliés et les États-Unis d'Amérique des fortifications de terre et de mer, et des îles constituant la défense de Pola, ainsi que des chantiers et de l'Arsenal.

IX.—Restitution de tous les navires de commerce des Puissances alliées et associées détenus par l'Autriche-Hongrie.

X.—Interdiction de toute destruction des navires ou de matériel avant évacuation, livraison ou restitution.

XI.—Restitution, sans réciprocité, de tous les prisonniers de guerre des marines de guerre et de commerce des Puissances alliées et associées au pouvoir des Austro-Hongrois.

Les plenipotentiaires soussignés, dûment autorisés, déclarent d'ap-

ARMISTICE WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 487

their approval of above conditions.

3rd November 1918.

Representatives of Italian Supreme Command.

Ten. Gen. PIETRO BADOGLIO.
Magg. Gen. SCIPIONE SCIPIONI.
Colonn. TULLIO MARCHETTI.
Colonn. PIETRO GAZZERA.
Colonn. PIETRO MARAVIGNA.
Colonn. ALBERTO PARIANI.
Cap. Vasc. FRANCESCO ACCINNI.

prouver les conditions susindiquées.

3 novembre 1918.

Les Représentants du Commandement Suprême de l'Armée austro-hongroise.

Signés :

VICTOR WEBER EDLER VON WEBENAU.
KARL SCHNELLER.
Y. VON LIECHTENSTEIN.
J. V. NYÉKHEGYI.
ZWIERKOWSKI.
VICTOR, FREIHERR VON SEILLER.
KAMILLO RUGGERA.

SUPPLEMENT TO PROTOCOL

Contains details and executive clauses of certain points of the Armistice between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria-Hungary.

I.—MILITARY CLAUSES.

1.—Hostilities on land, sea and air, will cease on all Austro-Hungarian fronts 24 hours after the signing of the Armistice, *i.e.*, at 3 o'clock on 4th November (Central European time).

From that hour the Italian and Allied troops will not advance beyond the line then reached.

The Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies must retire to a distance of at least 3 kilometres (as the crow flies) from the line reached by the Italian troops or by troops of Allied countries. Inhabitants of the 3 kilometre zone included between the two lines (above-mentioned) will be able to obtain necessary supplies from their own army or those of the Allies.

All Austro-Hungarian troops who may be at the rear of the fighting lines reached by the Italian troops, on the cessation of hostilities, must be regarded as prisoners of war.

2.—Regarding the clauses included in Articles II and III concerning artillery equipment, and war material to be either collected in places indicated or left in territories which are to be evacuated, the Italian plenipotentiaries representing all the Allied and Associated Powers, give to the said clauses the following interpretation which will be carried into execution :

- (a) Any material or part thereof which may be used for the purpose of war must be given up to the Allied and Associated Powers. The Austro-Hungarian Army and the German troops are only authorized to take personal arms and equipment belonging to troops evacuating the terri-

tories mentioned in Article III, besides officers' chargers, the transport train, and horses specially allotted to each unit for transport of food supplies, kitchens, officers' luggage and medical material. This clause applies to the whole army and to all the services.

- (b) Concerning artillery—it has been arranged that the Austro-Hungarian Army and German troops shall abandon all artillery material and equipment in the territory to be evacuated.

The calculations necessary for obtaining a complete and exact total of the artillery divisions and army corps at the disposal of Austro-Hungary on the cessation of hostilities (half of which must be given up to the Associated Powers) will be made later, in order to arrange, if necessary, for the delivery of other Austro-Hungarian artillery material and for the possible eventual return of material to the Austria-Hungarian Army by the Allied and Associated Armies.

All artillery which does not actually form part of the divisional artillery and army corps must be given up, without exception. It will not, however, be necessary to calculate the amount.

- (c) On the Italian front the delivery of divisional and army corps artillery will be effected at the following places—Trento, Bolzano, Pieve di Cadore, Stazione per la Carnia, Tolmino, Gorizia and Trieste.

3.—Special Commissions will be selected by the Commanders-in-Chief of Allied and Associated Armies on the various Austro-Hungarian fronts, which will immediately proceed, accompanied by the necessary escorts, to the places they regard as the most suitable from which to control the execution of the provisions established above.

4.—It has been determined that the designations M. Toblach and M. Tarvis indicate the groups of mountains dominating the ridge of Mts. Toblach and the Valley of Tarvis.

5.—The retirement of Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies beyond the lines indicated in Article III of the Protocol of Armistice Conditions, will take place within 15 days of the cessation of hostilities, as far as the Italian front is concerned.

On the Italian front, Austro-Hungarian troops and those of her allies must have retired beyond the line: Tonale—Noce—Lavis—Avisio—Pordoi—Livinallongo—Falzarego—Pieve di Cadore—Colle Mauria—Alto Tagliamento—Fella—Raccolana—Selle Nevea—Isonzo by the fifth day, they must also have evacuated the Dalmatian territory indicated above.

Austro-Hungarian troops on land and sea, or those of her allies, not having evacuated the territories indicated within the period of 15 days will be regarded as prisoners of war.

6.—The payment of any requisitions made by the armies of the

Allied and Associated Armies on Austro-Hungarian territory, will be carried out according to paragraph 1 of page 227 of 'Servizio in Guerra—Part II, Edizione 1915', actually in force in the Italian Army.

7.—As regards railways and the exercise of the rights confirmed upon the Associated Powers by Article IV of the Armistice agreement between the Allied Powers and Austria-Hungary, it has been determined that the transport of troops, war material and supplies for Allied and Associated Powers on the Austro-Hungarian railway system, outside territory evacuated in accordance with the terms of the Armistice, and the direction and working of the railways shall be effected by the employees of the Austro-Hungarian railway administration, under the supervision of special Commissioners selected by the Allied Powers, and the Military Italian Headquarters which it will be considered necessary to establish, the Austro-Hungarian authorities will give priority to Allied military trains, and will guarantee their safety.

8.—On territory to be evacuated at the cessation of hostilities, all mines on roads or railway tracts, all minefields and other devices for interrupting communications by road or rail must be rendered inactive and harmless.

9.—Within a period of 8 days from the cessation of hostilities, prisoners and Italian subjects interned in Austria-Hungary must cease all work, except in the case of prisoners and interned who have been employed in agricultural pursuits previous to the day on which the Armistice was signed. In any case they must be ready to leave at once on request of the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army.

10.—Austria-Hungary must provide for the protection, safety and supplies (expenses of these to be repaid) of the various Commissions selected by the Allied Governments to take over war material and to exercise general control, whether in the territory to be evacuated or in any other part of Austria-Hungary.

II.—NAVAL CLAUSES.

1.—The hour for the cessation of hostilities by sea will be the same as that of the cessation of hostilities by land and air.

Before that time the Austro-Hungarian Government must have furnished the Italian Government, and those of the Associated Powers, with the necessary information concerning the position and movements of the Austro-Hungarian ships, through the Wireless Station at Pola, which will transmit the information to Venice.

2.—The units referred to in Articles II and III, to be surrendered to the Associated Powers, must return to Venice between 8 a.m. and 3 p.m. on 6th November; they will take a pilot on board 14 miles from the coast. An exception is made as regards the Danube monitors, which will be required to proceed to a port indicated by the Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Associated Powers on the Balkan front, under such conditions as he may determine.

3.—The following ships will proceed to Venice :

<i>Teghethoff.</i>	<i>Saida.</i>
<i>Prinz Eugen.</i>	<i>Novara.</i>
<i>Ferdinand Max.</i>	<i>Helgoland.</i>

Nine destroyers of *Tatra* type (at least 800 tons) of most recent construction.

Twelve torpedo-boats (200-ton type).

Minelayer *Chamaleon*.

Fifteen submarines built between 1910 and 1918, and all German submarines which are, or may eventually be, in Austro-Hungarian waters.

Premeditated damage, or damage occurring on board the ships to be surrendered will be regarded by the Allied Governments as a grave infringement of the present Armistice terms.

The *Lago di Garda* flotilla will be surrendered to the Associated Powers in the Port of Riva.

All ships not to be surrendered to the Associated Powers will be concentrated in the ports of Buccari and Spalato within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities.

4.—As regards the right of sweeping minefields and destroying barrages, the Austro-Hungarian Government guarantees to deliver the maps of minefields and barrages at Pola, Cattaro and Fiume to the Commander of the Port of Venice, and to the Admiral of the Fleet at Brindisi within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities, and within 96 hours of the cessation of hostilities, maps of minefields and barrages in the Mediterranean and Italian lakes and rivers, with additional notification of such minefields or barrages laid by order of the German Government as are within their knowledge.

Within the same period of 96 hours a similar communication concerning the Danube and the Black Sea will be delivered to the Commander of the Associated Forces on the Balkan front.

5.—The restitution of merchant ships belonging to the Associated Powers will take place within 96 hours of the cessation of hostilities, in accordance with the indications determined by each Associated Power, which will be transmitted to the Austro-Hungarian Government. The Associated Powers reserve to themselves the constitution of the Commission referred to in Article V, and of informing the Austro-Hungarian Government of its functions, and of the place in which it will meet.

6.—The naval base referred to in Article VI is Spalato.

7.—The evacuation referred to in Article VII will be effected within the period fixed for the retirement of the troops beyond the Armistice lines. There must be no damage to fixed, mobile or floating material in the ports.

Evacuation may be effected *via* the Lagoon canals by means of Austro-Hungarian boats which may be brought in from outside.

8.—The occupation referred to in Article VIII will take place within 48 hours of the cessation of hostilities.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities must guarantee the safety of vessels transporting troops for the occupation of Pola and of islands

and other places as provided for in the terms of the Armistice for the Land Army.

The Austro-Hungarian Government will give directions that the ships belonging to Associated Powers proceeding to Pola should be met 14 miles out by pilots capable of showing them the safest way into port. All damage to the persons or property of the Associated Powers will be regarded as a grave infringement of the present Armistice terms.

The undersigned duly authorized Plenipotentiaries have signified their approval of the above conditions.

3rd November, 1918.

*Representatives of the Supreme
Command of the Austro-Hun-
garian Army.*

VICTOR WEBER EDLER VON
WEBENAU.
KARL SCHNELLER.
Y. VON LIECHTENSTEIN.
J. V. NYÉKHEGYI.
ZWIERKOWSKI.
VICTOR, FREIHERR VON SEILLER.
KAMILLO RUGGERA.

*Representatives of the Supreme
Command of the Italian Army.*

Ten. Gen. PIETRO BADOGLIO.
Magg. Gen. SCIPIONE SCIPIONI.
Colonn. TULLIO MARCHETTI.
Colonn. PIETRO GAZZERA.
Colonn. PIETRO MARAVIGNA.
Colonn. ALBERTO PARIANI.
Cap. Vasc. FRANCESCO ACCINNI.

TEXT OF MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND HUNGARY

Signed at Belgrade, 13th November, 1918.

MILITARY CONVENTION REGULATING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH
THE ARMISTICE, SIGNED BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND AUSTRIA-
HUNGARY, IS TO BE APPLIED IN HUNGARY.

1.—The Hungarian Government will withdraw all troops north of a line drawn through the upper valley of the Szamos, Bistritz, Maros-Vásárhely, the river Maros to its junction with the Theiss, Maria-Theresiopel, Baja, Fünfkirchen (these places not being occupied by Hungarian troops), course of the Drave, until it coincides with the frontier of Slavonia-Croatia.

The evacuation to be carried out in 8 days, the Allies to be entitled to occupy the evacuated territory on the conditions laid down by the General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies. Civil Administration will remain in the hands of the Government.

In actual fact only the police and gendarmerie will be retained in the evacuated zone, being indispensable to the maintenance of order, and also such men as are required to ensure the safety of the railways.

2.—Demobilization of Hungarian naval and military forces. An exception will be made in the case of six infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions, required for the maintenance of internal order and in the case of small sections of police mentioned in paragraph 1.

3.—The Allies to have the right of occupying all places and strategic points, which may be permanently fixed by the General Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

The Allied troops to be allowed to pass through, or to remain in any part of Hungary.

The Allies to have permanent right of use, for military purposes, of all rolling stock and shipping belonging to the State or to private individuals resident in Hungary, also of all draught animals.

4.—The rolling stock and railway staff usually employed in the occupied territory will remain (*see* paragraph 1), and a reserve of 2,000 wagons and 100 locomotives (normal gauge), and 600 wagons and 50 locomotives (narrow gauge), will also be handed over within the month to the General Commander-in-Chief. These will be for the use of the Allied troops, and to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia due to the war. Some portion of this material could be levied from Austria. The figures are approximate.

5.—The ships and crews, usually employed in the service of the occupied territory will remain, in addition to monitors will be surrendered to the Allies immediately at Belgrade. The rest of the Danube flotilla will be assembled in one of the Danube ports, to be appointed later by the General Commander-in-Chief, and will be disarmed there. A levy of 10 passenger vessels, 10 tugs, and 60 lighters will be made on this flotilla as soon as possible for the use of the Allied troops, to compensate for the deficiency of material from Serbia, due to the war. The figures are approximate.

6.—Within 15 days a detachment of 3,000 men from the railway technical troops are to be placed at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief supplied with the material necessary to repair the Serbian railways. These figures are approximate.

7.—Within 15 days a detachment of sappers of the Telegraph branch are to be placed at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief provided with material necessary for establishing telegraphic and telephone communications with Serbia.

8.—Within one month, 25,000 horses are to be placed at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief, together with such transport material as he may deem necessary. These figures are approximate.

9.—Arms and war material to be deposited at places appointed by the General Commander-in-Chief. A portion of this material will be levied for the purpose of supplying units to be placed under the orders of the General Commander-in-Chief.

10.—Immediate liberation of all Allied prisoners of war and interned civilians, who will be collected at places convenient for their despatch by rail; they will there receive directions as to time and place of repatriation, according to the orders issued by the General Commander-in-Chief. Hungarian prisoners of war to be provisionally retained.

11.—A delay of 15 days is granted for the passage of German troops through Hungary and their quartering meanwhile, dating from the signing of the Armistice by General Diaz (4th November, 3 p.m.). Postal and telegraphic communication with Germany will

only be permitted under the military control of the Allies. The Hungarian Government undertakes to allow no military telegraphic communication with Germany.

12.—Hungary will facilitate the supplying of the Allied troops of occupation; requisitions will be allowed on condition that they are not arbitrary, and that they are paid for at current rates.

13.—The situation of all Austro-Hungarian mines in the Danube and the Black Sea must be communicated immediately to the General Commander-in-Chief. Further, the Hungarian Government undertakes to stop the passage of all floating mines sown in the Danube up stream from the Hungarian and Austrian frontier and to remove all those actually in Hungarian waters.

14.—The Hungarian postal service, telegraphs, telephones and railways will be placed under Allied control.

15.—An Allied representative will be attached to the Hungarian Ministry of Supplies in order to safeguard Allied interests.

16.—Hungary is under an obligation to cease all relations with Germany and stringently to forbid the passage of German troops to Roumania.

17.—The Allies shall not interfere with the internal administration of affairs in Hungary.

18.—Hostilities between Hungary and the Allies are at an end.

Two copies made 13th November, 1918, at 11.15 p.m. at Belgrade.

Signed for the Allies by the delegates of the General Commander-in-Chief.

VOIVODE MISHITCH.
GENERAL HENRYS.

Signed for Hungary by the delegate of the Hungarian Government.

BÉLA LINDER.

PART III

THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION WITH BULGARIA

Signed September 29, 1918.

I.—Immediate evacuation, in conformity with an arrangement to be concluded, of the territories still occupied in Greece and Serbia. There shall be removed from these territories neither cattle, grain, nor stores of any kind. No damage shall be done

I.—Évacuation immédiate conformément à un arrangement à intervenir des territoires encore occupés en Grèce et en Serbie. Il ne sera enlevé de ces territoires ni bétail, ni grain, ni approvisionnement quelconque. Aucun dégât ne sera fait au départ.

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on departure. The Bulgarian Administration shall continue to exercise its functions in the parts of Bulgaria at present occupied by the Allies.

II.—Immediate demobilization of all Bulgarian armies, save for the maintenance on a war footing of a group of all arms, comprising three divisions of sixteen battalions each and four regiments of cavalry, which shall be thus disposed: two divisions for the defence of the Eastern frontier of Bulgaria and of the Dobrudja, and the 148th Division for the protection of the railways.

III.—Deposit, at points to be indicated by the High Command of the Armies of the East, of the arms, ammunition, and military vehicles belonging to the demobilized units which shall thereafter be stored by the Bulgarian authorities, under the control of the Allies.

The horses likewise will be handed over to the Allies.

IV.—Restoration to Greece of the material of the IVth Greek Army Corps, which was taken from the Greek army at the time of the occupation of Eastern Macedonia, in so far as it has not been sent to Germany.

V.—The units of the Bulgarian troops at the present time west of the meridian of Uskub, and belonging to the XIth German Army, shall lay down their arms and shall be considered until further notice to be prisoners of war. The officers shall retain their arms.

VI.—Employment by the Allied armies of Bulgarian prisoners of war in the East until the conclusion of peace, without reciprocity as regards Allied prisoners of war. These latter shall be handed over without delay to

L'Administration bulgare continuera à fonctionner dans les parties de Bulgarie actuellement occupées par les Alliés.

II.—Démobilisation immédiate de toutes les armées bulgares, sauf en ce qui concerne le maintien en état de combattre d'un groupe de toutes armes comprenant trois divisions de seize bataillons chacune, quatre régiments de cavalerie qui seront affectés, deux divisions à la défense de la frontière est de la Bulgarie et de la Dobroudja, et la 148^e Division pour la garde des voies ferrées.

III.—Dépôt en des points à désigner par le Haut Commandement des Armées d'Orient, des armes, des munitions, véhicules militaires appartenant aux éléments démobilisés, qui seront ensuite emmagasinés par les soins des autorités bulgares et sous le contrôle des Alliés.

Les chevaux seront également remis aux Alliés.

IV.—Remise à la Grèce du matériel du IV^e Corps d'Armée grec pris à l'armée grecque au moment de l'occupation de la Macédoine orientale, en tant qu'il n'a pas été envoyé en Allemagne.

V.—Les éléments de troupes bulgares actuellement à l'ouest du méridien d'Uskub et appartenant à la XI^e Armée allemande déposeront les armes et seront considérés jusqu'à nouvel ordre comme prisonniers de guerre; les officiers conserveront leurs armes.

VI.—Emploi jusqu'à la paix par les Armées alliées des prisonniers bulgares en Orient sans réciprocité en ce qui concerne les prisonniers de guerre alliés. Ceux-ci seront remis sans délai aux autorités alliées et les déportés civils seront

the Allied authorities, and deported civilians shall be entirely free to return to their homes.

VII.—Germany and Austria-Hungary shall have a period of four weeks to withdraw their troops and military organizations. Within the same period the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Central Powers, as also their nationals, must leave the territory of the Kingdom. Orders for the cessation of hostilities shall be given by the signatories of the present convention.

(Signed)

General FRANCHET D'ESPEREY.
ANDRÉ LIAPCHEF.
E. T. LOUKOF.

General Headquarters,
September 29, 1918, 10.50 p.m.

complètement libres de rentrer dans leurs foyers.

VII.—L'Allemagne et l'Autriche-Hongrie auront un délai de quatre semaines pour retirer leurs troupes et leurs organes militaires. Dans le même délai, devront quitter le territoire du Royaume les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires des Puissances centrales ainsi que leurs nationaux. Les ordres pour la cessation des hostilités seront donnés par les signataires de la présente convention.

(Signé)

Général FRANCHET D'ESPEREY.
ANDRÉ LIAPCHEF.
E. T. LOUKOF.

Général Quartier-général,
le 29 septembre 1918,
22 heures 50.

THE ARMISTICE CONVENTION WITH TURKEY¹

Signed October 30, 1918.

I.—Opening of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and secure access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

II.—Positions of all minefields, torpedo-tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters to be indicated, and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required.

III.—All available information as to mines in the Black Sea to be communicated.

IV.—All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned persons and prisoners to be collected in Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to the Allies.

V.—Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army, except for such troops as are required for the surveillance of the frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order. (Number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.)

VI.—Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkey; these ships to be interned at such Turkish

¹ The original of this convention was signed in English.

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port or ports as may be directed, except such small vessels as are required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

VII.—The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

VIII.—Free use by the Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use to the enemy. Similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army.

IX.—Use of all ship-repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

X.—Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

XI.—Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish troops from North-West Persia to behind the pre-war frontier has already been ordered and will be carried out. Part of Trans-Caucasia has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops; the remainder is to be evacuated if required by the Allies after they have studied the situation there.

XII.—Wireless telegraphy and cable stations to be controlled by the Allies, Turkish Government messages excepted.

XIII.—Prohibition to destroy any naval, military, or commercial material.

XIV.—Facilities to be given for the purchase of coal and oil fuel, and naval material from Turkish sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material to be exported.

XV.—Allied Control Officers to be placed on all railways, including such portions of the Trans-Caucasian Railways as are now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batoum. Turkey will raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

XVI.—Surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied Commander; and the withdrawal of troops from Cicilia, except those necessary to maintain order, as will be determined under Clause V.

XVII.—Surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies and communication with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.

XVIII.—Surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

XIX.—All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from the Turkish dominions: those in remote districts to be evacuated as soon after as may be possible.

XX.—The compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of the equipment, arms, and ammunition, including transport, of that portion of the Turkish Army which is demobilized under Clause V.

XXI.—An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish Ministry of Supplies in order to safeguard Allied interests. This representative is to be furnished with all information necessary for this purpose.

XXII.—Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners over military age to be considered.

XXIII.—Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

XXIV.—In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.

XXV.—Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, on Thursday, 31st October, 1918.

Signed in duplicate on board His Britannic Majesty's Ship *Agamemnon*, at Port Mudros, Lemnos, the 30th October, 1918.

(Signed) ARTHUR CALTHORPE.
 HUSSEIN RAOUF.
 RECHAD HIKMET.
 SAADULLAH.

APPENDIX VI

ORGANIZATION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE FOR THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TREATIES

It is impossible here to give full details of the organization, and would, in fact, be misleading; for the *personnel* and the duties of many of the various bodies varied considerably at different times, but the following details may be of value :

I. THE CONFERENCE

President.

Georges Clemenceau (France).

Vice-Presidents.

Hon. Robert Lansing (U.S.A.).

The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George (British Empire).

M. V. E. Orlando (Italy).

Marquis Saionji (Japan).

Secretariat General.

M. P. Dutasta (France).

Paul Mantoux (France).

(i) *Committee for Verification of Powers.*

Hon. H. White (U.S.A.).

The Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour (British Empire).

Jules Cambon (France).

Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi (Italy).

M. K. Matsui (Japan).

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(ii) *Drafting Commission.*

James Brown Scott (U.S.A.).
 C. J. B. Hurst (British Empire).
 M. Fromageot (France).
 A. Ricci Busatti (Italy).
 H. Nagaoka (Japan).

(iii) *Committee which drafted Answer to German Note sent 16th June, 1919.*

André Tardieu (France).
 W. Hudson (U.S.A.).
 Philip Kerr (British Empire).
 Count Vannutelli-Rey (Italy).
 M. Saburi (Japan).

II. THE CONFERENCE IN PLENARY SESSION

United States	5 seats.
Great Britain	5 "
Canada	2 "
Australia	2 "
South Africa	2 "
New Zealand	1 "
India	2 "
British Empire	Total 14 "
France	5 "
Italy	5 "
Japan	5 "

The representatives of the other States sat in alphabetical order.
 The following had three seats each :

Belgium.	Brazil.	Serbia (Yugoslavia).
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The following had two seats each :

China.	Hedjaz.	Rumania.
Czecho-Slovakia.	Poland.	Siam.
Greece.	Portugal.	

The following had one seat each :

Bolivia.	Haiti.	Panama.
Cuba.	Honduras.	Peru.
Ecuador.	Liberia.	Uruguay.
Guatemala.	Nicaragua.	

Note.—The names of Plenipotentiaries are prefixed to the Text of the German Treaty (*v.* Vol. III). China did not sign the German Treaty.

III. SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ALLIES.

<i>United States</i>	The President of the United States. Hon. Robert Lansing.
<i>British Empire</i>	The Right Hon. D. Lloyd George. The Right Hon. A. J. Balfour.

<i>France</i>	Georges Clemenceau. Monsieur Pichon.
<i>Italy</i>	V. E. Orlando. ¹ Baron Sonnino.
<i>Japan</i>	Marquis Saionji. Baron Makino.

Secretariat.

<i>France</i>	Monsieur P. Dutasta.
<i>United States</i>	Joseph Clark Grew.
<i>British Empire</i>	Lieut.-Col. Sir Maurice Hankey (succeeded by Mr. H. Norman).
<i>Italy</i>	Count L. Aldrovandi.
<i>Japan</i>	Sadao Saburi.

This organization was superseded at the end of March 1919 by the 'Big Four', though the 'Five' (the Foreign Ministers) prepared business and took important decisions, subject to the approval of the 'Four'.² The 'Ten' still met occasionally for formal purposes. On the departure of two of the 'Four' on the 28th June, the Council of 'Five' became the Supreme Council. M. Clemenceau attended these meetings as President of the Conference, while M. Pichon acted as French representative. In July Mr. Polk succeeded Mr. Lansing as the American member of the 'Five', and in September Sir Eyre Crowe succeeded Mr. Balfour as the British member of the 'Five'. In December Signor Scialoja succeeded Signor Tittoni as Italian representative, and Mr. Polk left for America, so that the United States was not represented by a Plenipotentiary. The Council of 'Five' was at times superseded by a Council of Prime Ministers, including an American Plenipotentiary, but it sat *en permanence* at Paris as the Supreme Council until the 21st January, 1920, when Clemenceau resigned, and the Supreme Council as such formally ended. It was succeeded by the Ambassadors' Council, consisting of the American, British, Italian, and Japanese ambassadors at Paris and of a French representative. This body sits at Paris, and its function appears to be to execute the conditions of the German Treaty, and it will probably be used to execute all others. For all important matters the Supreme Council can be revived either as a meeting of Foreign Secretaries or of Prime Ministers, when occasion demands. But it appears to have terminated its existence as a body sitting *en permanence* at Paris. Since the 21st January, 1920, it has met in London and at San Remo, and Mr. Lloyd George has been its official head.

¹ On the 28th June, at the signing of the Treaty with Germany, MM. Nitti and Tittoni had already superseded the others, but as they had not arrived, Baron Sonnino, the Marquis Imperiali, and M. Crespi signed for them. M. Tittoni took his place immediately after as one of the 'Five'.

² During the early sessions of the 'Four', which began at the end of March, Monsieur Mantoux alone was present. Subsequently, he acted as interpreter, and Sir M. Hankey as secretary, to the 'Four'.

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IV. COUNCILS SUBSIDIARY TO THE SUPREME COUNCIL

(1) *The Supreme War Council (S.W.C.).*

<i>United States</i>	General Tasker H. Bliss.
<i>Great Britain</i>	General Sackville-West.
<i>France</i>	General Belin.
<i>Italy</i>	General Cavallero.

Note.—This body formally came to an end on the 10th January, 1920, but a permanent War Council of the representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy has been formed. *v.* Vol. II, Chap. 2, Part i, p. 140, note.

(2) *The Supreme Economic Council (S.E.C.)*, succeeding the Inter-Allied Supreme Council for Supply and Relief, appointed the 11th January, 1919. The S.E.C. was constituted on the 8th February, 1919 (first meeting 17th February), of five members of each of the Four Powers. The presidency was held in turn by a representative of each nation. There were the following sections:

- (i) *Food and Relief.* President: H. Hoover (U.S.A.).
- (ii) *Finance.* President: Norman H. Davis (U.S.A.).
- (iii) *Means of Communication.* President: General H. O. Mance (British Empire).
- (iv) *Raw Materials.* President: M. Loucheur (France).
- (v) *Superior Blockade Council.* President: Vance McCormick (U.S.A.).
- (vi) *Shipping, Allied Maritime Transport Executive.* President: Kemball Cooke (British Empire).
- (vii) *Urgent Business.* President: Bernard M. Baruch (U.S.A.).

Note.—The American representatives on the S.E.C. withdrew after the 1st August, 1919. For later developments *v.* Vol. I, Chap. 8, Part iii, § 5. A Belgian representative was added after the first few meetings.

V. COMMISSIONS

- (1) *League of Nations.* (Plenary Session, 25th January, 1919.)¹ The *personnel* of this is given in League of Nations Documents, Appendix II, Part III, Vol. III.
- (2) *Responsibility for War and Guarantees.* (Plenary Session of 25th January, 1919.)
President, Hon. Robert Lansing (U.S.A.).
 - (i) Sub-committee—*Criminal Acts.*
President, Rt. Hon. W. F. Massey (New Zealand).
 - (ii) Sub-committee—*Responsibility for the War.*
President, Sir E. Pollock (British Empire).
 - (iii) Sub-committee—*Responsibility for violation of laws and customs of War.*
President, Hon. R. Lansing (U.S.A.).

¹ These dates may be taken roughly as indicating the time at which the commissions became of importance at the Conference.

- (3) *Reparation for Damage.* (Plenary Session, 25th January, 1919.)
President, L. L. Klotz (France).
Vice-Presidents, Right Hon. W. M. Hughes (Australia); M. van der Heuvel (Belgium).
- (i) Sub-committee—*Estimation of Damages.*
President, Right Hon. Lord Sumner (British Empire).
Vice-President, E. Chiesa (Italy).
- (ii) Sub-committee—*Inquiry into the financial capacity of Enemy States, means of payment and reparation.*
President, Right Hon. the Lord Cunliffe (British Empire).
Vice-President, M. Loucheur (France).
- (iii) Sub-committee.
President, Right Hon. W. M. Hughes (British Empire).
Vice-President, Bernard M. Baruch (U.S.A.).
- (4) *International Labour Legislation.* (Plenary Session, 25th January, 1919.)
President, Samuel Gompers (U.S.A.).
Vice-Presidents, Right Hon. G. N. Barnes (British Empire); M. Colliard (France).
- (5) *International Control of Ports, Waterways, and Railways.* (Plenary Session, 25th January, 1919.) *v. also Vol. II, Chap. 1, Part v, for list of personnel.*
President, M. Crespi (Italy).
Vice-President, The Hon. A. L. Sifton (Canada).
- (i) Sub-committee—*Questions relating to Transit.*
President, Hon. Henry White (U.S.A.).
Vice-President, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith (British Empire).
- (ii) Sub-committee—*Control of rivers, ports, and railways.*
President, André Weiss (France).

VI. FINANCIAL QUESTIONS

- (Sessions of Supreme Council, 23rd January–1st March, 1919.)
President, Right Hon. E. S. Montagu (British Empire).
Vice-Presidents, S. Crespi (Italy); Viscount S. Chinda (Japan).
- (i) Sub-committee—*Urgent problems relating to preliminaries of peace.*
President, S. Crespi (Italy).
- (ii) Sub-committee—*Dealing specially with monetary questions (in liaison with the Reparation Commission).*
President, M. Lepreux (Belgium).
- (iii) Sub-committee—*Enemy Debts.*
- (iv) Sub-committee—*Inter-Allied problems and project of Financial Section of League of Nations.*
President, L. L. Klotz (France).
- (v) Sub-committee—*Payment of Austro-Hungarian Coupons.*
President, Ed. Benes (Czecho-Slovakia).

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VII. ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

(Sessions of Supreme Council, 27th January—1st March, 1919.)

President, M. Clémentel (France).

1st Section, Permanent Commercial Relations.

President, Sir H. Llewellyn Smith (British Empire).

(i) Sub-committee—*Tariffs and Customs.*

President, Professor A. A. Young (U.S.A.).

(ii) Sub-committee—*Navigation.*

President, M. Bouisson (France).

(iii) Sub-committee—*Disloyal methods of Concurrence.*

President, W. Temple Franks (British Empire).

2nd Section.

(i) Sub-committee—*Industrial Property.*

President, W. Temple Franks (British Empire).

(ii) Sub-committee—*Pre-War Contrasts.*

President, Hon. C. J. Doherty (Canada).

(iii) Sub-committee—*Liquidation of Enemy Debts.*

President, M. Petit (France).

3rd Section. Ex enemy Aliens (Étrangers ex ennemis).

President, A. Ricci-Busatti (Italy).

4th Section. Abrogation and putting into force of Treaties.

President, M. C. Drogani (Italy).

VIII. AERONAUTIC.

(Session of Supreme Council, 12th March, 1919.)

President, Colonel Dhé (France).

(i) Sub-committee—*Military.*

President, Brig.-Gen. P. B. C. Groves (British Empire).

Vice-President, Gen. of Brig. Tanaka (Japan).

(ii) Sub-committee—*Technical.*

President, Lieut.-Col. A. D. Butterfield (U.S.A.).

Vice-President, Captain S. Fiuzzi (Italy).

(iii) Sub-committee—*Legal, Commercial, and Financial.*

President, M. D'Aubigny (France).

Vice-President, M. H. White-Smith (British Empire).

IX. TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

(Session of Supreme Council, 27th March, 1919.)

(a) *Central Co-ordinating Commission on Territorial Questions.*

President, M. André Tardieu (France).

Vice-Presidents, Marquis G. F. Salvago Raggi (Italy); Doctor S. E. Mezes (U.S.A.); Sir Eyre Crowe (British Empire); M. Otchiai (Japan).

(b) *Committee for Protection of Minorities in 'New' and other States.*

(Appointed 1st May, 1919.)

President, M. Berthelot (France).

Commissions.

1. *Czecho-Slovakia.* (Session of Supreme Council, 5th February, 1919.)
President, Jules Cambon (France).
2. *Polish Affairs.*
 - (a) *Inter-Allied Mission sent to Poland.* (Session of Supreme Council, 29th January, 1919.)
President, M. Noulens (France).
 - (b) *Permanent Inter-Allied Committee for Teschen.* (Session of Supreme Council, 31st January, 1919.)
President, M. Grenard (France).
 - (c) *Permanent Committee of Polish Affairs, Paris.* (Session of Supreme Council, 12th and 26th February, 1919.)
President, Jules Cambon (France).
3. *Rumanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.* (Sessions of Supreme Council, 1st and 18th February, 1919.)
President, André Tardieu (France).
Vice-President, G. Martino (Italy).
4. *Greek and Albanian Affairs.* (Sessions of Supreme Council, 5th and 24th February, 1919.)
President, Jules Cambon (France), succeeded, July, by A. Tardieu.
Vice-President, Right Hon. Sir R. Borden (Canada).
5. *Belgian and Danish Affairs.* (Sessions of Supreme Council, 12th and 21st February, 1919.)
President, André Tardieu (France).
Vice-President, Sir Eyre Crowe (British Empire).
6. *Saar Valley.* (Appointed 1st April.)
President, A. Tardieu (France).
Vice-Presidents, J. W. Headlam Morley (British Empire);
C. H. Haskins (U.S.A.).
7. *Alsace-Lorraine.* (Appointed 22nd April.)
Same as No. 6.

X. INTER-ALLIED NAVAL AND MILITARY COMMITTEE

(Session of Supreme Council, 12th February, 1919.)

President, Marshal Foch.

XI. CONTROL OF PRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIAL IN GERMANY FOR
DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY

(Session of Supreme Council, 24th January, 1919.)

No President.

The members were :

General J. J. Pershing (U.S.A.).
Right Hon. Winston Churchill (British Empire),
Marshal Foch (France).
M. Loucheur (France).
General A. Diaz (Italy).

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XII. SPECIFICATION OF WAR MATERIAL WHICH CAN BE DEMANDED FROM GERMANY TO PREVENT HER FROM RENEWING THE STRUGGLE

(Session of Supreme Council, 7th February, 1919.)
No President.

The members were :

Hon. R. Lansing (U.S.A.).
Right Hon. Viscount Milner (British Empire).
André Tardieu (France).
General U. Cavallero (Italy).

XIII. INQUIRY INTO MEANS FOR IMPOSING THE ARMISTICE ON GERMANY

(Session of Supreme Council, 10th February, 1919.)
President, Marshal Foch.

XIV. DRAFTING COMMISSION FOR THE MILITARY, NAVAL, AND AIR CONDITIONS OF THE ARMISTICE

President, General Dégoutte (France).

XV. MOROCCO

(Session of Supreme Council, 28th March, 1919.)
President, De Peretti de la Rocca (Italy).

XVI. SUBMARINE CABLES

(Session of Supreme Council, 7th March, 1919.)
President, M. Fromageot (France).

AUSTRIAN TREATY

The following Special Committees were appointed :

- (1) *Committee on Political Clauses.*
President, M. Laroche (France).
- (2) *Committee for Drafting Reply to Austrian Note.*
President, Jules Cambon (France).

Note.—On the above Commissions, Sub-committees, etc.,

France had	. 25	Presidents,	3	Vice-Presidents
United States	. 13	”	1	”
British Empire	. 11	”	8	”
Italy	. 9	”	7	”
Japan	. —	”	3	”
Belgium	. —	”	2	”
Czecho-Slovakia	. 1	”	—	”

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